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  <doc>
    <id>4730</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2012</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>224</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>235</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume>105</volume>
    <type>conferenceobject</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
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    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
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    <title language="eng">A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks</title>
    <abstract language="eng">We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012)</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17</identifier>
    <enrichment key="Series">Lecture Notes of the ICST</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="PeerReviewed">yes</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="PreprintUrn">urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995</enrichment>
    <author>Ralf Borndörfer</author>
    <submitter>Elmar Swarat</submitter>
    <author>Bertrand Omont</author>
    <author>Guillaume Sagnol</author>
    <author>Elmar Swarat</author>
    <collection role="institutes" number="optimization">Mathematical Optimization</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="traffic">Mathematics of Transportation and Logistics</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="borndoerfer">Borndörfer, Ralf</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="sagnol">Sagnol, Guillaume</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="swarat">Swarat, Elmar</collection>
    <collection role="projects" number="TOLLCONTROLOPT">TOLLCONTROLOPT</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="aopt">Applied Optimization</collection>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>1499</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear/>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>reportzib</type>
    <publisherName/>
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    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2012-04-10</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>2012-04-10</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks</title>
    <abstract language="eng">We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a&#13;
transportation network.&#13;
The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit&#13;
toll. We formulate a linear program to find&#13;
the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue,&#13;
and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing&#13;
the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal&#13;
mixed strategy for a coalition of $N$ inspectors can be solved&#13;
efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results&#13;
from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.</abstract>
    <identifier type="issn">1438-0064</identifier>
    <identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14995</identifier>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17</identifier>
    <enrichment key="SourceTitle">A rev. vers. appeared in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012), volume 105 of Lecture Notes of the ICST, pp. 224 – 235, Vancouver, Canada, May 2012</enrichment>
    <author>Ralf Borndörfer</author>
    <submitter>Guillaume Sagnol</submitter>
    <author>Bertrand Omont</author>
    <author>Guillaume Sagnol</author>
    <author>Elmar Swarat</author>
    <series>
      <title>ZIB-Report</title>
      <number>12-15</number>
    </series>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Stackelberg game</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Polymatrix game</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Controls in transportation networks</value>
    </subject>
    <collection role="msc" number="90-XX">OPERATIONS RESEARCH, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="optimization">Mathematical Optimization</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="borndoerfer">Borndörfer, Ralf</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="sagnol">Sagnol, Guillaume</collection>
    <collection role="persons" number="swarat">Swarat, Elmar</collection>
    <collection role="projects" number="TOLLCONTROLOPT">TOLLCONTROLOPT</collection>
    <collection role="institutes" number="aopt">Applied Optimization</collection>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-zib/files/1499/zib_report_12_15.pdf</file>
  </doc>
</export-example>
