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Do FOMC members herd?
(2011)
Twice a year FOMC members submit forecasts for growth, unemployment and inflation to be published in the Humphrey-Hawkins Report to Congress. In this paper we use individual FOMC forecasts to assess whether these forecasts exhibit herding behavior, a pattern often found in private sector forecasts. While growth and unemployment forecast do not show herding behavior, the inflation forecasts show strong evidence of anti-herding, i.e. FOMC members intentionally scatter their forecasts around the consensus. Interestingly, anti-herding is more important for nonvoting members than for voters.
Using a large international data set we analyze whether business cycle forecasters tend to herd or anti-herd. Applying different measures of economic crises, we distinguish between normal economic circumstances and times of crises. We fnd evidence for anti-herding behavior for most industrial economies, i.e. forecasters eliberately stick out their neck with extreme forecasts for strategic reasons. For a set of emerging market economies, by contrast, we find evidence for herding behavior. We relate this finding to the high incidence of economic and financial crises in these countries. A test for herding behavior during economic crises confirms that forecasters tend to herd in times of high forecast uncertainty.
Central bank projections have gained considerable attention for monetary policy modeling. However, less is known about the nature of central bank projections. This letter explores the unbiasedness and rationality of more than 2; 000 growth and in ation projections published by 15 major central banks. The results indicate that central bank projections are in most cases rational and unbiased. Interestingly,
in ation projections are more biased than growth projections.
In this paper, we contrast more than 6,000 private sector forecasts to projections of the German council of economic experts (Sachverständigenrat). Although the forecasts are submitted simultaneously, we find that the council's real economy forecasts, i.e. their growth, unemployment and fiscal forecasts have a higher forecast accuracy compared to the private sector forecasts. We also document that private sector forecasters deliberately place their real economy forecasts away from the council's projection. This strategic forecasting behavior explains why the private sector performs worse than the council. This result is robust over time but splitting the private sector in different groups reveals that the forecasts of banks compared to research institutes deviate more from the council's forecast.
We use oil price forecasts from the Consensus Economic Forecast poll to analyze how forecaster build their expectations. Our findings point into the direction that the extrapolative as well as the regressive expectation formation hypothesis play a role. Standard measures of forecast accuracy reveal forecasters' underperformance relative to the random-walk benchmark. However, it seems that this result might be biased due to peso problems.
We used the oil-price forecasts of the 'Survey of Professional Forecasters' published by the European Central Bank to analyze whether oil-price forecasters herd or anti-herd. Oil-price forecasts are consistent with herding (anti-herding) of forecasters if forecasts are biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. Based on a new empirical test developed by Bernhardt et al. (J. Financ. Econ. 80: 657-675, 2006), we found strong evidence of anti-herding among oil-price forecasters.
On the international consistency of short-term, medium-term, and long-term oil price forecasts
(2011)
We derive internal consistency restrictions on short-term, mediumterm, and long-term oil price forecasts. We then analyze whether oil price forecasts extracted from the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the European Central Bank satisfy these internal consistency restrictions. We find that neither short-term forecasts are consistent with medium-term forecasts nor that medium-term forecasts are consistent with long-term forecasts. Using a more complex expectation formation structure featuring a distributed lag structure, however, we find stronger evidence of internal consistency of mediumterm forecasts with long-term forecasts.
We use data from the Consensus Economics Forecast Poll to analyze how current account forecasters form expectations. Our results suggest that forecasts do not satisfy traditional unbiasedness and orthogonality criteria for forecast rationality. In addition, we find anti-herding behavior among forecasters for the Euro area and G7 countries. We also show that the cross-sectional heterogeneity in anti-herding is associated with cross-sectional heterogeneity in forecast accuracy. More specifically, we find some evidence indicating that forecasters who tend to herd provide more accurate forecasts than their colleagues who follow an anti-herding strategy.
This paper uses the Consensus Economic Forecast poll to investigate how forecasters in the foreign exchange market form expectations. In order to explain the expectation formation of forecasters, around 50,000 forecasts for 22 OECD-member currencies are analyzed. The results indicate that forecasters do not form expectations rationally when tested for unbiasedness and orthogonality. The results also suggest that forecasts for industrialized economies show a mix of trend-following and fundamentally-oriented behavior. By contrast, forecasts for emerging markets show significantly more destabilizing expectations. We find forecasting tendencies to strengthen in the short-run and medium-run when controlling for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. For long-run forecasts however this can not be confirmed.
We use the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecaster to show that euro area expectations are consistent with standard macroeconomic building blocks such as the Phillips curve, Okun's law, and the Taylor rule. Moreover, the paper finds that the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 did not change the expectation formation process as professional forecasters still adopt macroeconomic building blocks for their forecast. The scepticism that has recently been raised concerning macroeconomic building blocks has apparently not yet affected professional forecasts. On the contrary, we conclude that professional forecasters still have faith in macroeconomic building blocks.