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Research on motivation may be alive and vital, but it is highly fragmented. This thesis discusses the most prevalent motivation theories and compares their ideas and concepts to introduce two new fields of research in this area: neurology and cardiology. The next era of motivation research will conflate concepts derived from behavioral approaches with organic substructure and elevate our understanding of motivation. A sound understanding of motivation allows organizational scholars to solve the motivational problem in the context of the organizational problem. To make proper use of promising novel insights in organizational contexts, we will revisit the current state of performance evaluation and their ability to coordinate and motivate individuals. By reconsidering how rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation via complex moods, and how superior intrinsic motivation increases performance compared to extrinsic motivation, this thesis introduces the motivation-potential model of feedback. Using a case study on a feedback-based management control system at a European e-commerce company based in Germany, we test how self-determination theory could be expanded by neurological concepts and quantitatively applied to design performance evaluation systems under the consideration of the motivation-potential model of feedback. In its entirety, this thesis attempts to build common ground for the future of motivation research and provides in-depth examples of theorization upon the aggregation of the field of research, as well as practical application and execution.
We consider an R&D contest between n firms in the presence of external spillovers. Our analysis focuses on the effects of these knowledge spillovers on joint venture activities between firms. In particular, we are interested in how different budget responsiblities within the research joint venture (RJV) affect profits of firms taking part in the joint venture and profits of their non-cooperating rival firms. Three arrangements for RJVs are analyzed: First, cooperation, in which the firms participating in the joint venture completely share the knowledge they created in the innovation process and each firm has a sovereign budget responsibility. Second, a collusive arrangement in which the participating firms not only share their knowledge but have joint budget responsibilities in the sense that they make all strategic choices cooperatively and maximize joint profits. Third, a hierarchical form, in which the cooperating firms establish a joint headquarter which has strategic budget responsibility in the sense that can strategically subsidize R&D expenditures of its member firms so as to maximize overall RJV profits. We show that the first two arrangements can be mimiced in the hierarchical structure and that a hierarchical structure is optimal if it completely subsidizes its members’ R&D activities. In this case all rival firms are driven out of the contest.