@article{BorndoerferSagnolSchlechteetal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimal duty rostering for toll enforcement inspectors}, series = {Annals of Operations Research}, volume = {252(2)}, journal = {Annals of Operations Research}, edition = {252}, publisher = {Springer US}, doi = {10.1007/s10479-016-2152-1}, pages = {383 -- 406}, abstract = {We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, we developed a personalized crew rostering model, to schedule the crews of the tours. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The main focus of this paper extends our previous publications on how different requirements for the rostering can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bi-criteria analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method and how different input parameters influence the problem complexity.}, language = {en} } @article{SchlechteBorndoerferEroletal., author = {Schlechte, Thomas and Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Erol, Berkan and Graffagnino, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Micro-macro transformation of railway networks}, series = {Journal of Rail Transport Planning \& Management}, volume = {1}, journal = {Journal of Rail Transport Planning \& Management}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1016/j.jrtpm.2011.09.001}, pages = {38 -- 48}, abstract = {In this paper a bottom-up approach of automatic simplification of a railway network is presented. Starting from a very detailed, microscopic level, as it is used in railway simulation, the network is transformed by an algorithm to a less detailed level (macroscopic network), that is sufficient for long-term planning and optimization. In addition running and headway times are rounded to a pre-chosen time discretization by a special cumulative method, which we will present and analyse in this paper. After the transformation we fill the network with given train requests to compute an optimal slot allocation. Then the optimized schedule is re-transformed into the microscopic level and can be simulated without any conflicts occuring between the slots. The algorithm is used to transform the network of the very dense Simplon corridor between Swiss and Italy. With our aggregation it is possible for the first time to generate a profit maximal and conflict free timetable for the corridor across a day by a simultaneously optimization run.}, language = {en} } @article{BorndoerferSchlechteSwarat, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Railway Track Allocation -- Simulation, Aggregation, and Optimization}, series = {Proc. 1st International Workshop on High-speed and Intercity Railways (IWHIR 2011)}, volume = {2}, journal = {Proc. 1st International Workshop on High-speed and Intercity Railways (IWHIR 2011)}, number = {148}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-27963-8}, pages = {53 -- 70}, abstract = {Today the railway timetabling process and the track allocation is one of the most challenging problems to solve by a railway company. Especially due to the deregulation of the transport market in the recent years several suppliers of railway traffic have entered the market in Europe. This leads to more potential conflicts between trains caused by an increasing demand of train paths. Planning and operating railway transportation systems is extremely hard due to the combinatorial complexity of the underlying discrete optimization problems, the technical intricacies, and the immense size of the problem instances. In order to make best use of the infrastructure and to ensure economic operation, efficient planning of the railway operation is indispensable. Mathematical optimization models and algorithms can help to automatize and tackle these challenges. Our contribution in this paper is to present a renewed planning process due to the liberalization in Europe and an associated concept for track allocation, that consists of three important parts, simulation, aggregation, and optimization. Furthermore, we present results of our general framework for real world data.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferSagnolSwarat, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {An IP Approach to Toll Enforcement Optimization on German Motorways}, series = {Operations Research Proceedings 2011}, booktitle = {Operations Research Proceedings 2011}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_51}, pages = {317 -- 322}, abstract = {This paper proposes the first model for toll enforcement optimization on German motorways. The enforcement is done by mobile control teams and our goal is to produce a schedule achieving network-wide control, proportional to spatial and time-dependent traffic distributions. Our model consists of two parts. The first plans control tours using a vehicle routing approach with profits and some side constraints. The second plans feasible rosters for the control teams. Both problems can be modeled as Multi-Commodity Flow Problems. Adding additional coupling constraints produces a large-scale integrated integer programming formulation. We show that this model can be solved to optimality for real world instances associated with a control area in East Germany.