@inproceedings{BorndoerferBuwayaSagnoletal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Buwaya, Julia and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach}, series = {Proceedings of INOC'2013}, volume = {41}, booktitle = {Proceedings of INOC'2013}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org//10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100}, pages = {253 -- 260}, abstract = {We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.}, language = {en} }