TY - CHAP A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - A Case Study on Optimizing Toll Enforcements on Motorways T2 - 3rd Student Conference on Operational Research N2 - In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach. Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.SCOR.2012.1 VL - 22 SP - 1 EP - 10 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors JF - Annals of Operations Research N2 - We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2152-1 VL - 252(2) SP - 383 EP - 406 PB - Springer US ET - 252 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - An IP Approach to Toll Enforcement Optimization on German Motorways T2 - Operations Research Proceedings 2011 N2 - This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany. Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_51 SP - 317 EP - 322 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Buwaya, Julia A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach T2 - Proceedings of INOC'2013 N2 - We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented. Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org//10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100 VL - 41 SP - 253 EP - 260 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Omont, Bertrand A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks T2 - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012) N2 - We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways. Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17 VL - 105 SP - 224 EP - 235 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Omont, Bertrand A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks N2 - We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 12-15 KW - Stackelberg game KW - Polymatrix game KW - Controls in transportation networks Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Schwartz, Stephan T1 - An Extended Network Interdiction Problem for Optimal Toll Control N2 - We study an extension of the shortest path network interdiction problem and present a novel real-world application in this area. We consider the problem of determining optimal locations for toll control stations on the arcs of a transportation network. We handle the fact that drivers can avoid control stations on parallel secondary roads. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program and solved using Benders decomposition. We present experimental results for the application of our models to German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 15-32 KW - network interdiction Y1 - 2015 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-55405 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Buwaya, Julia A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks JF - Networks N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/net.21596 VL - 65 SP - 312 EP - 328 PB - Wiley Periodicals, Inc. ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar ED - Lavi, Ron T1 - The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games T2 - 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014) N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways. Y1 - 2014 SN - 978-3-662-44802-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8 N1 - Brief Announcement included in Back Matter p. 293 following VL - 8768 SP - 293 PB - Springer ER - TY - GEN A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Optimal Toll Enforcement - an Integration of Vehicle Routing and Duty Rostering N2 - We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, the crews of the tours have to be scheduled. Thus, we developed a personalized crew rostering model. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The paper focuses first on different requirements for the rostering and how they can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bicriterion analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. On the one hand the tour planning is a profit maximization problem and on the other hand the rostering should be made in a employee friendly way. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method. T3 - ZIB-Report - 13-79 KW - vehicle routing KW - crew rostering KW - integer programming KW - bicriteria optimization Y1 - 2013 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-45107 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Harman, Radoslav T1 - Optimal Designs for Steady-state Kalman filters N2 - We consider a stationary discrete-time linear process that can be observed by a finite number of sensors. The experimental design for the observations consists of an allocation of available resources to these sensors. We formalize the problem of selecting a design that maximizes the information matrix of the steady-state of the Kalman filter, with respect to a standard optimality criterion, such as $D-$ or $A-$optimality. This problem generalizes the optimal experimental design problem for a linear regression model with a finite design space and uncorrelated errors. Finally, we show that under natural assumptions, a steady-state optimal design can be computed by semidefinite programming. T3 - ZIB-Report - 14-39 KW - Optimal Design KW - Kalman Filter KW - Semidefinite programming Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52808 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Schmidt genannt Waldschmidt, Daniel T1 - Restricted Adaptivity in Stochastic Scheduling JF - 29th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2021) N2 - We consider the stochastic scheduling problem of minimizing the expected makespan on m parallel identical machines. While the (adaptive) list scheduling policy achieves an approximation ratio of 2, any (non-adaptive) fixed assignment policy has performance guarantee Ω(logm/loglogm). Although the performance of the latter class of policies are worse, there are applications in which non-adaptive policies are desired. In this work, we introduce the two classes of δ-delay and τ-shift policies whose degree of adaptivity can be controlled by a parameter. We present a policy - belonging to both classes - which is an O(loglogm)-approximation for reasonably bounded parameters. In other words, an exponential improvement on the performance of any fixed assignment policy can be achieved when allowing a small degree of adaptivity. Moreover, we provide a matching lower bound for any δ-delay and τ-shift policy when both parameters, respectively, are in the order of the expected makespan of an optimal non-anticipatory policy. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2021.79 VL - 204 SP - 79:1 EP - 79:14 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pronzato, Luc A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume T1 - Removing inessential points in c- and A-optimal design JF - Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference N2 - A design point is inessential when it does not contribute to an optimal design, and can therefore be safely discarded from the design space. We derive three inequalities for the detection of such inessential points in c-optimal design: the first two are direct consequences of the equivalence theorem for c-optimality; the third one is derived from a second-order cone programming formulation of c-optimal design. Elimination rules for A-optimal design are obtained as a byproduct. When implemented within an optimization algorithm, each inequality gives a screening test that may provide a substantial acceleration by reducing the size of the problem online. Several examples are presented with a multiplicative algorithm to illustrate the effectiveness of the approach. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02868664 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jspi.2020.11.011 VL - 213 SP - 233 EP - 252 ER -