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Fair value and audit fees
(2012)
This paper investigates the effect of fair value reporting and its attributes on audit fees. We use as our primary sample the European real estate industry around mandatory IFRS adoption (under which reporting of property fair values becomes compulsory), due to its unique operating and reporting characteristics. We document lower audit fees for firms reporting property assets at fair value relative to those employing depreciated cost―a difference that appears driven (in part) by impairment tests that occur only under depreciated cost. We further find that audit fees are decreasing in firm’s exposure to fair value, and increasing both in the complexity of the fair value estimation and for recognition (versus only disclosure) of fair values. We corroborate our findings in two alternative settings: contrasting UK and US real estate firms; and using UK investment trusts. Overall, the results suggest that fair values can lead to lower monitoring costs; however, any reductions in audit fees will vary with salient characteristics of the fair value reporting, including the difficulty to measure and the treatment within the financial statements.
A growing body of literature investigates the interaction of changes in accounting standards with institutions such as investor protection laws and corporate governance mechanisms. We examine the unintended consequences of fair value accounting in determining mandated preferred dividends. We study the case of Russian energy conglomerate UES, which had a good corporate governance track record and a consistent dividend history. Following its adoption of fair value accounting, UES reported the highest quarterly profit in world corporate history, but it subsequently omitted dividends for all its shareholders. The case analysis suggests that the transitory nature of fair value adjustments and the interaction with the investment policy were important considerations in justifying the dividend omission. The reduction in preferred dividends was not offset by any capital gains, and led to a wealth transfer from preferred to ordinary shareholders. Thus, requiring the use of fair value accounting when determining the dividend distribution base can lead to unintended consequences, and increase agency costs for minority shareholders.
This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.
This study revisits prior research on the valuation of dividends in an accounting-based valuation framework. Using a battery of tests, we show that market value deflation is essential in market-based tests of dividend displacement and signaling because it controls for ‘stale’ information in addition to scale (size) differences across firms. For U.S. firms, we show that after controlling for ‘stale’ information, the empirical association between dividends and market values switches from positive to negative. This switch is not explained by scale differences across firms. Further, we show that after controlling for staleness, the valuation of dividends remains positive for European firms. This result is explained by the relatively stronger association of dividends with future earnings in these settings (i.e., signaling). Lastly, our country-specific estimates of dividend valuation provide a potentially valuable index for studies aimed at examining the effects of accounting and securities regulation on information asymmetries in an international context.
This paper examines pricing differences across recognized and disclosed fair values. We build on prior literature by examining two theoretical causes of such differences: lower reliability of the disclosed information, and/or investors’ higher related information processing costs. We examine European real estate firms reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which require that fair values for investment properties, our sample firms’ key operating asset, either be recognized on the balance sheet or disclosed in the footnotes. Consistent with prior research, we predict and find a lower association between equity prices and disclosed relative to recognized investment property fair values, reflecting a discount assigned to disclosed fair values. We then predict and find that this discount is mitigated by lower information processing costs (proxied via high analyst following), and some support that it is also mitigated by higher reliability (proxied via use of external appraisals). These latter results are documented using subsample analyses to test one attribute (either information processing costs or reliability) while holding the other constant. Overall, these findings are consistent with fair value reliability and information processing costs providing complementary explanations for observed pricing discounts assessed on disclosed accounting amounts.
This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.
This paper analyzes whether a dividend tax cut for owner–managers of closely held corporations encourages income shifting, income generation, or both. We use rich Swedish administrative micro data from 2000 to 2011 comprising detailed firm- and individual-level information. We find robust evidence of extensive income shifting across tax bases in response to the 2006 Swedish dividend tax cut. Owner–managers of closely held corporations reclassify earned income as dividend income but do not increase total income. The response is more pronounced for owner–managers with tax incentives and with easier access to income shifting through a high ownership share.
This paper empirically examines why tax avoidance differs across individuals. We use rich Swedish administrative panel data on all taxpayers, with a link between corporate and individual tax returns. Surprisingly, few individuals utilize legal and observable tax avoidance opportunities. Our results show that there are several frictions in tax avoidance participation. In addition to monetary benets from tax avoidance (incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax avoidance (access), as well as information and knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are important factors for the individual's tax avoidance decision. We further show that information about tax avoidance opportunities spreads within informal networks.
We study the importance of owner wages and dividends as alternative payout channels in privately held firms. Using data on all Swedish closely held corporations and their owner–managers over the period 2000–2009, we find that dividends comprise one-fourth of total payout to owner–managers. Dividends are used as a flexible payout channel. Wages are the preferred payout channel and are rather sticky. Choice of payout channel and level of payout are affected by dividend and wage taxation. Consistent with the difference in flexibility across payout channels, shareholder taxes have a stronger impact on dividends than on wages.