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Fair value and audit fees
(2012)
This paper investigates the effect of fair value reporting and its attributes on audit fees. We use as our primary sample the European real estate industry around mandatory IFRS adoption (under which reporting of property fair values becomes compulsory), due to its unique operating and reporting characteristics. We document lower audit fees for firms reporting property assets at fair value relative to those employing depreciated cost―a difference that appears driven (in part) by impairment tests that occur only under depreciated cost. We further find that audit fees are decreasing in firm’s exposure to fair value, and increasing both in the complexity of the fair value estimation and for recognition (versus only disclosure) of fair values. We corroborate our findings in two alternative settings: contrasting UK and US real estate firms; and using UK investment trusts. Overall, the results suggest that fair values can lead to lower monitoring costs; however, any reductions in audit fees will vary with salient characteristics of the fair value reporting, including the difficulty to measure and the treatment within the financial statements.
Delegated monitoring
(2012)
To highlight the value of delegated monitoring through bond trustees, we examine the high-yield corporate bond market where default risk is high, covenants are numerous, and market values are particularly sensitive to wealth transfers. We show that bond trustees that also act as underwriters in the low-grade bond segment, but not the market’s largest trustees, reduce firms’ at-issue bond yields by 33 to 40 basis points. Accordingly, we report significantly lower bond default and downgrade risks associated with superior monitoring by these trustees. These pricing effects remain when we control for self-selection and do not hinge on whether we solely consider trustee identity or interaction terms of trustees with covenant variables that measure necessary monitoring effort. Our results can be interpreted as evidence for informational and reputational spillover effects of banks providing several services in the high-yield market segment.
This paper analyzes a congested airport that provides aeronautical services to airlines and concessions to retailers and car rental companies. The sum of retail demands inside and outside the airport area is fixed, while an increase of the passenger quantity increases car rental demand. It is shown that an increase of the per passenger retail profit can reduce the private aeronautical charge and the private car rental charge. By contrast, the effect of car rentals on the private aeronautical charge is ambiguous. The welfare-optimal passenger number and aeronautical charge are both independent of retail profit.
This paper develops a tractable model of third-degree price discrimination in airline markets that features two types of passengers with different time valuations, carriers in Cournot competition and a congested infrastructure. We find that price discrimination always leads to a loss of social welfare when, in the first stage, the congestion charge is chosen to maximize welfare by incorporating carriers’ behavior in the second stage. We also show that the welfare loss can be small if, in the process of choosing the optimal airport charges, carriers were treated as atomistic.
Using a large international data set we analyze whether business cycle forecasters tend to herd or anti-herd. Applying different measures of economic crises, we distinguish between normal economic circumstances and times of crises. We fnd evidence for anti-herding behavior for most industrial economies, i.e. forecasters eliberately stick out their neck with extreme forecasts for strategic reasons. For a set of emerging market economies, by contrast, we find evidence for herding behavior. We relate this finding to the high incidence of economic and financial crises in these countries. A test for herding behavior during economic crises confirms that forecasters tend to herd in times of high forecast uncertainty.