Network Spot Checking Games:
Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks
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Abstract

We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of edges to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.

Keywords Game Theory; Stackelberg Equilibrium; Security Games; Mixed Integer Programming; Price of Anarchy

1 Introduction

In 2005 Germany introduced a distance-based toll for trucks weighing twelve tonnes or more in order to fund growing investments for maintenance and extensions of motorways. The enforcement of the toll is the responsibility of the German Federal Office for Goods Transport (BAG), who has the task to carry out a network-wide control. To this end, 300 vehicles make control tours on the entire motorway network. In this paper, we present some theoretical work obtained in the framework of our cooperation with the BAG, whose final goal is to develop an optimization tool to schedule the control tours of the inspectors. This real-world problem is subject to a variety of legal constraints, which we handle by mixed integer programming [3]. In a follow-up work, we plan to

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use randomized schedules generated by the game-theoretical approach of the present paper as an input for the real-world problem.

In this paper, we study from a game-theoretic point of view the problem of allocating inspectors to spatial locations of a transportation network, in order to enforce the payment of a transit toll. In a precedent version of this article which appeared as a conference paper [1], we have used a Stackelberg game to represent the applied problem evoked above. This article deals with a class of games called spot-checking (SC) games that generalizes our former approach. SC games can be thought as particular security games, in which the strategies of attackers and defenders are represented by a graph structure. Security games have been introduced by Kickintveld et. al. [8], to study problems where the goal is to randomize different kind of inspections, in a strategical way; this includes a work on the optimal selection of checkpoints and patrol routes to protect the LA Airport towards adversaries [10], a study of the scheduling and allocation of air marshals to a list of flights in the US [7], or the problem of optimally scheduling fare inspection patrols in LA Metro [12]. In a way, SC games are to security games as routing games (in which players choose a path on a network) are to congestion games (where players choose a subset of abstract congestible elements), see e.g. Roughgarden and Tardos [11]. Many practical situations can be represented by this new class of games, as will be seen in Section 4. In particular, it is also possible to take into account the moves of inspectors over the network over time.

Contrary to standard security games, the players of a spot-checking game might have a very large number of available strategies, arising from the multitude of origin-destination paths in a network. For our application to toll enforcement in a transportation network, this new model takes into account every possible detour that fare evaders could take to avoid frequently inspected sections. In contrast, previous approaches used the trivial topology of a single metro line [12], or assumed that each user takes the shortest path [2]. We represent the mixed strategies of network users by multicommodity flows, which yields a compact linear programming formulation for the computation of a Nash equilibrium, see Section 5.1. However, we argue that the inspector should rather commit to a Stackelberg equilibrium, but this strategy is much harder to compute. A mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation is given in Section 5.2.

Indeed, we show that the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium is NP-hard in Theorem 6.1. As a corollary, it is NP-hard to find a Stackelberg equilibrium in pairwise zero-sum polymatrix games. The principal novelty of this article concerns the price of spite of SC games, and is presented in Section 6.2. We give two bounds on this quantity—which is a measure of how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium (rather than a Stackelberg equilibrium)—cf. Proposition 6.5 and Theorem 6.6. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for the application to German motorways in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries and Notation

We first recall some basic notions of game theory. In a game with $N$ players where each player may choose a strategy $p_i$ in a set $\Delta_i$, and wishes to maximize her own payoff $u_i(p_i, p_{-i})$, we say that $p_i$ is a best response to the set $p_{-i} \equiv \{p_1, \ldots, p_{i-1}, p_{i+1}, \ldots, p_N\}$ of strategies of the other players if

$$\forall p'_i \in \Delta_i, \quad u_i(p'_i, p_{-i}) \leq u_i(p_i, p_{-i}).$$

We denote by $BR_i(p_{-i}) \subseteq \Delta_i$ the set of best responses to $p_{-i}$ for Player $i$. In the standard setting, the set $\Delta_i$ is a probability simplex $\{p \geq 0 : \sum_i p_i = 1\}$. In this article, we allow $\Delta_i$ to be polyhedral for convenience, but one could easily come back to the standard case by expressing $p \in \Delta_i$ as a convex combination of the extreme points of $\Delta_i$.

The best responses allow us to define the Nash equilibria (NE) of the game:

$$(p_1, \ldots, p_N) \text{ is a Nash equilibrium } \iff \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}, \quad p_i \in BR_i(p_{-i}).$$

In this paper we also study Stackelberg equilibria, which are arguably more adapted to the present class of spot-checking games because of the asymmetry between controllers and network users, and have already been used in similar applications [10, 7, 12]. In a Stackelberg game, it is assumed that a player is the leader (in our case, the inspector), who plays first, and the other players (called followers) react with a best response. If the leader of the game is denoted by the index 1, a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is a profile of strategies $p \equiv (p_1, \ldots, p_N)$ that maximizes the leader’s payoff, among the set of all profiles such that the followers’ strategies $p_{-1}$ are in best response relationship to each other’s action:

$$p_{eq} \text{ is a strong Stackelberg equilibrium } \iff p_{eq} \in \arg \max_{p \in \Delta_1 \times \ldots \times \Delta_N} u_1(p_1, p_{-1}).$$

In fact, in the class of spot-checking games that we define hereafter, $BR_i(p_{-i})$ depends only on the leader’s strategy $p_1$ for every follower ($i \neq 1$), see Proposition 3.1. We can hence denote by $BR(p_1) := BR_2(p_1) \times \ldots \times BR_N(p_1)$ the set of best response profiles for the followers to a leader’s action $p_1$, and the problem of finding an equilibrium reduces to the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{p_1 \in \Delta_1} \max_{p_{-1} \in BR(p_1)} u_1(p_1, p_{-1}). \quad (1)$$

Note that the definition implicitly implies that when a follower has several best response actions available, he will select one that favors the leader most.

We will also evoke polymatrix games in this article. A game is a polymatrix game if every payoff function can be written as

$$u_i(p_i, p_{-i}) = \sum_{j \neq i} p_i^T A_{ij} p_j$$

(2)
for some matrices $A_{ij}$. A polymatrix game is called pairwise zero-sum if $A_{ij} = -A_{ji}^T$ for all $i \neq j$. We refer the reader to [4] for more background on this topic.

**Notation** We next introduce the notation used in this article. When a directed graph $G = (V, E)$ and a list of weighted commodities $C := \{(s_k, d_k, x_k), k \in K\}$ are given, $F_k$ denotes the set of $(s_k, d_k)$-flows of unit value: for all $f \in \mathbb{R}_+^E$, $f \in F_k$ if and only if

$$
\sum_{e' \in \delta^+(v)} f_{e'} - \sum_{e \in \delta^-(v)} f_e = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } v = s_k; \\
-1 & \text{if } v = d_k; \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

(3)

We also denote by $F(C)$ the set of multicommodity flows satisfying a demand $x_k$ on commodity $k$, that is, $F(C) = \{\sum_{k \in K} x_k f_k : \forall k, f_k \in F_k\}$. Let $z_e$ represent the weight of an edge $e \in E$. We denote by $SP_k(z)$ the set of all $(s_k, d_k)$-shortest paths. Their length is denoted by $spl_k(z) = \sum_{e \in R} z_e$ (for all $R \in SP_k(z)$).

The elementwise (Hadamard) product of two vectors $u$ and $v$ is $u \circ v$, so that $(u \circ v)_i = u_i v_i$.

### 3 Spot-Checking Games

In this section we define the class of spot-checking games studied in this article. They generalize our approach of [2] and [1], and describe the interaction between the users of a toll network and an inspector (or Player 0), who represents all fare inspectors of the transportation network.

A spot checking game (SC game) $G = (G, C, W, Q, \alpha)$ is formally defined by the following elements:

- A directed graph $G = (V, E)$;
- A set of weighted commodities $C := \{(s_k, d_k, x_k), k \in K\}$, representing origin-destination pairs $(s_k, d_k) \in V^2$ with $x_k > 0$ users;
- A set of edge weights $W := \{(w_e, \beta_e, \sigma_e), e \in E\}$, representing
  - the total cost $w_e \geq 0$ for a user taking edge $e$;
  - a reward $\beta_e$ (resp. a penalty if $\beta_e < 0$) for the inspector for each user using edge $e$; this $\beta_e$ typically corresponds to a fare for taking edge $e$;
  - The expected amount $\sigma_e \geq 0$ of penalty for a user controlled on $e$. This can be interpreted as the amount of a fine, multiplied by the probability to be controlled on $e$ (conditionally to the presence of an inspector on $e$);
- A set $Q \subset [0, 1]^E$ described by linear inequalities, representing possible distributions of the inspectors over the edges of the graph. The quantity $q_e$ corresponds to the probability that some inspector is present on edge $e$;
A fraction $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ of penalties to be considered in the inspector’s payoff.

