A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks
Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995
- We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
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| Author: | Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Bertrand Omont, Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat |
|---|---|
| Document Type: | ZIB-Report |
| Tag: | Controls in transportation networks; Polymatrix game; Stackelberg game |
| MSC-Classification: | 90-XX OPERATIONS RESEARCH, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING |
| Date of first Publication: | 2012/04/10 |
| Series (Serial Number): | ZIB-Report (12-15) |
| ISSN: | 1438-0064 |
| Published in: | A rev. vers. appeared in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012), volume 105 of Lecture Notes of the ICST, pp. 224 – 235, Vancouver, Canada, May 2012 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17 |
