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Dissertation

**Clarence Streit's *Union Now* and the Idea of an
Anglo-American Union: A Movement Away From
Imperialism to a World State?**

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- UN43 —. *Union Now: Why Freedom and Peace Require the Atlantic Democracies to Begin World Federal Union: Wartime Edition with Three New Chapters*. Federal Union, 1943.
- UN49 —. *Union Now: A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free: Postwar Edition with Five New Chapters*. Harper & Brothers, 1949.
- New Federalist* Roberts, Owen J., John F. Schmidt, and Clarence K. Streit [Publius II], eds. *The New Federalist*. Freedom & Union, 1950.
- Freedom Against Itself* Streit, Clarence K. *Freedom Against Itself*. Harper & Brothers, 1954.
- Freedom's Frontier* —. *Freedom's Frontier: Atlantic Union Now*. Harper & Brothers, 1961.

Finally, Streit's magazine, *Freedom & Union*, contains many articles that do not name an author. Analogous to the speeches by Chamberlain, I have numbered these 'missing authors' from *F&U*1 - *F&U*143.

1 Introduction

On October 29, 2016, the “Borowitz Report” was published with the following title: “Queen offers to Restore British Rule Over United States” (Borowitz). This “Report” is a column in *The New Yorker* that deals with current events in a satirical way. It continues:

Addressing the American people from her office in Buckingham Palace, the Queen said that she was making the offer “in recognition of the desperate situation you now find yourselves in. This two-hundred-and-forty-year experiment in self-rule began with the best of intentions, but I think we can all agree that it didn’t end well,” she said. (Borowitz)

Borowitz, of course, ridicules the possibility of Donald Trump becoming the next President of the United States, since the report appeared nine days before the presidential election. With the fictional voice of Queen Elizabeth II, he proposes a reunification of the United States with its former mother country to prevent the United States from having Donald Trump as its President. The underlying idea is that it is ‘natural’ that Britain and the United States can come together again and emerge stronger from such a situation of ‘crisis’. This shows that, despite the fact that a reunification is unrealistic, the notion of a certain ‘natural’ bond between both nations¹ still exists.

The idea to reunite the United States and Britain might seem fictional today, but roughly a century ago, there were numerous voices (mostly in Britain) who wanted this vision to become a reality. The discussion of a possible reunion of Britain and the United States peaked in British elitist circles in the 1880s and 1890s and

¹A short note on terminology: In this thesis, the term “state” is defined as a self-governing political entity with clear borders and sovereignty over a certain territory and a certain people. States are the “primary political units of the international system” (C. Flint 106). A nation is what Benedict Anderson describes as “imagined community”: a community that is “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (6, for more information, see p. 18 here). The focus of the term “nation” as it is used here, is more on the feeling of belonging together than on actual state-like structures. In case nations are regarded as sovereign, they have identical boundaries with a respective state since states can give political sovereignty on the international level. These are called nation states here. The terms “English-speaking nations” or “English-speaking world” refer to the following nations: the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. In case the state-like character of the English-speaking nations needs to be stressed, ‘English-speaking states’ is written in single quotation marks to indicate that states as such cannot be defined by language only. However, if the terminology in direct quotations is different, it is not changed. In rare cases, the terms “Anglo-Saxon states” or “Anglo-Saxon nations” are used. This is the equivalent to the terms “English-speaking nations” or “English-speaking states” without the inclusion of Ireland, since it does not define as Anglo-Saxon.

continued mainly until the 1910s. It was led by several luminaries, such as Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, William T. Stead, Andrew Carnegie, Lionel Curtis, and Philip Kerr. Because of their influential positions, all of them had the possibility to shape public discussions. In order to avoid a fragmentation of the British Empire, they advocated a strengthened “Anglo-world”, a “politically divided and sub-global, yet transnational, intercontinental, and far-flung” entity (Belich 49), which encompassed either Britain and its settler colonies Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and sometimes South Africa, or Anglo-America. A reform of the British Empire and a possible unification with the United States was regarded as a remedy to a disintegration of the former as well as to ongoing conflicts in the (English-speaking) world. After World War I, the proposals to reunite the Anglo-world dropped considerably in numbers because new realities, like the founding of the League of Nations and the strive for autonomy among the dominions² within the British Empire, made such a project ever more unrealistic. Yet, Curtis and Kerr continued to advocate closer collaboration between Britain and the United States in the following decades, however, without the same success as before.

In the 1930s, when the League of Nations turned out *not* to succeed in securing peace in the world, a wave of proposals for a world government emerged in the United States. These did not simply envision a ‘new’ League of Nations but wanted to transform international relations all together and structure them anew in order to secure peace in the entire world (Baratta, *World Federation I* 1). One of these

²The term “dominion” or “dominion status” was officially used in the British Empire until 1948. In 1907 it had become the label for colonies with responsible government and referred to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland. The Union of South Africa got the same status in 1910 and the Irish Free State in 1922. This distinguished the dominions decisively from other colonies which were not granted self-government and it also strengthened the dominions’ strive for even more autonomy within the British Empire. Although the term became redundant after the Statue of Westminster in 1931, when the dominions were defined as “freely associated members of the Commonwealth of Nations” with an allegiance to the Crown, the official language in Whitehall only was changed in 1948 and “Dominion (status)” was replaced by “Commonwealth Country” or “member of the Commonwealth” to stress their full independence. The former dominions themselves dropped the use of “dominion” earlier, as can be seen by the example of Canada, which joined the United Nations in 1945 under the designation of “Canada” instead of “Dominion of Canada” (McIntyre, “The Strange Death of the Dominion Status”; “Dominion”). In this thesis, “dominions” accordingly is used to describe Britain’s former white settler colonies of Canada (which includes Newfoundland), Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland until 1948. For the time after 1948, “former settler colonies” or “former dominions” or the names of the states today are used. Although India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka also became dominions in 1947 and 1948, they are not referred to here with the term dominion because they are not dealt with in the primary sources of this study.

proposals is Clarence Streit's *Union Now*.³ In contrast to many others, Streit did not want to found a world state on a universal level *a priori*, but wanted to start this ambitious project with a nucleus of fifteen democracies which he regarded as best qualified because they were the "world's greatest, oldest, most homogeneous, and closely linked democracies, the peoples most experienced and successful in solving the problem at hand" (*UN39* 7). Once this nucleus would have consolidated, other nations – in the end *all* other nations in the world – could be added. This Union of the Free or Atlantic Union would bring "freedom, democracy, peace and prosperity" (ix) for everyone. Although Streit is not largely known today,⁴ Baratta claims that "[i]f ever a book made a movement, *Union Now* was such a book" (*World Federation I* 53). Streit wrote five further editions of *Union Now* until 1961, published the magazine *Freedom & Union* that was sold across the world from 1946-1978, and founded three supporting organizations to realize his proposal.

At first sight, Streit's ideas are quite different from those of the late 19th and early 20th centuries to reunite Britain and the United States. However, on a second glance, there are indeed certain similarities. The nations he defines as the "greatest [...] democracies" mainly are English-speaking, with Britain and the United States in the lead, and the constitution of this Union⁵ closely resembles the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, Streit assumes that it is only logical to group the nucleus of a future world government around the English-speaking nations and that this would be accepted as "non-controversial" (*UN39* 105) in the rest of the world. In 1941,

³Other proposals of the 1930s-1950s are, for example, Wendell Willkie's *One World*, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn's *World Peace Through World Law*, Robert Hutchins and Guiseppe Antonio Borgese's *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*, Ely Culbertson's *World Federation Plan* (sometimes also called the quota force plan), and Vernon Nash's *The World Must Be Governed* (*World Federation I* 3-4).

⁴Clarence K. Streit lived from 1896-1986. Before he became a journalist, Streit worked for the Archives Division of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, where he got "access to considerable secret information", such as "position papers, minutes of meetings, and communications between the president and Washington" (Wooley 89). He quickly came to the conclusion that the League of Nations would not be able to secure peace. Allegedly, he was awarded the Rhodes Scholarship in 1920, but declined in order to marry (89). However, this is undocumented. In 1929, he became the correspondent for the *New York Times* in Geneva and Basle to report on the League of Nations ("C.K. Streit, Advocate of Democracies Union"). As he could observe the flaws in the structure of the League of Nations there first-hand, he developed an alternative plan to secure peace and freedom in the future. This was first published in his book *Union Now*.

⁵A short note on spelling: I decided to spell Union in uppercase when referring to the Union of the Free. For the description of the principle of a union in general, the term is written in lowercase.

he proposes to found the Union with English-speaking nations *only*, officially for the reason to not lose any further time in the emergency situation of World War II. This, again, is very similar to a reunification of Britain and the United States. Although Streit repeatedly claims later on that it was not his intention to restrict Union membership to English-speaking nations, it seems as if his plan really *was* to reunite Britain with the United States and base the world's peace on their political principles. Thus, Streit's proposal no longer is as different from the ideas mentioned earlier.

What makes *Union Now* and the "movement" it created even more interesting, apart from the similarities to the proposals by the contributors⁶ described before, is its transnational perspective. As I will show in this thesis, Streit's view was very much centered on the United States: He maintained a very exceptionalist view of his land of origin and only looked at his plans from an American⁷ perspective. However, what he tried to do is to convince people *around the world* to join him in his effort of creating a worldwide Union. Therefore, he *had to* take on a wider perspective on the surface, that was – at least at first sight – not *only* centered on the United States. In order to achieve this goal, he aimed at convincing people that American ideas and ideals were actually not only American, but universal. Thus, he tried to expand the (national) borders of his imagination and questioned the 'naturalness' of the borders that existed in his time. In the following study, I investigate not only the ideas of the contributors in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which have a British perspective; the focus of my study is on the proposal given by the American Clarence Streit and, in a further step, I compare and relate the ideas and the discourses they were subjects of to one another. Therefore, my study contributes to Shelley Fisher Fishkin's aim of expanding American studies and giving it a more transnational perspective. She rightfully claims that there is a "global flow of people, ideas, texts, and products" (26) in which the American nation participates, which means that it is never isolated. Consequently, ideas that were spread in the United

⁶For better readability, I use the hypernym contributors to describe the group of intellectuals I examine because they had diverse backgrounds and professions and there is not one term to adequately address all of them.

⁷A short note on terminology: The term "American" in this study refers to the United States, unless indicated otherwise. In rare cases, U.S.-American is used to point out the clear focus of the argument on the United States only.

States can never be examined as detached from the rest of the world, but have to be related to others around the globe. Additionally, ideas from other parts of the world may be similar and come up repeatedly in different contexts, which shows that they have to be related in some way – as are the proposals dealt with in this study. Thus, my thesis plays an important part in the aim of expanding American studies and providing it with a transnational perspective.

More specifically, it illuminates arguments that were used to justify a unification of Britain and the United States from the late 19th until the middle of the 20th centuries – *despite* the fact that none of these schemes were realized. All of these proposals were made in an era with a clear perception of several crises: either the looming decay of the British Empire, World War I, World War II, or the fear of a new depression or another World War. Especially in such times, older ideas are sometimes taken up again because coping strategies of the past allegedly can bring workable solutions to problems lying ahead. Interestingly enough, the ‘solutions’ to the crises in all of the proposals was some kind of common polity of Britain and the United States. Therefore, I will investigate whether this idea itself was presented as a viable strategy of the past that could end all the problems the respective nations were facing.

The focus of this thesis is the proposal by Clarence Streit, which is embedded in what I call the Atlantic discourse that can roughly be described as the conviction that a world order based on Atlantic principles can bring everlasting peace and prosperity to the world (see chapter 5). However, ‘Atlantic’ can mostly be replaced by ‘English-speaking’ or ‘Anglo-American’ if a closer look is taken at Streit’s writings. In order to understand this discourse, it needs to be put in relation with the Anglo-Saxon discourse of the late 19th and early twentieth centuries, which represents the basic – and very similar – assumption in the proposals by the contributors I examine in a first step (see chapter 2.3). In accordance with Hall’s claim that discourses are open systems that always contain traits of past discourses (“The West and the Rest” 292), I will show in how far the Anglo-Saxon and the Atlantic discourses are related. I hypothesize that both discourses indeed bear several similarities that remain the same despite the shift in time and place. Hence, the study is subdivided into two

phases: phase I from the 1880s to the 1910s, which deals with proposals related to the Anglo-Saxon discourse and which sets the context for phase II from 1938/39 to 1978, in which Clarence Streit's proposal of *Union Now* and its embeddedness in the Atlantic discourse is analyzed.⁸ During the period of investigation, the narrative of an imagined community of Britain and the United States (partly expanded to the rest of the English-speaking world) was constructed in both phases and a 'natural' claim to leadership was projected onto them. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the reasons which were given and accepted for a possible unification and for the existence of this imagined community were similar or even the same. After all, they formed the basis of the proposals that reflected the so-called "*Anglotopian dream*" (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 25): the idea of a peaceful world order founded on Anglo-American political principles.

In order to find proof for this assumption, I investigate the perception of Britain and the United States and their (common) position in the world among intellectuals who mused upon a unification of these nations. Furthermore, I illustrate reciprocal influences between the several designs for a future world order. The way the discourse of an imagined community between Britain, the United States, the English-speaking or even the Atlantic world (in Streit's case) was created is determined because this community formed the basis of all the proposals. Most importantly, I explore the arguments that were used to justify a unification of the respective parts of the world and illustrate which of them were maintained, which were (pretendedly) changed, and which arguments only developed over time.

Integration in the History of Ideas, State of Research and Primary Sources

The idea of larger polities in the world is not new, but, in fact, "the idea of world community once constituted the default setting of political thought and action" (Bartelson ix). Therefore, it is not surprising that such ideas of a world community come up again and again through the centuries. Although the Anglotopian dreams I deal with in my thesis only regard a world community as a further – and final – step in the development of world politics, they nevertheless are part of this philosophical

⁸The exact dates of phase II refer to the period during which Clarence Streit advocated his proposal for an Atlantic Union.

thread. After all, what these proposals intend to create is a larger community in the world that adheres to similar political principles, similar values and similar goals: peace and prosperity for all – although these ideas often intend to disguise “claims to Western dominance” in the world (175). Furthermore, the insight is quite old that there are certain challenges that can only be mastered on a global level, like sustainability or global justice, which have been regarded as problematic especially since the 20th century. Hence, the idea to internationalize the solution to these problems seems not too far-fetched. However, such a polity that could master international crises for the whole world has not been founded yet and a world state is far from being realized. Nevertheless, proposals for such an endeavor came up repeatedly and it is interesting to look at how the arguments for such plans are supported.

Immanuel Kant was one of the early thinkers who envisioned a new world order that should end in perpetual peace – an idea which also became the title of one of his most important publications in 1795: *Perpetual Peace*. He proposed a “universal state of world citizens living in freedom under cosmopolitan law [which] was very near to the modern concept of world federation” (Baratta, *World Federation I* 33). The goal of perpetual peace can only be achieved when all political systems change to a democratic rule since the majority of the people would not vote for war, so Kant (13-14). Thus, a perpetual peace can only be a democratic one. Therefore, Kant envisaged an international order that “consists of sovereign states entertaining peaceful relations with each other by virtue of being internally democratic” (Bartelson 152). This vision of the era of Enlightenment must have profoundly influenced the proposals dealt with in this thesis because – as will become clear later – many of Kant’s basic assumptions are relevant to the contributors here. They deal with questions of sovereignty in a new structure of the world, all of them want to achieve peace in the world and adhere to the idea of the *democratic* Anglo-world as the basis of any larger polity. This shows that although none of them mentions Kant explicitly in their respective proposals, his writings had a big impact on political theory of the following centuries. As such, the proposals dealt with here can be regarded as elements in the larger discussion of a future world order that are embedded in Kant’s philosophical tradition and have the same goal of an ever wider international

community.

From the end of the 19th century onward, quite a few proposals emerged which were intended to reform the Anglo-world so that it could dominate the world. Yet, none of them were realized. Still, after what is defined as phase I in this thesis, several further ideas developed of how the world should be structured in the future. One of the most important ones is the League of Nations. During World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson developed the idea, which eventually became a reality although the United States never joined. This was the first (nearly) universal polity which was supposed to prevent and end all wars in the world and whose Covenant was designed to include all the nations in the world. Despite the fact that it did not succeed, it presented an important first step towards the goal of an international, universal polity that became one of the aims in international politics of the 20th century. The following western international organizations were actively shaped by the United States – like the United Nations or NATO – and could not have worked without this important player. This was also realized in, for example, Britain. Thus, it is not surprising that Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, described the aim of NATO to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (“Origins – NATO Leaders”).⁹ When the history of today’s European Union is considered, the political proximity to the United States and the clear position against the communist world during the Cold War is one of its striking features. This shows how very important the United States, which was (and partly still is) considered the global policeman, is for the history of international politics in the western world. Although the proposals of phase I mostly were written before the League of Nations was founded, the importance of the United States already plays a decisive role in the deliberations and this study helps to illustrate the rise of the U.S. to become a global superpower from the end of the 19th until the middle of the 20th centuries. Analyzing Clarence Streit’s writings, the idea that the U.S. is *the* crucial player in the world becomes evident at first sight. Whereas it is clear that he was an American himself and ‘naturally’ over-estimated the importance of the

⁹As will become clear later, Clarence Streit was another contemporary who identified the non-membership of the United States as one of the basic flaws in the League of Nations because so much power in every aspect was missing in this polity.

U.S. in international politics, his proposal still has to be seen in the context of the world he lived in. During his lifetime, it was always the United States which was the leading power in the world, which made it seem impossible for Streit to envision a peaceful world without the overwhelming American power position. As such, *Union Now* has to be positioned within all of the ideas of a new world order that placed the U.S. at its center, whether they were realized or not. It is striking that the Atlantic discourse evidently was so convincing that proposals of a world state in the non-communist world at the time often seemed to ‘naturally’ group around the United States and/or were designed in a similar way as the United States’ political system itself – like in the case of *Union Now*.

As already mentioned, my study only deals with *Anglotopian* proposals, which are centered in the English-speaking world and should be expanded over time. Instead of focusing on the discussion of an imperial reform or Anglo-American union among *broader* parts of society, my study concentrates on proposals of certain intellectuals. However, this does not mean that the discourse among single intellectuals and somewhat wider classes is detached from one another. After all, intellectuals are part of a social context and can shape its regime of truth *if* their ideas are accepted by others. Thus, “ideas which contemporaries recorded, argued, and propagated” (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 7) must be investigated in order to understand “the thought of the past in its complexity and, in a sense which is neither self-contradictory nor trivial, as far as possible in its own terms” (Collini 3) – something which can only be achieved with individual case studies, according to Collini. More often than not, influences on ideas and concepts do not only form one person’s ideas but those of a broader environment, since they often are the result of the same discursive regime, which creates truths that only make certain ways of thinking acceptable in a society (see chapter 2.1). Therefore, intellectual history also gives insight into discourses that were created in certain periods of time and allows to draw conclusions on developments that influenced them. Accordingly, although the analyses of the intellectuals mentioned before are split up in separate chapters here, their opinions and beliefs need to be understood as linked to each other and embedded in a broader context, since they – in the first period of investigation – lived

in a similar time frame and, therefore, experienced similar changes that happened around them. Yet, as will become clear throughout the study, Streit's experiences were not all too different from the earlier ones.

As already mentioned briefly, the study is subdivided into two parts: Phase I refers to the discussion of a unification of Britain and the United States in the British Empire mainly from the 1880s until the 1910s (and a little beyond in the cases of Curtis and Kerr). The contributors had influential positions in their respective societies, which means that they could shape discourses to a great extent. In addition, their proposals themselves also are results of them being subjects of the Anglo-Saxon discourse. Since all of the contributors I chose for this study are well-known, a wide range of studies on them individually already exists. This has supported my aim to answer the following questions concerning the contributors and their ideas: Why did they want to reform the British Empire and/or unite it with the United States? What did they propose to realize this endeavor? Which discursive strategies are used to construct the idea of an (imagined) community among the English-speaking peoples in general and among the Anglo-Americans in particular? Preliminary studies on the individual contributors¹⁰ provide an excellent basis for both my argument and the overall scope of investigation. Among the contributors, only Joseph Chamberlain remains largely unexplored with regard to my focus on his particular mindset. A compilation and comparison of all of their arguments allows to paint a broader picture of ideas that existed within the contributors' spheres. Although several thorough overviews of federalist projects in the era from 1880-1920 exist,¹¹ none focus mainly on the arguments that were employed to justify such projects.¹² My study aims to fill these gaps in research.

The main part of my study – phase II – is an extensive case study on Clarence

¹⁰The most recent analysis on Cecil Rhodes, William Thomas Stead, and Andrew Carnegie was done by Duncan Bell. I am deeply grateful to him for sending me his unpublished manuscript of *Dreamworlds of Race* in early 2020, which was published in December 2020. Since he poses similar questions as I have, his findings were very helpful for the chapters on these three contributors. The chapters on Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr are mainly developed with the works by David Billington, Andrea Bosco, Alex May, and Priscilla Roberts.

¹¹The most recent ones were written by James Belich, Duncan Bell, and Srdjan Vucetic.

¹²One quite old study, which tried to include not only technical proposals but also underlying arguments of federalist projects, was published in 1931 by Seymour Cheng. His focus still is on the proposals as such and arguments for or against such a federation are only discussed on a very general level.

Streit's idea of *Union Now*. So far, his proposal of an Atlantic Union has been part of broader studies on world federalism, in particular the two volumes of *World Federation* by Joseph Preston Baratta. This is a detailed account of world federalist ideas in the middle of the 20th century. He concentrates on the technical aspects of the proposals and treats *Union Now* as one proposal of many at the time – which it definitely was – but he does not examine its arguments in much detail, nor does he establish the connection to the Anglo-Saxon discourse of what I framed as phase I. Wesley Wooley's *Alternatives to Anarchy* explores the movement around Streit from 1949-1959 and Justus Doenecke's *Storm on the Horizon* contains a study on Streit's depiction in the media at the time. However, none of these studies take a close look at the arguments and justifications Streit uses to support his claim that the respective nations should form the basis of a future world government. Yet, Streit's justificatory arguments require close analysis because his proposal is a reflection of the Atlantic discourse, which constructs truths that Streit regards as commonsensical around the world: the assumption of a 'natural' claim to leadership and an equally 'natural' community among the founders of the Union – in particular Britain and the United States. As such, *Union Now* presents a (more or less) concealed proposal of a new English-speaking hegemony in the world. Streit's ideas allegedly were not only accepted among supporters of his proposal, but partly also beyond this closed group. This is why Ira Straus, Streit's successor as executive director of his organization Federal Union Inc. (see p. 260 here), claims that the institutions of the Atlantic community (NATO, OECD, North Atlantic Assembly), "were built largely by persons of Atlantic federalist inspiration, at a time when Atlantic federalism was in the air" ("Clarence Streit's Revival" 337). Hence, he assumes a large influence of Streit's ideas on the international political elite of the era. It has to be noted, though, that Straus was a passionate advocate of Streit's proposal, so this assessment must be treated with caution because he probably overestimated Streit's influence. But the claim is interesting nevertheless: What Straus' comment clearly shows is that the idea of an collaboration on an international level was vital in the middle of the 20th century. As these organizations he mentions are also centered around what Streit calls Atlantic nations – the founders of the

Union of the Free – it is possible that the *reasons* for these ‘basic’ nations in all of the organizations all derive from a similar mindset, which is most likely closely connected to the Atlantic discourse.

The primary sources for phase II of the study were Streit’s eight books and the magazine *Freedom & Union* (1946-1978), of which he was editor. There are six editions of *Union Now* (published from 1939-1961) and two further books which underline his theory: *The New Federalist* (1950) and *Freedom Against Itself* (1954). Except for one, all issues of *Freedom & Union* could be obtained at the Max-Planck-Institute for Contemporary Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, the Ludwigs-Maximilian-Universität München, the University of Regensburg, the archive in La Contemporaine (University of Nanterre), and the library Sainte-Geneviève (University of Paris).¹³ I am aware of the fact that these sources are one-sided and Streit is presented in a very positive light, so a critical assessment of the sources was vital for my analysis. However, the advantage of this bias in the primary sources is that it gives excellent insights into the worldview of Streit and his supporters, which is what my study aims at.

I assume that the discourses of which all of the contributors were subjects – the idea of a natural leadership of Britain and the United States for the world – are connected and, maybe in a slightly different form, are carried on into the late 20th and beyond. Thus, a comparison of the arguments of both phases allows to ascertain which of the ‘original’ elements of the Anglo-Saxon discourse were maintained in the 20th century, which ones no longer were used, and which ones were used in a different way. Additionally, since phase I focuses on Britain and phase II on the United States, the study answers the question whether attitudes towards the English-speaking world as a whole are different or the same in both nations.

¹³As the magazine is not digitized, I had to read or partly scan the magazine in the respective libraries and archives. Vol. 30, no. 2 (1976) is not in stock anywhere in Europe because of delivery problems when it was published. For copyright reasons, only the table of contents could be scanned and sent to me from Princeton University. I would like to thank the staff of all these libraries and archives for their helpful support and good cooperation.

Chapter Overview

After this introduction, chapter 2 introduces Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, Benedict Anderson's imagined communities, and the notion of Anglo-Saxonism because these form the basis of my analysis. Chapter 3 focuses on phase I of this study. It starts with the reasons why new ideas of a restructuring of the British Empire came up at the time and sets the context for these (chapter 3.1). Chapter 3.2 begins with an overview of federalist proposals of the era concerning the English-speaking world and continues with the case studies on Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, William Thomas Stead, Andrew Carnegie, Lionel Curtis, and Philip Kerr (chapters 3.2.1 to 3.2.4). In the interim conclusion of chapter 3.3, I compile and compare all the arguments of phase I.

In chapter 4, I explain Streit's idea of *Union Now* and add critical remarks on his worldview. Streit's publications are dealt with in detail in chapter 4.4, which illustrates the progress of the idea from the 1930s to the 1970s. In chapter 5, I illuminate why Streit's idea is not necessarily an Atlantic project, but actually an Anglo-American one.

Chapter 6 explores Streit's arguments why a Union of the whole nucleus, of the English-speaking nations, and, most importantly, the United States and Britain allegedly is "non-controversial" (*UN39* 105) and vital for the maintenance of peace in the world. As Streit's proposal only was one of many ideas to federate the world, its significance is analyzed in chapter 7.

Although Streit denies to be an imperialist, he was criticized for applying imperialist arguments. Therefore, I answer the question whether Streit's proposal really was a movement away *from* imperialism *to* a world state or whether he wanted to maintain the same power relationship in the world as in the age of classical imperialism and whether imperial ideologies shaped his way of thinking in chapter 8.

Finally, in chapter 9, I compare the findings of both phases of my study and answer the questions raised earlier here.

2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Michel Foucault's Concept of Discourse

Foucault advances social constructivist theory, which ultimately results in the de-centering of the subject. To him, there is no (objective) Truth, but he claims that truth, knowledge, and the subject are all products of what Foucault calls discourses. Therefore, knowledge in our culture is produced through discourse and this determines the subjects' actions and behavior. Since this concept is followed here, one has to understand what a discourse is, how it is produced and how it works.

According to Foucault, a discourse is a “group of statements which provide a language for talking about [...] a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (Hall, “The West and the Rest” 291). This means that these statements *represent* a certain topic in a certain way. The discourse constructs the statements as true. Here, Foucault introduces a temporal dependence because the discourses of truths are connected to certain periods of time. Yet, despite of this they are not closed systems, but can maintain traces of past discourses (292). This means that consecutive discourses about similar topics can never be looked at fully independently from each other because the former discourse naturally influences the latter. What has to be stressed, though, is that a discourse is not a universal reality or truth, but the *construction* of such a truth. Therefore, the analysis of a discourse can never answer – and does not intend to do so – whether something was ‘true’, but only whether something was *accepted* as true. Neither is a discourse about whether something exists, but about “where meaning comes from” (“Representation” 30). After all, Foucault claims that nothing has meaning outside discourse, even though there are non-discursive practices, which are the precondition of a discourse. They serve as “a general element” for the discursive practices (Foucault, *Archaeology* 102). Non-discursive realms do exist, but only develop meaning within a discourse. What is important in order to understand how this system of representation of a discourse works, are the “rules and practices that produce[...] meaningful statements and regulate[...] discourse in different historical periods” (Hall, “Representation” 29). After all, the way a certain topic is constructed also affects how ideas are “put into

practice and used to regulate the conduct of others” (29). In other words: If a topic is constructed in a certain way, certain ideas will (or will not) develop out of it, which then again shape actions.

The knowledge in a discourse is produced, among others, by language, but discourse itself is produced by practice, the so-called discursive practice – “the practice of producing meaning” (“The West and the Rest” 291). As all social practices have meaning and influence actions, all practices also have a discursive aspect (291). This implicates that a discourse is constructed “by many individuals in different institutional settings” (292). Yet, statements within a discourse need not necessarily be the same, but can differ, as long as the relationships and differences between them are regular and systematic (Foucault, *Archaeology* 48, 75, 144; Hall, “The West and the Rest” 292). This means that all of them have to work together to produce the same kind of discourse by, for instance, repetition of those discursive events in different representations or texts – the discursive events, thus, follow the same strategy and refer to the same object. This process is called discursive formation and it produces “stable aggregated discourses” which still are open to other discourses (T. Purvis and Hunt 485; Hall, “The West and the Rest” 292).

A discourse also defines a way of constructing knowledge, which simultaneously excludes other ways of understanding the same topic because “discourses impose frameworks which limit what can be experienced or the meaning that experience can encompass, and thereby influence what can be said and done” (T. Purvis and Hunt 485). The goal of a so-called archaeological analysis of discourses is the description of the archive, of the possibilities of what “may be spoken of in a discourse” at a certain period of time (Smart 48). Hence, the archive of a discourse constitutes the set of rules that determine the forms and limits in which a statement is expressed, conserved, memorized, reactivated, and appropriated (48). This is closely connected to the discursive regime or regime of truth of each society which defines what

types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded values in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, *Power* 131)

Thus, certain entities need to be in a position to define certain discourses as true or false – or: which discourses are accepted and which are not. If entities have this status, they can also sanction certain discourses and determine which ways of acquiring truth are valuable and which are not. It can be expected that powerful entities define their own ways of finding truth as valuable, whereas other ways are sanctioned.

This leads to the question of the relationship of discourse and power. To Foucault, knowledge – produced by discourse – is a form of power itself and power “is implicated in the question of whether and in what circumstances knowledge is to be applied or not” (Hall, “Representation” 33). In other words: being in a position of power makes it possible to define something as ‘true’, which implies that power – which Foucault specifies as relational – defines knowledge and, in turn, truth. However, there is not one center of power in our society, but power “is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 98), which means that power relations can be found everywhere in society. Furthermore, it can be described as “relations, a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations” (198). This means that power always implies a *relation* between several powerful agents that need to work together. However, power must not be understood only as negative, but can be regarded as productive as well. After all, it produces knowledge and also forms the discourse. It is rooted in “forms of behaviour, bodies and local relations of power which should not all be seen as a simple projection of the central power” (201). Hence, it can be observed in all forms of interactions within society.

Foucault defines five important traits of the political economy of truth in our society which make it possible to further describe powerful entities in a culture and see how they work: Firstly, what we define as true is “centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it” (*Power* 131). Accordingly, science and university bear the power to define the regime of truth. Secondly, Foucault claims that truth constantly demands “economic and political incitement” (131), which indicates that politics and economy together with everything related to them are highly influential. Thirdly, truth is spread and consumed in various ways

“through apparatuses of education and information” (131) which reach large parts of society. This makes schools, educational institutions, and other entities which inform people the third group of powerful entities in a society. Fourthly, truth is “produced and transmitted under control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media)” (131). Accordingly, the four entities mentioned here do not only *produce* what is perceived as true, but Foucault clearly states that they also *control* which regime of truth is produced and diffused in society. Therefore, it is not possible to establish any regime of truth if these four apparatuses do not support it. Finally, the political economy of truth is “the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‘ideological’ struggles)” (131).¹⁴

Consequently, intellectuals in our society are never “bearer[s] of universal values”, but they ‘merely’ have a specific position in society. This position of the intellectuals has three main characteristics: the class position, the conditions of “live and work” that come with the position as intellectuals in our society, as well as the particularity of the politics of truth in each culture and society (131) in which intellectuals have a significant position since they can shape the politics of truth much more easily than others. Therefore, the system of dispersion of truth works especially well for all institutions that can produce and disseminate truth like, for example, schools, universities, politics, and newspapers. This means that in order to understand how and by whom a discourse is established, or if it is to be changed, these entities need to be looked at closely.

¹⁴A short note on the difference between ideology and discourse: With the concept of ideology, “the way in which forms of consciousness condition the way in which people [...] become conscious of their conflicting interests and struggle over them” is to be identified. Yet, there is a difference between the interests and the form of *experience* of them. The concept of discourse describes that social relations are lived and understood “in terms of specific linguistic or semiotic vehicles that organize [...] thinking, understanding and experiencing” (T. Purvis and Hunt 476). In that, the concept is neutral about elements outside of the discursive practice. Therefore, whereas ideology focuses on the external aspect of the communicative practices – the connection of lived experience to “notions of interest and positions that are in principle distinguishable from lived experience”, discourse focuses on the linguistic and semiotic dimensions of the communicative practices (476). This last trait indicates that truth is never ‘fixed’ or remains unchanged, but is constantly negotiated and has to be defended.

2.2 Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*

Benedict Anderson's theory of imagined communities has been mentioned repeatedly already. Since I claim that the contributors' aim was (even if unintentionally) to construct and, thus, unite a larger imagined community among the English-speaking nations, this concept needs to be defined and, in a further step, its applicability for this thesis has to be pointed out.

To Anderson, a nation "is an imagined political community – [...] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (6). Although not all the members of this community *know* all the others, they *imagine* to be part of the same community. However, this community is sometimes hard to determine exactly as there are "finite, if elastic boundaries" to it because the in-group has to define its borders in distinction to an out-group. Hence, an imagined community can never encompass all of humankind because if this were the case, no distinctive out-group would exist.¹⁵ "Sovereign" in this case describes the fact that the concept of nations developed in the time of the Enlightenment and Revolution when "the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" (7) was destroyed and nations dreamed of being free. This newly-won freedom was symbolized by the sovereign state. "Community" depicts the notion of a "deep, horizontal comradeship" that made it possible "for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (7). The construction of such a strong identification with the own imagined community was the aim of the contributors in this study.

Imagined communities need to "create attachments" that go beyond the existence of, for instance, "market zones, 'natural'-geographic or politico-administrative" (53) zones if people should deeply relate to it. Such common attachments can, for instance, be generated by common rituals. Anderson uses the example of pilgrimages in several religions. Their destinations do not have a specific meaning in themselves, but it is created by the "constant flow of pilgrims moving towards them from remote and *otherwise unrelated* localities" (54). Because of this flow from the entire world, the pilgrims imagine some kind of community among themselves. Otherwise, their

¹⁵Consequently, the idea to form a global imagined community could not have worked. However, this was not realized by the contributors as they partly tried to form such a group anyway. Therefore, their arguments are applied to the concept of an imagined community, nevertheless.

common destination does not have any deeper meaning. In this case, the idea that creates attachments to the community is a common religion. Other sources for such an attachment can also be induced by, for instance, the perception of a common culture, habits, heritage or history, and language.¹⁶

It is evident that the belonging to an imagined community – that is, a nation – is not something people “are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to *representation*” (Hall et al. 612). It means that a nation as such is not only a political entity, but it also produces meanings, so it is a “*system of cultural representation*” (612). Nevertheless, it remains a symbolic community which succeeds in generating a feeling of loyalty and a sense of identity. As such, it forms a strong bond that unites people and shapes their actions in allegiance to this community. Hall claims that a national culture as such already is a discourse and identities within this discourse are constructed “by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can *identify*”. These are contained in stories, memories, and images (614). This allows for an ever different construction and representation of what ‘the nation’ in a modern sense actually is. After all, by telling the ‘right’ stories, alluding to the ‘right’ memories and images, a *new*, wider nation can be constructed. This is what was intended by supporters of Anglo-Saxonism who perpetuated the idea of an imagined community of the Anglo-Saxon people in the world. Later on, Clarence Streit had a similar intention: He was subject of the Atlantic discourse that has its roots in Anglo-Saxonism (see p. 178). By writing *Union Now*, he intended to create the nucleus of a world state with the English-speaking nations at its core. Streit and his supporters, thus, perpetuated the idea of an imagined community of English-speaking peoples that should and could ‘rightfully’ govern the world.

¹⁶An example which illustrates the creation of an imagined community based on language is the singing of national anthems on national holidays because “there is in this singing an experience of simultaneity” or unisonance, which is an “echoed physical realization of the imagined community” (B. Anderson 145). Although every single person does not know all the others who are singing the anthem simultaneously, the idea is generated that there is a larger community which performs the same ritual at the same time.

2.3 Anglo-Saxonism and the Anglo-American Special Relationship

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the deliberations on a new world order, the reshaping of the British Empire, and the idea of a possible reunion of (parts of) the British Empire (with the United States) were closely linked to the concept of Anglo-Saxonism.¹⁷ This thesis argues that Anglo-Saxonism constitutes a discourse that induced ways of knowing the ‘nation’ (or national community) which includes the British Empire and the United States at its center and which should then become the center of a larger ‘nation’ or world state. The underlying notion of the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism implies a feeling of a ‘racial’ superiority and of a community between all nations that referred to themselves or were referred to as ‘Anglo-Saxons’ – mainly Britain and the United States but also Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The basis of this imagined community was an assemblage of factors like “mythology, historical experience, shared values, institutions, language, religious commitments and cultural symbolism” that can all together be subsumed as whiteness (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 28). However, the assumed common identity between the Anglo-Saxons should not only remain on a theoretical level but the aim of many of the concept’s supporters indeed was to start a closer political collaboration between them; the eventual goal was to secure their common position of power on the international level against other ‘rival races’¹⁸ and to form a security community among themselves (“Before the Democratic Peace” 657). This is why several scholars rightfully agree that the origins of what was called the Anglo-American special

¹⁷There are different studies on when support of Anglo-Saxonism peaked in the political and cultural life in the English-speaking world, but all agree that the closing decades of the 19th century have to be included (Tulloch 826; S. Anderson 13; P. Clarke 216; Vucetic, “Racialized Peace” 414; “Search” 107). Especially during the Venezuela crisis of 1895 and the Spanish-American War of 1898, Anglo-Saxonism became apparent as an idea that shaped policies (“Racialized Peace” 414). Stuart Anderson claims that the decline in popularity of Anglo-Saxonism started after the Russian-Japanese War of 1904 since this was the last occasion that Anglo-Saxonism “contributed significantly to the development of British-American relations” to contain the so-called ‘Slavic threat’ (13). However, a rapid decline in the acceptance of this concept cannot be imagined, since it was so widespread and deeply ingrained in people’s way of thinking at the time.

¹⁸A short note on the usage of the term “race”: I will use the term without quotation marks whenever I quote directly or paraphrase others. In all other cases, I will put it in single quotation marks in order to distance myself from the idea of some kind of perceived cultural superiority, which, for example, was felt by supporters of Anglo-Saxonism.

relationship in the 20th century¹⁹ can be traced to this period (S. Anderson 12; Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace” 657; Vucetic, *Anglosphere* 24; “Racialized Peace” 403; “The Anglosphere Beyond Security” 86-88; Lehmkuhl 13; Hyam 202). It is a viable explanation why the idea that both the United States and Britain ‘naturally’ can and should work together on several levels quickly became commonsensical and persistent after World War II. Had this idea just been ‘newly-invented’, it would have been forgotten more easily and might not have found many supporters in the first place. However, the policymakers of the middle of the 20th century as well as the main audience of their speeches and actions were raised in a time when the premises that the Anglo-Saxonist discourse produced enjoyed wide acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic (Jacobson 206). Consequently, this must have influenced them beyond the time when this notion was mainly popular (Heuser 133). Furthermore, Vucetic accurately describes that foreign policy choices have to be made in accordance with the existing discourse of identity and reality at the time. The greater this fit, the more likely a particular discourse of identity continues (*Anglosphere* 19, 24).²⁰ This is what happened to the idea of an Anglo-American special relationship in the second half of the 20th century: The relationship was maintained ‘special’ by common deliberations on policy and the articulation of the ‘specialness’ of the relationship. Consequently, the idea persisted – or: this discursive element sustained itself and evolved into one of the key aspects of Anglo-Saxonism, giving

¹⁹Churchill first applied the term “special relationship” in his “Iron Curtain Speech” in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946, to describe the relations between both the U.S. and Britain at the time and gained good publicity for it (Churchill qtd. in McCauley 185-86; Katzenstein 2). Yet, he had already used the term since 1943 (Reynolds, “Anglo-American Relation” 21).

²⁰This corresponds with the fact that high-ranking political leaders of the late 19th and early 20th century, such as Theodore Roosevelt or Arthur Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain, supported Anglo-Saxonism (S. Anderson 13) and, consequently, shaped their policies accordingly. It is a clear indicator that the Anglo-Saxonist discourse succeeded in influencing actions. However, early American support for a closer Anglo-American cooperation was not widespread. Priscilla Roberts states that actually only a small group of – admittedly – influential men in the United States openly backed the idea of a closer Anglo-American cooperation. Most of these young diplomats, journalists, financiers, and military men were grouped around former President Theodore Roosevelt, two of his Secretaries of State, John Hay and Elihu Root, as well as Henry and Brooks Adams, naval strategist Alfred Mahan, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (P. Roberts, “World War I” 115-16). Thus, it cannot be denied that the idea had some supporters in the United States but in comparison to Britain, their number was relatively small and not assertive enough in the end. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, had published *The Winning of the West* already in 1889, in which he praised the important role of the single race of Anglo-Americans. Yet, when in office, his nationalist convictions prevented any projects for military integration with Britain (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 15).

proof to Hall's claim that discourses are open systems. The special relationship, thus, structured political practices and made the subjects agree on certain policies. Therefore, the notion of the 'specialness' of the relation was discursively reproduced and put into practice.

Lehmkuhl argues that the 20th century special relationship relied on three main factors: a power asymmetry between Britain as declining and the U.S. as ascending power, personal friendship or kinship, which created networks and institutionalized patterns of consultation, as well as a coincidence in political objectives, especially in terms of defense and security (15-17). Hence, Anglo-Saxonism is one of the three columns of the Anglo-American special relationship and deserves a closer look. Furthermore, the political developments and ideas within the English-speaking world around the turn of the 20th century can only be comprehended with a deeper knowledge of Anglo-Saxonism. After all, many ideas developed that were intended on transforming the relationship also on the political level between both nations.

Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) is highly important for the understanding of Anglo-Saxonism. Soon after Darwin's publication, it served as scientific knowledge, giving rise to a pseudoscientific²¹ race theory which was applied to "almost any question where men of different ethnic backgrounds came into conflict" (S. Anderson 37) and international rivalries were understood as the struggle for existence between different 'races' (29). These 'races' were regarded as embodying "different stages in the biological evolution of species" (McCarthy 69). The "different stages" were considered the justification for the domination of 'lower' by 'higher races' because a hierarchy could be established among them (McCarthy 1, 76; Vucetic, "Racialized Peace" 407). Ideas about 'races' had already existed before, but now they were given 'scientific proof'.²² Thus, it was natural to supporters of this theory that the

²¹The term pseudoscientific is used here since many Social Darwinist thinkers, such as Herbert Spencer or William Graham Sumner, were not trained biologists but only applied Darwin's evolutionary theory to explain their own social theories and spread them in society. One example of this is Spencer's idea of laissez-faire liberalism, which concluded that since only the fittest would survive, no governmental protection for the weak was necessary (McCarthy 75-76; Mandler 73-85). Another example in reference to Anglo-Saxonism was the idea of evolutionary adaption to the environment. This could happen either by absorbing new "foreign elements" when new immigrants came to 'Anglo-Saxon lands' over the centuries (Besant 136) or by modifying the "racial character [...] by space as well as time" when the Anglo-Saxons moved to new areas (Tulloch 829).

²²The most important rivals for power for the Anglo-Saxons were the "Latin, German, and Slavic" 'races' because they had proved "their fitness in the struggle for existence" (S. Anderson

U.S. and Britain as the two main representatives of the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ had to cooperate and show their strength in the continuous struggle, which was mostly happening in the fields of military and economy. As such, Anglo-Saxonism in the second half of the 19th century provided the “abstract rationale for the diplomatic rapprochement” between Britain and the United States (S. Anderson 12).²³

Vucetic describes 19th and early 20th century Anglo-Saxonism as a “racialized identity”, which means that “race is not real in the biological sense but it is real in the sense that the social and political world is constituted by groups who have been, or were, treated as if they were races” (“Racialized Peace” 405). This means that the basis of the cooperation among groups in the international context was highly influenced by a concept of ‘race’ that was based not exclusively on biological factors but mostly on, for instance, culture or political common interests.²⁴ Within any group, ‘race’ was the prime discursive category to identify with, regardless of other possibilities, such as ethnicity, gender, or class, since all of them are intersected by ‘race’ (Vucetic, *Anglosphere* 7). Furthermore, ‘rival’ out-groups were also treated as if they were different ‘races’, which also established a hierarchical order of ‘races’ in times of popularity of Social Darwinism (McCarthy 1). Members of the same ‘race’ formed a strong community that was – in the case dealt with here – sometimes called an “Anglo-Saxon *brotherhood*” (Vucetic, “Racialized Peace” 404,

63). However, the Latin “race” (referring to France, Italy, and Spain) was believed to be in decline already, which left the German and the Slavic ‘races’ as most serious rivals. The Germans were regarded as descending from the Teutons – like the Anglo-Saxons themselves (on Teutonism as part of Anglo-Saxonism, see p. 26 here) – which left them in an ambivalent position: On the one hand, they were very similar to – and, thus, admirable for – the Anglo-Saxons but, on the other hand, German foreign trade and the construction of their navy presented a very serious threat. The Slavs were considered to be the greatest peril of all to the Anglo-Saxons, although they were described as only “semicivilized” or “barbarians” (64-70). Yet, after the defeat of Russia in the Japanese-Russian War of 1904-05, this ‘threat’ collapsed for the Anglo-Saxons (Kramer 1344).

²³Social Darwinism, thus, was an important line of thinking in terms of the understanding of ‘race’ until the 1890s. In fact, it was treated as the “basic ontological category in society and politics” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 25). Yet, as Mendel’s work was being rediscovered and experimental genetics were further developed, Social Darwinism was subsequently questioned (McCarthy 82). Nevertheless, “scientific racism” only finally lost its academic respectability when the atrocities of the Nazi regime became known and even the last scientists and scholars turned away from this field of ‘science’ (McCarthy 84; Vucetic, “Racialized Peace” 416-17). At the same time, with the “mid-twentieth-century human rights revolution”, notions of a “natural inequality” of states also got overturned (“Search” 112).

²⁴Therefore, these discursive practices produced a racialized Other against which the newly united ‘Anglo-Saxon racial self’ identified itself.

emphasis added).²⁵ Bell adds that in the case of Anglo-Saxonism, the belief in the superiority of this particular ‘race’ even led to the development of the idea that this ‘race’ could establish an “Anglo-world unity”, interstate war as such could be abolished (“Before the Democratic Peace” 657). First of all, this shows how firm the identification with the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ was, since a “world unity” of people scattered around the globe would not have been imaginable unless the identification with one common element was very strong. Secondly, it indicates how convinced its supporters were of the belief in their ‘racial’ superiority, because the idea implies that the ‘Anglo-world’ – and no other ‘world’ – has it in its power to abolish interstate war as a whole. This so-called “racial utopianism” was no longer as prominent after World War I but it still found “supporters deep into the 20th century” (663).

What Vucetic calls the “racialized identity” of Anglo-Saxonism is described as “social identity that is compounded of ethnicity, culture, tradition, and language” by Frantzen and Niles (2). In comparison to Vucetic’s description, this more stresses the cultural aspect of Anglo-Saxonism. Both definitions do not include a biological component of the concept, although the term which is often used is “race”. Stuart Anderson focuses more on the aspect of civilization in his definition because to him, Anglo-Saxonism is the

belief – part of the prevailing orthodoxy in Great Britain and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – that the civilization of the English-speaking nations was superior to that of any other group of people on the planet. (11-12)

Here, the terms “Anglo-Saxon” and “English-speaking” are mixed already, which was done repeatedly over time and, thus, both terms cannot be fully distinguished. Again, ‘race’ is not negated even if the emphasis was on culture or language.²⁶ Stuart Anderson also mentions that the characteristics that were ascribed to the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ were both biologically and culturally defined (12), which is re-

²⁵Other expressions of the same lexical field that were used similarly were “brothers”, “cousins”, and “Anglo-American family” (“Racialized Peace” 409, 413). Note the striking similarity to Benedict Anderson’s wording, who describes an imagined community as “deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). Although “comradeship” does not belong to the lexical field of “family” in the strict sense, it still is closely connected to it. Thus, it can be said that the supporters of Anglo-Saxonism practiced what Anderson found about a century later in his studies.

²⁶Theodore Roosevelt, for example, rather used the (more culturally shaped) expression “English-speaking peoples” than “Anglo-Saxon race” but he referred to the same concept (Kramer 1323).

flected in Bell's term of a "biocultural assemblage" to describe the notion of 'race' (*Dreamworlds* 28). Today, this mixture between the concepts of 'race' and culture seems highly implausible, yet around the turn of the 20th century, the "usage of the term race was highly imprecise" and its definition circled around cultural markers ("historical memories, language, shared values, habitus") that were often described as whiteness (Bell, "Imagined Spaces" 204; "Before the Democratic Peace" 649; P. Clarke 221). Hence, the definitions do not necessarily contradict each other.

Since both the United States and Britain (or the whole British Empire) presented one 'racial' family to Anglo-Saxonists, the goal was to make war impossible between them because "[w]hen brothers being to fight, they never cease fighting" (Besant 142). By the end of the 19th century, a British petition that was signed by thousands that wanted war to be regarded as "intolerable" between the English-speaking peoples (Campbell 183; Vucetic, "Racialized Peace" 413). Although the signing of a petition rather presents a wish than a reality, the fact that the idea of a so-called 'racial peace' among the Anglo-Saxons was so popular clearly indicates that the perception of the respective other part of the Anglo-American world had changed in comparison to the middle of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxons were seen as *the* 'race' that could establish peace on earth – a fact that was considered self-evident by supporters of Anglo-Saxonism. Bell finds that the arguments to back this claim were the following: If the Anglo-world combined its military and industrial might, the resulting entity would be so powerful that potential rivals would not dare attack. Additionally, the Anglo-Saxons could claim moral legitimacy to establish peace in the whole world because of the political virtues of the Anglo-world. However, both arguments were mixed by contemporaries and cannot be regarded as distinct from each other ("Before the Democratic Peace" 660).²⁷

The endeavor to bring peace to the world translated into a "peculiar sense of mission in the world" that tied Britain and the U.S. closer together (Heuser 133; see also S. Anderson 24-25). This is very similar to the idea of an American exceptionalism. British historian E.A. Freeman even called this perceived sense of mission

²⁷Two prominent thinkers of the time who were convinced of this are Andrew Carnegie and Cecil Rhodes (Bell, "New Anglo Century" 44). For a discussion of their vision for a possible reunion of the United States and Britain, see chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

a “manifest destiny of the race” (qtd. in Bell, “Alter Orbis” 218), a term which is surprising given his British background. Manifest Destiny is an concept which cannot easily be applied to the British context because of the respective ‘missing’ founding myth in Britain. It presumes that the Americans are exceptional and chosen by God to spread their ideas and ideals across the world. Yet, in the 19th century, Anglo-Saxons “were proclaimed the racial embodiments and shock troops of American Manifest Destiny” (Kramer 1323). By referring to Anglo-Saxons instead of, for example, ‘white Americans’ or using any other kind of denomination in this description, the genuine American ‘destiny’ is connected to ‘old world Britain’. This makes it a bit contradictory: American Manifest Destiny is independent from the old world and means that it is the *Americans* who were chosen by God to spread across the world. Nevertheless, in particular when ‘Anglo-Saxon political institutions’ were spoken of around the turn of the 20th century, there seemed to be general agreement that not only the Americans as a nation but the Anglo-Saxons as a whole had a “special mission in the world, to transform and redeem other nations, especially through the example of their republican institutions” (Kramer 1322; see also McCarthy 72; S. Anderson 23). Hence, the “racial destiny” – or “racial exceptionalism” (Kramer 1324) – of the Anglo-Saxons is closely linked with the ‘national destiny’ of the United States. This is very similar to American exceptionalism and is at the same time extended to the ‘British branch’ of the Anglo-Saxons.

As the compound word Anglo-Saxon already suggests, the group of people it refers to was a *mixture* of ‘races’. Ultimately, the Anglo-Saxons were traced back to the Teutons, who themselves derived from the Aryans (1322). In the Teutonic origins theory, the “institutional germ” (S. Anderson 37) of democratic social organization originated among the Teutons in German forest tribes and was brought to Britain in an intact form in the fifth and sixth centuries. Belich calls this institutional germ a “unique addiction to law and liberty” that had been “hardwired into their genes or souls by an Anglo-prone Nature or Providence” (5). This pure form of a democratic system as well as the Teutonic ‘race’ was kept intact “by wiping out rather than absorbing the undemocratic and racially inferior Celtic Britons”. Subsequently, “English freedom and gift for self-government” (S. Anderson 38) evolved in

Britain. In the 17th century, these descendants of the Teutons – the Anglo-Saxons – brought this “seed” to the New World so that “democratic, libertarian institutions” could also develop in the United States (37-38).²⁸ Hence, both the political institutions and people of the United States and Britain had the same Teutonic origins.²⁹ Partly, the settler colonies of the British Empire were regarded as a “diffusion of the English people”, so that they still belonged to an organic whole or were the “natural extension of the ‘mother country’” (Bell, “Victorian Idea” 167; “Imagined Spaces” 205).

The assumed superiority of the Anglo-Saxon institutions was also interpreted as being derived from a presumed ‘racial’ superiority and the Anglo-Saxons were ascribed a “unique racial endowment” (S. Anderson 12; see also McCarthy 72). Apart from being the most democratic ‘race’ – in fact, the Anglo-Saxons saw a lack of democracy anywhere else but in ‘their’ lands (Vucetic, “Racialized Peace” 413) – the alleged characteristics of Anglo-Saxons were the love of liberty in any form, high intelligence and morals, as well as adventurousness, fearlessness, the ability to adapt quickly to new surroundings and to transform their environment. They were also perceived as truthful, logical, and patient, they had the capacity to work and were loyal to friends and nation (S. Anderson 12, 20; Kramer 1324). Furthermore, Anglo-Saxons typically were of male gender, “tied to tasks of struggle and conquest” (Kramer 1322), Protestants, and – first and foremost – white;³⁰ these were

²⁸Note that this is one of the many inconsistencies in the theory of Anglo-Saxonism, which existed at the same time. The Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ was characterized by hybridity with the “theoretical possibility of future assimilations” that made its boundaries porous in terms of “race, culture, and destiny” (Kramer 1322). Edward A. Freeman, Oxford historian and “the most enthusiastic of Teutomaniacs” (Mandler 92), even praised the Anglo-Saxons for having done so in the past. By “adoption, naturalization, assimilation”, new immigrants in England had become “Teutonized” and in the U.S., the same processes happened with new immigrants when they are made Americans (qtd. in Mandler 91). This is the same idea as the metaphor of the melting pot that melts all ‘races’ so that they become ‘American’ in the end. Conversely, Anglo-Saxons praised themselves for maintaining their ‘racial purity’ by “wiping out rather than absorbing” (S. Anderson 38) ‘inferior races’. The contradiction was never resolved that wiping out other ‘races’ and absorbing them at the same time is not possible.

²⁹Note that other ‘races’ in the United States and the British Empire were not paid attention at all in the Teutonic origins theory.

³⁰Only in 1962 did the description of WASP (White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) come up, which is more familiar today, although sometimes used in a derogatory way. Stereotypically, WASPs inherited a lot of wealth, have an Ivy League education, a business career and close connections to political leadership. They may even have an English accent in their manner of speaking although they are Americans (Frantzen and Niles 2). Thus, in contrast to the characteristics that are connoted with Anglo-Saxonism, WASPs can be described in a more concrete way and the concept

attributes that were connected with ideas of modernity and civilization (Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace” 650; Vucetic, *Anglosphere* 25). Admittedly, these are mostly quite superficial categories, which could not be proven to the fullest, but this was not necessary: Anglo-Saxonism became such a powerful force because people *wanted* to believe in it, not because they had proof for it (S. Anderson 19). Apart from their ‘common characteristics’ the Anglo-Saxons also naturally felt united by their common ancestry, by their assumed common culture and history as well as by their language (Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace” 650)³¹ – these on the other hand indeed were categories that could largely not be denied.³² It is debatable whether there really is or was any kind of ‘common Anglo-Saxon culture’; however, as people once more *chose* to believe in its existence, it is counted here among the postulations which were accepted as factual.³³ The idea behind these wide-ranging markers was that, although there might be different ‘types’ of Anglo-Saxons, such as Canadians and Americans, Anglo-Saxondom as such anchored and united them across the world (Bell, “Imagined Spaces” 205).

Evidently, the concept of Anglo-Saxonism was a highly racist one. The ‘racial

is perhaps not taken as seriously across society today as was Anglo-Saxonism at the turn of the 20th century.

³¹Considering these cultural markers, Anglo-Saxonism is very similar to pan-ideologies of the 19th century which were often based on ethnicity, religion, or regional coherence. Supporters of these ideologies often wanted to “unify members of so-called ‘pan-groups’ beyond nationalist boundaries” and, thus, to break apart existing states (Lüdke). Advocates of Anglo-Saxonism aimed at uniting across existing states all over the world but they did not want to destroy those states since they regarded the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ states as homogeneous entities which did not need any further division among themselves. This is the reason why pan-ideologies are not dealt with here in more detail.

³²Kramer, however, notices that there was a difference in stress of the common characteristics of the Anglo-Saxons in the United States and Britain. The Anglo-American League which was founded in 1898 in Britain to establish closer ties between both nations more focused on the blood relations of the Anglo-Saxons, whereas the American counterpart (founded in the same year) emphasized the common language and institutions (1345). Hence, the Americans did not stress blood relations as much at the end of the 19th century in comparison to the middle of the 19th century, when Anglo-Saxonism was a means to exclude not only non-whites but also “pathetic Celtic newcomers” (Jacobson 206). The reason might have been that they are an immigrant nation and if new immigrants are to be included in some kind of ‘Anglo-Saxon cult’, accentuating common ancestry with the Anglo-Saxons in Britain would have repelled them from becoming integrated. However, Stuart Anderson states that with the influx of many new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe to the U.S. in the 1890s, Anglo-Saxonism gained importance. ‘Anglo-Saxon Americans’ wanted to defend their leading position in society and created a fear that America would be ‘lost’ if they did not resist this new immigration. This is the reason why immigration became severely restricted in that period (54). For more information on the Anglo-American League, see chapter 3.2.

³³This indicates that the Anglo-Saxon discourse had already produced a regime of truth which generated knowledge about this topic.

mission' of the Anglo-Saxons was closely linked to the idea of the 'white man's burden', which had to 'redeem' 'inferior races', which were mostly non-white. Yet, in the case of Anglo-Saxonism, it becomes very clear what Jacobson means when he says that 'races' are "invented categories" (4) and the history of whiteness is one of "fluidity" (9): Depending on the context, 'races' – the Anglo-Saxon 'race' in particular – could refer to different entities. At points, only three 'races' in the world were spoken of (the 'white', 'yellow', and 'black races') and sometimes there was a distinction between different white 'races' (English, German, French, Russian) that were closely connected to the respective nations. Furthermore, the English and American 'races' were mentioned in the context of Anglo-Saxonism and were either seen as "divergent English and American races" or as members of a "great worldwide racial stock", which occasionally was called the "English-speaking race" (S. Anderson 18). The imprecision of the concept allowed it to be applied in different contexts. Processes of in- and exclusion could take place repeatedly and simultaneously and result in different conclusions of who belonged to a specific 'race'. When the settlers of the U.S. expanded their territory across the continent, they used the notion of Anglo-Saxon supremacy to justify their violent actions against Native Americans and, thus, distanced themselves from non-whites (Jacobson 205).

The success and popularity of Anglo-Saxonism can be explained and was also partly maintained by the "social, familial, intellectual, and literary networks" between the elites on both sides of the Atlantic. One phenomenon, which exemplified the idea of particularly close relations between Britain and the United States, were strategic marriages between American heiresses and high-ranking British men. They and their children then had actual family bonds and blood relations across the Atlantic and, hence, were proof that such bonds existed (Kramer 1327; Belich 480).³⁴ There was also a close cultural relationship among "literate, English-speaking Americans and Britons", which was facilitated by the letters and the publication of books that were shipped (mostly westward) across the Atlantic in large quantities (Belich 40). Additionally, Anglo-American literary political magazines like the *Atlantic*

³⁴Belich counts 319 cross-Atlantic marriages between 1783 and 1914, with 263 marriages between 1870 and 1914 (480). One prominent example is Winston Churchill, who had an American mother and a British father (P. Clarke 200).

Monthly, the *North American Review*, the *Fortnightly Review*, *Scribner's*, *Century Magazine*, and *Nineteenth Century* were popular in the late-Victorian age (Kramer 1326). The fact that people had 'common literature', which very often contained notions of Anglo-Saxonism that was produced for and read on both sides of the Atlantic, created an imagined community among especially the elites of Britain and the United States.

In this thesis, the concepts of Foucault's discourse and Benedict Anderson's imagined communities are combined in order to analyze the way in which the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism (which later was the basis of an Atlantic discourse) aimed at producing a (racialized) imagined community among the respective audiences. After all, the understanding that they together form a nation influenced the contributors' "way of constructing meanings" and shaped as well as structured their actions and conceptions of themselves (Hall et al. 614). My hypothesis is that all the contributors that are chosen here share the conviction that the people they describe as Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking, or Atlantic are united in a certain way – thus, they form an imagined community – and this community forms the main pillar of their Angltopian proposals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Therefore, I will investigate how this imagined community is formed and take a look at the representational strategies that are used to construct the "common-sense views of national belonging" (614). Furthermore, it is important to study how the narrative of the national culture is told and how the idea of a modern nation is constructed. This "modern nation" here that goes way beyond national boundaries as we know it relies on the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism which constructs what I call a *transnational* community of Anglo-Saxon peoples around the world.

According to Hall, there are five main discursive strategies to answer these questions (614): A narrative of the nation is told and retold in various forms, like national histories, literature, media, and popular culture. Therefore, a "set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols, and rituals" develops, which represents the common experiences that give meaning to the nation – or in the case here: the imagined community. The members of this community feel that they all share this very same narrative and, consequently, they connect

their lives to a common destiny. Furthermore, the common origins, tradition, and continuity have to be stressed repeatedly and what has to be constructed is the notion that the “national character remain[ed] unchanged through all the vicissitudes of history” (614). Consequently, the very same national identity appears to have existed forever. This is closely connected to the third discursive strategy that is relevant here, namely what Hobsbawm would call the invention of tradition (*Invention of Tradition*): the notion that traditions which claim to be very old are actually of fairly recent origin and still manage to connect people behind them. Additionally, the discursive strategy of a foundational myth can be used to form such a modern nation. This story “locates the origin of the nation, the people, and their national character so early that they are lost in the mists of [...] ‘mythic’ time” (Hall et al. 614). Finally, this community is often constructed around the idea of a pure, original people (615).