At first sight, it may seem odd that every controlled user gets fined. The reason behind is that the strategy of any user is completely represented by his path in the network. Typically, every edge of the network is either a pay-edge, where $\sigma_e = 0$ and the reward $\beta_e > 0$ corresponds to a toll fare, which is included in the user costs ($w_e \geq \beta_e$). Or the edge is an evasion edge, where the reward is $\beta_e \leq 0$ and the expected fine is $\sigma_e > 0$. In other words, paying a fare and getting fined exclude each other. We refer the reader to Section 4 for more details and examples on how to model practical situations using SC games.

**Inspector’s strategy** In the simplest variant of the problem, there are $\gamma$ teams of controllers over the network, who can each control an edge $e \in E$. The set $S$ of pure strategies for the inspector hence corresponds to the subsets $S$ of $E$ of cardinality $\gamma$. The inspectors commit to a mixed strategy $\tilde{q}$, i.e. for all $S \in S$, $\tilde{q}_S$ indicates the probability of allocating one team of inspectors on each of the $\gamma$ edges $e \in S$. In practice, we will see that our model only depends on the marginals $q_e = \sum_{\{S \in S : S \ni e\}} \tilde{q}_S$, which represent the probability that team of inspectors is present on edge $e$. It is easy to see that the marginal strategy $q$ satisfies

$$\sum_{e \in E} q_e = \gamma,$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$$\forall e \in E, \ 0 \leq q_e \leq 1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

Conversely, if we are given a vector $q$ satisfying Equations (4) and (5), we can find a mixed strategy $\tilde{q}$ whose marginal equals $q$. To see this, one can notice that the set of extreme points of the polyhedron $Q$ defined by Equations (4) and (5) coincide with the set of pure strategies $S$. More evolved strategy sets $Q$ for the inspector, taking into account the moves of controllers over time, will be discussed in §4.3.

**User flows and payoffs** For a given inspection strategy $q \in Q$, the loss of every user who selects a path $R$ over the graph $G$ is $\sum_{e \in R} w_e + \sigma_e q_e$, where the first term accounts for travel and toll costs, while the second term is the expected fine. Note that we do as if evaders could be fined several times; in practice, this is only a simplifying assumption, since in most toll networks fare evaders can be fined only once (fine receipts count as a valid proof of payment). For a reasonable number of controllers, our results show that the probability of being controlled more than once is very small, though. A similar approximation has been used in [12] and [2].

We associate the users of commodity $k$ with a single player (called Player $k$). Her mixed strategy represents the distribution of $k$–users over the $(s_k, d_k)$–paths, and forms a flow $p^k \in F_k$. We denote by $p = \sum_k x_k p^k \in F(C)$ the multicommodity flow of all network users. The payoff of Player $k$ is:

$$\text{Payoff}_k(p, q) := - \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (w_e + \sigma_e q_e).$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)
The total payoff of the inspector is obtained by summing the collected rewards and penalties, and depend on the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ of the game $\mathcal{G}$:

$$\text{Payoff}_0(p, q) := \sum_k x_k \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (\beta_e + \alpha \sigma_e q_e)$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\beta_e + \alpha \sigma_e q_e). \tag{7}$$

The extreme values of $\alpha$ correspond to two important situations. If $\alpha = 1$, the payoff defined in (7) corresponds to the total revenues from rewards and penalties, a setting which we denote by MAXPROFIT. If $\alpha = 0$, the inspector’s payoff comes from the fares only (assuming that the reward $\beta_e$ is a fare for edge $e$). This setting, which we call MAXTOLL, might be well suited if the goal is solely to enforce the payment of a fare. In contrast, with MAXPROFIT it might be advantageous to have a bit of evasion on certain commodities, in order to earn money from fines. The parameter $\alpha$ may be seen as a parameter weighting the objectives of MAXTOLL and MAXPROFIT, for the scalarization of a bi-objective problem.

**Users’ best responses** Observe that the payoff of any user does not depend on the strategy of other users (because we ignore congestion effects). An important consequence of Equation (6) is a characterization of the best responses of Player $k$ to the inspector’s strategy $q$, in terms of shortest path in $G$. We denote by $\mathcal{B}R(q) \subseteq F(\mathcal{C})$ the set of users’ best response multicommodity flows obtained thereby.

**Proposition 3.1.** Let $q \in Q$ be a strategy of the inspector. A strategy $p^k$ for Player $k$ is a best response to $q$ if and only if $-\text{Payoff}_k(p, q) = \text{spl}_k(w + \sigma \circ q)$. In other words, best responses for Player $k$ are flows supported by $\text{SP}_k(w + \sigma \circ q)$.

**Proof.** If $p^k$ is a flow of unit value through commodity $k$, then $-\text{Payoff}_k(p, q) = \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (w_e + q_e \sigma_e)$ corresponds to the expected length for Player $k$ from $s_k$ to $d_k$ in the weighted graph with weights $w_e + \sigma_e q_e$. This expression is minimized if and only if the flow $p^k$ uses only shortest paths. \hfill $\Box$

**Remark 3.2.** We plan to investigate an extension of SC games with congestion in a follow-up work. Note that the number of agents using edge $e$ can have an influence on both the travel time (and hence the costs $w_e$) and the probability to be controlled (and hence the expected penalty $\sigma_e$).

### 4 Handling Practical Situations with SC Games

The general model introduced in the previous section can be used to model a variety of practical situations. We next review important examples inspired from real-world applications.
4.1 A transit network model

We start by showing that the model used in the conference paper [1] at the origin of this article can be cast as a SC game. Here, the network users are assumed to travel over a network \( G_0 = (V_0, E_0) \) with edge costs \( w_e \) and expected penalties \( \sigma_e \) (conditionally to the presence of a controller on edge \( e \)). For a given commodity \((s_k, d_k, x_k) \in C_0 \subset V_0 \times V_0 \times \mathbb{R}_+ \ (k \in K)\), Player \( k \) can either decide to pay a fare \( \tau_k \) (and in this case she will take the shortest path from \( s_k \) to \( d_k \)), or she can evade the fare and choose an arbitrary path from \( s_k \) to \( d_k \) in \( G_0 \).

To represent the strategies corresponding to paying the fare, we create a set of additional vertices \( \bar{V} \), containing a node \( \bar{s} \) for every source \( s \in S = \{s_k : k \in K\} \) and a node \( \bar{d} \) for every destination \( d \in D = \{d_k : k \in K\} \).

We then connect these new nodes by creating a set of dummy edges \( \bar{E} \), that contains

- an edge \( \bar{s} \rightarrow s \) for all \( s \in S \), which corresponds to the action of evading the fare, with all weights equal to zero: \( w_{\bar{s}s} = \beta_{\bar{s}s} = \sigma_{\bar{s}s} = 0 \);
- an edge \( d \rightarrow \bar{d} \) for all \( d \in D \), with all weights equal to zero as well;
- an edge \( \bar{e}_k = (\bar{s}_k, \bar{d}_k) \) for all \( k \in K \), which corresponds to the action of paying the fare. The user cost for taking this edge is defined by \( w_{\bar{e}_k} = \text{spl}_k(w) + \tau_k \), the inspector’s reward is \( \beta_{\bar{e}_k} = \tau_k \), and users cannot be fined on this edge (\( \sigma_{\bar{e}_k} = 0 \)).

By construction, the dummy toll edge \( \bar{e}_k = (\bar{s}_k, \bar{d}_k) \) can only be used by Player \( k \). The original edges \( e \in E_0 \) are taken by users evading the fare, so that the inspector’s reward \( \beta_e \) can be set to 0 on these edges; alternatively, \( \beta_e \) can be set to a negative value to penalize fare evasion in the inspector’s payoff. (It is also possible to penalize evasion on a per-user basis, by setting a negative reward on the dummy evasion edges \( s \rightarrow \bar{s} \).)

The SC game is obtained by considering the extended graph \( G = (V, E) \), where \( V = V_0 \cup \bar{V} \) and \( E = E_0 \cup \bar{E} \), as well as the set of extended commodities \( C = \{(\bar{s}_k, \bar{d}_k, x_k) : k \in K\} \). An example graph \( G_0 \) is represented together with its extension \( G \) and the associated edge weights in Figure 1.

