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We used the oil-price forecasts of the 'Survey of Professional Forecasters' published by the European Central Bank to analyze whether oil-price forecasters herd or anti-herd. Oil-price forecasts are consistent with herding (anti-herding) of forecasters if forecasts are biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. Based on a new empirical test developed by Bernhardt et al. (J. Financ. Econ. 80: 657-675, 2006), we found strong evidence of anti-herding among oil-price forecasters.
We consider an R&D contest between n firms in the presence of external spillovers. Our analysis focuses on the effects of these knowledge spillovers on joint venture activities between firms. In particular, we are interested in how different budget responsiblities within the research joint venture (RJV) affect profits of firms taking part in the joint venture and profits of their non-cooperating rival firms. Three arrangements for RJVs are analyzed: First, cooperation, in which the firms participating in the joint venture completely share the knowledge they created in the innovation process and each firm has a sovereign budget responsibility. Second, a collusive arrangement in which the participating firms not only share their knowledge but have joint budget responsibilities in the sense that they make all strategic choices cooperatively and maximize joint profits. Third, a hierarchical form, in which the cooperating firms establish a joint headquarter which has strategic budget responsibility in the sense that can strategically subsidize R&D expenditures of its member firms so as to maximize overall RJV profits. We show that the first two arrangements can be mimiced in the hierarchical structure and that a hierarchical structure is optimal if it completely subsidizes its members’ R&D activities. In this case all rival firms are driven out of the contest.
A fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can force the firm to sell the following forward contracts: the firm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but receives the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competitive financial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic probability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only.
The Leading Question:
What Western multinational corporations (MNCs) need to know to successfully reverse their innovation flow i.e. launch new products developed in emerging markets in their domestic markets?
Main Findings:
- Realities in emerging markets are well suited for designing basic products that can be the starting point for product up-contenting.
- Products originally developed for emerging markets can be successfully adapted for sale in developed markets – a “reverse” innovation flow gains momentum.
- This strategy can both help to unlock new customer segments in wealthy markets and to compete against emerging MNCs, private labels, and generics conquering these markets bottom-up.
We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.
The regulation of rail network access is a key component of the EU policy that aims to strengthen rail markets. Two specific regulations are proposed: (i) a priority for long-distance (freight) services and (ii) a scarcity premium. Based on a congested network with two rail links, numerical simulations demonstrate that total surplus can be greater under the priority rule, which depends on the network charge per train-kilometer. Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is always greater under the priority rule, while fixed network-cost recovery is easier to achieve if a scarcity premium exists.
This paper considers a transport network with two firms that operate a parallel service on a hub-to-hub connection and monopoly services on spoke-to-hub connections under increasing returns to scale. We find the following: A symmetric equilibrium cannot occur under independent (non-cooperative) pricing when the number of spoke-to-spoke passengers becomes positive. The effect of cooperative pricing on mark-ups in spoke-to-hub, hub-to-hub and spoke-to-spoke markets (where double marginalization can occur) can be positive or negative. Cooperation can reduce total welfare though hub-to-hub markets are small.