In the following, I will investigate in how far these five strategies are used by the contributors chosen here and how they (do not) manage to construct an imagined community among specific groups of people within the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism, that later developed into an Atlantic discourse (see p. 178). The single arguments that are used by the contributors are in themselves representations of Anglo-Saxonism or Atlanticism, respectively. As this thesis covers a time-span of about a century, it is interesting to look at how these representations of the Anglo-Saxon and later Atlantic discourses were upheld by the contributors, in particular Clarence Streit, whose writings are the main focus of this thesis.

3 Phase I: The Anglo-Saxon Discourse on Union in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

3.1 Reasons for Deliberations on a (New) World Order at the Turn of the 20th Century

In the last decades of the 19th century, the world changed considerably: The technological revolution altered the perception of distances in the world, new great powers emerged, and – from a British perspective – the British Empire faced internal changes as well as new challenges. Having been the global hegemon in the preceding century, it, of course, wanted to maintain its power position in the 20th century. Such circumstances naturally lead to the development of new ideas of how to cope with them in the future, which is what also happened in the British Empire at the turn of the 20th century. This part of the thesis deals with proposals of restructuring the British Empire to enable it to remain in its powerful position in the upcoming century. The ideas dealt with here either refer to a federation or union of the whole British Empire, ‘only’ Britain³⁵ and the dominions, or the ‘white’ parts of the Empire with the United States.

It is vital to understand the changes in the last decades of the 19th century since they provide the background of understanding why and how new schemes for a common rule of the English-speaking peoples on a larger scale could be generated. The industrial revolution had already started long before the end of the 19th century. However, in this period it accelerated considerably and spread across the world, which changed both the pace and scale of interaction on a global scale. Consequently, important questions needed to be answered to create a “first fully global security system” (Deudney, *Bounding Power* 215):

Which actors and institutions would survive these upheavals and be most adaptive to the constraints and opportunities of a new era? [...] [H]ow many actors, of what sort, located where, and interacting how, would survive? (219)

³⁵During the 18th and 19th centuries, the terms “England” and “Britain” were often used synonymously because of the dominance of England within the political structure (Langford 12-15). I decided to use the term “Britain” and only use England when I refer to England as a part of Britain. The term “United Kingdom” here only refers to the political entity. Whenever direct quotes use the term in a different way, I do not change it.

Several fears and ideas of the age are reflected here. Deudney uses the words “survive” as well as “adaptive”, which shows that not all actors and institutions *could* last in the future and those which *would* endure needed to adapt to the new realities in the best possible way. Thus, competition among the actors across the world increased and it was unclear how their future relationship would be characterized. Cambridge historian John Robert Seeley notes in his famous work *The Expansion of England*³⁶ that the trend of world politics favors “vast political unions” (86). In fact, the dominant idea in world politics was that only great, perhaps even omnipotent powers would be able to survive in the future. Their sheer size brought with it the capability to deal with larger problems as well as the necessary prestige to be adequately respected by other great powers that gained strength at the time (Bell, “Imagined Spaces” 198; “New Anglo Century” 36; *Idea of Greater Britain* 244). This conviction is called the empire peace thesis, which claims that war can be abolished if the world is managed by few big empires rather than by many small states. It has two variants: the inter-imperial one, which means that few dominant powers cooperate with each other, and the hegemonial imperial one, which strives to establish one *one* big empire in the world. The idea is that if only one or very few big powers operate in the international system, the number of autonomous polities is reduced. This, in turn, works as a stabilizing factor because not as many individual interests are at play.³⁷ Such big empire(s) can mostly uphold the peace

³⁶This book by John Robert Seeley is based on a series of lectures he gave in 1881-82 and was highly influential in the last decades of the 19th century: Until the end of the 1880s, ten printings of it were sold (Vucetic, “Search” 108), which is quite a lot. His book provided the intellectual basis for what later became the imperial federation movement (Deudney, “Greater Synthesis?” 194; Behm chapter 2; see chapter 3.2 here), although Seeley’s ideas have already spread in the 1870s (Burgess, *British Tradition* 38). The main points in *The Expansion of England* are that the white parts of the British Empire form a so-called “Greater Britain” that is tied together by a “community of race, community of religion, [and a] community of interest” (Seeley 20). There are only two alternatives for the future composition of this Greater Britain: Either the four important groups of colonies (Canada, the West Indian islands, the “Australian group”, and South Africa) gain independence or they are federated in a similar way as the United States (24-25). Seeley himself prefers the latter; the Empire should be consolidated and made powerful enough to resist the U.S. and Russia in the 20th century. Additionally, he claims that the discussion of what happened to the British Empire is vital not only for the ‘English race’, but for the entire world since “[t]he whole future depends upon it [the English race]” (162).

³⁷This theory has another variant, which was, however, not shared by the majority of imperialists at the time: It states that only *democratic* empires can guarantee peace in the world (democratic empire thesis). They not only have the economic and military might, they also bear the moral legitimacy of popular government. Consequently, these ‘civilized’ empires can rightfully govern allegedly ‘backward’ – meaning: non-democratic – parts of the world (“Before the Democratic

within their own jurisdiction and the larger their scope, the more parts of the world can be pacified. Furthermore, because of their strength in military, economic, and political terms, empires can also maintain the peace outside of their own jurisdiction because this position deters attacks on them and they can become an arbitrator for conflicts in the whole world (*Dreamworlds* 319-20). Therefore, to safeguard British power also in the 20th century and keep the peace within and outside of the British Empire, it needed to be strengthened enough to be able to cope with new upcoming rival powers as well as with internal difficulties in the Empire that started to disrupt the whole entity.

For ideas of a federation across the globe to become both imaginable and possible, another decisive change was necessary at the end of the 19th century. It happened especially after 1870 and affected the perception of distance in the world. In this period, technology and science transformed human affairs because of the emergence of new ways of communication and transportation (Deudney, *Bounding Power* 220). The telegraph made communication across large distances both quick and easy, which seemed to diminish distances between different areas in the world. Furthermore, the steam engine, which was used for ship and railroad transportation, intensified and accelerated transportation of both goods and people.³⁸ This also created the impression that the world was ‘shrinking’. Furthermore, the expansion of the railroad network reduced the advantages of mobility across the oceans, since huge areas across land were now also made accessible (Deudney, “Greater Synthesis?” 192). Bell argues that the strong belief in the ever bigger power of technology to “shrink” the world even can be called “techno-utopianism” (“Imagined Spaces” 203). It can be rephrased as the belief that *everything* was possible and solvable with new technologies so that new ‘utopias’, such as a strong and worldwide federation of the Empire, could be imagined. This conviction was shared across the political

Peace” 654). The racist and imperialist notions of this idea will be dealt with in chapter 8.

³⁸The telegraph had already been invented in 1837. However, it took some time to really have an impact since the English channel got its first functioning cable in 1851 and a functioning cable across the Atlantic was only installed in 1866. In 1871 and 1872, Australia and New Zealand were connected to Britain via telegraph cable, too. Although the first steamship sailed across the Atlantic in 1833, this technology was only used extensively after 1850 (Bell, “Dissolving Distance” 543-44; *Dreamworlds* 37). The larger amount of transportation of goods naturally also resulted in a higher economic interdependence in the world particularly by the end of the 19th century (“Dissolving Distance” 524).

spectrum (Bell, “Dissolving Distance” 528). Seeley also writes that “distance has been almost abolished by steam and electricity” (74). The utterance illustrates how strong the belief and hope in the new technologies as well as their impact on the perception of the world were: Distances no longer mattered. This in turn had a huge effect on the political imagination of the era: The world was getting smaller, physical limits, that had been very relevant in the past, no longer seemed to exist, and, therefore, larger political units as well as an identification across huge territorial areas were deemed feasible. Referring to the British Empire after 1870, a stronger unification of the scattered colonial Empire or a so-called “Greater Britain” seemed possible for the first time in history. Thus, the Empire’s huge geographical scope could develop from one of its biggest weaknesses to one of its greatest advantages in the world. Once the loose bonds in the entity could be overcome by the exploitation of those new technologies, all the scattered parts of the Empire around the world would form one really unified entity in a world ‘without distances’. Within this new political imagination, a solidarity or kinship between different groups across the world could be created. Although the English-speaking peoples were living far apart, the links between them could theoretically be intensified. Hence, a globe-spanning, common identity within the British Empire seemed possible because the new technologies created a higher awareness of material, cultural, and emotional interdependence (Bell, “Alter Orbis” 223; “Dissolving Distance” 559). These developments were not confined to the British Empire, but, especially for the connections between people in the U.S. and Britain, Bell’s assumption of the higher awareness of this interdependence can be regarded as true. Contact between them – be it in the form of letters or literary work but also in business and tourism – was simplified and deepened because of these new technologies (Kramer 1326; Bell, “New Anglo Century” 233). This facilitated the establishment of an imagined community among both societies because they could stay in closer contact and exchange their opinions more actively. Hence, the technological revolution became the necessary – if not sufficient – condition³⁹ for new ideas about a possible unification of the Empire and

³⁹As sufficient conditions for imagining a global state Bell names the following: the social, cultural, and political ruptures, which transformed Britain over the 19th century, as well as the rise of democracy and the fear for domestic unrest (528).

for larger ideas of a world state, which also came up in the same era (“Victorian Idea” 174; “Dissolving Distance” 528).

Throughout the 19th century, the British Empire was *the* leading power in the world. However, by the end of the period, new competitors emerged and a new balance in international politics was necessary, which is another reason why a new and stronger (unification of the) British Empire was sought (“Imagined Spaces” 204, 208-09; Deudney, *Bounding Power* 223-24; Bell, “Dissolving Distance” 550-51). The British experienced a relative decline in their power position with the rise of Germany, Russia, and the United States to great powers.⁴⁰ They presented a threat in military, economic, and geographical terms, which had to be dealt with if the Empire should not become ‘second rate’. Consequently, the idea of a Greater Britain or the unification of all the English-speaking peoples across the world was seen as a possibility to remain a hegemonic power and be on equal footing with the new great powers in the 20th century. It would combine great wealth and geopolitical power which could not be challenged so easily (Campbell 202; Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain* 36). Furthermore, the political system of the world more and more was perceived as “closed” because of fewer and fewer ‘white spots’ on the global map (Deudney, *Bounding Power* 223). This resulted in the impression that interconnection, competition, and conflict between the great powers intensified. Accordingly, the increased pressure by the end of the 19th century is probably the reason why so many more schemes for a federation of the British Empire emerged in the 1880s and 1890s than before (Kramer 1325).

In addition to the threat from outside by other powers, several internal threats developed simultaneously. First of all, there was the ongoing and inevitable rise of democracy. Supporters of the British Empire often regarded democracy as a potentially destabilizing factor. Some even feared that democracy as such would cause inter-state violence – which would further weaken the British Empire in itself – and that democracy itself is anti-imperial (Bell, “New Anglo Century” 35). Proponents of the strong variant of this “democratic war thesis” claimed that democracies as

⁴⁰Deudney also mentions Japan among the new competitor states in this period (*Bounding Power* 221). Yet, as Japan neither seemed as threatening as the other three new great powers nor did it play a major role in the discourse of a future reform of the British Empire, it is left out of the analysis here.

such were prone to violence, whereas advocates of a weaker version of this thesis – who were in the majority – believed that democratic structures and norms only *facilitated* war or at least did nothing to avert it (“Before the Democratic Peace” 653).⁴¹ Furthermore, there was a fear of both ‘moral decay’ because of the enlargement of the franchise to ever wider parts of the population, which gave the impression that the ‘uneducated public’ could soon dominate British politics.⁴² The second great internal threat was a perceived overpopulation of Britain. It should be solved by systematic emigration to its colonies (Bell, “Victorian Idea” 175-76), which needed to be regulated and the emigrants had to be bound closer to Britain. Greater Britain could be solution: The spread of Anglo-Saxon peoples across the world promised to be beneficial to the world (in they eyes of its supporters) and the establishment of a Greater Britain could “tam[e] the transition to democracy” – and, consequently, also the assumed ‘moral decay’ related to that (*Idea of Greater Britain* 2).

The combination of these new circumstances let advocates of the Empire construct the situation as a crisis.⁴³ The usage of this term as part of a discursive strategy has an intentional emotive element and should serve a certain purpose. People should become convinced that a change in imperial politics was imperative since the whole Empire would dissolve otherwise. This fear was intensified by references to the historical examples of the Roman and Greek Empires. These were role models for Victorians in terms of scope, but also convinced them at the same time that empires as such were self-dissolving over time (Bell, “Victorian Imperial Thought” 737). This narrative was particularly important since Victorian imperialists noticed a lack of awareness about the importance of the Empire among their

⁴¹Supporters of the “democratic war thesis” naturally did not agree with the democratic empire thesis, although they can have promoted the empire peace thesis (see p. 33 here). Only in the 20th century did empirical studies indicate that democracies fight each other less likely than other states (“Before the Democratic Peace” 648), but this had not had scientific proof in the 19th century yet.

⁴²The big electoral reforms in Britain in the 19th century happened in 1832, 1867, and 1884/85. After the third reform, about 66% of the male citizens in England and Wales were eligible to vote (Wende 48). Although this presented a huge enlargement of the electorate, voting still was a privilege rather than a right and the restrictions for being able to register for voting still were so rigid that the fear of ‘moral decay’ seems exaggerated from today’s point of view. Yet, among the elite of Victorian Britain the perception was different, since these people were not used to having to share their power and influence with other people, especially with those of lower classes.

⁴³However, John Randolph Dos Passos, as a contemporary American writer, strongly objected this view. To him, the assertion that the British Empire was in decline was “absurd” even in 1903 (Passos 5).

compatriots (*Idea of Greater Britain* 31-33), which naturally could speed up the process of a dissolving Empire if nothing was done about it. However, the British colonial Empire both presented the problem as well as the solution: On the one hand, a secession of important parts of the Empire was feared, especially since the settler colonies achieved more autonomy over time.⁴⁴ Some even were afraid that if they gained independence, they might fuse with another state, like for example, the United States, which further would have weakened the Empire (Bell, “New Anglo Century” 35). On the other hand, if the dominions were bound more closely to the Empire, a stronger Empire across the whole world could emerge (“Imagined Spaces” 200-01). To realize this, a “new model of imperial citizenry” (“Victorian Idea” 176) needed to be developed to secure the identification with the Empire from within and make it stronger both against internal and external threats.

Apart from the fact that the United States presented a new challenge to the British Empire, the relationship between both states changed considerably at the end of the 19th century. Bradford Perkins named this the “Great Rapprochement” (Perkins), a term which describes the peaceful managing of crises between the U.S. and Britain,⁴⁵ stronger transnational relations, and the “development of a strong sense of kinship between Britain and the United States” (Schumacher 73). This kinship also translated into a firm belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons, which was widely shared among both societies in that era. According to Vucetic, this rapprochement mainly developed out of the ideal of a “racial peace” between the whole ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ that needed to be established (Vucetic, “Racialized

⁴⁴Gallagher argues that the dominions did not want to leave the Empire for lack of alternatives in their defense (85). So it is doubtful whether the fear of secession really was necessary around the turn of the 20th century.

⁴⁵Most notable among those crises are the Venezuela Boundary Dispute of 1895 and the Spanish-American War of 1898, which both were settled peacefully between Britain and the U.S. although the decisions could easily have been taken differently. An intervention of the U.S. in Venezuela because of British territorial claims would have been necessary especially because Venezuela appealed to the U.S. for help and because U.S. politics still followed the Monroe doctrine. Instead of going to war, however, the conflict was resolved by the Treaty of Washington in 1897, in which the U.S., Britain, and Venezuela agreed to “submit all their disputes to arbitration” (Campbell 188). When the Spanish-American War became more likely in 1898, Britain first was expected to take the Spanish side. In the end, it did not join the other European powers in their endeavor to mediate between the conflict partners but proclaimed neutrality after the outbreak of the war. This was greeted friendly in the United States. Hence, a sense of kinship seemed to have developed between the U.S. and Britain. At the same time, the idea came up that war between English-speaking peoples should become impossible because of their ‘common race’ (Kenny and Pearce 22-23; Campbell 175-83, 191-96); see also chapter 2.3.

Peace” 403-04). Yet, a *translatio imperii* began: Until the end of the century, the British regarded themselves as the ‘natural leaders’ of this ‘Anglo-Saxon race’, for which they were now challenged by the Americans. This means that their relationship had to be defined anew. Before the Great Rapprochement, the United States had had different roles in British political perception over the course of the century. Until the American Civil War, the relationship between both states can be described as rather hostile (Campbell 175). Additionally, the U.S. still presented a ‘lesson’ to Britain of how *not* to treat the colonies if they were to be kept within the Empire. Toward the end of the century, the United States developed to a great power and presented a huge threat to the British economy as well as geopolitical superiority, so it had to be taken seriously (Bell, “Victorian Imperial Thought” 737). Nevertheless, it also was a model of how a future empire could be structured: After the Civil War, the U.S. was living proof that large areas could be governed in a federal way and that liberty still could prosper in such a political system – something which many empires had never achieved in the past (*Idea of Greater Britain* 237-38). Accordingly, the relationship by the end of the 19th century was ambivalent, since the U.S. both was admired and feared as competitor for the British Empire at the same time.

However, this new and closer relationship also paved the way for new ideas. By the end of the 19th century, the idea of an Anglo-Saxon fraternity – in particular a fraternity between the United States and Britain – had gained wide acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic (Tulloch 826) and facilitated the construction of an imagined community of both nations. This makes it less than surprising that not only schemes for a federation of the British Empire were developed. The U.S. was included in those schemes ever more often with the goal of strengthening these ties, so that both states could mutually benefit from their respective strength.

3.2 Ideas of a Federation of the Empire and an Anglo-American Union

Although the first proposal to realize a Greater Britain in an imperial federation came up only in 1871 by J.A. Froude (Deudney, “Greater Synthesis?” 193), both Martin and Burgess agree that the idea of a federation of the British Empire did

not only emerge at the end of the 19th century, but it represents a continuation in the history of thought of the preceding decades which applied similar discursive strategies to justify such a federation and developed similar ideas for a federation. The latter, however, states that it was the special circumstances of the time between 1869 and 1871⁴⁶ that let the so-called imperial federation movement become so significant up until the 1920s and that it was not just any cyclical increase in the discussion as Martin suggests (*British Tradition* 24-25; G. Martin 65, 71). The debate about an imperial federation only decreased with the ever stronger autonomy of the dominions (Belich 460-70), which were finally defined by Balfour in 1926 as follows:

They are *autonomous* communities within the British Empire, *equal in status*, in no ways subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. (qtd. in McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision* 169; emphasis added)

The dominions, thus, were placed on an equal footing with Britain within the Empire, which made ‘control’ over them and their policies nearly impossible, especially since the definition of the Balfour Report was transformed into a legal norm in 1931 in the Statue of Westminster. Afterwards, only very little hope was left – from a British perspective – that a federation with the dominions could become a reality.

Yet, before the 1920, especially during the 1880s and ’90s, several ideas of a reorganization of the British Empire were discussed under the banner of imperial federation. However, there is no clear definition what imperial federation meant exactly. This was convenient for its supporters (at first) since a lot of followers could be gained and mobilized without having to agree one one definite scheme for the

⁴⁶Burgess refers to the uproar that was created by the colonial policy of the Gladstone government as well as the emergence of a political movement within and outside of the British parliament that favored a closer union of the “white self-governing empire” (“Imperial Federation” 62). He explains that Gladstone’s colonial policy was perceived as incompetent because in an effort to cut public expenditure, the Prime Minister also reduced imperial defense. This led to harsh protests. Furthermore, the financial burden of wars like the American Civil War and the Maori Wars in New Zealand became apparent for the British Empire: Both Canada and New Zealand expected Britain to protect them in such conflicts, which turned out to be very expensive. This led to a feeling of urgency about the future Empire and its financial structure (62-66). Finally, in summer 1871, a public meeting at the Westminster Palace Hotel in London was held to discuss colonial questions. This is identified as a landmark in the history of the imperial federation movement by Burgess because a new political movement dedicated to the consolidation and closer union of the Empire started to develop at this point (73).

federation of the Empire (Burgess, *British Tradition* 24). What they did agree on was that the Empire needed greater efficiency, coherence, and stability in the 20th century (Kramer 1325) and, for some of them, Greater Britain presented the possibility to cope with the threats of the age (Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain* 34). Hence, Seeley's usage of the discursive strategy in *The Expansion of England* (1888) which constructed of a unity of blood, which should result in a political union, clearly "resonated with its target audiences" (Vucetic, "Search" 109) and facilitated a further discussion of a potential federation, not only of the British Empire but also of the whole English-speaking world.

The term "Greater Britain" was introduced into public discourse by Charles Dilke's travelogue *Greater Britain*, which he published in 1868 after his travels through the English-speaking world. His conclusion is that the British Isles, America, Australia, and India can and should be combined to what he calls "Greater Britain" (viii)⁴⁷ – which already implies that the result is 'greater' than 'just' *Great Britain*. Subsequently, the general idea of a larger federation of the Empire was discussed by people across the political spectrum, Bell names "Tory peers, liberal 'public moralists', and socialist leaders" ("Imagined Spaces" 198).⁴⁸ Among those, the radical minority envisioned a progressive multi-lateral institutional order, which should be realized by colonial unity and the following democratization of both Britain and the international system. Conservatives more focused on the idea of securing British power and on "dampening [the] threat posed by radicalism". For instance, they wanted to initiate systematic emigration to the colonies, which should 'generate' new imperial patriots (198). Belich is unsure how far the idea of Greater Britain expanded beyond intellectual circles. This resonates with Deudney who concludes that, although the proposals never were implemented, they were debated in the general public, among leading intellectuals, as well as among government officials. Yet, Vucetic claims that the idea of Greater Britain was part of middle-class language in Victorian Britain, which presumes a wider audience (Be-

⁴⁷Note that Dilke includes both Ireland and India in Greater Britain but these populations are not automatically part of 'the people' for him (Vucetic, "Search" 108).

⁴⁸"Public moralists" are an elite class of academics, businessmen, lawyers, politicians, and journalists who dominated the discourse of the elite in the metropole of the Empire (Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain* 5), so they definitely belonged to influential parts of the upper (middle) class of the Victorian society which had the power to shape and control a discursive regime.

lich 459; Deudney, *Bounding Power* 227; Vucetic, “Search” 108). Since the 1870s, schemes for a federation of the British Empire have also been discussed in several articles and essays of the mid-Victorian press and review literature (Burgess, *British Tradition* 25), which also gives the impression that at least people interested in the topic could take part in the discussion and it indicates that a powerful apparatus – the media – was used to further construct and consolidate the discourse of an Anglo-Saxon imagined community. However, it took the British parliament longer than the general public to recognize this discourse as relevant because it was still rarely taken seriously among the Westminster elite (*British Tradition* 27; Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain* 3).

The term which was used in the debates about the future of the British colonial Empire often was imperial federation and the communities which should be federated frequently were labeled Greater Britain. The imperial federation had four possible scopes: the separation of the settler colonies from “the ‘rule of Britain among alien races’”, a federation between the former and Britain, an economic integration of Greater Britain by a system of preferential taxation in the entity, and “a program of social democratization and expanded welfare” (Deudney, *Bounding Power* 227). For the term Greater Britain, no clear definition existed, either. Some used it as a synonym for the whole British Empire,⁴⁹ some for Britain together with the settler colonies Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and others referred to the whole English-speaking or Anglo-Saxon world, which also encompassed the United States (Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain* 7; P. Clarke 209).⁵⁰ It has to be noted, though, that the inclusion of the United States in this federation was regarded as unrealistic in the near future by many British unionists (Bell, “New Anglo Century” 36). This changed in the 1880s/90s when the debate on an Anglo-American union intensified and ranged from proposals of a deeper political and economic cooperation, over a defensive alliance, to a “novel transatlantic political community” (“New Anglo Century” 39; see also Kramer 1325).

Seeley, who provided the intellectual basis for the idea of an imperial fed-

⁴⁹This included the non-white parts of the Empire and was used most rarely (Belich 458).

⁵⁰Katzenstein mentions that a “vision of Anglo-America” found ever more supporters by the end of the 19th century, which would enable this new political entity to maintain its dominant position in world politics (13-14).

eration, sees Greater Britain as “like-minded communities” that are “established overseas, through ‘the diffusion of our race and the expansion of our state’” (17).⁵¹ This means that again, ideas of ‘race’ and statehood were mixed. Yet, Belich states that some kind of unity of Greater Britain already was a reality at the time⁵² because of the reciprocal influence of the several parts of the English-speaking world on each other, in particular on Britain. He calls this a “recolonization” of the motherland that let the several parts move closer together especially in economic and cultural aspects (259-60). This fits with the assertion that most late Victorian imperial thinkers already regarded the population of Greater Britain as one single nationality which should become member of a new sovereign power (Bell, “Imagined Spaces” 205; “Victorian Idea” 168). Bell argues that what united Greater Britain were “shared norms, values and purpose”, something he summarizes with the term civic imperialism. This encompasses “public duty, individual and communal virtue, patriotism, disdain of luxury, and the privilege of the common (imperial) good” and helps to imagine Greater Britain as a “morally and spiritually regenerative power of imperial patriotism” (“Victorian Idea” 172-73). As can be seen here, the idea is displayed that the people of Greater Britain are on a higher civilizational level than all the other people in the world, which is the basic idea of Anglo-Saxonism. Both, Anglo-Saxonism and imperial federation, thus, were inextricably linked. The assumed moral high ground should both be used in Greater Britain to create “a new breed of rugged and loyal subjects” (173) for Britain and to become powerful enough to cope with any upcoming threats from inside and outside the Empire.

There were basically three different models for how Greater Britain should be structured (“New Anglo Century” 36-37): Firstly, an extra-parliamentary federation, which would require only a quite small change in the current system because only an imperial Advisory Council should be established to give “non-binding advice on imperial affairs” to the British parliament (36). Secondly, parliamentary federal-

⁵¹Seeley and Dilke disagree about the inclusion of the United States: Dilke is convinced that “America offers the English race the moral directorship of the globe, by ruling mankind through Saxon institutions and the English tongue” (318). This means that for Greater Britain to be a success, the United States has to be included. Seeley, on the other hand, regards Greater Britain only as consisting of the white parts of the British Empire (18), which excludes the United States.

⁵²This view was not only shared from the inside but also, for example, French liberals regarded America and the British Empire as one bloc at the end of the 19th century (Vucetic, “Search” 110).

ism was envisaged: The franchise should be rearranged and the colonies should get a new constitutional status so that the colonies could send their own representatives to the parliament in Westminster. As this idea was common at the end of the 18th – not so much at the end of the 19th century (36) – it can be regarded as one result of the American War of Independence in British political thinking. It sounds very much like a learning from the American independence of the 18th century, which could possibly – but not certainly – have been avoided if the American colonists had got an adequate representation in Westminster, an opinion that at least was held by supporters of parliamentary federalism. Although in a minority, this string of theory remained the most persistent (“Victorian Idea” 168; Burgess, *British Tradition* 24). The third proposal was supra-parliamentary federalism, which was a relatively new idea at the time. A new state should be founded for all “people belonging to the same nation and/or race” (Bell, “New Anglo Century” 36). These should be governed by a supreme federal legislative chamber and further local representative institutions that would have large autonomy over specific fields of policy. Yet, the supreme authority would remain with a newly configured parliament in Westminster or the new imperial chamber, which sometimes was called a senate. This chamber would be responsible for policies that concerned the new polity as a whole, such as questions of war and peace or trade. The model for this last proposal was the political system of the United States (“New Anglo Century” 36; “Victorian Idea” 168). However, there were also supporters of the idea of Greater Britain that did not want any institutional change but they saw the “key to the future [...] in the shared identity of the British people spread across the world” (“New Anglo Century” 37). This would require no change on the political level.

Seymour Cheng did a very extensive study on the proposal of any kind of imperial federation and also summarized the arguments that stood *against* such ideas.⁵³ Not all points of criticism were shared by all thinkers, but Cheng found repeated evidence for certain arguments in all the schemes he analyzed. First of all,

⁵³Cheng compiled all proposals by supporters of the Imperial Federation League and the Round Table Group until 1917 and clustered them along elements of these proposals, such as the composition of the imperial parliament, the executive, the judiciary, and the units of federation (*Schemes*). Although his study seems a bit repetitive and reproductive, it provides a good overview of the proposals that came up in this period.

he mentions the lack of geographical unity. Apparently this was criticized despite a widespread belief in the possibilities of the new technologies since a scattered new political formation still remained problematic. Secondly, the “diverse nature of the British Empire” and the fact that there were “inhabitants of every race, religion, and political system” (Cheng 229) was discussed. Thus, the necessary conditions Seeley sees for a federation – “community of race, community of religion, community of interest” (20) – were not regarded as fulfilled in the whole Empire. The next points of criticism refer to constitutional problems: As main arguments Cheng mentions an interference with local autonomy, which affects mostly the self-governing parts of the Empire that were striving for more local autonomy at the time, an increased responsibility together with the danger of becoming involved in a war, the resistance of the British parliament to change its own status, and a general opposition in Britain against constitutional rigidity. Furthermore, there is the difficulty of enforcing federalism within the Empire and the danger that a forced federal union would lead to the disintegration of the Empire (Cheng 227-46). Next to all of these problems, one of the biggest difficulties was that there either was not *one* scheme that all supporters could agree on so that it could be realized in practical politics (like in the case of the Imperial Federation League, see p. 46 here) or that there was a concrete idea (like among the Round Table Movement, see p. 48 here) that was outpaced by the developments within the Empire. As soon as the dominions gained an ever stronger position in the Empire, a federation of them with the mother country was no realistic alternative any more.

Federation schemes were discussed in many different organizations at the time. The Royal Colonial Institute (founded in 1868 as Royal Colonial Society) was dedicated to a greater understanding of the British colonies at the time and took great interest in new ideas of bringing them closer together (“Our History”; Burgess, *British Tradition* 25). The Anglo-American League (founded in 1898) had an American and a British branch and consisted of “British and American political, business, civic, and religious leaders” who wanted to generate a lasting close relationship between those two nations (Kramer 1334). Right after its founding, more than 500 Britons and Americans joined the League and showed their support (Tuffnell 110). The

focus of the discussion on why Britain and the U.S. should work together in this league was on cultural factors, such as the idea of race, literature, law, freedom, and humanity. The motive clearly was that “the most cordial and constant co-operation between the two nations” is “in the interest of civilisation and peace” (Passos 99). Although the goal ‘only’ was to bring Britain and the U.S. closer together, a mission of both nations for the rest of the world was established, however, without any *concrete* goals of realizing this cooperation on a political level. This aspect is one the Anglo-American League shares with basically all the other supporting organizations that discussed any closer relationship between different parts of the English-speaking world.

The most influential of such groups within the British Empire at the end of the 19th century was the Imperial Federation League, which was founded in 1884 in London and quickly formed branches throughout the whole Empire.⁵⁴ It also published an own monthly review, the *Imperial Federation* (Bodelsen 207-08)⁵⁵ and, thus, it became part of an important apparatus to shape the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism. Bell regards the establishment of the League as a reaction to the presumed crises in the era because it created an alternative vision of how the future Empire could be structured (“Imagined Spaces” 201). Next to the discussions within the Royal Colonial Institute, Charles Dilke’s *Greater Britain*, James A. Froude’s book *Oceana*,⁵⁶ and most of all Seeley’s *The Expansion of England* provided the League with a scholarly basis and Seeley himself took an active part in the formation of the Imperial Federation League (Burgess, *British Tradition* 38). Although only 104 people were present when it was founded, they were a highly important and influential group, which could use its power to further spread the Anglo-Saxon discursive regime. The early members of the League were “MPs from both British political parties and

⁵⁴Bosco mentions 31 branches in the UK, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand with altogether over 2,000 members (*Fall* 2).

⁵⁵Although Bodelsen’s study is nearly 100 years old, it still provides a good analysis of the Imperial Federation League and is cited by nearly every scholar working in this field. Some of his theses may be outdated, like the fact that he assumes discussions about a possible federation of the Empire to be a new phenomenon at the end of the 19th century, but his account of the Imperial Federation League nevertheless is still accurate and can, thus, be quoted here.

⁵⁶Like Dilke’s *Greater Britain* (1868), Froude’s *Oceana* (1866) was published after a world tour. There, Froude became convinced that South Africa but also Australia and New Zealand would want to federate within the British Empire. He was not sure whether the U.S. might join this federation in the near future, but he regarded it as an important friend (S. Anderson 47).

many eminent colonial adherents” (40-41). Thus, support from parts of the elites of the society was secured and promised to have influence on politics. The goal of the Imperial Federation League was a “permanent unity of the empire by some form of federation” (*British Tradition* 40; see also Bell, “Anglospheres” 48-49). As already mentioned, the vagueness allowed the League to gain more supporters for its endeavor since these did not have to agree on any concrete federation plan. An attempt to finally agree on a definite scheme, which was made by the League’s president Lord Rosebery in 1892, actually led to its disestablishment (Bodelsen 210-11). The only compromise the responsible council could find until November 1892 was that in the Empire

a Council would be established, to consist, beside the representatives of the three great Dominions, of the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, war, the Colonies, and India; the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (211).

However, the functions of this council again were not defined. This report was presented to Prime Minister Gladstone who rejected the proposal. This judgment and the following realization that no further agreement could be found led to the collapse of the Imperial Federation League in 1893 (S. Anderson 47). In the end, the Imperial Federation League may not have achieved its goal of any imperial federation but it served to keep alive the interest in the future of the Empire and possible solutions to its challenges. Furthermore, the debates of the League were heavily shaped by Anglo-Saxonism, which let this discourse continue to construct the transnational political community as the ultimate goal. Many of the League’s supporters later promoted Anglo-American friendship, such as Lord Rosebery, Charles W. Dilke, and Joseph Chamberlain, and they used the same arguments – clear representations of Anglo-Saxonism – for this federation that were originally developed for a federation of the Empire without the United States (47-49).⁵⁷ One success of the Imperial Federation League was the establishment of imperial and colonial conferences starting in 1897. Since it wanted to “formalise consultation between the British and the colonial governments in matters of common foreign policy” (Burgess, *British Tradition* 43), its goal seemed to have been achieved. It is a bit ironic that these

⁵⁷This shows that the imagined community of the British Empire was easily expanded to include a former out-group – the United States – which speaks for the flexibility of its boundaries.

conferences led to more and more common decision-making of Britain with the dominions, which finally resulted in the Statute of Westminster in 1931 (43). So the exact opposite of the League's aim was the effect: Instead of a stronger federation of the Empire that should secure its power position in the future, autonomy and later independence was granted to important parts of it, which let the rest of the Empire become less important in the 20th century.

In 1909, another organization was established that discussed federal ideas of the British Empire and the English-speaking world: the Round Table. Its leaders Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) wanted to federate the British Empire as a whole so that Britain could play an important role in the 20th century as well. Their focus first was on a federation of Britain with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which could only be realized if the dominions were treated as equals to Britain. Only this would allow them to achieve full nationhood (Kendle 79-80). The big difference between the Imperial Federation League and the Round Table Movement is that the latter consisted of a group of close friends who all had a "coherent set of beliefs and goals" (80) instead of being a loose formation of people with different kinds of views. By 1910, its vision was summarized by Lionel Curtis in the so-called "Green Memorandum" (see chapter 3.2.4). Since realities changed during World War I and the dominions became much more powerful concerning their own defense in the war, their way to independence was much more promising and a federation within the Empire became less attractive (Kendle 92; Bosco, "From Empire" 222). Consequently, the overall goal of a commonwealth of the dominions and Britain could no longer be pursued. Nevertheless, the Round Table continued to advocate a federal restructuring of the (English-speaking) world. What the members of the Round Table Movement all were convinced of was that an international political system should be created that was based on the rule of law and that the British Commonwealth was the perfect model for such an organization. The League of Nations was seen as a first step to the realization of international peace but it would not be capable of replacing the British Empire in its role of keeping peace and order on the global level. When the Empire started to disintegrate, the Round Table also lost importance (*Fall* 432). Bosco concludes that by 1921, "it had become

quite clear that the Round Table organisation was not a ‘movement’ any longer” (434). Still, Curtis and Kerr continued to work for a federation of the world around the English-speaking nations and tried to shape debates in higher political circles accordingly.

The idea of a renewed structure of the English-speaking world – or the world as a whole – was not only promoted in political pressure groups and think tanks, this discourse was also represented in different literary genres on both sides of the Atlantic (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 19; “Race, Utopia” 47).⁵⁸ It seems logical that these literary works deal with the same hopes and anxieties of the time as political thinkers did because these affected all people alike. Accordingly, new and partly utopian⁵⁹ worlds were invented and described in numerous novels, short stories and poems (“Before the Democratic Peace” 658). According to Matarese, who did an extensive study on American utopian literature of the 1880-1900, this era is the peak of this kind of literature. She claims that in contrast to British utopian literature of the period, American authors not only wanted to entertain their readership but they also hoped that they would see their visions realized one day (8-9).⁶⁰ However, it has to be questioned whether British authors did not also want to bring about the new world they were describing. Bell focuses on British and American utopian literature that discusses the idea of a future Anglo-world as the basis of perpetual peace in the future. Many of these stories, which flourished from the 1870s until World War I, are future war stories.⁶¹ He finds that the “clearest and most elaborate accounts of the Anglo dreamworld”, which are “interwoven with visions of racial supremacy, violent conquest and imperial rule” can be found in the genre of science fiction

⁵⁸A close and excellent analysis of several of these literary works can be found in chapters 5 and 6 of *Dreamworlds of Race* (*Dreamworlds*), which is why this is not repeated here but only the most basic findings are mentioned. Parts of the books have already been published in Bell’s article “Race, Utopia, Perpetual Peace”.

⁵⁹Utopia here is defined as a “vision of a supposedly better world – one more ‘civilised,’ one more in tune with the dictates of destiny, one that upholds a purported superiority of one political community or form of life over others” that would realize global peace (23-24).

⁶⁰The main topic that reoccurs in American utopias is the national image the American authors have of their nation, which can be summarized under the following six categories: introversionism, which means that the focus of the writers is on their own nation rather than on any others, uniqueness, moral superiority as well as three elements of what Matarese calls the “messianic outlook”: a moral exemplar, an active crusader, and a benevolent superpower that could redeem the rest of the world (chapters 2 & 3).

⁶¹A further overview of these future war stories can be found in Franklin (19-53) and I.F. Clarke.

(*Dreamworlds* 204-05). In the 1890s, due to the Great Rapprochement, the pattern of friends and foes shifted, which can also be seen in the novels because they more and more deal with the idea of an Anglo-American cooperation or common polity – the peak being in 1898, the year of the Spanish-American war.⁶² Yet, British authors very often still did not give up British leadership in favor to the Americans at this point (211-13).

The focus in this study is on ideas of a unification of Britain and the United States. Although this never became a reality, it is still interesting and telling to analyze which discursive strategies were used to argue why those two nations should be reunited. In the following chapters, schemes by British thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries will be examined that include both Britain and the United States in their proposal. They were selected according to their relevance in studies of other scholars in this field, in particular Duncan Bell, Daniel Deudney, and Stuart Anderson. The reason why only British contributors were chosen is that the debate before 1914 was much more active in Britain than in the United States (P. Roberts, “World War I” 115). This is not surprising, since Britain had more to lose than its possible partner across the Atlantic. Furthermore, Bell finds that most of the unionists in the United States did not want to be politically fully integrated in Britain and preferred a loser cooperation (*Dreamworlds* 10). The contributors that will be dealt with here are Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, William Thomas Stead, Andrew Carnegie,⁶³ as well as Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. All of them had big influence on political thinking or even on concrete politics and they were seen as relevant thinkers by their contemporaries because they actively pushed the debates on these topics. Thus, they were in an excellent position in society to shape the corresponding regime of truth. They partly knew each other and had close relations, in particular Stead with Rhodes and Carnegie as well as Curtis with Kerr. Stead

⁶²Novels of 1898 that envision a future war that ends in an Anglo-American State are, for example, Louis Tracy’s *The Final War*, Stanley Waterloo’s *Armageddon*, Benjamin Rush Davenport’s *Anglo-Saxons’ Onward!*, and Samuel W. Odell’s *The Last War* (Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace” 662). Other, more well-known authors today, who included this topic in their works are Arthur Conan Doyle in *The White Company* (1894) and in “The Adventure of the Noble Bachelor”, one of the *Adventures of Sherlock Holmes* (1893), as well as H.G. Wells in *Anticipations* of 1902 (“New Anglo Century” 43).

⁶³Although Andrew Carnegie was living in the United States at the time, he was Scottish-born and maintained a close relationship to his land of origin, which is why he still is included among British contributors here.

also knew Chamberlain and first admired him, but in the later stages of the latter's life he turned against him because he assessed that Chamberlain more focused on ambition than on principle (Marsh 226). Chamberlain himself apparently had contact with Carnegie and they were close enough for Chamberlain to ask Carnegie for financial support of the university of Birmingham. His relationship with Rhodes, however, was quite complicated because Chamberlain "disliked what he knew about Rhodes" (319).

The order of the chapters before follows the birth dates of the contributors. Although not all the ideas were developed in the order of those chapters, the respective age of the thinkers still shows that certain representations of the Anglo-Saxonist discourse only were constructed over time. Since several comparative analyses already exist which deal with some of the questions asked here,⁶⁴ these were used to compile the arguments for a closer Anglo-American cooperation. However, no such analysis exists for Chamberlain, which is why this chapter is mainly based on primary sources.⁶⁵ What has to be noted, though, is that the goal of this part of my study is not to examine every single statement by every single contributor here, but to get a general understanding of the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism, which led to the generation of ideas of an Anglo-American cooperation and the arguments and discursive strategies the contributors used to justify this endeavor. This still allows me to comprehend the essential topics that were publicly discussed in this respect. Since these were accepted by a broader audience, it can be assumed that they represent a part of the Anglo-Saxonist discourse, which forms the basis of the understanding of politics concerning the English-speaking world at the time even if not all ideas were commonly shared in every single detail.

3.2.1 Joseph Chamberlain

Joseph Chamberlain's ideas about a new form of unity of the Empire and a new relationship with the United States are shaped by his biography. Starting as a

⁶⁴Duncan Bell's latest book *Dreamworlds of Race* also deals with ideas for a federation by Rhodes, Stead, and Carnegie. As his analysis is similar – even though not the same – to my own point of interest, it is the basis of the chapters on those three contributors.

⁶⁵My method in particular was to manually code the texts, which allowed for clustering of arguments and ideas that subsequently were divided into several categories. Accordingly, (reoccurring) arguments that were used in different forms could be deduced.

manufacturer, his business of producing screws became a success in the mid-1860s in Birmingham (20).⁶⁶ His upbringing in a Unitarian family, which taught him to strive for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, and his entrepreneurial background may have been the reason why his arguments for a reform of the Empire bear many economic impulses for bettering the situation within the Empire. After all, better economic conditions in the Empire would benefit its people considerably. When he started politics, the ambitious man was among the new generation of Radicals who were convinced that state power must be extended for the well-being of the whole community (31). This notion can be found throughout many of his political speeches. Chamberlain quickly made a career as a politician, starting as mayor in Birmingham and becoming a member of Gladstone's government after the elections of 1885, in which he first (unsuccessfully) tried to become Secretary of State for the Colonies (223-24). In August 1887, he led a diplomatic delegation to Washington to resolve disputes between the United States and Canada about fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. According to Otte, this was where he developed his idea of an imperial federation (27). Chamberlain's first speech to the New York Chamber of Commerce already indicates his understanding of the relation between his home country and the United States: Both their peoples belong to the Anglo-Saxon race but he describes the Americans as the "still greater and more far-reaching nationality of the Anglo-Saxon race" (qtd. in Marsh 287). In fact, in a speech in December of the same year, he even refuses "to speak of the United States as a foreign nation" since they are "of the same race and blood" ("Mild Sovereignty" 7). This shows that – despite his impression of an "inferiority of American civic culture" (Marsh 287) – he sees a close connection between peoples on both sides of the Atlantic and, thus, works for the perpetuation of the Anglo-Saxon discourse, which can also be traced in his later speeches. In Salisbury's cabinet of 1895, Chamberlain finally became Secretary of State for the Colonies, a position in which he had to deal with the rising international competition for territories, resources, and power. Additionally, he used it to promote his goal of closer imperial unity (365-67). His

⁶⁶Until today, Marsh's biography of Joseph Chamberlain is one of the standard references since it provides a – if not *the* – most extensive analysis of Chamberlain's life and works. Thus, it is quoted here repeatedly.

three main goals for his policies as Colonial Secretary were the development of the colonies' economic viability, the consolidation and extension of the power of the British Empire, and the creation of an imperial federation (Crosby 112-13). The main discursive strategy with regard to the establishment of a closer cohesion of the Empire was focused on reframing trade policy and he fought for a commercial understanding between the colonies and the mother country – maybe his original career as an industrialist had had an influence on this. Marsh states that only after the conference of the imperial prime ministers on the occasion of the coronation of Edward VII, Chamberlain let go of his plan to further unite the Empire because the colonial prime ministers did not support it (534). Nevertheless, he kept fighting for a system of imperial preference and tariff reform especially from 1903 until the end of his political career in July 1906 when he suffered a stroke (Boyd 124).

Chamberlain was acquainted with Charles Dilke, whose book *Greater Britain* shaped Chamberlain's way of thinking about imperial politics in the way that he was convinced of an internal unity of what Dilke described as Greater Britain (Crosby 22; Marsh 115-16, 257-58). He was equally influenced by Seeley's *Expansion of England*, of which Chamberlain was a very early reader and admirer (Crosby 43). Both Chamberlain and Seeley share several beliefs: The exercise of governmental power is to the advantage of the Empire and trade is what mainly keeps the Empire together apart from the realization of a community of interest. Additionally, the Empire needs to be further unified to be able to defend itself against Russia and the U.S. in the future. However, although Chamberlain welcomed Seeley's general idea, he did not adopt the latter's vision unqualified ("Greater Britain of British Race" 137-38; Marsh 176-78).

To demonstrate Chamberlain's ideas and arguments, his speeches (and one of his articles) will be analyzed along those main questions: What does he want to achieve in order to unify the Empire (with the United States)? Why does he want to unite it and how does he form the Anglo-Saxon discourse? And, generally, why do these different parts seem to fit together so well? Since Chamberlain presented a public figure who gained a lot of support through his speeches, it can be assumed that he shaped public thinking and that he had the possibility to solidify the Anglo-

Saxonist discursive regime. Mostly, his speeches were welcomed by their audiences, as can be seen in the positive reactions noted down in the transcripts (e.g. Chamberlain, “Relations” 21; *Times*5). Hence, the ideas clearly were in accordance with the regime of truth the audience was living in. This shows how commonsensical Anglo-Saxonism was at the time and the speeches provide a good basis for an analysis of not only Chamberlain’s way of constructing the truth but they also give insight into which discursive practices were accepted by his compatriots. Chamberlain mainly discussed an imperial federation or a federation with the United States around 1887 and from 1895-1903. Although years apart, his utterances taken together nevertheless seem to be consistent in themselves, which is logical since they all are part of the same discourse. Therefore, nearly no distinction between both phases is necessary for the sake of the argument here. I will start with the question of imperial unity and continue with Chamberlain’s idea of an Anglo-American alliance later on. Both sets of arguments are important since he was convinced that an imperial federation “might lead eventually to a federation of all Anglo-Saxon states” (S. Anderson 88), which includes the United States. For that reason, the two parts cannot be read as fully distinguishable from each other.

In general, Chamberlain is convinced that nations are united by sentiment and interest, which is a discursive strategy he applies again and again (e.g. Chamberlain, “Recent Developments” 675; “A Demand for Inquiry”). As sentiments as such are not enough to ensure close collaboration, Chamberlain thinks that a satisfactory scheme for some form of unification has become possible and necessary by the 1880s (“Relations” 27). His ideas on the concrete form of the union shift a bit over time. In 1896, he pleads for a union of free states with independent institutions to defend their common interests, which is also described as a “great kingdom of States in a true Imperial federation” (“Commercial Union” 366). Accordingly, Chamberlain later presents his vision of the future Empire as a “living entity in which each part shall contribute to the success and the security of the whole” (“United Empire” 70). Whereas this sounds as if the states in the union would have an equal status, another one of his proposals clearly resonates the idea that the colonies – although “sister nations” – should provide their resources for the defense of the “mother country”

(*Times*3). The construction of the notion of a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (B. Anderson 7), which is commonsensical within the Anglo-Saxonist discourse, is very obvious here. The main profiteer of the union, thus, should and would be Britain, and only in secondary place the colonies. Apart from the fact that he does not provide a clear definition of what ‘union’ means for him, Chamberlain also changes the constituents of this new polity he envisions. Mostly, he talks about the self-governing colonies (Chamberlain, “Commercial Union” 366; “Federation” 110), but he also mentions that his idea of a unification of the Empire would “unite varying race, varying interests, and different aspirations” when it is made an “organised whole” (“Preference” 295). The latter description sounds very inclusive and most likely refers to *all* parts of the British Empire. Nevertheless, as Chamberlain assumes that an “essential unity” and a “community of interest” are necessary in order to strengthen the Empire for the future (“Commercial Union” 366),⁶⁷ this prerequisite is not completely fulfilled if different races, interests, and aspirations are united in one new polity. The contradiction might be the reason why his plans for a union or federation only very rarely refer to parts of the Empire other than the self-governing ones.

Despite the fact that he does not define the structure of the new entity, Chamberlain has more concrete suggestions for its governance: He wants to found “one great Parliament of the Imperial race” (Chamberlain, “Federation” 110), which should encompass all self-governing parts of the Empire. In case a commercial union is founded, Chamberlain plans to install a council for the Empire that observes the execution of arrangements, considers and amends them, deals with questions of commercial law and communication, and may be responsible for imperial defense, since this also protects imperial commerce (“Commercial Union” 367-68). It seems as if this council should, on the one hand, be part of the government, since it could not take these responsibilities otherwise, but, on the other hand, it appears only to have a non-binding advisory character for the government. Its status, thus, remains unclear. Furthermore, Chamberlain wants a “transoceanic capital” to emerge

⁶⁷The resemblance to Seeley is especially striking in this utterance because Seeley also regards the Empire as united by a “community of race, community of religion, community of interest” (20).

that should be even bigger and more important than London at the time (“True Conception” 5). Especially after he became Colonial Secretary in 1895, his vision increasingly focuses on the idea of a *commercial* union to strengthen the unity within the British Empire – something which has to be done because Chamberlain recognizes the danger of the Empire falling apart (*Times*7). In 1888, he only argues that commercial relations have to be maintained and increased, which would strengthen the ties between Britain and the colonies (Chamberlain, “Relations” 26). This idea becomes much more concrete in 1896, when Chamberlain wants to create a customs union or a kind of British *zollverein* with free trade throughout the Empire.⁶⁸ The advantage of such a customs union is that all parts would profit: a huge free trade area would be created with 300,000,000 people, together with a vast and rich area and an almost unlimited market for (agricultural) products from the colonies (“Commercial Union” 370-71). In the early 20th century, he adds the idea of imperial preference as well as the vision of a self-sufficient Empire that leads to a “unique position of the empire, absolutely unparalleled” (“Canada” 333; see also Chamberlain, “A Demand for Inquiry”; “Tariff Reform” 153; *Times*7).⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Chamberlain is convinced that Britain cannot impose imperial preference on the colonies but that suggestions in this respect have to come from them. Although the reasons for this belief remain unclear, it is repeated throughout his career (e.g. Chamberlain, “Relations” 28; “True Conception” 5; “Canada” 332) and, indeed, initiatives came from the colonies in the course of the Jubilee and Coronation conferences in 1897 and 1902. Chamberlain then harshly criticizes the British government for not taking these opportunities (“Commercial Union” 367; “Retaliation” 165, 180; “Attitude” 192-93, 195).⁷⁰ Additionally, Chamberlain works for a “concerted system of defence” (Chamberlain, “Relations” 28), which partly has already existed: The colonies sup-

⁶⁸Germany was the model for this idea: In 1833, the German *zollverein* created an economic union that decisively helped in unifying parts of the later German Empire.

⁶⁹Thompson rightfully argues that this strategy of imperial preference may have benefited Britain itself the most but, all in all, it was an imperial strategy which not only focused on the mother country (82).

⁷⁰In fact, suggestions to give each other preferential trades had already been made at the Colonial Conference in 1887 by colonial politicians and were repeated at the special meeting in Ottawa in 1894. However the British government always declined the offers for fears that these would harm the commercial and manufacturing sectors within the United Kingdom. Chamberlain then was one of the tariff reformers who took this as evidence that the colonies indeed wanted a closer commercial union (85).

ported Britain in its fight in Egypt as well as during the South African War and, thus, proved their loyalty (“Relations” 27; “South African War” 66). According to Chamberlain, once both trade and defense are united, the British Empire needs to fear no other state since it itself becomes the most powerful state in the world that cannot be surpassed by any other (“True Conception” 5; *Times*7). Hence, the clear aim is to secure British power for not only the foreseeable but also the remote future.

Chamberlain is convinced that the idea of a united Empire can be described as “comparatively new” but it has been the idea “almost of fanatics, certainly of theorists” so far. What is evident, though, is that his idea was not developed independently, but is implemented in the overall discourse of an Anglo-Saxon (political) community of the time. Yet, by 1897, this unity can become a reality because Chamberlain considers imperial unity and loyalty as given (*Times*4). What can and has to be done to bring forward an even closer unification of the Empire, is to “infuse [...] a spirit of united and Imperial patriotism” (*Times*5) into the other parts of the Empire, which has already been started by fostering more communication and personal contacts. This indicates the strategy to also construct the Anglo-Saxonist regime of truth not only in Britain, but in other (white) parts of the Empire as well. He is convinced that the colonies have the same desire to get closer together (Chamberlain, “Commercial Union” 366), which resonates in the proposals of a commercial union mentioned above. Clearly, the stronger connection between the different parts of the Empire only became possible because of the technological revolution in the 19th century and the results of this were noticed by Chamberlain.

The prime reason *why* the Empire should be reorganized was the fear of decline. Like many others, Chamberlain is also convinced that “[t]he future is with the great empires” of which not all can continue to exist – Social Darwinist thinking is very apparent here. Nevertheless, Chamberlain still says that “there is no greater empire than the British Empire” (“As One Great Nation” 108) and once it is united it can become “greater, more united, more fruitful for good, than any Empire in human history” (“Anti-Corn Law” 255). Especially after 1903, he claims that the danger of becoming second rate in world politics is very real if the imperial or foreign

policy is not changed (“Tariff Reform” 145; *Times*7). Still, despite the perceived relative decline of the British Empire because of the rise of the U.S., the German Empire, and Russia, he remains optimistic that this challenge can be managed if people “think imperially” (“Canada” 331). However, this new and strengthened British Empire would not only benefit itself, but it would fulfill the “manifest duty of our [British] race” and this “higher patriotism [...] will have great influence on the world” (*Times*2; Chamberlain, “Canada” 332). Thus, Chamberlain attributes a sense of mission to what he repeatedly calls the “British race” that will serve not only its own greatness but which can uplift the whole world to a ‘higher level of civilization’ and save peace in the world. The similarity of the term “manifest duty” with the term Manifest Destiny that applies to the United States is most likely not chosen randomly. Chamberlain sees and constructs a close racial link between the United States and the British Empire (see p. 64 here) and must have been familiar with the concept of U.S. Manifest Destiny that ascribes the very same role to the American nation that Chamberlain claims for the British here. Since they belong to the same race, it is only natural to Chamberlain that they have to share this destiny or duty. Therefore, the imagined community between the British and the Americans is given further and deeper meaning. Furthermore, the term ‘manifest’ also means ‘apparent to everyone’, so the rightfulness of this British duty cannot be questioned by anyone because the assigned role is so obvious and commonsensical. Finally, by naming this sense of mission a “duty”, Chamberlain describes the same idea as Rudyard Kipling in his poem “The White Man’s Burden”, which was published about a year after Chamberlain’s speech of 1897 and is another representation of the Anglo-Saxonist discourse – here in its openly imperialist form. As he does not explain this expression any further and the audience seems to have accepted it since it would have been indicated in the transcript, this indicates that the idea of the ‘British race’ – or the ‘white races’ in general – *having* to ‘redeem’ the rest of the world was widespread at the turn of the 20th century.

Uniting the Empire is actually not too hard in Chamberlain’s opinion. An “essential unity of the empire and of that community of interest” (“Commercial Union” 366) already exists in the Empire, which can be seen by the “assurance

of mutual support and pride in the great edifice in which they are all members” (“South African War” 67; see also *Times*1). The visible bonds of this “edifice” are the crown and the flag that unite the “sister States in which the mother country by virtue of her age, by virtue of all that she has done in the past, may claim to be first, but only first among equals” (Chamberlain, “Canada” 328). This shows that at least among the settler colonies and Britain itself a unity is assumed as given that only needs to be strengthened. The basis for this unity are the bonds of “kinship and mutual interest” (*Times*1), which also implies that Chamberlain sees those parts of the Empire as one big family. This is also reflected in his choice of words like “kinship” and “sister States”. Chamberlain regards not only the colonies as such as ‘members of one family’ but he also considers the people in those colonies as “different branches of the Anglo-Saxon race which form the British Empire, and the vast dominion of the queen”. Doing so, he constructs the narrative of a natural and deep familial connection of those nations. Thus, weakening the ties would be “unpatriotic” and “unworthy to repudiate the obligations and responsibilities which the situation entails upon us” (“Relations” 25-26) – or it can be described as a tearing apart of the ‘family’. An Empire union would both meet the present need for strengthening the own state and bring the ‘family’ closer together. Nevertheless, he makes it clear that Britons represent the “parent race” or the “headship of the race” (*Times*1; Chamberlain, “South African War” 67). Hence, a hierarchy among this ‘race’ is clearly established and consolidates Britain’s claim to leadership within the Empire. Therefore, idea that all the white colonies within the Empire should be equal to Britain sounds a bit dishonest, although Chamberlain still seems to have been an idealist who was convinced that he really worked for the betterment of all people within and outside of the Empire.

Chamberlain ascribes certain characteristics to this British race: The “greatest of the governing races that the world has ever seen” has had huge success in administering vast dominions, which makes it a race with an “Imperial instinct” (*Times*1; Chamberlain, “South African War” 66). Consequently, its people have a mission to further spread their rule across the world so that they become worthy of the leadership of this British race. The future of the British state or the whole

Empire depends on the future of the British race that possesses the greatest heritage and must not become second rate in world politics (*Times*7; Chamberlain, “Anti-Corn Law” 255; “Canada” 334-35). So neither the idea of a “manifest destiny of the race” nor the depiction of the several parts of the Empire as a family is meant only figuratively, but Chamberlain understands it literally: The people are *one* “race” that is chosen to work for the betterment of the rest of the world.

Additionally, the Empire is united by the bonds of the same religion, history, laws and – of course – the same language (“True Conception” 2; “Canada” 330), which all together work well in creating an imagined community. Yet, this has to be viewed critically by all means: Chamberlain only talks about the British settler colonies and completely neglects both the non-white inhabitants of those colonies and all the colonies that are no settler colonies. These are, however, only rarely considered in his ideas for imperial federation at all. Naturally, British settlers brought with them their religion, their legal system, as well as their language and, since they all remained part of the British Empire even after they left Britain, they share the same history and remain British subjects (“Relations” 28). As a consequence of the existence of all of these bonds, Chamberlain describes the Empire as a federation “which may not, indeed, be distinctly outlined, but which exists already in spirit at any rate” (“South African War” 67). Thus, the basis of these bonds is uncontroversial to Chamberlain as well as the fact that the rest of the Empire – if not the world – benefits from these bonds especially if they become ever closer. The sentiment of belonging together is strong already that he does see no reason why anyone in the Empire would object to an even closer union among them. Hence, a federation or union seems easily achievable.

Still, sentiment alone is not enough, since this tie is “so slender that a rough blow might shatter it and dissolve it into its constituent elements” (“Preference” 296). The same argument is used for the Empire’s commercial interests: There seems to be a *willingness* to trade mainly with the rest of the Empire, but if no commercial union is founded to protect business of and in the Empire, it will fall apart (*Times*7). During the South African War of 1899-1902, the different parts of the Empire have recognized that due to the new developments in science and

technology but also because of increased international competition, the Empire has also been drawn together in the question of defense (Chamberlain, “United Empire” 70-72). This means nothing else but that the different parts need each other because Britain or any colony alone would not be able to fight all the dangers ahead on its own. For that reason, a “concerted system of defence” is ever more pressing (“Relations” 28) – something Chamberlain has already demanded in 1888, long before he became Colonial Secretary. The result of this “great federation of our [British] race” would be “peace and liberty and justice” (“South African War” 67).

Chamberlain not only advocates a federation or union of the British Empire but also some kind of collaboration with the United States. He notices in 1898 that over the last 30 years, the desire for a union between both nations has increased and, thus, defines it as Britain’s “next duty” to “establish and maintain bonds of permanent amity with [the] kinsmen across the Atlantic” to defend their “common ideals” (“Recent Developments” 674, 676; *Times*5). It becomes clear that he expanded the imagined community of the Anglo-Saxons within the British Empire to the ones in the United States: Both of them have the same ideals and are “kinsmen”, which evokes the narrative of the family once more here. However, he sounds a bit desperate in this attempt already, which might be an indicator that he indeed recognizes the diminished relative position of the British Empire in world politics: After he points out that an “ultimate alliance” or a “league of the English-speaking people” is no longer only visionary but realistic, he explains that

the British nation would welcome any approach to this conclusion – that there is hardly any length to which they would not go in response to American advances – and that they would not shrink even from an alliance *contra mundum* [...] in the defence of the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon race (“Recent Developments” 676).

Although Chamberlain throughout his speeches presents Britain as *the* strongest and most prestigious power in the world, this utterance clearly sounds as if the Empire really needed any kind of support or friendship from the United States – and not the other way around. However, he still wants to give the impression that a “cordial understanding between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race” would benefit both of them equally (674) and tries to counter the impression that the Empire *needs* the United States to remain strong in the future.

What Chamberlain wants to establish with the United States is a “close touch” in cases when they have the same interests, but no permanent alliance. This is neither “desirable” nor “practicable” because it is “impossible to foresee and to define the innumerable cases to which a general alliance would apply, and [. . .] the obligations of such an alliance would be onerous, unnecessary, or unpopular” (676). If they joined together in a permanent alliance, an ultimate breakdown of their friendship would be the consequence, which would more likely be a danger than a “source of strength” (676). Still, if friendship between both nations remains and is reinforced, occasions for such temporary alliances will occur much more frequently than with any other nation in the world because the British Empire and the United States have “natural sympathies”. Yet, this also means that any alliance between them has to be mutually beneficial (677-78). As can be seen, Chamberlain does not really have any clear concept of how this collaboration with the United States should be organized. This becomes even clearer in his statement of 1899: He speaks of “[t]he union – the alliance, if you please – the understanding between these two Great nations” (*Times*6). He could not have been more vague in terminology by using “union”, “alliance”, and “understanding” for one and the same process. Yet, by remaining vague, he continues to be consistent with his argument that he does not want any kind of alliance – or union or understanding – for *all* possible occasions. Hence, he leaves the possibility open for supporters of a general collaboration between the British Empire and the United States to back the idea without having to commit to one specific scheme.

The reasons why the U.S. and the Empire should collaborate more closely is that they have a common sense of mission: The “friendship and unbroken amity between Great Britain and the United State is the best guarantee for the peace and civilization of the world” (Chamberlain, “Britons in America” 15-16; see also *Times*6).⁷¹ This discursive strategy helps to construct the topic that all the Anglo-Saxons need to be united since they already have a common mission and are chosen to follow it. So only their *joint* effort can pacify the world and lets everyone ‘benefit’ from what they call “civilization”. Apparently, not only those nations themselves

⁷¹The inclusion of the American people among the “chosen people” by Chamberlain is also noted by Hyam (204).

would profit in aspects of power and wealth, but Chamberlain is convinced that it would also be of service to the rest of the world. The common interest in the “cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world” (*Times*5; see also Chamberlain, “Relations” 24-25), thus, legitimizes this collaboration and also makes it necessary.

