TY - UNPD A1 - Conrads, Julian A1 - Ellenberger, Mischa A1 - Irlenbusch, Bernd A1 - Ohms, Elia Nora A1 - Rilke, Rainer Michael A1 - Walkowitz, Gari T1 - Team goal incentives and individual lying behavior N2 - In this article we examine the influence of two goal compensation schemes on lying behavior. Based on the die rolling task of Fischbacher/Föllmi-Heusi (2013), we apply an individual goal incentive scheme and a team goal incentive scheme. In both settings individuals receive a fixed bonus when attaining the goal. We find that under team goal incentives subjects are less inclined to over-report production outputs beyond the amount which is on average necessary for goal attainment. Investigating subjects’ beliefs on their team mates’ behavior under team goal incentives reveals that subjects who either believe that lying is not profitable (i.e., the team goal cannot be reached with a lie) or not absolutely necessary (i.e., there is a good chance that the team goal can also be reached without lying) tend to be honest. We also find that subjects who believe that the team goal has already been reached by their team mates tend to over-report production outputs. Across treatments, women are found to be more honest than men. Subjects’ ersonality is not associated with reported production outputs. Our work contributes to previous research on how different compensation schemes affect unethical behavior in organizational settings. T3 - WHU – Working Paper Series in Economics - WP 17/02 KW - Vergütungssystem KW - Compensation scheme KW - Lügen KW - Lying KW - Arbeitsgruppe KW - Team KW - Ziele KW - Goals KW - Individuelle Unterschiede KW - Individual differences KW - Experiment Y1 - 2017 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-whu/frontdoor/index/index/docId/405 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-4054 VL - 2017 IS - WP 17/02 PB - WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management CY - Vallendar ER -