Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (20)
- Article (2)
Language
- English (22)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (22)
Keywords
- Corporate taxation (4)
- Steuerhinterziehung (4)
- Einkommensteuer (3)
- IFRS (3)
- Income tax (3)
- Körperschaftssteuer (3)
- Privatunternehmen (3)
- Tax avoidance (3)
- Corporate Governance (2)
- Corporate governance (2)
Institute
- WHU Financial Accounting & Tax Center (FAccT Center) (22) (show_all)
This study examines heterogeneity in tax rate elasticities of corporate capital using staggered variation in local business tax rates of German municipalities. The results suggest an average long-run capital decline of 0.97% after a 1% increase in the tax rate. In line with prior literature that suggests higher investment-cash flow sensitivities of firms with financing constraints tax rate elasticities are up to half times larger for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Moreover, capital responses are about half times larger for firms with fewer tax avoidance possibilities. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on tax incidence. I find a weaker relation between taxes and capital for firms that are less likely to bear the economic burden of the tax because they shift the tax incidence to their stakeholders.
This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.
This paper examines the sensitivity of profit shifting to the corporate tax rate difference between a subsidiary and its parent company. We exploit tax rate variation stemming from European tax reforms over the period 2003-2013 while accounting for tax base adjustments that might affect firms’ profit shifting response to tax rate changes. We find that affiliates’ profits are sensitive to tax rate changes. However, tax base broadening reforms mitigate the tax rate incentives for profit shifting and significantly reduce the semi-elasticity of profits with respect to corporate tax rates. Finally, we provide evidence of a downward trend in the tax sensitivity of profit shifting, suggesting that the spread of anti-avoidance regulation may have successfully constrained profit-shifting strategies.
This study examines the relation between executives’ inside debt holdings and corporate tax risk. As executives’ inside debt holdings are unsecured and unfunded, they should align executives’ interests with those of outside debtholders and incentivize executives to act more conservatively toward risk. Hence, inside debt should also reduce the risk of tax avoidance activities. Consistent with this prediction, we find that executive inside debt holdings are negatively related to tax risk. Further, this relation becomes stronger at higher levels of tax risk. We also find that the relation between insider debt and tax risk is stronger for firms that are not facing liquidity constraints and among well-governed firms. The latter result implies that institutional ownership and inside debt compensation are substitutes in reducing tax risk. Overall, our results suggest that part of the observed cross-sectional difference in tax avoidance can be explained by a reduction in tax risk that is related to executive inside debt holdings.
Tax loss carrybacks
(2016)
Tax regimes treat losses and profits asymmetrically when profits are immediately taxed but losses are not immediately refunded. We find that treating losses less asymmetrically by granting refunds less restrictively increases loss firms' investment: A third of the refund is invested and the rest is held as cash or returned to shareholders. However, the investment response is driven primarily by firms prone to engage in risky overinvestment. Consistent with the risk of misallocation, we find a delayed exit of low-productivity loss firms receiving less restrictive refunds, indicating potential distortion of the competitive selection of firms. This distortion also negatively affects aggregate output and productivity. Our results suggest that stimulating loss firms' investment with refunds unconditional on their future prospects comes at the risk of misallocation.
This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.
This paper examines pricing differences across recognized and disclosed fair values. We build on prior literature by examining two theoretical causes of such differences: lower reliability of the disclosed information, and/or investors’ higher related information processing costs. We examine European real estate firms reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which require that fair values for investment properties, our sample firms’ key operating asset, either be recognized on the balance sheet or disclosed in the footnotes. Consistent with prior research, we predict and find a lower association between equity prices and disclosed relative to recognized investment property fair values, reflecting a discount assigned to disclosed fair values. We then predict and find that this discount is mitigated by lower information processing costs (proxied via high analyst following), and some support that it is also mitigated by higher reliability (proxied via use of external appraisals). These latter results are documented using subsample analyses to test one attribute (either information processing costs or reliability) while holding the other constant. Overall, these findings are consistent with fair value reliability and information processing costs providing complementary explanations for observed pricing discounts assessed on disclosed accounting amounts.
The paper studies the effect of uncertainty in firm-speciffic tax avoidance on firm value. We first show in a clean surplus valuation model that expectations about future profitability interact with corporate tax avoidance. Two dimensions of corporate tax avoidance strategies matter for valuation: uncertainty and level of expected future tax rates. We confirm the importance of level and uncertainty of tax avoidance for forecasts of future tax rates using a small sample of analyst tax rate forecasts. Consistent with the model and the implications from analyst forecasts, we derive a tax signal-to-noise ratio based on historical tax information. In our sample of 2,820 firms, we show empirically that this tax signal-to-noise ratio amplifies the effect of pre-tax earnings on firm value. Pre-tax earnings have a stronger effect on firm value for firms with effective and persistent tax avoidance. Firms with volatile effective tax rates receive a discount on their earnings.
This paper empirically examines why tax avoidance differs across individuals. We use rich Swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers, with a link between corporate and individual tax returns. Surprisingly, few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities. Our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation. In addition to monetary benets from tax avoidance (incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance (access), as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are important factors for the individual's tax avoidance decision. We further show that information about tax avoidance opportunities spreads within informal networks.
We test whether dividend taxes affect corporate investments. We exploit Sweden’s 2006 dividend tax cut of 10 percentage points for closely held corporations and five percentage points for widely held corporations. Using rich administrative panel data and tripledifference estimators, we find that this dividend tax cut does not affect aggregate investment but that it affects the allocation of corporate investment. Cash-constrained firms increase investment after the dividend tax cut relative to cash-rich firms. Reallocation is stronger among closely held firms that experience a larger tax cut. This result is explained by higher external equity in cashconstrained firms and by higher dividends in cash-rich firms after the tax cut. The heterogeneous investment responses imply that the dividend tax cut raises efficiency by improving allocation of investment.