4.2 Transportation networks with a distance-based toll

With the previous model, it is not possible to consider network users who pay the fare on a portion of their trip only. This is of particular relevance for the application mentioned in the introduction of this article. Indeed on the German motorways the transit fee is proportional to the distance. So crafty drivers might take the chance to pay the toll on a short portion of their trip only, where they know that the frequency of controls is high.

To represent users’ strategies in this situation, we shall now introduce a two-layer graph structure. Let \( G_0 = (V_0, E_0) \) represent the physical transportation network, and \( C_0 := \{(s_k, d_k, x_k) : k \in K\} \) be a list of weighted commodities. For
all $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $s_k$ and $d_k$ represent the origin and the destination of $k$. We denote by $l_e$ the length of edge $e \in E_0$ and by $f$ (resp. $b$) the toll rate (resp. the average basic costs such as e.g. fuel consumption) per kilometer. In addition, we assume that the expected penalty to pay on edge $e \in E_0$ is $\sigma_e$ (conditionally to the presence of a team of inspectors on $e$).

We create a set $V_1$, containing a vertex $v'$ for every $v \in V_0$, as well as a set $V$ of artificial start and destination nodes, containing a vertex $\bar{s}$ for every $s \in S = \{s_k : k \in \mathcal{K}\}$ and a vertex $\bar{d}$ for every $d \in D = \{d_k : k \in \mathcal{K}\}$. To connect these new vertices, we create the following sets of edges:

- $E_1 = \{(u', v') : \forall (u, v) \in E_0\}$;
- $E_s = \{(ar{s}, s), (\bar{s}, s') : \forall s \in S\}$;
- $E_d = \{(d, \bar{d}), (d', \bar{d}) : \forall d \in D\}$;
- $E_t = \{(v, v'), (v', v) : \forall v \in V_0\}$.

The edges of the level $E_1$ represent portions of a trip where the toll fee has been paid, while the matching edges in $E_0$ correspond to fare evasion. Transition edges $e \in E_t$ allow the users to switch between these two layers, at a cost $\theta$ that should be set to represent the reluctance of users to change strategy during a trip. Artificial edges of $E_s$ and $E_d$ ensure the connectivity of the new commodities $\mathcal{C} := \{(s_k, \bar{d}_k, x_k) : k \in \mathcal{K}\}$ with both layers. To sum up, the
different edge weights are defined by:

\[ \beta_e = \begin{cases} 
  f_l e & \text{if } e \in E_1; \\
  0 & \text{otherwise}, 
\end{cases} \]

\[ w_e = \begin{cases} 
  b l e & \text{if } e \in E_0; \\
  (b + f)l e & \text{if } e \in E_1; \\
  \theta & \text{if } e \in E_t; \\
  0 & \text{otherwise}, 
\end{cases} \]

and \( \sigma_e = 0 \) for all \( e \in E_0 \). A simple example of two-layer graph is depicted on Figure 2.

### 4.3 Spatio-temporal aspects

The models presented so far do not take time into account. This is an important challenge, since the inspectors must move along edges of the networks and their duties must not exceed a certain length. In consequence, the set \( Q \) defined by Equations (4) and (5) might not be well-suited to represent all possible marginal strategies of the inspector.

The authors of [12] have proposed to represent the duties of metro ticket inspectors by flows in an adapted graph. Their approach provides exact schedules for each inspector. More precisely, a strategy consists in a sequence of trains that the inspector must control at a given time. However, this very fine model might not be very robust to any kind of delays or incidents that can occur in the inspection process, so that the inspectors might not be able to follow the prescribed schedule. To cope with this problem, planners of the BAG (the authority in charge of fare inspections on the German motorways, cf. Section 1) allocate the inspectors to a set of predefined control areas, on which they must patrol during a given time interval, see [3]. The graph structure which we next present combines ideas of [3] and [12].

We consider a time discretization \( T = \{0, \ldots, T-1\} \) of the period of interest, typically one day, and we make the simplifying assumption that every network user starts and ends his trip within the same time window \( t \in T \). We
denote by $G_0 = (E_0, V_0)$ the graph representing the static problem (obtained e.g. by using the construction of § 4.1 or § 4.2), and we make a time extended graph $G = (V, E)$ which contains $T$ parallel copies of $G_0$: $V = V_0 \times T$ and $E = E_0 \times T$. A commodity $k$ in $G$ corresponds to a pair of nodes $(s_k, d_k) \in V^2$, such that $s_k = (u, t)$ and $d_k = (v, t)$ for a pair of nodes $(u, v) \in V_0^2$ and a time window $t \in T$.

A control area $S \in \mathcal{S}$ consists of a subset of edges $S \subset E_0$ (control areas might overlap). We create a graph $C = (S, A)$ which connects nearby control areas, i.e. $(S_i, S_j) \in A$ whenever it is possible for a team of inspectors to control $S_i$ at time $t$ and $S_j$ at $t + 1$. Again, we create a time extended version $D = (S \times T, \bar{A})$ of $C$, which we call the cyclic duty graph, as follows:

\[
\bar{A} = \left\{ [(S, t), (S, t + 1 \mod T)] : \forall S \in \mathcal{S} \right\} \\
\cup \left\{ [(S, t), (S', t + 1 \mod T) : \forall (S, S') \in A] \right\}.
\]

We have depicted in Figure 3 a simple example for a graph $C$ and the corresponding cyclic duty graph $D$. The inspectors’ duties can be represented by paths in $D$. In practice, duties have a prescribed length, for example 8 hours, which corresponds to paths of a certain length $L$ in $D$. With a simple construction, it is possible to create a modified duty graph $\tilde{D}$ with start and end depot nodes $d_s$ and $d_t$, that enjoys the property that every $(d_s, d_t)$—path corresponds to a path of length $L$ in $D$. Hence the mixed strategy of a single inspector can be represented by a $(d_s, d_t)$—flow of value one in $\tilde{D}$. We refer the reader to [12] for details about this construction.

Now, we assume that there are $\gamma$ teams of inspectors, as in the paragraph preceding Equation (4). The inspector’s strategy can hence be represented by

\[\text{Figure 3: Example for a graph } C \text{ connecting the control areas (lower right corner) and its associated cyclic duty graph } D \text{ (main drawing), for a time discretization of one day with } T = 6 \text{ time windows. The path highlighted in red represents the duty of a team controlling } S_4 \text{ during the morning, } S_5 \text{ at noon and } S_3 \text{ during the afternoon.}\]
a \((d_s, d_t)\)-flow \(\bar{q}\) of value \(\gamma\) in \(\tilde{D} = (\tilde{V}, \tilde{A})\):

\[
\forall v \in \tilde{V}, \sum_{a' \in \delta^+(v)} \bar{q}_{a'} - \sum_{a \in \delta^-(v)} \bar{q}_a = \begin{cases} 
\gamma & \text{if } v = d_s; \\
-\gamma & \text{if } v = d_t; \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

(8)

The vertex set of \(\tilde{D}\) is

\[
\tilde{V} = S \times T \times \{1, \ldots, L\} \cup \{d_s, d_t\},
\]

and similarly as in [12] it can be seen that the expected number of inspectors in the control area \(S \in S\) at time \(t\) is

\[
\hat{q}(S,t) = \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{a \in \delta^-(S,t,l)} \bar{q}_a.
\]

(9)

As a simple approximation we can assume that the inspectors are spread uniformly on all the arcs of a control area, so that the an inspector on the control area \(S\) is present on edge \(e \in S\) with probability

\[
\kappa_{e|S} = \frac{l_e}{\sum_{e' \in S} l_{e'}}
\]

where \(l_e\) denotes the length of edge \(e\). It follows that the expected number of inspectors on \(e \in E_0\) at time \(t\) is

\[
\sum_{\{S \in S: S \ni e\}} \kappa_{e|S} \hat{q}(S,t).
\]

If this quantity is smaller than one, it can be interpreted as the marginal probability \(q(e,t)\) to find an inspector team on the edge \((e,t) \in E\) of the time extended graph \(\tilde{G}\). To summarize, the set of marginal strategies \(Q\) of the inspector can be defined by:

\[
Q = \left\{ q \in (\mathbb{R}_+)^E : \exists \bar{q} \in (\mathbb{R}_+)^\tilde{A} \text{ s.t.}
\right. \\
(i) \quad \bar{q} \text{ satisfies the flow conservation (8)}; \\
(ii) \quad \forall (e,t) \in E, \\
q(e,t) \leq \sum_{(S \in S: S \ni e)} \kappa_{e|S} \sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{a \in \delta^-(S,t,l)} \bar{q}_a; \\
(iii) \quad \forall (e,t) \in E, \quad q(e,t) \leq 1 \}
\]

To conclude this section, we briefly mention some simple extensions that can be plugged in this model (by adapting the graph \(G \) or \(\tilde{D}\) in an intuitive fashion):

- Several side constraints can be added in the above definition of \(Q\). For example, the proportion of duties starting at night can be bounded from above, or we can bound from below the inspection frequency of some control areas to ensure a network-wide control.
• If all controllers do not start from the same location in the network, it is possible to consider several start and end depot nodes in the duty graph \( D \).

