@inproceedings{BorndoerferOmontSagnoletal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Omont, Bertrand and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {A Stackelberg game to optimize the distribution of controls in transportation networks}, series = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012)}, volume = {105}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS 2012)}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17}, pages = {224 -- 235}, abstract = {We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of \$N\$ inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.}, language = {en} }