An agreement between Britain and the United States would make them “a potent and even an irresistible factor” in the promotion of peace (“Recent Developments” 676). This implies that they can set the rules of conduct in the world and that they would gain immensely in the military and financial field, since “even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack would wave together [...] over an Anglo-Saxon alliance” (*Times*5). The idea that these two nations together would be an ever more powerful entity in the world is very prominent in the speeches and it also seems logical to Chamberlain since he does not explain these utterances any further. This fits with the assumption that the United States has already been seen as part of the cultural entity of Greater Britain by Chamberlain and that he is convinced that “every patriotic American” wants to work together with Britain (Chamberlain, “Britons in America” 15-16). Later on, he claims that British support for the Americans in the Spanish-American war proves that they are “indeed one people” (*Times*6). So not only Britons but also Americans want this closer collaboration because they are united in a certain way already, which only needs to be strengthened.

There are several bonds that unite Britons and Americans, which are summarized as follows:

The influences which are working to bring us together are not merely those of kinship, language, literature, law, and history, although these are powerful factors which exist in our case and in that of no other two great nations of the world. But there is another element [...] which is, that in the consideration of every subject, whether political or religious, social or moral, we start from the same standpoint [...] [and] our processes of reasoning and the root principles from which we proceed are identical. (Chamberlain, “Recent Developments” 677)

Chamberlain describes the seemingly obvious arguments of the same ancestry, language, literature, law, and history and, therefore, creates an imagined community between Britons and Americans. These elements present a stronger bond than be-

tween any other group of people in the world. Thus, they are claims that can be expected by a supporter of Anglo-Saxonism like Chamberlain. Yet, he even goes one step further and also asserts that their *way of thinking* – this implies “the consideration of every subject”, the “processes of reasoning”, and the “root principles” – is not only similar but “identical”. Hence, the main cause of their closeness is not what seems obvious to the outside but what lies beneath these apparent links of ancestry, language, or history. If an identical way of thinking exists, then any kind of collaboration is easy between those two nations because no differences are to be expected in their dealings with one another in questions of policy or religion and social or moral questions. This gives the impression that if there are no differences of any kind *and* the relationship is much closer than between any “other two great nations of the world”, there is no argument against a closer unification of Britain and the United States. On the contrary, Chamberlain says that there could be “no greater disaster” for the two nations – or even for “mankind” as a whole – “that they should find themselves at any time in a hostile attitude” to one another (*Times*6; see also *Times*5). A possible hostile attitude can be prevented by their unification.

Already in 1888, Chamberlain ascribes the ‘racial’ ties between the United States and Britain as equally strong as between the different parts of the British Empire. They all are of “common blood, and common origin, and common traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race” (Chamberlain, “Relations” 24; see also *Times*5).⁷² Clearly, the idea of a pure and original ‘people’ is evoked here. The ‘original’ Anglo-Saxons from Great Britain brought with them a certain set of characteristics that still can be seen in the U.S. several hundred years later: tenacity, endurance, courage, devotion to duty, aspirations to liberty, and reverence for law (Chamberlain, “Britons in America” 15). So in addition to their *real* kinship, the Anglo-Saxons in both the United States and Britain have the same traits of character, they strive for the high goal of liberty and have the “same love of justice” that is the “distinguishing feature of [their] race” (17).⁷³ This combination puts both “branches” of the ‘race’ on the

⁷²Since this is applied to *all* Americans, Chamberlain either sees all Americans as Anglo-Saxons or people without Anglo-Saxon roots are not regarded as *true* Americans, which would express the conviction in a ‘natural white supremacy’. This distinction is never made by him, however.

⁷³On another occasion, Chamberlain describes the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon race as “humanity, justice, freedom, and equality of opportunity” (“Recent Developments” 676). As this is published ten years later than the speech of 1888, it shows that his belief in the rightfulness of these arguments

“first rank among civilized nations”. Chamberlain illustrates this with the image of a “gulf that separates the ethics and logic of the English-speaking people from those of the rest of the civilized world” (“Recent Developments” 677, 682).⁷⁴ This shows that the Anglo-Saxons not only *lead* civilization but they are so far ahead of others that a whole *gulf* divides them, which is a very drastic expression and illustrates the extent to which Chamberlain sees the Anglo-Saxons as being on the highest level of a ‘racial’ hierarchy.

As a conclusion, Chamberlain’s ideas for a further unification of either the Empire or even of the Empire with the United States can be described as very vague, both in what he wants to achieve and how he names this new relationship. As he was a sponsor of the Imperial Federation League and tried to revive it after it had lost its momentum (S. Anderson 88; Cheng 45), it seems as if he was convinced that the League’s vague approach could be successful. The lack of concrete definitions – a strategy of the Imperial Federation League – allowed followers from different fields of life and different points of view to generally support Chamberlain in his endeavor to unite the Empire or the English-speaking world. Additionally, he seems to regard the bonds of kinship, race, and “community of interest” as much more important than the concrete structure of his idea for a unification and repeatedly stresses that any unification takes a lot of time and cannot be achieved easily. This again could bring together supporters of Anglo-Saxonism behind his proposals and gives the impression that the *way* to and the eventual *goal* and *structure* of the unification could still be shaped in different ways. Therefore, Chamberlain and his supporters do not settle for one specific scheme and can, thus, work together even with people with whom they do not fully agree on the question of an eventual federation of the Empire or a unification with the United States. Yet, in the later stages of his political career Chamberlain indeed mostly focuses on an economic union, which predefines this field as the most important one, and lets his plans become more concrete. These, however, are never realized. The only ‘achievement’ Chamberlain

is still strong and this discursive element remains the same.

⁷⁴Note the usage of the term English-speaking instead of Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon here. Chamberlain changes the expression repeatedly, which gives the impression that he either does not distinguish between the terms or that he tries not only to include the U.S. in his explanation of the close bonds but also the rest of the (white) Empire.

has – which is not only *his* achievement – is the decision that imperial conferences should be held at least every four years (Cheng 46). Thus, a closer consultation with the dominions indeed started during Chamberlain’s political career – ironically, with the final result that the dominions did not federate with the rest of the Empire but became ever more independent.

Chamberlain’s idea on ‘race’ is very clear: The ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ – or ‘British race’, as he sometimes calls it – is the “governing race” in the world (*Times*1), which should, therefore, rightfully rule over the rest of the world. This shows that he is strongly influenced by Social Darwinist theories and – like all Anglo-Saxonists – does not question the claim to leadership of his own ‘race’.⁷⁵ He believes this without reconsidering these theories of his time and does not see any point of criticism regarding this view of the world. Next to the fact that he assumes that the Anglo-Saxons have to remain powerful at any cost, he is convinced that ‘backward people’ need the ‘civilization’ the Anglo-Saxons would bring them – whether the former agree with ‘being civilized’ or not. These views are typical of the late 19th century across all of Europe, so it is not surprising that Chamberlain also shares them. However, especially from today’s perspective, they have to be viewed very critically. Yet, since these ideas were so widespread at the time, they could also be used to mobilize a broad range of people because these ideas about ‘race’ had a “‘mainstream’ character” (Mock 199),⁷⁶ which benefited the acceptance of Chamberlain’s idea as

⁷⁵At one point, he extends the idea of Anglo-Saxon rule over the world to the Germans and advocates for a “Triple Alliance” between Germany, the U.S., and the British Empire. The argument is that “at bottom the character, the main character, of the Teutonic race differs very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo-Saxon [...] and the same sentiments which bring us into close sympathy with the United States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer sympathy and alliance with the Empire of Germany” (*Times*6). However, this view was neither shared by his followers nor by the German State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow to whom this was addressed, so that the speech can be described as a flop (Crosby 122; Marsh 479-80). It is an example of a discussion which obviously did not fit the discursive regime of his time, so it was not accepted by the audience. Yet, his vagueness in his concept still allowed him and his other ideas to be taken seriously even after these ‘new’ ideas were not supported by his followers.

⁷⁶Mock’s analysis shows that the concept of ‘race’ is of functional importance to Chamberlain because the need for security, order, and prosperity are manifest in the concept of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ and this legitimizes English leadership of the world. While I agree with these arguments, I have to contradict Mock’s view that Chamberlain’s understanding of ‘race’ is non-biological (Mock 198-201). Chamberlain indeed talks very clearly about the Anglo-Saxons being “governing race” (*Times*1) and about the Americans being “bred of our race” (*Times*5). Whilst the former quote implies a mixture of biological and non-biological factors, the latter clearly indicates that the actual blood relation between Britain and the United States was understood in a biological way. Therefore, I would suggest that his concept of ‘race’ was not ‘non-biological’ but at least

a whole.

If the ideas for the unification of the *Empire* can be described as vague, they are even more so for an alliance or any other kind of unification with the United States. Regarding the Empire, Chamberlain mostly talks of a federation or a union that he wants to achieve, but this is not done for the unification with the United States. There, Chamberlain mixes terms in a seemingly random way and makes his ideas even less concrete by stating that he does *not* want a unification for all possible purposes with the United States – he wants this for the Empire, though. What is more important to him concerning the United States, however, is the idea of blood ties with the American people because he strongly emphasized the idea of the same ‘race’. One possible reason might be that a ‘racial family’ within the British Empire seems to be more obvious, whereas it has to be emphasized more firmly for the United States because of its independence in the 18th century and the following estrangement between both nations. Therefore, this recentering on what ‘actually’ knits both nations together is harder to argue than for the British Empire as a whole since the latter *is* united in some form. Interestingly enough, the argument that Britain and the U.S. have the same language appears repeatedly in Chamberlain’s speeches, but it does not seem overly important to him – maybe because it is so self-evident that it needs no further explanation. Stuart Anderson, thus, rightfully claims that Chamberlain believes in the “efficacy of sentimental attachments between nations and in the important role which an Anglo-American alliance [is] to play in the future history of the world” (88). As long as Chamberlain can convince his compatriots and the American people that their common destiny is to shape the future of international politics, these emotions seem to be a basis firm enough for him because the development would automatically go in the direction of a closer collaboration.

biologically-shaped. This means that the biological relation is indeed important, but the claim to leadership in the world and the characteristics that are associated with the Anglo-Saxon or British ‘race’ are mixed with a political understanding of the own strength that is only partly related to the idea of a biological ‘race’.

3.2.2 Cecil Rhodes and William Thomas Stead

The ideas about the future of the British Empire and the whole world by Cecil Rhodes and William Thomas Stead cannot fully be separated. Stead had a big influence on Rhodes and tried to shape the latter's thinking during Rhodes' life. The two men first met in 1889 and had regular correspondence thereafter. Rhodes also bought shares of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, where Stead was editor, and when Stead founded the magazine *Review of Reviews*, he used it to spread the ideas of a 'racial' union of the Anglo-Saxons – an endeavor he shared with Rhodes.⁷⁷ Stead also published an annotated version of Rhodes' *Last Will and Testament* and commented on it quite extensively.⁷⁸ Thus, he also shaped the perception of Rhodes' ideas for the readers of this will. In general, it seems as if Stead was much more active in guiding Rhodes' way of thinking than the other way around. I agree with Bell's estimation that Rhodes cannot be regarded as a "sophisticated and subtle mind" ("Dreaming the Future" 208), which is nothing that can be said about W.T. Stead. Nevertheless, Rhodes' ideas tell a lot about the discourse at the end of the 19th century that sees the Anglo-Saxons on top of the 'racial hierarchy'.

Cecil Rhodes was born in Bishop Stortford, Hertfordshire, in 1853 and died in 1902 at the age of 48 (Rotberg, *Founder* 674). Over large periods of his life, he lived in southern Africa, where he made a fortune with his diamond business. Rhodes first became a Member of Parliament of the Cape Colony in 1880, and later Prime Minister of the Cape of Good Hope Colony. In 1896, he had to resign as Prime Minister due to the Jameson Raid, an attempt to generate civil unrest in the Transvaal (*Founder* 106; T. J. Schaeper and K. Schaeper 8). From 1873-1881, he made several trips to Oxford in order to get a degree at Oxford university; this course of studies normally took three years, Rhodes needed eight and does not seem to have been the most dedicated student even when he was physically present at the university (Rotberg, *Founder* 89-90). Nearly all his life, Rhodes suffered from poor health: Rotberg even claims that by 1898, Rhodes was quite sure that he would not live longer than five more years (661), which became true in the end. This is probably

⁷⁷Andrew Carnegie's views were also published in the *Review of Reviews*. He will be dealt with in the next chapter.

⁷⁸In the citations here, Rhodes appears as the author of the testament, although the comments are Stead's.

the reason why he started writing his will quite early on in his life and revised it over and over again. These different wills together with several of Rhodes' letters (mainly to W.T. Stead) allow to reconstruct his ambitions for the future British Empire. Bell finds that Rhodes had three main aims: the unification of southern Africa under British rule, imperial federation, and a fusion of the English-speaking peoples (*Dreamworlds* 132). The latter two are of interest for this thesis and these parts of Rhodes' visions – or “dreamworlds” as Bell calls it (56) – will be elaborated on in the following. What has to be clearly stated, though, is that Rhodes was a white supremacist, an imperialist and cultural chauvinist, who had definite ideas about ‘racial hierarchies’ (Maylam 144, 156) and – especially as Prime Minister of the Cape of Good Hope Colony and as entrepreneur in the diamond business – was in a position in which he easily could and did oppress blacks by denying them the right to vote and treating them horribly in his diamond mines. Nevertheless, Ziegler claims that the name Rhodes today – despite the acknowledged criticism for his imperialist methods and thinking – still is also associated with “academic excellence and the unabashed elitism of the Rhodes Scholarships” in large parts of the world (4). This may be a very benevolent assessment of the situation, although Ziegler himself does not approve of it.⁷⁹

Like Stead, Rhodes wants to create a vast political structure that gives autonomy to its constituent parts, which is basically the idea of home rule. In 1888, he suggests an Imperial Parliament, which should provide representation to the white colonies and deal with the distribution of the colonies' financial contributions to the Empire's budget. In the following year, he also endorses the idea of preferential duties with the colonies as proposed by the Fair Trade League (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 137). However, in his seventh will of 1893, Rhodes contests that a unity of the English-speaking peoples does not necessarily need “any rigid, powerful, imperial framework” (T. J. Schaeper and K. Schaeper 15). Yet, he still muses upon a possi-

⁷⁹Maylam also criticizes that the new edition of Robert Rotberg's huge biography of Rhodes of 2002, which was originally published in 1988, only has a new preface. The text remains largely unchanged and can be seen as a “further attempt to rehabilitate Rhodes”, which Maylam describes as “strangely misplaced in the early twenty-first century, when Rhodes' idealism as well as the originality of his ideas have come to be seriously questioned” (140). Nevertheless, Rotberg's biography of Rhodes is the most extensive study on the imperialist and entrepreneur, which is why it will be used in this study as well.

ble realization of some form of imperial unity. Bell claims that it was under Stead's influence that Rhodes becomes convinced that the U.S. Constitution provides a template that could help to realize this ideal in the future and consolidate the Empire (*Dreamworlds* 139, 142).

Rhodes' new polity should not only include the British Empire as such, but the United States should be 're-integrated' into it. In his writings "Confessions of Faith" of 1877,⁸⁰ which are integrated in his second will later, Rhodes calls this process a "recovery of the United States" (qtd. in J. Flint 249), which indicates that he sees the circumstance of an independent United States as 'unhealthy'. It is the "greatest tragedy of modern history" to him that the so-called two branches of the 'Anglo-Saxon race' split apart after 1776 and this condition has to be ended (Bell, "Before the Democratic Peace" 660; see also Bosco, *Fall* 92). Hence, in addition to his endeavor to federate the Empire, Rhodes advocates a fusion of the English-speaking world, since a united 'English-speaking race' will be able to govern the entire world in the future.⁸¹ This means that the goal is not only to unite the existing parts of the Empire with the United States but to expand it as a whole and bring all of the "uncivilized world under British rule" (Rhodes 95, 97; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 134). Hence, a sense of mission of the 'English-speaking race' is constructed. Additionally, a federation of the English-speaking world would be such a powerful entity that everlasting peace would result from its founding because no other polity would dare attack it. To realize this English-speaking federation, Rhodes thinks about starting a commercial war with the United States that would – after a British victory – join the British Empire (Rhodes 63; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 139). This shows that he still was convinced that the British clearly presented the stronger element in the English-speaking world.

In general, Rhodes seems to have preferred a unification under the Union Jack – which is plausible given his idea of how this process should be started. Yet, Stead is convinced that Rhodes would also be willing to unify the 'English-speaking race' under the Stars and Stripes – and, thus, give up British monarchical features and

⁸⁰The full text of the "Confessions of Faith", which presents the first elaboration of Rhodes' vision, first was published in Flint's *Cecil Rhodes*.

⁸¹The geographical center of this polity could alter from time to time because Rhodes proposes to hold parliamentary sessions five years in London and five years in Washington (73).

the existence of the British Empire as a whole (*Dreamworlds* 142-43; S. Anderson 50; Bosco, *Fall* 94; see also p. 76 here). Stead even goes one step further in his comment in *The Last Will and Testament* because he claims that a unification of the ‘English-speaking race’ was so important to Rhodes that he was not only “American” in his ideas, but he fully “preferred the American to the British Constitution” and was willing to sacrifice the British Empire (Rhodes 63). Even though it is Stead’s firm belief, it cannot be fully verified whether this is just an (over-)interpretation or whether Rhodes really was so inclined to the American system. In Stead’s book *The Americanization of the World*, the author no longer claims that Rhodes was an “American” in his ideas but calls him a “Big Englander” – in contrast to the Little Englanders⁸² of the time – whose main aim was to unite the English-speaking race, though, only in an American union “if it could not be secured in any other way” (*Americanization* 403-04). The doubts about a possible over-interpretation of Rhodes’ ‘American intentions’ are also voiced by Bell, who finds that the notion in Rhodes’ last will clearly leans toward an imperial union rather than an English-speaking ‘racial’ union. None of Rhodes’ earlier biographical sketches even contains the idea of a formal union with the United States, although they show that Rhodes strongly admires the United States and wants to bring about stronger Anglo-American relations (*Dreamworlds* 145).

Apart from the idea of starting a commercial war with the United States, Rhodes already in 1877 talks about his idea to create a “secret society” with the aim of furthering the British Empire, bringing “the whole uncivilised world under British rule for the recovery of the United States [sic] for the making the Anglo-Saxon race but one Empire” (qtd. in J. Flint 249). This secret society should include only the best and brightest of each generation, be modeled on the Jesuit order, and have agents all over the Empire (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 134; “Dreaming the Future” 209; Davidson 10). Rhodes’ idea of a secret society led to the creation of the conspiracy theory – partly originated by the American historian Carroll Quigley – that this society of Rhodes’ really existed and secretly spread Anglo-Saxon imperial beliefs throughout the world to control the world’s destiny. Quigley claims that this

⁸²The term Little Englander was used to describe Britons who did not want to expand the British Empire any further.

secret society was realized in the Rhodes Scholarships and Milner's Kindergarten (*The Anglo-American Establishment*).⁸³ According to Rhodes' last will, the goal of the scholarships should be "instilling into their [the scholars'] minds the advantage to the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom of the retention of the unity of the Empire" (23). However, the idea to make these scholars the basis for a future group to control the world does not come up here. Although the conspiracy theory has to be more than seriously doubted, Priscilla Roberts still claims that today's Rhodes Fellowship replaces the secret society ("World War I" 114) and Bell partly agrees by saying that the "Rhodes scholarship program is a pale reminder of this utopian ambition" ("Dreaming the Future" 209).

What are Rhodes' arguments for wanting to federate the British Empire and bringing it 'back together' with the United States? He is convinced that the English-speaking world controls many, if not most, of the material resources in the world. If it was federated, it would be able to mediate between quarreling parties and, thus, avoid war by a "more rational method" (Bosco, *Fall* 94), the method of actual material power. Rhodes claims that after a union with the United States, which would take about 200 years to be realized (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 140), universal peace could be achieved within 100 years (Rhodes 66). Furthermore, the English-speaking race could be beneficial for the world in many more ways: By working as a "preeminent agent of global justice" (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 148), the principles of the English-speaking peoples – justice, liberty, and peace (133) – as well as the best possible political institutions "from local self-government to supranational governance" (Bosco, *Fall* 92-93) could be spread, which would result in a better situation for everyone. Bosco concludes that, in the eyes of Rhodes, the English-speaking peoples have the "moral duty in the administration of backwards peoples, training them in the art of self-government, and establishing with them permanent economic and political ties" (93). This accounts for Rhodes' firm belief in a sense of mission of the 'English-speaking race' that is very similar to the American idea of Manifest Destiny and is extended to all the 'British race' in terms of the spreading of its political institutions. Hence, the English-speaking world is not only powerful in a material way but also in a political and ideological way and should become ever more

⁸³Quigley's arguments are explained in full in Rotberg, "Control?" esp. 551-52.

powerful in the future. Once again this discursive strategy reiterates the notion of a sense of mission and constructs the idea of a special Anglo-Saxon ‘race’.

The most important reason for a unification of the English-speaking world, however, is that Rhodes as a Social Darwinist believes that the ‘English-speaking race’ is the “finest race in the world and the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race”. If it governs more parts of the world, it “simply means more of the Anglo-Saxon race [sic] more of the best [sic] the most human, most honourable race the world possesses” (qtd. in J. Flint 248, 250). So, on the one hand, the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ needs to spread across the world because it needs more space for itself, but, on the other hand, it also has a civilizing mission towards the rest of the world and has “evolved for the progress and elevation of mankind” (Rhodes 63; see also Ziegler 8). Accordingly, the world can only be brought to a higher level of civilization with the assistance and further spread of the ‘English-speaking race’. In the end, this process would bring the whole world “greater prosperity, happiness, and peace” (T. J. Schaeper and K. Schaeper 13). However, Rhodes’ *priority* in his vision for the future clearly is the ‘elevation’ of the Anglo-Saxon ‘*race*’, not the British Empire or any kind of *political* institution (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 138; “Dreaming the Future” 209) – let alone any other ‘race’.

Rhodes’ friend and supporter William Thomas Stead was born in 1849 in Embleton, Northumberland, became an enthusiastic imperialist, worked for international arbitration and world peace, as well as for a closer unification of the ‘English-speaking race’. Thus, his death on the Titanic in 1912 let journalist J.L. Garvin conclude that the middle of the Atlantic is probably the place where Stead himself “might have chosen” his grave – right in the middle between the two worlds he wanted to reunite (qtd. in Whyte, *The Life of W.T. Stead* 315). In 1880, Stead started working as assistant editor – in 1883 he became editor – of the prestigious *Pall Mall Gazette*, which had a “definite and comparatively small audience” (*The Life of W.T. Stead* 313). Over time, Stead turned into one of the most famous journalists in Britain of his age. He saw journalism as a means to educate the public and start social campaigns (Dzelzainis and Livesey 12). However, Frankel notes that because of his “controversial activities and radical positions[,] [he] alienated many of

the genteel readers of the *Pall Mall Gazette*", which is why its circulation dropped in the second half of the 1880s (21). Yet, when Stead became editor of the new monthly *Review of Reviews*, he gained a large readership and used this magazine both to promote the idea of a fraternal union between the British Empire and the United States as well as to give Rhodes' imperialist ambitions a platform (S. Anderson 49; Maylam 128).⁸⁴ This already shows that Rhodes and Stead worked closely together after their first meeting in 1889, after which Stead writes enthusiastically about Rhodes' view of the world and describes him as "[his] man!" (qtd. in Whyte, *The Life of W.T. Stead* 270).

Next to his articles and the commentary in Rhodes' *Last Will and Testament*, most of Stead's arguments can be found in his book *The Americanization of the World*, which was an annual supplement to the *Review of Reviews* of 1902. It bears close resemblance to Carnegie's *Triumphant Democracy* (see p. 82 here) both in structure and arguments: Britain will act in its best interest if it unites with the United States and this English-speaking federation will dominate the world in the future. However, it remains unclear who influenced whom, although the "federation scheme would appear to be Carnegie's" – even though it may have been inspired by Stead (Frankel 68-69). The main argument in *The Americanization of the World* is that the world is becoming "Americanized", which indicates that the United States is taking the lead in the English-speaking world. Americanization means an ever stronger influence of the United States in the fields of religion, literature, journalism, language, art, science, music, sport, and commerce (Stead, *Americanization* 255-380). This process as a whole should be welcomed by Britain, since it would result in a better position in the world and a more democratic system within the Empire (Brake 175). Hence, the U.S. is needed and *can* help Britain obtain this position. This shows Stead's great admiration of the United States, which mainly derived from reading Carnegie's *Triumphant Democracy* and does not wane after his first visit to the United States in 1893, even though he experienced it to be completely differently from what he had expected (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 117).

⁸⁴To get an ever wider readership and enhance his influence, Stead also founded two further offshoots of the *Review of Reviews* in the U.S. and in Australasia. However, his American counterpart as editor, Albert Shaw, did not always agree with Stead's views and their relationship was problematic (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 116; Frankel 21).

Stead believes that by uniting the ‘English-speaking race’ and by occupying as much of the world as possible, humankind can reach a new level of civilization and not only a *Pax Anglo-Saxon* but world peace can be ensured.⁸⁵ He calls this an “imperialism of responsibility”. According to Stead, this is a liberal variant of imperialism that is “within limits defined by common sense and the Ten Commandments” and “very different [...] from blatant Jingoism” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 17; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 110; S. Anderson 49). Hence, Stead recognizes that “blatant Jingoism” is part of imperialism at the turn of the 20th century, but he clearly criticizes this form of imperialism. What he really wants is an imperialism of the ‘English-speaking race’ that accelerates “existing efforts to ‘civilise’ the rest of the world” (“Dreaming the Future” 661) – without questioning whether the rest of the world *wants* to be ‘civilized’, however.

Stead has three main aims, which he emphasizes differently through the time: In the 1880s, he advocates an imperial federation without the United States, from the 1890s onward, he wants an Anglo-American union, and after about 1905, a European union is his focus. Yet, he never stops believing in his “Anglotopian dream”. All three of these goals are seen as “potential steps on the road to global co-operation, even a ‘World State’” (*Dreamworlds* 112)⁸⁶ which is an attempt to “rebuild the city of God on terrestrial ground” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 107).⁸⁷ This means that the development towards a world state should start with the English-speaking or European nations, which would guarantee a western canon of values in the world state. At the same time, Stead paints the picture of a God-given mission of the Anglo-Saxons who are the only ones that can build this “city of God” on

⁸⁵Note that the so-called *Pax Anglo-Saxon* is a clear reference to the *Pax Romana* of Ancient Rome, which constructs the understanding that the Anglo-Saxons should and can be as powerful as the Romans 2000 years before.

⁸⁶That a world state is the ultimate goal for Stead becomes clear when he summarizes his political creed in 1897: “If we cannot have a Parliament of Man and a Federation of the World, we ought at least to have a Parliament of Anglo-Saxondom and the federation of the English-speaking and English-ruled realms.” (qtd. in Scott 109) The term “Parliament of Man” stems from the poem “Locksley Hall” of 1835 by Queen Victoria’s poet laureate Lord Alfred Tennyson. The poet portrays a vision of the future that can be described as utopian because a “Parliament of man, the Federation of the world” is described as “common sense” that is “lapt in universal law” (Tennyson). This fantasy subsequently was quoted by many Victorian idealists who envisioned a world state based on an Anglo-American union (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 22). For more information on Tennyson and “Locksley Hall”, see Ebbatson, Mazzeno, Southam.

⁸⁷For the role of religion in Stead’s life, see p. 77 here.

earth. Therefore, the specialness of Anglo-Saxons, which is one of the main representations of Anglo-Saxonism, is pointed out here again.

Unlike Carnegie, Stead regards imperial federation as compatible with an Anglo-American Union. This very polity is of vital necessity mostly for the British Empire which has the choice: Either it risks a possible disintegration of the Empire, a fraternal war with the United States, and plays “second fiddle for the rest of [its] existence” (Stead, *Americanization* 6), or it merges with the United States into a United States of the English-speaking world and, thus, contributes to “maintain[ing] the peace of the world and general disarmament” (396-97, 409). The result would be the avoidance of any internal war, a stronger and extended Empire as well as an improvement of the “moral and material” condition of all English-speaking peoples (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 16). However, the basic idea is clear: The United States is clearly in the leading and stronger position and, consequently, “has no longer any need of a British alliance” (*Americanization* 405). For that reason, the British have to take the initiative and suggest this ‘racial union’ to the United States. This is one essential point in which the opinions of Stead and Rhodes differ completely. Whereas Stead regards the Americanization of the world as a positive phenomenon, which also includes the taking over of the leading position among the English-speaking peoples, Rhodes would have liked to see a different development. Like Carnegie, Stead is also convinced that the elites of the English-speaking world approve of this idea but are not yet ready to openly declare their support (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 128).

It is quite unclear in Stead’s writings, which political form this imperial federation or an Anglo-American union should have. Bell explains that Stead’s ideas become more extensive over time: In 1885, he proposes a Colonial Council for the British Empire, an advisory body for colonial representatives, which is a very limited proposal. By 1890, however, Stead’s suggestion is a “full-blown state” (111), since he calls for a “true Imperial Senate” in his first article in the *Review of Reviews* of 1890 (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 16). Finally, Stead argues that “[e]ven if we cannot have the reunion, we might have a race alliance” (*Americanization* 418), which means that he is fully aware of the fact that a complete reunion of

the United States with the British Empire is unlikely at this point but that he at least wants to start with “co-operation in the broad field in which [their] interests are identical” (418). His goal is to find an “institution which even aspires to be to the English-speaking world what the Catholic Church in its prime was to the intelligence of Christendom” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 15).⁸⁸ This can be interpreted as the necessity of a strong polity or institution that guides the way and presents a strong basis on which to build the future. In the new polity Stead wants to maintain the “freedom of national self-government, and unrestricted sovereignty” for all members of the federation (or race alliance) except for those fields of government “which are specifically surrendered to the central authority” (*Americanization* 419).⁸⁹ This basic idea already suggests that the U.S. Constitution is Stead’s model for a future imperial federation. He regards the distribution of fields of government between the federal and the state levels as solved in the best possible way in the United States. Bell argues that the reasons for this view are both “principled and pragmatic”: The difficulty of persuading *all* English-speaking peoples to adopt the U.S. Constitution could be eased by allowing the British customs and traditions to be kept up within Britain, although the federation implies “that autonomy [is] limited to the realm of cultural practices” and does not encompass political sovereignty (*Dreamworlds* 126). The British monarchy, for example, would not have to be abolished as such but it would become a local institution. The whole polity, however, would be a federal union with a written constitution, no hereditary titles or state religion, and an elected head of state (“Stead, ‘Future’” 343; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 126) – thus, the British Empire would be “Americanized” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 16). Furthermore, the so-called United States of the English-speaking peoples should have a common citizenship, be responsible for the army, the fleet, and industrial resources so that an extended area of free trade can develop within the English-speaking world (“Stead, ‘Future’” 341; *Americanization* 416-17). Ideally, the “laws of the two countries” should be assimilated in those parts that are of “in-

⁸⁸Stead himself was a very religious man, which, for example, Rhodes was not. Nevertheless, it is interesting that both, Rhodes and Stead use an explicitly Christian model for their vision of how the unification of the English-speaking world should start: Rhodes’ model is the Jesuit congregation and Stead’s the Catholic church.

⁸⁹Stead agrees with Carnegie on this point who also says that “[e]ach member must be free to manage his own home as he thinks proper” (qtd. in Stead, *Americanization* 419).

ternational interest, such as copyright, trade-mark, marriage and divorce, patents, etc.” (*Americanization* 425). In cases of conflict, an Anglo-American arbitration tribunal could be instituted to “reconstitute the unity of the English-speaking race”. Yet, the states have to agree to arbitration voluntarily in order to be able to retain their freedom of action in “core national interests” (qtd. in Bell, *Dreamworlds* 119). Still, Stead does not consider that the states possibly would not want to arbitrate in case of conflict, since this seems illogical to him. He wants to create a fully working state which should encompass the British Empire and the United States. Yet, in contrast to Rhodes, who mostly advocates an imperial federation, a ‘racial’ union with the United States is more important to Stead than an imperial federation of the British Empire.

Stead claims that the reason why this federation of the English-speaking peoples should be constituted is that they all have a sense of mission who see themselves as “one of God’s chosen agents for executing coming improvements in the lot of mankind” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 17; see also Bell, *Dreamworlds* 13). This notion is very similar to the idea of an American Manifest Destiny, which also assigns the Americans a God-chosen role to further spread their ideals across the world. Thus, God himself gives the Americans the legitimacy to expand their territory ever further in the future. Yet, Stead extends this role to all the ‘English-speaking race’ which “has a worldwide mission to civilise, colonise, Christianise, conquer, police the world and fill it with an English-speaking law-abiding Xian⁹⁰ race” (qtd. in Scott 109) and, at the same time, expands the imagined community to encompass the English-speaking peoples in the U.S. and Britain. However, Stead contradicts himself in the very same document because he says that “[w]e ought to use our taxes, etc., in developing the character of our own people, not in civilising others” (qtd. in Scott 109). Furthermore, he says in *The Americanization of the World* that it

should be no ambition of ours to dominate the world save by the influence of ideas and the force of our example. The temptation to believe that we are the Vicegerent of the Almighty, charged with the thunderbolt of Heaven, for the punishment of evildoers, is one of the subtle temptations by which the Evil One lures well-meaning people to embark upon a course of policy which soon becomes indistinguishable from

⁹⁰The term Xian is abbreviation of the word Christian.

the buccaneering pure and simple. (Stead, *Americanization* 437)

This is the total opposite of the other statements before since Stead explains here that the English-speaking peoples not only do *not* have a civilizing mission but that even the idea of having one would make them equally bad as people who conquer other parts of the world just for their personal gain even if the English-speaking peoples mean well. This is not what Stead wants them to be associated with. It also sounds as if he wants to criticize the American idea of a Manifest Destiny. This contradiction might be resolved in his concept of “imperialism of responsibility” which allows imperialism – in the sense of expanding one’s own sphere of influence – only if it is for the *benefit* of the new subjects. Yet, whatever the benefit to other peoples really is, still is defined by the English-speaking peoples in this context. However, since Stead himself was a Christian who truly believed that “God was working directly through him to bring about a racial millennium” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 107), which means that he and the English-speaking peoples probably would make the ‘right’ decisions for their new subjects. He also states that the English-speaking race “‘possess[es]’ the secret for the salvation of the world” (qtd. in *Dreamworlds* 107), so it has to be doubted whether his rejection of both a God-given as well as a civilizing mission is totally honest. He regards his role and the one of the ‘English-speaking race’ as God-given, which legitimizes imperialism. Yet, imperialism to civilize others is rejected in some of his writings but welcomed in others. In the end, this discrepancy cannot be resolved completely.

In his early career Stead very often uses the term Anglo-Saxon to describe the English-speaking world. However, after admitting that this excludes the Celts, he mostly talks about the English-speaking race (113). His understanding of ‘race’ is a mixture of both biological and cultural factors – Bell names this a “biocultural assemblage” (41): Stead states that “several foreign elements, French, Huguenots, German emigrants, fugitive Jews, Dutchmen and Spaniards” all were added in the past to our English blood. It has been our [English race’s] salvation” because with the mixture of “Welsh and Irish, Scotch and English, Celts [...] and Danes”, a conglomerate ‘race’ emerged with “infinite modifications across the Atlantic”. So there is no real “common race in England, let alone in the United States. We are

all conglomerates, with endlessly varying constituents.” (Stead, *Americanization* 148-49)⁹¹ This means that although the ‘English-speaking race’ belongs together, it remains diverse because of the several different influences that have shaped it in the past. This is surprising, given that until then, the English-speaking people were indeed described as if they were a “pure, original people” (Hall et al. 615) despite the fact that they indeed were not. Thus, Stead here uses the complete opposite of one of Hall’s discursive strategies that can construct the idea of a modern nation. Yet, all its people still have something in common: a “shared habitus, memory, and [...] language” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 114). Therefore, the English-speaking people still have important other traits that construct an imagined community among them, which makes up for the ‘missing purity’ of their origins. Since Stead sees it as the tendency of the time that people with the same language unite, like in the cases of Germany or Italy, he hopes that the English-speaking race will be united in the 20th century as well (Stead, *Americanization* 13, 397). However, ‘English-speaking’ is more important to Stead than ‘race’ as a whole because language also carries historical memory and cultural value (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 113). So people of the same language cannot only have the bond of blood but also the bond of a common history and culture, which is at least equally binding. Furthermore, Britain and the United States as the “two great conglomerates of English-speaking men” are also united by the “same law, the same religion, the same literature, the same family life, the same moral ideals” (“Stead, ‘Future’” 341). A mere ‘racial’ bond alone would not necessarily link them strongly enough. This again sounds as if even though the ‘English-speaking race’ is diversified across the world, its culture and all the elements associated with it, are basically the same – thus, the ‘English-speaking race’ is not that varied after all. Additionally, the ‘English-speaking race’ is seen as a single nation because the same language, type of government, culture, religion and joint interests make up one nation (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 123). The British Empire only presents one half of this nation and the United States the other half (“Stead, ‘Future’” 342), so a (re-)unification of this ‘single nation’ is logical for Stead. Still,

⁹¹He calls America a “Smelting Pot” at the same time, which creates unity among different immigrant groups in the United States (149) – a process which later is called the melting pot by Israel Zangwill.

a unification is only seen as a first step towards an international or world state. To facilitate this, Stead hopes that the English language will become a global language so that conflicts do not even come up and “unruly plurality” is avoided (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 113).

Finally, the ‘English-speaking race’ should also be reunited because it possesses so much power in every way: It begins to dominate the world (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 15) and it has mastered “railways, steamships, telephones, telegraphs and electricity” better than all the other peoples in the world. Since the mastering of this material progress indicates moral superiority to Stead and the ‘English-speaking race’ has superior values (derived from Christianity), it also rightfully governs so many parts of the world for the benefit of the people living there (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 121) – imperialism of responsibility is clearly reflected here. Consequently, a politically integrated ‘English-speaking race’ would bring peace and justice to the world (121) because the peoples around the world would be ‘elevated’ in terms of their ‘level of civilization’ *and* the new United States of the English-speaking peoples would be so powerful that no other state would dare attack it, which secures peace.

Rhodes and Stead had close contact for a very long time and actually only split apart when Stead criticized the British intervention in the Boer War – which most likely was the reason why Rhodes excluded Stead as an executor of his will in 1901. Nevertheless, Stead had a strong influence on Rhodes and his view of the world, especially concerning the United States. This can be seen in the similarity of their ideas, since they mainly differ in their opinion on which ‘branch’ of the ‘English-speaking race’ should dominate the other.

3.2.3 Andrew Carnegie

Andrew Carnegie was born in Dumfermline, Scotland, in 1848. At the age of 13, his family emigrated to the United States and he started working in a cotton factory in Pittsburgh. Despite the fact that he had only one to two years of formal schooling, he was a very successful businessman, who made a fortune in the railroad and steel businesses: He was a multi-millionaire already by the age of thirty (Nasaw xi; Bell,

Dreamworlds 42). Being a “truly self-educated Scotsman” (Eisenstadt 7) who was always eager to learn, Carnegie supported “public libraries, educational institutions and other public places that would benefit those individuals willing to better themselves” (Weber 535). Thus, he wanted to give everybody the possibility to learn and attend schools, regardless of financial means. He also lived what he preached in his essay “Gospel of Wealth” (Carnegie, “Gospel”): Rich people should give away their wealth while still alive so that others could benefit from it.⁹² Carnegie spent half his year in Britain and the other half in the United States, which indicates that he saw himself in the “role of cultural and political liaison between what he referred to as the two branches of the English-speaking race” (Nasaw xii). In 1901, he sold his steel company because he wanted to dedicate the rest of his life to philanthropy. He focused on interstate peace, traveled a lot, and distributed large sums of money to support his cause of an English-speaking common polity and world peace. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was subsequently established in 1910 and is still strong today (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 95).

Carnegie is convinced that a federation of the English-speaking peoples⁹³ would be “one great hope for peace and progress of the world” (Eisenstadt xv). Once more, the discursive strategy of a mission of the English-speaking peoples is applied here. He explains these convictions in various essays and in his book *Triumphant Democracy* of 1886, whose second edition has the title *The Reunion of Britain and America: A Look Ahead* (1898). *Triumphant Democracy* immediately became a bestseller – Eisenstadt speaks of 17,000 sold books in the first months, which is a huge number at the time (Carnegie, *Triumphant Democracy*; Eisenstadt 8). The main theme of the book is the contrast between Britain as an “overtaken monarchy” and the United States as a “firmly standing republic” that “had become the most productive and affluent nation in the world” because of its basic democratic principle (Eisenstadt xii, 1). In order to not become of secondary importance, Britain needs to change its constitution and imitate the American system since this is the best possible constitution, so Carnegie. Yet, although the political systems of both nations are quite

⁹²In this context, it is fitting that Carnegie also donated large sums for the planned university of Birmingham after he had been approached by Joseph Chamberlain on this matter (Marsh 460-61).

⁹³Carnegie prefers the term “English-speaking peoples” to the term “Anglo-Saxon race” (*Dreamworlds* 34), although ‘racial’ patriotism is a “constitutive element of deeper union” for him (287).

different, their people still present a single ‘race’ that should be unified. The book immediately gained a lot of reviews, which were mostly positive in the U.S. but not so much in Britain (Eisenstadt xiii; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 48). Later on, Carnegie worked on the revised edition, whose most important part was the last chapter (“A Look Ahead”), that was already published in 1893 as an article with the same title in *The Nineteenth Century*. This started a wide debate on the topic of “universal race peace” (“Before the Democratic Peace” 658) since it advocates a British-American reunion to solidify the ‘race’ (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead”; *Reunion*). Throughout his writings, ‘race’ is the basic category of politics: “Race, democracy, peace and empire were fused together in a fantasy of liberal white supremacism.” (Bell, “Race, Utopia” 47-48)

Carnegie was an important and influential person at the turn of the 20th century because “[i]n 1886 America, steel was king, and Carnegie was steel. When Carnegie spoke, people listened.” (Eisenstadt 1) Consequently, he could build a large network of all kinds of powerful people in different sectors both in the United States and Britain: He befriended many important “men of letters” of the time, including Herbert Spencer, Matthew Arnold, Richard Watson Gilder (editor of the *Century* magazine), and Sam Clemens (Mark Twain); he also published articles on a regular basis in journals that were respected and read on both sides of the Atlantic (Nasaw xii). Furthermore, he financed Liberal newspapers in Britain that agreed with the positions of people like Joseph Chamberlain, John Morley, John Bright, and Charles Dilke (Eisenstadt 12). Thus, Carnegie himself also held such positions and actively promoted them. Additionally, he made large financial contributions to the Liberal Party in Britain and had contact with important leaders like W.E. Gladstone, who was party chief in 1885 (xiii). He succeeded in shaping British politics especially in the 1880s and tried to do the same more actively and visibly in the United States: He was a “confidant of Republican presidents and secretaries of state and Liberal prime ministers and cabinet ministers” (Nasaw xii) and, thus, secured his influence. However, in the Taft administration, the President, like his predecessor Theodore Roosevelt, “resented the little Scotsman’s meddling in government affairs” but nevertheless saw Carnegie’s value as “campaign contributor and

cheerleader for ‘progressive’ economic policies” (710). Given the fact that Carnegie had advocated a federation of the United States with Britain for 30 years (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 4; “Before the Democratic Peace” 658), it seems logical that he also tried to influence politics in this direction whenever he could – after all, the topic was one of his most important concerns.

First and foremost, Carnegie works for a ‘racial’ union between Britain and the United States, which he sometimes calls “Union of the English-speaking race” (Carnegie, “Americanism versus Imperialism” 8), “race alliance” (“Imperial Federation” 503), “British-American Union”, or “Re-united States” (both Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 710). It is obvious here that the original narrative of a ‘racial family’ still constructs the same truth – a community created around a unified ‘racial’ identity⁹⁴ – although the lexical field Carnegie works with is different. This speaks for a slight semantic shift that describes the same representational concepts. Over the years, his ideas of which steps to take first to reach the overall goal change a bit. Since the political system of the United States is seen as the ideal by Carnegie, he wants it to be the template for a British-American union. In the 1880s, he propagates a political reform towards more democratic structures in Britain as a precondition of the union. However, in the following decade, he becomes convinced that democratic reform in Britain would be the *outcome* of a ‘racial’ (re)union. This means that first steps towards a (re)union of Britain and the United States can be taken before republicanism has spread through Britain (Bell, “Race, Utopia” 52; *Dreamworlds* 49).⁹⁵ Additionally, the *kind* of polity Carnegie wants to realize also changes: In the 1880s and 1890s, he argues that Britain and the United States should be equal in the new polity.⁹⁶ Yet, when the United States becomes ever more powerful by the end of the century, Carnegie claims that Britain should *join* the United States because it has to avoid a “slow and painful decline”. After all, the future lies with large polities instead of small nations (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 96; see also Nasaw 626). Britain has to admit that the United States has become more powerful

⁹⁴Note that ‘unified’ always has to be an illusion since there is always a plurality of identities even within communities that claim otherwise.

⁹⁵W.T. Stead agrees with this and is convinced that this would happen under the banner of Americanization.

⁹⁶However, he says that Britain should be the “first among equals” because it is the (former) mother country of the United States (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 702; “Imperial Federation” 503).

than its former mother country and that the only way to not become insignificant is to seek annexation with the United States (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 697; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 52; Eisenstadt 57).⁹⁷ The technological development of the time, especially the telegraph, made the idea of larger political entities possible.⁹⁸ Carnegie repeatedly includes this in his arguments and even claims that this progress has not only made a reunion and a global political community *possible* but *inevitable* (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 692-95). Nevertheless, he remains unclear about *how* the new polity should be organized. His ideas sound considerably different: In the 1880s and 1890s, he muses on a possible federation with every constituent element of the new polity having its own household (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 55-56). However, when transatlantic alliances are widely discussed, he no longer wants to realize a firm alliance under any circumstance but argues for an “alliance of hearts” that, to him, already exists (Carnegie, “Americanism versus Imperialism” 6). Yet, Bell notes that Carnegie’s “choice of vocabulary often implie[s] something more institutionally ambitious than common citizenship, a defensive alliance, or even confederation” – it sounds more like Carnegie wanted to realize a state with a written constitution (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 56).

Carnegie invented a symbol for his union even though it was never created: At his Scottish castle Skibo, Carnegie flew a flag with the Union Jack on one side and the Stars and Stripes on the other – representing his personal identity as a Scottish-American and an emblem of how closely-knit he regarded both nations (“Race, Utopia” 47). Although he is sure that the “reunion idea would be hailed with enthusiasm” and that “[n]o party would oppose” (Carnegie, *Reunion* 19), he still has to admit that such a project also gives the impression of a “hopeless fantasy”. This might be the reason why the widespread support Carnegie originally envisages for his proposal only comes in the 1890s (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 47) – so a few

⁹⁷This idea is also advocated by Stead in one of his articles in 1902 (“Stead, ‘Future’” 343).

⁹⁸To Carnegie, both steamship and telegraph have made distances across the oceans irrelevant and allowed people to live in the “same temporal plane” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 53). This helps the creation of larger polities since the perception of the simultaneity, or a “meanwhile”, according to Benedict Anderson, first makes the “birth of the imagined community of the nation” possible (24). Although Anderson talks about the novel and the newspaper, which first prospered in the 18th century and illustrate this simultaneity very well (25-26), it can be applied ever more to the steamship and the telegraph, since these inventions made the communication across different parts of the world even faster than before and the knowledge and realization of what was happening at the same time in other parts of the world was intensified.

years after his original publication of *Triumphant Democracy* in 1886. Nevertheless, he is confident that the future would bring a “re-union of the separated parts” of the ‘English-speaking race’ (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 690). However, Carnegie only refers to Britain, Canada, and the United States and does not initially include Australia and New Zealand because they are too far away – despite new technological inventions – and neither populated nor prosperous enough (*Reunion* 28; Bell, “Race, Utopia” 56). Although temporary difficulties for certain industries right after the founding of the union could occur, Carnegie is sure that the Americans, as the richest of the single parts, would certainly make those monetary sacrifices for the union as a whole (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 690).

As already discussed, the constitutional model for the British-American union is the U.S. Constitution because Carnegie regards it as the “most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the breath and purpose of man” (qtd. in Gerlach 198; see also Weber 536). Carnegie claims that the intrinsic superiority of the American political system of republicanism can be seen by the immense productivity of the United States between 1830 and 1880. The three most important variables that have contributed to it are “the ethnic character of the people, the topographical and climatic conditions under which they developed, and the influence of political institutions founded upon the equality of the citizen” (Carnegie, *Triumphant Democracy* 11). Furthermore, the federal government has proved that “immense areas can be successfully governed under one head, and exist as one power, the freest government of the parts producing the strongest government of the whole” (“A Look Ahead” 692). In Britain, Carnegie regards the hereditary monarchy as the main reason for its poor socio-economic development because it did not prosper as much as the United States. Therefore, he argues, Britain should abolish the aristocratic principle as well as the established church and adopt a written constitution, since the former are obstacles to prosperity (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 47; Eisenstadt 1, 24, 53). A constitution modeled on the U.S. example would lead to “uniform arrangements for the whole of the race” in the long run (Carnegie, “Imperial Federation” 504-05; see also Bell, “Race, Utopia” 52). However, as later becomes clear, Carnegie thinks that all parts of the union should govern themselves freely, they should also have their own leg-

islature and elect representatives to Congress in Washington (S. Anderson 53; Bell, “Race, Utopia” 59). Conversely, this does not necessarily imply that Britain has to change its constitution and abolish the monarchy *right away*. Furthermore, Carnegie wants to establish a common British-American citizenship. Yet, he claims that this does not require new legal and political institutions (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 690; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 55). *How* this should work is never explained, though.

In contrast to many other proponents of closer Anglo-American relations, Carnegie wants the British Empire to dissolve because he is convinced that an Anglo-American union and an imperial federation are neither complementary nor could one follow the other (*Dreamworlds* 49). The colonies of Canada and Australia⁹⁹ are “of age” (Carnegie, “Imperial Federation” 498) and, consequently, Britain cannot govern them any more nor force them into an imperial federation. Furthermore, they would become independent one way or the other and this process can be peaceful or violent – the latter of which should be avoided, of course. For these reasons, Britain should allow Canada and Australia to develop diverse industries and not remain agricultural regions of the Empire that are not self-sustaining (498-500, 504). Additionally, the colonies’ independence would benefit the ‘English-speaking race’ as a whole (“The Venezuelan Question” 133).¹⁰⁰ Yet, the most important reason why the Empire-critic Carnegie wants the Empire to dissolve is that it is seen as a distraction of the actual goal of an Anglo-American union because too much time and effort is placed in thoughts about imperial federation or a tariff reform (in the case of Joseph Chamberlain). Hence, the independence of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand¹⁰¹ would be the first step towards Carnegie’s union because the energies of keeping them would be free and could be used to pursue the British-American union (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 50; “Race, Utopia” 52). Moreover, any imperial federation or “Trade League” within the Empire excludes half of the ‘English-speaking race’ – the people of the United States – and, thus, has to be avoided since this makes the overall goal of an Anglo-American union impossible (Carnegie, “Imperial Federation” 496).

To realize his ideas, Carnegie – like Rhodes and Stead – takes a top-down

⁹⁹When Carnegie speaks of Australia, he very often also includes New Zealand, which is why the latter has to be kept in mind here, too.

¹⁰⁰However, Carnegie does not explain *how* this would benefit the ‘English-speaking race’.

¹⁰¹He does not speak of an independence of South Africa at any point.

approach that should be led by the elites of the respective societies. This is a viable strategy, since they have the power to shape a certain regime of truth. Carnegie claims that they should develop friendly feelings toward each other and implement the vision of closer political unity (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 51). The Anglo-American union as such should then come about in four consecutive steps: Firstly, Britain has to give independence to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In a next step, Canada should be absorbed by the United States.¹⁰² After all, they are quite alike and geographically near, which makes a common government easier (97). The third step would be that they – the U.S. together with Canada and Britain – form an “indissoluble union of indestructible states” (Carnegie, *Reunion* 31) before the last step of letting go all imperial possessions of the “new English-speaking Atlantic polity” would end this development (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 55). This new polity would be the basis for perpetual worldwide peace, global disarmament, and a better development of all of humanity (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 693-94; Bell, *Dreamworlds* 50; “Before the Democratic Peace” 659). Furthermore, within this new union, the individuals would have many more possibilities for individual development and the state would then “produce good and patriotic citizens” (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 698-99, 701). Note that the term “produce” in this case does not imply that the people have a choice but that they are objectified. This indicates how ‘natural’ or commonsensical Carnegie regards this process and how he does *not* concern himself with any disagreement about his plans.

Carnegie’s vision does not end with a combined Anglo-America but the “advocacy of international peace [is] an integral part” of it (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 74). He works for a permanent council of arbitration modeled on the U.S. Supreme Court that would have wide authority beyond the English-speaking race and any resistance against its power would be impossible (Carnegie, “Imperial Federation” 506). Later on, Carnegie supports the idea of a “League of Peace” comprising three to four major powers and an international police force. This League of Peace should establish a system of arbitration to end international conflict, demonstrate the leadership of the English-speaking peoples, and further the unity of Britain and the United States

¹⁰²This argument was popular in the United States at the time but not in Britain or Canada itself (“Race, Utopia” 56).

(Bell, *Dreamworlds* 98; Weber 540-41). Hence, it makes sense that Carnegie also supported the first Hague Conference in 1899 and its goal of the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration. According to Carnegie, peaceful arbitration is a better way to end international conflict and realize peace than “the amelioration of the conditions of warfare” (Wall 916-17, 904). However, what remains vital to him is the fact that the English-speaking peoples have to obtain a leading position in this process.

Why exactly should the *English-speaking* peoples obtain this role? The first reason that becomes apparent in Carnegie’s writings is their sense of mission which is used as a discursive strategy in his writings. He claims that a council or a race alliance “would be a service to mankind which justified labour, expenditure, and even risk” (Carnegie, “Imperial Federation” 507) because Britain’s “management of the land acquired by our race has been best for the higher interests of humanity” (“The Venezuelan Question” 133). Thus, they are seen as responsible for the better development of many parts of humankind. Consequently, peace between the two branches of the ‘English-speaking race’ – Britain and America – would be the foundation for peace in the whole world (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 77) because this peace would spread further across the world and benefit even more people. However, Weber claims that Carnegie’s vision of a “pacifying mission” on equal grounds with other peoples is restricted to the western world¹⁰³ because outside of it “this internationalism [is] rooted in a sense of racial as well as political superiority” (542). This belief in the superiority of the English-speaking peoples derives from Carnegie’s reading of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy according to which humanity progresses even further and lets only the fittest ‘races’ survive and shape the world. Naturally, Carnegie is convinced that the ‘English-speaking race’ – conveniently the one he identifies with himself – is the fittest of the ‘races’ because it has shaped the world considerably already and will continue to do so. This strong belief is another concise summary of what Anglo-Saxonists believed in and shows which kind of reality they constructed. One telling expression of his conviction is the following:

The English race is the ‘boss’ race of the world. It can acquire, can colonize, can

¹⁰³The term “western world” was “initially equated with the Anglo-Saxon race” and only subsequently extended to the rest of the European nations (Weber 542).

rule. It establishes law and administers justice everywhere it settles, where before there was neither the one nor the other. It tolerates all religions and encourages free press; it makes free men in free states. (Carnegie, “The Venezuelan Question” 130)

Accordingly, the narrative of the sense of mission creates the firm belief or knowledge that the ‘English-speaking race’ does not only have the *ability* to govern the world but also the *legitimacy* to do so because it results in the betterment of the people everywhere.

The English-speaking peoples as such form a single ‘race’ – a very strong bond – that only needs to be united politically. In contrast to Stead, Carnegie again assumes that the English-speaking peoples form a homogeneous community that is much less varied than Stead designs it. The only difference between the branches of the ‘race’ is their political system and this challenge can be overcome (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 53). According to Carnegie, three-fourths of the people in the United States are still “purely British” in 1893¹⁰⁴ and Germans, Britons as well as Americans all belong to the same Teutonic ‘race’.¹⁰⁵ Despite immigration into the United States, the Anglo-Saxon or Germanic element has not changed significantly (“A Look Ahead” 691), but the American people remain connected to the rest of the ‘English-speaking race’ and the Anglo-Saxons still form the majority in the United States – at least among the elites that direct society (Weber 539). It has to be noted, though, that despite the fact that his glorification of the U.S. is closely connected with the idea of a superiority of the ‘English-speaking race’, Carnegie advocates immigration into the United States and is against legislative discrimination of immigrants (Bell, “Race, Utopia” 55).¹⁰⁶

In addition to their common ‘race’, Carnegie considers the English-speaking peoples also as connected via their language, literature, religion, and legal system. As these factors seem indisputable, Carnegie can easily create an imagined community using these discursive elements. Despite political difficulties of the past, these bonds remain strong – in fact, “no rupture whatever between the parts has ever taken place” in these respects (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 691) – and they can

¹⁰⁴In *Triumphant Democracy* of 1886, it is still four-fifths (Carnegie, *Triumphant Democracy* 12).

¹⁰⁵Interestingly enough, Carnegie does not include Germany in his proposals although he claims that the Germans belong to the same race.

¹⁰⁶However, Carnegie also supports a limited right to vote in the case of missing educational qualifications, which, for example, would negatively affect African-Americans at the time (*Dreamworlds* 53).

and should become stronger again in the future on the political level. Once this is achieved, the mutual feeling of confidence and closeness will intensify even more (“Imperial Federation” 505; “A Look Ahead” 691).¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, Carnegie is convinced that only large political entities should be built for the future. This alone makes a reunion of Britain and America seem plausible, but such a polity would also have economic and military advantages: A reunion would secure free trade within the polity and open “[t]he richest market in the world” – the United States’ market – to Britain, which would bring prosperity to the former mother country and new entity as a whole (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 694-95, 697; Bell, “Race, Utopia” 54). Clearly this argument should appeal more to Britain than to the United States, since Britain was facing an economic crisis at the time, but it was logical enough so that the United States could also see a benefit for itself in the idea. From the military perspective, the reunion would make Anglo-America so strong that no other power could successfully attack it or would even dare to do so because the union’s military strength would work as a deterrent to aggressors (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 693-94; Bell, “Before the Democratic Peace” 659; *Dreamworlds* 52). Thus, no power would need to “maintain either a great standing army or a great navy” (Carnegie, “A Look Ahead” 694) in the long run, since the war danger as such would be diminished.

Finally, the British-American union would not only be a deterrent to attacks as such, but it would have the authority to settle any kind of international dispute. With the founding of the union, the people in this new polity would ascend morally and their “regard for others would be so great” that no one would question their decisions in settling disputes – indeed a very idealistic way of thinking. Carnegie describes the union as “friend of all, the enemy of none” (694), so all the other nations in the world could rely on a fair and equal treatment by the British-American union. This, in turn, would result in this polity becoming *the* decisive global player which would be modest, from Carnegie’s perspective, but which could still use its power

¹⁰⁷In order to let the bond of the common language become stronger, Carnegie also initially played an active part in the campaign to simplify the spelling of American English in 1906. The idea was that simplified spelling would help make English become a worldwide language, which would contribute to a peace all over the world. The campaign was supported by, for example, Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, William T. Stead, and H.G. Wells, but was not overly successful in the end (53-54).

to shape politics according to its own ideas. Although this is a clearly imperialist attitude, Carnegie himself claims to be against imperialism, above all in terms of the forceful occupation and administration of new territories because he is convinced that “people should be left to develop at their own pace” (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 84). However, this refusal of imperialism has its limits: Settler colonialism, according to Carnegie, is a good means of avoiding an “empire of conquest” and still extend the own territorial basis. Carnegie’s definition of imperialism, therefore, means to expand and rule via naval and military power. The opposite of ‘his’ imperialism – “Americanism” – includes “moral force, education, civilization” (“Americanism versus Imperialism” 5). Hence, everything beyond hard power is not part of his definition of imperialism and, thus, it is easy for the advocate of world peace to oppose imperialism on this ground.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, I agree with Weber’s analysis that although Carnegie officially rejects imperialism, “his internationalism [is] [...] deeply intertwined with notions of civilising mission and racial superiority” (539).

In his unpublished article “A Look Today” of 1898, Carnegie states that he has not changed his vision of a British-American union five years after “A Look Ahead” was published and that he is confident that it would become a reality one day (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 85). In this view, he is joined by W.T. Stead who wants this idea to get more public attention than it already has (73). Thus, given the fact that both Carnegie and Stead were men of high reputation and had large audiences, it can be assumed that the vision of a British-American union along Carnegie’s idea was discussed or taken into serious consideration – at least in parts of the elitist circles at the time who, in turn, could shape the discursive regime in society.

3.2.4 Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, and the Round Table Movement

In 1909, a new group was founded that supported the idea of an organic unity of the British Empire and later also a reunification of the Empire with the United States: the Round Table. Most of its members came from Milner’s Kindergarten, which was a group of young Oxford graduates who came to South Africa to assist the political federation of the four southern African colonies and to rebuild this

¹⁰⁸Carnegie strongly supported the anti-imperialist league both financially and intellectually, which was founded in November 1898 (Eisenstadt 167).

region (Bosco, *Fall* 125-28; Gorman, “Quest” 72).¹⁰⁹ They all were influenced by the theory of Social Darwinism, the idea of a superiority of the English-speaking peoples, the belief in a ‘responsibility’ towards non-Europeans as well as an Imperial mission of the Europeans in general (Bosco, *Fall* 125). When the members of the Kindergarten returned back to Britain, they first continued their informal meetings and then officially founded the Round Table group on 4-6 September, 1909 in Plas Newydd (Wales). The Round Table can be described as “[p]art think tank, part research group, part secret social club, and part lobbying outfit” (Morefield 99-100). Until 1914, there were Round Table groups in all of the dominions which supported mostly the same goals (Bosco, *Fall* 248). The trigger for their debates was the expansion of the German Navy and the changed relationship between the dominions and Britain; the dominions wanted to become more independent but were still dependent on Britain for their defense. The Round Table group was convinced that the only way to strengthen and secure the unity of the Empire was a “well-defined imperial union, not dissimilar to that envisioned by Joseph Chamberlain during the tariff debate earlier in the decade” (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 46).

A year after its founding, the group also started publishing a quarterly journal called *The Round Table*, whose first editor was Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian). The aim of the journal was to create an imperial identity in all parts of the Empire that should pave the way for a federal government (Billington 2). Philip Kerr developed the journal into an important source of information for imperial and foreign affairs (Lavin 114). It was widely distributed across the British Empire with a circulation of roughly ten and a half thousand. Yet, as one copy often was read by multiple readers because it was ordered by, for example, university and public libraries, government departments, embassies, and newspaper offices, it is hard to estimate the total readership (Bosco, *Fall* 385; May, “Empire Loyalists” 39). What can be said, though, is that its readership was not the “average reader” but, first and foremost, elitist opinion makers across the English-speaking world (P. Roberts, “World War

¹⁰⁹Bosco argues that the founding of this group was Milner’s tactic to realize Rhodes’ plan of creating a “select and cohesive group of young imperialists” who fought for the Empire’s unity and the “ultimate recovery of the United States” (*Fall* 153). Lionel Curtis, one of the Round Table group’s founding members, mainly recruited among Rhodes scholars (Lavin 119), which underlines this assertion. However, the assumption has to remain speculative. A detailed account of the history of the Round Table can be found in Lavin 105-33 and Kendle chapter 5.

