WHU – Working Paper Series in Economics
ISSN 2511-1159
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- 2018 (6) (show_all)
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WP 18/06
At the beginning of their career civil servants in Germany can choose between the social health insurance (SHI) system and a private plan combined with a direct reimbursement of the government of up to 70 percent. Most civil servants chose the latter, not only but also because they have to cover all contribution payments in the social system themselves, while normal employees get nearly 50 percent from their employers. The city state of Hamburg decided to change the system by paying a share of the contributions if civil servants choose the social plan. We use a stochastic microsimulation model to analyse which socio-economic types of civil servants could benefit from the Hamburg plan and if this changes the mix of insured persons in the SHI system. Our results show that low income and high morbidity types as well as families have a substantially higher incentive to choose SHI. This reform might thereby increase the adverse selection of high risk cases towards SHI.
WP 18/05
Gone with the windfall
(2018)
Due to the debate about the generosity of LTC insurance benefits the German government decided to increase benefits and widen the circle of LTC beneficiaries with the Second LTC Strengthening Act. In this paper, we evaluate the long-term implications of this recent reform for the German LTC insurance scheme. Using the framework of generational accounting we show that the reform has led to a widening of the short-term gap between revenues and expenditure and that the LTC insurance is not sustainably financed, neither pre- nor post-reform. By the early 2020s there will be fiscal pressure for further reforms. From an intergenerational perspective, the reform can be seen as a windfall to current beneficiaries increasing the intergenerational redistribution through the pay-as-you-go system.
WP 18/04
This paper examines the recession probabilities for the Eurozone along four different dimensions: First, we identify the best performing indicators for a recession within the next 12 months based on 43 underlying single variables and their different transformations in a benchmark model. We find that a modified version of the yield curve incorporating the shadow interest rate removes the downward rigidity of the front-leg and restores part of the informational content of the term spread at the zero lower bound. However, the best performing single indicator of the benchmark model is Real M1 followed by the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), the investment grade corporate bond spread and the Terms of Trade. Second, the paper establishes three submodels to increase the lead-time and the stability of recession models: (i) Monetary transmission channels via principal component analysis; (ii) Bivariate regressions to identify paramount combinations; (iii) Unstable surges vis-à-vis the Hodrick-Prescott trend to detect animal spirits and hawkish mistakes. Third, the analysis is extended over various forecasting horizons (6m, 18m and 24m). Fourth, the results are analyzed from the perspective of risk-affine and risk-averse investors.
WP 18/03
This paper develops techniques of estimation and inference in a prototypical macroeconomic adaptive learning model with slowly decreasing gains. A sequential three-step procedure based on a `super-consistent' estimator of the rational expectations equilibrium parameter is proposed. It is shown that this procedure is asymptotically equivalent to first estimating the structural parameters jointly via ordinary least-squares (OLS) and then using the so-obtained estimates to form a plug-in estimator of the rational expectations equilibrium parameter. In spite of failing Grenander's conditions for well-behaved data, a limiting normal distribution of the estimators centered at the true parameters is derived. Although this distribution is singular, it can nevertheless be used to draw inferences about joint restrictions by applying results from Andrews (1987) to show that Wald-type statistics remain valid when equipped with a pseudo-inverse. Monte-Carlo evidence confirms the accuracy of the asymptotic theory for the finite sample behaviour of estimators and test statistics discussed here.
WP 18/02
This paper employs event study methods to evaluate the effects of ECB’s nonstandard monetary policy program announcements on 10-year government bond yields of euro area member states. It covers data from 11 euro area countries from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2017 and distinguishes between the more solvent countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands) and the less solvent ones (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it is the first paper to reveal that measurable effects of announcements arise with a one-day delay meaning that government bond markets take some time to react to ECB announcements. Second, it quantifies the country-specific extent of yield reduction which seems inversely related to the solvency rating of the corresponding countries. The reduction of the spread between both groups in response to an event is due to a stronger decrease in the less solvent group. Third, this result is confirmed by letting the announcement variable interact with the spread level, which is an innovation in this strand of literature. By employing different data as control variables, it turns out that the results are robust for a given event set.
WP 18/01
We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects’ beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback rovision in public goods settings.