TY - UNPD A1 - Czerny, Achim I. T1 - Code-sharing, price discrimination and welfare losses N2 - Airlines frequently use code-share agreements allowing each other to market seats on flights operated by partner airlines. Regulation may allow code-share agreements with antitrust immunity (cooperative price setting), or without antitrust immunity, or not at all. I compare relative welfare effects of these regulation regimes for complementary airline networks. A crucial point is that such agreements are used to identify and price discriminate interline passengers. I find that interline passengers always benefit from code-share agreements while non-interline passengers are worse off. Furthermore, I show that the second effect questions the overall usefulness of code-share agreements from a welfare perspective. T3 - WHU – Working Paper Series in Economics - WP 08/05 KW - Luftverkehrsgesellschaft KW - Airline KW - Allianz KW - Alliance KW - Code-Share-Vereinbarung KW - Code-share agreement KW - Kartellrechtliche Immunität KW - Antitrust immunity KW - Preisdiskriminierung KW - Price discrimination Y1 - 2017 UR - https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-whu/frontdoor/index/index/docId/517 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:992-opus4-5171 PB - WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management CY - Vallendar ER -