TY - GEN A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 14-38 Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Buwaya, Julia A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach N2 - We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented. T3 - ZIB-Report - 12-47 KW - Stackelberg Equilibrium KW - Game Theory KW - Mixed Integer Programming Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-17401 SN - 1438-0064 ER -