Fakultät für Informatik und Mathematik
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Analysing security assumptions taken for the WebRTC and postMessage APIs led us to find a novel attack abusing the browsers' persistent storage capabilities. The presented attack can be executed without the website's visitor knowledge, and it requires neither browser vulnerabilities nor additional software on the browser's side. To exemplify this, we study how can an attacker use browsers to create a network for persistent storage and distribution of arbitrary data.
In our proof of concept, the total storage of the network, and therefore the space used within each browser, grows linearly with the number of origins delivering the malicious JavaScript code. Further, data transfers between browsers are not restricted by the Same Origin Policy, which allows for a unified cross-origin browser network, regardless of the origin from which the script executing the functionality is loaded from.
In the course of our work, we assess the feasibility of a real-life deployment of the network by running experiments using Linux containers and browser automation tools. Moreover, we show how security mechanisms against third-party tracking, cross-site scripting and click-jacking can diminish the attack's impact, or even prevent it.
We introduce a new browser abuse scenario where an attacker uses local storage capabilities without the website's visitor knowledge to create a network of browsers for persistent storage and distribution of arbitrary data. We describe how security-aware users can use mechanisms such as the Content Security Policy (CSP), sandboxing, and third-party tracking protection, i.e., CSP & Company, to limit the network's effectiveness. From another point of view, we also show that the upcoming Suborigin standard can inadvertently thwart existing countermeasures, if it is adopted.
Direct access to the system's resources such as the GPU, persistent storage and networking has enabled in-browser crypto-mining. Thus, there has been a massive response by rogue actors who abuse browsers for mining without the user's consent. This trend has grown steadily for the last months until this practice, i.e., CryptoJacking, has been acknowledged as the number one security threat by several antivirus companies.
Considering this, and the fact that these attacks do not behave as JavaScript malware or other Web attacks, we propose and evaluate several approaches to detect in-browser mining. To this end, we collect information from the top 330.500 Alexa sites. Mainly, we used real-life browsers to visit sites while monitoring resource-related API calls and the browser's resource consumption, e.g., CPU.
Our detection mechanisms are based on dynamic monitoring, so they are resistant to JavaScript obfuscation. Furthermore, our detection techniques can generalize well and classify previously unseen samples with up to 99.99\% precision and recall for the benign class and up to 96\% precision and recall for the mining class. These results demonstrate the applicability of detection mechanisms as a server-side approach, e.g., to support the enhancement of existing blacklists.
Last but not least, we evaluated the feasibility of deploying prototypical implementations of some detection mechanisms directly on the browser. Specifically, we measured the impact of in-browser API monitoring on page-loading time and performed micro-benchmarks for the execution of some classifiers directly within the browser. In this regard, we ascertain that, even though there are engineering challenges to overcome, it is feasible and beneficial for users to bring the mining detection to the browser.
Allowing users to control access to their data is paramount for the success of the Internet of Things; therefore, it is imperative to ensure it, even when data has left the users' control, e.g. shared with cloud infrastructure. Consequently, we propose several state of the art mechanisms from the security and privacy research fields to cope with this requirement.
To illustrate how each mechanism can be applied, we derive a data-centric architecture providing access control and privacy guaranties for the users of IoT-based applications. Moreover, we discuss the limitations and challenges related to applying the selected mechanisms to ensure access control remotely. Also, we validate our architecture by showing how it empowers users to control access to their health data in a quantified self use case.
This doctoral thesis is dedicated to improve a linear algebra attack on the so-called braid group-based Diffie-Hellman conjugacy problem (BDHCP). The general procedure of the attack is to transform a BDHCP to the problem of solving several simultaneous matrix equations. A first improvement is achieved by reducing the solution space of the matrix equations to matrices that have a specific structure, which we call here the left braid structure. Using the left braid structure the number of matrix equations to be solved reduces to one. Based on the left braid structure we are further able to formulate a structure-based attack on the BDHCP. That is to transform the matrix equation to a system of linear equations and exploiting the structure of the corresponding extended coefficient matrix, which is induced by the left braid structure of the solution space. The structure-based attack then has an empirically high probability to solve the BDHCP with significantly less arithmetic operations than the original attack. A third improvement of the original linear algebra attack is to use an algorithm that combines Gaussian elimination with integer polynomial interpolation and the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), instead of fast matrix multiplication as suggested by others. The major idea here is to distribute the task of solving a system of linear equations over a giant finite field to several much smaller finite fields. Based on our empirically measured bounds for the degree of the polynomials to be interpolated and the bit size of the coefficients and integers to be recovered via the CRT, we conclude an improvement of the run time complexity of the original algorithm by a factor of n^8 bit operations in the best case, and still n^6 in the worst case.