• The possibility for a user to advance or postpone her departure (in order to travel at a time with less controls) could be represented by adding edges in \( G \) that link the different time copies of \( G_0 \), with a cost \( \zeta \) for the delay.

We shall now return to the general model of SC games introduced in Section 3, and we study the problem of computing some equilibria for a generic game \( \mathcal{G} = (G, C, W, Q, \alpha) \).

5 Computation of Equilibria

The notion of equilibrium is essential in game theory. Depending on the ability of the players to observe the others’ actions, committing to a Nash or a Stackelberg equilibrium may be better suited [9]. However, there is a natural interpretation for the Stackelberg strategies of the inspector: the Stackelberg game model assumes that every user of the network plays with a best response to the inspector’s strategy \( q \). In particular, a Stackelberg strategy for MAXTOLL \((\alpha = 0)\) maximizes the (weighted) number of users who have an incentive to pay the fares (with weights corresponding to the fares). In fact, one can expect that many users are always honest and pay the network fares independently of the frequency of inspections. To some extent, the Stackelberg equilibrium can hence be considered as an approach to maximize the Inspector’s payoff in the worst case. This is not truly the worst-case situation, since network users could take only toll-free sections (in the case of a transit system for example, users could decide to walk), thus depriving the Inspector from all sources of profit. However, there is no reason to assume that network users want to minimize the Inspector’s payoff, and the Stackelberg approach guards ourselves from crafty behaviours.

5.1 Nash equilibria

We next show that the SC game \( \mathcal{G} \) can be transformed into a zero-sum game that has the same Nash equilibria.

**Proposition 5.1.** Let \( \mathcal{G} = (G, C, \{w, \beta, \sigma\}, Q, \alpha) \) be a SC game. If \( \alpha > 0 \), then \( \mathcal{G} \) has the same set of NE as the zero-sum game \( \mathcal{G}' = (G, C, \{w, w, \sigma\}, Q, 1) \), where the inspector’s rewards \( \beta_e \) have been replaced by the edge costs \( w_e \) and \( \alpha = 1 \). If \( \alpha = 0 \), \((p, q)\) is a NE for all \( q \in Q \) and \( p \in BR(q) \).

**Proof.** We start with the case \( \alpha > 0 \). First note that \( \mathcal{G}' \) is zero-sum indeed:

\[
\text{Payoff}_{\mathcal{G}}(p, q) + \sum_{k \in K} x_k \text{Payoff}_{k}(p, q) = 0.
\]
The NE are entirely defined by the set of best responses of every player. We are going to see that these sets coincide for \( G \) and \( G' \), from which the conclusion follows. The payoff of Player \( k \) is the same in both games, so \( BR_k(q) \) is the same in \( G \) and \( G' \). Now, the set of best responses for the inspector in \( G \) is

\[
BR^G_0(p) = \arg \max_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha \sigma_e q_e + \beta_e).
\]

For a fixed \( p \), let us add \( \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha w_e - \beta_e) \) in the function to maximize. This term does not depend on \( q \) and so it does not change the set of maximizers:

\[
BR^G_0(p) = \arg \max_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} \alpha \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\sigma_e q_e + w_e) = BR^{G'}_0(p).
\]

Finally, the case \( \alpha = 0 \) is trivial, because Payoff\(^G_0(p,q) \) does not depend on \( q \).

It is well known that a Nash equilibrium of 2-player zero-sum games can be computed by linear programming. In our case, the game \( G' \) has more than two players, but its special structure could allow us to formulate the game as a pairwise zero-sum polymatrix game, see [2], a class of games for which a Nash equilibrium can also be computed by linear programming, see [4]. However, the LP that we would obtain would have a constraint for each pure strategy of the network users, a number which might be exponentially large. To cope with this problem, we shall next exploit the flow representation of the users’ strategies and the shortest path characterization of best responses. This yields a compact LP for the computation of a NE of \( G \).

By Proposition 3.1 we know that the loss of Player \( k \) at a NE \((p,q)\) is \( \text{spl}_k(w + \sigma \circ q) \). The computation of a NE of \( G' \) (and hence of \( G \)) thus reduces to the computation of a strategy \( q \in \mathcal{Q} \) maximizing \( \sum_k x_k \text{spl}_k(w + \sigma \circ q) \), a weighted sum of shortest path lengths. This can be done by linear programming, by introducing some node potentials \( y^s_v \) for every source node \( s \in \mathcal{S} := \{s_k : k \in \mathcal{K}\} \) and for all \( v \in \mathcal{V} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{q,y} & \quad \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} x_k y^s_{dk} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad y^s_v - y^s_u \leq w_e + \sigma_e q_e, & \forall s \in \mathcal{S}, \forall e \equiv (u,v) \in \mathcal{E}; \\
& \quad y^s_s = 0, & \forall s \in \mathcal{S}; \\
& \quad q \in \mathcal{Q}.
\end{align*}
\]

The constraints (10b)-(10c) are from the classical linear programming formulation of the single-source shortest path problem, and bound the potential \( y^s_v \) from above by the shortest path length from \( s \) to \( v \) in the graph \( G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, c(q)) \). The objective function (10a) hence asks for the maximization of the weighted sum of shortest paths \( \sum_k x_k \lambda_k(q) \) over the set of feasible inspector’s strategies (10d).
We point out that the optimal dual variables of constraint (10b) for a given $s \in S$ define a single-source multi-sink flow on the subset of commodities $\mathcal{K}_s := \{k \in K : s_k = s\}$ originating in $s$. This flow can be decomposed as a sum of $(s_k, d_k)$-flows, which yields the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategy $p^k$ for every Player $k$.

Observe that in accordance with Proposition 5.1, the LP (10) for the computation of a Nash equilibrium does not depend on the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$.

The concept of Stackelberg equilibrium looks much more suitable for our application, but as we shall see, the computation of such an equilibrium is also much harder.

5.2 Stackelberg equilibria

Using ideas similar as in [10], a mixed integer program (MIP) can be formulated for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium $(p, q)$. We reduce drastically the number of required variables, by using a single-source multi-sink flow $\rho^{s} = \sum \{k : s_k = s\} x_k p^k$ for each $s \in S$, instead of using a flow $p^k$ for every commodity. With the use of big-$M$ constraints, we ensure that this flow uses only edges belonging to $\text{SP}_k(w + \sigma \circ q)$. By Proposition 3.1, $\rho^{s}$ hence corresponds to best-response strategies to $q$ for the players whose commodity source is $s$.

\[
\begin{align*}
    \max_{q,y,\mu,\rho} \quad & \sum_{k \in K} \alpha x_k y_{d_k}^k + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{e \in E} \rho^s_e (\beta_e - \alpha w_e) \quad (11a) \\
    \text{s.t.} \quad & 0 \leq w_e + \sigma_e q - (y_v^s - y_u^s) \leq M_e (1 - \mu^s_e), \quad \forall s \in S, \forall e \in E; \quad (11b) \\
    & y_v^s = 0, \quad \forall s \in S; \quad (11c) \\
    & q \in Q, \quad (11d) \\
    & \sum_{e' \in \delta^+(v)} \rho^s_{e'} - \sum_{e \in \delta^-(v)} \rho^s_e = \begin{cases} 
    \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}_s} x_k & \text{if } s = v; \\
    -x_{(s,v)} & \text{if } (s,v) \in \mathcal{K}_s; \\
    0 & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases} \quad \forall s \in S, \forall v \in V; \quad (11e) \\
    & 0 \leq \rho^s_e \leq M^s \mu^s_e, \quad \forall s \in S, \forall e \in E; \quad (11f) \\
    & \mu^s_e \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall (s,e) \in S \times E. \quad (11g)
\end{align*}
\]

As in Problem (10), constraints (11b)-(11c) bound $y_{d_k}^s$ from above by the shortest path length for commodity $k$ in the graph with weights $w + \sigma \circ q$, and constraint (11d) forces $q$ to be a feasible strategy for the inspector. We introduce a binary variable $\mu^s_e$ which can take the value 1 only if edge $e$ belongs to a shortest path tree rooted in $s$ (second inequality in (11b)). Indeed, the first inequality in (11b) is saturated when the difference of potential $(y_v^s - y_u^s)$
between the extreme points of an edge \( e \equiv (u, v) \) equals the weight \( w_e + \sigma_e q_e \) of \( e \), which indicates that there is a shortest path originating in \( s \) that uses \( e \).

