TY - CHAP A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Omont, Bertrand A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks T2 - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012) N2 - We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways. Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17 VL - 105 SP - 224 EP - 235 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Buwaya, Julia A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks JF - Networks N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/net.21596 VL - 65 SP - 312 EP - 328 PB - Wiley Periodicals, Inc. ER -