L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Refine
Year of publication
- 2008 (1)
Document Type
- Working Paper (1)
Language
- English (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (1)
Keywords
Institute
Airlines frequently use code-share agreements allowing each other to market seats on flights operated by partner airlines. Regulation may allow code-share agreements with antitrust immunity (cooperative price setting), or without antitrust immunity, or not at all. I compare relative welfare effects of these regulation regimes for complementary airline networks. A crucial point is that such agreements are used to identify and price discriminate interline passengers. I find that interline passengers always benefit from code-share agreements while non-interline passengers are worse off. Furthermore, I show that the second effect questions the overall usefulness of code-share agreements from a welfare perspective.