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- WHU Financial Accounting & Tax Center (FAccT Center) (6) (show_all)
This paper analyzes whether a dividend tax cut for owner–managers of closely held corporations encourages income shifting, income generation, or both. We use rich Swedish administrative micro data from 2000 to 2011 comprising detailed firm- and individual-level information. We find robust evidence of extensive income shifting across tax bases in response to the 2006 Swedish dividend tax cut. Owner–managers of closely held corporations reclassify earned income as dividend income but do not increase total income. The response is more pronounced for owner–managers with tax incentives and with easier access to income shifting through a high ownership share.
This paper empirically examines why tax avoidance differs across individuals. We use rich Swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers, with a link between corporate and individual tax returns. Surprisingly, few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities. Our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation. In addition to monetary benets from tax avoidance (incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance (access), as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are important factors for the individual's tax avoidance decision. We further show that information about tax avoidance opportunities spreads within informal networks.
We study the importance of owner wages and dividends as alternative payout channels in privately held firms. Using data on all Swedish closely held corporations and their owner–managers over the period 2000–2009, we find that dividends comprise one-fourth of total payout to owner–managers. Dividends are used as a flexible payout channel. Wages are the preferred payout channel and are rather sticky. Choice of payout channel and level of payout are affected by dividend and wage taxation. Consistent with the difference in flexibility across payout channels, shareholder taxes have a stronger impact on dividends than on wages.
We examine the role of tax incentives, tax awareness, and complexity in tax evasion. We observe a specific type of tax evasion among business owners in Swedish administrative panel data, after the tax authority has approved all tax returns. For the period 2006–2009, approximately 5% of tax returns overstate a claimed dividend allowance. Tax awareness decreases and complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting. Our results indicate that some observed misreporting could be accidental, while some misreporting is deliberate tax evasion. We identify a positive and significant effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by exploiting a large kink in the tax schedule. The majority of misreporting cases remains undetected by the tax authority. Self-correction of tax evasion by taxpayers is the dominant type of detection.
We test whether dividend taxes affect corporate investments. We exploit Sweden’s 2006 dividend tax cut of 10 percentage points for closely held corporations and five percentage points for widely held corporations. Using rich administrative panel data and tripledifference estimators, we find that this dividend tax cut does not affect aggregate investment but that it affects the allocation of corporate investment. Cash-constrained firms increase investment after the dividend tax cut relative to cash-rich firms. Reallocation is stronger among closely held firms that experience a larger tax cut. This result is explained by higher external equity in cashconstrained firms and by higher dividends in cash-rich firms after the tax cut. The heterogeneous investment responses imply that the dividend tax cut raises efficiency by improving allocation of investment.
This paper tests the effect of dividend taxation on employment. Since dividend taxation affects real investments, tax-induced changes in real investments should map into employment effects. Using a difference-in-difference approach around the Swedish 2006 dividend tax cut and unique corporate-level data with income tax information on every employee, we find robust evidence of dividend tax-induced employment effects. In response to the dividend cut, both employment and wage levels increase in cash-constrained firms relative to cash-rich closely held corporations.