TY - GEN A1 - Sagnol, Guillaume A1 - Borndörfer, Ralf A1 - Schlechte, Thomas A1 - Swarat, Elmar T1 - The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games N2 - We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways. T3 - ZIB-Report - 14-38 Y1 - 2014 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-zib/frontdoor/index/index/docId/5277 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775 SN - 1438-0064 ER -