TY - UNPD A1 - Höffler, Felix A1 - Kranz, Sebastian T1 - Using forward contracts to reduce regulatory captures N2 - A fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can force the firm to sell the following forward contracts: the firm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but receives the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competitive financial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic probability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only. T3 - WHU – Working Paper Series in Economics - WP 10/02 KW - Incentive regulation KW - Anreizregulierung KW - Regulatory capture KW - Vereinnahmung einer Regulierungsbehörde KW - Virtual power plants KW - Virtuelle Kraftwerke Y1 - 2017 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-whu/frontdoor/index/index/docId/458 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-4581 ER -