TY - GEN A1 - Schwartz, Stephan A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Designing Inspector Rosters with Optimal Strategies N2 - We consider the problem of enforcing a toll on a transportation network with limited inspection resources. We formulate a game theoretic model to optimize the allocation of the inspectors, taking the reaction of the network users into account. The model includes several important aspects for practical operation of the control strategy, such as duty types for the inspectors. In contrast to an existing formulation using flows to describe the users' strategies we choose a path formulation and identify dominated user strategies to significantly reduce the problem size. Computational results suggest that our approach is better suited for practical instances. T3 - ZIB-Report - 16-65 Y1 - 2016 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-61123 SN - 1438-0064 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors JF - Annals of Operations Research N2 - We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2152-1 VL - 252(2) SP - 383 EP - 406 PB - Springer US ET - 252 ER -