I” 127; “Lord Lothian” 108-09). Therefore, the magazine and its audience were in an excellent position to shape the discursive regime in their societies.

Bosco claims that the Round Table theorized, promoted, and managed the “transition from a British to an American leadership” and, thus, assisted the creation of an Atlantic world order with an Anglo-Saxon hegemony (*Fall* 466). This was done by a coordination of several activities that individually only had minor effects but, taken together, they were quite effective in the shaping of opinions and – incidentally or not – included all apparatuses vital to the establishment and maintenance of a regime of truth: The Round Table used public and private opportunities to influence, for example, the quality press (*The Times*, *The Observer*), opinion makers and journals (*The Quarterly Review*, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, *The Economist*, *The Spectator*), publishing companies, as well as academic institutions, such as universities, colleges, and, for instance, the Rhodes Trust (217). Furthermore, their meetings – so-called moots – and dinners brought together many leading politicians and allowed the movement to create a broad social network throughout the society’s elites (Gorman, “Quest” 78-79). Finally, many influential positions were obtained by Round Tablers, such as Philip Kerr, who became one of Prime Minister Lloyd George’s private secretaries in 1916, and many others who had official posts at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, for instance (“Quest” 79; Bosco, *Fall* 385). Consequently, they could use their positions to try to influence practical politics. This elitist approach was a huge asset for the Round Table movement. One of the most long-lasting effects of Round Table engagement is their idea of trusteeship to govern ‘backward’ peoples. It became the basis for the mandate system of the League of Nations and the U.N.’s Trusteeship Council. Additionally, the Royal Institution of International Affairs (Chatham House) – founded mainly by Lionel Curtis – and its American counterpart, the Council on Foreign Relations, helped to lay the groundwork for “a language of both international relations and global governance” (Morefield 132) that favored Britain’s and the United States’ position and set their democratic ideals as incontestable for the whole world. Morefield argues that the Round Table’s ideal of the commonwealth “set the stage for the kind of postimperial imperialism” that was prominent in the League of Nations and is still

often accepted until today,¹¹⁰ for example in the works of Niall Ferguson (132).

Before World War I, the members of the Round Table were confident that the British Empire could be reformed and federated so that an organic unity would emerge. However, at the end of the war, circumstances had changed considerably: Germany was defeated, so the main argument why the Empire has to stand together was gone and the dominions had gained a stronger position within the Empire because of their strategic role in obtaining victory in the war. This new position became especially apparent at the Imperial War Conference in 1917, when the dominions got a seat at the negotiating table, and in their independent representation at the peace conference in Versailles. Thus, imperial coherence had to be regarded as a past condition and imperial federation became impossible after 1917 or, at the latest, in 1931 with the Statute of Westminster. Kerr and Curtis, the main leaders of the group, also became fully aware of the fact that imperial disintegration was inevitable (Bosco, *Fall* 432; “From Empire” 225). Furthermore, the Round Table groups around the world were in decline at the time for several reasons: The dominion groups lost many of their members, probably because of the lost outlook of an imperial federation and the hope of dominion independence. Additionally, many members throughout the Empire and in London got responsible jobs in banking and other businesses, which distracted them from their work for the Round Table. Curtis himself had a nervous breakdown in 1919 and, consequently, spent several weeks in Morocco. The decline in interest and members was so sharp that a planned moot in November 1919 had to be canceled for lack of interest (*Fall* 432; Billington 65).¹¹¹

The fundamental argument of the Round Table for a reformation of the Empire was that there only was a choice between an organic union and a disruption of the whole Empire. An organic union means that Britain has to give up its leading position and that the dominions become equal within the polity. The reformed Empire

¹¹⁰For this discussion, see chapter 8.

¹¹¹The Round Table movement still continued to exist after 1919 and gathered members from the “worlds of academe, business, journalism, politics and public administration” who frequently met in London clubs (May, “Empire Loyalists” 38). Only in the 1970s, women were allowed to participate. May claims that until the 1980s most of the members “might be described as left-wing or ‘one nation’ Conservatives” but the group also had supporters from the Liberal and Labour Parties as well as people without any definite political affiliation (38).

should be led by an imperial government that is responsible to all electors within the Empire and can directly act on its individual citizens. This would result in a redistribution of the financial, political, and military burden of the Empire between Britain and all the self-governing dominions (Bosco, *Fall* 171, 215; Morefield 102). In the opinion of the Round Tablers, this would give the dominions the opportunity to achieve full nationhood, which they can only develop once they are treated as equals within the Empire (Kendle 80). A complete federation of the Empire remained their ultimate goal but until this could be realized, the Round Table worked for a better coordination within the Empire.

The Round Tablers themselves were imperialists – although their understanding of imperialism had a positive connotation. Originally strongly influenced by Milner’s racial imperialism, Curtis and Kerr redefined imperialism as a way to follow their English sense of mission to spread liberalism across the world and ‘serve’ the cultural and political needs of all the people in the world (Bosco, “From Empire” 236; Morefield 115). Thus, they regarded their principles of liberty and democracy as the ideals of western civilization but also as universal ones which would benefit the whole world in the end (Curtis, *Project* 11-12; Gorman, “Quest” 69, 86). In their opinion, this legitimized the expansion of the British realm. That the Round Table members were convinced of the British sense of mission and nurtured this discursive element, becomes clear in the following quote by Curtis: He is sure that “[c]ivilized states [are] obliged to assume control of backward communities to protect them from exploitation by private adventurers from Europe” (Curtis, *Problem* 203). For that reason, only the ‘English-speaking race’ can protect other “backward communities” from any kind of exploitation and, therefore, bring them ‘security’.

After 1919, a tactical change can be observed, since the Round Table more intensely promoted a closer cooperation with the United States. It was obvious that even a reformed Empire would not be able to guarantee international stability and the United States was a great ‘new’ powerful state. Thus, the goal was a re-establishment of the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century: a worldwide hegemony of the ‘English-speaking race’ in military and economy fields, as well as finance (Bosco, *Fall* 438; “From Empire” 224-25). Although the ultimate aim was a federation, the

first steps would be to achieve better cooperation between the English-speaking nations, in particular between Great Britain and the United States. Such a cooperation should be institutionalized especially in the fields of politics and economy. This would be the solution to the world's instability resulting from its division into too many sovereign states (*Fall* 215-16).

Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr were the two main leaders of the group, yet, their ideas differed considerably, which is why they have to be analyzed separately. Curtis got the reputation of a “man above politics, a conciliator who could mediate between competing camps with fairness and equanimity” (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 41). When he participated in drafting the Selborne Memorandum in 1907, which formed the basis of the later constitution of the Union of South Africa, he became known as an expert for imperial affairs for the first time (43). Throughout his life, important politicians such as Cecil Rhodes, Sir Alfred Milner, Jan Smuts, New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward, and Winston Churchill consulted Curtis in questions of the future of the Empire and the British Commonwealth (40), which further underlines his outstanding position. In general, his “old-boy network” consisted of men with “white Anglo-Saxon Protestant racial and religious sentiment” both in the dominions and in Britain (Lavin 114).

This fits with the background in which Curtis was raised: He was born in 1872 and died in 1955. His upbringing was shaped by an evangelical environment. Although he lost the connection to the Church of England in Oxford, he still “derived from his upbringing a sense of divine mission” and he also regarded imperialism as some form of “secular religion” (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 42-43). Before the founding of the Round Table, he already held different official posts under Milner, like in the Johannesburg city council and as assistant colonial secretary responsible for urban affairs (“Quest” 72). After 1909, he traveled through the dominions extensively and, thus, widened his network of supporters of his cause. From 1920-24, he was mainly preoccupied with the establishment of the (Royal) Institute of International Affairs, also called Chatham House.¹¹²

¹¹²The Institute became a Royal Institute in 1926. The aim was to be a think tank that promotes an Anglo-American alliance to prevent a new war and bring about a stable world order. To realize this, it gave “essential knowledge to the intellectual leadership which had the responsibility for the making of foreign policy”. Today's focus obviously is more on the stable world order than

Curtis' political vision can be read in the so-called *Green Memorandum*,¹¹³ a document which was developed within the Round Table group but Curtis was the main contributor. It was circulated among 120 members who could all comment on it and make their suggestions. In the end, Curtis decided which of these he accepted or rejected, so it "represents any opinion but his own" (Curtis, *Problem* vi). The final version was published as *The Project of the Commonwealth* in 1915 and as a shorter version as *The Problem of the Commonwealth* in 1916. Bosco states that this final version and the conclusions drawn in it nearly led to the split of the Round Table movement since not all members agreed with Curtis (*Fall* 250). May claims that the press seemed to take little notice of the book because of the ongoing war ("Round Table and Imperial Federation" 553). Yet, according to Bosco, the proposal still contributed to a debate on the Round Table's strategy during the war and started further discussions on the future of the Empire (*Fall* 288).

In the *Green Memorandum*, Curtis suggests a new institutional architecture for the Empire: The imperial parliament should consist of a lower house, which is elected directly by the citizens with proportional representation, and an upper house that represents each member state. Each constituent state should get 30 peers for this house, 10 of which should be re-elected every five years. The upper house should control defense, foreign policy, and the government of India as well as the dependencies. Consequently, the costs of imperial defense would be more equally distributed between all the dominions and Britain. The imperial parliament would have the power to raise taxes but the constituent states should still decide upon how to collect them (Curtis, *Problem* 162, 172). The sessions of parliament should no longer only take place in London but successively in the different centers of the federation. Within the whole polity, Britain would have the same legal status as the other members Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.¹¹⁴ This means that there would have to be two kinds of cabinets and parliaments: one responsible for

an Anglo-American alliance (Bosco, "From Empire" 228, 235). For more on Chatham House's founding, see Bosco, *Fall* 439-65.

¹¹³The name is a reference to the memorandum's green cover.

¹¹⁴Curtis argues that anything short of full equality of the dominions in the new polity would result in a disruption of the commonwealth (*Problem* 153).

the imperial electorate¹¹⁵ and one on the state level (152-53). On the latter, all the constituent elements would enjoy large autonomy, which Curtis sees as a reward for the dominions for accepting proportionate representation in the imperial parliament (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 47). Furthermore, there would be a supreme court responsible for discrepancies between the federal legislature and state governments. To bring about such a federation, Curtis wants to call a constitutional convention modeled on the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 – something which underlines his deep admiration of the American political system (Bosco, *Fall* 191; May, “Round Table and Imperial Federation” 551).

Curtis has often been criticized for ignoring colonial nationalism (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 61). Yet, he does not neglect it but assumes that the colonies still identify with the British Empire strongly enough so they would not want to become independent of the Empire. He even sees nationalism as a goal to which the Empire is developing. This is the reason why he wants each dominion to get the right to decide upon their own immigration and upon their policies and taxes to make them effective. Curtis is convinced that the dominions have their own national consciousness but he still “believe[s] that the common identity fostered by a shared British culture enable[s] the empire to function as an institution of peace” (“Quest” 84). Nevertheless, the dominions should be reintegrated into the Empire and get an equal status with Britain. Otherwise, they would try to conduct their own foreign policy independently from the Empire without being able to defend themselves adequately (Curtis, *Problem* 68; Gorman, “Quest” 79-80). So far, Britain has had to bear the financial as well as military burden alone, which is a condition Curtis wants to change.

To foster the unity within the Empire, Curtis promotes the idea of an imperial citizenship as a consequence of an imperial federal union. This citizenship should be tied to the whole Empire, not to the local state, so the definition of citizenship is widened considerably. According to him, all citizens within the Empire should enjoy the benefits of imperial citizenship, but some citizens are “more equal than others” because only “those most able to rule should govern” the Empire (*Imperial*

¹¹⁵The most important positions in the imperial cabinet would be a Foreign Secretary, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the War Secretary, and an Imperial Minister of Finance (156).

Citizenship 44). Those who *are* able to govern, though, need to get this right in any case because otherwise they would lose this capacity (Curtis, *Problem* 20). So in theory, everybody should be equal but in reality, there would be two classes of citizens with more and less political rights. This is what Curtis calls the principle of the commonwealth:¹¹⁶ The burden of government should only rest on those parts of the commonwealth that are fit to govern it. Morefield rightfully criticizes that while the aim of imperial citizenship in theory is universal, it actively excludes the majority of people in the Empire, who are mostly non-white, from governing (129-30). This becomes clear when looking at Curtis' idea of free movement of imperial citizens: Only people with enough property have the right of free movement, which does not exclude non-whites explicitly but implicitly, since they rarely had as much property as whites in the British Empire (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 61). Gorman adds that this concept of imperial citizenship clearly has an ideal of 'whiteness' that regards the bonds between the Anglo-Saxon parts in the world as most important. The basic concept can be described as "*authoritarian liberalism*", which means that British liberal principles should be imposed on all people within the Empire rather than allowing the nations to develop principles of government on their own (206-07). Yet, Curtis never finds a solution for "the existence of multiple loyalties within the Empire with the formation of a unified imperial state" (50). Still, his goal is that the imperial citizenship should be the "key to world peace" (44) once it is extended to the rest of the world. After all, good citizenship implies giving loyalty and responsibility to others (Curtis, *Project* 702-03; Kendle 101). However, in his understanding, civilization is defined as a "British-led European civilization, drawn in equal parts from the Greco-Roman tradition and the legacy of liberty" of the French and American revolutions in the 18th century. This is an indicator that an extension of this full citizenship – the one of people who can *govern* – never should be given to different 'races' (Gorman, "Quest" 94) but should remain with

¹¹⁶After 1915, Curtis substitutes the usage of the term Empire by the term Commonwealth. According to Morefield, this was done to let the reader focus more on the liberal and democratic character of the Empire rather than on its imperialist tendencies (101). May claims that the usage of Commonwealth instead of Empire rather reflects the preoccupation with the white and self-governing dominions ("Empire Loyalists" 46-47), which basically is a similar argument: the attention should be turned away from the neglect or bad treatment of the non-white population within the Empire.

the white Anglo-Saxon people of the Empire as such. This is a clear representation of the Anglo-Saxon discursive regime, which accepted no other ‘race’ to be on an equal hierarchical level as the Anglo-Saxons. Any “premature extension” of these rights has to be avoided because it would only lead to anarchy on the world political level (Curtis, *Project* 16). Following this line of reasoning, it would be quite easy to argue why citizenship should not be extended further for fear of chaos. Hence, it is doubtful whether an extension of the full citizenship to non-white people would have happened at all.

During the year 1919, Curtis develops a scheme that includes stronger Anglo-American relations in the Round Table’s objectives. He wants to create an ‘institutionalized’ foreign policy elite that should bring the commonwealth – in particular Britain – and the United States closer together (Bosco, *Fall* 438). The starting point for such a new commonwealth should be the League of Nations, in which the English-speaking peoples and their dependencies should lead the way (Lavin 158). In the end, the Empire together with the United States would be the basis of a new world state that brings together different nations in one political framework and result in world peace. This was a policy Curtis together with Kerr worked for especially in the 1920s, however, without success (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 207; Kendle 100-01).

In 1938, Curtis publishes *Civitas Dei*, in which he draws out a new plan of obtaining a world federation to achieve world peace. He wants to organize the entire world as one big commonwealth that consists of several smaller commonwealths with a federal structure. The federal structure ensures local self-government which, in turn, elevates the condition of the people living in it because they are the sovereigns in their states and feel responsible for their actions (*Civitas Dei* 890-95). He is convinced that most English-speaking peoples agree that this form of government will spread throughout the world one day, but for the moment “the idea of the nation state [still] imprisons their minds” (901). The nation states as such together with national sovereignty make people consider their own interests first, which leads to many conflicts. Consequently, nation states need to be abolished, which can be done in a real commonwealth in Curtis’ understanding. He envisions that in the

near future, two to three federal commonwealths – most likely Australia and/or New Zealand together with Britain – will form the basis for a worldwide commonwealth.¹¹⁷ Curtis does not want more states to join in the beginning because an organization with fewer entities is easier as a first step. Those three fit very well for this purpose because they speak the same language, have similar constitutions, and their security depends on each other already (932). Therefore, the imagined community Curtis has already constructed for those nations should and would easily become a new polity in his opinion. However, once this commonwealth has consolidated, the United States should be admitted quickly (937). Once the United States was incorporated in this commonwealth, no future world wars could happen any more (Kenny and Pearce 37). It can be said that this was a new version of the idea of the principle of the commonwealth: The states which are able to govern, should do so and guide the rest of the world. The model for their common constitution should once more be the U.S. Constitution together with its regulations for extension because this world federation is “destined to grow” (Curtis, *Civitas Dei* 935) and to gradually encompass the whole world. However, only states should be admitted that fit to the character of the whole commonwealth in terms of policy. Yet, different languages are no obstacle because the feasibility of an organization with different languages has been proved by the League of Nations already. After some generations, this commonwealth would be so powerful that no one would question it and that the people living in it would fully identify with the commonwealth as a whole so that no internal danger of disruption needs to be feared. This would recreate the ‘balance’ of the 19th century when the British Empire was the hegemonic power and worked as a stabilizing factor for the rest of the world (938).

The reasons Curtis names why the English-speaking peoples should control the world in the future are the following: First of all, the British Navy controls the seas and should continue to do so in the future. This power position has to be guarded against threats from the inside and outside and, since it is strong already, *can* be defended easily. The strength of the British Navy ensures the protection of British political culture and its institutions. This is not only vital to the British Com-

¹¹⁷The initiative for this new step has to come from Australia and New Zealand, though (*Civitas Dei* 933).

monwealth as such but to the whole world: Curtis is convinced that the supreme Anglo-Saxon (political) culture is valid for the whole world and should be extended to the rest of the world. Therefore, it is important to protect it. However, as the British Empire already rules a quarter of the world world “in which government is confined to the races capable of the task” (*Problem* 200), the further extension of this good government is a natural process. British “special genius for government” (Morefield 100) and its immense “knowledge of free institutions and how to create them” (Lavin 179) makes it easier and legitimate for the ‘English-speaking race’ to extend its power. After all, any English-speaking commonwealth would always live up to the principles of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law (Morefield 122) and would, thus, assist other people in the world to gain a better life. Curtis presents the ‘British race’ as the most advanced ‘race’ in history that everybody looks up to. It is logical to him that it should lead the world towards a better future (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 53; “Quest” 83-84). However, he also has a very open understanding of the ‘British race’: If properly educated, other, non-British people can become members of the ‘British race’ (*Imperial Citizenship* 50). This means that if the British work for the betterment of the whole world (something Curtis is convinced of), they have to educate the rest of the world for them to obtain the same high standards that the ‘British race’ lives up to. Finally, only the ‘British race’ has found a way to ensure everlasting peace within its realm: the British Commonwealth and its imperial citizenship. Curtis claims that it “determines by peaceful methods of law the federations of a large number of races and communities” (*Project* 15). Hence, the ‘British race’ has the responsibility for peaceful coexistence of the other ‘races’ and communities in the world. The way Curtis describes it, it sounds as if the ‘British race’ was the ‘parent race’ on the highest step of the ‘racial hierarchy’, so it can rightfully govern all the others. Thus, the influence of Social Darwinist thinking and the language of the Anglo-Saxonist discourse is very apparent in his thoughts.

The second leader of the Round Table and another one of its founding members, Philip Kerr, lived from 1882-1940 and became the 11th Marquess of Lothian in 1930. Like Curtis, he devoted his life to the achievement of a liberal world order,

in which the Anglo-American nations should take the leading role (Billington 1). However, his emphasis on the *Anglo-American* element was much stronger than in Curtis' case. The methods he used to pursue his goal were mainly intellectual, since Kerr focused on the elites of society who should be influenced. He wrote articles and books, in which he tried to persuade his readers, in particular the American ones, to take a larger role in international affairs together with the British Commonwealth, he gave speeches, especially during his time in the United States, and he informally built a network of American Anglophiles during World War I, which he maintained throughout his life (P. Roberts, "World War I" 122-27). During his life Kerr held several influential positions: Being the first editor of *The Round Table* from 1910-1916, he developed the journal into an influential paper in the field of international relations and used it to try to bring about closer Anglo-American cooperation – something he continued after his time as editor. From 1916-1921, he was one of the private secretaries to Prime Minister Lloyd George and also accompanied him to Versailles, where he could influence practical politics in his role as Lloyd George's adviser and get in contact with many American "visiting officials, bankers, pressmen, and academics" to whom he stayed connected for the rest of his life ("Lord Lothian" 109). As secretary to the Rhodes Trustees (1925-1939), he successfully worked towards establishing the Rhodes Scholars as an elitist group of men, who fought for liberal-democratic standards and reached influential positions in their lives (Billington 3, 75). Priscilla Roberts claims that this was quite successful, since by 1939, "most committed American interventionists were former Rhodes scholars" ("Lord Lothian" 125). Finally, from 1939 until his death in 1940, Kerr served as British ambassador to the United States, where he contributed to the persuasion of the United States to take an active part in the war (P. Roberts, "World War I" 132; Bosco, "Federalist Critique" 147). Had Kerr only *felt* that his campaign rivaled Curtis' of an organic union around 1930 (P. Roberts, "Lord Lothian" 132), it became clear by the outbreak of World War II that he had *surpassed* Curtis in influence by then. Bosco claims that during the inter-war years Kerr was the most influential advocate of federalism in Britain ("Federalist Critique" 270, 272). His campaign can be subdivided into two parts: a reform of the British Empire and a

larger integration of the English-speaking world, which includes the United States. Both should have a federal structure that could either come about voluntarily or through the Empire (Kerr 35-36, 48). Kerr defines himself as an imperialist, however, imperialism to him, like to Curtis and the Round Table in general, means that self-government should be granted to parts of the federal structure as soon as they reach a certain level of development and they worked for the achievement of a federalist structure of the whole polity of the British Commonwealth (Bosco, “Federalist Critique” 248).

Kerr has several points of criticism concerning Curtis’ *Green Memorandum*: While Curtis is convinced that such a restructuring of the Empire can be accomplished within five to fifteen years, Kerr claims that the federation can never be realized as a first step towards further development. He also criticizes that if peace in the Empire is enforced, Canada will become independent. Unless there is a revolution in communication and transportation, organic unity will lead to the breakup of the Empire (May, “Round Table and Imperial Federation” 552; Kendle 83). Kerr also sees no necessity for a reform of Britain as a preliminary step towards a federation of the Empire because its constituent parts do not have to be federations themselves in his opinion (Kendle 87). The Imperial War Cabinet as well as the Imperial Conferences are considered the most helpful model for establishing international stability, so Kerr helps draft several proposals for a sharing of power with the dominions,¹¹⁸ however, these ideas are not accepted at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 and, thus, are not supported any further (Bosco, *Fall* 371; Billington 48, 65). After the US intervention in the war in 1917, Kerr accepts dominion nationalism. Along with many other British and American Atlanticists,¹¹⁹ he wants to use the existing inter-allied organizations for economic cooperation to possibly create a permanent economic machinery as a first step towards a League of Nations that secures peace and provides an economic weapon to discipline other nations who are aggressive (P. Roberts, “World War I” 128). For that reason, Kerr hopes that this cooperation during the war will continue in peacetime despite differences between

¹¹⁸Kerr also wants to achieve India’s full self-government – a topic he has pursued since 1912 already – and a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Billington 47; Kendle 91-93).

¹¹⁹Atlanticists are supporters of a close cooperation between the USA and either Britain or all of Europe. This discussion was mainly held from the 1930s onward.

Britain and the United States over the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, both nations are obliged to supervise the progress in the non-European world, according to Kerr. Britain took over this role until the end of World War I but can no longer fulfill it alone and needs U.S. assistance to keep the peace (Billington 55). It seems as if Kerr is convinced that both powers have the mission – if not the destiny – to care for the best possible development in the rest of the world. Non-involvement is seen as selfish because the problems of humanity can only be solved if the “civilized powers” cooperate (qtd. in P. Roberts, “Lord Lothian” 107) – the scope of the plans for reforms, thus, has widened from the British Commonwealth or the English-speaking world towards the benefit of all humanity. Accordingly, several suggestions are made by Kerr that all involve some kind of permanent council or conference. One of these is an enlargement of the Supreme War Council that was established at Versailles, which should be the basis for further Anglo-American cooperation after the war (Bosco, *Fall* 364). Kerr considers the League of Nations as a possibility to guarantee economic and political stability in Europe *on the condition* that the United States and Britain are the dominant powers within the League and “share [...] the burden of directing it” (417). Both states would, thus, restore the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century because they would bring overwhelming power into the league and could control the maintenance of peace and economic prosperity in this organization. Yet, when the United States’ Senate rejected the U.S. entry into the League, Kerr tried to convince British politicians – unsuccessfully – to declare the same reservations or leave the League within two years, since no Anglo-American domination of the League would be possible and the League had a better chance to survive if the United States was a member (P. Roberts, “World War I” 130-31). When no change in the British strategy concerning the League of Nations occurred, his support for the League of Nations ceased.¹²⁰

Kerr becomes convinced that a federation of the world is the solution to international problems and provides an alternative to the dysfunctional League of Nations. The theoretical basis of his understanding of federalism stems from reading *The Federalist*, which is why he sees the political system of the United States as

¹²⁰A summary of Kerr’s criticism of the League of Nations can be found in Bosco, “Federalist Critique” 266-67, 368.

the role model for the whole world. According to Kerr, federalism can reconcile the processes of both nationalism and interdependence in the world (Bosco, “Federalist Critique” 247-49). However, Priscilla Roberts claims that Kerr’s idealistic goal of a world federation should actually only cloak the vision of an Anglo-American alliance, which is a goal he first articulates in 1909 in a memorandum to former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour (“Lord Lothian” 105, 120-21). In this memorandum, Kerr clearly argues that the aim must be an Anglo-Saxon Federation in order to dominate the seas, guarantee peace, and check German imperialism. He wants Balfour to forward this proposal to the American President Theodore Roosevelt but, apparently, this never happens (P. Roberts, “World War I” 119; “Lord Lothian” 105).¹²¹ His advocacy of an Anglo-American domination of the world after World War I, thus, presents no break, as one might assume, but a continuation of his original plan in which the Anglo-Saxonist discourse resonates. However, it is also an endeavor out of self-interest for the British Commonwealth, since at the latest in the 1920s, Kerr is convinced that the only possibility for the Commonwealth to survive is for it to cooperate with the United States (“Lord Lothian” 111). By 1927, he even believes that a larger integration of the English-speaking peoples in the world has become possible, which would be a realization of Rhodes’ dream (Bosco, “From Empire” 231).

Although an Anglo-American unity is seen as the immediate goal, Kerr’s ultimate aim, however, still is a federal union of all the people in the world, a “world government, with regional federations, on the model of a truly federal British Commonwealth, as an intermediate stage” (Reynolds, *Lord Lothian* 4). The result would be a “world commonwealth of patriotism” with institutions that allow national differences while at the same time they provide the entire world with the same constitutional law so that war can be ended, liberty preserved, and property secured. In the new commonwealth, every state should be able to control its internal affairs and only the fields of defense, trade and migration, citizenship, currency, debt and taxation, as well as inter-state communications should be regulated on the federal level. Nevertheless, Kerr is aware that a world state for the moment is not practical poli-

¹²¹Still, the addressee of this idea – Theodore Roosevelt – was a strong supporter of Anglo-Saxonism, so the idea to approach him was not too far-fetched.

tics. Therefore, he proposes that along the example of the British Commonwealth, a nucleus of several nations with the same values should voluntarily federate as a first step and take over the responsibility for those colonies and territories that are not yet ‘mature’ (Kendle 102-03). Hence, international right, liberty, and international law could even be realized by the force of arms (P. Roberts, “World War I” 124). This implies that the first nations need to be powerful enough to do so. In some of his lectures in 1922 and 1923,¹²² Kerr pictures several of these federations, namely four to five “great unities” that come together either by consent or conquest and comprise the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, Britain and its Empire – “to which France and the other European democracies tend[...] to gravitate” (qtd. in Bosco, “Federalist Critique” 169) – as well as the United States together with the whole American continent. Kerr hopes that Britain and the United States together would form a so-called Atlantic bloc¹²³ that would be so powerful that no state or combination of states could challenge it in any way. This would ensure a safe transition from a European system of states towards a world system (269-70).

The main reason why Kerr wants to reform not only the Empire but English-speaking or even the whole world is that to him, national sovereignty is the root of all evils in the world. As long as nation states with unrestricted national sovereignty exist, they will always put strategic and military interests first and might resume to war to solve a conflict. As mentioned before, the only solution to this problem is the founding of a world state along the model of the American federation, since this is a system that the whole world can apply and that would solve the problem of the nation states (Billington 78-79; Kendle 102). Kerr regards this as especially important for the English-speaking nations because they would fall prey to hostilities otherwise. In 1927 he still fears that most of the danger for this antagonism might come from U.S. imperialism and the American refusal to cooperate with other nations (Bosco, “From Empire” 232). Thus, the goal is to bring peace to both the English-speaking nations and the rest of the world by federating all nations.

¹²²These lectures were printed in the book *The Prevention of War*, which Kerr published together with Lionel Curtis.

¹²³Note the semantic shift that occurs again: Britain and the United States are subsumed as an Atlantic bloc, which is an indicator that the Anglo-Saxonist discourse of the early 20th century became an Atlantic discourse later on.

‘His’ world federation – the commonwealth of men – should start with nations with common values. The most important value is democracy, because Kerr sees this as the cure for all evil. “[G]overnment must be conducted with the consent of the governed” and based upon “the freedom and responsibility of the individual” (qtd. in Kendle 102), so that the people remain the ultimate sovereigns (P. Roberts, “Lord Lothian” 121; Billington 40). The phrasing Kerr uses displays his deep admiration of the United States and its political system, since it is a direct quote of the Declaration of Independence. Kerr does not question that this American idea, which is deeply ingrained in American cultural memory,¹²⁴ can be applied to all other parts of the world (Kerr and Curtis 63-70). Another value the nations of the nucleus have to fulfill is that they need to be liberal states – again, liberalism understood in an American context. Furthermore, the nucleus should in a first step consist of white and Protestant nations¹²⁵ because Kerr is convinced that these are best capable of establishing a solid democracy that could also undertake the responsibility for colonies or dependencies which are not yet ‘able’ to govern themselves democratically (“World War I” 118; Kendle 103).

Kerr is convinced that the English-speaking world as such presents a very natural group because of its common heritage – the British Empire and its political traditions that are the “anchor of civilization in world” (Billington 166; see also P. Roberts, “World War I” 124) – which is why they should start the commonwealth of men.¹²⁶ Priscilla Roberts argues that Kerr’s conviction before World War I is a racist belief in the Anglo-Saxon or western superiority and that he regards the ‘white races’ as superior in “character, intelligence, culture and political development” (“World War I” 118). However, she also shows that Kerr eventually indicates that the other ‘races’ in the world will reach the same level he assumes for the ‘white races’ – *if* the

¹²⁴Cultural memory here is understood as “a form of collective memory, in the sense that it is shared by a number of people and that it conveys to these people a collective, that is, cultural, identity” (Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory” 110). This means that by sharing a certain memory with a certain group of people, a common cultural identity is established between them. For more on cultural memory, see Assmann, “Das kollektive Gedächtnis zwischen Körper und Schrift” and Harth.

¹²⁵In 1924, he states that the most successful democracies within the Christian world are Protestant nations (qtd. in P. Roberts, “World War I” 118).

¹²⁶It has to be noted, though, that Lothian reverts this idea at the end of his life and no longer draws such a sharp distinction between the English-speaking nations and all the other nations in Europe that have no dictatorial form of government (Billington 166).

‘non-white races’ are ‘guided’ by the former, because this governing would be the result of the “natural laws” (118-19, 129). Thus, the western world, in particular the English-speaking nations, have to dominate the world order after World War I so that disputes in the world can be solved and “backward races” can be educated and their level of civilization can be bettered (qtd. in Bosco, *Fall* 424). This means that Kerr clearly regards the English-speaking peoples as the world police, who can rightfully govern the rest of the world since it is their sense of mission to bring a better government and level of civilization to the rest of the world.¹²⁷

Finally, it is especially important that the first nations that are united should be exceptionally powerful: In 1909, Kerr makes it clear that the Anglo-Saxon federation needs to be able to dominate the seas, guarantee peace, and check German imperialism (“World War I” 119). After World War I, he maintains this general position and points out that any kind of peace needs all the great powers behind it (“World War I” 124-45; Bosco, “Federalist Critique” 269). Hence, his understanding of how and why an international federation can work is not only based on an idealistic understanding of the same values and understandings of politics, but direct military, economic, or political power are the most important prerequisites for any member of a future federation.

All in all, the positions of both Curtis and Lothian are both clearly shaped by their Round Table background: their deep admiration for the U.S. political system as well as for the work of the American Founding Fathers, the conviction that the ‘white races’ need to care for other ‘backward races’ and ‘educate’ them towards self-government, and the idea that the English-speaking peoples in particular are able to take on a leading role in the formation of a future world order.

3.3 (Common) Ideas and Arguments

When comparing the ideas and arguments of the group of like-minded contributors of the previous chapters, three fields are interesting to take a look at: ideas they all have in common, ideas with partial (dis-)agreement, and ideas that only developed

¹²⁷Kerr is also convinced of the existence of a ‘white man’s burden’ that has to be shared not only among the English-speaking peoples but also between “the four allies [...] united in fighting the Germans” in 1914 (qtd. in P. Roberts, “World War I” 129).

over time. Answering these questions allows to get a better idea of the discourse of Anglo-Saxonism and its progression from the 1880s to the 1920s. This discourse sets the stage for the second phase of this thesis as I claim that Clarence Streit's way of thinking is a representation of the Atlantic discourse in the later 20th century that has its roots in the Anglo-Saxon one (see p. 178 here).

As it is typical of the period of the (extended) turn of the 20th century, the fear of decline of the British Empire is a very important topic for most of the contributors and they agree that something needs to be done if the Empire should remain powerful in the future. In fact, Carnegie is the only one who is not in despair about the weakening of the British Empire. Nevertheless, he opts for a complete dissolution of the Empire, so he must have seen that it cannot have a future with its existing structure at the time. Especially Stead and Curtis use a drastic language which implies that the British Empire has the choice to either 'federate or perish', which sounds very alarming. This way of thinking is closely connected with the firm belief in Social Darwinism, which is another typical feature of this era and also forms an element of the Anglo-Saxonist discourse. Stead is the only writer who does not *directly* use Social Darwinist language, but he still seems to have been convinced that the English-speaking peoples have to defend their position in the future so that they do not become overpowered by another 'race'. This is the essence of any Social Darwinism and, therefore, constructs the same truth as is done by the other contributors. All of them regard the 'British/Anglo-Saxon race' or the English-speaking peoples – whatever they call them – as belonging to the first rank of civilized nations, if they are not even seen as *the* most highly developed civilization. This common 'race' of the people in the British Empire and the U.S. is also called the "governing race" or a 'race' with an "imperial instinct" (*Times*1) that can be described as having a "special genius for government" (Morefield 100). They all agree that this 'race' is not only connected by a 'racial' relationship in the biological sense but also by religion, laws, a common history, and, of course, a common language. There is also general agreement that a hegemonic position of this most highly advanced 'race' that can promote liberty and justice in the world could more easily, or later *only*, be achieved if the U.S. is included in these schemes

– a process for which all of them take a top-down approach and are convinced that it would still find support within the population. After all, by taking a top-down approach, the likelihood increases that the regime of truth can be constructed that defines an Anglo-Saxon (re-)unification as the only option for future politics. While Chamberlain mainly focuses on the British Empire itself and Rhodes at first remains unclear about this, they both include the U.S. in their schemes in some form, which shows that the imagined community of the Anglo-Saxons, which originally mostly included only the ‘white’ parts of the British Empire, was expanded to include the United States over time.

Taken together, this English-speaking federation would have been extremely powerful in different fields: economically, materially, militarily, and even what might be called ‘morally’. All contributors, starting with Rhodes, also focus on the fact that the new polity would have a lot of authority that would bring peace to the world – de facto, because of the fear of others of the federation’s material and military power or because it can act as arbitrator in international conflicts. However, it would not only get this role because of outside factors but also because the English-speaking peoples are considered to have a sense of mission to bring peace to the world, spread their advanced political institutions for the betterment of others, and ‘civilize’ other ‘backward’ peoples in the world – all but Chamberlain agree to the latter two arguments. This shows that an imperialist way of thinking was an element of the Anglo-Saxon discourse and, thus, was considered ‘normal’, ‘appropriate’, and commonsensical at the time. Although Chamberlain never fully endorses it, his speeches still show no indication that he refuses imperialism. Stead even redefines it as “imperialism of responsibility” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 17), which, for him, is contrary to jingoist imperialism because it works only for the ‘betterment’ of the people. However, jingoists themselves also were convinced that their actions benefited other ‘backward’ peoples. Conversely, Carnegie is the only one who clearly takes a stand against imperialism. However, his understanding of the term only reflects military and naval power. Softer forms of imperialism, like settler colonialism, are regarded as good means to expand one’s own territory. Thus, Carnegie clearly ignores that settler colonialism does not necessarily mean that no force is used to

oppress the native population and that the outcome of a forceful extension of one's own territory is the same as in the case of what he calls imperialism. This indicates that his knowledge still is shaped by the discursive regime of the time, which takes a sense of mission of the Anglo-Saxons towards the rest of the world for granted – regardless of the method. Yet, no matter how the extension or the strengthening of the 'English-speaking race' in the world would come about, all the contributors ascribe noble goals to themselves that should be realized with the new political entity: Next to bringing peace and security to all, liberty and justice should be realized in the entire world. Furthermore, Stead and Carnegie also dream of global disarmament, which again is a precondition for Kerr to see the League of Nations operate successfully – at least after 1919. This shows that, in theory, it is also one of his goals, although he is realistic enough to see that this will not be happening so shortly after World War I. All of them see no reason why their proposals should get any general opposition considering their idealistic goals that nobody can seriously want to obstruct.

Yet, they do not agree in all of their arguments. Only Chamberlain, Rhodes, and Curtis partly muse upon the founding of an imperial parliament with all or most of the self-governing parts of the Empire but without the U.S. and think about a new 'flexible' capital that does not necessarily have to be in one place all the time. The rest of the contributors has a wider scope when it comes to the ideas for a structural reform of the (English-speaking) world, which indicates that they were more realistic in their assessment of the future of the British Empire; obviously, it needed to be strengthened further than just by an internal reform in order to be able to maintain its hegemonic position of the 19th also in the 20th century. Consequently, a wider imagined community had to be constructed which included the United States and formed the basis of the new polity. Chamberlain, Rhodes, and Curtis do not regard the inclusion of the U.S. as vital at all times, although they agree that it *could* be included in a new organized English-speaking polity in some form – be it in an alliance, as second great power in the League of Nations, or as a potential candidate to join a worldwide commonwealth. In case of a joint federation or union, they agree that the weaker constituent has to take the initiative to get it started – except for

Rhodes who does not mention this question in the texts analyzed here. However, *which* part of the new polity is the weaker one is defined differently. Chamberlain and Curtis (in his *Civitas Dei*) talk about the self-governing colonies that need to approach Britain in order to found a federation, so they obviously still see Britain in the decisive and defining position that the others would *want* to approach. Stead, Carnegie, and Kerr, however, all consider Britain to be in a position that has to suggest a merging with the U.S., which reflects Britain's diminished importance in the world and is a clear indicator of the *translatio imperii* that took place around the turn of the 20th century.

The question whether the institutions of the constituent parts need to be harmonized in any common polity is also answered differently: Whereas Stead, Curtis (in *Civitas Dei*), and Kerr clearly affirm this, the other three contributors take some kind of middle ground here. To Chamberlain, the colonies within the Empire already have the same institutional structure, so no additional harmonization is necessary. As he only wants a temporal alliance with the United States, a harmonization of political institutions would not make any sense if the connection is so loose. According to Stead, Rhodes would be willing to sacrifice the British Empire to achieve an Anglo-American union, but, first of all, it remains unclear whether he really believes that and, secondly, a dissolution of the British Empire and a following union with the U.S. does not necessarily mean that the constituent parts need to change their political systems. Carnegie changes his opinion on this point over time. In the 1880s, he regards a democratization of Britain, which in effect does mean a harmonization of the institutions with the United States, as a *precondition* of an Anglo-American union. However, in the next decade, he is sure that such a process would be the *outcome* of the union. Although a hereditary monarchy in some way counters the idea of a democracy, Carnegie – and also Kerr – agree that it could still remain a local institution. Nevertheless, they do not see it as a defining factor in the political system, which is why this question is marginalized by them and does not affect the question of a possible harmonization of political institutions. Although the general ideas of the contributors analyzed here on any kind of merging of the English-speaking world around the turn of the 20th century may seem homogeneous,

there are still quite a few elements in which they differ.

The most interesting aspect is where a chronological development of ideas can be observed. While Chamberlain is convinced that the Empire as such can be restructured to remain the most powerful player in the international field, all the other contributors – if only reluctantly in the case of Rhodes – are not so confident any more. Even though Curtis wants Australia, New Zealand, and Britain to unify in a first step in *Civitas Dei*, he sees it as a necessity to expand this nucleus in the direction of a future world state, since these three states alone would not be able to keep the peace in the world for lack of strength. An idea that clearly develops in this period is the applicability of a federal union across several existing states. Chamberlain has the idea of a system of preferential trade and a closer cooperation between the constituent states in the Empire but he does not yet definitely talk about a necessary federation. This changes with Rhodes, who is the first to clearly advocate it. Rhodes is also the last one who clearly steps up for a unification under the Union Jack, whereas all the other contributors after him no longer regard this as an option. After all, the observation can be made that the contributors clearly realized that U.S. was taking over the leading position in the English-speaking world.

The U.S. Constitution is the political template they all want to apply, so this development also fits with the changing perception of the Americans as such: Chamberlain still regards the American civic culture as inferior to the British one, Rhodes does not comment on it but the rest of the contributors have a deep admiration for the American political system and its civic culture. Accordingly, the belief that a written constitution is necessary if a larger polity is to be realized, intensifies: Chamberlain considers any permanent alliance still as quite impractical and Rhodes does not want to have a rigid framework in his seventh will of 1893. Yet, already in his later life, his opinion changes and all the following contributors agree that a written constitution is necessary.¹²⁸ This observation corresponds with Priscilla Roberts' conclusion that the roots of federalism after World War I can be traced to the 1870s with, among others, Rhodes and Milner's Kindergarten ("World War I"

¹²⁸Carnegie talks of an already existing "alliance of hearts" at one point ("Americanism versus Imperialism" 6), which would not need any firm constitution. Yet, as this is only one incidence and the rest of his writings clearly promotes a written Anglo-American constitution, this is not all too relevant here.

114). Yet, what federalism means changes over time. Whereas Rhodes and Stead still favor the idea of complete autonomy of the constituent parts, this assessment slightly changes with Carnegie. Since he states that Britain would have to adopt a written constitution in a federation and abolish the aristocratic system and/or let it only remain a local institution, this presents a clear intervention in British autonomy. Curtis and Kerr even go one step further: For them, unrestricted national sovereignty in any system on the international level is the root of all evil in the world because it lets the nations think about their own security and economic well-being first, which results in more aggressive military and economic policies. This is something they observed in the development of the League of Nations, so they definitely want to abolish *unrestricted* national sovereignty in ‘their’ federations in order to save the peace in the world. Over time, the willingness to ‘sacrifice’ the British Empire in favor of an English-speaking federation also increases: Chamberlain still defines Britain as the stronger power, or at least as equal to the U.S., so a dissolution of the Empire would not make sense to him. Yet, Rhodes – according to Stead – already changes his opinion on this aspect over the course of his life. Stead and Carnegie do not hesitate to advocate a disintegration of the Empire that cannot be avoided anyway. However, Curtis and Kerr relativize this: They want the Empire to become part of a larger federation since it is no longer *the* most important power or cannot remain so, but they do not favor breaking it apart.

Furthermore, the objective of the whole reform movement widens considerably over time. Chamberlain in the beginning only thinks about a reform of the British Empire and possibly a loose cooperation with the United States. For Rhodes, this cooperation should already be firmer but remain within the English-speaking world, which, however, should be expanded. Stead is the first author to state that the ‘English-speaking race’ should really occupy the whole world so that peace could be realized everywhere; this view is confirmed by Carnegie. Kerr also wants to found a world state on a federal basis. Lionel Curtis has different approaches to this very same goal: First, he envisions an extension of the imperial citizenship to people in the entire world. Then, after 1919, he wants Britain and the United States to control the world through the League of Nations, and, finally, in *Civitas Dei*, three

English-speaking states should start a nucleus of a world state that should successively be enlarged. Although these ideas may seem different, the goal remains the same: The English-speaking peoples should govern the globe – which, of course, is an idea generated by the Anglo-Saxon discourse they all helped to create.

Finally, the perception of the role of democracy and its importance changes. For Chamberlain and Rhodes, democracy does not really play an important part in their vision of a larger, global polity. Stead already wants the whole world to become Americanized, which means that democracy should first spread throughout the realm of the English-speaking peoples, who then ‘conquer’ the entire world. For Carnegie, the topic also plays an important role and he wants to realize global democracy through this British-American union. Curtis and Kerr also particularly address the topic but this has a specific reason: Both of them regard the ongoing democratization as a good development. However, especially Curtis emphasizes that the English-speaking peoples need not *realize* democracy, because they already live up to it. So, starting with W.T. Stead, democracy and other values they ascribe to the English-speaking peoples, notably liberty, should be expanded to the rest of the world. Curtis and Kerr also point out that the values of democracy and liberty are English-speaking or western values that are actually universal so that everybody can benefit from their realization in all parts of the world. This notion is not originally a discursive element of Anglo-Saxonism, but ever more becomes one of the later Atlantic discourse that developed out of the Anglo-Saxon one. Therefore, Curtis and Kerr’s ideas show that the discourse opened up to a (partly) new direction: the idea that Anglo-Saxon values are not only restricted to this group but are or should become universal. Although the others might not have articulated this as clearly, they still are convinced of the superiority of their own values, so they probably would have agreed to the general assumption that *these* values should be spread across the world. The discourse of Atlanticism constructs the idea that Atlantic nations are united by a common set of values, whose main pillars are democracy and liberty. As these were promoted by the very same people who also advocated federalism from the 1870s onward, Priscilla Roberts once more can be confirmed because she also claims that the roots of Atlanticism are the very same ones as those of federalism

after World War I: They rest on the idea of a ‘racial’, ideological, and institutional superiority of the Anglo-Saxons (114-15). Consequently, the discursive strategies and elements of Anglo-Saxonism would have to be traceable in Clarence Streit’s ideas, which form the second part here, since he is a representative of the Atlantic discourse.

Although Curtis and Kerr still lived to see World War II and their productive period continued after the 1920s, it has to be noted that ideas of an Anglo-American federation and the reform movement of the Empire were no longer as powerful after World War I as before. The most important reason for this development was that the dominions in the Empire became more independent, so that a reform of the Empire that would strengthen the whole entity became ever more unlikely. Additionally, the League of Nations was founded in 1919 and the United States was no member. Consequently, Britain no longer could hope to control the world together with the United States through the League. Obtaining a tighter control over the world *next* to the League would presumably have been perceived as aggressive towards the rest of the world and, thus, needed to be avoided. In this period, it also became obvious to Britain that a *translatio imperii* from a British to an American century had taken place by the end of World War I (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 8). Furthermore, the League of Nations provided the world with a new system that could serve to secure peace and it was given the opportunity to prove its feasibility – despite the fact that it quickly turned out to be a wrong assessment. Still, the existence of this new international organization arguably inhibited further broad debates about a new ‘British’ world order. It seemed to be a thing of the past. Nevertheless, Anglotopian visions continued to emerge if only in much smaller quantities (356). I claim that Clarence Streit’s idea of *Union Now* is one of them in the wider sense because, although he does not admit this openly, he still wanted to realize a reunification of the Anglo-Americans.

4 Phase II: The Revival of the Union Idea in a New Form: Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now*

Despite the fact that global politics were shaped differently towards the middle of the 20th century, there were certain similarities of the 1930s in comparison to the turn of the 20th century: Again, there was much insecurity about world politics across all ranks of society. The League of Nations had not outlawed war as such but only under certain conditions, and failed ever so often to secure peace, like in the case of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (Morgenthau 476-77, 481-82). This resulted in diminished trust in this new intergovernmental polity which was supposed to eliminate all future wars. Additionally, the Great Depression led to a heightened frustration with the current political system on the national as well as on the international level. In the U.S., the provisions to help the people in an economic crisis were changed by the New Deal to ease the situation. Nevertheless, it had become obvious that the economies of single states in the world – especially of those which were seen as western states – were closely interconnected and a crisis in one of them could quickly affect all the others. These conditions naturally generated new ideas about a new political and economic system in the world. Furthermore, new players in the international political world changed the overall circumstances: The Soviet Union had risen to an important global player during the 1920s. Yet, the world was indecisive on how to deal with it since it represented a totally new form of state. The democratic states in particular regarded it more and more as a state they did not want to align with. In Germany, Hitler became Reich Chancellor and a reorganization of the relatively young republic followed along with an ideological change towards totalitarianism. It became clear very quickly that the so-called ‘Third Reich’¹²⁹ needed to be treated with caution as it was a power in the heart of Europe which strove to regain a strong position in world politics and to extend its reign over other states and regions. Never before had this been so obvious as during the Munich Crisis in 1938 when the failure of Churchill’s appeasement policy became evident to the world.

¹²⁹The expression ‘Third Reich’ is the wording of Nazi propaganda. As this should not be repeated without indicating it as such, I decided to write such propaganda terms in single quotation marks.

It was then that Clarence Streit could finally convince the publishers Harper & Brothers in New York and Jonathan Cape in London to print his book *Union Now*, which appeared in several editions in 1939, 1940, 1941, 1943, 1949, and 1961 (see chapter 4.4). Streit wanted to create a nucleus of a future world state, which was subsequently to be expanded until all parts of the world were a member of this “Union of the Free”. This nucleus should consist of fifteen states which he regarded as most fitting for this purpose (see chapter 6). To provide an overview of Streit’s ideas, first the development of the idea of *Union Now* and the constitution as well as further provisions of the Union of the Free will be described briefly in the following. Although Streit always denied this proposition, I argue that he, in fact, wanted to organize the world along Anglo-American political principles and not along any other system. This (re)unites the English-speaking nations in a new state, which would eventually be a world state, and further establish their hegemonic position in world politics in the future. As such it can be counted among the ideas that were generated through the Anglo-Saxon or Atlantic discourse since the basic endeavor was the same: a reunification of the English-speaking peoples across the world because they represent the most highly developed peoples in the world.

4.1 The Development of the Idea of a Union of the Free

As a correspondent for the *New York Times* in Geneva and Basle from 1929-35 (*F&U034* 19),¹³⁰ Streit witnesses the procedures in the League of Nations himself and analyzes its flaws. He especially criticizes the general philosophy of leagues as he is convinced that this system does not suffice to effectively secure peace in the world (*UN39* 70-85, 269-287).¹³¹ Certain matters cannot be solved by one nation alone so

¹³⁰Interestingly, Streit himself claims to have been a reporter there from 1925-1938 (*F&U034* 19) but articles by him could only be found in the *New York Times* up to 1935 according to its index (International). Given that he also published front page articles up until then, it is highly unlikely that he stopped writing articles for the *New York Times* completely and still continued working there. However, the obituary published in the *New York Times* says that he worked for the newspaper on the League of Nations in Geneva for a decade starting in 1929 (“C.K. Streit, Advocate of Democracies Union”). This is the reason why I decided to continue working with the information Streit gives himself, although it still seems a bit unreliable.

¹³¹As Streit repeats his arguments in his books (see chapter 4.4), the citations are given here as follows: The first citation is quoted explicitly. If no other is given, the reader can assume that the same argument appears in later editions. Only if the argument (or if the exact wording is important: the wording) changes, later citations are given to highlight the difference.

that nation states no longer are sufficient to provide solutions to the problems they all have to face. Streit particularly disagrees with *absolute* national sovereignty¹³² and the unanimity rule following from that because it makes quick action nearly impossible (*UN39* 140-42) and can lead to severe conflicts. To him, this system is the cause for ineffective government, arms race, war, trade barriers, and monetary instability (*UN40* 128-29). He equally opposes the idea that each member state has the same vote no matter its size or population. This concentrates the power of a state in the hands of the executive, which leads to a democratic deficit. Hence, the holders of sovereignty in the national and the international context have to be changed from the states to their individual citizens (*UN39* 120-27, 175), which makes the latter the ultimate sovereigns. The result of such a process is a rule of law in international politics. To Streit, this means that the democratic rule of law, which until then is practiced only within the nations themselves, would be transferred to the international field and make the individual citizens more important to the law than the nations. Thus, “lives, liberties, [and] happiness” could be secured for everybody (*Freedom’s Frontier* 161).¹³³ In order to realize this, Streit wants to create a world government as a federal union because he is convinced that this political system can protect the world against war, solve social problems, and, at the same time, maintain individual liberty as well as human dignity (*UN49* xiv). Such a powerful Union would bring prestige for all members which in turn would result in security for all of them (*UN39* 160-61). The unresolved security problem is regarded as very pressing by Streit: “If we are to save our world, we need Union, and we need it now. If we are to save ourselves [sic] none of us can dodge or divide his individual responsibility, or delay.” (208) Although this has already sounded urgent by 1939, Streit remains hopeful even after World War II that there is still – if only little – time left to found the Union (*Freedom Against Itself* 199; *Freedom’s Frontier* 147). However, he does not want to create a worldwide and universal union at once, nor does he just want to form an alliance of states because neither solution can work

¹³²Criticism on absolute national sovereignty is mentioned throughout all his books so not all examples can be quoted but just a few: *UN39* 4, 171-174; *New Federalist* 17-18; *Freedom Against Itself* 85, 87, 103, 106, 159, 179.

¹³³For the discussion of this uncritical adoption of American myths in Streit’s writings, see chapter 4.2.

to secure peace (*UN43* 255). As he is convinced that not every nation can and should be included in the Union *from the beginning*, he limits the founding states to a nucleus of fifteen (seven in the edition of 1941) and wants to realize the Union by the “normal principle of growth” with the “vanguard” taking the lead (*UN39* 87). This should be the “basis for peaceful change” in world politics (*UN49* 262) so that good government becomes possible because its prerequisites are fulfilled: freedom, peace, and plenty (*UN41* 4). The result would be that people have a “freer, fuller, better individual life and greater civilization” (*Freedom’s Frontier* xii).

In the editions of 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1949 the founding states of the Union¹³⁴ are the following:

The American Union, the British Commonwealth (specifically the United Kingdom, the Federal Union of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ireland), the French Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. (*UN39* 6-7)

The composition of the nucleus is modified a bit over time,¹³⁵ yet the general idea remains the same: to found a Union “with all the available and willing democracies of Atlantica”.¹³⁶ After this nucleus consolidates, other states – in the end *all* states in the world – can be admitted to the Union of the Free, given they meet the prerequisites for admission.¹³⁷ Once a state becomes a member of the Union, it has the same democratic guarantees as all other members and, thus, all the people living in the Union are equals before the law (112). Streit wants to limit the number of founding states from 12 and 20 as this is “intended only to make possible and hasten the organization of effective world government” and not to further delay the founding of the Union (105-09).¹³⁸ In the end, he opts for the mentioned fifteen

¹³⁴Streit either calls this Union the Union of the Free or the Atlantic Union. Spelling here is as follows: Unless written differently in quotes, the term “Atlantic Union” in capital letters refers to Streit’s idea of an Atlantic Union that is started with a nucleus of 15 or 7 states. “European union” describes the general idea of a (federal) union in Europe, but not the European Union as we know it today since the period of investigation ends before 1992 and confusion is to be avoided this way. Whenever “Atlantic/European unity” is spoken of, any idea of general unity is meant, which can be a part of Streit’s Union but does not necessarily have to lead the way to the Union of the Free.

¹³⁵For those changes, see chapters 4.4.3 and 4.4.6.

¹³⁶With the term “Atlantica” Streit describes the democracies around the Atlantic Ocean or the nation states which shared an Atlantic culture – the founding states of the Union. The origin and meaning of the term Atlantica are dealt with on p. 234 here.

¹³⁷See chapter 4.3, p. 139 here.

¹³⁸The vital necessity of a small nucleus with a particular group of states is repeated by John F. Schmidt and Clarence K. Streit in 1950 (*New Federalist* 30, 43). The arguments why Streit only

states to found the Union because the organizational challenge is much smaller as fewer participants have to agree and the ones included already are chosen carefully to only encompass nations with similar ideas of politics.¹³⁹ Furthermore, they combine much of the world's power and, consequently, can build an even stronger power bloc which works in two ways: Firstly, it counterbalances the opposing power(s)¹⁴⁰ and, thus, works as a deterrent against a new war;¹⁴¹ secondly, it should draw other nations towards the Union because they would want to be part of this great and wealthy polity. However, not any group of powerful states can form the nucleus, but they additionally need to have – what Streit calls – “moral power” and close ties with one another (*Freedom's Frontier* 31).¹⁴² All in all, Streit is convinced that no other group of states can found a sound, workable Union on a worldwide basis: “If we the people of the American Union, the British Commonwealth, the French Republic, the Lowlands, Scandinavia and the Swiss Confederation can not unite, the world can not.” (*UN40* 29-30) This makes the fifteen nations of the nucleus appear to be some kind of ‘elite of the world’ which holds the fate of the whole world in its hands. After the founding of the United Nations, Streit becomes convinced that ‘his’ nucleus approach makes even more sense than before the War as the main flaw of the League of Nations (the organization on a state basis) is continued in the United Nations and, therefore, it again cannot secure peace (*UN49* 267).

The way Streit wants to bring this Union about is a so-called “Atlantic Convention” modeled on the Philadelphia Convention of 1787,¹⁴³ where a Union Constitution is to be worked out. Streit also proposes an “*Illustrative Constitution*”¹⁴⁴ in *Union Now* to speed up this process (*UN39* 243-51). He continues to argue that the *principle* of union is more important for him than “any concrete plan for union”

includes seven founders in the edition of 1941 can be found in chapter 4.4.3.

¹³⁹These arguments will be further elaborated in chapters 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5.

¹⁴⁰In the first editions of *Union Now*, these are Germany, Japan, and Italy, after World War II it is the Soviet Union and later also Communist China.

¹⁴¹See chapter 6.4.

¹⁴²See chapters 6.4 and 6.5.

¹⁴³Streit often adopts American myths and concepts and wants to impose them on the rest of the world. For a discussion of this topic, see chapter 4.2.

¹⁴⁴Streit italicizes the *Illustrative Constitution* in *Union Now*. However, as it is not an independent work of its own, this will not be continued here. To indicate that it is Streit's *Illustrative Constitution*, it is written in capital letters in this thesis. In cases the term comes up in direct quotes, it is not changed.

(176). Nevertheless, the “draft [of the Illustrative Constitution] is drawn entirely from the Constitution of the American Union”, except for some minor provisions (243; see also chapter 4.3 here). To him, it is commonsensical that the United States takes the initiative to call such a convention because it is most experienced in a democratic federal union and it also is the most powerful and biggest of the founding states (*UN40* x; see also *UN41* 30). Thus, it pleases Streit a lot to see several resolutions introduced in the U.S. Congress with the aim of calling an Atlantic Convention (*Freedom’s Frontier* 33).¹⁴⁵

4.2 Critical Remarks on Streit’s Worldview

On the surface, Clarence Streit’s elaborations on a world government seem highly idealistic and even utopian because he describes of a new world order with freedom, democracy, peace, and equality for everyone. By taking a closer look, however, it becomes clear that these need to be assessed as naive and ‘strategically blind’ to certain aspects. Most of them relate to Streit being an American who romanticizes his own nation’s founding period and derives unrealistic expectations from the global hegemonic position of the United States. This idealization is partly extended to some of the other founding nations of the Union. The critical remarks of this chapter need to be kept in mind for the whole study on Streit’s *Union Now*, since his misconceptions and uncritical interpretations of history, which are seen much more critical in modern American studies,¹⁴⁶ form the basis of his proposal.

According to Paul, the national identity of the modern United States is “constructed and affirmed by way of this repertoire of foundational mythology that entails the creation of a ‘usable past’ [...] and the ‘invention’ of a ‘tradition’” (12) in the understanding of Commager and Hobsbawm (*Usable Past; Invention of Tradition*). The American self-understanding entails a collection of myths that sometimes even contradict one another but which portray the U.S. as “predestined entity and (still) unfinished utopian project” (Paul 12). In Streit’s opinion, however, this utopia has already been realized in the United States. He paints an mythicized image of history as a predestined, progressive development in the direction of ever-lasting

¹⁴⁵For more information on the resolutions, see chapter 7.3.

¹⁴⁶See Fisher Fishkin.

peace, freedom, and democracy, so that this alleged utopia can serve as a blueprint for the rest of the world. His understanding reveals a closeness to Whig historiography, which regards history as inevitable progress along a given destiny. Streit constructs a biased version of the past – or invents a tradition – by interpreting historical facts in a way that the form such a destiny. The writings of Clarence Streit show that this discourse no longer was restricted to the Anglo-Saxons, but was widened to what he called the “Atlantic world” that had the United States at its center (see p. 178 here). By inventing such a destiny, though, he deliberately ignores that the American founding period was not free of conflict but, on the contrary, the “foundational national discourse has always been marked by struggles for hegemony (e.g. between the North and the South or the West and the East), as established regimes of representations are always being contested” (12).¹⁴⁷ Since these struggles do not fit Streit’s view of American exceptionalism, which is especially grounded in the romanticized history of the founding period, he does not even mention or allude to these conflicts and, thus, suggests a harmonious national history and, in turn, an identity based on nostalgia. He does this by creating a simple stereotype of the Founding Fathers and influential philosophers of the late 18th century: He depicts them as wise men, who anticipated their nation’s fate and unanimously found a solution to every single future problem in the world. In doing so, he falls prey to a process of ‘double romanticizing’: Firstly, the Founding Fathers themselves romanticized the republics of classical antiquity as perfect first forms of balanced democratic governance¹⁴⁸ and wanted to create an equivalent of this in the modern world (Wood 49-50). Secondly, Streit romanticizes the Founding Fathers’ wisdom and decisions in the very same way and admires them nearly in a godlike manner.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the perception of the Founding Fathers is distorted in such a way

¹⁴⁷Although Paul is right that struggle between the North and the South as well as between the West and the East were vital, it is important to note that these regions themselves were not homogeneous. Struggles for hegemony also took place *within* these entities, such as struggles between different ‘races’ and classes.

¹⁴⁸It is important to note that the philosophers read by the Founding Fathers themselves had not experienced the Roman republic, but only lived during the time of the Roman Empire (Wood 50). Hence, they also romanticized their own history.

¹⁴⁹This process was even developed one step further because Ira Straus, Streit’s successor as executive director of his organization Federal Union Inc. (see p. 260 here), also romanticizes and idealizes Streit in a similar way and puts him on the same level as Thomas Paine (“Clarence Streit’s Revival” 328).

that Streit does not accept any challenge to their alleged wisdom. He indirectly brands everyone as unreasonable who does *not* admire them in the same way as he does. According to him, for example, the U.S. Constitution, which was developed by the Founding Fathers, is the only constitution in the world that is time-tested and has successfully worked for such a long time. This allegedly was something the Founding Fathers anticipated and, thus, it is the only model that can be applied on the international level (*UN39* 194, 243). For that reason, Streit regards the Founding Fathers not only as architects of his own nation but, following his logic, also as creators of the basis of the a rule of law among nations on the global level. This means that they would be the Founding Fathers of both the United States *and* the Union of the Free, which should eventually encompass the entire world. Therefore, he uses the discursive strategy of constructing a founding myth of the Atlantic world that was supposed to help to create this modern ‘transnational nation’.