Due to the need for fast and energy-efficient accesses to growing amounts of data, the share and number of embedded memories inside modern microchips has been continuously increasing within the last years. Since embedded memories have the highest integration density of a fabrication technology they pose special test challenges due to complex manufacturing defects as well as strong transistor aging phenomena. This necessitates efficient methods for detecting more subtle defects while keeping test costs low. This work presents novel methods and techniques for improving the efficiency of embedded memory manufacturing tests. The proposed methods are demonstrated in an industrial setting based on production-proven transistor, memory as well as chip models and their benefits over the current state-of-the art is worked out.
In dieser Arbeit wird eine neue Integraltransformation, die Roulettransformation, eingeführt. Diese arbeitet mit anisotropen Skalierungen und Rotationen. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Roulettransformation allgemeine gerichtete Singularitäten im Sinne von temperierten Distributionen auflöst. Die Abklingraten an Punkt- sowie Liniensingularitäten werden explizit angegeben.
This thesis distills technical requirements for an increased probative value and data protection compliance, and maps them onto cryptographic properties for which it constructs provably secure and especially private malleable signature schemes (MSS). MSS are specialised digital signature schemes that allow the signatory to authorize certain subsequent modifications, which will not negatively affect the signature verification result.
Legally, regulations such as European Regulation 910/2014 (eIDAS), ‘follow-up’ to longstanding Directive 1999/93/EC, describe the requirements in technology-neutral language. eIDAS states that, when a digital signature meets the full requirements it becomes a qualified electronic signature and then it “[...] shall have the equivalent legal effect of a handwritten signature [...]” [Art. 25 Regulation 910/2014]. The question of what legal effect this has with regards to the probative value that is assigned is actually not determined in EU Regulation 910/2014 but in European member state law. This thesis concentrates in its analysis on the — in this respect detailed — German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). Following the ZPO, a signature awards the signed document with at least a high probative value of prima facie evidence. For signed documents of official authority the ZPO’s statutory rules even award evidence with a legal presumption of authenticity. This increased probative value is also awarded to electronic documents bearing electronic signatures when those conform to the eIDAS requirements. The requirements centre around the technical security goals of integrity and accountability. Technical mechanisms use cryptographic means to detect the absence of unauthorized modifications (integrity) and allow to authenticate the signed document’s signatory (accountability).
However, the specialised malleable signature schemes’ main advantage is a cryptographic property termed privacy: An authorized subsequent modification will protect the confidentiality of the modified original. Moreover, the MSS will retain a verifiable signature if only authorized modifications were carried out. If these properties are reached with provable security the schemes are called private malleable signature schemes. This thesis analyses two forms of MSS discussed in existing literature: Redactable signature schemes (RSS) which allow subsequent deletions, and sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) which allow subsequent edits. These two forms have many application scenarios: A signatory can delegate that a later redaction might take place while retaining the integrity and authenticity protection for the still remaining parts. The verification of a signature on a redacted or sanitized document still enables the verifying entity to corroborate the signatory’s identity with the help of flanking technical and organisational mechanisms, e.g. a trusted public key infrastructure. The valid signature further corroborates the absence of unauthorized changes, because the MSS is still cryptographically protecting the signed document from undetected unauthorized changes inflicted by adversaries. Due to the confidentiality protection for the overwritten parts of the document following from cryptographic privacy the sanitization and redaction can be used to safeguard personal data to comply with data protection regulation or withhold trade-secrets.
The research question is: Can a malleable signature scheme be private to be compliant with EU data protection regulation and at the same time fulfil the integrity protection legally required in the EU to achieve a high probative value for the data signed?
Answering this requires to understand the protection requirements in respect to accountability and integrity rooted in Regulation 910/2014 and related legal texts. This thesis has analysed the previous Directive 1999/93/EC as well as German SigG and SigVO or UK and US laws. Besides that, legal texts, laws and regulations for the protection requirements of personal data (or PII) have been analysed to distill the confidentiality requirements, e.g. the German BDSG or the EU Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). Moreover, an answer to the research question entails understanding the relevant difference between regular digital signature schemes, like RSASSA-PSS from PKCS-v2.2 [422], which are legally accepted mechanisms for generating qualified electronic signatures and MSS for which the legal status was completely unknown before the thesis. Especially as MSS allow the authorized entity to adapt the signature, such that it is valid after the authorized modification, without the knowledge or use of the signatory’s signature generation key. On verification of an MSS the verifying entity still sees a valid signature technically appointing the legal signatory as the origin of a document, which might — however — have undergone authorized modifications after the signature was applied.
