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This paper examines the sensitivity of profit shifting to the corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and its parent company. We exploit tax rate variation stemming from European tax reforms over the period 2003-2013 while accounting for tax base adjustments that might affect firms’ profit shifting response to tax rate changes. We find that affiliates’ profits are sensitive to tax rate changes. However, tax base broadening reforms mitigate the tax rate incentives for profit shifting and significantly reduce the semi-elasticity of profits with respect to corporate tax rates. Finally, we provide evidence of a downward trend in the tax sensitivity of profit shifting, suggesting that the spread of anti-avoidance regulation may have successfully constrained profit-shifting strategies.
This study examines the relation between executives’ inside debt holdings and corporate tax risk. As executives’ inside debt holdings are unsecured and unfunded, they should align executives’ interests with those of outside debtholders and incentivize executives to act more conservatively toward risk. Hence, inside debt should also reduce the risk of tax avoidance activities. Consistent with this prediction, we find that executive inside debt holdings are negatively related to tax risk. Further, this relation becomes stronger at higher levels of tax risk. We also find that the relation between insider debt and tax risk is stronger for firms that are not facing liquidity constraints and among well-governed firms. The latter result implies that institutional ownership and inside debt compensation are substitutes in reducing tax risk. Overall, our results suggest that part of the observed cross-sectional difference in tax avoidance can be explained by a reduction in tax risk that is related to executive inside debt holdings.
Tax loss carrybacks
(2016)
Tax regimes treat losses and profits asymmetrically when profits are immediately taxed but losses are not immediately refunded. We find that treating losses less asymmetrically by granting refunds less restrictively increases loss firms' investment: A third of the refund is invested and the rest is held as cash or returned to shareholders. However, the investment response is driven primarily by firms prone to engage in risky overinvestment. Consistent with the risk of misallocation, we find a delayed exit of low-productivity loss firms receiving less restrictive refunds, indicating potential distortion of the competitive selection of firms. This distortion also negatively affects aggregate output and productivity. Our results suggest that stimulating loss firms' investment with refunds unconditional on their future prospects comes at the risk of misallocation.
This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.
In many situations, firms have an incentive to charge different prices to different consumers. A price discrimination strategy aims at exploiting differences in consumers' willingness to pay in order to increase the firm's profit. At the same time, consumers often evaluate a purchase transaction with respect to the perceived (un)fairness regarding the terms of the transaction, prices or qualities provided. If consumers are inequity averse to the extent that they care about whether other customers pay a lower relative price per quality, a quality based price discrimination may turn out less profitable than if consumers act selfishly.
The dissertation project analyzes the impact of consumer social preferences on the implementation of different pricing strategies in monopolistic and duopolistic markets. It accounts for asymmetrically distributed information about product quality and emphasizes the optimal signaling strategies in a monopoly. Additionally, quality-based price discrimination is identified as the optimal strategy to eliminate potential competition under perfect information. In the context of third-degree price discrimination, the effect of inequity aversion on quality choices is analyzed.
This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.