Streit assesses all the decisions of the founding era of the United States completely uncritically and both idealizes the founding documents, the people involved, as well as the founding myths of the United States. Furthermore, he simplifies the political philosophy of the United States as ‘invented’ by the Founding Fathers and breaks them down into simple and easy axioms he perceives as true. For example, he is convinced that a federation of states is the only way to democracy and peace, since alliances would have to be rejected because they are unstable and unreliable (15-16). In this aspect, he disregards the context of the 18th century and is convinced of the applicability of these very same political principles on a global level in the 20th century. After all, Streit is absolutely certain that the U.S. Constitution can and *should* become the blueprint for a constitution of a global government because it allegedly is designed to incorporate ever more parts of the world (*New Federalist* 78). Since it was developed during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, Streit also wants a convention of a selected group of nations to initiate and Atlantic Union. After all, he considers this to be the only way to create a global constitution in the style of the American one (see chapter 7.3) and, at the same time, it would provide the Atlantic Union with a founding narrative that can help to build up an imagined community among its members.

Whenever Streit uses American myths and analogies in his writings, he tries to create an imagined community among his audience which he considers to be people in the Atlantic nations – the founders of the Atlantic Union. He is convinced that this community is defined by a common belief in the wisdom of the Founding Fathers, of the rightfulness of the political principles they created, and of the myths that made the United States a nation. However, there is a logical fallacy in these assumptions that excludes all non-U.S.-Americans from this imagined community. First of all, many of them cannot fully understand or even recognize these allusions towards the Founding Fathers or American national myths. Streit very often only uses short quotations or drops the name of, for instance, a Founding Father and expects the readers to immediately understand all the allusions and concepts behind it. Yet, if somebody has (nearly) no knowledge of American history or the founding documents,¹⁵⁰ they would in many cases not even assume that there is deeper meaning behind these remarks. For instance, Streit appraises “Hamilton’s financial principles” that would solve all the financial debt problems of the Union nations *if* they united along the model of the United States (*UN49* 319; see also p. 212 here). Since no further explanation is given what these principles are, Streit assumes that the reader knows them already. However, a deeper knowledge of the Federalist Papers is required to understand what Streit wants to explain. This excludes all the people who have not familiarized themselves with Hamilton’s essays. Another example is the title of one of his books, *Freedom Against Itself* (1954). Americans would presumably understand that this is a variation of a phrase in Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech of 1858 (see p. 162 here)¹⁵¹ and would, therefore, be able to anticipate what Streit argues in this book just by reading its title. However, this is not the case for people who are not familiar with American cultural and political history. This is the reason why such rhetorical mechanisms mostly do not work with an international audience. The second group of people that does not belong to this imagined community are those Americans who have a more critical view of their

¹⁵⁰In particular, this refers to the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, and/or many writings by philosophers of the time, for example Thomas Paine.

¹⁵¹As Streit admires Lincoln in the same way as the ‘original’ Founding Fathers, the expression “belated Founding Father” (Paul 219) is very fitting for what Streit considered him.

history than Streit. Those people neither believe in the infallibility of the American Founding Fathers and the political system they created, nor in the full applicability of this very system to 20th century realities. Yet, due to Streit's own ideological delusions, he cannot have realized how someone would *not* believe in the superiority of the American political culture and system. Consequently, a rebuttal of counter arguments is not included in his elaborations.

In the same manner as the American founding history, Streit does not criticize American founding myths, like American exceptionalism, Manifest Destiny, the melting pot, or the frontier experience. He uses this as a strategy to try to construct an imagined community within the Atlantic discursive regime. Streit is convinced that Americans have to “maintain a high level of spiritual, political and moral commitment to [their] exceptional destiny” (Madsen 2) because he believes in all seriousness that the United States forms the redeemer nation that needs to live up to its God-given mission of spreading its ideals across the world. This is a conviction that derives from Manifest Destiny in its purest form. To Streit, who obviously is a subject to the Atlantic discourse and the regime of truth it produced, Americans are morally superior, which they and the rest of the world would realize and accept to be taken for granted (*UN39* 58). Therefore, Americans are justified to take the lead in founding a government for the whole world – after all, the entire world would benefit from their guidance by the realization of freedom, democracy, and peace. Thus, the U.S. can act like a world police that intervenes when parts of the world stand in the way of this ‘noble endeavor’. It should determine the policy of all the world because, firstly, this is its destiny, and, secondly, its goal is to better the situation for the rest of the world. Yet, this role should be extended: Starting with the United States, all the members of the Atlantic Union would subscribe to this mission.¹⁵²

The concepts of the melting pot and the frontier both have one decisive similarity: they are white narratives and preclude all non-whites. As such, the melting pot theoretically creates a homogeneous society in which all are equal. Streit believes in this very notion but does not see that despite it *might* seem inclusive, the process of unification and equalization of a wide range of people involves processes

¹⁵²For the discussion of the imperialist notions here, see chapter 8.

of “forced acculturation and violent assimilation” (Paul 259). In Streit’s time, the dominant form of social order in the United States still was white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant. Thus, all people who wanted to ‘belong to the society’ had to adapt to this culture or remain marginalized. This clearly excludes all non-whites in the U.S. and makes the concept of the melting pot actually seem very restrictive, if not even oppressive. Streit, however, does not realize this for two reasons: Firstly, what he perceives as American culture actually refers to WASP social values that are, at least in theory, inclusive in the sense that everyone can become an in-group member of as long as they adapt to the dominant cultural practices. Secondly, Streit does not believe in a *forced* acculturation or assimilation because these processes happen rather voluntarily, in his opinion. Since he considers WASP-culture superior in every way, it is clear to him that all the people in the U.S. or even the world would also *want* to adapt to it because they also wish to achieve this allegedly ‘higher’ cultural level. Thus, his belief in the melting pot, once more, shows his missing level of reflective capabilities and his ignorance towards or disregard of people different from himself. Another way of describing it, however, is that he was a subject of a certain discursive regime which simply did not produce the idea that people could *not* be convinced of the superiority of American culture and politics; Streit therefore did not reflect upon this possibility.

The same groups which are excluded from the ‘melting process’ are also not included in the experience of the frontier. Historically, the frontier described the westward movement of mostly white people across the American continent, who extinguished and mainly fought Native Americans in their advance further father west. Hence, there was a clear distinction between the groups before (Native Americans) and behind the frontier (European settlers). The ‘civilization’ formed behind it also excluded all other non-whites since they did not participate in the frontier movement and, thus, had no such cultural experience or memory of it. In this way, the narrative of the frontier could not be shared by all Americans.¹⁵³ Furthermore, despite the fact that Streit always strictly disapproves of any form of colonialism or

¹⁵³Although Asians, for example, helped building the railroad further westwards, they still are excluded from this all-white myth of a liberating frontier because they themselves still were suppressed by whites and could not determine their own destiny in the progress to the west of the continent.

imperialism, the frontier movement was a form of colonialism itself. The first North American colonies themselves started to colonize North America and the settlers which moved further westward simply continued this practice and brought the rest of the continent under their rule. Hence, unless a white supremacist point of view is applied, it is hardly understandable that Streit does not regard this as problematic when he assesses the “expansion principle” of the United States as peaceful only (*New Federalist* 78) since this was not the case. So, his view of both the melting pot and the frontier are as uncritical as the assessment of the Founding Fathers and American history in general.

All in all, Streit’s white supremacist and racist convictions become clear in these aspects. Obviously, he could not rid himself of the idea that white people are superior to non-whites.¹⁵⁴ He also does not criticize the existing racial segregation in the United States, which is in stark contrast to the idea of all men being created equal. Thus, he must either be convinced that the domination of what he perceives as the American society by white people is rightful or he must deliberately have decided to ignore the fact that racism still prevents the democratic ideal from realization in his own nation. Given the fact that he wants to fight Germany for not treating all men equally – although the atrocities of the Nazis can never be excused – (*UN39* 109), his glorification of the great American society and culture is especially perfidious. Streit seems to disregard the fact that the U.S. does not live up to its own ideals as ‘cradle of modern democracy’ as this line of thinking is not acceptable within the Atlantic regime of truth.

Yet, this systematic ignorance of the problematic relationship between colonialism and democracy is not confined to Streit’s idealizing assessment of the United States. Despite the fact that democracy and peacefulness are two of the most important prerequisites for becoming a founding member of Streit’s Union (see chapters 6.2 and 6.3), many of the former major colonial powers are included among the founders. Not only the United States itself but most of all Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands still partly held large colonial empires by the 1930s. The fact

¹⁵⁴In his statistics on the population of the founding nations of the Union (see chapter 6.4), he also only includes the white population of South Africa in the number of this entire population (*UN39* 95). This shows that non-white in South Africa are not even regarded as citizens by him. For more on Apartheid, see footnote 366.

that neither democracy nor peacefulness could have been realized in the acquisition and maintenance of these colonies counters his ideal that all of the founders need to have long democratic and peaceful traditions. Furthermore, the Union should create a bulwark against imperialism (see chapter 8) but included many imperialist powers itself. This shows that many elements of Streit's proposal are highly contradictory and need to be viewed critically. Yet, since he convinced a lot of people around the world of the feasibility of *Union Now*, it is still worthwhile to look at both his proposal, its arguments, and discursive strategies that helped to construct the Atlantic discursive regime. After all, the fact that he could gain supporters, is an indicator that his ideas must have been accepted by many at the time despite being highly contradictory and based on a nostalgic romanticizing of (American) history.

4.3 The Illustrative Constitution of the Union of the Free and Further Provisions

As has been mentioned, the Illustrative Constitution (243-51) of the Union of the Free in Streit's books is mainly based on the U.S. Constitution.¹⁵⁵ This is one indicator that Streit sees the United States as the ideal state, whose system can also work on an international level. The reason why he chooses the American Constitution as a blueprint is also a very practical one: If a new polity is to be founded, Streit regards it best to establish it "on [a] familiar time-tested political basis with a minimum of innovation" (194). This way, it is easier to convince people of it as they can see the living example of how the system works in the United States. Additionally, Streit claims that all the other existing unions in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Switzerland are modeled on this "American invention" (*UN414*).¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, if a blueprint already exists, the discussions *at* the convention itself probably progress faster than if a constitution first has to be worked out.

¹⁵⁵As the U.S. Constitution is considered to be well-known among the readers, not all its provisions are explained here but only those regulations which are especially important to Streit and the ones which differ from the original. This is the reason why the Judiciary Branch is not dealt with here as Streit wants to copy the judiciary system of the United States as a whole for the Union.

¹⁵⁶Although all of these states are organized as a union, it is doubtful whether they are really modeled on the United States as Streit asserts. This, however, is one indication of how much more important and better he regards the U.S. in comparison to other states in the world. This will further be discussed in chapter 5.

Organization as a Democratic Federal Union

The most important aspect of American democracy in Streit's eyes is its realization as a democratic federal union. Streit claims that in this system the individual is regarded as the unit of government, not the state. This is the case in leagues, a system he regards as defective like in the cases of the so-called League of Friendship or the League of Nations, the United Nations, or NATO because in such a polity each state has the same voting power regardless of its size, which makes them undemocratic. All of them are doomed to failure as they have one common flaw: They are based on absolutely sovereign nations which protect their interests at any cost. This leads to slow progress because of the necessity of unanimous decisions as well as to a democratic deficit because all states, no matter their size, have only one vote (*UN39* 128-58, 176; *New Federalist* 10). Streit argues that if 'democracy' is taken seriously, the unit of government on the national as well as the international level has to be the individual, not the state. The idea is emphasized in the Illustrative Constitution by a small, yet decisive modification: Lincoln's definition of democracy is changed to "government of ourselves, by ourselves, for ourselves" (*UN39* 243). Here, it is firstly made more explicit that the unit of government should not be the states but 'the people', who are addressed by the reflexive pronoun. This pronoun, secondly, appeals to the people on a far more personal level than the original impersonal expression of "government of, by, and for the people" so that everyone should feel spoken to. Streit's goal is to give all individuals in the Union the same vote in all the decisions. This would be most radically realized by eradicating the nations as such, but that is not his intention. What he wants is to end *absolute, unlimited* national sovereignty among the nations (4).¹⁵⁷ Nations should continue to exist in the Union but only with limited sovereignty so that *true* sovereignty re-

¹⁵⁷The overcoming of absolute national sovereignty and replacing it by citizen sovereignty is called a "moral revolution" by Streit in his edition of 1961. This "moral revolution" is the prerequisite for the Union to be founded at all and includes putting the "Rights of Man above the Rights of Nations" (*Freedom's Frontier* 161-62). This is a clear reference to *The Rights of Man* by Thomas Paine, who claims in the context of the French Revolution that a revolution can be a legitimate way to achieve the realization of natural rights for all the people. Hence, Streit clearly argues in Paine's philosophical tradition here because he demands another revolution to realize the rights of man on the international level. For a discussion of Streit's uncritical application of concepts of the 18th century to the 20th, see chapter 4.2.

mains with the people. Therefore, democracy and union are two concepts which are inextricably linked: Democracy with true citizen sovereignty can only be realized in a union and the idea of citizen sovereignty, which is so vital for the Union, is not possible without a democratic political system (208). Not only democracy and union are indivisible but also the concepts of freedom and union, since one would not be possible without the other. To describe this relationship, Streit invents the term “freedom-and-union” which he explains as follows:

Each of these three words has equal weight, and the whole is greater than any of its party, or their sum. For freedom without union is anarchy, and union without freedom is tyranny. Neither conduces to creativeness; freedom-and-union does. (Freedom Against Itself 26)

Consequently, the idea is that the danger to freedom in the world can only be faced with the combination of freedom *and* union. The realization of both concepts is seen as “the immortal issue facing man” (“Freedom & Union Is 10” 17) and can only be solved by a democratic federal union. Streit even argues that originally “[m]an’s freedom began with men uniting”. So it works vice versa: Freedom in every level can only be obtained through union and union is the only way to secure freedom (UN39 225). Additionally, both tendencies reciprocally reinforce each other: The freer a people is, the more dependent it is on other peoples. Consequently, the more one people depends on others, the more freedom can develop within a society (232, 235). The discussion on the interdependence between union and freedom has already started in *Union Now* of 1939 and is continued in the magazine *Freedom & Union* (UN39 232, 235; “Freedom’s Laggard Leadership”; “Forgotten Sure-Fire Explorer”).

Subsidiarity in the Federal System

As mentioned before, Streit does not want to abolish the nation states as such, he only wants to eliminate *absolute* national sovereignty. This should be realized by a system of subsidiarity in the Union. The distribution of competences between the Union and the states has the goal of securing freedom in the best possible way. The important test of “whether in a given field government should remain national or become union is this: Which would *clearly* give the individual more freedom?” (UN39 12) The idea is that individuals, consequently, can best protect their freedom

and individuality as they can decide which part of their sovereignty they want to give to which level of government and neither state nor Union government have “any power in still other fields that are reserved to the citizen” (*New Federalist* 15-16, 24). Eventually, the “rights or sovereignty that the state or nation retains in entering a federal union are just as important to its guarantee of liberty as are the union’s rights to sovereignty” (16). In the end, both have to be fulfilled: The citizens’ freedom has to be secured and the Union as well as the states have to be checked against each other so that there is neither over- nor undercentralization to threaten freedom (*New Federalist* 17, 21; see also C. K. Streit, “How Confusion Over Freedom”; “Arabs Raise Two Flags”). Thus, citizens not only are the true holders of their sovereignty, but they themselves also are responsible for securing their own freedom. This also supports the idea that the “*supreme* purpose in forming government is not – as many assume – to prevent war but to preserve and promote human liberty” (*New Federalist* 26). According to Streit, citizens would give the Union the following rights if they followed his proposal:

1. The right to grant citizenship.
2. The right to make war and peace, to negotiate treaties and otherwise deal with the outside world, to raise and maintain a defence force.
3. The right to regulate inter-state and foreign trade.
4. The right to coin and issue money, and fix other measures.
5. The right to govern communications: to operate the postal service, and regulate, control or operate other inter-state communication services.
(*UN39* 179)

Furthermore, the Union can tax citizens and enforce its laws but these are rights which should equally be given to the states because effective government is not possible otherwise (134). All in all, the Union of the Free should be a fully sovereign new state, a unification not only in the political but also in the financial, economic, and military sense (see also *UN49* 277) and still give “*de jure* status to all the existing decentralization that free men value” (*New Federalist* 29). Federalism thus replaces “passports, currencies, customs barriers and military forces of the nations” (74) and brings “unity with respect to selected matters [...] of common concern while leaving state sovereignty undisturbed as regards all other matters” (Dulles xvi). Citizenship would be a dual one after the founding of the Union: People are citizens of the Union, but they also retain their national citizenship (*New Federalist*

95). This provides the possibility of free movement of people across the Union without having a visa system. National feelings associated with the ‘original’ national citizenship can be maintained because Union citizens would not have to give up this part of their identity. At the same time, further rights are added to their national citizenship, which facilitates an identification both with the own nation as well as with the Union.

Streit also wants to introduce a Union currency in order to facilitate free trade within the Union. The goal is a big free trade zone without tariffs or different currencies to make the Union economically as strong as possible (97).¹⁵⁸ The advantage of establishing a new Union currency is that no national feelings are associated with it so that all parts of the Union can equally identify with the new currency (*UN39* 256).

The important factor in the decision of how to distribute fields of government, however, is that it is the *citizens*, not any state, who redistribute parts of their sovereignty to higher levels. A state “as an entity cannot give up a part of its sovereignty” (*New Federalist* 11) and the citizens can also decide to keep parts of their sovereignty to themselves (*UN39* 244). Streit even argues that the citizens not only do *not lose* sovereignty, but *gain* it “in the very fields on which peace and war depend” (“King Nation” 5) and that this new distribution of rights “reduce[s] enormously the amount of actual interference from the State suffered¹⁵⁹ by the citizens of this whole area” (*UN39* 134).

Legislative Branch

Like nearly all the other provisions, the legislative branch in the Illustrative Constitution is very similar to the U.S. model. There are two houses with two different forms of representation: the House of Deputies with a representation of each state according to the number of its citizens and a Senate with a representation based on

¹⁵⁸For more information on the economic power of the Union, see chapter 6.4.

¹⁵⁹Note that Streit explicitly uses the word “suffer” to describe the relationship between states and citizens in his time. This goes in line with a statement of 1961 in *Freedom’s Frontier*: “In every field of life, Atlantic Union would open a much higher possibility of fulfillment to every citizen who is specially gifted or deeply interested in that particular field.” (170) It implies that in every other form of government people have to *suffer* from not being able to make the best out of their talents and only an Atlantic Union provides them with such possibilities.

the states as such. Streit chooses this system because it provides possible protection of smaller states from the domination of bigger ones. He claims that this is realized nearly perfectly in the constitution of the United States with the double representation of citizens in both houses. The House protects the votes of the individuals because of the representation basis of the individuals,¹⁶⁰ whereas the Senate still makes it possible for the single states to pursue their interests as they get two votes each.¹⁶¹ Streit is convinced that this is more democratic than any alternative solution as all citizens of the Union have the same vote and smaller states do not have to fear being controlled by bigger ones because they have a fairly equal representation in the Senate. ‘Fairly equal’ indicates the slight change he makes from the American Constitution to the Illustrative Constitution in *Union Now*: As explained in 1949, the Canadian principle in the Senate gives “the very populous members a somewhat larger representation than the less populous ones, without, however, giving them control of it” (*UN49* 283).¹⁶² Nevertheless, Streit displays a double standard here: Although he formally does not want the smaller states to be outvoted, he is very cautious to always secure the overall majority of votes for the English-speaking peoples – mostly for the Americans. However, Streit is convinced that after some time the division of representatives in both houses will not be along national but along party lines (*UN39* 187), so that a stronger American representation will not have any effects on the decision-making. This is quite naive, since he could have seen that national identity and national feelings do not simply vanish when nations join and form larger entities. Furthermore, had Streit really been convinced that national representations would not matter after some time, it does not make sense that he argues repeatedly that the Americans should not be outvoted by other nations in the Union (see chapter 5). However, he also claims early on that the idea of a representation on population basis would be widely accepted because it is not

¹⁶⁰Streit proposes one deputy every 1,000,000 inhabitants “or major fraction thereof” with each state having at least one (*UN39* 247).

¹⁶¹Deputies are to be elected every third year, Senators every eight years. Note that this would increase the number of elections in comparison to the United States today because the dates for the elections every three and eight years cannot always be synchronized, so that citizens have to – or can – go to the polls more often.

¹⁶²The differences between the allocation of seats in the Canadian and the U.S. Senate is again explained in *Freedom & Union* in 1951 (Hartley, “Canadian Perspective”). In 1939, Streit has already proposed that each state should get two Senators and “two more for each additional 25,000,000 population or major fraction thereof” (*UN39* 247).

an American but a British invention (*UN41* 176) and, thus, potential fears of the Americans forcing others to adopt only their system should be dispelled.

Executive Branch and Capital of the Union

Unlike in the United States, the executive of the Union is composed of a so-called “Board of Five”, very similar to the Swiss federal council with its seven councilors. Three of the five Board members are directly elected by the citizens, one by the House and one by the Senate. They have a term of five years with one member being re-elected each year.¹⁶³ A majority of them forms a quorum and decisions can also be taken by a majority of the Board. However, there is also a President of this Board, an office which rotates among the Board members each year. Laws can only be passed with the agreement of the majority of the Board and a two-thirds roll-call majority of both House and Senate (*UN39* 248). The advantage of those five Board members is that they can “travel through the Union, and it would be easy for the Board to arrange rotation whereby one would be visiting the more distant parts of the Union while another was visiting the less distant parts and the other three were at the capital” (191). The model of how and why this should work is the British Royal Family: Family members visit different parts of the Commonwealth in order to represent the British rule over the whole area and give the Commonwealth an institution to identify with (191).

The Board has the same constitutional powers as the President of the United States with the addition that it can dissolve the whole Congress or only one chamber and have it newly elected. However, all its executive power which is “*not expressly retained by it* [the Board]” (249) is exercised by a Premier with the help of a cabinet and the support of the House or Senate. When the Premier loses support in either house, the Board can appoint a new one (249). This Premier is also an alteration of the U.S. Constitution and is very similar to the British Prime Minister who gets appointed by the monarch and governs the state together with the cabinet.

¹⁶³This would further increase the number of elections held in the Union (see also footnote 161). On the one hand, many elections give the citizens a lot of possibilities to make their voices heard, but, on the other hand, the whole state would have constant election campaigns, which is costly and might lead to people no longer voting because elections would simply occur too often. Yet, Streit is convinced that having many elections has a “unifying effect” (“How the Presidential Campaign Unites Americans” 2).

Provisions for Non-Self-Governing Territories

Especially when the first edition of *Union Now* appeared in 1939, many of the founding states still ruled over colonial territories, so the question of how to deal with them if the Union was founded still was pressing. Streit is convinced that the people in non-self-governing parts of the empires are not yet experienced enough to be equally represented in the Union like the western democracies. To free them of the rule of their motherland would deprive them of “all the freedom that the organization of a sound nucleus of world government would bring the whole human species” (185) or even expose them to dangers such as the destruction of democracy because it spread too quickly.¹⁶⁴ He comes to the conclusion that in the Union, only people who are “born or naturalized” in the self-governing parts of the Union members should become citizens and be eligible to vote. This way it is possible for the other parts to benefit from the advantages of the Union without having to take responsibility for the Union’s actions yet.¹⁶⁵ The goal then is to “train them for admission to the Union as fully self-governing nations” (185, 245). In this context, Streit at first only talks about India but continues the discussion on non-self-governing territories in general. It is quite interesting, however, that he does not skip this passage in the edition of 1949 (*UN49* 140-42), although India became independent two years previously with the passage of the Indian Independence Act. In 1961, the section on India and the non-self-governing parts of the Union is left out in the text, but the provisions for non-self-governing territories are still mentioned in the Illustrative Constitution (*Freedom’s Frontier* 287-96).

On the constitutional level, all non-self-governing parts of the Union should be transferred to the Union. However, local administration in the colonies would not be changed but left “to the individuals with the most training for it” (*UN39* 186). Streit even argues that this is a logical step especially for those states with the most colonies and the most effective administration of them: Their expertise in managing the colonies can help others to achieve the same standard. In the end, all colonies

¹⁶⁴This view of the non-self-governing territories of the empires is very questionable and reflects an imperialist way of thinking. This will be dealt with in chapter 8. Here, only a description of Streit’s argument is made.

¹⁶⁵Again, this is a very patronizing point of view.

and former mother countries profit from this development, in his opinion (185).

Admission of New Members

As Streit's goal is an eventual universal Union, there have to be provisions of how to admit new members. First of all, the so-called "federalist expansion principle" (*New Federalist* 78) – meaning the way of admitting new states like in the U.S. – is seen as peaceful and an expansion by conquest is strictly rejected.¹⁶⁶ Once a new state is admitted to the Union, it has rights equal to the founding states. In *The New Federalist*, Streit lists the minimum requirements for the admission of a state to the Union: Its constitution has to be "compatible with the federal constitution" and it has to be approved "both by the people of the state and the federal congress". Furthermore, new states have to "accept the supremacy of the federal constitution", they have to guarantee the Union's Bill of Rights and have to have free government "in the fields left to its independent jurisdiction" (79-80). However, it is vital to Streit that new states 'only' have to meet the same prerequisites as the original founding states of the Union. Additionally, the democratic experience of new members is vital and everyone of them has to prove their "devotion to the basic principles of The Union" – meaning: freedom and democracy – and the "ability to practice them" (*UN41* 28-29). These last prerequisites became particularly important after World War II, when the possible admission of Germany and Italy – former opposing powers – obviously had to be considered (*UN49* 288).

However, what is contradictory and what Streit discusses at no point, is what happens to the size of the Congress if the number of member states is enlarged. It is illogical that he, on the one hand, opposes a large nucleus (also in terms of Deputies and Senators) in case the Latin American republics are included from the beginning (289) because the Constitutional Convention would be too big and ineffective. On the other hand, both the numbers of Deputies and Senators in the Union Congress would increase immensely as soon as new states are added. At the latest when the Union would finally be universal, its Congress would reach the point of having simply too many representatives to work properly and decisions would take too long. Although this is exactly one of the main points of criticism he has about leagues,

¹⁶⁶This romanticized perception of the expansion of the United States is discussed in chapter 4.2.

Streit never mentions this possibility.

4.4 Publications by Clarence K. Streit

Streit publishes six editions of the book *Union Now*, all with a different focus, which can be seen in the additional chapters that are added to it. Streit argues that the basic chapters of *Union Now* do not need any alterations or updates because new events since 1939 can “provide a test of its [the book’s] wisdom and foresight which anyone can apply” (*UN43* xii; *UN49* ix) since several of his predictions have become true.¹⁶⁷

4.4.1 *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (1939)*

According to Streit, the first publication of *Union Now* actually was not in the form of a book but as a series of newspaper articles starting in 1933 when Streit still was a correspondent for *The New York Times* in Geneva (*UN39* ix).¹⁶⁸ He himself says that, originally, he wrote this book because of the “lessons and dangers in the Depression” he witnessed in 1933 (*Freedom Against Itself* 180). With the rise of Hitler to power, Streit was convinced that another war could only be avoided by founding ‘his’ Union and that he had to make his proposal known all over the world. After rewriting the articles for his book several times, he first offered it for publication in 1934 and 1935 but was not successful. For that reason, he published it as a private edition of 300 copies in August 1938 (e.g. C. K. Streit, “To Get the Union Now” 21). This edition was sent to “leading men in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and other countries” (*UN43* xvii) in order to convince those in power to change their policies and found the Union.¹⁶⁹ Considering the fact that

¹⁶⁷To name a few: the outbreak of war in 1939, the continued failure of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations to secure peace all over the world, and the ongoing strive of nations to secure their absolute national sovereignty.

¹⁶⁸In *Freedom & Union*, he no longer talks about newspaper articles but only of a manuscript which was first drafted in 1933-34. As no newspaper articles could be found, it is possible that he may have written articles for a newspaper, but that they were never published.

¹⁶⁹However, no list of men the book was sent to could be found. The only hint I have is that Streit gave one of the copies to Lionel Curtis, who confirms it himself (“Lionel Curtis – Prophet” 11; Curtis, “World Order” 310).

in order to change a discursive regime, influential people in society have to be won, this strategy could theoretically have been successful, although the Union was never realized in the end.¹⁷⁰

Only after the Munich Crisis of 1938, Streit could convince the publishers of Harper & Brothers in New York and Jonathan Cape in London to print his book, which then was published on March 2, 1939¹⁷¹ in the United States and on March 9, 1939 in Britain. In June and August of the same year, the French and Swedish translations¹⁷² appeared and a German translation allegedly was not published in Switzerland because of the outbreak of the war (C. K. Streit, “To Get the Union Now” 21).¹⁷³ However, the French translation only consists of a foreword and the first chapter of the original (C. K. Streit, *Union ou chaos?*). This might indicate that the book was either taken less seriously in France or that its cause was not seen as pressing as in the English-speaking world. By Streit’s own accord, the English version of 1939 allegedly already had fifteen editions by the time the shorter edition of 1940 was published (*UN40* vii). This number is doubtful because it is very high for one year and can, if at all, only be explained if the circulation of the first edition was very small and all the other ‘editions’ only are reprints and the wrong expression was used.¹⁷⁴ In 1963, *Freedom & Union* claims that there even were 17 editions in the first year after the publication of *Union Now* (*F&U054*). In 1964, Streit announces that in the 25 years since the first publications, half a million copies of *Union Now* were sold (*F&U058* 12).

Streit himself argues in 1961 that the publication *Union Now* made a huge impact and also met the zeitgeist of the 1930s: there was fear of war and anxiety about whether the U.S. had to become involved in it, disillusionment with the League

¹⁷⁰For more on how Streit tried to change the existing regime of truth, see chapter 7.2.

¹⁷¹*Freedom & Union* mentions that the book was already sold on February 25, 1939 (*F&U058* 12), but this is the only source indicating another date.

¹⁷²The French translation was also sold in Belgium, Switzerland, Romania, and Germany (*F&U039* 11).

¹⁷³This is a claim Streit makes himself. However, he does not reflect on the fact that Switzerland was neutral during the war, which makes this assertion appear a bit unreliable. Baratta claims that a “pirated” Chinese and a Dutch Indonesian edition also existed by 1941 (*World Federation I* 54).

¹⁷⁴After all, an eleventh edition of *Union Now* could be found, which is exactly the same as the 9th edition (*UN39, 9th edition; UN39*). So it is quite possible that edition in this case simply was used to describe reprints.

of Nations, and a “hunger for a fresh and promising approach” – something he claims his book provides (“‘Union Now’ in 1939”). Baratta argues accordingly that, even though only for a minority, Streit became the “prophet of world government” (Baratta, *World Federation I* 53) with the publication of *Union Now*.

4.4.2 *Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union (Shorter Version), (1940)*

The edition of 1940 is written because of “rapidly rising demand”. Streit sees this as a positive sign: Although the war has already broken out in Europe, people are convinced “that the book’s proposal of Inter-democracy Federal Union is timely to a high degree” (*UN40* vii). However, the edition is about one third shorter than the original edition, which is the reason why it sometimes was called the concise edition.¹⁷⁵ Streit originally explains in this chapter why the existing international system cannot be simply reformed, but something completely new has to be created in its stead. As this already becomes clear in the first chapters, he regards this chapter as a mostly redundant. Since this edition is much shorter than the original and Streit is convinced that there is nothing to add to this ‘timeless’ proposal, most of it is included in all the following editions of *Union Now* but for *Union Now With Britain* of 1941.

In this edition the subtitle of the whole book is changed from “A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies” (1939) to “The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union” (1940). The alteration of the indefinite to the definite article insinuates a changed perception of the whole proposal. In 1939, *Union Now* still was “a proposal”, meaning one of many. In 1940, the definite article in the title indicates that *Union Now* then is the *one and only* proposal which still can save democracy and peace in the world. This makes it appear more unique to the readers and supports the ambition of providing the best and most practical idea to restructure global politics. The second big change from “Federal Union of the *Leading Democracies*” to “*Inter-Democracy Federal Union*” sounds more egalitarian:

¹⁷⁵The basic parts of the original are still included since the cuts affect mainly the topics “no longer needed after the war began”, like the Czech crisis (*F&U*054 16) and one chapter is shortened to a large extent: chapter IV “Patching Won’t Do”. In the edition of 1939, this chapter has 21 pages, in 1940 only 9 pages.

In the first edition, the title hints only to the *leading* democracies in the world. This conveys the impression that really only the leading democracies are included in the Union and it could repel other democracies from feeling addressed. The title of 1940 clearly shows an openness to all democracies in the world which can join the Union.

4.4.3 *Union Now With Britain* (1941)

Union Now With Britain was written in 1940 after the French defeat in June and then went to press before January 25, 1941 (*UN41* 113; *Freedom's Frontier* 12), at a time when the danger of war had been a reality for Europeans for over a year and had become more threatening in the United States. Streit is convinced by then that the U.S. would inevitably enter the war and it is not only beneficial but even vital to re-organize their relations with Britain beforehand. Thus, the war against the Axis powers can be won, democracy saved, and not “more lives than necessary” will be lost (*UN41* 20). As the title already suggests, the idea is no longer a Union of *fifteen* democracies, but only of those nations which have “formed the great core and body of the original nucleus of fifteen” (14) – Streit also calls them the “remaining democracies” (7): the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.¹⁷⁶

Although he mentions that other – then occupied – democracies with governments in exile can, in theory, become founding nations, too, this approach is not followed because Streit is concerned that it would slow down the founding of the Union. Conversely, this is no option for him because the danger of war is so pressing and he only wants to “maintain the closest relations with all the exiled governments” (188). This is in sharp contrast to all his alleged apprehensions against a mere English-speaking (or British-American-French) Union he had before.

¹⁷⁶It is striking that Streit at first speaks of the “*seven* democracies that remain” (*UN41* 14; emphasis added), but later on he only mentions the U.S. and Britain. This leads to the conclusion, that in the term Britain all the dominions either all are ‘naturally’ included but still are seen only as a less important part of the imagined community of the English-speaking nations, or that Streit is convinced that Britain’s authority over the dominions in the Commonwealth is still big enough that it can speak for all of them without them objecting. Another indication for this assumption is his description of the founding nations in 1939 because he mentions the British Commonwealth as one founding nation and only enumerates these six democracies in brackets (see p. 122 here). In a later occasion, Streit only talks about the “British democracies” (52) and includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and possibly Ireland in this expression. So he definitely regards them as one entity.

The argument until then is that a Union only of English-speaking (or English- and French-speaking) people deprives the nucleus of the overwhelming strength it needs right from the start and gives the impression of an English-speaking hegemony in the Union which could deter other nations from wanting to join¹⁷⁷ – both of which has to be avoided (*UN39* 105). Yet according to Streit, the seven “remaining democracies” alone still have sufficient strength to become a power strong enough to secure freedom, peace, and plenty for the future (*UN41* 14) and can start a new “Golden Age for all mankind” (50). Following his line of argument that the nucleus has to be as strong as possible and that it has to consist of free states with long democratic traditions,¹⁷⁸ it still would have been possible to include – of the original fifteen states – Sweden and Switzerland as they still were not involved in the war or conquered by the ‘Third Reich’ by the time the book was published. This would better have given the impression that his aim was *not* a purely English-speaking Union from the beginning. Instead, Streit even reinforces the conveyed idea in *Union Now With Britain* that his worldview, which is shaped by the Atlantic discourse, centers around the English-speaking nations.

Streit still opts for the purely English-speaking suggestion for the official reason that they have “the most practical experience in self-government and federal union” (15). Assuming that Streit is convinced of a ‘natural unity’ of the English-speaking nations (see chapter 5), this can further be used as an argument why Sweden and Switzerland are not included because they would have needed more convincing to join the Union, whereas it would be ‘natural’ for the other seven to agree on this matter.¹⁷⁹ In fact, Streit argues that a Union of these seven English-speaking na-

¹⁷⁷Streit speaks of “an offensive air of exclusivity” in case of an all English-speaking Union (*UN39* 105-07), which indicates a certain danger of such a proposal that might result in a conflict.

¹⁷⁸The arguments of free and democratic states will be dealt with in chapters 6.2 and 6.1. A critique of this pretension can be found in chapter 4.2.

¹⁷⁹One possible – other – explanation why Streit does not include Sweden nor Switzerland can be found in the next edition of 1943. He states that the ‘natural ties’ binding the Americans with the Swiss and Swedish democracies would “obviously become more compelling as direct contact with them is restored” (*UN43* 253). An inclusion of two nations the founders for the moment have little contact with is not possible. In *Freedom’s Frontier* (1961), he argues that the reason for the exclusion of Sweden and Switzerland in 1941 is that they are surrounded by dictatorship, so that there are only the seven English-speaking nations left (*Freedom’s Frontier* 32). Yet, with Switzerland in the heart of Europe and Sweden adjacent to the recently conquered Norway, the Union could also have been seen as a bulwark against the ‘Third Reich’ not only outside of but also within continental Europe.

tions would be as easy to organize as an “inter-allied council, or any other alternative machinery” (7) – with the difference that only the Union could actually win the war and save the peace afterwards. This all indicates how much more important Streit regards those seven nations in comparison to the other eight, although he claims until the last edition that the impression of an English-speaking hegemony in the Union is to be avoided (*Freedom’s Frontier* 32). Despite the fact that main topic of *Union Now With Britain* is the quick and immediate founding of the Union, Streit dedicates several chapters to the explanation why Britain and the United States fit together so well and can rightfully start the Union for the whole world. On the one hand, this shows that the intended readership of this book clearly is a different one: mainly English-speakers, who are addressed more directly. On the other hand, it solidifies the impression that the important nations in the Union as a whole indeed only are the Anglophone ones for Streit (see chapter 5).

To give the new founding states a document to start with at the planned constitutional convention for the provisional Union, Streit – in reference to the Declaration of Independence of 1776 – adds a “Declaration of Inter-Dependence and Union” to *Union Now With Britain*. It has a twofold aim: Firstly, it should provide a possible declaration the delegates at the “Union’s Inter-Continental Congress” can sign, and secondly, it is intended to show “how well the principles and form and phrases of the original Declaration of 1776 fit the present purpose” (*UN41* 205). Streit copies the “basic paragraphs” two and three from the original and only slightly changes paragraphs one and four to apply it to the situation at the time: The intention no longer is independence but union, resulting from the already existing inter-dependence,¹⁸⁰ and not George III but absolute national sovereignty is indicted. Once more, this is an example which highlights Streit’s firm belief in the applicability of his own state’s political system not only to the national but also to the international level. However, what has to be clearly emphasized here again is that he used the American Constitution as blueprint completely uncritically and is totally convinced that ‘his’ own political system is superior to all others and would also ‘naturally’ be accepted as such by all other nations in the world. He even adds the remark that the British should not object this for being “too American a model for them to follow

¹⁸⁰For the argument why Streit sees the nations as inter-dependent, see chapters 6.4 and 6.5.

now with dignity”. All of them, Americans as well as British, believe in “these universal democratic principles”, so all of them should sign them together because this is what the Founding Fathers did in the 18th century (206-07).¹⁸¹ This way he tries to construct a community among the people of both nations, committing both of them to the goal of realizing universal democratic principles. These cannot be objected to, which makes an opposition to the “Declaration of Inter-Dependence and Union” harder, in Streit’s opinion, as it is easier to follow an already existing declaration than to start anew.¹⁸² However, what Streit does not consider is that the Declaration of Independence is mainly seen in a positive way in American but not so much in British collective memory. So it is doubtful whether the latter felt included in this constructed community.

Not only the number and composition of the founding states but also the structure of the book is completely different in *Union Now With Britain*. All the other books contain at least the short edition of *Union Now*, however, the edition of 1941 does not, although the most basic parts of the idea are explained. This can be seen as underlining the provisional character of this proposal because the idea is that first a provisional Union between the United States and Britain should be established in order to defeat autocracy¹⁸³ and then to “safely call a separate Federal Convention to begin the slower process of working out a definitive Constitution” (7). However, even if other states cannot join the Union immediately, the development of such a definitive Constitution is an absolute necessity; without this process, the Union states “win or stop the war in vain – for we [the Union states] then split apart and lose the peace” (8).

¹⁸¹For more information on this, see chapter 4.2.

¹⁸²Apparently, Streit does not see the constitutional problem of simply founding the Union by an act of Congress – the invitation to Britain – and not *really* asking the opinion of people both in the U.S. and the other English-speaking nations. This is criticized right away in the book review by Fordham. The author of this review does not even elaborate on all other points of criticism since those “would require an essay” (156). Hence, the perception of Streit’s proposal obviously was not as positive as he might have wished for.

¹⁸³A short note on the terms dictatorship and autocracy: In their classic study of dictatorship and autocracy, Friedrich and Brzezinski state that the terms cannot be used synonymously as dictatorship presents the generic term of the particular political system and can be subdivided into totalitarian and autocratic dictatorships (Friedrich and Brzezinski 15-17; see also Linz). However, Streit never distinguishes between the terms autocracy and dictatorship, but he uses them interchangeably. Although the difference between both terms is clear, I decided not to correct Streit’s statements in this respect in order to maintain the flow of reading.

The title *Union Now With Britain* suggests that the initiative of the Union should come from the United States and not from Britain, since otherwise it would have to be “Union Now with the U.S.” or even “Union Now with the English-speaking peoples”. To avoid the impression of an American domination in Britain, it appears logical that both audiences in the U.S. and Britain are addressed differently. Indeed, there are slight differences in the editions of the book which are published in the United States and in Britain. The very first chapter contains a call to action in which Streit asks the readers whether they want to live “supremely” or if they want to know “how good [they] really are” (9). In the American (Harper & Brothers) version, this paragraph follows:

Here is a proposal that we now do something really worthy of us, while we can. Something that will lift us out of our humdrum lives, and leave us each greater. Something that none of us will ever forget, that our whole species will always remember. Something worth our while on earth. Something deathless that we can do . . . but only if we do our best. (10)

However, this paragraph does not appear in the British (Jonathan Cape) version. It clearly addresses the American idea of exceptionalism, of being the “city upon a hill”. American readers are called upon to take the initiative to start the Union with Britain and to fulfill their ‘destiny’ in the world since they are the only ones who can achieve this. It not part of the British version probably because, although the British might feel special and exceptional, their ‘exceptionalism’ still is different from this understanding in the U.S., where it is part of the cultural heritage, and the British would not have felt addressed by this paragraph as much as the Americans might have.

In the British version of the table of contents, an extra chapter appears here, which is called “To Beat Swords into Ploughshares” (*UN41, Jonathan Cape* 5). This is a quote from the Bible¹⁸⁴ and indicates that Streit wants the nations in the world to pursue peaceful means and end the war. As the British, in contrast to the Americans, were already fighting the war against the Axis powers at the time and could, thus, *end* the war more easily than the ‘inactive’ Americans, this is an appeal which

¹⁸⁴The original quotation is: “And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” (*KJV* Isaiah 2:4)

probably would not have worked in the United States. It is curious, however, that this chapter cannot be found in the text, but there is only a short remark of this biblical metaphor and not an extra headline in the text as indicated in the table of contents (27). Yet, the message still is conveyed: The time is ripe and the issue has to be solved urgently on both sides of the Atlantic together.

The other interesting difference between both versions is the title of the Illustrative Constitution in the British version. Before the draft constitution is printed in both versions, Streit writes a short introduction about the fact that he was criticized for making the Illustrative Constitution sound too final, although he has argued before that it only was a suggestion. He again wants to reassure the British that the form and provisions of the permanent Union Constitution can still be discussed and that the Illustrative Constitution would not necessarily be applied in the provisional Union. However, the title of this chapter in the table of contents of the British version is “Draft” and in the American version, it is “Definitive Union”. In the text itself, both versions have the latter title. This implies that Streit, on the one hand, already knows that there are apprehensions on the British side about being ‘overruled’ by the Americans. The word “draft” makes it sound much less final, which can serve to soothe the British. Yet, as the title “draft” does not appear in the text, the attempt to ease the British can be assumed as failed. This shows that Streit is very well aware of the fact that the Union Constitution would *really* be an American system ‘imposed’ on the British – and in a later stage on the rest of the world. As he still is convinced that the American system would, beyond doubt, be beneficial to all nations, this does not present a problem for him, however. Still, on the surface, he wants to maintain the impression that none of the provisions have been decided so far and that his Illustrative Constitution is only a draft.

Although Streit previously argues that the Union has to be founded for the fight against autocracy – which then is represented by the Axis powers – he never before has mentioned the ideology of the ‘Third Reich’ directly and has proved it wrong. This changes in *Union Now With Britain*. When he explains that the old alliance system (“the European system”) has not worked in the past and that he wants a new (American) system in global politics, he takes care to emphasize that

what he does *not* want is “*America Ueber Alles*”.¹⁸⁵ This would mean to force the American system on all the other nations in the world and have an ‘American totalitarian state’ controlling all the others in the end (*UN41* 23). Nevertheless, he only sees *Union Now With Britain* as an “emergency proposal”, as the single chance to realize the Union as quickly as possible and at the same time to be as strong as necessary in the upcoming war – which is only achievable with a unification of the United States and Britain (plus its dominions).

4.4.4 *Union Now: Why Freedom and Peace Require the Atlantic Democracies to Begin World Federal Union (Wartime Edition, 1943)*

In 1943, after the United States joined the war, Streit is sure that they will win it. Yet, he is equally convinced that the peace afterwards will probably be ‘lost’ if no federal union is established among the democracies. This was achieved after the Revolutionary War and the Civil War but not after World War I (*UN43* ix). The result then, in Streit’s opinion, was World War II. This is the reason why he writes another edition of *Union Now* during 1943¹⁸⁶ in order to persuade people to found the Union.

This wartime edition of *Union Now* consists of most of the parts of the concise edition and three new chapters. However, it still is shorter than the edition of 1940 for reasons of “brevity and economy” (xii). Streit completely omits two chapters of the concise edition and shortens another one. The reason for this might be the fact that this edition was written and published during the war (even though the main battles were not fought on U.S. grounds), a time when paper was probably harder to get, more expensive or at least it is possible that publishers would not print any long book, but might have limited the numbers of new books being published. Still, the omitted chapters appear in the table of contents with a remark of the omission as to indicate their importance nevertheless. Streit states that these chapters “sought to

¹⁸⁵This is a wordplay with the first stanza of the German national anthem which was sung in Germany before 1945. The text starts with “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles”, which can be translated as “Germany, Germany above all else”. This stanza was exploited by the Nazis to support their goal of conquering the world and bringing it under their rule. It openly displays their conviction of a German superiority over the rest of the world. Streit wants to position himself clearly against any notion that the USA intends to do the same as Nazi Germany.

¹⁸⁶The first chapter (“Wartime Opening”) is dated to September 1, 1943 by Streit (*UN43* xx).

prove our need for world government” (xii), which would be obvious to all readers at the time. Apart from the omissions, Streit praises himself for not changing anything in comparison to the previous editions because only like this, *Union Now* can become a “test of [. . .] wisdom and foresight which anyone can apply” (xii). The focus of this edition then can be the discussion why the “league system” cannot “suffice to keep the peace, so long as peace is not upheld by an overwhelming ‘unbalance of power,’ such as only Union of the Free can supply” (xiii).

As the previous edition has a mere English-speaking nucleus, Streit has to defend this idea to his critics in the wartime edition by emphasizing that *Union Now With Britain*’s suggestion was only made to deal with the emergency of the war and not because he wanted to found an exclusively English-speaking Union. Furthermore, due to “the bravery of the British and by Hitler invading Russia instead” as well as the fact that the U.S. was involved in the war by 1943 anyway, Streit claims that a mere English-speaking Union no longer makes sense because the acute danger of Britain being defeated no longer exists. The many changes and uncertainties in world politics of the recent years rather have made “the exact composition of the nuclear Union still less definite”, but the Union should only consist of nations “with whom we [the United States] has compelling natural ties”. Those ties again lead to the original fifteen nations, but it seems ever more important to Streit that France has to be included in any kind of Union – be it provisional or final (250-52, 264). These arguments may all have been brought forward to ease critics of *Union Now*. However, especially the clarity with which the last of these arguments is emphasized implies that Streit must have faced severe objections both among his followers and critics (see also chapter 7.1.1, p. 255 here).

The subtitle of the book (“Why Freedom and Peace Require the Atlantic Democracies to Begin World Federal Union”) hints to two ideas: First of all, the question of winning the war is not *asked* by Streit because it is not even mentioned in the title. Only the time after the war is addressed and it is clear that he sees the Atlantic democracies in the position to shape the peace order. This alone reflects the fact that losing the war is out of question for Streit, as he does not even bring up this possibility in the book itself. Secondly, as it is explicitly stressed that the

Atlantic Democracies would only *start* a World Federal Union but would not found it *only* for themselves, Streit perhaps partly responds to potential criticism about the Union being only suitable for a certain group of nations, about it not being open to others, and the accusation that the goal of universality is only pretended or will never be achieved (e.g. Schwimmer 2).

In the wartime edition, Streit does not completely discard the idea of another universal organization in global politics – next to the Union – for the first time. This is also logical from the point of view that the Declaration of the United Nations was signed shortly before Streit started writing the book and he could not have rejected this new forum if he wanted to be taken seriously. Yet, if his arguments against “league systems” are considered, this seems implausible. He still argues that the situation is different by then because the U.S. would be – unlike in the League of Nations – part of the United Nations. Nevertheless, a nuclear Union should be founded by the United States at the same time in order to gradually grow to universality and, thus replacing the already existing universal organization (*UN43* 262-63). Like in *Union Now With Britain*, the United States again is presented as the natural leader of *Union Now* and would – if the plan was fulfilled – also cement its predominant position and importance to the world.¹⁸⁷

4.4.5 *Union Now: A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free* (Postwar Edition, 1949)

By September 1948, the time Streit wrote the foreword to the next edition of *Union Now*, he claims that “[a]ll American editions of *Union Now*, unabridged, abridged and wartime, are now out of print.” Yet “with the spectre of a third World War”, he sees a risen demand for the book again, so he decides to publish a postwar edition in 1949 (*UN49* ix). Once more, Streit does not change the core of the text but presents his updated views in five additional chapters at the end of the book. The chapters he left out in the wartime edition again are part of this edition. Additionally, there are two introductions written by Estes Kefauver, then U.S. Senator from Tennessee, and Dr. Oscar Jaszi, then Professor of Political Science at the Oberlin College, Ohio

¹⁸⁷For a discussion on this aim, see chapter 8.

(ix-x). Both of them, *ex officio*, could influence a lot of people in their opinion. The fact that people of such a high standing openly promoted Streit's idea indicates both that his idea was known at least to parts of the society and that he was indeed taken seriously by many people.¹⁸⁸

Once more, Streit defends his approach of including only English-speaking nations in the nucleus of *Union Now With Britain* and re-emphasizes that it was an emergency proposal which only applied to the situation in 1941. This shows that the criticism of this approach apparently must have continued and the doubts about whether he does or does not really want to establish an English-speaking Union obviously have not been removed (ix). However, he does not say that any other group fits the purpose of starting the Union better than the English-speaking one.

One of the new chapters has the title "Where I Re-Writing *Union Now*". Streit explains there how a possible nucleus can again be constituted according to the political situation of the time. For the first time, he claims that possible additions to the list of founders could be Iceland, Luxembourg, the Philippine Commonwealth, and perhaps Italy (288).¹⁸⁹ He no longer is sure about the inclusion of Finland, as

¹⁸⁸For the significance of the idea of *Union Now*, Streit himself, and his possibility to establish a new regime of truth, see chapter 7.2.

¹⁸⁹Streit does not give reasons why he wants to add Iceland. He says about Luxembourg that it is already "united by customs union to Belgium and the Netherlands", which would presumably make it seem illogical to exclude Luxembourg from the Union of which Belgium and the Netherlands would be members. Despite their lack of experience in self-government, Italian people can be rewarded for overthrowing communism and, thus, be included among the founders. Furthermore, this can encourage the development of democracy in Japan and Germany (*UN49* 288). The idea of including the Philippines first is deliberated in *Freedom & Union* in 1947 ("How to Cut Taxes More" 2). The reasons for the inclusion of this state seem far-fetched and apologetic at the same time: Streit claims that the Philippines as a U.S. dependency have already been included in the original edition of *Union Now* and after they have gained independence, they still have only very little experience in democratic government – one of the core prerequisites for becoming a founding member of the Union. Yet, they "have had a longer period of such training than most other Asiatic peoples". Additionally, their inclusion would be a "valuable proof" that the Union does not have imperialist means or intends to remain a "white man's union" (*UN49* 288-89). Nevertheless, this reasoning sounds as if Streit desperately tried to find a way to counter criticism of a "white man's union". Furthermore, by claiming that the Philippines are fitter than the other Asian nations because they have had more training in self-government by the United States, what Streit tries to argue against is being reinforced: The Philippines are seen as a better fit because their 'training' was given to them by 'white men' – the U.S. in particular (288) – and therefore, the Philippines are more reliable to be able to govern themselves than any other Asian state that has not received the same 'training' by the United States. Consequently, a hierarchy among Asian nations is established, which puts the nation on top which 'benefited' most from a former imperial power. This constructs the image that U.S. imperialism as such was not totally 'worthless' but that it, in fact, was for the 'benefit' of the Filipinos. This thought, on the other hand, is highly imperialist.

this might cause a war with Russia due to the geographical proximity.¹⁹⁰

Another important new idea Streit explains in this chapter is that he no longer is convinced that the only way to a world federal government is the “Union of the Atlantic democracies” alone, but he also suggests that several regional unions around the world could be founded as a first step towards a universal Union. For this he proposes a Union of Southern Asia, a free Chinese Union, and a new “free” Soviet Union. While they are founded, the Atlantic Union would grow and, finally, all unions would be federated into one big Union of the Free (287). It is unclear whether he makes those suggestions in order to increase the chances of the Union being realized at all. He might have assumed that it was more likely for Asian people, for example, to first federate in Asia than to join an Atlantic Union right away.¹⁹¹ However, as he has repeatedly emphasized before that the whole world is the United States’ concern and it therefore has to have a say in the world’s political decisions, this suggestion does not seem totally honest, because it would deprive the U.S. of influence on the other unions’ policies. Still, it can be rated as an attempt to clear the impression that the Union of the Free would mainly be determined by the U.S. and maybe Britain. Nevertheless, all the unions would need to have (nearly) the same constitution as a federation of all of them could not work otherwise. This again would consolidate the United States’ influence on all the other unions because its constitution is the blueprint. Hence, the possible attempt can at best be rated as goodwill but can also be seen as strategy to distract from the actual plan of having a union based on the U.S. model.

The big political chance since the publication of the last edition was – apart from the fact that World War II was over – the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union being the prime opponent of the Union and no longer the Axis powers. Yet, the apprehensions towards this state have begun earlier. In 1939, Streit does not yet see the Soviet Union as a clear enemy, because he does not know how to

¹⁹⁰Streit would like the Union itself to decide on this question and simply expresses his concerns (289). However, he has already mentioned in 1939 that if other states might have those worries, he would not include Finland in the nucleus as to not further delay the founding of the Union. Yet, in this first edition he only has those kinds of concerns himself about the inclusion of Spain and Czechoslovakia but not about Finland (*UN39* 108).

¹⁹¹This thought goes in line with the subtitle of the book (“A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free”), which once more introduces Streit’s ideas only as one proposal of many that does not claim sole representation.

judge this new form of state.¹⁹² It is still hard to imagine for him that the Soviet Union would join the war on the side of the Axis, so he decides to remain open to its inclusion (*UN39* 161). A change of this assessment starts in *Union Now With Britain*: Streit still hopes that the Soviet Union could be won over to the side of the Union as he claims that it would only be driven towards an alliance with Japan if the free waited too long to found the Union (*UN41* 49, 192). Still, in the very same edition, the Soviet Union is clearly counted among the autocracies for the very first time (152-53). In 1943, the Soviet Union is described to be seriously weakened because Streit recognizes that it would be “in much greater need of outside help than it was before the war”, but, nevertheless, it is seen as a candidate which wants to overrun the world (*UN43* 254). This needs to be averted by forming the Union. In 1949, finally, the Soviet Union is described as a “formidable dictatorship [...] bent on driving individual freedom off the earth, and enslaving all mankind under its tyrannical world government” (*UN49* 251). Thus, it is not only an ideological enemy but also has a doctrine which directly runs counter to Streit’s idea of an own world government – similar to what the ‘Third Reich’ presented previously.

The other big difference, whose development had already started by the time the wartime edition was written, is the existence of the United Nations. Like before, Streit wants the Union to become a member of the United Nations in 1949 and, therefore, help the latter to ‘survive’ because he assumes that an international forum is necessary. Yet, the Union would stabilize and ultimately replace it as the sole international universal organization. He also is convinced that this change would not even need any alteration of the United Nations Charter as this does not “forbid the people of any two or more nations from voluntarily uniting in an organic federal union, constituting a new government” (285-87, 303). Although it seems quite naive to think the other nations within the United Nations would not protest against this endeavor, it might also have been an attempt to show that his proposal does not

¹⁹²On the one hand, he thinks the Soviets share the democratic theory that all men are created equal, which would qualify them as a member. On the other hand, democracy allows its society to chose freely between individual enterprise and collective action in the field of economy. This is not the case for the Soviet Union, which again disqualifies it as member of the nucleus (*UN39* 109-11). Yet, the Soviet Union should be admitted to the Union as soon as it meets the prerequisites (114).

run totally counter to other existing international organizations.

Although Streit sees the danger of a World War III in 1949, the situation seems more hopeful to him: The term Atlantic community is widely used, the United States has turned its policies from isolationism to internationalism by joining the United Nations, and the “creation of a free world government is not yet recognized as ‘Public Problem No. 1,’ but is immensely closer to such recognition than [...] in 1939” (258). One of the reasons for these new circumstances is the (perceived) wider spread of Streit’s ideas – probably also because of the founding of the organization Federal Union Inc. (see chapter 7.1) – and a sense of urgency created by the speeding technological progress, which could lead to the finding of new solutions to pressing problems. Hence, although the situation seems a bit desperate with the ever more freezing Cold War and the continuing disunion of the democracies, Streit seems all in all hopeful in 1949 that his idea would become a reality.

4.4.6 *Freedom’s Frontier: Atlantic Union Now* (1961) – Adjustments to New Realities

In 1954, Streit claims to be currently writing another book (*Freedom Against Itself* 211), which probably turns out to be the last edition of *Union Now*, namely *Freedom’s Frontier: Atlantic Union Now*. This edition deals with the proposal in the face of new global political circumstances (in particular the founding of NATO) and, thus, adjusts the proposal to these new realities. Since the previous edition, a resolution – after several failed attempts – has passed the U.S. Congress which contains a call of an Atlantic Convention “to explore how to advance their [the North Atlantic nations’] freedom by greater political and economic unity”¹⁹³ and at the same time there were “only 200 copies of the 1949 Postwar edition left in print”. This is why Streit sees a new demand for it, although he claims that “[m]ore than a quarter million copies in all have been sold” – which would indicate that a lot of people have already read his proposal. Yet, this number seems relatively high and it at least has to be doubted whether it is true, although it is not possible to prove Streit wrong.

¹⁹³The Atlantic Convention finally started in January 1962 (see chapter 7.3, p. 308 here).

As Streit wants to deal with the changed political situation in more detail, he decides to subdivide *Freedom's Frontier* in two parts: "Book I" consists of thirteen chapters, in which he "consider[s] afresh the proposal and philosophy of *Union Now* in the light of the world changes since 1939" and then adds most parts of the concise edition of *Union Now* as "Book II" (*Freedom's Frontier* ix-x). Those parts which are left out "deal with conditions that no longer obtain, such as American neutralism, or that I [Clarence Streit] consider secondary. All that is basic has been retained, with no change whatever in the original text." (xiv) Streit no longer mentions the titles of the omitted chapters in his table of contents but only skips the respective numbers in the count of the remaining chapters. This accounts for the fact that they obviously are not as important to him any more and are not seen as 'basic'. The content of those chapters – to a great part like in 1943 – is the need for a world government and the inadequacy of the existing international organizations to save the peace. Apparently, Streit regards this as obvious to his readers, since he does not elaborate it any further. Nevertheless, he includes the content of several of the 'missing' parts in Book I of *Freedom's Frontier*, namely the explanation why the founders he chose fit best for the purpose of founding the Union and why the current global political system is inadequate. Hence, it seems as these circumstances still need to be explained in 1961 in his opinion.

Streit's goal in *Freedom's Frontier* is to give the readers a positive ideal to work for because mere opposition to several ideas is "not [what] moves us in the highest measure" (xi). Being "moved" is necessary in his opinion in order to realize the Union in the world. Accordingly, he no longer wants to argue with the danger and fear the free nations have to face.¹⁹⁴ Yet, although this seems so important to him, it is strange that he starts *Freedom's Frontier* exactly with the content he wants to avoid because the first sentence is: "Avoidable catastrophe and missed opportunity, both immense, have marked the years since *Union Now* appeared in 1939." This is followed by an introduction to reasons why the situation has remained as dangerous and the founding of the Union as urgent as before (3). Since the first and the previ-

¹⁹⁴The positive ideals – though allegedly so very important – are only the topic of the last chapters 12 and 13 of Book I. This tells a lot about how important they in fact seem to be to Streit, since they only are dealt with this late in the book.

ous publication of *Union Now*, the “Communist dictatorship” has become stronger, the perceived danger of a new depression has remained, the race in space has been accelerating, and all the newly-independent nations of the several former empires have not become a member of any union, which was one of the original aims (7-16). Yet, the Union of the Free has not been founded so far, which leaves all its potential members still unprotected against those evils and the outcomes that might result from these circumstances.

This is probably the reason why Streit in 1961 again, more clearly, and at a much earlier place in his book than before introduces the idea of several regional unions which join one big federation as an equally good opportunity to get the Union founded (19, 30). It indicates that he is more willing to make compromises to get ‘his’ Union founded at all and probably also wants to ease apprehensions about the Union being imperialist, which might come from other parts of the world that are not included in his original nucleus.¹⁹⁵ Yet, it is striking that the regional unions do not come up again later in the book, but Streit continues to only argue for an Atlantic Union, and that he mainly focuses on the United States and Britain when he explains who should found the Union and provide ideas for its design. Still, he repeats for the third time that *Union Now With Britain* was an emergency measure which should serve to found the Union “while the iron was hot” at a time of crisis because such a condition could sometimes help trying out something new (12).

The decisive change in *Freedom’s Frontier* is the composition of the nucleus (of the Atlantic world).¹⁹⁶ Streit argues that for practical reasons the already existing NATO group should found the Union, meaning that the states now considered are first and foremost the “NATO sponsors” United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg¹⁹⁷ together with the other NATO members Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Luxembourg, the German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Turkey (32-33). Although no longer all the previously mentioned seven English-speaking nations are included, the remain-

¹⁹⁵For the discussion on whether *Union Now* can be seen as imperialist, see chapter 8.

¹⁹⁶Whenever a “nucleus” of the Union is spoken of here, the expression refers to the nucleus of the Atlantic Union unless indicated otherwise.