Equation (11e) forces \( \rho^s \) to be a single-source multi-sink flow rooted in \( s \), whose demand on the commodity \( k \in K_s := \{ k \in K : s_k = s \} \) corresponds to the number of users \( x_k \). Constraint (11f) ensures that the flow \( \rho^s \) only uses edges from \( \text{SP}_k(w + \sigma \circ q) \). Now, \( \rho^s \) can be decomposed as \( \sum_{k \in K} x_k p^k \), where \( p^k \in F_k \) is a flow through commodity \( k \) of value one. By construction, \( p^k \) is a flow of minimal cost \( \text{spl}_k(w + \sigma \circ q) = \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (w_e + q_e \sigma_e) \), and it follows that \( p^k \) is a best response to \( q \), see Proposition 3.1.

Finally, the objective function (11a) rewrites to the inspector’s payoff (7) when replacing \( y^d_{sk} \) and \( \rho^s_e \) by their values as a function of \( p^k_e \):

\[
\sum_{k \in K} \alpha_k x_k \tau^k + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{e \in E} \rho^k_e (\beta_e - \alpha w_e) = \sum_{k \in K} \alpha_k x_k \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (w_e + q_e \sigma_e) + \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{e \in E} \sum_{k \in K} x_k p^k_e (\beta_e - \alpha w_e) = \sum_{k \in K} x_k \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (\alpha q_e \sigma_e + \beta_e).
\]

We point out that the big-\( M \) constants \( M_e \) and \( M^s \) can all be chosen in the same order of magnitude as the other coefficients of the problem.

### 5.3 Stackelberg for MAXTOLL in the transit network model

In this section, we show that the Stackelberg MIP (11) can be simplified for the case of the transit network model introduced in §4.1 with \( \alpha = 0 \) (MAXTOLL). In this situation indeed, the inspector’s payoff can be expressed as \( \sum_{k \in K} x_k \tau^k \mu_k \), where \( \mu_k \) is a binary variable indicating whether Player \( k \) has an incentive to pay the toll. So the flows of network users \( \rho^s \) is not involved anymore:

\[
\max_{q, y, \mu} \sum_{k \in K} x_k \tau^k \mu_k \quad \text{(12a)}
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad y^s - y^v \leq w_e + \sigma_e q_e, \quad \forall s \in S, \quad \forall e \equiv (u, v) \in E; \quad \text{(12b)}
\]

\[
y^s = 0, \quad \forall s \in S; \quad \text{(12c)}
\]

\[
w_{\bar{e}_k} - y^d_{\bar{d}_k} \leq M_k(1 - \mu_k), \quad \forall k \in K; \quad \text{(12d)}
\]

\[
\mu_k \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall k \in K; \quad \text{(12e)}
\]

\[
q \in Q. \quad \text{(12f)}
\]

The binary indicator variable \( \mu_k \) can take the value 1 if and only if the inequality corresponding to \( \bar{e}_k = (\bar{s}_k, \bar{d}_k) \) in (12b) is saturated, i.e. when the single edge \( (\bar{s}_k, \bar{d}_k) \) forms a shortest path for commodity \( k \), which means that Player \( k \) has an incentive to pay the toll.
6 The Price of Spite of SC games

We have seen in the last section that computing a NE is easy (and can be done by LP), while the computation of a SSE is harder and requires integer variables. In this section, we will first show that the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium is NP-hard indeed, which justifies the Mixed Integer Programming approach of § 5.2. Then, we will see that under some additional assumptions – that are typically satisfied for the model structures presented in Section 4 – the optimal Stackelberg payoff of the inspector can be reasonably well approximated by committing to a Nash strategy. Because the Nash strategy consists in allocating the controls in the most harmful way for the network users, we will introduce the concept of “price of spite” for an SC game, which can be seen as the price of anarchy of the game when the performance of a solution is measured by the inspector’s payoff in the Stackelberg model.

6.1 Computing a Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard

As evoked earlier, an SC game can be reformulated as a polymatrix game, see (2) and Section 2.3 in [2], in which the inspector simultaneously plays against all network users, but there is no interaction between users. Such games are called “Bayesian games” by some authors, because they are equivalent to the following situation: the inspector plays against the users of an unknown commodity, which is chosen to be \((s_k, t_k)\) with probability proportional to \(x_k\). It has been shown by Conitzer and Sandholm that computing a Stackelberg strategy of the leader in a Bayesian game is NP-hard, thanks to a reduction from SET-COVER [5].

However, SC games do not entail the whole generality of Bayesian games. In particular, the case \(\alpha = 1\) (MAXPROFIT) appears to be an easier problem, because the sub-game played between the inspector and Player \(k\) has a particular zero-sum plus costs structure (the zero-sum part corresponds to the rewards and penalties paid to the inspector, and the cost part accounts for the difference \(\sum_{e \in R} (w_e - \beta_e)\) charged to Player \(k\) when she chooses the route \(R\)). Hence, the MAXPROFIT game can be reformulated as a pairwise zero-sum polymatrix game, with a dummy player who has a single strategy, consisting in receiving the aforementioned cost part. It is known that pairwise zero-sum polymatrix games are polynomially solvable, i.e., a Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time [4]. As a byproduct of the next theorem, we obtain that the computation of a Stackelberg strategy of the leader is NP hard in a polymatrix game, even when the game is pairwise zero-sum. This could not have been deduced from any result in [5]. Our proof is based on a reduction from the 0/1 KNAPSACK problem and is given in Appendix A.

**Theorem 6.1** (Computing a Stackelberg strategy is NP-hard). Given a SC game \(G = (G, C, W, Q, \alpha)\), it is NP-hard to compute a Stackelberg strategy of the inspector, even when \(\alpha = 1\) and every user of commodity \(k\) has only two routes to go from \(s_k\) to \(t_k\).
Corollary 6.2. Consider a pairwise zero-sum polymatrix game $G$, in which one of the players is seen as the leader. It is NP-hard to compute a Stackelberg equilibrium of $G$.

Remark 6.3. The reduction from KNAPSACK suggests that computing a SSE in a pairwise zero-sum polymatrix game is maybe not so hard. Indeed, it is well known that there is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for KNAPSACK, which relies on dynamic programming. This leaves open the question of the approximability of MAXPROFIT in polynomial time. We want to investigate this issue in future work.

6.2 The price of spite

In game theory, the concept of Price of Anarchy (PoA) has been introduced to measure the loss of efficiency of a system when its agents adopt a selfish behavior, and has been popularized by the pioneering work of Roughgarden and Tardos on congestion games [11]. The Price of Spite that we will next define has a similar vein, albeit a different meaning. Indeed, in SC games the Nash equilibrium should not be interpreted as the natural outcome of a game played by selfish players. We have argued that the inspector should commit to a Stackelberg strategy, but a Nash strategy could still be seen as a heuristic choice for the inspector: maximizing the total loss of his adversaries is much easier than maximizing his own payoff. The price of spite is thus a measure of how the payoff of the inspector degrades when choosing this most harmful strategy.

Definition 6.4 (price of spite). Consider an SC game $G = (G, C, W, Q, \alpha)$. We measure the efficiency of an inspector strategy $q \in Q$ by the inspector’s payoff in the Stackelberg model (i.e., network users select a best response route that favors the inspector most):

$$H(q) := \max_{p \in BR(q)} \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha \sigma_e q_e + \beta_e).$$ (13)

Define by $N \subset Q$ the set of Nash equilibrium strategies of the inspector. The price of spite is then defined as the worst possible ratio between a Stackelberg and a Nash strategy:

$$PoS := \max_{q \in Q} H(q)$$

$$\min_{q \in N} H(q^*).$$

The next proposition gives an upper bound which is very useful to measure the quality of a Nash strategy $q^*$. We will need some additional notation. Given a strategy $p \in F(C)$ of the network users, we define the metric $d(p) = \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha w_e - \beta_e)$. This corresponds to the total latency experienced by all network users when the time to travel on edge $e$ is $\alpha w_e - \beta_e$. We also define $d_{\min}$ to be the smallest possible value of $d(p)$, that is,

$$d_{\min} := \min_{p \in F(C)} \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha w_e - \beta_e) = \sum_{k} x_k \text{spl}_k (\alpha w - \beta).$$
Note that \((\alpha w_e - \beta_e)\) could be negative if \(\alpha\) is small. But we can still define \(d_{\min} > -\infty\) if \(G\) has no cycle of negative weight (for the weights \(\alpha w_e - \beta_e\)).

