D62 Externalities
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This paper considers a congested airport that provides aeronautical services to airlines and concessions to retailers or, respectively, car rental companies. It is shown that airport retailers exert downward pressure on the private aeronautical charge. On the other hand, the effect of car rentals on the private aeronautical charge is ambiguous. By contrast, the first-best airfare and aeronautical charge are independent of retail profits, while they are positively related to car rentals. Finally, the comparison of private and welfare-oriented airport behavior shows that private behavior can lead to the welfare-optimal outcome when commercial services exist.
We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.
This paper analyzes a congested airport that provides aeronautical services to airlines and concessions to retailers and car rental companies. The sum of retail demands inside and outside the airport area is fixed, while an increase of the passenger quantity increases car rental demand. It is shown that an increase of the per passenger retail profit can reduce the private aeronautical charge and the private car rental charge. By contrast, the effect of car rentals on the private aeronautical charge is ambiguous. The welfare-optimal passenger number and aeronautical charge are both independent of retail profit.
This paper develops a tractable model of third-degree price discrimination in airline markets that features two types of passengers with different time valuations, carriers in Cournot competition and a congested infrastructure. We find that price discrimination always leads to a loss of social welfare when, in the first stage, the congestion charge is chosen to maximize welfare by incorporating carriers’ behavior in the second stage. We also show that the welfare loss can be small if, in the process of choosing the optimal airport charges, carriers were treated as atomistic.