¹⁹⁷Streit and his supporters call these first seven nations the “NATO sponsors”, because they are seen as mainly responsible for creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Blumenthal 18).

ing three – the United States, Canada, and Great Britain – together still form a majority of English-speaking peoples in the new polity. Despite the fact that Streit again and again stresses that English-speaking peoples should *not* dominate the Union, he still uses the argument that they would be in the majority in the Union in 1961. This again underlines that a commanding influence of those nations is indeed his goal and that he is convinced that all of the English-speaking nations actually *have* to be part of a newly founded world state.

As the composition of the nucleus changes, new arguments are needed why these states fit together nearly as good as the original ones, since the ‘first’ nucleus is still called “ideal” by Streit (32). First of all, it is a practical deliberation because NATO as an organizational body already exists, which means that a further unification of those states is easier. The states would not have to start from scratch, but they already have a forum to discuss further steps and no additional convention has to be called. Streit’s second idea is that the fifteen NATO nations belong to a cultural region he now – after first coming up with the term in 1943 – officially calls Atlantica.¹⁹⁸ Apparently, Streit still sees enough “democratic experience” and “community of background” among this group so that they can still form a sound nucleus *and* feel that they belong together (34). The “democratic experience” of all but five new members has been praised repeatedly in the editions before and seems enough so that in 1961 “the problem which Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey present should not be dangerously difficult” (36).¹⁹⁹ In order to ease possible reservations among the other founders, Streit lists many important philosophers, scientists, artists, and politicians from those five nations to show how much these have contributed to the development of today’s culture so far (36-37).²⁰⁰ However,

¹⁹⁸For the development of this term and its connotation, see p. 234 here.

¹⁹⁹In fact, Streit has already added the Germans to the group of the so-called Atlantic community for the first time in *Freedom Against Itself* in 1954 (see chapter 4.4.8). He argues that they were under dictatorial rule only 12 of the 200 years which are relevant for him and apart from that they lived in a free republic for 23 years – Streit obviously refers to the years 1919-1933 and 1945-1954 – and the German philosophers have contributed a lot to the idea of freedom in the past (*Freedom Against Itself* 30). This shows that Streit probably has fewer apprehensions about the Germans by then and wants to give them a new chance but also that he still needs to convince his followers of this view. Thus, the “problem” of the inclusion of Germany in 1961 is probably not too big any more for him.

²⁰⁰For a closer discussion of the importance of “democratic experience”, see chapter 6.2; for the “community of background”, see chapter 6.5.

the impression remains that these five do not fit to the other ‘new’ founding nations²⁰¹ but present a big compromise in Streit’s idea.

Once more, the title of the new edition of 1961 needs to be stressed. It can be split in its two components: ‘Freedom’ and ‘Frontier’. The latter one is a genuine American concept, which, on the one hand, describes the westward movement of the frontier in the 19th century, and which – according to Frederick Jackson Turner – worked as a “crucible” and thus greatly shaped the America culture (Turner 23). This metaphor then was modernized in the 20th century by John F. Kennedy, who tells the Americans that they are standing “on the edge of a new Frontier – the Frontier of the 1960s” at the Democratic National Convention in 1960 after accepting his nomination (Kennedy). What both Turner and Kennedy do is to unite (white) Americans behind this common cultural memory²⁰² so that they all feel included.²⁰³ Kennedy then again appeals to the Americans that new challenges are lying ahead but that they have enough strength, courage, and wisdom to face these. Exactly this idea is also included in Streit’s title *Freedom’s Frontier*. However, this time not only the Americans are addressed but everybody who can unite behind the idea of freedom, and *those* people should face the challenge of world government together. Yet, it remains doubtful whether this allusion could have worked in other nations but the U.S. because ‘facing frontiers’ is not an idea that is as deeply ingrained in other nations’ cultures and cultural memories. Nevertheless, it shows that Streit apparently must have been influenced by Kennedy’s speech, which only was given shortly before *Freedom’s Frontier* was printed.²⁰⁴

All in all, Streit still is quite confident about the Union being founded in the near future. The only obstacle he sees is the “confusion of sovereignty” which persists mostly in the United States but also in the other ‘decisive’ nations Britain and France. Once this is cleared away – something which *Freedom’s Frontier* is supposed

²⁰¹The other new members are Iceland and Luxembourg. Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland are no longer included.

²⁰²Assmann defines cultural memory as referring to mythical history of the definite past (“Communicative and Cultural Memory” 117), which cannot be applied to speeches by Turner or Kennedy – especially at the time Streit published his books. Yet, as their memory was and is celebrated ceremonially and their wording is codified to a high degree (Erl 26), the term cultural memory still fits to a certain extent.

²⁰³For Streit’s uncritical view of such concepts as the melting pot, see chapter 4.2.

²⁰⁴However, no hint could be found that Streit and John F. Kennedy knew each other.

to do – and people get convinced that citizen sovereignty should replace absolute state sovereignty also in global politics, the Union would be founded quickly because people would demand it (*Freedom's Frontier* x, 25-28).²⁰⁵ As the Americans should take the initiative of founding the Union, all they need is enough demand and support for the Union because “there has not been a single great thing asked of the American people since the war that they and their representatives in Congress have not promptly delivered” (24). Obviously, Streit believes that the Americans are willing to make all the necessary sacrifices and that people around the world would both support the Americans and follow their lead.

In comparison to the previous edition of 1949, the probability of getting the Union founded has improved by far in Streit's view. Even though atomic weapons have been used ‘successfully’ already before 1949, the need of a world government has become “more urgent No. 1 in our dawning rocket atomic age” (147). Additionally, NATO was founded in the meantime,²⁰⁶ which, thus, provides a forum to realize Streit's ideas and also presents an organization in which the western states stand together against their biggest enemy: the Soviet Union. The Cold War as a whole is an emergency situation but can also provide the necessary trigger to finally start a new chapter in global politics and found the Union.

Freedom's Frontier is the last edition of *Union Now*. Throughout all his books, Streit always sees the time ripe for the founding of the Union of the Free even though after some time, it seems more and more surprising to the reader that he does not give up hope. Yet, after 1961, the discussion of how the Union can come about is only continued in the magazine *Freedom & Union* (see chapter 4.4.9).

²⁰⁵In one of the reviews on *Freedom's Frontier*, the author claims that although Streit's way of writing “smacks more of poetry than of political science, more of hope than of history”, writing like this “has, on occasion, shaped history” like in the case of the Confederation period (Dieterich). So despite the fact that the inaccuracies in Streit's ideas were seen, Dieterich still can imagine that an idea like this could become a reality one day. As such, he must have been a supporter of the cause since its opponents would clearly regard the theoretical shortcomings as more striking. An example of this is another review by William M. Armstrong, who also addresses the fact that the book (and its original of 1939) “lends [...] a faint touch of unreality [...] because – as all but a handful of reviewers at the outset failed to realize – Mr. Streit is tied irretrievably to nineteenth-century values.” This is the reason why Streit cannot answer the “really hard questions that his book raises” and why Armstrong is convinced that the book does not have to be taken seriously (“Book Review: Clarence K. Streit. *Freedom's Frontier*”).

²⁰⁶The postwar edition appeared before the founding of NATO (*Freedom's Frontier* 31).

4.4.7 *The New Federalist* (1950)

The New Federalist is the first of two books which Streit (co-)wrote to support his cause but which is *not* another edition of *Union Now* of 1939. Being a clear reference to the ‘original’ *Federalist* by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay with the pseudonym “Publius”, *The New Federalist* was written by Clarence K. Streit, John F. Schmidt, and Owen J. Roberts with the pseudonym “Publius II”.²⁰⁷ However, in contrast to the original, they always state who wrote which of the 26 articles. Not only its name but also the aim is similar to the original: Whereas the authors of the *Federalist Papers* want the U.S. Constitution – a federal union constitution – to be ratified among the thirteen states, those of the *The New Federalist* want “to help get an international federal constitution drafted” (Editor’s Foreword x) and, thus, they explain the benefits of a federal union along Streit’s proposal. Obviously, the footsteps *The New Federalist* is following are quite big, but this is intended because the authors want to prove that the original principles still apply in the 20th century (xii). It also shows that by 1950, Streit and his supporters were quite self-confident. Otherwise, they would not have tried to ‘continue’ one of the most essential writings in American history and, consequently, placed their intended constitutional change in the 20th on equal footing with the processes in the Early Republic.

Before it was published as a book, all the articles of *The New Federalist* could be found in the magazine *Freedom & Union* (see chapter 4.4.9) from October 1946 to February 1949. When these were combined in a book, Streit announces in its foreword that further articles will follow (xiii), but this never happens. An indication of how well-known Streit’s ideas were by then is the fact that John Foster Dulles, who became Secretary of State only three years later, wrote the introduction. He emphasizes the inadequacy of the global political system of the time to deal with the “expanding and hostile unity” – communism – and indicates that federalism like in the U.S. system provides “a possible way for free peoples to gain the added strength needed to meet the severe tests that fate may hold in store for them” (Dulles xv-xvii).

The New Federalist subdivides the provisions of the Illustrative Constitution

²⁰⁷For the discussion on the uncritical assessment of American texts of the Early Republic, see chapter 4.2.

in *Union Now* in 26 chapters and explains all the reasons why the authors think that the realization of the proposal is the best solution to save world peace. Thus, it serves to support the political theory of *Union Now* and might also have been intended to convince critics of the fact that the federal principle of the United States can be applied in the whole world, since it has already been working in the United States. After all, Streit argues that the task of the time is “extending between at least some nations the principles of federal union, [...] [and] beginning at least the nucleus of a world republic” (*New Federalist* 3). This is seen as the only chance for freedom and peace to survive in the world and once enough people can be convinced that they have to give up living independently from each other, the Union can be founded (23). Yet, the allusion to the original *Federalist* probably mostly addressed people in the U.S. because it is *their* Founding Fathers who wrote the original Federalist Papers and whose political beliefs are referred to. Hence, it is much more likely that the reference to these American icons worked for the people in the U.S. than elsewhere in the world because although admired around the world, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay do not have the same iconic status anywhere else.

4.4.8 *Freedom Against Itself* (1954)

The other ‘additional’ book is *Freedom Against Itself*. Its title is a reference to Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech of 1858 (Lincoln). In his acceptance speech of the nomination for the U.S. Senate for the Illinois Republican Party, Lincoln anticipated a conflict within the United States to ultimately settle the dispute on the question of slavery. This was the line along which the United States was divided in his era and his conclusion was the following: “A house divided against itself cannot stand. [...] I do not expect the Union to be *dissolved* – I do not expect the house to *fall* – but I *do* expect it will cease to be divided.” (54-55)²⁰⁸ Lincoln’s drastic prediction came true and the issue of slavery was resolved after the Civil War, so that the ‘house’ no longer was ‘divided’. This also is Streit’s goal, which is why it makes sense to him

²⁰⁸The origin of the metaphor of a house divided can be found the Bible, whose quote were slightly changed by Lincoln: Mark 3:25: “If a house is divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”; Matthew 12:25: “And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand” (*KJV*).

to hint at this metaphor. However, it can only be expected to have been understood in the United States, since Lincoln's speeches are not as well-known in the rest of the world. Yet, Streit either obviously does not realize this or he explicitly mainly wants to address the audience in the United States. As this would have defeated the purpose of founding a worldwide Union, it has to be assumed that the former explanation applies.

To Streit this 'division of the house' resembles the situation of his time: The question of whether "absolute national sovereignty" should structure global politics leaves the free nations divided (against themselves). As this principle was followed in global politics in the past, they formed

associations of governments designed to maintain unlimited national sovereignty – leagues of nations and alliances, from the Wilsonian Covenant through the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*Freedom Against Itself* 5).

This side of the coin is freedom's "dividing power" because all the nations want to remain free from each other and, therefore, are disunited. However, freedom also has a "uniting power" because people come closer together through "the machines its [freedom's] inventiveness produces".²⁰⁹ Consequently, with the existence of freedom and the following 'uniting' processes, the Atlantic community could develop, but this community remains "ungoverned, a prey to anarchy" (2). Resolving this contradiction, then, is the challenge for the free world and it has to face it sooner better than later.

Streit started writing *Freedom Against Itself* in 1942 (xiv), but it took a long time to be finished and published for reasons that remain unclear. One possibility might be that he was hopeful after World War II that the situation after the war would make the Union become ever more likely. Yet, the publication of three books within five years (1949, 1950, 1954) and another one seven years later in 1961, all of them advocating an Atlantic Union, speaks for an increased desperation on the side of the author. He sought to convince people to follow his proposal in different ways and no longer only by re-editing the original of *Union Now*.

²⁰⁹For an explanation why the existence of freedom leads to new inventions, see chapter 6.1.

4.4.9 The Magazine *Freedom & Union* (1946-1978)

In addition to all the books Streit wrote, he was also the editor of the magazine *Freedom & Union*, which was published by Federal Union Inc.,²¹⁰ from October 1946 until summer 1978.²¹¹ The aim – as stated in the first editorial – is to establish a periodical in all “Atlantic countries” dedicated to serving the principles of “liberty & union” evenly throughout the “Atlantic area” and inform the readers on “important facts & trends in this vital field [of universal world government]”. In the end, this should create an “ever deeper sense of community loyalty among the people of all nationalities who practice the same basic principles of individual liberty, a ‘Bill of Rights’ patriotism” (C. K. Streit, “‘On Second Thought’ Oct. 1946” 2).²¹² The title of the magazine obviously was not chosen randomly but emphasizes the important relationship between freedom and union (see p. 133 here).

The real scope and influence of *Freedom & Union* is hard to estimate. In 1949, Streit claims that *Freedom & Union* is published in 51 nations, “including an imposing number of prominent leaders of public opinion in the major democracies” (UN49 267). If this is presumed to be true, it sounds as if the magazine was widely read (at least geographically) and has gained much influence, given the fact that the magazine first was published three years previously. Yet, as Streit also claims that *Union Now* in its first year has 17 editions (F&U054), a number which sounds quite unrealistic (see p. 141 here), it is possible that he exaggerates here as well. Neither the total number of printed issues at the time nor the 51 nations are listed anywhere, so the numbers cannot be verified. However, in 1965, the “Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation”²¹³ is first printed in the magazine. According to these

²¹⁰For information on Federal Union Inc., see chapter 7.1.1.

²¹¹Before *Freedom & Union* was founded, a so-called *Union Now Bulletin* first was published in March 1939 by Melvin Ryder and Thomas Streit, Clarence’s brother (F&U058 13). It got renamed to *Federal Union World* in 1940 and appeared until August 1942 and again from May 1943 as a “mere house organ” (F&U117). I decided to exclude it from my analysis for two reasons: Clarence Streit was not the editor of this bulletin, which means that he did not have the main responsibility for this monthly. Furthermore, neither the *Union Now Bulletin* nor *Federal Union World* had a large audience, since it only became a “general magazine” (F&U117) that could reach more people than just House members under the name of *Freedom & Union*.

²¹²Once more, this quote can be expected to mainly have addressed people in the United States because the American Bill of Rights do not have the same status in the cultural memory of other parts of the world. For more information, see chapter 4.2.

²¹³The “Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation” is required by the USPS annually to confirm both ownership and management information as well as to ensure that circulation requirements for periodicals (in the case of *Freedom & Union*) are met. The respective “Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation” is published several times in *Freedom & Union* at the end of the year (F&U069; F&U093; F&U101; F&U107; F&U118; F&U136; F&U140).

statements, the total distribution of *Freedom & Union* was the following:

Date	Total Number of Copies Distributed
September 28, 1965	8,500
November 21, 1967	7,500
September 30, 1968	8,000
September 30, 1969	8,300
October 28, 1971	7,938
October 1, 1973	7,400
September 27, 1974	6,900

These figures appear to be very low. Even though libraries also subscribed to the magazine,²¹⁴ which means that a lot of people possibly could have read one issue, not too many individual people can have registered for and read *Freedom & Union* around the world. Hence, it can be assumed that the impact of *Freedom & Union* was relatively scarce at least at the end of the magazine's publication period because of an ever lower number of issues published each year and because the numbers of subscribers in general were not high.

Apart from (mostly Streit's) interpretations of the current world political situation,²¹⁵ the magazine was used to announce and advertise new book publications by Streit and other authors who had similar ideas. These sometimes were published as serials (partly in condensed form) before the actual publication.²¹⁶ All the reports are shaped by the idea of a "rising tide". The "Rising Tide" actually became the

²¹⁴Streit explicitly mentions libraries in a notice to subscribers in 1977 (*F&U*142). However, he does not say which libraries from which nations subscribed.

²¹⁵There are many articles in *Freedom & Union* for which no author is named. However, it can be assumed that these had to be in accordance with the editors if they were not even written by Streit himself.

²¹⁶Three examples may suffice here: *Peace by Oceanic Union*, a book by Michel Debré (then French Prime Minister) and Emmanuel Monick with the original title *Demain la Paix*, which was translated by Clarence Streit's wife Jeanne Defrance, was published from July-August 1959 until April 1960 (Debré and Monick, "National Sovereignty – an Obsolete Dogma"; "Why Continental Unions Lead to War"; "Empires Lead to Nationalism"; "Oceans Unite Men"; "Oceanic Community No. I"; "How Ocean Unions Would Meet Need"; "Trade and Currency Questions"; "The Oceanic Solution"; "Let the Atlantic Peoples Unite"). *The Anglo-American Predicament* by British historian H.C. Allen was published from July-August 1961 until May 1964 with several breaks in between (Allen, "Perils to Liberty"; "Britain, the Commonwealth, the U.S. and European Union"; "The British Dilemma"; "Between Europe and the U.S."; "To Britons"; "Atlantic Union Would Solve Britain's Economic Problems"; "The Challenge to America"; "The Threat from Red China"; "Free Trade Advantages"; "The American Spirit"; "How Atlantic Union Would Benefit Europe";

title of a series in *Freedom & Union*, which wanted to show all the ongoing steps in favor of a future world government (e.g. *F&U049*; *F&U073*). However, the main focus of these is short quotes by people that support Streit's vision of an Atlantic Union and on the development of organizations, such as Federal Union Inc., the Atlantic Union Committee, and the International Movement for Atlantic Union (see chapter 7.1). Although the goal of the magazine also is to present conflicting points of view from the agenda of *Union Now*, there are very few of these. This is achieved at least rudimentarily for the topic of the resolutions, which were introduced in Congress to start an Atlantic constitutional convention, and the discussions thereof (see chapter 7.3). Yet, although such reports are published, they mainly are used to point out the fact that even though people are of different opinions, they either have not (yet) understood the benefits of an Atlantic Union or their arguments are partly taken up and levered out in the next resolution that is introduced in Congress.

In addition to this, seemingly supporting speeches by (mostly) politicians around the world are published who fostered the idea of transnational cooperation and/or association. Presumably, these should provide an indicator for the readers that 'union movements' are happening around the world and that these are supported by not only private individuals but also people in powerful positions all over the world. Yet, these speeches and statements quite often are over-interpreted by the editors, meaning that as soon as the slightest hint is dropped that some kind of closer collaboration or any union is an eventual goal, the speaker is celebrated as a supporter of Streit's cause. One prominent example is the interpretation of Eisenhower's speeches. On December 2, 1953 he, for instance, stated the following as President of the United States:

Unity among free nations is our only hope for survival in the face of world-wide Soviet conspiracy backed by the weight of Soviet military power. [...] We know that the future of freedom depends on unity of action among the free peoples.

"Atlantic Union Is Preferable"). In the 1970s, when 'new content' in *Freedom & Union* became scarce except for long reports on the Atlantic resolutions in Congress, Aurelio Peccei's book *Chasm Ahead* was published from April 1970 until June-July 1971. Peccei founded the Club of Rome from 1968 together with Alexander King and became its first president. The publication of the excerpts of his book ends with the remark "*to be concluded*", but this never happens (Peccei, "'Chasm' Apr. 1970"; "'Chasm' May 1970"; "'Chasm' June 1970"; "'Chasm' July-Aug. 1970"; "'Chasm' Sept. 1970"; "'Chasm' Oct. 1970"; "'Chasm' Apr. 1971"; "'Chasm' May 1971"; "'Chasm' June-July 1971").

This was quoted later by Senator James Murray in the Senate Committee during the discussion on the resolution in 1955 (*F&U*030 9, see p. 305 here). It should prove to the readers of the magazine that both Eisenhower and Murray support Streit's Atlantic Union to the same extent even though this was not really the case. Another interesting example in this context is the re-print of Jean Monnet's full speech at the Dartmouth College Commencement on June 11, 1961 (Monnet). Monnet calls for a closer union between the United States and the parts of Europe which have already been united by the Rome Treaty. This union should encompass common institutions, which are not clearly specified, but his demand is interpreted by the editors as the plea for an Atlantic Union along Streit's proposal, although it is not mentioned at all in the speech and Jean Monnet fought hard for European, not Atlantic, unification.²¹⁷ By introducing Jean Monnet as "Mr. Europe" the editors of *Freedom & Union* also clearly address the American audience as Monnet can be assumed to be well-known in Europe at the time. Consequently, the impression is conveyed to the Americans that people in Europe, who apparently seem to trust Monnet with their political unification and the future of their continent, support an Atlantic Union. This way, Americans should be convinced that Europeans want to unite with them as well, and European readers of *Freedom & Union* get the impression that politicians of high rank and prestige in Europe have the same vision of the future as they themselves have. This means is also used to convey the impression until the very last issue that the authors have not given up hope for an Atlantic Union, they are convinced that a constitutional convention would be called, and the Union would be founded soon.

Another endeavor of the magazine also was to arouse interest in Congressional action in favor of the founding of an Atlantic Union. When Senator Estes Kefauver first introduces a resolution in Congress in 1949 with the aim of founding the Union in the long run, the process is also reported at length in the magazine – like all the following resolutions with the same intention. All in all, 10 resolutions are introduced (see chapter 7.3) and especially from 1965 onward, the coverage of it

²¹⁷Streit from the beginning criticizes both the idea of leaving "Europe to the Europeans" and the idea of leaving peace and freedom also of the U.S. to the Europeans alone. This is not possible as Europe and the United States are too interconnected and trusting the Europeans alone with the preservation of peace "would still be unworthy of us [the Americans]." (*UN*39 23)

takes up more and more space in *Freedom & Union*, in the case of Vol. 28, No. 2-3 (March-June 1973) even the whole issue. This might have resulted from the fact that not much else in the field of world government was happening at the time and the reports on the resolutions still convey the impression that something is developing in the ‘right’ direction.

In the 1970s, the magazine’s editors faced many difficulties like illnesses, shortening of staff, or financial problems, so that fewer and mostly shorter issues are published and problems are admitted.²¹⁸ Additionally, the re-publication of earlier articles is intensified – under the pretext of proving that Streit’s predictions of world politics were correct²¹⁹ – so that there is fewer and fewer *new* content in the single issues. This all together can be interpreted as a sign of an increasing insignificance of the whole movement around Streit. In the last issue of 1978, it is announced that he, at the age of 82, gives up his post as chairman and chief executive officer of Federal Union Inc. and, consequently, also as editor of *Freedom & Union*; his successor as publisher of the magazine is Dr. Miller Upton (“Foreword” 1; Chapman). Although it is claimed that the organization has thus “recently [been] strengthened” and Streit still hopes that *Freedom & Union* will come back to a regular schedule soon (*F&U*143), the issue of Summer 1978 is the last one to be published.²²⁰

5 A New Anglo-American Union?

Although Streit repeatedly states that the Union, its provisions, and its culture, firstly, must not be dominated by English-speaking peoples and, secondly, not by

²¹⁸The first notice that *Freedom & Union* has to be postponed appears in the November-December issue of 1970 (*F&U*111). Such a remark is repeated in nearly every single issue until October 1972 (C. K. Streit, “Please Excuse Delay”), but after that, the magazine no longer appears monthly and regularly but is first officially reduced to a bi-monthly in November 1972 (*F&U*133) – something which had already been the case for some time by then – and finally to a quarterly in 1974 (*F&U*139). However, not even this could be upheld as there is no issue between September 1974 and January 1976. After that, only three further issues follow: April-June 1976, January-March 1977 and Summer 1978.

²¹⁹ One example is the monetary crisis of 1967, of which *Freedom & Union* has warned since 1963 (C. K. Streit, “Disaster by Delusion” 3). However, such crises happened repeatedly in history, so the ‘warning’ or ‘prediction’ would have come true at some point anyway.

²²⁰There are ‘newer’ issues of a magazine called *Freedom & Union*, but these are not included here; see chapter 7.1.1, p. 261 here.

the English-speaking nations or the United States in particular (*UN39* 106-07) , the reader quickly gets the impression that this would in fact be the result if the Union was founded.²²¹ One could even go so far to say that this is Streit's actual idea, but it was supposed to be concealed behind the impression that the ultimate goal is a worldwide Union. If all of Streit's writings are taken into account, several reasons hint in this direction.

The most obvious indication is the composition of the founders. If the fifteen nations of the 'original' nucleus are listed, it is striking that seven out of them are English-speaking and, thus, form the majority in the nucleus – numerically as well as in terms of population. This would also translate into a majority in both houses of Congress. Accordingly, it is obvious that nothing – neither at the planned convention nor after the Union is founded – could be decided against any common vote of the English-speaking nations since they would have a very strong voice in shaping the Union's constitution and its policies.

Furthermore, Streit never makes a proposal in which the English-speaking nations would *not* dominate the Union. They would control at least the House of Deputies with the majority of representatives because of their large populations and, except in the case of *Freedom's Frontier*,²²² also have the majority of seats in the Senate of the Union. Streit presents two proposals of how to allocate the delegates for the House of Deputies: He wants either “one deputy for every half million or million citizens” (187). In the Illustrative Constitution, he opts for the latter. These numbers are presented here. In the edition of 1939, the English-speaking nations have 198 out of 277 Deputies (71.48%) and 22 out of 42 Senators (52.38%), with the U.S. alone holding 126 Deputies (45.49%) and 10 Senators (23.81%) (248). Thus, if the English-speaking delegates work together, no decision can be made without them or at least not without the approval of the American ones. The only other significantly higher number of seats for non-English-speaking nations is given to France

²²¹Ira Straus also mentions that Streit never intended an English-speaking dominance and that a mere English-speaking Union never was Streit's his idea (“Atlantic Federalism” 315). However, as he was Streit's successor as executive director of Federal Union Inc. (see chapter 7.1.1) and also advocated the same proposal, this defense is quite natural. Nevertheless, it is striking that even in 1999, Straus emphasizes this point so strongly.

²²²In *Freedom's Frontier*, only three English-speaking nations are included, which would not give them a majority in the Senate. However, this is not reflected in the Illustrative Constitution of this edition (*Freedom's Frontier* 292), which is why this exception is not taken into account here.

with 42 Deputies (15.16%) and 4 Senators, which amounts to 9.52% (187-88, 248). As the Senate principle of having mostly two Senators per state does not change (only alterations: 4 are allocated to France and Britain each, 8 to the United States), it is interesting to take a look at the new distribution of Deputies Streit proposes in the following editions of *Union Now*. All of them except for *Union Now With Britain* give 201 of 280 Deputies to the English-speaking nations (71.79%) as the number of delegates for the United States is raised from 126 to 129 in 1940 (*UN40* 142-43, 207). Accordingly, the overall dominance of the English-speaking peoples in both houses is increased even more. During World War II, Streit introduces a (seemingly) slight change of the allocation of seats: The representation in the House of Deputies should be based on the “*voting* population instead of the whole population” (*UN43* 249). Although he never explains the consequences of this change, it can be assumed that the representation of the U.S. or all the English-speaking nations would be even stronger.²²³ In many founding states women, for example, were not yet allowed to vote.²²⁴ This would lead to an even weaker representation of those states both in Senate and House because the number of Senators as well as Deputies would no longer be determined by the whole population but only by half of it (or even less) in several states.²²⁵

Union Now With Britain is a special case: Streit allocates 203 and 24 seats for Deputies and Senators among the English-speaking nations and he again adds two new Deputies and Senators each only to the U.S. delegation (131 and 10; 64.53% and 41.67%). This means that the U.S. gets the majority of seats in the House of Deputies (131 of 203), and the British Commonwealth gets the majority of Senators (14 of 24) (*UN41* 61). If the Union was constituted with the fifteen founders again, this distribution would add up to 282 Deputies and there is a total of 42 Senators (219).²²⁶ The result is quite interesting and telling: Whereas there are 203

²²³At this point, it is unclear whether Streit counts non-white Americans among the voting population in the United States in 1943. After all, especially black people *de facto* banned from voting due to the requirement of poll taxes at the time.

²²⁴By 1943 these were Belgium (until 1948), France (until 1944), Switzerland (until 1971).

²²⁵The fact that most of the population in the Union of South Africa is black and was not eligible to vote at the time is not relevant for this argument as Streit had not included them in his counting in the first place (*UN39* 95), although he mentions this circumstance (*UN40* 142). This clearly racist and imperialist way of thinking will be topic of chapter 8.

²²⁶It is unclear why Streit returns to the number of 129 American Deputies and 8 Senators only two years later in the wartime edition of 1943.

English-speaking Deputies (71.99%) and 24 Senators (57.14%), the total numbers of the other eight states together are 79 (28.01%) and 18 (42.86%), respectively. Thus, although many new nations become members, their voice is comparatively weak in contrast to the seven English-speaking members. This further adds to the proposition that it is *not* Streit's intention to give full and equal representation to all people in the world but that the hegemony of the English-speaking peoples, the American ones in particular, should be secured for the future. The fact that he does not even adapt the allocation of seats in both houses in *Freedom's Frontier* to the new circumstances (see footnote 222) also indicates, firstly, that the proposal of 1961 is a compromise for him and, secondly, that what he actually wants is to secure an English-speaking hegemony in the world. The only change that is briefly discussed is that although 'only' the United States, Canada, and the UK are English-speaking members of the nucleus in *Freedom's Frontier*, Streit still considers it as important that they still form the majority of people in the nucleus (*Freedom's Frontier* 35), which results in a majority of seats in the House of Deputies.

Additionally, the English-speaking nations are treated as one entity. As has been described above, the Illustrative Constitution is very similar – in most points the same – to the U.S. Constitution. Yet, Streit claims that the American political system, firstly, derives from the British one (*UN41* 175; *Freedom's Frontier* 80-81)²²⁷ and, secondly, the way the Union should be founded represents both a British ("gradualist") approach as well as an American one of founding a new state in one event like in the case of the United States ("Atlantic Union Makes Twofold Alliance"). Thus, the U.S. political system can be considered both British and American. Furthermore, Britain itself formed a union with Scotland in 1707 (*Freedom's Frontier* 80) and encouraged Canada, Australia, and South Africa to become unions themselves. Hence, according to Streit, it has "done far more to spread federal union around the world than we Americans have (except by the power of successful example)" (81).²²⁸ Accordingly, the British – and also the former domin-

²²⁷The argument is that British colonials – the later Americans – 'invented' the system of federal union, but maintained the ideas of representative government, the jury trial, and common law (*UN41* 175).

²²⁸For Streit this is proven by the fact that "federal union has increasingly become Britain's ready remedy for many kinds of political problems", for example, in the "densely populated multilingual sub-continent of India, the Malayan peninsula or the far-scattered islands of the British West

ions – do not have to adapt as much to a federal union because they already have a similar political system and are convinced of its benefits (*UN41* 175).²²⁹ Consequently, it appears only logical to Streit that Britons in favor of a world government like to organize international politics in a federal union. This discursive representation constructs an imagined community among the English-speaking nations in the aspect of politics within all the other founding nations of the Union of the Free. After all, only the English-speaking ones seem to ‘naturally’ pursue the goal of a federal union. They are the ‘obvious’ members of the Union which do not need to be convinced because the importance of freedom and the political realization in a union is ‘logical’ to them. Additionally, they also all share the same parliamentary tradition. As the other nations do not have this tradition, they cannot become a member of this specific community *before* the Union is founded. Still, the official goal supposedly is to construct an (imagined) community among *all* the members of the Union of the Free – however only on the principles of the ‘original’ imagined community of the English-speaking peoples.²³⁰

Indies”. Consequently, there were already ten federal unions in the British Empire by 1961 and seven out of eleven Commonwealth member also were federations (*Freedom’s Frontier* 81).

²²⁹Streit sees additional proof of the fact that the British *want* to found a larger federal union in Churchill’s offer to France of a union in 1940 to defeat Hitler together. This is something for which Streit praises Churchill repeatedly (*UN41* 175; *New Federalist* 5; *Freedom Against Itself* 104; *Freedom’s Frontier* 20, 86). In June 1940, the defeat of France by Germany was very close. In this emergency situation, Winston Churchill, then new British Prime Minister, made an offer to France of a Franco-British union on June 14, 1940 to save France. The offer included the idea of “*one Franco-British nation*, with common citizenship, a *united Parliament*, joint organs of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and economic policy, a single war cabinet with unified command over British and French armed forces, and shared responsibility for war debts and reconstruction” (Baratta, *World Federation I* 86). However, France already sought terms for an armistice with Germany the following day. Still, General Charles de Gaulle revised Churchill’s offer a bit and sent it back to the British cabinet. In the end, the French council did not agree to the offer for fear of being reduced to a British dominion or worries that the British would take the French colonial Empire (87-89). Nevertheless, for Streit, Churchill’s offer displays that in emergency situations, a union between several states might save from defeat. Furthermore, it is proof for him that the idea of a union of several states already exists and is accepted among many high-ranking politicians at the time. Accordingly, not only does Streit praise this attempt of a union in his books, but several articles in *Freedom & Union* do the same: Géraud; C. K. Streit, “Who Controls Atlantic Power?” 2; C. K. Streit, “What Is Reasonable” 3; C. K. Streit, “It Can Be Done” 1; C. K. Streit, “Atlantic Defense Problems” 24; C. K. Streit, “De Gaulle Urged Federal Union”; R. Aron; *F&U*099; *F&U*097. It is even claimed that Streit’s proposal *Union Now* inspired Churchill’s proposal (*F&U*098), although this most likely overestimates the book’s impact.

²³⁰Interestingly enough, Streit never uses Switzerland as one of the best examples to secure freedom, although it is praised in several occasions. Switzerland is a federation as well and, if Streit’s argument is followed, thus, automatically guarantees freedoms for its citizens. Therefore, it could have fit into the group of ‘natural’ members equally well. As Streit does not mention this connection at all, it once more reinforces the notion that either other nations and their experiences

Of course, if the argument is made that Streit actually wants a mere English-speaking Union or at least secure a clear dominance of those nations for the future, *Union Now With Britain* as a whole has to get special attention because this would have realized this idea exactly. Although it is supposed to be an emergency proposal, it has been taken more seriously than Streit expected – how else can the repeated explanations of its provisional character in all the following editions be understood? Apparently, the author had to face much criticism from his opponents but also his supporters.²³¹ Such criticism seems logical as Streit states in both previous editions that a mere English-speaking Union would not be strong enough and would give an “offensive air of exclusivity” (*UN39* 105; *UN40* 77; see also p. 144 here). By naming the seven English-speaking democracies the “remaining democracies” and the “great core and body of the original nucleus of fifteen” (*UN41* 14), Streit seems to think differently in 1941: He regards the English-speaking nations as the most important ones within the nucleus. Additionally, he indirectly denies that there could be other democracies in the world *at all* at the time because he ignores that other democracies indeed are neither occupied nor defeated by 1941. This impression cannot even be concealed when Streit emphasizes that democracies “of other languages” and European democracies, which throw off their dictatorial occupiers, should be admitted as soon as possible on the same conditions as the founding nations (28-29).²³² Yet, to him, the anticipated inclusion of the “democracies of other languages” (28) at a later time is a standing token that the government of the Union is based on the principle of freedom and equality for *all* citizens (see also *UN39* 107). Nevertheless, as he elaborates this so explicitly, he must have taken the criticism seriously that there actually *is* an English-speaking dominance in the Union. Interestingly enough, Streit continues by stating that the inclusion of those “smaller nations” is not vital if they do not want to join (*UN40* 78). This completely contradicts the previous argument. On the one hand, this is another indication that he does not regard the

are not seen as that important to the Union as the English-speaking ones or that what he really wants is an Anglo-American or English-speaking Union.

²³¹Criticism by his supporters became evident in 1941, when Federal Union Inc., Streit’s main supporting organization, split up and the World Federalists emerged from this break (see chapter 7.1.1, p. 255 here).

²³²The fact that Sweden and Switzerland indeed could have been included in *Union Now With Britain* from the beginning has already been discussed in footnote 179.

“smaller nations” as important for the founding of the Union and, on the other hand, this once more solidifies the impression that a dominance of the bigger nations over smaller ones – in this case: the dominance of the English-speaking peoples over the rest of the world – seems ‘natural’ to him.

In *Freedom’s Frontier*, the English-speaking nations numerically are in the minority and ‘only’ include the U.S., Canada and Britain. Yet, this impression can be confronted with two arguments: First of all, although this new circumstance would have needed a new allocation of seats in both houses, Streit sticks to the original proposal of the books before and does not adapt the Illustrative Constitution at this point. Although he states that the ‘original fifteen’ are the ideal group for him, it would have been more honest to at least note that a new Illustrative Constitution would be needed if his proposal was followed. This would have shown the new distribution of power more clearly and might have cleared up doubts about an English-speaking hegemony in the Union, at least for some people. Secondly, Streit mentions that he first would like to admit Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, and “some of the stabler Latin American Republics”, although he does not specify them any further (*Freedom’s Frontier* 36). If this list is analyzed, the importance and self-evidence that English-speaking nations, above all, have to belong to the Union as soon as possible become obvious again: Only Austria, Switzerland, and the Latin American Republics are not English-speaking, whereas all the others broadly belong to the sphere of influence of either Britain or the United States.²³³ The inclusion of those nations would have once more increased the hegemony of the English-speaking nations as a whole.

Another important factor why the impression of an intentional English-speaking dominance comes up is that, although the Union of the Free is open to all nations in the world once they meet the prerequisites for admission, most non-English-speaking nations can only *join* but not be a member from the beginning. This limits their influence on the overall structure of the Union and further strengthens the dominant position of the English-speaking nations, in particular of the United States. Addi-

²³³The proposed inclusion of the Philippines even is used as a standing token for the fact that the Union is not ‘racially’ constricted (*New Federalist* 47). This additional comment might have been another form to take up criticism of his proposal (see also footnote 189).

tionally, apart from the short mentioning of the Philippines as a potential member in the editions of 1949 and 1961, Streit does not include any Asian nations and nearly completely neglects African ones. Even though South Africa is included in most proposals, the only reason for this is that it is a British dominion and the non-white part of the population – the broad majority – was not eligible to vote at the time. Accordingly, they could neither influence South Africa’s politics nor the constitution of the Union as long as their franchise was restricted. There are two possible explanations for this absence of Asian and African nations in the nucleus and both are closely associated with imperialist ways of thinking. First of all, Streit wants to unite those democracies, which have already had a leading position in the world. These are mostly the old imperial powers. He argues that they have enough power and experience to found the Union, but it can also be read as a way to solidify their influence on world politics and to prevent any future interference. Yet, the English-speaking democracies are perceived as the ‘leading’ ones by Streit.²³⁴ Accordingly, their prime influence on the Union is strengthened and also regarded as ‘just’ by Streit at the time. The second explanation is that the Union should be an Atlantic one, with ‘Atlantic’ being used as a synonym to ‘western’. Streit regards the nations which are included in this group as ‘best qualified’ to set up a world government. However, as will be elaborated later (chapter 6.5, p. 239), Streit’s understanding of Atlantic culture or ‘the West’ is shaped by the culture of Britain and the United States. Accordingly, setting up an Atlantic Union again would enshrine their political, cultural, economic, and also military ideas in the world. However, at no point does Streit even question whether better ideas can come from other parts of the world than from the Atlantic or English-speaking ones, as can most evidently be seen in the Illustrative Constitution. He argues that the whole world would profit from the ‘English-speaking’ federal union system without even mentioning that it would further intensify the influence of the English-speaking nations in the world.

Streit also has concrete proposals for the leading personalities in the Union: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Both of them are the “greatest living champions of democracy” and there could not be the “slightest doubt that both these men would be called on to continue to play the outstanding roles in the new

²³⁴See chapter 8.

Union government” (UN41 42). As *Union Now With Britain* only includes English-speaking nations, the leading figures would have to come from there. Still, the automatism of these suggestions is striking. Even when Streit talks about a future extended Union, both politicians still are seen as natural Board members for the Union and other recommendations are vaguer because he proposes that a “third member *might* be Mackenzie King” or it “*might* be de Valera” and “there would be good arguments in favor of others, – of, say, *an* Australian, or *a* Frenchman, or *a* German” (44; emphasis added). By not naming other ‘natural’ leaders and either remaining vague or using the conjunctive form in the suggestion, Streit indirectly says that there is no better alternative to the American President and the British Prime Minister as most important Board members of the Union. Due to his experience as *New York Times* correspondent in Geneva and Basle alone, Streit should have been able to name several able politicians who could have fulfilled this role at the time. In *Freedom’s Frontier*, only Churchill is still recommended as the best possible leader – Roosevelt was dead by the time, after all – (*Freedom’s Frontier* 83), which once more gives the impression that people from the U.S. and Britain are best-suited for this job and ‘naturally’ respected all over the world. Streit even reflects and wonders why Churchill as a man of such high prestige and leading power has not yet “urged that the United Kingdom and the United States lead in uniting the Atlantic community by [...] federal principles”, which would still have been possible after Roosevelt’s death that left Churchill “the one towering statesman and hero of Atlantica” (83). Hence, although new possible leaders of an Atlantic federation might have emerged, Streit sticks to his original ‘ideal’ candidate, who happens to be Anglo-American and was British Prime Minister in the past. Other *ideal* candidates except for Roosevelt and Churchill are never mentioned, though.

Even if Streit might have proposed a common leadership of Britain and the United States, there are several indications that the U.S. among those two ‘partners’ is the more important one. Firstly, it speaks volumes that the Illustrative Constitution is so similar to the U.S. Constitution, although Streit argues that several important elements from Canada, Britain, and Switzerland are added (see chapter 4.3). This demonstrates how very much he is convinced of the fact that the political

system of the U.S. is so well-balanced that only slight alterations can improve it. Secondly, Streit asserts that it is only the United States which can rightfully start the Union because it has the most experience with federal government and is strong enough to do so (see also p. 124 here) – in contrast to all the other nations in the world. Thirdly, in *Union Now With Britain*, there is a passage, which is quite telling:

We Americans now have even less control over what the British government will do tomorrow than the British government had over the French government in the June debacle. [...] Yet, should the British government be forced to surrender its fleet to Hitler, we would be inextricably and horribly entangled in the result. (*UN41* 105)

What Streit does here is twofold: On the one hand, he claims that Britain and the United States are so closely linked that a surrender of the British would severely affect both of them. As this is not explained any further, it must seem natural to Streit that this circumstance is understood automatically. On the other hand – and this is decisive here – he expects American *control* over British politics or military strategy and, consequently, he establishes a hierarchy between both states. Having been a journalist, he must have been aware of the power of words and it is, thus, very surprising that he uses a word as harsh as “control” for what he demands for the U.S. over Britain. This could not even be weakened when he later continues that the Americans and the Europeans “*share* the responsibility for the condition all mankind” (105; emphasis added).²³⁵

There is another factor which adds to the idea that Streit wants the U.S. to have control over Britain or at least be the leading part of the two: He argues that a Union between both has to be founded and not some kind of “Inter-Allied Council” or a league system because, within both of these structures, the United States would only have one vote out of seven, despite having the largest population of all seven English-speaking nations. This is ever more pressing for him because, with Britain being the ‘head’ of the Commonwealth, he imagines that it can influence the other members’ policies to a great extent (60). This would mean that Britain could outvote the U.S. in any decision as long as the same amount of votes was al-

²³⁵ Apparently, Streit here even believes that the U.S. and the Europeans indeed *are* responsible for the rest of humankind. This once more puts them into a hierarchically higher position and displays a ‘western-only’ perspective.

located to each English-speaking nation. Being an American, he naturally opposes this possibility, however, without considering that the opposite argument can be used on the British side; they would certainly also not want to be “controlled” by the Americans, no matter how much more democratic the modus might have been.

This chapter has shown that despite the fact that the Union should be open to all the world and should *not* only be founded by English-speaking nations (with the exception of *Union Now with Britain*), Streit cannot fully conceal his actual aim of founding a new world order based on what he calls Atlantic principles. However, as has been stated here already, ‘Atlantic’ is mostly used as a synonym to ‘western’ and the meaning of ‘western’ is mainly defined by Anglo-American (or only American) ideas. This means that, to Streit, Anglo-American ideas and ideals actually are universal and he, thus, tries to construct an imagined community of all the ‘western’ world by widening the original Anglo-American community to other so-called Atlantic nations. This should facilitate the founding of a modern transnational nation which Streit calls the Atlantic Union, but whose “great core and body” (14) lies in the English-speaking world. In essence, this is very similar to the Anglotopian proposals of the contributors discussed for phase I here. Therefore, I claim that what originally was an Anglo-Saxon discourse which constructed the idea that the *Anglo-Saxons* should control the world turned into what I call an Atlantic discourse that demands the same for the *Atlantic* world. Yet, it has always to be remembered that the *principles* of this discourse are nearly only shaped by the English-speaking, in particular by the Anglo-American world. Consequently, the Anglo-Saxon discourse and the Atlantic discourse can be expected to bear a lot of similarities in their discursive strategies and elements. In some cases the kind of language that was used might have changed, but the resulting discursive regime should be partly the same or at least very much alike. Hence, I will take a look at the discursive elements that are applied by Streit to construct an Atlantic imagined community and to argue why the respective nations should become founders of the Union. In a second step, I will investigate if these actually mostly apply to the English-speaking or Anglo-American nations only. This would then be proof of the assumption that the original Anglo-Saxon discourse was transformed into a discourse that should

be cloaked under the name of Atlantic discourse to conceal the real intention of founding a new world order based on the – formerly called – Anglo-Saxon nations.

6 Reasons for a Union of the Respective Fifteen Nations

6.1 Freedom

First and foremost, the respective nations needed to be free and share the same concept of freedom (*UN39* 93) because Streit is convinced that freedom is the prerequisite for peace (*UN49* 269).²³⁶ Therefore, Streit aims at constructing an imagined community among what he perceives as the freest nations in the world. After the war, he gives a more precise definition of this concept: The Americans should unite with those nations “who have contributed as much to the freedom of Americans as Americans have contributed to theirs” (*UN49* 281). So, a simple ‘sharing’ of a vague concept is not enough, but the nations should have contributed to the definition of freedom for years and, thus, reciprocally influenced each other. Furthermore, Streit claims that the freest nations are the least aggressive and most productive at the same time. In fact, they are not only the least aggressive, but the system of individual freedom is the best safeguard against the use of governmental power (275). Streit is convinced that the free people of Atlantica²³⁷ are not only most productive in a material way but also their thoughts. Nearly all “ideas, ideals and institutions” which govern the world have their origin in Atlantica (*Freedom’s Frontier* 173). The most important ones of them are the principles of individual and national freedom and the “federal way to combine individual and national freedom to the advantage of both and save them from the twin dangers of anarchy and tyranny” (17, 173-75). Thus, he constructs the image of an in-group of superior, free nations that fights the out-group of inferior, ‘tyrannic’ nations. Yet, he does not claim any superiority of the free *people* of Atlantica but only of their *principles*.²³⁸ Accordingly, it is

²³⁶See also *Freedom Against Itself* 82, 118-19.

²³⁷For an explanation of the term Atlantica, see p. 234 here.

²³⁸See also *New Federalist* 38. For further discussion of the productive power of the free in terms of inventions, see chapter 6.4, p. 218 here.

easier “to overawe dictatorship and speed recovery soon enough to eliminate present dangers” if one puts more power into the hands of the “freest fraction of mankind” (UN49 275).

The people in the respective nations have to be free in many ways: They must have the “same minimum guarantees for freedom to the individual, whether called the Bill of Rights, the Rights of Man, or *les Droits de l’Homme*” (UN40 67).²³⁹ This guarantee together with the voluntary – that is, free – decision to enter the Union is the most important condition for joining the Union of the Free, as the name of the new polity already suggests (UN41 183).²⁴⁰ Other freedoms, although already included in the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, are emphasized again and again: the freedoms of speech, press, association, conscience (see also *New Federalist* 38), and religion (UN41 31).²⁴¹ The importance and interpretation of freedom are summed up by a statement which emphasizes Streit’s firm belief in Locke’s political thought: All nations have to “share the same desire to protect the individual from the mass, and assure him the utmost possible liberty within the limits that the liberty of other individuals allows” (UN39 91).

In addition to a Bill of Rights or similar statute, the vast amount of liberties of the citizens has, furthermore, to be secured in all states by “the same broad lines of free representative government” (91). This makes a certain variation of representative government possible – be it, for example, a presidential or a parliamentary system – but other, non-free forms of government remain excluded. It is important to highlight that the concept of state is the same in all the founding states – a state which first and foremost secures freedom.²⁴² In *Union Now With Britain*, Streit

²³⁹The Union’s Rights of Man contain all the citizens’ rights they have already had before and each nation can still add more rights to the citizens’ rights (25). However, these minimum guarantees have to be protected at all costs (33).

²⁴⁰Because of the necessity of a *voluntary* decision of new members to join the Union, Streit regards himself as protected against accusations of imperialism. He defends himself by saying that the allegation of imperialism is unfounded as the Union’s ruling is not against the will of the people but a consequence of their free decision (“Answering Questions Nov. 1960”). For the discussion on imperialism in *Union Now*, see chapter 8.2.

²⁴¹In *Union Now With Britain* Streit for the first time introduces a possible adaption to the ‘Rights of Man’: “freedom from both overwork and unemployment” (UN41 215). This is subsequently included in the editions of 1943 and 1949 (UN43 249; UN49 283) and displays a widening understanding of what belongs to the field of ‘standard of living’.

²⁴²Streit summarizes the most important parts of the “common concept of state” as follows: The individual is seen as an equal unit in a free representative government with the same minimum guarantees for freedom to the individual. There has to be freedom of speech, press, association, and

even argues that those free principles “made Britain and America”, which means that those two nations and their forms of government are a synonym of the principle of freedom itself. This is supported by his vision to build the Union mainly upon British and American principles: representative government and federal union – both of which he claims are only possible *because* of the existing freedoms in the nations (*UN41* 50). When Streit explains his idea for a constitution of the Union of the Free he repeatedly points out that the union principle – which means making it possible for several free states to live together freely and peacefully – is “nothing new, strange, untried, nothing utopian, mystic” (*UN39* 30) and that it works “not only in the United States [...] but in Canada between the British and French, in the Union of South Africa between the Boers and the British, in Switzerland among German, French and Italian cantons in the heart of Europe” (*UN41* 12).²⁴³ By including not only the United States, Canada, and Britain in this enumeration, Streit creates an imagined community of all the nations that adhere to this union principle as the basis of their political structure. This imagined community can then be a good starting point for the Union. In fact, Streit is convinced that the freest nations in the world need the Union more than any other nation as this is the only way to secure their freedom in the future (*UN39* 31; *Freedom Against Itself* 87).²⁴⁴ Naturally, giving up the freedom which has already been gained by them would be regarded as a great failure or a step backward. Thus, the aim is to establish a “decisive *imbalance of power on the side of freedom* as the basis for peace during the long transition period from present world conditions to an eventual universal world government” (*UN49* 262; emphasis added; see also 275) to make “more freedom of every kind [possible] for our individual selves” (*UN39* 166). This can only be fully realized by founding the Union.

conscience together with the supremacy of civil power. Furthermore, law is made by the common free consent of men equal before it with the desire to protect the individual from the mass, so that everyone can enjoy the “utmost possible liberty within the limits that the liberty of other individuals allows” (*UN39* 91). The overall idea is that if all citizens of the several member states are equal citizens in the Union, all of them have more liberty (*New Federalist* 27, 49; C. K. Streit, “Answering Questions Nov. 1960”).

²⁴³See also *UN39* 4. The fact that the concept of a federal democratic union is not a new idea is again strongly emphasized by Streit when he introduces Freedom’s Frontier in his editorial of April 1961 in *Freedom & Union* (“‘Union Now’ in 1939”) but also in *Freedom & Union* itself (e.g. “U.S. Revolution”).

²⁴⁴See p. 133 here for this connection.

However, although Streit theoretically allows all free nations into the Union, their constitutions and, therefore, also the way those nations secure their freedom, have to be adapted to the American federal union – at least on the level of the ‘transnational’ Union. Accordingly, Streit *theoretically* considers it possible that freedom can be secured otherwise, but either he regards it as unlikely or cannot imagine a better system than a federal union to fulfill this aim. After all, by placing “their faith in freedom”, the free would demonstrate that “freedom works when coupled with federal union” (*UN49* 293) and, thus, freedom will no longer be identified with disunion (*UN43* 253; *Freedom’s Frontier* 13-14),²⁴⁵ but with strength.

In the later editions of *Union Now* and the magazine *Freedom & Union*, Streit repeatedly emphasizes that the founding of the Union has both become more urgent and likely because of the greater stress on freedom in the education of society. This indicates that different educational apparatuses have constructed and solidified the importance of freedom in the existing regime of truth at the time. According to Streit, the education on the principles of freedom and federal union are much more widespread in 1949 than in 1939 and the nuclear threat makes the free world realize that united action is necessary (*UN49* 304). Furthermore, Streit is very pleased to hear that General Eisenhower “placed increasing stress on the principle of individual liberty” in his public statements although he has not yet “throw[n] his great weight on the side of the Union of the Free” (307).²⁴⁶ Streit feels confident that if the principles of freedom are an omnipresent topic in the public discourse, people will become (even more) convinced that the only solution to the world’s problems is the Union of the Free. However, he also has the impression that the “true principle of nationality and freedom” has not yet been understood by all the people, which makes further education vital (“How Confusion Over Freedom”; *F&U*032). This is why the free have to be role models for the rest of the world: “We have to prove in time that the world’s freest men are not only the finest fighters but the bravest builders of the world.” (*UN43* 270-71) The free will take the first, brave step towards a free world for the benefit of all humankind so that freedom can finally spread throughout the

²⁴⁵For the discussion of the identification of freedom and democracy with disunion, see p. 196 here.

²⁴⁶However, Streit does not mention which public statements he is referring to.

whole world.²⁴⁷

Freedom Against Itself can be rated among the efforts to raise public awareness of these “true principles of nationality and freedom”. The overall topic is the paradox which the concept of freedom presents in Streit’s opinion:

It is freedom that is causing this rapid advance of discovery and inventions [...] at the same time it is halting man’s political and moral progress. We, the free, are the ones who have long been thus dividing freedom against itself, and bringing depression, dictatorship and war down upon us, and all mankind, again and again. (Freedom Against Itself 1)

On the one hand, the great amount of freedom enabled men to make their civilization prosper and make political as well as moral progress possible. On the other hand, as all nations are so free, they do not want their freedom to become constrained again and prefer living in nation states rather than in a worldwide state. For Streit, this shows that they have a wrong understanding of a world state and the education on the principles of freedom and union has not yet worked properly because he is convinced that nation states, not a world state, constrict freedom. This is considered the reason why a worldwide union has not been founded so far: People supposedly fear giving up parts of their sovereignty in a larger polity, which they misinterpret as giving up their freedom. The consequence of this is the situation the free have to face: They are disunited, which brings about “*depression, dictatorship and war*”. In particular the “dividing power” of freedom causes the “anarchy” in world politics and lets dictatorship become stronger.²⁴⁸ Therefore, it is clear to Streit that education on freedom is necessary even more to convince people that they can all have “an even higher, safer, freer life” in the Union (*Freedom Against Itself* 2, 136)²⁴⁹ and the sacrifices are worth it. After all, only vices need to be ‘sacrificed’, so nothing crucial is lost if they are given up: Next to prejudices against other people it is “some of the power we [the people] have given our politicians, some of the special privileges that some of us have” (11). Conversely, an international system without an organization

²⁴⁷See also *UN49* 275, 304; *New Federalist* 3.

²⁴⁸See also *Freedom Against Itself* 95-99, 101, 146-47, 178, 183.

²⁴⁹Education is a task not only Streit and his organization Federal Union Inc. set themselves, but he also demands it from all the “people of Atlantica” so that freedom is no longer associated with disunion (5-6). Yet, he claims once more that it is the British and the Americans who have recognized the necessity of a Federal Union in recent years and want to “have a common government for their common affairs” realized in the form of a federal union (99).

in a federal union makes the people sacrifice “their own individual lives and liberties in order to keep alive absolute national sovereignty and [...] international anarchy” (114, 165-66).

6.2 Democracy

The next characteristic which should make the founding nations of the Union an imagined community cannot be entirely separated from the concept of freedom, although it is done here for reasons of clarity. All the members of the nucleus have to be democracies: “*The way through* [these dangerous times in 1938] *is Union now of the democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite.*” (UN39 2)²⁵⁰ Streit sees a Union as a

democracy composed of democracies – an interstate government organized on the *same basic principle*, the same basic method, and for the same basic purpose as the democracies in it, and with the *powers of government divided* between the union and the states the better to advance this *common purpose, individual freedom* (5; emphasis added).

Accordingly, only democracies can actually fulfill the purpose of the Union – the advancement of freedom – because they share the same political system and can establish a larger democracy on a higher level. In his summary why the original fifteen democracies should form the nucleus he says that they are the

world’s greatest, oldest, most homogeneous, and closely linked *democracies*, the peoples *most experienced and successful* in solving the problem at hand – the peaceful, reasonable establishment of *effective inter-state democratic world government* (7; emphasis added).

This phrase is slightly altered in *Union Now With Britain*: “let us begin [...] with a nucleus, with *a few* of the greatest, oldest, most homogeneous and closely linked democracies” (UN41 11; emphasis added). Hence, even in the emergency situation of the war, it is vital for Streit to include exclusively democracies and not to extend the list of founders to other, non-democratic states. The reason for this is given already in 1939: “We organize a tug-of-war, not a government, when we arrange for those who believe that government is made for the people to pull together with

²⁵⁰Streit wrote this text in 1938, which is why he refers to the situation of the Munich crisis of 1938 here.

those who believe the opposite.” (UN39 88) Thus, having democracies as well as autocracies among the members of the Union does not work as they are founded on different governmental principles, which would lead to friction in the Union.²⁵¹

Naturally, the *understanding* of democracy needs to be the same in all the nations of the nucleus: In this case, the common concept of the state has to be the broad American understanding of government of the people, government for the people, government by the people (UN39 91). The fact that the reason for this focus is not explained indicates that Streit regards it as commonsensical that the rest of the Atlantic world agrees to this understanding and ‘naturally’ follows it. However, the single democracies within in the Union can practice democracy in their own ways, “whether by republic or kingdom, presidential, cabinet or other form of [democratic] government, capitalist, socialist, or other economic system” (2).²⁵² Explaining the evolution of the fifteen’s understanding of democracy, Streit refers to several nations: Switzerland, the Netherlands, England, the United States, and France and he claims that “[t]ogether they have worked out and established the modern theory and practice of democracy” (93). What is meant by the “modern theory and practice of democracy” is never fully explained, though. However, it has several important elements which – according to Streit – have mainly developed in the United States, Britain, and France: The French are highly developed on the democratic scale as they set a very high value on the individuals’ lives and give all of them an equal voice in policies.²⁵³ If this system is to be preserved, the democracies have to win the war. By 1941, the provisional Union with only the English-speaking nations is Streit’s solution to increase this possibility. Nevertheless, the elements of the “importance of the individuals’ lives” and an “equal voice for all” are regarded as prime elements of modern democracy and must not be forgotten. Yet, it is striking that the merits the *English-speaking* nations gained for democracy are

²⁵¹See also *New Federalist* 12, 34-38.

²⁵²It is striking that Streit would allow a “capitalist, *socialist* or other economic system” (UN49 5; *Freedom’s Frontier* 192; emphasis added) in the Union since socialist systems only theoretically fit his ideal of equality for all but are rarely, if ever, democratic in reality. This clause is not even altered in the editions after the war although it must have been clear to him by then that a socialist economic system can hardly be combined with a democratic state.

²⁵³Yet this has also prevented them from effectively preparing for war because of too many democratic processes in which everyone was included. This in turn made the German occupation possible (UN41 111-12).

not summarized in an extra chapter in *Union Now With Britain* like the French ones. This adds to the proposition that the achievements of the English-speaking peoples for democracy are regarded as so evident that they do not need any further explanation. Conversely, the French ones require some spotlight so that they are not overlooked.²⁵⁴

When Streit further explains the definition of democracy (177-78), it is again clearly noticeable that he has the American democratic union as a blueprint in mind and he constructs the idea that the American democracy is the basic form of all democracies in the world. Even though all the other founding states are democracies as well, he argues that the *American* form of democracy – a federal union – is ideal and should function as a model for the worldwide Union. Nevertheless, however one judges this claim that the American democracy is the best representative for a *real* democracy, it seems logical that the nations in the Union have to define democracy a similar way – be it an American interpretation or any other – because a common democratic policy can only be successful if this prerequisite is met.

As a free democratic government is seen as complicated and demands more personal responsibility from the citizens than other forms of governments, the founding nations need to have a long working experience with this form of government: Roughly 150 years in the U.S., 250 years in Britain, and 150 years in France seem enough for Streit (*Freedom's Frontier* 80, 85, 89).²⁵⁵ During those years many prob-

²⁵⁴Although mentioned in the previous editions, Switzerland and the Netherlands are not presented as if they contributed enough to the development of democracy to be dedicated an extra chapter in *Union Now With Britain* at all. So, Streit regards their contributions as even less important than France's. The same impression comes to mind in *Freedom's Frontier*: Streit again focuses on the possible reasons why the United States, Britain, and France do not start or join the Union – something which remains unclear and illogical to him because they share the same concept of democracy and have shaped its development and philosophy the most (*Freedom's Frontier* 80-90). Once more, the other nations which presumably have contributed as much to the development of democracy are not mentioned in an extra chapter. This, in turn, reinforces the impression that he does not regard them as important as the United States, Britain, and France.

²⁵⁵In *Freedom Against Itself*, Streit not only names the United States and Britain as having enough democratic experience, but he adds Switzerland and the Netherlands to the list of nations which “have had even 150 years of unbroken experience in relative free self-government” (*Freedom Against Itself* 6). However, in contrast to previous books, he no longer includes France because recently, their “record [...] has been a checkered one” – this comment probably refers to the Vichy regime when parts of France can in no way be described as democratic because of the collaboration with the Nazis. Furthermore, he then clearly states that in terms of democratic experience, the other English-speaking nations, which by then are independent, share the British experience, but they have only been “recognized as independent nations [...] for some thirty years”. This makes them less experienced than the former mother country (134).

lems had to be overcome. Streit claims that they were solved by the original fifteen founding nations in a democratic way.²⁵⁶ The one example Streit mentions to support this argument is the British Empire, which allowed unions be founded within the Empire to avoid a revolution in the following areas: Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, the Malayan peninsula, the British West Indies (81; see also footnote 228).²⁵⁷ As governing themselves democratically and with equal liberty for everyone is seen as very hard for the people and the fifteen founders have achieved it for a long time, it seems just and right for Streit that the people in those nations qualify for a founding member of the Union of the Free as they are the “peoples most advanced and experienced politically” (*UN39* 88). Streit states that by 1961 only one-eighth of humankind has succeeded in this kind of government for at least 50 years and this fraction of the world population shrinks in numbers with the ever-growing population in the rest of the world. With several shortcomings in the ‘perfect’ government with equality for all, the following nations still have accomplished it: “the United States [...] the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxemburg [sic], the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 40). These are most of the founding nations of the original nucleus, which is further proof to Streit that these nations really *are* an imagined community united behind their form of government.

