TY - UNPD A1 - Irlenbusch, Bernd A1 - Rilke, Rainer Michael A1 - Walkowitz, Gari T1 - Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games - the role of transparency N2 - We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects’ beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback rovision in public goods settings. T3 - WHU – Working Paper Series in Economics - WP 18/01 KW - Feedbackgestaltung KW - Feedback design KW - Transparenz KW - Transparency KW - Öffentliches Gut KW - Public good KW - Konditionierte Kooperation KW - Conditional cooperation KW - Experiment KW - Experiment Y1 - 2018 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-whu/frontdoor/index/index/docId/639 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-6396 PB - WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management CY - Vallendar ER -