We denote the inspector’s payoff by \(I(p, q)\), so that \(H(q) = \max_{p \in BR(q)} I(p, q)\). For short, we say that a strategy \(p \in BR(q)\) satisfying \(H(q) = I(p, q)\) is a **tie-breaking best response** to \(q\). We denote the total loss of all network users by \(\Lambda(p, q) := \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\sigma_e q_e + w_e)\). A simple calculation shows that the following relation holds for all strategy profiles \((p, q) \in F(C) \times Q\):

\[
I(p, q) = \alpha \Lambda(p, q) - d(p). \tag{14}
\]

**Proposition 6.5.** Let \(G = (G, C, W, Q, \alpha)\) be a SC game such that \(G\) has no negative weight cycle (with respect to the weights \(\alpha w - \beta\)). Let \((p^*, q^*)\) be a NE of \(G\) and let \(\hat{p}\) be a tie-breaking best response to \(q^*\). Then, for all \(q \in Q\) we have:

\[
H(q) \leq H(q^*) + d(\hat{p}) - d_{\min}.
\]

**Proof.** Let \(p\) be a tie-breaking best response to \(q\), so we have \(H(q) = I(p, q)\) and \(H(q^*) = I(\hat{p}, q^*)\). By definition of the NE, it holds that \(\Lambda(p^*, q^*) \geq \Lambda(p, q)\), because \(p \in BR(q)\). Moreover, we have \(\Lambda(p^*, q^*) = \Lambda(\hat{p}, q^*)\) because \(\hat{p} \in BR(q^*)\). We now apply the relation (14) two times:

\[
\begin{align*}
H(q) &= I(p, q) = \alpha \Lambda(p, q) - d(p) \\
&\leq \alpha \Lambda(\hat{p}, q^*) - d(p) \\
&= I(\hat{p}, q^*) + d(\hat{p}) - d(p) \\
&\leq H(q^*) + d(\hat{p}) - d_{\min},
\end{align*}
\]

where the last inequality follows from \(d(p) \geq d_{\min}\). \(\square\)

In words, this proposition bounds the loss of efficiency of the Nash strategy \(q^*\) by the **detour** done by the tie-breaking best response flow \(\hat{p}\) (for the metric \(d\)). Given the strategy \(q^*\), we point out that \(d_{\min}\) and \(d(\hat{p})\) correspond respectively to shortest path lengths (for the metric \(d()\)) in the whole graph and in the directed acyclic subgraphs \(SP_k(w + \sigma \circ q^*)\). In real-world applications, this bound turns out to be excellent for \(\alpha = 1\) (MAXPROFIT), cf. Section 7.

Without further assumptions on the model however, there is no hope to obtain an upper bound for the price of spite of a SC game \(G\). Indeed, a reviewer has suggested an example with the following properties: the efficiency of the Nash strategy is \(H(q^*) = 0\), while the Stackelberg strategy has efficiency \(H(q) = 1\). This example is sketched in Appendix B. A bound can be obtained though, under a set of additional assumptions. We next consider a set of hypotheses that are satisfied by the distance-based toll in Germany. In remark 6.7, we will also give a similar result for the model of public transportation network presented in Section 4.1.

We assume that every edge \(e \in E\) has a **length** \(l_e \geq 0\); in addition, there are some constants \(b > 0\) (basic costs per km) and \(f > 0\) (fare per km) such that:
(A1) There exists a partition of the edge set $E = E_P \cup E_E \cup E_D$ (pay, evasion, and dummy edges) such that:

$$\begin{cases} w_e = (b + f)l_e, & \beta_e = fl_e, \sigma_e = 0 \quad \text{if } e \in E_P \\ w_e \geq bl_e, & \beta_e = 0, \quad \sigma_e > 0 \quad \text{if } e \in E_E \\ w_e \geq 0, & \beta_e = \sigma_e = l_e = 0 \quad \text{if } e \in E_D \end{cases}$$

(A2) The shortest $(s_k,t_k)$–path $R$ for commodity $k$ has length $\ell_k := \sum_{e \in R} l_e$, and there exists an $(s_k,t_k)$–path $R^k_{\text{pay}}$ that uses only edges of type $E_P$ and $E_D$ (i.e., no evasion edge) where the total user costs are $\sum_{e \in R^k_{\text{pay}}} w_e = (b + f)\ell_k$.

(A3) There exists a uniform control strategy $q^U \in Q$ such that $q^U_e = 0$ for all toll-free edges $e \in E_P \cup E_D$, and $q^U_e$ is proportional to $\sigma_e^{-1}l_e$ on the evasion edges, that is, $\exists u > 0 : \forall e \in E_E, q^U_e = u l_e/\sigma_e$.

Note that the quantity $u$ from Assumption (A3) may be interpreted as the average penalty per evaded kilometer. For example, consider the simple control set where the pure strategies of the inspectors are all subsets of $E$ of cardinality $\gamma$, see Eq. (4)-(5). It is easy to verify that $u$ must be equal to

$$u(\gamma) := \frac{\gamma}{\sum_{e \in E_E} \sigma_e^{-1}l_e},$$

so that Assumption (A3) is satisfied whenever $\gamma \sigma_e^{-1}l_e \leq \sum_{e \in E_E} \sigma_e^{-1}l_e$ for all $e \in E_E$.

**Theorem 6.6.** Consider an SC game $G$ satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A3). Then, the price of spite of $G$ is bounded from above by $\max (1, 1/\alpha)$. 

Proof. Recall that $\text{splt}(l) = \ell_k$. We denote by $L := \sum_{k \in K} x_k \ell_k$. We first claim that the efficiency of any feasible strategy $q \in Q$ is bounded by $H(q) \leq f L$. Otherwise, let $p \in BR(q)$ be such that $I(p,q) > f L$. This implies the existence of a commodity $k$ for which $\sum_{e \in E} p^e_e (q_e q_e + \beta_e) > f \ell_k$. Denote by $\ell^+_k$ the average length covered by flow $p^k; \ell^+_k = \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e l_e \geq \ell_k$. Observe that $bl_e \leq w_e - \beta_e$ for all $e \in E$ (this follows from (A1)). Thus, the total loss of Player $k$ is:

$$\sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (q_e q_e + w_e) \geq \sum_{e \in E} p^k_e (q_e q_e + \beta_e) + b l^+_k > f \ell_k + bl.$$

But then, this contradicts $p \in BR(q)$, because the flow putting all the weight on the $(s_k,t_k)$–path $R^k_{\text{pay}}$ of Assumption (A2) yields a loss $(f + b)\ell_k$.

Then, let $(p^*, q^*)$ be a NE of $G$, and observe that $H(q^*) = I(p^*, q^*)$. Since $q^* \in BR(p^*), \Lambda(p^*, q^*) = \max_q \sum_{e \in E} p^*_e (q_e q_e + w_e)$, and Eq. (14) gives:

$$I(p^*, q^*) = \max_q \sum_{e \in E} p^*_e (q_e q_e + \beta_e).$$
Therefore,

\[ I(p^*, q^*) \geq \min_{p \in F(C)} \max_{q \in Q} \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha \sigma_e q_e + \beta_e) \]

\[ = \max_{q \in Q} \min_{p \in F(C)} \sum_{e \in E} p_e (\alpha \sigma_e q_e + \beta_e), \]

where the last equality follows e.g. from Sion’s minimax theorem. Now, for the homogeneous control strategy \( q^U \) from Assumption (A3), we obtain

\[ I(p^*, q^*) \geq \min_{p \in F(C)} \left( \alpha u \sum_{e \in E^g} p_e l_e + f \sum_{e \in E^p} p_e l_e \right) \]

\[ \geq \min(f, \alpha u) \Sigma. \]

We finally obtain the desired inequality, by combining the inequalities \( H(q^*) \geq \min(f, \alpha u) \Sigma \) and \( H(q) \leq f \Sigma \) for an arbitrary \( q \in Q \):

\[ \frac{H(q)}{H(q^*)} \leq \frac{f}{\min(f, \alpha u)} = \max \left( 1, \frac{f}{\alpha u} \right). \]

\[ \square \]

**Remark 6.7.** We can also adapt the proof of Theorem 6.6 to work in the framework of the transit network model of Section 4.1. Here, we need to assume \( \sigma_e > 0 \ (\forall e \in E_0) \) and the existence of a homogeneous control \( q^U_e = u \sigma_e^{-1} l_e \) \((\forall e \in E_0)\). By using a similar reasoning, we can prove that the price of spite is bounded from above by

\[ \frac{\sum_k x_k \tau_k}{\sum_k x_k \min(\tau_k, \alpha u \ell_k)}. \]

**Remark 6.8.** The key point in the previous proof is that the graph \( G \) contains no edge such that \( \beta_e = \sigma_e = 0 \) (except maybe on dummy edges that have a length \( l_e = 0 \)). Such edges typically correspond to shortcut (or detour) edges that avoid the paying network, and can yield an arbitrarily large price of spite, see Appendix B. However, we show in the next section that the presence of shortcuts only has a limited impact on the price of spite for the German truck toll.

