TY - UNPD A1 - Jost, Peter-J. T1 - Joint ventures in patent contests with spillover and the role of strategic budgeting N2 - We consider an R&D contest between n firms in the presence of external spillovers. Our analysis focuses on the effects of these knowledge spillovers on joint venture activities between firms. In particular, we are interested in how different budget responsiblities within the research joint venture (RJV) affect profits of firms taking part in the joint venture and profits of their non-cooperating rival firms. Three arrangements for RJVs are analyzed: First, cooperation, in which the firms participating in the joint venture completely share the knowledge they created in the innovation process and each firm has a sovereign budget responsibility. Second, a collusive arrangement in which the participating firms not only share their knowledge but have joint budget responsibilities in the sense that they make all strategic choices cooperatively and maximize joint profits. Third, a hierarchical form, in which the cooperating firms establish a joint headquarter which has strategic budget responsibility in the sense that can strategically subsidize R&D expenditures of its member firms so as to maximize overall RJV profits. We show that the first two arrangements can be mimiced in the hierarchical structure and that a hierarchical structure is optimal if it completely subsidizes its members’ R&D activities. In this case all rival firms are driven out of the contest. KW - Wettbewerb KW - Contest KW - Nebeneffekt KW - Spillover KW - Gemeinschaftsprojekt KW - Joint venture KW - Forschung KW - Research KW - Organisatorische Abbildung KW - Organisational design KW - Strategische Haushaltsplanung KW - Strategic budgeting Y1 - 2018 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-whu/frontdoor/index/index/docId/688 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-6888 N1 - Published in: Journal of Economics and Business, 63(2011)6, pp. 605-637 PB - WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management CY - Vallendar ER -