The thesis documents the results achieved in several domains:
1. Analysis of legal requirements towards integrity protection for an increased probative value and towards the confidentiality protection for use as a privacy-enhancing-technique to comply with data protection regulation.
2. Definition of a suitable terminology for integrity protection to capture (a) the differences between classical and malleable signature schemes, (b) the subtleties among existing MSS, as well as (c) the legal requirements.
3. Harmonisation of existing MSS and their cryptographic properties and the analysis of their shortcomings with respect to the legal requirements.
4. Design of new cryptographic properties and their provably secure cryptographic instantiations, i.e., the thesis proposes nine new cryptographic constructions accompanied by rigorous proofs of their security with respect to the formally defined cryptographic properties.
5. Final evaluation of the increased probative value and data-protection level achievable through the eight proposed cryptographic malleable signature schemes.
The thesis concludes that the detection of any subsequent modification (authorized and unauthorized) is of paramount legal importance in order to meet EU Regulation 910/2014. Further, this thesis formally defined a public form of the legally requested integrity verification which allows the verifying entity to corroborate the absence of any unauthorized modifications with a valid signature verification while simultaneously detecting the presence of an authorized modification — if at least one such authorized modification has subsequently occurred. This property, called non-interactive public accountability (PUB), has been formally defined in this thesis, was published and has already been adopted by the academic community. It was carefully conceived to not negatively impact a base-line level of privacy protection, as non-interactive public accountability had to destroy an existing strong privacy notion of transparency, which was identified as a hinderance to legal equivalence arguments. With RSS and SSS constructions that meet these properties, the thesis can give a positive answer to the research question:
Private MSS can reach a level of integrity protection and guarantee a level of accountability comparable to that of technical mechanisms that are legally accepted to generate qualified electronic signatures giving an increased probative value to the signed document, while at the same time protect the overwritten contents’ confidentiality.
Performance optimization of stencil codes requires data locality improvements. The polyhedron model for loop transformation is well suited for such optimizations with established techniques, such as the PLuTo algorithm and diamond tiling. However, in the domain of our project ExaStencils, stencil codes, it fails to yield optimal results. As an alternative, we propose a new, optimized, multi-dimensional polyhedral search space exploration and demonstrate its effectiveness: we obtain better results than existing approaches in several cases. We also propose how to specialize the search for the domain of stencil codes, which dramatically reduces the exploration effort without significantly impairing performance.
Smart Grids integrate currently isolated power and communications networks, while introducing several new technologies on the hardware and software sides. One of the most important ingredients is the potential for demand-response programs, which offer the possibility of sending instructions to consumers to adapt their power consumption over a certain period of time. However, high-frequency data collection exposes consumers’ usage behaviors, leading to security and privacy challenges for Smart Grids.
In this thesis, three cryptographic schemes are constructed for different demand-response programs. In the mandatory incentive-based demand-response program, privacy preservation depends on the power consumption of consumers. An anonymous authentication scheme is constructed for overload auditing and privacy preservation. Consumers’ identities are anonymous during normal operation. The operation center defines an acceptable consumption threshold at times of power shortage. Consumers must follow the instruction and curtail their power consumption to meet the threshold. If they do so, the consumers keep their anonymity, while disobedient consumers, whose power consumption exceeds the threshold, can be identified. Security analysis demonstrates that the constructed anonymous authentication scheme is secure in a random oracle model. In the voluntary incentivebased demand-response program, consumers are categorized as either obedient or disobedient consumers according to their consumption curtailment. Consumers utilize a homomorphic encryption algorithm to encrypt their usage and report the ciphertexts to the operation center periodically. At a time of grid instability, the obedient consumers reduce their consumption and prove their curtailment by using a range proof. Both the usage reports and the proofs from obedient consumers concerning their consumption are reported without leaking private information. In order to achieve the real-time requirement, a security model is proposed and a batch verification algorithm is constructed, which is proved to be secure in the defined oracle model. Apart from reward and penalty detection in demand-response programs, theft detection is also an important requirement in Smart Grids. In order to achieve theft detection, this thesis employs the dynamic k-times anonymous authentication and blind signatures to create an efficient theft detection mechanism in the prepaid card system, where consumers pay for their consumption in advance and obtain credentials. A consumer sends the credentials anonymously and obtains corresponding credentials during times of consumption. If a thief tries to send reused credentials to steal electricity, his anonymity will be revoked. Finally, this thesis proves that the proposed mechanism finds the real identities of power thieves, without sacrificing the privacy of honest consumers under the random oracle model.