### 7 Application to the truck toll in Germany

We have solved the models presented in this paper for several instances based on real data from the German motorways network. We present here a brief analysis of our results.

Mobile controllers drive on the network and are able to control every truck they overtake. Hence, the expected penalty to pay on a section where an inspector is driving can be approximated by \((v_I - 1)P\), where \( P \) is the amount of a
fine, and $v_I$ and $v_T$ represent the average speeds of the inspectors and the truck drivers, respectively. In our experiments, we have set $\sigma_e = 60\€$ on all evasion edges (the penalty is $P = 400\€$ and controllers drive 15% faster than truck drivers). The basic costs (e.g. fuel and driver’s salary) were set to $b = 0.5\€/km$, and the toll fares are $f = 0.17\€/km$.

### 7.1 Static case, transit network model

We first present results for two instances in the static case (i.e., time is not taken into account), with the simple transit network model of §4.1. The results presented below rely on the set of strategies $Q$ described in (4)–(5), where a set of $\gamma$ inspectors can be arbitrarily distributed over the edges of the network.

In upper part of Figure 4(a), a Nash equilibrium strategy $q^*$ of the inspector on the whole German network is represented. Here it was assumed that $\gamma = 50$ controllers are simultaneously present on the network, which has 319 nodes, 2948 edges and 5013 commodities. The dotted edges on the figure represent toll-free shortcuts, where the costs per kilometer is twice higher as on the the

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Figure 4: (a): Graphs of the two instances discussed in §7.1, with colors showing a near-optimal strategy for MAXPROFIT and $\gamma = 50$ on the network of Germany (above) and an optimal Stackelberg strategy for MAXTOLL and $\gamma = 3$ for Berlin-Brandenburg (below). (b)-(e): Experimental results for the region of Berlin-Brandenburg.
motorway network \((w_e = 2b_e)\), but no control can occur \((\sigma_e=0)\).

For \(\alpha = 1\) (MAXPROFIT), the bound \(H(q^*) \geq H(q) + d(\hat{p}) - d_{\text{min}}\) of Proposition 6.5 guarantees that the payoff from this Nash strategy is at least 99.3% of the optimal Stackelberg payoff. To compute this bound, note that we must first compute a Nash strategy \(q^*\) and its tie breaking best-response \(\hat{p}\). In contrast, the bound of Theorem 6.6 depends only on the per kilometer fares \(f\) and the uniform penalty rate \(u\). For the values \(f\) and \(u\) of this instance, the upper bound on the price of spite is \(\frac{f}{u} = 1.44\).

Further tests on a smaller network representing the region of Berlin-Brandenburg (45 nodes, 130 edges, 596 commodities) confirm that the Nash equilibrium strategy might be a good trade-off between the computation time and the efficiency of the controls. This network is represented in the lower part of Figure 4(b), with colors showing a Stackelberg strategy for MAXTOLL and \(\gamma = 3\). Figures 4(b)-4(d) compare 4 strategies in function of the number of controllers \(\gamma\): the strategies MAXPROFIT and MAXTOLL, the Nash equilibrium strategy computed by LP (10), and a strategy in which control intensities are proportional to traffic volumes on each edge of the physical network \(G_0\) (of course, no inspector is allocated to the dummy toll edges where \(\sigma_e = 0\)). Plot (b) shows the profit collected when committing to one of these strategies (in the Stackelberg model, i.e. drivers select a best response which favors the inspector most). We see on Plot (c) that the Nash strategy is always near-optimal in terms of profit. However, we point out that the MAXTOLL strategy outperforms the others in terms of toll enforcement (Plot (d)), at the price of a small loss in total profit (7% for \(\gamma = 2\) and 2% for \(\gamma = 4\)). In another experiment, we have set \(\gamma = 3\) and we have played with the parameter \(\alpha\), which joins MAXPROFIT (\(\alpha = 1\)) to MAXTOLL (\(\alpha = 0\)). Plot (e) shows that for \(\alpha = 0.75\), one can find a solution with almost the same profit as in MAXPROFIT, but with a higher fraction coming from the toll, and hence less evasion.

### 7.2 Static case, two-layer network model

We shall now present some results for an instance constructed with the two-layer network model of \(\S 4.2\). The graph of this instance represents the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate; the graph \(G_0\) has 37 nodes, 142 edges and 323 commodities, which yields 148 nodes and 506 edges in the two-layer graph \(G\).

The Stackelberg strategy of the inspector for MAXPROFIT and \(\gamma = 6\) is indicated in Figure 5, as well as the flows of network users in the two-layer graph. In the northern part of the graph, the red edges in the toll evasion level are much wider than the corresponding green edges in the fare compliance level, which indicates that many users have no incentive to pay the toll here.

The evolution of the inspector’s payoff with \(\gamma\) is plotted in Figure 6, for the Stackelberg, Nash, and proportional strategies (as a percentage of the maximum, i.e. the profit reached with the Stackelberg strategy). Here again, the Nash strategy is optimal in most cases (except for \(\gamma = 10\) where it captures 98.7% of the optimum). Curiously, the inspector’s payoff sinks between \(\gamma = 7\) and \(\gamma = 8\) with the proportional strategy. This is explained by the lower graph of
Figure 5: Inspector’s Stackelberg strategy (above) and Driver flows (below) for the MAXPROFIT problem with $\gamma = 6$. In the lower 3D-figure, the width of the edges is proportional to the number of network users in the two-layer graph. The red edges represent fare evasion, the green edges fare compliance, and the yellow ones correspond to toll-free sections.

Figure 6: when $\gamma = 8$, this strategy assigns a too high control frequency on certain edges, which creates a situation where many drivers have an incentive to take a toll-free trunk road, thus depriving the inspector of the incomes from both fares and fines on this edge.

7.3 Examples with time dynamics

We have considered several real-world instances corresponding to several control regions of Germany, for the model with cyclic duty graphs presented in §4.3. For example, the network corresponding to the control region located around the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt is depicted in Figure 7. The upper part of the figure shows the graph $C = (S, A)$ connecting 17 sub-control areas, with nodes whose location coincide with the barycenter of each control area $S \in S$. We have used a time discretization of two hours, so that an inspector’s duty of 8 hours has length $L = 4$ in the cyclic duty graph $D$. The lower part of Figure 7 shows the intensity of the controls in the Nash strategy, during 4 different time
Table 1 summarizes the results for several control regions of Germany, for the MAXPROFIT problem ($\alpha = 1$). For each instance, the table gives the size of both the graph $G_0 = (V_0, E_0)$ of the physical network, and its time-extended version $G = (V, E)$ that was constructed along the lines of Section 4. In addition, the table shows the ratio $\text{eff} = \frac{H(q^*)}{H(q^* + \hat{p}) - d_{\text{min}}}$ which bounds from below the efficiency of the Nash strategy $q^*$, cf. Proposition 6.5; the bound $\frac{f_u}{u}$ on the price of spite, cf. Theorem 6.6; and the CPU time to solve the LP (10) on a PC with 8 cores at 3.2 GHz.

To evaluate the impact of shortcut edges that allow the user to avoid the paying network (cf. Remark 6.8 in the last section) we have considered 2 variants of each instance. An instance without shortcut, where we consider only the edges of the motorway network (black edges on Figure 8), and an instance with shortcuts (red edges). Since we have no data on trunk roads in Germany, shortcuts were generated according to the following procedure: An edge with weights $\sigma_e = \beta_e = 0, w_e = 2bd_{u,v}$ is added between between the nodes $u$ and $v$ whenever the distance $d_{u,v}$ between $u$ and $v$ is below a threshold, and the strategy consisting in taking only the edge $e = (u, v)$ is not dominated by the pay-strategy from $u$ to $v$ on the motorway network: $2bd_{u,v} < (b + f) \text{spl}_{u\rightarrow v}(t)$.

