TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Omont, Bertrand A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks N2 - We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 12-15 KW - Stackelberg game KW - Polymatrix game KW - Controls in transportation networks Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Reuther, Markus A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Schulz, Christof A1 - Swarat, Elmar A1 - Weider, Steffen T1 - Duty Rostering in Public Transport - Facing Preferences, Fairness, and Fatigue N2 - Duty rostering problems occur in different application contexts and come in different flavors. They give rise to very large scale integer programs which ypically have lots of solutions and extremely fractional LP relaxations. In such a situation, heuristics can be a viable algorithmic choice. We propose an mprovement method of the Lin-Kernighan type for the solution of duty rostering problems. We illustrate its versatility and solution quality on three different applications in public transit, vehicle routing, and airline rostering with a focus on the management of preferences, fairness, and fatigue, respectively. T3 - ZIB-Report - 15-44 Y1 - 2015 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-56070 SN - 1438-0064 ER -