The opposite of such a democratically experienced people are “[p]eoples that accept dictatorships [who] must be classified, politically, among the immature, or retarded, or inexperienced, high as they may rank otherwise” (*UN39* 88). Their biggest flaw is that they are not able to “govern themselves freely. While men accept being governed as children, they must be rated as immature.” (88) Next to an

²⁵⁶He never explains how long the democratic experience of the other twelve nations apart from Britain, France, and the United States is, though. Germany is mentioned as the most obvious example which was a democracy after World War I and later turned into a totalitarian system. Thus, it did not have enough experience in democracy and in solving problems when *Union Now* first was published in 1939 and Streit still doubts the practicability of including Germany until 1954 (*UN39* 8-9; *Freedom Against Itself* 289-290). The change when Germany is seen as an important part of the nucleus of the Union of the Free only comes in 1961 when Streit praises them for “throwing off so soon the worst poisons and humiliations that any Atlantic people has suffered” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 20) and when he admires the Germans’ “astonishing energies” (36).

²⁵⁷As further positive examples are missing it seems as if Streit himself sees this claim as so self-evident that no more illustrations are needed *or* that he could not find any further ones. The latter makes the argument appear very weak, whereas the former would indicate that Streit’s assumed readership must have been convinced of his arguments anyway.

imperialist way of thinking that uses the narrative of the white man's burden (see chapter 8), this shows that Streit attributes great 'responsibility' to the founding nations of the Union – especially to the Americans (*UN41* 29). Making the world safe for democracy²⁵⁸ is not a task any group of nations can achieve but only those with enough experience – or in other words: those who are 'mature' enough.²⁵⁹

Since the political circumstances changed after World War II Streit sees a “necessity of marrying the ideal and the practical” (*Freedom's Frontier* 31) and alters his group of founders to the fifteen NATO nations. He argues that this composition still has a “ratio of experienced and inexperienced democratic peoples or ‘problem’ nations [...] great enough to give a stronger guarantee of individual freedom than any practical alternative can” (31-32).²⁶⁰ *The New Federalist* explains why experience is so important: When inexperienced people simply copy the form of government of the free, it does not work for long as they do not know how to handle this political system (*New Federalist* 41).²⁶¹ As he insists that the original fifteen

²⁵⁸Streit wants to make the world safe for democracy and highly admires Woodrow Wilson (see footnote 332), so the wording here is chosen deliberately. As the quote is repeated again and again, it can be regarded as a discursive strategy used by Streit to provide the Union with a narrative that unites them and makes it become a modern nation since this is a goal all of them should subscribe to.

²⁵⁹When Streit explains the relation of the Union to the non-self-governing territories – India in particular – of the Union, this responsibility is once more pointed out: it is the task of the Union to train those people living there for an admission as self-governing nations. Before they are not self-governing and have internalized the principles of democracy they only endanger the Union as it can “destroy democracy by seeking to spread it too quickly and over-loading the state with too many voters untrained for self-government” (*UN39* 185). This imperialist point of view is discussed in chapter 8.

²⁶⁰The fact that the U.S., Britain, and Canada – the nations which are most “experienced” in democracy – as well as Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Norway together make up about half of the total population in the NATO group and the “inexperienced” people are only about one third (total: 471,000,000 people, “experienced”: 322,000,000), reassures Streit that this nucleus still is “sound”. Furthermore, over 40 per cent of the NATO population does not only have democratic experience but also experience in federal union if Canada and the United States' population are added up (*Freedom's Frontier* 35). Britain no longer is counted among the nations with experience in federal union although they have ‘brought’ it to Canada, Australia, and South Africa (*UN41* 175) and they themselves formed a Union with Scotland in 1707 (*Freedom's Frontier* 80).

²⁶¹Two examples are given as proof of this theory. The negative one is the French Revolution when the French allegedly tried to adopt the British system (*New Federalist* 41). This might refer to the fact that the French constitution of 1791 includes the King of the French, something which Streit might have misjudged as the British system of a constitutional monarchy. As another constitution soon followed this one, the French were not able to handle this political system. The positive example is the founding of the United States when only the “most experienced democracies in the world” took part at the Federal Convention in 1787 and worked the United States Constitution (45). However, it has to be noted that the latter argument contradicts itself. The founding states of the United States of America could not have had a long working experience in democracy and

are “the ideal list” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 32),²⁶² the stress in his argument has to be on the expression “practical alternative” as no other group of states was organized in a similar way at the time.

Streit builds an imagined community of all the English-speaking nations in ‘his’ Union and wants them to determine the Union’s policies and structure, be it in the nucleus of 1939 or 1961. The reason Streit gives why they ‘rightfully’ should dominate the Union is that the “people who speak English”²⁶³ both are “*champions of local government*” and “*advocates and builders of inter-state government*” (*UN41* 121). This is a remaining discursive element of the Anglo-Saxon discourse that was also included in the Atlantic discourse without further explanation. Hence, the discursive regime was constructed in a similar way and this notion was accepted as true by the subjects of this discourse. Consequently, the group of English-speaking nations holds a special position among the fifteen founders. Streit is convinced that

the English language has become identified with freedom and union.

English was the native tongue of the two fundamental creations of modern democracy, from which many others stem. One was created by the British, the other by us Americans. The British worked out for us and for every other nation the basic machinery of every democracy today – representative government. We Americans solved for the British and the world, as well as for ourselves, the problem of how to govern the relations between these democratic states. We provided the machinery of inter-democracy government – Federal Union. (121)

This means that the English-speaking peoples as a whole and the Anglo-Americans in particular, unlike all others, do not need persuasion to adopt the idea of a democratic union with a representative government as they already have internalized it because of their language and the ideas which follow it. Streit argues that it is this language that built the foundation of democratic and free political cultures in the respective nations.²⁶⁴ This way, he once more creates an imagined community to which access is restricted because non-English-speaking nations cannot be included.

federal union because Streit always claims that the ‘ideal’ federal union was only invented then. Yet, he never realizes this flaw.

²⁶²In *The New Federalist*, it is repeated that the original founding nations “would have to be included in any list of nations that lead the world in the free way of life” (47).

²⁶³Despite the fact that Canada has a large French-speaking population, Streit always regards the state as “English-speaking” (*UN41* 121), although he does acknowledge the fact that a large French-speaking population exists in Canada (*UN39* 106).

²⁶⁴See also chapter 6.5, p. 247 here for the discussion on the English language as a foundation of a stable nucleus.

The English-speaking peoples are regarded as best-suited for the purpose of a union as they are not only free but also ‘naturally’ democratic. At the same time, Streit constitutes the (political) community of Britain and the United States: The concept of representative government originally was a British invention, which was taken up by the Founding Fathers and later spread through the world:

The whole English-speaking world has long since adopted the basic principles of 1776. All the larger British democracies have gone still further and established for themselves Federal Unions modeled on the Constitution of the United States of America – whose framers had turned to the British Constitution to solve some of their hardest problems. (52.)

Thus, the British and American democratic approach is seen as intertwined. The British invented the system of representative government and later on, the system was adopted for parts of the British Empire “with the usual Federal safeguards for less populous democracies” (5). The imagined community, at first sight, is only constructed between Britain and the United States, but the expression “larger British democracies” suggests that the former settler colonies are still regarded as an integral part of the mother country in 1941. Accordingly, they also naturally belong to this community. Streit claims that within this group, the democratic forms of government influenced themselves reciprocally which resulted in ‘perfect’ democracies in all of them. By not mentioning other nations which developed representative democratic political systems, he also excludes them from the close circle of the English-speaking nations, although they might fit into this community in the aspect of political tradition and the current political system. This shows that, although democracy is a vital aspect for Streit, *English-speaking* democracies are even more important.

6.3 Peaceful Nations

As “securing the peace” was one of the main goals of the Union of the Free, all the nations in it naturally needed to be peaceful. Still, depending on the circumstances, ‘peaceful’ was defined in different ways. In 1939 Streit wants the founding states of the nucleus to have “peaceful, good neighborly relations” with one another (*UN39*

91) and none of them should have been at war with “any of the others since more than 100 years” (7).²⁶⁵ He even mentions that “[n]o two of the fifteen have fought each other since the Belgian-Dutch war of 1830” (91), so their ‘peacefulness’ could be proved because they have more than fulfilled the original condition. The new composition of the nucleus after the war asks for a different justification why the fifteen NATO nations together still meet this prerequisite of being peaceful. Streit changes it insofar as to say that *the majority of the nucleus* (in this case two-thirds of the nations) should not have fought a war against each other for “*nearly a century and a half*” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 35, emphasis added). Clearly, this definition of ‘peaceful’ is much less strict than in the beginning as no longer all but only a *majority* of the founders needs to be ‘peaceful’. This change in the definition has already started some years previously. In *The New Federalist*, John F. Schmidt and Clarence K. Streit argue that the nucleus is peaceful, in particular the three biggest nations (United States, Britain, and France), as they “have not fought each other for more than a century, if one agrees that Vichy was not France” (*New Federalist* 49). Hence, it can be said that the understanding of peacefulness is bent just to fit the overall argument. The Vichy regime *is* French history as well and, thus, it cannot be ignored that the U.S. and Britain fought at least parts of France.²⁶⁶ It contradicts *Freedom Against Itself* of 1954 when it is acknowledged that France’s democratic record is a “checkered one” (*Freedom Against Itself* 134). Nevertheless, the definition *had* to be wider as World War II only ended 16 years before, the Korean War only one year previously, and the new founding states were all part of NATO – a *military* alliance which by its nature cannot always be peaceful. Apparently, what is defined as fight for freedom in the United States does not count in Streit’s opinion although it still is a non-peaceful fight. This shows how important the Union is to Streit and that he more and more is willing to make compromises just to get it founded at all.

In 1941, before the United States joined the war, Streit states that “the Union policy is our safest, surest, best way to secure *real* peace” (*UN41* 6) and continues

²⁶⁵Note that wars *within* one nation – like, for example, the American Civil War or the American Indian Wars – are not considered here.

²⁶⁶If this argument was valid, one would also have to say that the Nazi regime was ‘not Germany’, but Streit – correctly – does not go there (see also footnote 199).

to warn about the fact that war remains a danger to democracy. After the entry into the war, Streit blames the democracies themselves for the situation they are in: If they had worked together from the onset, the ‘peace machinery’ would have been more successful (*UN43* xvi).²⁶⁷ Obviously, he regards the Atlantic democracies as more responsible for the maintenance and restoration of peace than the other nations in the world. They need to bring the war to an end and ‘win the peace’, which means that a stable democratic peace order has to be established. However, even after the war is over, the perceived threat of another, more dangerous, and possible atomic war is prominent (*Freedom Against Itself* 104, 168-70, 176-77, 218), so apparently, the democracies have not been able to win the peace. Yet, in 1961 Streit still believes that an Atlantic Union is the “surest hope not merely to prevent war [again], but to put, and keep, the Communist empires in a conciliatory mood” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 54-55). Thus, the Union has to seem non-aggressive to the Soviet Union and China. Declaring this, he returns back to the argument of 1939 that the Union is the only way to eliminate inter-state war and war in general (*UN39* 155-58) – a goal he aims at all the time.

Especially after 1945, Streit works hard at presenting the Atlantic nations as peaceful. In the edition of 1949, he mentions for the first time that they need “to win *without* war [which] requires boldness even more” (*UN49* 321) than to win *by* war. Winning by war is the supposed strategy of the class enemy, the Soviet Union. The argument again is reinforced in *Freedom’s Frontier*: “Since the formation of the Atlantic alliance a few months after the appearance of that 1949 edition, however, we have at least been acting on the principle that the free Atlantic community *is* the citadel of peace.” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 16) What he probably means by this claim is that the new postwar attempts for international cooperation, such as the U.N., NATO, and the Bretton Woods institutions are efforts to secure the peace and the Atlantic nations are their architects. Furthermore, in contrast to autocracy, the democratic nations always claim to fight for peace and also do not expand in a pugnacious manner because further nations can be added to the Union without

²⁶⁷Yet, as Streit argued before and continued to warn that leagues would not be adequate for securing the peace at all, he contradicts himself with this argument here because the existing ‘peace machinery’ *could* not have worked if his arguments are followed. After all, international relations between states were organized in a league structure.

conquest (*UN41* 142, 156-57; *Freedom Against Itself* 118-19).²⁶⁸ Hence, even though they founded a military alliance, the Atlantic nations are perceived as peaceful and peace-loving agents who stand up against the aggressive communist powers. Only by *uniting* these few nations, there is “reasonable hope of winning, without war, against dictatorship, depression and disintegration” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 31).²⁶⁹

Once more, Streit praises the British next to the Americans for being more peaceful as well as for having more political anticipatory capabilities than other nations and, thus, he again constructs a leading position for both of them within the Atlantic community. He claims that throughout their history, they have been “turning peacefully from systems that were no longer giving results, and trying in time other systems that promised to work better” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 82). In this way he once more employs the notion that the British do not need to be convinced of trying a new form of organization in the world. They have already shown in the past that they know when to change their political system peacefully without having to endure a revolution and they most likely will continue to do so in the future Union.²⁷⁰

Although the Union is supposed to be peaceful and ‘peacefulness’ is a prerequisite for membership, it has to be questioned whether its aims really *are* peaceful. In 1939, Streit still sees no reason for “hostile policy towards such autocracies as Japan, Germany and Italy” (*UN39* 114). Yet, this is contradicted in the same edition when Streit explains that the Union police would only need to keep its armaments as a “temporary precaution against the militant absolutist powers – Japan, Germany and Italy” (161) since they are the nations threatening peace (94). This means that

²⁶⁸However, he also criticizes that “[a]ll three ways of uniting more people and land under a common government [these are: Federal Union, free immigration, and “the natural increase in population”] have been much less productive in the last forty years than they used to be” (*Freedom Against Itself* 119). So apparently, *no* expansion of their own territory and populations is no option for the free, either.

²⁶⁹See also *New Federalist* 46; C. K. Streit, “Big Four” 3; C. K. Streit, “Freedom’s Answer to Sputnik.”

²⁷⁰However, the Union proposal of how to secure peace for the future is made by an *American* who sees no difficulties for the two nations working together so closely. Streit, for example, does not anticipate any problem in the fact that Britain would be the definite ‘junior partner’ in this state and would have to consent to an American way of dealing with world politics. Given the fact that Britain until today is a nation which is very proud of its former Empire and its position of power, it is hardly likely that they would agree to work together in a new state with its former colony ‘dictating’ the terms.

there indeed is fear of those three states, which requires a military policy once aggression breaks out. In 1940, Streit conversely tries to explain that the enemy of the Union is not any nation *as such* but the “autocratic principle of absolute national sovereignty” and that the Union will lead “no crusade against autocracy abroad” (UN40 12). Because of the war situation, this changes in *Union Now With Britain*: Already in the first chapter, the language becomes more violent as the goal is to “defeat dictatorship without hereby humiliating the people with whom it is [...] identified” (UN41 8). The conflict becomes more personalized because the aim of the Union is to “check Hitler and Mussolini” and war against them seems likely: Union “gives the maximum guarantee of keeping dictatorship out and stopping its war machine, *whether by peace or war*” (46; emphasis added). As the possibility of the United States joining the war on the side of the Allies increases, Streit also presents the Union as the *only* power in the world which can dictate the peace terms after the war (66-76). Thus, he is convinced of the Union’s military power being strong enough to defeat the autocracies and that it can decisively shape the peace order afterwards which fits with the basic assumption of the Atlantic discourse: A new world order can only be successfully built by the Atlantic nations. The Union is definitely seen in opposition to another group of powers: In 1941 it still is the Axis powers,²⁷¹ after the war it is the Soviet Union and later China, even if Streit keeps on stressing that the Union is not aimed *against* any nation (UN49 261).

This changed perspective can be seen in the language Streit uses. In 1939, 1940, and 1941 Streit writes the following:

I see *no reason for hostility* between the nucleus and Soviet Russia and many reasons why both should be good neighbours. (UN39 114; emphasis added)

It is *wrong, all wrong, to conceive* of Union as aimed *against the nations under autocracy*. (UN40 12; emphasis added)

The Union deeply desires to establish at once *normal peaceful relations with all outside nations*; [...] it takes the opportunity which its creation provides to propose to those at war with any of its members that peace be restored [...] and the settlement [...] of all disputes that led to this war (UN41 210; emphasis added).

Here, Streit emphasizes the peaceful endeavor of the Union as he avoids aggressive language, although he clearly defines in- and out-groups in these quotes. This fur-

²⁷¹The Soviet Union is mentioned among them for the first time, however (UN41 152-53; see p. 153 here).

ther represents the idea that a member of the out-group can never become a member of the Union, but it also facilitates identification within the ‘Atlantic in-group’ as it has a common ‘enemy’.²⁷² As the pressure caused by the communist states increases after the war, Streit spots a necessary advantage and changes the language considerably. He states that a Union of the Free brings “much surer *protection* than even the United States now enjoys” (*UN49* 264; emphasis added). It is evident that Streit sees a powerful enemy of the Union against whom *protection* is needed. Protection on a state level, in turn, does not necessarily work in a peaceful way and can quickly escalate into war. Furthermore, he is convinced that

democracies are prone to unite only under *pressure of emergency*, and usually too late to avoid war or other disaster. History also shows that their leaders are prone to underestimate the degree of action such *pressure* makes possible. (278; emphasis added)

This “emergency” and the “disaster” which needs to be avoided is clearly linked to the situation of the Cold War. The communist expansion throughout the world is pressuring the free world to act and to stand together in order to be able to defend itself against the new threat. During the war, the same argument has already been used but with more urgency: If no union among the democracies is founded during the war, “these democracies will split on what to do about Europe after the war as badly as they did before” (*UN43* 265, 261).²⁷³ Hence, the necessity of an emergency as an incentive to unite is not a new phenomenon. The threat during the Cold War, which creates an emergency situation, is seen as mainly coming from one state: the Soviet Union. The ongoing pressure strengthens Streit’s confidence in his plan of founding the Union and that a new war – possibly an atomic one – can be avoided.²⁷⁴ A cynical interpretation would state that a war or crisis is the best

²⁷²Again, it is worth noting that Streit does not consider that this would prevent a worldwide Union from being realized in the first place because if all nations in the world are members, there is no longer an out-group to help shape the imagined community of the in-group.

²⁷³John Foster Dulles agrees with this view in the introduction to *The New Federalist* in 1950. He adds that anything less than a formal union is not enough for sovereign states to stand together because mere promises are not kept “unless, when the event occurs, national self-interest coincides with the promise” (Dulles xvi). However, if no peril is perceived by the people, they will not found such a strong polity. According to Streit, the “people of several states unite to form a federal union only when the lack of a strong central government threatens their liberties and lives” (*New Federalist* 16).

²⁷⁴The fact that Streit is scared of a new war against another dictatorship but remains hopeful at the same time becomes obvious when reading his editorial in *Freedom & Union* of December 1957. There he once more states that the main target is to “save freedom from another war

opportunity to finally found the Union as the democracies have to stand together in this time of emergency to either win against the opposing power or overcome the crisis – and the identification as an in-group is facilitated because a clear out-group can be detected in such situations. According to Streit, especially the Soviet Union understands this connection.²⁷⁵ This is why Streit contradicts his own argument at this point: On the one hand, the Union is not supposed to be formed *against* other states but, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is endangering the states which then have to found the Union to be strong enough to *fight* communism. Thus, they have to unite *against* the Soviet Union. So all in all, although peacefulness is one of the most important prerequisites for joining the Union, it is not designed to be entirely peaceful. This is one of the contradictions Streit accepts because in the long run, this newly founded state would secure peace for the whole world if all enemies are defeated.

6.4 Power Position in the World

The most rational reason why these fifteen states in particular should form the nucleus of the Union is their overwhelming position of power in the world. This position was deduced from the premises or truths of the Atlantic discourse that was propagated by Streit. He argues that due to this status they can win the fight for freedom and secure peace in the future (253).²⁷⁶ A Union among those democracies is vital because the current relations between them are loose and any weaker organization, such as a league or an alliance, is not binding enough and will not let the states develop their full power. Thus, it can be said that the democracies' disunion

and depression", but he adds that by forming a Union, the free can "lead the world to the new era science now makes possible". In the Union, there is "so much power behind freedom that dictatorship will not dare attack" and this "greater power [can be gained] at less cost" if the Union was founded "swiftly and in such a way as to add it to the force of surprise and regain the leadership of the world" ("Freedom's Answer to Sputnik" 1). See also O. J. Roberts, "Practical Way to Peace" 20; Meeman; Caldwell; C. K. Streit, "Big Four" 2-3; C. K. Streit, "Why Soviet Smiles Add Urgency" 4; Urey, "Atlantic Union Is Imperative" 15; C. K. Streit, "The Monetary Menace" 1.

²⁷⁵The great danger is that by "lull[ing] it [the free world] with talk of peaceful co-existence", the Soviet Union reduces the free's urge to unite because they do not see such a strong necessity to unite as the *perceived* pressure is lessened (C. K. Streit, "Against the D-Bomb" 2).

²⁷⁶See also *New Federalist* 46-48; *Freedom Against Itself* xvii.

presents their biggest problem and weakness: Their powers are divided and they will probably lose their strong position in comparison to autocracy or dictatorship if they remain disunited. The disunion of the democracies during the war becomes a vicious circle: Because of the disunion, they have lost prestige and, consequently, people “identified democracy with disunion”. For that reason, the simple solution is to show *united* effort to demonstrate the “inherent strengths of the democracies” (*UN43* 253)²⁷⁷ and to create an “unbalance of power” in favor of the Union of the Free so that the peace can be preserved (*UN43* xiii). As the disunion among the democracies continued after 1945, the Soviet Union could gain control over “all the four arms that we [the democracies] then [in 1939] practically or completely monopolized” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 7).²⁷⁸ Yet, (re)gaining strength becomes especially important and necessary after the war as due to the technological progress, people can “both [...] build a far better world and [...] destroy civilization” (*UN49* 252). Streit is convinced that “[o]nly by fully federating *all* the free fraction [...] the free can gain the decisive power they need, morally, militarily, politically, to save themselves and world peace” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 42).²⁷⁹

In order to distinguish themselves from dictatorship, the free nations need to fully display their plans both to their own citizens and the world and they must not work secretly. However, “to win this game while playing with their cards faced up on the table”, the free need to be so powerful that “nothing can possibly beat” this strong hand (*UN49* 276). Hence, the most powerful states in the world need to be united to present an effective deterrent against any kind of aggression from the outside (see also *New Federalist* 48) and they have to cooperate instead of work

²⁷⁷See also Dulles xvi; *New Federalist* 1.

²⁷⁸The “four arms” are the power over the air as well as sea, industrial, and atomic power. For this argument, see *Freedom Against Itself* 123-27.

²⁷⁹In Streit’s opinion this has been proved by the fact that the Soviet Union ended the Berlin Blockade after the founding of the Atlantic Alliance because it is seen as a first step of uniting the free nations. Thus, Moscow wants to “remove the incentive to unite further”. In Streit’s opinion this worked: Moscow stayed in a conciliatory mood after the founding of the NATO and made concessions to the free just to not give them any more reason to unite even more against the Soviet Union (*Freedom’s Frontier* 54-56). Accordingly, the only way to cope with the new situation is to take further steps towards a unification of the free world because no matter how defective Streit regards the Atlantic Alliance (45-46), the mere founding of it worked as an incentive for Moscow to remove some pressure. Yet, as Streit sees this as a positive development, the argument is a contradiction of the idea that the probability of founding the Union is higher in a situation of crisis (*UN49* 278, see chapter 6.3, p. 195 here).

against each other. This collaboration can quickly and easily produce great results, for example, in science and engineering. If scientists and engineers work together, progress in those fields is much more likely – something which seems particularly vital when it comes to atomic power (*UN49* 264; *Freedom Against Itself* 26, 165). Later, Streit again argues in *Freedom & Union* that only in a federation “[f]reedom’s power in every field – not only in per capita production and standard of living but on the political, military, scientific, educational and moral sides” becomes strong enough to fight communism (“How Communism Is Beating”).²⁸⁰

The overwhelming power position of the Union states comes along with a twofold responsibility and aim: On the one hand, Streit is confident that only this Union can save the peace by being a strong power. On the other hand, if it is really powerful, it can “from birth dwarf all the rest of the world” (*UN39* 176), which implies that the rest of the world has to adapt – or better: ‘surrender’ – to the Union’s power.²⁸¹ Streit says that the original nucleus of 1939 “practically owns this earth” (104) without knowing it which is an obvious representation of the Atlantic discourse. He tries to prove this by using statistics released by the League of Nations in which he compares the relative power of the founding states to their enemies’ strength in several aspects (92-103).²⁸² Despite the fact that there have

²⁸⁰A division of this power even among the three biggest states – the United States, Britain, and France – is harmful to the end of saving world peace (*UN43* xvi-xv) and the disunion of all the fifteen states caused the “economic, financial and monetary world war” (*UN39* 101) even before the actual World War began.

²⁸¹For the discussion of imperialism in Streit’s writings, see chapter 8.

²⁸²Streit uses the League of Nations yearbook *International Trade Statistics* of 1936, the League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook* of 1937 and 1938, the League of Nations *Monetary Review* of 1938, the League of Nations *World Trade Review* of 1937, and the League of Nations *Armaments Yearbook* of 1937. For figures on German armament, he partly uses the *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Luftwaffe* (Yearbook of the German Airforce) of 1938. Yet, Streit does not question the reliability of this German yearbook, which was published in the ‘Third Reich’ and, consequently, has to be read as propaganda, which most likely intends to present Germany as being weaker to the outside world than it actually was. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Streit does not invent the figures he uses but only adds up the numbers from official statistics. Although these figures would have had to be updated in the later editions, Streit declares that no real change is necessary or possible. Due to the wartime and postwar situation, the general impression of the power relations between the two respective opposing groups of states remains “substantially true” (*UN43* 253; *UN49* 262) even if some details of the statistics are no longer entirely accurate. Another reason why he does not use newer statistics in the later editions is that after the war, it is nearly as hard as before to get precise figures due to the “abnormal postwar conditions in many countries”. Thus, it is best, in his opinion, to not “correct the tables but to let them stand as [they are] showing, broadly, the normal picture toward which the world is returning” (*UN49* 262) – it is assumed that the difficulty of getting new figures is the main reason why Streit does not change the figures. Furthermore, he argues that the presented figures by the Soviet Union and China are doubtful due to their

been relative losses in some aspects of power by 1961, Streit claims that by forming the Union, the states *together* become even more dominant as “the strength that union brings is far greater than the sum of its parts” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 51) and the communists would be intimidated by the mere establishment of the Union. Consequently, he once more sees no need to revise the original tables.²⁸³ Still, major changes after 1945 are explained, mainly focusing on the population, area, production, and the military, as well as the fact that the opposing powers no longer are Germany, Italy, and Japan but the Soviet Union (*UN49* 262-64).²⁸⁴ By 1961, Streit acknowledges the fact that the Soviet Union has become much more powerful than estimated, but he still is confident the free nations will surpass its power once united (*Freedom’s Frontier* 7-9, 16, 51-53).

Apart from the fact that statistics are not updated, what can and must be criticized about them is that Streit always compares the power of fifteen democratic states to three (two in the later editions) so-called autocracies.²⁸⁵ Hence, the latter group naturally appears relatively weaker. Still, Streit is convinced that the statistics do not lack credibility but that they show the world’s actual power relations. In this way, he further perpetuates the construction of the Atlantic discourse because he represents the Atlantic nations as the strongest ones in the world that can not be challenged by any other power. As this study analyzes his scheme for the Union of the Free and he was quite successful promoting it (see chapter 7), his arguments need to be examined despite this flaw in the concept. For reasons of clarity, the mentioned aspects of power will be examined separately.

propaganda and there is no data at all for the possession of gold reserves.

²⁸³In 1943, Streit has already anticipated that the “relative group power” would be “substantially restored” after the war (*UN43* 253). The expressions “substantially restored” and “substantially true” imply that Streit himself cannot be totally sure whether the relations remained the same or not, at least not in detail. Nevertheless, he is convinced of the fact that no change in power relations could happen and uses this argument repeatedly; see also Cook.

²⁸⁴In the edition of 1949, Streit points out that several British colonies and the Philippines became independent and, therefore, fewer people and a smaller area are governed by the democracies. In terms of production, he estimates that the power relations between the opposing blocs has, on balance, remained the same and the Union gained much more relative power in the military field. Yet, he does not provide the readers with any kind of new figures but just assumes that the readers believe him (*UN49* 262-64).

²⁸⁵To maintain the flow of reading, the term autocracies here is used as hypernym to describe the respective opposing powers of the Union. Accordingly, the term democracies refers to the democratic founding nations of the Union.

Population and Area

At first, Streit demonstrates that the fifteen states together have the biggest proportion of the self-governing population in the world and, thus, constructs the notion that the free are ‘unbeatable’ in this aspect of power: The League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook* of 1937 shows that the fifteen combine 280,000,000 people among their self-governing population, about 20,000,000 more with their citizens in the dependencies, and more than 900,000,000 people (self-governing and non-self-governing) all together (*UN39* 94-95). In comparison to that, “[t]he population of Japan, Germany and Italy aggregates only 189,000,000, and when dependencies are added their combined man-power is 260,000,000 – less than a third of that of the democracies” (94).²⁸⁶

The fifteen democracies do not only govern more people, but they also control a land area, which is roughly ten times as big as that of the autocracies.²⁸⁷ In fact, Streit even says that the fifteen democracies “own almost half the earth, rule all its oceans, govern nearly half mankind” (7). By using this kind of language that puts the democracies’ size in relation to the whole globe, he creates an image in his addressees’ minds that makes the area governed by the democracies appear even larger than it already is. He apparently truly believes that this power alone already puts the nucleus in a very strong position for various reasons: First of all, the population in the area of the fifteen founders was and is socialized in a democratic system and, consequently, is able and willing to continue governing itself democratically. Secondly, a large population also means that many workers can boost the economy, and many soldiers can form a big army if needed. Thirdly, because the Union controls most of the area in the world and is so overly powerful in this respect, it can also “set the standard for all the world” and “control [...] all important means of communication” in the world simply because of the sheer size of the Union and its market (165; see also p. 207 here). According to Streit, the combination of these reasons leads to the conclusion that the Union states not only do but *have* to control

²⁸⁶According to the statistics, the Soviet Union has a population of 175,500,000 people in 1937, which is also much less than the population of the free. However, it is more than half of the population of the latter although the Soviet Union is only one state.

²⁸⁷The numbers given in the statistics for the respective areas (dependencies included) are the following: 15 democracies: 61,599,000 sq. km; 3 autocracies: 5,868,000 sq. km; Soviet Russia: 21,176,000 sq. km (*UN39* 95).

the world, which is one of the essential elements of the Atlantic discourse.

Two aspects of the area covered by the fifteen states seem important to him: The total area needs to be as big as possible. The fact that it is not one united land mass but a dispersed territory is equally relevant. This gives the Union an “invulnerability from surprise attack” (160) because not all parts of the Union can be attacked at the same time and even if one region is hit, the rest of the Union can defend it and the polity as a whole can still work. The Union’s industrial and military centers are spread across the globe – even so far that it has “advanced bases much nearer Communism’s citadel than the Kremlin would have as regards the Union’s citadel in North America” (*UN49* 265; *Freedom’s Frontier* 46).²⁸⁸ This results in a greater danger for the Soviet Union than for the Union of the Free, since the latter can fight back much more easily.²⁸⁹ Additionally, it provides security from an atomic war with the Soviet Union as any such attack on the Union would result in an ever bigger destruction of Soviet territory in return because the Soviet Union consists of one united landmass that can be destroyed much more easily in one strike (*UN49* 264).²⁹⁰

A decisive change in the aspect of population and area is the ongoing decolonization between 1939 and 1961. Streit claims that from the Belgian, Dutch, British, and French empires, more than 30 new sovereign states have developed (*Freedom’s Frontier* 50). In essence, this means that the area controlled by the democracies already in 1949 is ‘only’ 42.8% of the world (46.3% in 1939) and that the percentage of the world’s population under democracy shrunk from 43.1% to 23% (*UN49* 262). In that year, Streit claims that only one-seventh of the world’s population has still been governed democratically with equal liberty for 50 years (274). By 1961 it merely is one-eighth with half of it coming from the United States (*Freedom’s Frontier* 40).²⁹¹

²⁸⁸In the edition of 1961, “advanced bases” (*UN49* 265) is replaced by “dependable bases” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 46). This change of expression is an indicator of the stronger obligation Streit demands from the Union nations by then as the interdependence of the western nations has become clearer in the Cold War. It might have resulted from a higher state of alarm on the side of the author when it comes to the estimation of the communists’ power. Furthermore, the quote indicates that the “Union’s citadel” needs to be on the western side of the Atlantic.

²⁸⁹As Streit is convinced that the Union is peaceful, it would, naturally, not attack another power but only fight back.

²⁹⁰In the edition of 1939, Streit still only talks about a possible “surprise attack with gas or germs” (*UN39* 182), but his solution to these dangers is the same: a dispersed territory.

²⁹¹In comparison to 1939, the main losses are raw materials, area, and population (*Freedom’s*

Although this contradicts Streit's argument of 1939 that the Union includes nearly half of the area and population in the world (*UN39* 96), he does not see a problem in that. According to him, these newly independent nations are still loyal to the Union as they also continue to be dependent upon the fifteen founding nations for economic and financial reasons.²⁹² Furthermore, the people *governing* the new nations have a similar mindset as the people in the formerly colonizing states because both were educated in the same schools in Europe (*Freedom's Frontier* 50).²⁹³ With these arguments Streit tries to convince his readers that the imagined community of the free in reality has not become diminished in size by the loss of the colonies. After all, these are still loyal and so they still belong to this very same imagined community in some way. Therefore, the 'loss' is not as big and as grave as it might be feared by the Atlantic nations.

Throughout all the editions of *Union Now*, the English-speaking nations among the founders constitute the majority of the area and people. In *Union Now With Britain*, Streit argues that they give the Union "most of its power, for together they own one-third of the earth and govern one-third of humanity" and they can jointly control the world's oceans – about half of it can be commanded by the British and the other by the American navy. As the former has its center in London, geographically near the war zone of World War II, the British navy is seen as endangered during the war in case London falls (*UN41* 15). Only a Union with the United States can prevent a possible disintegration of the British navy, a development which would, consequently, also mean a loss of control over the oceans for all the English-speaking nations – if they are seen as one entity.²⁹⁴

Once both states merge in a union, the English-speaking nations can even "carry through the Union program" alone as they can "then hold trust for the Eu-

Frontier 50).

²⁹²The connection Streit makes here between loyalty and economic and financial dependence indicates that his perspective is very naive and – what is more disturbing – completely ignorant of the imperialist notions of what he says. This will be discussed in chapter 8.

²⁹³See also sections *Production and Raw Materials* as well as *Moral Power* in this chapter, pp. 204 and 218 here.

²⁹⁴This shows that, on the one hand, both centers of the English-speaking world hold a hegemonic position at sea but, on the other hand, this position is fragile if London falls. Despite the fact that both parts are regarded as an entity, the United States is clearly seen as the leading power, which still needs Britain's might to be overly dominant. Yet, the U.S. can secure Britain's – and their own – position at sea.

ropean democracies their territory overseas, draw on the resources of half the earth and half the human race” (15).²⁹⁵ The idea here is that with a merely English-speaking Union the war can still be won and a free world can be built on this basis afterwards. The fact that Streit does not regard the other eight nations of the original proposal as important enough for the fight for freedom – otherwise it would not be possible for the English-speaking nations to win alone – again indicates that the latter really are seen as the “great core and body of the original nucleus of fifteen” (14). This is emphasized more clearly when Streit once more claims that the seven English-speaking nations rule the oceans and that “none of [them] can be conquered [...] and the cause of freedom lost, except through [their] disunion” (52). Here, an imagined community is constructed among the English-speaking peoples: Streit is convinced they can continue to rule the oceans even if they are not yet formerly joined in the Union of the Free because they already belong and act together along the same principles and with the same goals for themselves and the world: freedom, democracy, and peace.

According to the statistics of 1937, the English-speaking nations represent 71.55% of the population of the fifteen without the dependencies and 59.27% including them (*UN39 95*).²⁹⁶ This is the reason why Streit, again and again, proposes an allocation of the seats in the House of Deputies as well as the Senate of the Union where the English-speaking peoples – mostly from the U.S. – have a clear majority. Although Streit never mentions it in his books, had the Union been founded, this majority in the Union Congress could surely be used to dominate the other delegates if the members of the English-speaking nations worked together. A close collaboration between the English-speaking nations, in turn, could be easily

²⁹⁵This even applies in case of an invasion of the British or Irish Isles because the rest of the state would still be working with its major part being in the United States. For a further explanation of the claim of trusteeship, see p. 207 here.

²⁹⁶The smaller percentage of English-speaking population with dependencies results from the fact that not only the U.S. and the UK but also France, the Netherlands, and Belgium had a huge proportion of ‘their’ population in their respective dependencies at the time. The numbers are (first without, then with dependencies): United States: 128,840,000 / 144,505,000; UK: 47,187,000 / 505,528,000; France: 41,910,000 / 112,358,000; Netherlands: 8,557,000 / 75,135,000; Belgium: 8,331,000 / 21,898,000 people (*UN39 95*). Thus, within the group of all the fifteen, many more (partly also smaller) nations have a huge population in their dependencies, which results in a smaller percentage of English-speaking population with dependencies of the group within all fifteen nations.

assumed if Streit's argument is followed because they are seen as an entity even before the founding of the Union. Conversely, if the percentages of the majority in population and seats are compared, the large majority of 71.60% in self-governing population only comes down to 68.63% of Deputies and 52.38% of Senators, which at least would have been a slightly less clear dominance.

By 1961, there are only three English-speaking nations left within the group of possible founding nations: the United States, Canada, and Britain. Although most of the English-speaking nations are not included, more than 50% of the population in the Union come from the United States, Britain, or Canada, and those three nations still encompass a "vast scale of [the] area" of the Union (*Freedom's Frontier* 35).²⁹⁷ Although four other English-speaking nations of the original nucleus are no longer part of the nucleus in 1961, the remaining three can still dominate the Union because they are so heavily populated.

Production and Raw Materials

In terms of raw materials and the production, the fifteen have

[i]n all but six of these essentials [...] more than half of the world total. [...] In four of the six – artificial silk, land area, population and wheat production – the fifteen have more than forty per cent of the world total. In the other two, potash and raw silk, the fifteen have twenty-five per cent of the first and more important. (*UN39 96*)²⁹⁸

If the fifteen combined their power, they would have the monopoly over most of these "essentials" and, consequently, could control the world market, whereas the autocracies do not have the same possibility. According to Streit, the six mentioned entries are "the things that are most essential whether to modern civilization or to war" and these are the fields in which "the fifteen are most powerful and the au-

²⁹⁷Streit adds them up to 249,000,000 people in the United States, Canada, and Britain, whereas the total population in the Union would be 471,000,000 (*Freedom's Frontier* 35). This made an English-speaking majority of 52.87%.

²⁹⁸The figures in *Union Now* are taken from the League of Nation's *Statistical Yearbook* of 1938. It shows which percentage the fifteen democracies, the three autocracies, Soviet Russia, and the "Remaining Countries" in the world hold in the following categories: the production of nickel, rubber, motor-cars, ground nuts, sulphur, wood pulp, iron ore, tin, gold, butter, petroleum, copper, coal, raw cotton, natural phosphates, electricity, wool, lead, steel, aluminium, artificial silk, wheat, potash, and raw silk, as well as the known gold reserves, the merchant ship tonnage, the air traffic (miles flown), the value of the foreign trade, the area, and the population (qtd. in *UN39 97*). However, Streit only regards these six entries as "essentials": artificial silk, land area, population, wheat production, potash, and raw silk.

tocracies weakest” (96). Hence, the autocracies’ monopoly over raw silk and potash is not as important as the democracies’ dominance over the others. Furthermore, the democracies also have the monopoly over the world’s manufacturing and transportation resources, which increases their power position (96-98).²⁹⁹ Consequently, they are economically quite autonomous and do not depend on other states as much as the autocracies. Additionally, Streit claims that by processes of centralization and coordination, the power position can be strengthened even more in the Union, as this removes “waste effort, duplication, friction, cross-purposes, and diffusion” (UN41 68-69).

Material autonomy of the Union is easier to achieve and can be seen as a precaution for the risk that its establishment leads to animosities with other states. Streit is convinced that this power position still is underestimated because there are “many other countries who would stand with the democracies in the event of attack by the autocracies” (UN39 98),³⁰⁰ which would add to the monopoly of produced goods and corresponding raw materials. He also argues that the dominant position of the Union would be even greater after its founding as “no outside country could withstand the bargaining power of this rich market with its monopoly control of essential raw materials” (163).³⁰¹ He even uses this argument after decolonization reduced the area – and, consequently, the access to raw materials – of the former empires of Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and France. The newly independent nations would continue to supply the Union with raw materials because if they wanted to raise their standard of living, they would remain dependent on the stored capital and manufactured goods from the Union states, which makes them belong to the (imagined) community of the democracies – from the perspective of the Union nations – whether they want it or not. Streit argues that the monopoly in material power still exists and could only be lost if the democracies do not unite (*Freedom’s Frontier* 50; see also p. 202 here). Considering the fact that the Soviet Union and China undeniably tried to influence the newly independent nations to turn them

²⁹⁹Steel and wood pulp are seen as the most important manufacturing resources, the most important transportation resources are ships, motor cars, and planes (96-98).

³⁰⁰Yet, he does not mention which other countries he has in mind.

³⁰¹See also *Freedom Against Itself* 306. For the discussion whether this can be seen as a form of imperialism, see chapter 8.

into satellites, it must be criticized that Streit may not have assessed the situation correctly. The former colonies had become independent *because* they did not want to be governed by their mother countries any longer – be it directly or indirectly by remaining the suppliers of raw materials. Next to displaying an imperialist way of thinking, it would be highly idealistic to assume that they would willingly continue to have the same dependent economic relations with their former mother countries after their independence. Conversely, it is also a pragmatic argument as the newly founded nations still needed manufactured goods as well as a market for their raw materials.

In his short update of the figures of 1939 in 1949, Streit states that the losses in production are compensated by the increased wartime production in the British Commonwealth and the United States and the fact that the Axis powers, as well as Soviet Russia, suffered “far worse ruin during the war” (*UN49* 262). Additionally, western European production will quickly rise due to the European Recovery Program. The Atlantic Union, thus, is presented as still much more powerful than the Soviet Union. Streit also asserts that the free tend to exaggerate in their estimation of the Soviet Union’s power even more than they did in the past for the Axis powers. As the latter are “more developed industrially and otherwise”, the Kremlin should not be overestimated (262-63). Yet, Streit has to admit that the need for a unification of the free world’s powers and resources is more urgent in 1961. The Soviet Union has caught up in terms of production and Nikita Khrushchev bragged about “‘burying’ us [the free world] in its production in another decade” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 16).³⁰² Still, Streit is convinced that the Union of the fifteen – then – free states would soon compensate for the “losses in relative material power that Atlantica has suffered since 1939” (38).³⁰³

Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed again that the fifteen democracies Streit chose are 12 more nations than three autocracies, which makes the argument of the strongest productive power and the possession of raw materials only partly con-

³⁰²The reference here is that Khrushchev boasted at the American National Exhibition in the Soviet Union in 1959 that the Soviet Union would have caught up with the U.S. in terms of production within seven years and would thereafter surpass them (Khrushchev 0:24-0:49).

³⁰³Later he argues that especially Germany and Italy add to the relative manufacturing and transportation power of the Union (*Freedom’s Frontier* 50).

vincing – if at all. Still, the fifteen do have – according to the statistics and if they worked together – “almost monopoly world control of such war essentials as rubber, nickel, iron, oil, gold and credit” (*UN39* 160). In 1939, this gives them an advantage over the autocracies in the war yet to come. During the war in 1941 it is claimed that even though only the English-speaking nations are included in the nucleus “[n]o material power has been lost except the minor fractions of populations and territory which were situated on the European continent” (*UN41* 14). Additionally, the colonies of France, Holland, Belgium, and Denmark still are perceived as democratic because they are not occupied by Germany at the time. Hence, the ‘English-speaking states’ can keep the monopoly of most of the war essentials if they hold the overseas territories of the other European nations in trust (14-15).³⁰⁴ This displays how Streit *really* sees the distribution of material power in the original nucleus: Nearly all of it is controlled by the ‘English-speaking states’, whereas the material power of the other states is only marginal. As Streit mentions the possibility of the English-speaking ones holding in trust these territories without providing any further explanation, he must have been convinced that they not only are economically and politically strong enough to do so. This temporary administration seems to be a ‘natural’ procedure to Streit and he is convinced that this is also understood in the European nations, so that they would not have any apprehensions. However, this is only possible if the hegemonic position among the original fifteen nations in the fields of economy and politics is commonly accepted. If this is the case, the English-speaking nations are not only regarded as an imagined community by themselves but also by other nations.

Trading Power

Close trade relations also add to the democracies’ power position. In 1939 Streit writes:

The chief market of every one of the fifteen is formed by the other fourteen. [...] On the whole seventy per cent of the trade of all our democracies is with each other, seventy-three per cent of their exports going to and sixty-seven per cent of their

³⁰⁴Streit declares that the ‘English-speaking states’ can then “blockade dictators from rubber, tin, nickel, copper, lead, gold, cotton, wool and oil, gain the time to control the air also” (*UN41* 15).

imports coming from the democratic group – while only eleven per cent of their trade is with the Triangle of autocracy. (*UN39 90*)

It seems like the democracies do not have to depend on the autocracies for trade but the latter rely on trading with the former. The figures of the League of Nations Yearbook *International Trade Statistics* of 1936 indicate that the trade relations between the original states indeed were very close.³⁰⁵ Streit argues that all of them export more to the other fourteen states than to any other group of states and that they receive their imports mostly from each other.³⁰⁶ After having stated this, Streit subdivides them into three groups: “the three great democracies, the eight small European democracies and the four British overseas democracies, to allow their comparative trading importance to be seen” (98, 100). His conclusion of this subdivision is that the three “great democracies” (U.S., Britain, and France) alone are more than twice as powerful and important for world trade than the autocracies.³⁰⁷ Two aspects are important here: Among the three great democracies, France is the weakest, which once more constitutes a clear dominance of Britain and the United States.³⁰⁸ Secondly, however, the dominance of the big English-speaking nations among the fifteen in this aspect is not as clear as one might expect.³⁰⁹ The overall impression in *Union Now* is that they are the most important states in the group of fifteen. Still, they only traded 63.93% of the imports and 67.25 % of the exports among them. This, in turn, means that the eight European states had 36.07% of the imports and 32.75% of the exports.³¹⁰ This shows that the smaller European states were not as weak in the aspects of trade as could be expected from Streit’s

³⁰⁵According to Streit, the figures need to be assessed as “conservative” because the trade with the colonies is not taken into account in the yearbook (*UN39 92*).

³⁰⁶New Zealand and Ireland have the highest percentage of exports (96% each), Switzerland the lowest (50%). New Zealand also has the highest percentage of exports from the other fourteen (92%) and Switzerland the lowest (44%). Streit explains the low percentage of Swiss imports from the democracies with the fact that it is geographically situated “between two of the autocracies” and therefore naturally gets many products from them (90, 92).

³⁰⁷The United States, Britain, and France together have \$5,569 million of imports and \$4,034 million of exports, whereas Germany, Japan, and Italy together have \$2,363 million of imports and \$2,262 million of exports (100).

³⁰⁸Imports and exports: France: \$1,003 million / \$565 million; United States: \$1,779 million / \$1,946 million; UK: \$2,787 million / \$1,523 million (100). This adds up to the following percentages in the imports and exports among the fifteen: France: 11.09% of imports, 7.61% of exports; United States: 19.68% of imports, 26.20% of exports; UK: 30.83% of imports, 20.51% of exports.

³⁰⁹For some reason, Streit includes Ireland among among the “small European democracies” in these statistics and not among the English-speaking ones.

³¹⁰For this calculation, Ireland again is included among the English-speaking nations and France is included among the European states.

argument.

Yet, a close trade relationship among the democracies as a whole is not surprising. This qualifies the argument that democracies in general are connected so much stronger than the autocracies and that this connection is especially strong in the case of the fifteen founding nations. Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares have shown that democracies tend to trade with one another because of similar political and economic structures: They mostly have a limited government, which often comes along with open polities and a fair judicial system. For economic agents from other nations with limited government in particular, these two factors are incentives for trade for several reasons: Firstly, all agents, domestic and foreign, are equally protected by the rule of law. This is not necessarily the case in other political systems. Secondly, “[l]imited government assures economic actors that their positions will be protected from government fiat” (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 649). Finally, especially when economic actors come from nations with the same political system – in this case, a democracy – they are very likely to be accustomed to the system and its rules. Consequently, they will not have difficulties dealing with the system in another democracy, since it follows the same rules as the system in their own nation (Dixon and Moon 10). Thus, it is not only easier but also more likely that economic agents from democracies trade with each other and that similarity in systems increases trade flows. However, Streit’s argument is that democracy *as such* facilitates trade with *all* other nations of different political systems. This has to be relativized because it is the similarity of political system that is decisive. For that reason, looser trade relations with the autocracies and stronger ones with other democracies can be expected.

Additionally, distance also influences trade relations (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 653). Naturally, geographically closely situated states are more likely to have close trade relations than geographically very distant states if it is only due to shorter and cheaper routes of transportation of goods. Thus, the close trade relations among the European nations are not as outstanding as Streit suggests. Furthermore, geographical distance alone cannot explain trade relations as the examples of Australia and New Zealand show. They are far away from Europe and

still have close trade relations with the other states of the nucleus. Nevertheless, they have a close cultural proximity due to their history and, therefore, trade relationships are encouraged. Nations with a larger cultural distance have looser trade relationships because of a clear perception of cultural otherness, which can prevent closer relations in general and trade relations in particular. Hence, not only geographical but also cultural distance or proximity have a huge influence on the probability of close trade relations, which one more ‘naturally’ explains the close relationship among the fifteen.

There is another circumstance Streit does not consider: the political decisions of the autocracies. Not only their aggressive foreign policy but also their domestic economic decisions had a huge impact on the trade with other states in the 1930s. The ‘Third Reich’, for example, had the economic goal of autarchy to not depend on other states in the upcoming – and already planned – war. Trade relations with other states were looser because of this political decision. In general, governments’ decisions often influence trade with other states: Incoming trade, for instance, can be restricted, regulated, or highly taxed, which discourages foreign economic agents. Additionally, autocratic governments also control *which* materials and goods can be imported. Especially if a war is being prepared or its probability is accepted, mainly imports of war essentials can be expected. This happened in the ‘Third Reich’ at the latest after 1937 (Tofahrn 104). Thus, trade with other states was restricted considerably. This makes the autocracies appear weaker in such statistics on trade Streit uses, but can simply be explained by the economic decision to not focus on trade with other nations.

One gets the impression that Streit desperately wants to find proof that a democratic political system automatically leads to close trade relations with all other states. Yet, this is a bit too simplified. Still, the fifteen democracies traded a lot with each other and could be presented as a strong economic entity, for which it came naturally to seek trade mainly with each other. This community of democracies also was much stronger in terms of trade than the ‘community’ of the autocracies. Yet, a comparison does not make sense here. Firstly, Streit contrasts fifteen democracies with three to four autocracies, so the former group naturally trades more. Secondly,

the economies of both groups were structured differently. The democracies focused on free trade, whereas the autocracies did not want to become dependent on other nations, which naturally results in less overall trade. Nevertheless, as the trade relations indeed were close – if only for other reasons – it has to be questioned whether this community of nations is only imagined or real in the aspect of trade.

Financial Power

In terms of financial power, the fifteen democracies are regarded as dominant in the world because they “possess practically all the world’s gold and banked wealth” (*UN39* 7). Additionally, they are highly interdependent as well as independent from outside states as they “have built up each other with their savings and trust them to each other at their lowest interest rates” (91).³¹¹ Therefore, they have more to lose if another depression hits. According to Streit, the only solution to that problem is forming a Union of those fifteen wealthy democracies (30-31). Referring to the League of Nations *Monetary Review* of 1938, Streit states that except for France, whose people allegedly do not keep their savings in the banks,³¹² “the per capita banked wealth in each democracy is greater than the highest per capita rating among the autocracies” (98). Additionally, the democracies together have roughly seven times the banked wealth of the autocracies. Again, it has to be noted that the autocracies are in the minority, so this argument is not overall convincing.³¹³ It is remarkable, however, that the English-speaking nations together hold 87.04% of

³¹¹Streit, however, does not prove this assertion and does not give reasons why he comes to this conclusion. Yet, as he mentions the aspect of trust here, it is possible that he wants to construct an imagined community among the democracies that confide in each other also financially because they have a feeling of belonging together. If people chose to believe it, they would not need proof of this assertion.

³¹² It is unclear why Streit argues that the French do not keep their money in the banks as he does not give any proof for the assumption. One possible explanation could be that his wife, Jeanne Defrance, was French and she or her family might have had this habit so Streit assumed that this was a French habit as such. Yet, this can only be guessed.

³¹³According to *Union Now*, the democracies have \$98,703 million and the autocracies \$14,121 million, which means that the democracies have 6.99 times as much banked wealth (99). The ‘poorest’ of the autocracies is Italy (banked wealth: \$2,727 million), which still is more than most of the democracies had: Australia (\$2,190 million), Sweden (\$2,035 million), the Netherlands (\$1,165 million), Belgium (\$1,106 million), Denmark (\$975 million), Ireland (\$900 million), the Union of South Africa (\$743 million), Norway (\$609 million), New Zealand (\$570 million), and Finland (\$340 million) all have less banked wealth than Italy. Germany as the richest of the autocracies has a deposit of \$6,788 million, an amount which only the United States (\$59,000 million) and the United Kingdom (\$19,678 million) exceed (99).

the total banked wealth of the fifteen democracies and that four of the six richest nations also are English-speaking.³¹⁴ They definitely are the most influential in the group of fifteen in terms of wealth, if not to say that they are desperately needed by the other states within this group for their cash flow – in case all fifteen democracies are seen as one ‘financial entity’.

In 1949, Streit concludes that if those rich nations were united based on his proposal, they “would need only 1.65 years of its entire national income to pay off *completely* all the present national debts of the United States, the British, the French, and all the other democracies” (*UN49* 319-20) if they followed Hamilton’s financial principles.³¹⁵ This quite optimistic prediction for the financial situation of the Union is repeated by Streit when he promotes the Atlantic Union resolution in *Freedom & Union* in 1955 (see p. 305 here). He states that if the resolution was adopted and the Union founded afterwards, the gross national product of the Atlantic democracies would “vastly exceed by 1965 the rosier present forecasts of it” (“Against the D-Bomb” 1). Thus, he is quite confident that that the already strong position of the democracies can further be strengthened by founding the Union. However, Streit also regards an economic crisis as a constant danger. As in the case of all the other possible crises, the only possible solution is the founding of the Union. An economic depression would not only have a negative effect on the single economies of the democracies but also on their unity (*UN41* 105-09). This is why he anticipates that the Soviet Union wants to foster a new depression in order to keep the democracies apart – a possibility the democracies need to cope with and act upon (*Freedom Against Itself* 8-9, 150, 166-68, 172, 182-83, 191).³¹⁶

³¹⁴The English-speaking nations have \$85,716 million of \$98,703 million, most of it coming from the United States (\$59,000 million). The four richest English-speaking nations are: United States (\$59,000 million), United Kingdom (\$19,678 million), Canada (\$2,835), and Australia (\$2,190). The next richest nations are France (\$3,290 million) and Switzerland (\$3,267 million), who clearly own much less money than the English-speaking ones (99).

³¹⁵Hamilton’s idea for the United States was to free all states of the Union of its debts and to take it to the higher inter-state level so that the newly founded government would pay them back. In order to raise money, the Union got the power to install customs on luxury goods. This resulted in a better credit status and allowed the individual states to start anew in terms of finance. The other option – a debt cut – would have severely devaluated the currency, which would have made it harder to pay back debts (Sylla and Cowen 318). This allusion to Hamilton here is another example which shows that Streit took knowledge about the American Founding Fathers and their philosophy for granted; see chapter 4.2.

³¹⁶See also C. K. Streit, “The Soaring Cost”; C. K. Streit, “Bruges Proposes Atlantic Institute”; C. K. Streit, “The Monetary Menace”; C. K. Streit, “The U.S. Word”; C. K. Streit, “Shall Union

Military Power

When it comes to the military, Streit admits in 1939 that the relative power relations all over the world are hard to estimate:

Much has been said of the secret armament of Germany, but there is really secret armament everywhere. [...] Bluffing, concealing, lying, to fool adversaries into thinking that one is stronger or weaker than one really is – this has always been so elementary a principle of military strategy that all armaments figures need always to be regarded skeptically. (*UN39* 101)

Still, he is convinced that relatively reliable information in this aspect could be found in the *Armaments Yearbook* of the League of Nations of 1937 (102).³¹⁷ His interpretation of those figures is that if the Union wants to maintain a two-power standard “not only on the sea but on the land and air sides” (101), the democracies of the Union actually have to disarm because the three autocracies Germany, Japan, and Italy are “the only countries that threaten war” (101)³¹⁸ and two of them are much weaker than the Union states would be together. The same would even be true for a three-power standard, meaning that the Union has more military power than the three autocracies combined (*UN39* 160). Again, this is natural because of the comparison of 15 to 3 states. Additionally, Streit is of the opinion that by combining the military strength with the monopoly of most of the production and of most of the raw materials, the potential of the democracies is much greater because these materials and their further processing are vital for fighting a war (101).³¹⁹

Be Deferred.”

³¹⁷Streit compares the fifteen democracies with the three autocracies (colonies included, respectively) in the following aspects: “national defence expenditure” (1937-38), “navy tons build and building” (1937), “air force, no. of planes” (1937), and “army effectives” (1937). The *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Luftwaffe* is used for the number of planes from Britain and India, the United States, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Japan. Streit admits that due to missing reliable information, the numbers of German war expenditure, navy tons, and air force are the average of French and Russian estimations, and the number of army effectives is estimated by the League of Nations *Armaments Yearbook*. He shows awareness of the fact that war expenditure in Germany has risen since the latest accurate figures of 1934 although he does not know by how much. As a result, it is hard to fully compare Germany (and the other Axis powers) to the democracies because the figures are not accurate. However, they provide the base for Streit’s argument, which is why they are used here to explain his reasoning. It has to be noted that unlike in the statistics for trade, the colonies are included in the estimation of military power. This is done without further explanation, but it can be assumed that, although the trade with the colonies is marginalized, especially the ‘fighting power’ of the colonies in terms of soldiers is vital to all great powers. This makes them appear stronger in this aspect.

³¹⁸For the argument of a possible disarmament of the Union, see also *UN39* 7, 160.

³¹⁹Streit even assumes that the armed strength of the democracies is underestimated, particularly

Consequently, he must have been convinced that the *real* power relationship of the democracies and the autocracies is even more clearly in favor of the former. Still, if the navy tons, war planes, and army effectives of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia of 1937 are added up, those four states together are remarkably strong (*UN49* 74):³²⁰ They have 1,983,345 navy tons (15 democracies: 3,639,898), 12,500 war planes (15 democracies: 14,369), and 2,611,200 army effectives (15 democracies: 2,389,000). Although only four states – in contrast to the fifteen of the opposing group – are taken together, they have about 54% as many navy tons, 87% as many war planes and even more army effectives (109%) than the fifteen democracies. This calculation contradicts Streit’s argument at least in the aspect of armed power. If fifteen democracies are not too much stronger than four autocracies, or actually weaker in terms of army effectives, their overall strength cannot be as great as estimated. Nevertheless, it needs to be considered that Germany had changed to a wartime economy since at the latest 1937 when Hitler wanted the German economy to be ready for war within two years (Tofahrn 104, 341-47). Consequently, the German economy put more effort in the production of armaments and war strategic products than in others. This has to be included in the comparison of the power position of the states as a whole because Germany, accordingly, neglected other sectors.

By the time *Union Now* was written, World War II was only a possibility, not yet reality. Nevertheless, the comparison of military strength already is quite important to Streit. In *Union Now With Britain*, which was written before the U.S. joined the war, Streit is still confident that the founding of the Union alone can turn the tide in favor of the free world because the military power of the seven “remaining” states seems enough for Streit for to achieve this aim (*UN41* 78). After the war, Streit is sure that the democracies are “separately maintaining armies whose total strength is numerically about equal to that of the Soviet army” (*UN49* 263). So obviously, he both regards the democracies as even stronger and is confident that

in the case of the United States (*UN40* 74). This additional comment is only made in the concise edition in 1940, which might indicate that Streit was harshly criticized for it, so that he no longer includes it in the following editions.

³²⁰The figures are quoted in the edition of 1949, although this has already been Streit’s estimation in 1939. However, the statistics *including* the Soviet Union only appear in the postwar edition. Yet, for reasons given in footnote 282 here, he is still convinced that the power relations have remained “substantially true” (*UN49* 262).

he can assess the opponent's military strength by then. In the context of the Cold War, this is only partly convincing. Although there was an arms race between the two parties, neither of the two blocs fully displayed its total military power to the respective other if the presented strength was a deterrent strong enough.³²¹

What is striking about the original figures is that the amount of defense expenditure of the democracies is roughly 2.6 times higher than of the autocracies, but they only have about twice as many navy tons, 1.69 times more war planes and 1.82 times as many army effectives:

	15 democracies	3 autocracies
national defense expenditure 1937-38	\$3,342.6 million	\$1,295.5 million
navy tons	3,639,898	1,776,021
air planes	14,369	8,500
army effectives	2,389,700	1,311,200

(qtd. in *UN39* 102)³²²

The English-speaking democracies alone spend 1.96 times more on defense than the autocracies, but they only have 1.58 times more navy tons than the autocracies, only 0.88 of the autocracies' war planes, and 0.93 times the number of army effectives:

	English-speaking democracies	3 autocracies
national defense expenditure 1937-38	\$2,533.0 million	\$1,295.5 million
navy tons	2,798,789	1,776,021
air planes	7,447	8,500
army effectives	1,221,800	1,311,200

(qtd. in *Union Now* 102)

One of the reasons for the high number of navy tons of the 'English-speaking states'

³²¹In any case, in 1961 Streit is convinced that an effective Atlantic Union would at least save \$10-13 billion a year just for the American taxpayer which otherwise is spent on defense because a united free world would still be strong enough in terms of military power. As this was only an estimation of the savings based on the coordination of the NATO forces, Streit thinks that the possible financial savings in a full federal union in all defined fields of government would be much higher (*Freedom's Frontier* 136-38, 159-60). Hence, by founding the Union, the military power of the members would increase even more at less cost. Streit claims that they would be so powerful on the military field that Moscow could never attain this level at all ("Boomerang Economies" 3).

³²²Here it becomes clear that the intended two-power standard could not be upheld by the Union states, especially not if the states disarmed.

certainly is the fact that Britain is a sea power. Needless to say, Germany as a land power has fewer naval tons and it had to further reduce its army and navy after World War I due to the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. Italy and Japan, however, were heavily armed both on sea and land which made up for Germany's low figures in the group of the autocracies. Yet, as the 'Third Reich' had already changed to wartime economy before, the exact figures could not be known from the outside. Nevertheless, it had to be more powerful than these figures already suggest. This strongly contradicts Streit's argument of the democracies' power being so much greater in this aspect.