The table shows that the bound on the quality of $q^*$ degrades a bit when shortcut edges are added, but for the considered instances we always have a
guarantee that $H(q^*)$ is at least 95% of the optimum. The upper bound on the price of spite ($f/u = \text{toll rate per km/uniform penalty per km}$) is given only for the instances with no shortcut, so that Theorem 6.6 applies.

8 Conclusion and Perspectives

We have introduced the class of spot-checking games, which are particular security games played on a graph. These games can be used to represent many situations in which controls must be distributed over a network. We have proposed a LP / MIP based approach to compute Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of this game. Users’ strategies are represented by multicommodity flows, which makes it possible to compute a Nash equilibrium of the game very efficiently. The computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium is NP hard, which justifies our MIP approach. We have introduced the price of spite of spot checking games,
which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a
Nash strategy, rather than to a Stackelberg strategy. Two bounds are given:
the first one analyzes the quality of a Nash strategy \( q^* \) in terms of detours of
the tie-breaking best response multicommodity flow \( \hat{p} \). The second bound is for
a distance-based toll network, and depends only on the ratio between the toll
fares per kilometer and the average penalty per evaded kilometer (if the fare inspec-
tors are uniformly spread over the network). Finally, we have demonstrated
the quality of these bounds for a real-world application.

For future work, we would like to extend our model, in order to take into
account congestion effects. More precisely, we want to investigate the situation
where the weight \( w_e \) of an edge and the expected penalty \( \sigma_e \) are functions of
the number of agents taking this edge.

Another research direction suggested by this article is the investigation of
polytime approximation algorithms for the computation of a Stackelberg equi-
librium in a spot-checking game. We think that a FPTAS might exist for the
case where \( \alpha = 1 \), and more generally for all pairwise zero-sum polymatrix
games.
References


A NP hardness of SC games

In this section we prove that it is NP hard to compute a Stackelberg strategy of a SC game, even when $\alpha = 1$ (Theorem 6.1). We recall that such a strategy is a maximizer of $H(q)$ over $Q$, see (13).

Our proof is based on a reduction from the binary knapsack problem, which is well known to be NP-complete [6]:

$$(0/1 \text{ Knapsack}) \quad \text{Given are a finite set of objects } \Upsilon, \text{ a weight } \omega(a) \in \mathbb{N}, \text{ a utility } u(a) \in \mathbb{N} \text{ for each } a \in \Upsilon, \text{ and positive integers } W (\text{knapsack capacity}) \text{ and } U (\text{desired utility}). \quad \text{Is there a subset } \Upsilon' \text{ of } \Upsilon \text{ such that } \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} \omega(a) \leq W \text{ and } \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} u(a) \geq U?$$

Proof of Theorem 6.1. Given an instance $\mathcal{R}$ of the 0/1 Knapsack problem, we construct an SC game $G$ in which $\alpha = 1$, there are exactly two possible routes for each commodity $k \in K$, and such that $G$ has the following property: there exists an inspector’s strategy $q$ that yields a payoff $H(q) \geq U$ if and only if $\mathcal{R}$ is a yes-instance (where $H(q)$ has been defined in (13)).

Our instance is constructed as follows: for each object $a \in \Upsilon$ there is a commodity $(s_a, t_a)$, with two arcs $\hat{a}$ and $\check{a}$ joining $s_a$ to $t_a$: $G = (\{s_a, t_a : a \in \Upsilon\}, \{\hat{a}, \check{a} : a \in \Upsilon\})$. The arcs $\hat{a}$ and $\check{a}$ are respectively pay- and evasion-edges, with weights $\beta_{\hat{a}} = u(a)$, $\beta_{\check{a}} = 0$, $\sigma_{\hat{a}} = 0$, $\sigma_{\check{a}} = 1$, $w_{\hat{a}} = u(a)$, $w_{\check{a}} = u(a) - \frac{\omega(a)}{2W}$.

Note that we can assume without loss of generality that $\omega(a) \leq W$ for each object $a$, so that $w_{\check{a}} \geq 0$. There is a single user on each commodity ($x_a = 1$), $\alpha = 1$, and the set of all inspector’s strategies is the standard probability simplex over the evasion edges $Q = \{q \geq 0 : \sum_{a \in \Upsilon} q_a = 1\}$.

Given an inspector’s strategy $q \in Q$, it is easy to compute the inspector’s payoff $H(q)$, see Eq. (13). Indeed, for a commodity $a \in \Upsilon$ two cases can appear: either $q_a < \frac{\omega(a)}{W}$, and in this case the only best response is to take the evasion path. Or $q_a \geq \frac{\omega(a)}{W}$ and paying the toll is a best response. When there is a tie ($q_a = \frac{\omega(a)}{2W}$), the user of commodity $a$ chooses the strategy that favours the inspector most; that is, he will pay the toll because $\sigma_{\check{a}}q_a = \frac{\omega(a)}{2W} \leq \frac{1}{2} \leq u(a)$.

Hence,

$$H(q) = \sum_{a: q_a < \frac{\omega(a)}{W}} \sigma_{\check{a}}q_a + \sum_{a: q_a \geq \frac{\omega(a)}{W}} \beta_{\check{a}}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a: q_a < \frac{\omega(a)}{W}} q_a + \sum_{a: q_a \geq \frac{\omega(a)}{W}} u(a).$$

(15)
We first assume that $K$ is a yes-instance. Then, let $\Upsilon'$ be a knapsack of value $\geq U$. We define a control strategy by setting $q_\hat{a} \geq \omega(a) W$ for all $a \in \Upsilon'$, and $q_\hat{a} = 0$ for all $a \not\in \Upsilon'$ (this is possible because $\sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} \omega(a) \leq W$). Then, Eq. (15) gives $H(q) \geq \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} u(a) \geq U$.

Conversely, let $q$ be such that $H(q) \geq U$. Define $\Upsilon' := \{ a \in \Upsilon : q_\hat{a} \geq \frac{\omega(a)}{W} \}$. Eq. (15) gives $H(q) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} q_\hat{a} + \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} u(a) \leq \frac{1}{2} + \sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} u(a)$. This implies that the integer $\sum_{a \in \Upsilon'} u(a)$ is larger than $U - \frac{1}{2}$, and thus it is larger than or equal to $U$. This proves that $K$ is a yes-instance.

Finally, the reduction from $K$ to $\mathcal{G}$ is clearly polynomial. Hence, finding a Stackelberg strategy of the inspector in a SC game is NP-hard, even when $\alpha = 1$ and each user has only two routes.

\[ \square \]

### B An instance with unbounded Price of Spite

Consider the SC game depicted in Figure 9. There is a single commodity $C = \{(s,t,1)\}$. There are two teams of controllers, who can defend any subset of 2 edges. The mixed strategy of the inspector is thus $Q = \{ 0 \leq q \leq 1 : \sum_e q_e = 2 \}$. Edge weights are labelled as triples $(w_e, \sigma_e, \beta_e)$. The wide solid edges represent pay-edges ($w_e \geq \beta_e \geq 0, \sigma = 0$), the thin solid edges represent fare evasion ($\beta_e = 0, \sigma_e > 0$), and the dashed edge is a detour path from $s$ to $t$ that avoids the paying network ($\beta_e = \sigma_e = 0$).

It is not hard to see that the strategy profile where the network user takes the free road from $s$ to $t$ (the dashed edge with weights $(3,0,0)$), and the inspector defends $s \to u$ and $u \to t$ at 100% each is a (pure) Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the dashed path taken by the user is a tie-breaking best response (because there
is no other (s,t) path of length 3 with respect to the weights $w + \sigma \circ q$, and this profile gives no revenue to the inspector.

But the inspector has a better strategy. If he defends the evasion edge $s \rightarrow u$ and the long evasion edge $s \rightarrow t$ at 100% each, the network user has three possible best responses: the path $s \rightarrow u \rightarrow t$ (paying the toll on $s \rightarrow u$ and evading the toll on $u \rightarrow t$), the path $s \rightarrow u \rightarrow t$ (evading the toll on both $s \rightarrow u$ and $u \rightarrow t$) and the free road from $s \rightarrow t$, each having a cost of 3 with respect to the weights $w + \sigma \circ q$. The tie-breaking best response is the first path, which yields a revenue of 1 to the inspector (independently of the value of $\alpha \in [0,1]$ because the revenue comes from the toll between $s$ and $t$, not from penalties). This shows that this instance has an infinite price of spite.