TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Buwaya, Julia A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of edges to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 14-07 KW - Game Theory KW - Stackelberg Equilibrium KW - Security Games KW - Mixed Integer Programming KW - Price of Anarchy Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-47139 SN - 1438-0064 ER -