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{BorndoerferSagnolSwarat, author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {A Case Study on Optimizing Toll Enforcements on Motorways}, series = {3rd Student Conference on Operational Research}, volume = {22}, booktitle = {3rd Student Conference on Operational Research}, doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.SCOR.2012.1}, pages = {1 -- 10}, abstract = {In this paper we present the problem of computing optimal tours of toll inspectors on German motorways. This problem is a special type of vehicle routing problem and builds up an integrated model, consisting of a tour planning and a duty rostering part. The tours should guarantee a network-wide control whose intensity is proportional to given spatial and time dependent traffic distributions. We model this using a space-time network and formulate the associated optimization problem by an integer program (IP). Since sequential approaches fail, we integrated the assignment of crews to the tours in our model. In this process all duties of a crew member must fit in a feasible roster. It is modeled as a Multi-Commodity Flow Problem in a directed acyclic graph, where specific paths correspond to feasible rosters for one month. We present computational results in a case-study on a German subnetwork which documents the practicability of our approach.}, language = {en} } @misc{BorndoerferReutherSchlechteetal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Reuther, Markus and Schlechte, Thomas and Schulz, Christof and Swarat, Elmar and Weider, Steffen}, title = {Duty Rostering in Public Transport - Facing Preferences, Fairness, and Fatigue}, issn = {1438-0064}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-56070}, abstract = {Duty rostering problems occur in different application contexts and come in different flavors. They give rise to very large scale integer programs which ypically have lots of solutions and extremely fractional LP relaxations. In such a situation, heuristics can be a viable algorithmic choice. We propose an mprovement method of the Lin-Kernighan type for the solution of duty rostering problems. We illustrate its versatility and solution quality on three different applications in public transit, vehicle routing, and airline rostering with a focus on the management of preferences, fairness, and fatigue, respectively.}, language = {en} } @misc{BorndoerferSagnolSchlechteetal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Sagnol, Guillaume and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Optimal Toll Enforcement - an Integration of Vehicle Routing and Duty Rostering}, issn = {1438-0064}, doi = {10.1007/s10479-016-2152-1}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-45107}, abstract = {We present the problem of planning mobile tours of inspectors on German motorways to enforce the payment of the toll for heavy good trucks. This is a special type of vehicle routing problem with the objective to conduct as good inspections as possible on the complete network. In addition, the crews of the tours have to be scheduled. Thus, we developed a personalized crew rostering model. The planning of daily tours and the rostering are combined in a novel integrated approach and formulated as a complex and large scale Integer Program. The paper focuses first on different requirements for the rostering and how they can be modeled in detail. The second focus is on a bicriterion analysis of the planning problem to find the balance between the control quality and the roster acceptance. On the one hand the tour planning is a profit maximization problem and on the other hand the rostering should be made in a employee friendly way. Finally, computational results on real-world instances show the practicability of our method.}, language = {en} } @inproceedings{SagnolBorndoerferSchlechteetal., author = {Sagnol, Guillaume and Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games}, series = {7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014)}, volume = {8768}, booktitle = {7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014)}, editor = {Lavi, Ron}, publisher = {Springer}, isbn = {978-3-662-44802-1}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8}, pages = {293}, abstract = {We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.}, language = {en} } @misc{SagnolBorndoerferSchlechteetal., author = {Sagnol, Guillaume and Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Schlechte, Thomas and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games}, issn = {1438-0064}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775}, abstract = {We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.}, language = {en} } @article{BorndoerferBuwayaSagnoletal., author = {Bornd{\"o}rfer, Ralf and Buwaya, Julia and Sagnol, Guillaume and Swarat, Elmar}, title = {Network spot-checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks}, series = {Networks}, volume = {65}, journal = {Networks}, publisher = {Wiley Periodicals, Inc.}, doi = {10.1002/net.21596}, pages = {312 -- 328}, abstract = {We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of arcs to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is more relevant for this problem and we give a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem. We show that the computation of such an equilibrium is NP-hard. More generally, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a SSE in a polymatrix game, even if the game is pairwise zero-sum. Then, we give some bounds on the price of spite, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we report computational experiments on instances constructed from real data, for an application to the enforcement of a truck toll in Germany. These numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed methods, as well as the quality of the bounds derived in this article.}, language = {en} }