@inproceedings{Sagnol2012, author = {Sagnol, Guillaume}, title = {Network-related problems in optimal experimental design and second order cone programming}, volume = {51}, booktitle = {Proceedings of PROBASTAT'2011, Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications}, doi = {10.2478/v10127-012-0016-x}, pages = {161 -- 171}, year = {2012}, abstract = {In the past few years several applications of optimal experimental designs have emerged to optimize the measurements in communication networks. The optimal design problems arising from this kind of applications share three interesting properties: (i) measurements are only available at a small number of locations of the network; (ii) each monitor can simultaneously measure several quantities, which can be modeled by ``multiresponse experiments"; (iii) the observation matrices depend on the topology of the network. In this paper, we give an overview of these experimental design problems and recall recent results for the computation of optimal designs by Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP). New results for the network-monitoring of a discrete time process are presented. In particular, we show that the optimal design problem for the monitoring of an AR1 process can be reduced to the standard form and we give experimental results.}, language = {en} } @misc{BorndoerferBuwayaSagnoletal.2012, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Buwaya, Julia and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach}, issn = {1438-0064}, doi = {/10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-17401}, year = {2012}, abstract = {We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.}, language = {en} } @misc{BorndoerferSagnolSwarat2011, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {An IP Approach to Toll Enforcement Optimization on German Motorways}, issn = {1438-0064}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_51}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-14299}, number = {11-42}, year = {2011}, abstract = {This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.}, language = {en} } @misc{SagnolBorndoerferSchlechteetal.2014, author = {Sagnol, Guillaume and Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games}, issn = {1438-0064}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775}, year = {2014}, abstract = {We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferSagnolSchwartz2016, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Schwartz, Stephan}, title = {An Extended Network Interdiction Problem for Optimal Toll Control}, volume = {52}, booktitle = {INOC 2015 - 7th International Network Optimization Conference}, doi = {10.1016/j.endm.2016.03.040}, pages = {301 -- 308}, year = {2016}, abstract = {We study an extension of the shortest path network interdiction problem and present a novel real-world application in this area. We consider the problem of determining optimal locations for toll control stations on the arcs of a transportation network. We handle the fact that drivers can avoid control stations on parallel secondary roads. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program and solved using Benders decomposition. We present experimental results for the application of our models to German motorways.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferSagnolSwarat2012, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {A Case Study on Optimizing Toll Enforcements on Motorways}, volume = {22}, booktitle = {3rd Student Conference on Operational Research}, doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.SCOR.2012.1}, pages = {1 -- 10}, year = {2012}, abstract = {In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.}, language = {en} } @article{BorndoerferSagnolSchlechteetal.2016, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors}, volume = {252(2)}, journal = {Annals of Operations Research}, edition = {252}, publisher = {Springer US}, doi = {10.1007/s10479-016-2152-1}, pages = {383 -- 406}, year = {2016}, abstract = {We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferSagnolSwarat2012, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {An IP Approach to Toll Enforcement Optimization on German Motorways}, booktitle = {Operations Research Proceedings 2011}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_51}, pages = {317 -- 322}, year = {2012}, abstract = {This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferBuwayaSagnoletal.2013, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Buwaya, Julia and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach}, volume = {41}, booktitle = {Proceedings of INOC'2013}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org//10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100}, pages = {253 -- 260}, year = {2013}, abstract = {We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferOmontSagnoletal.2012, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Omont, Bertrand and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks}, volume = {105}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012)}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17}, pages = {224 -- 235}, year = {2012}, abstract = {We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of \$N\$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.}, language = {en} } @article{BorndoerferBuwayaSagnoletal.2015, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Buwaya, Julia and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks}, volume = {65}, journal = {Networks}, publisher = {Wiley Periodicals, Inc.}, doi = {10.1002/net.21596}, pages = {312 -- 328}, year = {2015}, abstract = {We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article.}, language = {en} }