TY - CONF A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar A2 - Lavi, Ron T1 - The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games T2 - 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014) N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways. Y1 - 2014 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-zib/frontdoor/index/index/docId/5276 SN - 978-3-662-44802-1 N1 - Brief Announcement included in Back Matter p. 293 following VL - 8768 SP - 293 PB - Springer ER -