Designing Inspector Rosters with Optimal Strategies

Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-61123
  • We consider the problem of enforcing a toll on a transportation network with limited inspection resources. We formulate a game theoretic model to optimize the allocation of the inspectors, taking the reaction of the network users into account. The model includes several important aspects for practical operation of the control strategy, such as duty types for the inspectors. In contrast to an existing formulation using flows to describe the users' strategies we choose a path formulation and identify dominated user strategies to significantly reduce the problem size. Computational results suggest that our approach is better suited for practical instances.

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Author:Stephan Schwartz, Thomas Schlechte, Elmar Swarat
Document Type:ZIB-Report
Date of first Publication:2016/11/21
Series (Serial Number):ZIB-Report (16-65)