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Innovation and Competition in the Digital Economy: Implications for Internet Platforms, Telecommunications Networks and Data Sharing Initiatives

  • Governments around the world currently focus on shaping the digital economy. Particular attention is paid to Internet platforms, Internet infrastructure and data as essential components of the digital economy. The three studies in this thesis contribute to the understanding of the behavior of firms in each of these domains and derive insights for future regulations and business projects. The first study deals with the ranking of content on Internet platforms and how it affects the incentives of content providers to invest in content quality. The focus of the study is on sponsored ranking and organic ranking, but the case that a vertically integrated content provider is favored by an Internet platform is also taken into account. Using a game theoretic model, it is shown that there is no ranking design that strictly leads to more investment compared to the other designs. It is also shown that the Internet platform usually chooses the type of ranking that, from the perspective of the Internet platform and consumers, yields the bestGovernments around the world currently focus on shaping the digital economy. Particular attention is paid to Internet platforms, Internet infrastructure and data as essential components of the digital economy. The three studies in this thesis contribute to the understanding of the behavior of firms in each of these domains and derive insights for future regulations and business projects. The first study deals with the ranking of content on Internet platforms and how it affects the incentives of content providers to invest in content quality. The focus of the study is on sponsored ranking and organic ranking, but the case that a vertically integrated content provider is favored by an Internet platform is also taken into account. Using a game theoretic model, it is shown that there is no ranking design that strictly leads to more investment compared to the other designs. It is also shown that the Internet platform usually chooses the type of ranking that, from the perspective of the Internet platform and consumers, yields the best expected overall content quality. The second study deals with the incentive of Internet service providers to throttle specific Internet content. The key finding is that Internet service providers use this instrument to utilize the capacity of their telecommunications network more efficiently. This leads not only to more benefits for Internet users, but also to a higher incentive to invest in network capacity due to better monetization. The third study examines the circumstances under which firms are willing to share data with other firms. By means of an economic laboratory experiment, it is shown that more data is shared if the firms have control over who exactly they share data with. Thus, for example, data pools that grant unrestricted data access to all participating firms can be expected to perform worse than data pools that give their participating firms control over with whom their uploaded data is shared. In addition, the third study finds that established relationships are characterized by more data sharing and less volatility in the amount of shared data than new relationships. The study concludes that data sharing projects should not be expected to work optimally right away. In summary, the studies in this thesis identify a number of costs that may arise when digital firms' choice is restricted by regulation or design. The ability of Internet service providers to throttle certain content and the ability of Internet platforms to choose the ranking design are usually used in the best interests of consumers. Data sharing also works best when firms are free to decide who gets their data.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Oliver Zierke
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:739-opus4-10006
Advisor:Jan Krämer, Andreas König
Document Type:Doctoral Thesis
Language:English
Year of Completion:2021
Date of Publication (online):2021/10/21
Date of first Publication:2021/10/21
Publishing Institution:Universität Passau
Granting Institution:Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Date of final exam:2021/07/22
Release Date:2021/10/21
Tag:net neutrality; online platform; platform regulation; ranking algorithm; sponsored search
Page Number:iii, 104 Seiten
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
Licence (German):License LogoStandardbedingung laut Einverständniserklärung