However, in *Union Now With Britain* Streit displays a certain nervousness about the main danger for the seven English-speaking democracies: They can lose their strength "in one sudden catastrophe" – something which is particularly dangerous for the control of the sea power. As Britain and the United States each provide half of the sea power of the Union and London is "fearfully exposed" in the war, this power could quickly be lost (*UN41* 15). This must have been really alarming for Streit as just one year before he unconcernedly stated that the only thinkable possibility of a united action of Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia was a "serious loss in British sea power" (*UN40* 70).³²³ Yet after the war, Streit is confident again. He argues that sea power generally is more important than land power for reasons of greater mobility and the Union states by then have 91% of the world's navy tonnage together with "strategic bases and straits all over the globe". There are no figures for the democracies' percentage of the world's navy tonnage before the war, but Streit claims that it was "only twice that of the Axis trio". Now with the new counterpart, the Soviet Union, being a land power, the democracies have numbers "at least 20 times greater than Soviet Russia" (*UN49* 264).³²⁴

Since World War II, a new weapon had been developed: the atomic bomb. By the time the postwar edition was written, the free democracies were still in the sole possession of the atomic power in the world as only the United States succeeded in

³²³This is a conclusion Streit only draws in the edition of 1940. This possibility is not even mentioned in the edition of 1939.

³²⁴Comparing the data given in the edition of 1939, the claim concerning the Axis power can be confirmed (*UN39* 102), however, no new data is given for the comparison with the Soviet Union in 1949.

building an atomic bomb. Streit is confident by then that the use of atomic power can be internationally controlled by the Union, which again enhances its power in this respect. It would be the sole international authority for the use of atomic power and weapons and its jurisdiction would be extended once more states are admitted (*UN49* 264-66; *Freedom's Frontier* 49).³²⁵ Additionally, if more atomic powers are added to the Union, it becomes increasingly impossible to challenge the Union's atomic power so that the ongoing atomic arms race can be ended (*UN49* 265-66; *Freedom's Frontier* 49). All in all, Streit is still quite optimistic about his estimation of the military power of the democracies after the war.

In 1961 however, the author seems much more concerned about this relationship between the democracies and the communist dictatorship than before: The latter made comparatively big improvements in air force and sea power, especially in comparison to the former opposing powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The result is that after 1950, the Soviet Union can actually challenge the free in air and sea power (*Freedom's Frontier* 16). It has rebuilt its industry and mainly focuses on the production of armaments by then, in particular on the atomic bomb.³²⁶ This way, the Soviets have “also broken the one complete monopoly we [the democracies] had”. It is furthermore alarming for Streit that the Soviets are “armed with rocket power that surpasses [the democracies' power] in intercontinental guided missiles and thrust into Space” (7). The reason for this distressing situation is – in Streit's opinion – that the free have not united their efforts but keep their “scientific secrets” not only from the communists but also from each other (16).³²⁷ Hence, in comparison to both the time when *Union Now* first was published in 1939 and to the previous edition of 1949, the democracies have lost relative power in the military field to a great extent.³²⁸ This impression is one of the factors why Streit wants to found the Union even more urgently and as quickly as possible as he – like from the 1930s onward – does not believe in the practicability of a balance of power (*UN39*

³²⁵In *Freedom's Frontier*, Streit repeats this argument even though the Soviet Union has succeeded in building an atomic bomb by then. According to him, the more atomic states join the Union, the weaker the position of the Soviets is so that they would “prefer to reach atomic agreement with the Union soon after its creation”; see also C. K. Streit, “Answering Questions July-Aug. 1960” 33.

³²⁶The Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949.

³²⁷See also C. K. Streit, “Strange Security” 3.

³²⁸See also *Freedom Against Itself* 7-8; C. K. Streit, “Leonov's Bodywriting.”

4, 28; *UN41* 12; *UN43* 22; *UN49* 22; *Freedom's Frontier* 204). He equally does not fully trust that what is called a balance of terror can reliably secure the peace, although he regards it as a strong deterrent to any attack from Moscow. This 'balance' developed after World War II and results in the fact that each power bloc can completely destroy the other (*Freedom's Frontier* 44-46).³²⁹ Because of this situation, non-military factors become more important in Streit's line of argument when the power relationship between the Union states and the Soviet Union are compared (49-51). Apparently, the 'truths' set forward by the Atlantic discourse were no longer as persuasive as before: With the emergence of the Soviet Union, sheer military power and a presumed cultural superiority of the Atlantic nations could no longer unchallengeably construct 'the West' as a 'natural' hegemon in the world. Hence, the truths of the Atlantic discourse were actually quite literally challenged by the Soviet Union and its communist ideology.

Moral Power

Moral power is probably the aspect of power attributed to the fifteen founders which is hardest to define. In *The New Federalist*, John F. Schmidt and Clarence K. Streit claim that an ideal nucleus needs to have "enough moral power" to work as a foundation for a world state. This power then is ascribed to "countries for refuge from tyranny and leadership toward freedom" (*New Federalist* 48). Hence, to start with a first definition of the term, it can be interpreted that moral power is a synonym for "the power to guarantee freedom" (*UN49* 281; *Freedom's Frontier* 43). Using a

³²⁹There is very little research on the term "balance of terror". Apparently it was coined by Lester Pearson in June 1955 in a speech in San Francisco, in which he claims that the balance of power was succeeded by a "balance of terror" (Edwards 238). In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of 1959, which is printed in *Freedom & Union*, the term balance of terror also is used, however this particular situation is criticized for being unstable (*F&U*035). Some years later, Harold Urey assesses the achievement of a "balance of terror" positively. He won the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1934 and was a supporter of world government at the latest in 1939. In 1950 he became a member of the Atlantic Union Committee (see p. 293 here) and published repeatedly in *Freedom & Union*, mostly stressing that he was an atomic scientist – probably to indicate to his readers that he knew what he was talking about in terms of destructive weapons. According to him, a balance of power is no longer possible due to the destructive nature of modern weapons. But because of the existing balance of terror he considers the free world to be in a "good situation" (Urey, "Urey Answers Questions" 21; see also Urey, "Atlantic Union Is Imperative"). Yet, Urey remains unconvinced that this kind of balance can work to prevent a new war (C. K. Streit, "The Monetary Menace" 1; "1938 'Union Now' on Munich" 20).

card game metaphor, Streit explains that the founding nations of the union together have to be federated to hold the decisive “four aces” to “save themselves and world peace” in the future: “*The ace of clubs, or armed power [...] The ace of spades, or productive power [...] The ace of diamonds, or raw material power [...] The ace of hearts, or moral power*”. Having the four aces, the “unbeatable royal flush” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 51) – and knowing it – reinforces the moral power for the Union as a whole.

Moral power is regarded as particularly strong in the United States as the ‘land of the free’, which is why Streit claims that a Union membership – or the founding of the Union at last – is particularly important to the United States. After all “[n]o other [nation] has so much to lose economically, politically, and *morally* as we by failure to solve in time the problem of world government” (*UN39* 58; emphasis added). Accordingly, the United States has the (moral) obligation to take the initiative to create the Union in order to not suffer from *not* founding it (*UN40* x; *UN41* 4).³³⁰ In *Freedom Against Itself*, this is especially vital as neither Italy nor Germany, France, or Britain – *the* biggest powers in Europe – are seen as having the same “moral and material resources they had in the 1920’s to resist the social dangers inherent in depression” and their economies are highly dependent on U.S. economy. Consequently, if the latter suffers from a minor depression, the other four will suffer severely and might not be able to cope with the dangers of a depression. For that reason, the U.S. has to act fast and take the lead in founding the Union (*Freedom Against Itself* 172). As it is only the U.S. which is made responsible for founding the Union here, it is once more represented as the leading power in the Atlantic world, which furthermore helps to reconstruct the key element of the Atlantic discourse, namely that the United States is the dominant and defining power at the center of the future world order.

In February 1956, Streit declares in his editorial to *Freedom & Union* that it

³³⁰In *The New Federalist*, Streit argues that due to the political processes in Britain, the United States, and France, many free representative governments and federal unions exist in the world. As the French stressed the importance of freedom in the past – a principle which is also vital in the U.S. – the Americans owe the French for realizing this principle for the whole world (*New Federalist* 2) – Britain is no longer mentioned in the explanation here. This can lead to the assumption that the Americans, on the one hand, must feel obliged to realize this idea which is so important to the French. On the other hand, it is *only* the Americans who can still accomplish this as they obviously are more powerful than the French and, thus, can start this Union.

is the English-speaking peoples – no longer the Americans alone – who are “most responsible for the retarded political development of the Atlantic Democracy” and should therefore take the initiative to found the Union (“The French Situation” 2). Thus, an ‘imagined community of responsibility’ is constructed among all the English-speaking peoples. However, neither the U.S. nor the English-speaking peoples as a whole would found the Union for solely their own benefit but for the “cause of peace and freedom – their [the other nations’] cause” (Meeman 10). This way of thinking which closely resembles the idea of Manifest Destiny and is accepted by Streit totally uncritically at this point.³³¹

Streit is convinced that the existing moral power – which is strongly connected with morale, fighting spirit – also helped the U.S. and its allies during World War I because they believed in and fought for “something more worth dying for”: the positive goal of “organizing a better world for everyone” (*UN41* 77-78) or making the world safe for democracy – to use Wilson’s words.³³² Yet, the First World War could only be won by the “parallel use of [...] military and [...] moral power, and by getting all the value we [the United States and its allies in the war] could from both as soon as possible” (78).³³³ However, this power was not enough to make the peace last after 1918. In World War II, Streit is sure that many American lives can be spared if the Union is founded – a circumstance which would further strengthen the free’s moral power (77-78).³³⁴ One of the reasons for why people’s lives can be

³³¹This altruistic motive of only wanting to extend freedom to “still other fields and to an ever-increasing number of people” is seen to be especially strong in the United States, but is also ascribed to the other founders of the Union in *The New Federalist* (38).

³³²Although Streit thinks that leagues cannot work, he is a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson’s ideals and work. The mere idea and establishment of the League of Nations “could bring out the great truth that freedom of man had reached the point where it required law and order and government to be organized on a world scale”. Streit continues: “This institution Wilson did create [...] he alone was wise enough to know that the League with all its faults was at that moment in history worth a dozen Versailles treaties” (*UN39* 198). Evidently, he praises Wilson for being a man of vision who fought against resistance inside and outside of his own nation just to let his beliefs become a reality. In a way, Streit might have wanted to become a ‘second Wilson’ as he also sees himself as one of the few visionaries who really understands how an ever-lasting peace can be created and who fights hard for this goal. Possibly for this reason, Streit continues to appraise Woodrow Wilson several times throughout his writings (*UN39* 41, 56, 193, 198; *UN41* 85-86, 94, 111-12, 155, 162; *UN43* 263; *Freedom Against Itself* 103; *Freedom’s Frontier* 24, 126).

³³³Streit estimates that “[h]ad [they] waited with [their] moral power till [their] military power was ready, [they] would have lost” World War I (*UN41* 78).

³³⁴As *Union Now With Britain* was written before the U.S. entered the war, Streit might still have seen the possibility of avoiding his nation joining it. Thus, it is partly logical that he only refers to American lives here because the idea that lives of fellow American citizens can be spared

saved is that under democracy, they have “greater enduring and inventive powers” and their political system produces a “better morale” because each citizen has “a direct and equal interest in the war”. This stimulates the people to “feats of courage, ingenuity, resourcefulness, and to more fruitful teamwork” (112). If a lasting peace order is to be built afterwards, however, the Union has to keep up the moral power by providing the means for future world peace.

Hence, “moral power” is not solely defined as being able to guarantee freedom but also as having a positive goal – at least for a western perspective – and the true belief in the righteousness of one’s own idea of bringing about a new peaceful world order.³³⁵ However, only in 1961 when Streit introduces *Freedom’s Frontier* in *Freedom & Union*, he fully acknowledges this insight that “the positive as a motive for action” is important and a new world order cannot only be built upon fear of another strong power alone (“‘Union Now’ in 1939” 2).³³⁶ Furthermore, traits such as courage, ingenuity, resourcefulness and the ability to work together belong to “moral power” as well.

These characteristics have helped the free to develop several’ achievements since 1900: Streit mentions that with their inventions the people have liberated themselves sevenfold: they can “fly round the planet”, have “*opened to mass production the ‘New Continent of Chemistry’*”, women got emancipated in political, industrial, and financial ways, the western way of life has spread to other parts of the world and has freed the people from foreign rule,³³⁷ “[h]ereditary despotism has been

can cause a strong emotional reaction among the American people. After all, they are the main audience of his book, since they should take the first step towards founding the Union. Normally, people do anything to prevent unnecessary death, so Streit might have relied on this effect and hoped that this would convince more Americans that the Union was their only chance of staying out of the war and of saving American lives. In the same edition, Streit argues that only a Union with Britain could “halt tyranny’s onward march and save America from invasion” (19), which addresses the same emotional reaction for Americans. In *Freedom’s Frontier*, Streit again mainly speaks to Americans with the very same argument that many American lives can be saved if the Union is founded and no third world war breaks out (*Freedom’s Frontier* 138).

³³⁵By combining their power during the war “the people of the North Atlantic have led the world-wide war against [...] ignorance, poverty, disease and premature death” (174). According to Streit, they, consequently, became role models for the rest of the world. By this redefinition of the war aims, the North Atlantic people again are morally qualified for leading the world into the new peace order.

³³⁶Streit explains that the pre-existing (moral) power would be strengthened by the Union as the result of the Atlantic Union would be “*moral* and material, *spiritual* and scientific” rewards (“‘Union Now’ in 1939” 2; emphasis added).

³³⁷Streit seems to deliberately ignore here that the western powers more often than not *were* the foreign rulers.

overthrown”, the death rate has been reduced, and the control of atomic energy has been mastered – with both its positive and negative consequences (*Freedom Against Itself* 17-20). As a consequence, the founding nations can rightfully take the lead as they are “leading first in certain moral and spiritual principles” like “equal importance and dignity of each human being” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 174). They all have this belief in common, which is why they can lead the world to an era that has only become possible because of progress in all kinds of fields: science, industry, politics, and morality (5).³³⁸ As political, cultural, military, economic, and moral questions are seen as interrelated (153), the nucleus evidently has to be regarded as united by a strong faith in their moral force because its nations are closely connected in all the other fields – a connection which could probably not be upheld with a lack of ‘moral connection’ and moral power.

Although the founders of the Union already need to have high moral power in the beginning, it still is necessary to put more “moral and material power behind [the free]” (41) for them to succeed in their endeavor of saving peace in the world. This can and should be achieved by founding the Union: Because of the resulting stronger position in the world, the newly founded state would gain immensely “not only in per capita production and standards of living but on the political, military, scientific, educational and moral sides” (51, 30-31). One could also say that the psychological effect on the nations in the Union and outside of it would be enormous – to use the other ‘definition’ of moral power. Inside the Union, it would give the people more confidence in their own power and they would also maintain the psychological leadership of the world. Outside of it, the Union would be seen as a role model of a state. Consequently, this would give other people in the world a positive ideal to work for (*New Federalist* 31; C. K. Streit, “Freedom’s Answer to

³³⁸In 1954, Streit is convinced that this progress can be seen and proved by the fact that most Nobel Prize winners come from the United States, Britain, and Germany, which are all nations of Atlantica, whereas on the other hand the “peoples who have long suffered despotism have shown little creativeness”. This leads to the conclusion that the “free people of Atlantica as a community [...] stand out in the world for creative, inventive, pioneering power even more sharply than do the democracies in the *Union Now* tables that first brought out their vast material strength” (*Freedom Against Itself* 28-31). To further demonstrate this, Streit first lists what he calls the “Major Inventions, Discoveries and Innovations Since 1750” in annex 1 of *Freedom Against Itself* and groups them according to fields and states of origin. Additionally, he also lists the number of Nobel Prize winners categorized by states from 1901 until 1953 and shows that most of them come from Atlantica (239-73, 281, 144-46).

Sputnik” 2). Streit even goes as far as to say that people outside of the Union would “enlist within these countries all the active force that can be needed to replace their present regimes with democracy” (*UN39* 113) – in the hope of becoming a Union member. So on the one hand, the founding of the Union can lessen the tension of the Cold War because the Union would be so powerful in every respect that it would serve as a strong deterrent against attacks from outside. This would greatly improve the moral power of the Union members. On the other hand, the impact on non-Union members would be enormous, too. The Union would be proof that a high standard of living, security, economic efficiency, prosperity, social justice, and the respect for human dignity can be realized under conditions of freedom (*F&U023* 12; Hartley, “Why Atlantic Union?” 9; Allais, “To Win Cold War” 11). This again would give the people under autocratic governments a powerful stimulus to start a revolution against their oppressors and overthrow those systems from within³³⁹ because they would want to achieve the same goals for them and endeavor to join the Union (*UN41* 87; *Freedom’s Frontier* 162-64).³⁴⁰ The final result would then be the solution to the problem of freedom: There would be freedom from fear and want and other states would also start to build free institutions (C. S. Osborn, “Peace and Freedom” 10).³⁴¹

The already existing moral power within the founding nations is one of the

³³⁹This is another occasion where Paine’s influence on Streit becomes apparent; see chapter 4.2 and footnote 157.

³⁴⁰See also O. J. Roberts, “Practical Way to Peace” 24; Hartley, “First Step” 6; C. K. Streit, “Why Soviet Smiles Add Urgency” 4; C. K. Streit, “U.S. Revolution.” Streit is even confident that this revolt from within would not only be a possibility but that the Soviet Union actually is afraid of it already. This conviction is also displayed in a comment in his editorial in *Freedom & Union* of February 1957: He argues that there can be no safety for freedom in the world as long as “the Communist power to attack is [not] decisively weakened”. This is a chance for the free world then as “[t]he Kremlin is [...] so obviously vulnerable to revolt in Eastern Europe” that the triggering of such revolts can mean the end of communist power (“Ike Aims to Save Europe” 2). If the Kremlin really is seen as this vulnerable, Streit must have had high hopes of a quick end of the Cold War as well as a of an imminent founding of the Union. In *Freedom’s Frontier* four years later, when the Union still was not founded, he makes a concrete list of peoples in those nations which – in his opinion – would definitely start to revolt once the Union was founded. He includes Poles, East Germans, Balts, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Albanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Romanians, and Bulgarians (*Freedom’s Frontier* 163). Hence, it is not certain whether he really believes the Cold War to be over *soon* by then, but he becomes increasingly certain of the destruction of communist rule from within at *some* point.

³⁴¹The quote of “freedom from fear and want” constitutes a close resemblance with Roosevelt’s “Four Freedom’s Speech”, which obviously influenced Streit’s way of thinking (*New Federalist* 31; C. K. Streit, “Against the D-Bomb” 1; Urey, “Atlantic Union Is Imperative” 15).

reasons why Streit is not distressed because of the ongoing decolonization. The leaders of the newly independent nations “were educated in America, Britain and France, and speak – and what is most important – think in English or French” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 50).³⁴² This means that the heads of the new states were taught the importance of guaranteeing freedom for the people (from a western point of view), although this was not practiced in their colonies before the decolonization. Therefore, Streit is sure that they would be loyal to the Union as only the Union can live up to the ideal of freedom in the highest possible degree. Once more, Streit displays a certain naivety here: The former colonies mostly fought a long – and often bloody – fight against the colonial empires. It is highly unlikely that these new nations would voluntarily join the Union if their former mother country was a member and could determine the Union policy as much as the founders could. The former colonies would probably be suspicious if they *really* would be treated equally and if the resentment or even animosities of the old imperial powers against them would *really* be overcome in the Union. In Streit’s mindset, however, the founders *do* have so much moral power that these fears should be ungrounded.

Summary

Streit estimates that the fifteen democracies have so much power “that the problem of ending the present chaos and organizing the world is nothing less than a problem in organizing these few democracies” (*UN39* 101). Yet, this organization in the Union is vital to fully benefit from this power (*Freedom Against Itself* 112, 206). Once this is achieved, the founders can control the world (*UN39* 176) as they have the “four aces” in their hands: the ace of armed, productive, raw material and moral power. Combined with its “joker” – the “*Union’s power to grow*” – this would further increase the vast power the fifteen have already had in the beginning (*UN49* 280-81; *Freedom’s Frontier* 42-43).³⁴³ Hence, with the founding of the Union, the “problem the absolutist [and later the communist] powers [...] presents could be safely left to

³⁴²This statement tells a lot about Streit’s clearly western and imperialist worldview because a common (western) education by the (former) colonial powers is deemed better and more important than any other kind of education since western education has shaped the way of thinking of the people in the ‘right’ way. For this discussion, see chapter 8.

³⁴³Although Streit does not name it “the joker” before, the idea that the Union’s power grows as soon as new members are admitted has already come up the first edition of *Union Now* (*UN39* 7).

solve itself” (*UN39* 10). Although Streit warns in 1954 of the possibility that dictatorship’s power grows very fast (*Freedom Against Itself* 169, 178), he is confident by 1961 that not the Soviet Union would surpass the free – as Khrushchev boasted in the so-called “Kitchen Debate” in 1959 (Khrushchev 0:24-0:49) – by 1970 or 2000, but by then, the “federation would immensely stimulate the growth of freedom’s power in every field – not only in per capita production and the standard of living, but on the political, military, scientific, educational and moral sides” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 51). In the end, the Union would “profit from incalculable and increasing moral and material power” (30-31). Furthermore, as the founding of the Union would cause revolutions in the communist states and encourage other regions in the world to federate as well,³⁴⁴ not only the people *within* the Union but also *outside* of it would benefit from this increased power of the new polity. Thus, Streit’s discursive strategy is to construct the idea that the democracies already *are* very powerful and can theoretically control the world. Therefore, it is only a small step to organize the Atlantic world and become even more powerful so that the democracies can take the position and *fully* rule the world. This would also be of advantage to the rest of the world because the “chaos” would be ended by the Atlantic Union.

Among the founding nations, the English-speaking ones in whatever combination alone form a very strong group: The majority of the people in the Union would be English-speaking and live across the globe, but they still have a very close relationship. This alone creates an imagined community among them *within* the community of the Union. The other people are not united by such strong bonds, they are less powerful in any thinkable combination, *and* they would be in the minority in the Union. Most of the raw materials and produced goods in the Union would come from the English-speaking nations. Thus, not only would the English-speaking peoples have a strong *political* voice but they would also have a strong *economic, military, and moral* position within and outside of the Union. Nevertheless, Streit emphasizes from the beginning that a mere English-speaking or a British-American-French Union “deprives the nucleus of the great advantage of strength so overwhelming from the start that no possible combination can come

³⁴⁴Streit mentions possible federations in “Southern Asia, among the Arab nations, in Africa and in Latin America” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 30).

near it” (UN39 105). Hence, despite the fact that Streit definitely sees a ‘natural’ unity among the English-speaking nations within the nucleus, the proposal of *Union Now With Britain* seemingly is only an emergency plan. Nevertheless, he also contradicts himself strongly in *Union Now With Britain*. He argues there that nearly no power for the nucleus would be lost if it consists only of the English-speaking nations who would also control the territories overseas of the European nations during the war (UN41 14). Furthermore, he declares in the edition of 1943 that “peace depends on continued united action, particularly by the Atlantic democracies who control such immense power” (UN43 260-61).³⁴⁵ It is important to bear in mind that he particularly refers to the United States and Britain – not even the whole British Commonwealth – in this statement. Consequently, his honesty has to be questioned when he objects a mere English-speaking Union because only Britain and the United States seem to be responsible – or at least *mainly* responsible – for the maintenance of peace in the future. Hence, both of them are once more represented as the center of the Atlantic world and, therefore, they mainly shape that world and the future policies in the world order Streit wants to found. Additionally, by simply looking at the figures, the ‘English-speaking states’ as a whole are indeed the strongest among the fifteen, although France is comparatively powerful in some aspects. Derived from this supremacy of the English-speaking nations, the notion throughout the text is clear: When the future world order is described, it is always the (Anglo-)American principles and political ideas which are regarded as the ideal and to which all other nations in the world should adapt.³⁴⁶ Thus, this essential representation of the Atlantic regime of truth can quite smoothly be constructed using the aspect of power in the discursive strategies.

6.5 Close Ties

If all the previously mentioned reasons for the ‘ideal nucleus’ are combined, it probably still would not result in a solid and stable polity because the close ties on the

³⁴⁵Note that “*continued* united action” means that they have already been working together which furthers the idea of an (imagined) community.

³⁴⁶For a further discussion of the topic of imperialism, see chapter 8.

level of society or the psychological level would be missing. These are necessary for the nations which should found the future world state because if the founders have a “community [...] in spirit, in interests, and as a geographical region” they have better qualifications for “succeeding in federating soundly” (*New Federalist* 47).³⁴⁷ In short: they need to *feel* that they belong together because they are an imagined community. A successful organization and federation in the world is facilitated by the fact that the nations in the world more and more depend on each other and grow ever closer together. Streit argues what unites the world in the first place is “civilization” (*UN39* 36-39; *UN49* 259). So, “civilization” is one of the prerequisites for Streit why a certain group of nations are ‘one’ already, belong together and need world government. He argues as follows:

the richer, the stronger, faster in communications and generally the more developed mechanically and more educated civilized a people is, the less sufficient it therefore is, the more dependent on all mankind, the higher the ratio of its external to its internal problem and the more urgent its need of world government (UN39 40).

Apparently, the more a people is a leading figure in the world, the more it can be classified as ‘highly civilized’ – something which applies to the founders of the Union equally – and the more it depends on others. In fact, the people around the North Atlantic are seen as “most interdependent” in the world (*Freedom Against Itself* 79). Streit argues that the democratic and free peoples already *are* united closely but they still need to convert this *de facto* status into established law. At the same time, such a world state only works if such ties exist³⁴⁸ even though they do not need to be as close as in the United States alone (*UN39* 182):³⁴⁹ “[T]he more natu-

³⁴⁷This is very similar to John Stuart Mill’s idea in *Representative Government*, in which he explains that for a federation to work, there has to be “a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations”. These sympathies can be “those of race, language, religion, [...] of political institutions, as [they are] conducting most to a feeling of identity and political interest” (238). This idea is also quoted in the introduction to *Freedom Against Itself* (*Freedom Against Itself* xvii). The notion that bonds are necessary to found a larger worldwide federation also comes up in repeatedly *Freedom & Union* (e.g. Lindsay; Hartley, “The United States Must Build Anew”).

³⁴⁸This is, for example, explained in *The New Federalist*: In a polity with more nations, there is more diversity of “development, background, interests and purpose”, which makes for a looser cohesion. Yet, if the group of the nucleus is ‘natural’, no other state would “take umbrage at not being included.” In 1955, this condition is met especially well by the seven NATO sponsors who “form the heart of the Atlantic Community” (“How to Organize” 22; see also Brundage, “How to Solve” 12).

³⁴⁹Streit even argues that the “lack of homogeneity of citizens” and of centralization would add to the strength of the Union (*UN39* 182), which kind of contradicts his previous idea of the necessity of ever closer ties.

rally coherent and congenial the founders are, the fewer they will be – and the more likely they are to form a strong organization” (*New Federalist* 42). Hence, only with additional ties apart from the above mentioned (chapters 6.1 to 6.4), the necessity, practicability, and feasibility of the future polity can be seen by the governments and people not only from a rational but also from an emotional point of view. The perception of belonging together – which is meant by the ‘emotional point of view’ – is particularly vital in times of crises since these are the times when people really need to work together. If they feel connected to each other, the likelihood of them helping each other is much higher, which in turn helps overcoming a crisis more easily. This is what Benedict Anderson describes as the “deep, horizontal comradeship” that needs to be constructed in a modern nation to make it possible “for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (7). I claim that it was indeed Streit’s intention to construct such a strong bond between the people within the Union.

The original fifteen founders are regarded as the “greatest, oldest, most homogeneous, *closely linked* democracies” (*UN39* 7; emphasis added) which together form a “[g]eographically, culturally, commercially, financially, politically, historically [...] most cohesive nucleus” (*UN40* 69).³⁵⁰ Accordingly, they are “naturally drawn together” (*UN39* 86), which results in a common destiny of those democracies so that they have to “stand together or hang separately” (*UN41* 108).³⁵¹ As Streit represents it here, the Atlantic nations bring with them the perfect conditions for forming a strong imagined community, which will become even more obvious in this

³⁵⁰In *Freedom Against Itself*, this argument is explained very similarly: They have – unlike all other possible groups of nations – such a “combination of community-making ties – spiritual, political, economic, financial, historic, geographic, cultural, linguistic, racial military. [...] Nowhere else is this knitting together advancing half so fast today” (*Freedom Against Itself* 80). When the composition of the nucleus changes in 1961, Streit still is convinced that the original nucleus is the “ideal group”, however, the new group nonetheless has ties close enough to meet the present needs and provide a nucleus which is sufficiently stable.

³⁵¹This quote is an alteration of one of Benjamin Franklin’s quotes (“We must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”) which he allegedly said while signing the Declaration of Independence (P. Aron 52). The fact that Streit takes up this idea and changes the first part of it from “hang together” to “stand together” shows two things: First of all, he deeply admires Benjamin Franklin. Secondly, however, he wants his proposal for the democracies to sound more optimistic as they will not “hang” together – which implies the possibility of collective death – but they will “stand together” and be stronger together than any other power in the world. However, non-American readers of *Union Now* cannot be expected to automatically make the connection to Franklin when reading this quote because his legacy is not part of their history.

chapter.

Nevertheless, although the nucleus should be limited to nations with the strongest bonds, the Union should work together with other nations in a league or on a cooperative basis (*UN43* 261) and is open to admitting other nations at a later stage. Yet, the flaw in this idea is that it would not be possible for other nations with looser connections to the nucleus to become a member as easily because they would probably never attain the same level of ‘closeness’ as the founders allegedly already naturally have. Additionally, the construction of the imagined community relies on the existences of a clear out-group. This means that either the bonds between all the members become looser once more nations are added and the original out-group becomes ever smaller or the members of the out-group are regarded as so distinct from the in-group that their inclusion in the Union becomes impossible. This is an argument Streit never fully develops, but he is convinced that newly added members would automatically be treated equally on all levels and they could easily become a member. Considering his arguments why the fifteen are so close, both has to be questioned as will become clear in this chapter.

In the following I will analyze on which grounds this perceived strong affiliation of the nucleus nations is based. As the aspects of commerce, finance, and politics have already been topics of chapter 6.4, only Streit’s arguments for the connection by geography, culture, religion and values, language, and history are examined here.

Geography

The overall idea is to found a “*Union now of the democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite*” (*UN39* 2; emphasis added). Streit obviously regards the fifteen democracies as especially well-connected by the ocean – not like other entities of the world which are a united land mass. The ocean as the constituting basis of government has the advantage that there are not geographical limits to it and the sea is a “cheap and excellent means of communication, a common body of water” (*UN39* 90; see also *Freedom Against Itself* 80). Streit claims that with the exceptions of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa all the nations of the original nucleus are connected by the *North Atlantic Ocean*.³⁵² However, even

³⁵²Streit never even reflects on the fact that Switzerland has no access to any sea or ocean at all

these three exceptions can use the sea as means of communication although they are geographically further away.³⁵³ Thus, the future world state would have “cheap means of communication at its core” but still can “head [...] straight toward universality” (*New Federalist* 49) as other many nations can use the sea for the same purpose as the founders of the Union. Furthermore, Streit is convinced that the distances, particularly on the sea, would (and already have) become smaller due to the technological progress, so that this connection will become even closer in the future (*UN39* 38, 83, 90; *UN41* 103-104; *New Federalist* 3; *Freedom Against Itself* 16-17).³⁵⁴

Streit probably is convinced that an increase in all kinds of communications would also result in a community spirit among all regions of the Union. Having access to common goods and getting in contact with people from other parts of the Union would show the people that they have much in common and can understand each other easily. In a further step, this would raise awareness that a common government which regulates each person’s life makes sense and gives everybody the same opportunities. Additionally, the necessity of assisting other people – especially in times of crises – can be understood more easily when ‘the other’ is known, since it becomes self-evident in such cases.³⁵⁵ Hence, the development is reciprocal: The closer the (perceived) geographical proximity, the more contact people can have with ever faster means of communications. Thus, the development of a community spirit is furthered, which again increases communications.

but includes it ‘naturally’ in the group of *Atlantic* nations.

³⁵³As all of them still were part of the British Empire in 1939 and they all were former British settler colonies whose ruling classes supposedly share a common culture with Britain, it did not make sense for Streit to exclude them. For this aspect, see p. 231 here.

³⁵⁴In 1939, Streit already distinguishes between geographical and “electrical” distance (*UN39* 273), so apparently, electricity and the possibilities arising from this are vital to his understanding of ‘real’ distance. Clearly, the argument of the connecting ocean was developed in an era when planes were not yet used extensively in peacetime and ships provided the most efficient way of communication. Yet, although Streit maintains this argument, he already mentions in the edition of 1939 that planes can in fact be used both for communication and war and that they, consequently, make distances between nations smaller – and more dangerous in case one nation might attack another (165-66; see also chapter 6.4, p. 200 here).

³⁵⁵Encouraging and facilitating communication among the people of the Union is one of Streit’s endeavor to “knit together the Union.” This includes postal communications, “electric means of communications”, communication of goods and men as well as “air communications” (*UN39* 257-58, 165-66; see also *Freedom Against Itself* 48).

Culture and 'Race'

When describing how the culture of the fifteen democracies is “inextricably interconnected” (*UN39* 90; see also *Freedom Against Itself* 4), Streit blends two aspects: the connection on the level of culture and via a common ancestry. Referring to the first aspect, he claims that the people living in Atlantica have a high similarity in their everyday culture. To illustrate this, Streit explicitly mentions in *Freedom's Frontier* that even though the nucleus he then proposes consists only of NATO nations, “for the present purpose” also “such non-NATO people as the Australians, Austrians, Irish, New Zealanders, Swedes and Swiss” are included in the explanation of the fact that they all are part of an Atlantic culture (*Freedom's Frontier* 165). He summarizes that the Atlantic peoples supposedly mainly travel or study in Atlantica, the “books, plays, works of art [they] like [...] come from the other Atlantic nations”, they have close business ties, their history is intertwined and the people they regard as heroes or heroines come from Atlantica. Their individual cultures actually are not unique, but they “share more concepts and customs with each other than with others.” Finally, they stand in for each other whenever the freedom of one of the Atlantic nations is endangered and they have fought together for freedom “[m]ore than once”. Streit’s conclusion then is: “Actions, we all say, speak louder than words, and our actions say we all belong at heart to Atlantica.” (165-66)³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶Streit never gives a clear definition of which nations are included in Atlantica. In *Freedom Against Itself* he explains that all 12 NATO members of the time (by 1950 these were: the United States, Canada, the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal) are part of the region of Atlantica, which is defined as “the nations around the North Atlantic ocean”. However, when he speaks of states, which were brought together by inventions and machines, he also includes Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland (*Freedom Against Itself* 3). This implies that the latter somehow belong to the group of NATO nations on another level. Later on, he debates which nations to invite to a convention if the Union is to be founded. There he definitely includes the seven NATO sponsors (see p. 157 here), possibly delegates from all NATO nations, maybe West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland. At last he also mentions “such non-Atlantic democracies as Australia and New Zealand”, whose inclusion could result in “a wider cross-section of Atlantica” (302). Apparently, Streit has an idea of what is defined as the region of Atlantica, but he includes slightly different nations in this ‘region’ from time to time. In *Freedom's Frontier* Austria is no longer seen as a part of Atlantica (*Freedom's Frontier* 165) – however, it is no member of NATO, which is the explanation why it is not part of the nucleus. Obviously, Streit’s definition of Atlantica was in flux in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, which he admits in *Freedom Against Itself*: “my frequent use of such terms as ‘Atlantic Union’ and ‘Atlantica’ in this book does not imply the exclusion of *any* democracies outside the North Atlantic region” (*Freedom Against Itself* 302). This allows him to change the founding members later on (in 1961) without contradicting what he said seven years previously. On the other hand, readers can be confused about the included states if only such vague definitions of Atlantica are presented; see also *Freedom Against Itself* 79; *New Federalist* 49.

He evidently applies the discursive strategy of stressing the common origins and traditions of the Atlantic peoples here to form a modern nation which, to him, is a kind of community that is perceived as such by every single one of its members. Apparently, what he calls Atlantica is not only a geographical area around the Atlantic Ocean, but he is convinced that the culture of these nations is a common one shared by every person in this area.³⁵⁷ Consequently, no change in “the languages, customs, institutions that diversify Atlantica” (139) is needed to found the Union as they already are very similar and the federal structure of the Union allows for slight variations in the polity, especially in aspects related to culture.

In his explanations, the existence of an Atlantic community or culture is referred to as something given, which requires no further clarification, so the idea seems to be uncontroversial to Streit. This shows that he obviously argues within the Atlantic discursive regime of truth that represents Atlantica as an imagined community that is more powerful than all the other communities in the world. He very much assumes that Atlantica is a “country”, as can be seen in the following quotes: In *Freedom Against Itself*, he names it “the forgotten country, [which] has no common government” and the “country without a patriot” whose people “still do not see that they *are* a people, a country – that all their ‘lands of the free’ form together *the Land of the Free*” (*Freedom Against Itself* 31-32, 3, 80). In *Freedom’s Frontier*, he simply calls it “the country in which you already live” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 140). Considering the fact that he assumes that this ‘country’ is homogeneous on the cultural and political levels, but also in the origin of its citizens, founding the Union would not only be the ‘next logical step’ but also an easy one. However, the United States, for example, is not homogeneous at all in its population and Streit, for instance, completely excludes Americans without European origin – non-white Americans – from his vision of Atlantica. Whether he simply ignores them or regards them as assimilated in ‘mainstream’ American culture, his point of view displays the clear notion of white supremacy in the United States – and beyond – that marginalizes other non-white groups of people (see also chapter 4.2). This is a resemblance to the Anglo-Saxon discursive strategy that also represented the white, Anglo-Saxon nations as being on top of the ‘racial’ hierarchy and neglected

³⁵⁷This notion was referred to as “spiritual ties” (*UN49* 281) some years previously.

or oppressed all other peoples within the realm of the Anglo-Saxons. As Streit mentions this without further explanation, it can be concluded that this element of the Anglo-Saxon discursive regime made its way into the Atlantic one.

Streit praises NATO for being “a step in the right direction” of founding the Union because it provides “at least some degree of political organization” (*Freedom Against Itself* 113) as he fears the breakdown of the level of Atlantic unity at the time. This can happen due to a depression or if Soviet Russia succeeds in destroying the existing unity (183, 219). Still, the fact that he dreads the *breakdown* of the unity implies that some form of unity has to exist already even though not on a political level. Streit also estimates that the NATO could further the cohesion of the Atlantic nations as the aim of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a

development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being (“The North Atlantic Treaty”).

This should be achieved by the elimination of conflict and further economic collaboration. As these aims do not address military but political, cultural, and economic endeavors of closer unity, the realization of this so-called “Canadian Clause” is an issue addressed again and again by the supporters of *Union Now* (e.g. *Freedom Against Itself* 216; “Canada in Lead Again”).³⁵⁸ Apparently, the existence of this Atlantic community or Atlantic culture needs little further explanation as the people belonging to it know that they are part of it. In contrast to the political ideas of the community,³⁵⁹ the existing “nonpolitical ideas and machinery have been enlarging the community which needs to be governed politically” (*Freedom Against Itself* 91). Again, these ideas have to be clear to the people belonging to the community and not necessarily to the people outside of it since it is the *in-group* that needs to have an element to identify with and distinguish itself from the out-group. As the latter should not be included in the Union (at the beginning), Streit does not reflect on the fact that this could be problematic for the further extension of the Atlantic

³⁵⁸The clause got this nickname in *Freedom & Union* because the magazine claims that it was the Canadians who had insisted on it being part of the NATO treaty (Nicholson 22). Attempts to realize *Union Now* on a political level are discussed in chapter 7.3.

³⁵⁹The examples given for these political ideas are: individualism, national sovereignty, trade barriers, currencies, and armaments (*Freedom Against Itself* 91).

Union with other cultures and people joining, but he simply looks for the ‘easiest’ way to realize the Union as soon as possible. However, this attitude implies that it is totally natural for Streit that all the other people in the world would adapt their political systems and cultures to the Atlantic (or American) one because it is the best system in the world from Streit’s perspective. Once more, it exemplifies that he is a subject of the Atlantic discourse that does not accept other political systems to be regarded as equally viable.

From 1943 onward, Streit uses the term *Atlantica* for the cultural region he wants to unite (*UN43* xii).³⁶⁰ This term as such is quite interesting and reveals a lot about how Streit sees the people living in the area of *Atlantica*. The origins of the term are in Plato’s mystic island Atlantis which is described in the works *Critias* and *Timaeus*. Atlantis was a sea-based military empire said to have been in the Atlantic Ocean with a highly advanced civilization, a huge military might (Gill 22), as well as vast “natural and mineral resources, and the extravagant splendour of [...] royal palaces and temples” (27). Its ten kings originally stemmed from the sea god Poseidon, which vested divine power in them as well as the guarantee of moral righteousness. Furthermore, its laws were given to the empire by Poseidon himself, which also made them divine (Clay and A. Purvis 39-40; Stegman 245-46). However, despite many attempts, the island of Atlantis could not be found anywhere.

By naming the cultural region *Atlantica* – with the intended reference to Atlantis – Streit definitely wants the fifteen democracies to be the ‘new Atlantis’ which can claim to have the highest moral standards, laws which are nearly perfect – after all, if the reference to Atlantis is taken seriously, they can even be called divine – and be one of, if not *the* most powerful state in the world. Thus, he tries to provide them with the narrative of a mythic origin, which is one of the major discursive strategies Hall mentions to build a modern nation. The ends of freedom, peace, and democracy can only be achieved by the Union if a particular group people for the nucleus is chosen: the Atlanticans (*Freedom’s Frontier* 97).³⁶¹ They have all the necessary prerequisites to found the Union as “[n]o people ever had such faith and

³⁶⁰Streit explains that former Ambassador William C. Bullitt suggested the term to him. Later on Streit also calls the founding nations the “nations of Atlantis” (*UN43* 249).

³⁶¹The term Atlanticans describes the people in the founding nations of the Union, the people of ‘original Atlantis’ are called Atlanteans.

hope as have we Atlanticans today – or such means to turn them soon into reality” (168). As a result of this Union, there

would soon rise a far higher civilization than Man has yet attained, anywhere, any time [...] this new Atlantis would far surpass from every standpoint – moral, material, artistic, scientific spiritual humane – that of the fabled Atlantis Plato had dreamed of” (168).³⁶²

By putting the Atlanticans on equal footing with the idealized and mythologized Atlanteans, Streit believes that the former have the perfect civilization and they represent an ideal everybody must live up to. Accordingly it is only just and right for them to claim the leading (moral) role in the world since “practically all the basic ideas – sound, unsound, and in between – that rule the world today” come from this cultural region (173).³⁶³ With this description, the constructed knowledge that the Atlanticans are on the highest level of civilization is reinforced once more.

However, the way Plato’s Atlantis story continues, the Atlanteans faced a moral decline after “generations of stability and virtuous behavior” (Gill 22) because of a continued mixture with “a large quantity of mortal stock”, which made “their human traits became predominant” (Stegman 246). They ultimately lost the war against Athens and disappeared beneath the Atlantic Ocean (Gill 1-2). So the ‘perfect’ civilization and state of Atlantis could not be upheld in the antiquity. Streit must have known about this end of the myth but still claims for the Atlanticans to be the ‘elite’ in the world – regardless of the fact that the Atlanteans were beaten by Athens and declined morally. He is convinced that all the Atlanticans can now fulfill the destiny that was denied to the Atlanteans (*UN43* 270-71).

In the aspect of culture, the English-speaking nations are once more regarded as especially closely knit which is why Streit calls them the “core and body of the original nucleus of fifteen” (*UN41* 14). This idea is twofold: First of all, he states that they are the most important part of the nucleus. Secondly, he calls them the “core”, not the “core nations” or similar. This indicates that he does not see the necessity of distinguishing between them, but he considers them an entity in them-

³⁶²Note the close similarity of Tennyson’s idea of a “Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World” here, which is also quoted by Streit (*Freedom’s Frontier* 85; see also footnote 86 here).

³⁶³These ideas are national sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people, federal union, universal suffrage, the liberty of conscience, speech, and press as well as all other Rights of Man, the rule of law, a worldwide organization for peace, justice, disarmament, and the improvement of the standard of living (174).

selves which is reflected in the language he uses. Despite being politically divided into the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations (15),³⁶⁴ they are clearly considered as having the strongest natural bonds among all the nations of the nucleus if their culture is not even regarded as basically the same (*Freedom's Frontier* 165-66). Although the idea that they are more closely connected may seem natural because of their common history with the United States being a former British colony, Streit's understanding goes further. To him, the English-speaking peoples are one political, cultural, and 'racial' unit³⁶⁵ which so naturally belong together that it is not possible to think of them otherwise. He does not reflect on the fact that the English-speaking nations are not homogeneous: The United States, for example, is an immigrant nation with – admittedly – many immigrants from Britain. Nevertheless, not all of them come from Britain or even Europe and the U.S. culture as well as the composition of its people is quite heterogeneous. Streit's line of thought in this case may result from the fact that he must have believed in the idea of the American society as a melting pot and, apparently, the result of this 'melting process' to him was a homogeneous, English-speaking, (white) people in the United States. However, this view totally excludes all non-white and all non-Anglo-Saxon Americans because this myth of a working melting pot "in its hegemonic vision has often obscured the role of racism in American society by projecting a colorblind vision of social harmony and by obscuring ongoing inequality" (Paul 282). Evidently, Streit is ignorant of the fact that in the United States, the land he idealizes to the fullest, social and racial inequality and discrimination were and are still very much reality because he only sees the United States as a homogeneous white society with equal rights for everyone. Like the United States, neither Britain, nor Canada,

³⁶⁴In 1939, Streit explains the composition of the nucleus by stating that either fifteen or ten nations should form the nucleus. This difference in numbers results from the fact that the British Commonwealth then is still regarded as 'one part', whose single units are only mentioned in brackets (*UN39* 6-7, see als p. 122 here). Later on, he speaks of fifteen nations but again and again, the six nations are referred to as British Commonwealth, making it even more obvious that they are regarded as an entity (see footnote 176).

³⁶⁵For the discussion of 'race' in *Union Now*, see p. 240 here. As indicated above, the ideas of culture and 'race' cannot be entirely separated in Streit's argument, which is why 'racial' unity is also included here.

Australia, New Zealand, or least of all South Africa³⁶⁶ are homogeneous.³⁶⁷ This is something Streit indirectly mentions for Canada at one point by saying that there is a French-speaking population in Canada (*UN39* 106), but he never sees this as a problem because he is so convinced of the supremacy of the people and principles that he calls ‘English’ or ‘English-speaking’.

Despite the fact that the former British ‘white’ dominions and Britain itself are not homogeneous, their elites in fact very often *are* of white British descent and decisively shape politics and culture in the respective nations. This resulted, for instance, in a special treatment of the settler colonies by Britain while the Empire still existed as these got responsible government and became independent much earlier than others. After all, were rated as more ‘mature’ and ‘civilized’. Furthermore, the family connections between them and the former motherland were indeed closer and marriages across those nations and the United States were frequent (Belich 480). This again produced an ever closer relationship between them and facilitated the maintenance of an ‘English’ element in their elites. If the elites so often married among each other, they would not easily allow people of other descent to become part of the elite as well. These circumstances probably influenced Streit’s perception in so far as he is convinced that the nations as such are homogeneous. At the same time he neglects all the other elements of the English-speaking societies and cultures resulting from the influence of native inhabitants and immigrants from all over the world. This illustrates two things: First of all, he only has the elites in mind when he talks about a nation as a whole, which is a very elitist point of view

³⁶⁶For South Africa, Streit does mention that only the white population is counted among the populations of the people of South Africa, but he never discusses the problems of it – neither the fact that non-white South Africans are apparently not seen as ‘normal people’ by him who do not belong in the group of English-speaking nations nor the fact that South Africa under Apartheid can neither be described as democratic, free, or peaceful at all from today’s perspective. Although Streit theoretically wants to include all people in the world, this refusal to accept the majority of the South African population as full citizens has to be counted among the inconsistencies in his proposal (see chapter 4.2).

³⁶⁷Streit lists the following people in the English-speaking world: “Englishmen, Americans, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, [...] South Africans” (*UN41* 121). Especially because he distinguishes between the several parts of the UK but does not do so for the other parts of the English-speaking world, it seems noteworthy that the UK is indeed not seen as totally homogeneous but still as belonging together politically and culturally. The other parts of the English-speaking world, which are mentioned here, are treated as if they were homogeneous in descent and language although they, like the UK, do not have such a population and society (see also footnote 263).

(see also p. 299 here). Secondly, as the societies in his opinion seem to be shaped ‘rightfully’ by white, British immigrants, this way of thinking, which was common among the elites of his time, is closely connected to 19th century Anglo-Saxonism and imperialism (see chapters 2.3 and 8).

The English-speaking nations in the Union are constructed as a strong and powerful entity in themselves and this group is regarded – probably mostly by themselves but also by others – as the natural ‘leader’ for the future world order. In *Union Now*, this is clearly reflected by several aspects. First of all, it is always the United States which should take the initiative to invite the other nations to found the Union, and at the same time Britain (and the nations which are implicitly included in this term) is seen as the nation which would ‘naturally agree’ to such suggestions. After all, the Atlantic discursive regime does not accept other options. Furthermore, the importance of liberalism and democracy in both politics and society is seen to be nowhere as strong as in those two respective states. Additionally, they are the ones that combine most of the power in the world and, therefore, have the might to realize the Union together. In fact, their consent to the Union is enough to get it founded at all (*UN39* 107). Moreover, their cultural dominance in the Union is constituted by the fact that Streit naturally thinks of English or French as the main working languages in the Union. As the English-speaking peoples would be in the clear numerical majority in this new polity, it can be expected that the English language would prevail in the discussions. These arguments together show that Streit sees no alternative to the English-speaking nations forming the “core” of the Union and, thus, helps to construct the respective regime of truth which he assumes to be viable in the rest of the world as well.

Especially *Union Now With Britain* displays Streit’s way of thinking – and indirectly that of the supporters of his idea since they partly accepted it (see chapter 7.1.1, p. 255). Although Streit claimed before that a mere English-speaking Union (or a Union with only Britain, the United States, and France) was not powerful enough and could not work, the idea in 1941 is clear: the Union *can* and *should* be established on the political principles of the English-speaking nations, in particular the United States, and they *will* be the dominating force(s) in the new state. This

would result in a strong shaping, if not a domination, of the culture in the Union. However, they have already formed the “core and body of the original nucleus of fifteen” (*UN41* 14) before, so this attitude is not surprising. In the editions after 1941, it becomes clear that the dominance of the English-speaking nations would prevail on every level. In the wartime edition Streit emphasizes that only the U.S. and Britain have most of the power and the closest ties. The Union should be founded by the United States “with a limited number of other peoples” which should have “compelling natural ties” *with the United States* (*UN43* 252). Streit emphasizes that these nations do not necessarily have to be listed exactly but again and again he refers to Britain as the obvious other founding nation. This furthermore supports the hypothesis that what he actually wants is to create a Union between Britain and America and simply group other nations around it – the others are seen as less important anyway (e.g. *UN40* 78).³⁶⁸ Apparently, political, cultural, or any other kinds of contributions from other nations are not necessary, or even desired, because Britain and America themselves already embody the perfect nations, civilizations, and culture(s) for Streit. This once more stresses his exclusionary view and the idea that he uncritically regards the American culture as the ideal for the whole world.

Interestingly enough, the term ‘Atlantic nations’ is ever so often used interchangeably with ‘western nations’ or ‘the West’ by Streit and his supporters. This further underlines the proposition that – even if not always deliberately – Streit, on the one hand, sees them as a community which is not necessarily *imagined* and, on the other hand, he also perceives the Atlantic nations to be *the* western nations. Yet, the perception of ‘the West’ as such is heavily shaped by the United States and Britain. One obvious example that ‘Anglo-American’ also means ‘western’ is Hans Kohn’s³⁶⁹ article “West Must Build Atlantica” in *Freedom & Union* in December 1954. He states:

Around an *Anglo-American nucleus*, the democratic forces not only of the smaller Western countries, but of France, Germany and Italy could successfully *overcome the anti-Western temptations* rooted in some political traditions and partly in social structure of these great nations which have contributed so much to Western

³⁶⁸Interestingly enough, this explicit comment only appears in the edition of 1940, but was not included in the edition of 1939.

³⁶⁹Hans Kohn was a Professor of History at the City College of New York and published *The Idea of Nationalism* in 1944, which made him an expert on this topic at the time.

civilization. (7; emphasis added)

It is declared right in the beginning that the nucleus of the Union should Anglo-American, not western or Atlantic. However, “anti-Western temptations” can only be overcome with the assistance of the Anglo-American nations in a Union shaped by Britain and the United States. Those temptations exist in the traditions and structure of *other* western nations which need Anglo-American assistance to overcome them. Therefore, it is implied that the term “western” actually *is* a synonym for Anglo-American because nothing anti-western is grounded in their culture and only they can fully help others to overcome such tendencies. Kohn continues in his article to say that the U.S., “which [is] in many ways *the product of all the forces of western civilization*”, should lead the rest of the western world and point “the way to their unification, not only to prevent war but to preserve and strengthen the Western way of life” (7; emphasis added). Hence, the U.S. is represented as the final ‘product’ or the ‘culmination’ of western civilization, but it also has to develop further and strengthen this particular way of life. Kohn evidently is convinced of the ‘natural’ leadership of the U.S. in the western world both on cultural and political levels. As the article is not criticized in any way by Streit as editor of the magazine, it can be assumed that he agrees with this view.

A topic Streit subsumes under the aspect of culture is ‘race’. He claims that the people of the founding nations allegedly come from the “same basic Greek-Roman-Hebrew mixture grafted on the same dominant Teutonic-Celtic stock” whose “civilization [...] has reached broadly the same level” (*UN39* 90);³⁷⁰ they are seen as “divided practically into only two racial stocks” (*UN39* 106). Hence, he intends to construct the idea that they are a pure, original people, although it seems a bit contradictory that this presumably ‘pure people’ actually *is* divided into several “racial stocks” – which are only very few in Streit’s opinion. It is striking that the ‘races’ he includes in the imagined community of Atlantic peoples are all white and since Streit does not include ‘non-white races’ in his description of those ‘races’ which should start the world government, as they apparently are not on the same

³⁷⁰See also *Freedom Against Itself* 79; *New Federalist* 49. Note that Streit’s assumption here is contradictory: Neither Teutons nor Celts derive from Greeks, Romans, or Hebrews. So it seems as if basically all ‘white races’ of the world are included in his definition.

‘level of civilization’ for him because they are not “mature” enough (88; see also p. 326 here). This way of thinking reveals Streit’s white supremacist notions.³⁷¹ These exclude all non-whites not only for the time of the founding of the Union but most likely also beyond. It becomes obvious that Streit perceives a ‘racial difference’ between the people of the founding nations and all the other (non-white) people in the world and that this also has a strong impact on their ‘level of civilization’. If the fifteen founding nations belong together so ‘naturally’ (in both possible meanings: figuratively as well as literally), they can – in Streit’s understanding – *of course* build a strong nucleus for a future world state because they already form an entity. This is reinforced by the claim that

[o]ur nations – especially the English-speaking ones, but also the French, Belgians, Dutch, Italians – are a mixture of Atlantic peoples. Inter-marriage is still greatest, most successful and most rewarding within our Atlantic community (*Freedom’s Frontier* 166).³⁷²

This implies that they were related in the past and intensify this connection even more in the present day. Thus, the ties between the several parts of the nucleus again are not only cultural but also exist in terms of ‘race’ in the biological sense. These strong bonds draw them together so that their inclusion in the nucleus is not only “non-controversial” (*UN39* 105), but it should also be welcomed by the Atlantic people – and, hopefully, by all the other people in the world who are not included. After all, Streit is convinced that all the people in the world *know* who belongs to the in-group of Atlantic people and who is a member of the out-group. Additionally, the decision about which nations first to admit to the nucleus is made easier: If the peoples from the same “racial stock” – that is, white people – have the same ‘level of civilization’, the first new nations also have to be ‘far developed’

³⁷¹Streit must have been directly criticized for white supremacy because he explicitly positions himself against this in one of the very early issues of *Freedom & Union* in 1947: “We oppose the totalitarian spirit and dictatorship in all their forms, whether called communism, fascism, racism, ‘white supremacy,’ or by any other name, as dangerous both to liberty and peace.” (*F&U*001) However, as can be seen in the example given here in the text, Streit still does not reflect that he himself does express this kind of thinking.

³⁷²In the edition of 1949, Streit has already emphasized the fact that the United States are an immigrant nation with most of the immigrants coming from the other Atlantic democracies. Consequently, most Americans have ancestors there, which makes them not only *feel* but also *be* related to the people in the other nations of the nucleus (*UN49* 281). This is taken up in *Freedom Against Itself* when Streit calls the Americans and Canadians “transplanted Europeans” who “have become by intermarriage an amalgam of the parent peoples, united closely with several of them by a web of family connections” (*Freedom Against Itself* 80; see also p. 237 here).

in this aspect and can then be admitted.³⁷³ This provides a high barrier, above all for people in ‘non-white nations’, because they are regarded as ‘less civilized’ than white people with European descent by Streit. However, the latter are the ones to decide whether new nations can be admitted to the Union and most probably rate their own ‘civilization’ higher than any other – especially if they are (founding) members of the Union and already obtain a ruling position in the world. Considering Streit’s firm belief in the founding nations’ superiority, which is shared by many others at the time, it would be highly naive to suppose that the assumed ‘lower level of civilization’ would *not* be an issue when it comes to the admission of non-white nations. Furthermore, although Streit probably is convinced of his argument of the “community of background and interest” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 34) of the founding nations, he obviously does not see the problem resulting from his idea: If all the people of the nucleus have the same cultural and ethnic background *and* the overall idea is that the nucleus should be enlarged by other nations after a phase of consolidation, this strong connecting link either has to be loosened or dissolved. Otherwise, the new members will never really be a full and equal part of the world state, although they would have the same rights on the surface as the founders. Additionally, the inclusion of ever more diverse and non-Atlantic nations to the nucleus would make the construction of an imagined community *within* the Union more difficult because there would be fewer criteria to identify with apart from the common political regime.

‘Racial’ ties are considered to be on the same level as all the other possible connecting ties between the founders, as can be seen in the following quote: The people of the United States should “federate with another 140,000,000 men and women, with whom they already have the closest *natural*, political, economic, historical, cultural, social and spiritual ties” (*UN49* 281; emphasis added). These close ‘natural’ ties – according to Streit – are not only an invention, but they have existed for a very long time: In the Atlantic Union the “Celts, Romans, Danes, Angles, Saxons and Normans who mixed to make the English people” (*Freedom’s Frontier*

³⁷³See also *UN39* 39, 115. Streit mentions the example of the German people here: They already are seen as highly civilized and, consequently, they have to be included at the earliest time possible – once they have overthrown dictatorship.

169) come together again.³⁷⁴ This quote allows two conclusions about Streit's way of thinking: Firstly, he claims that the respective people have already belonged together at one point in history. Secondly, by explaining that the Celts, Romans, Danes, Angles, Saxons, and Normans "made" the English, a hierarchy is established: Since the former only are *parts* of the latter, and the *result* of their 'mixture' is the English, those are clearly regarded as 'better' or 'further developed' than the formerly mentioned peoples. Although these 'races' "who mixed to make the English people" continued to live in the regions they originated in and later developed into modern nation states, those are seen as part of a larger culture which is supposed to be 'English'. As the 'English race' is regarded to be the 'culmination of history', it is not surprising that Streit gives the English-speaking peoples a preponderant position in the Atlantic Union. Hence, it can once more be argued that the *Atlantic Union* actually should become a synonym for a union on *Anglo-American* – or English – principles to which all the other people in the world have to adapt.³⁷⁵ In Streit's opinion, this would only be the political realization of an informal condition – the cultural Atlantic community – which has already existed for a long time.³⁷⁶

Religion and Values

Another aspect, which is closely related to culture, is religion. It is quite important to Streit that the people of the fifteen nations of the nucleus mainly belong to two denominations of the Christian religion: Protestantism and Catholicism. By having this common religious background, the nations of the nucleus share the same values and this facilitates any kind of cooperation – be it on a political, cultural, or any other level. Nevertheless, Streit does not want a "religious test" as requirement for membership of the Union, nor should a "Union religion" be made official (*UN39* 251). In fact, every nation should be able to "regulate relations between church and state, and worship in the way its own people wished" (*Freedom's Frontier* 139).

³⁷⁴Note the high similarity to 19th century Anglo-Saxonism (see chapter 2.3). The idea also comes up repeatedly in *Freedom & Union*: Hartley, "Why Atlantic Union?" 5; Hartley, "Atlantic or Pacific?"; Gillette 7.

³⁷⁵For the discussion on the imperialist notions in *Union Now*, see chapter 8.

³⁷⁶Danchev notes that the idea that an Atlantic community exists and shares common values is an "exploitation of history" for a certain purpose (429). This fits my own assumption that Streit also exploited history for the purpose of finding arguments for his whole proposal (see chapter 4.2).

Yet, the influence of Christianity on Streit – and, consequently, on his ideas – is very obvious and can, for instance, be seen in the sheer number of direct Bible citations in *Union Now*.³⁷⁷ However, this argument that no Union religion is intended is not further elaborated in the books because the Judeo-Christian heritage of all the included nations before 1961 cannot be questioned.

With the inclusion of Turkey in the nucleus of 1961, a non-Christian nation would have been a founding member and Streit never even mentions the fact that Turkey does not ‘fit’ to the other nations in terms of religion. Still, as Streit claims that this nucleus would be the combination of the “ideal” and the “practical” (31), Turkey definitely is more of a practical than an ideal member if the line of argument of a common religious background is followed. Yet, Streit also argues in *Freedom’s Frontier* that Ataturk started a “westernizing movement that has now swept through all Islam” (38). Although Turkey is not “all Islam”, this can be seen as an argument for the possibility of an inclusion of nations with Muslim background. Nevertheless, the argument of religion means that any candidate country which does not have a majority of Christian people is not able to fulfill the prerequisites for membership easily or probably has more difficulties fitting in and would only be included if it is “practical” to do so. Additionally, the construction of an imagined community within the Union would become less probable once more if common religious convictions would be diminished in importance over time, since they are so important to Streit in the first place. Streit apparently never thinks of that when he argues that the ultimate goal is a universal worldwide Union.

Closely related to the topic of religion are the values that accompany it. Peoples who share the same religion and history theoretically have a similar understanding of the values which are valid in a society. These are not explicitly listed by Streit in his books. However, he mentions repeatedly that the general understanding of how a society works, which values are vital to the people, and what the overall aim of government is has to be the same for all possible members – in particular the founders – of the Union. A vague explanation can be found in *Freedom & Union*:

³⁷⁷Every chapter starts with several quotes, which often are biblical ones. Furthermore, allusions to biblical passages are made quite frequently throughout Streit’s writings (see, for example, p. 147 here).

The ‘values’ can be the “common heritage of democracy and individual freedom under the rule of law” (*F&U*038 21) which derive from “Greco-Roman, Christian, European and American tradition” (Danielou). Once more, the discursive strategy of constructing a seemingly ‘common’ origin – no matter how scattered it may seem here – is used to represent the members of the Union as belonging to the same imagined Atlantic community.

These values were a topic at the Bruges Conference in 1957,³⁷⁸ where Dr. Hans Kohn gave the keynote that was praised by Streit. Kohn emphasizes “how broad, deep and strong a community of moral interest unites the Atlantic people” (“Bruges Proposes Atlantic Institute” 12). At this conference, one of the commissions dealt with the religious and spiritual values of the Atlantic community. It found that the “ties binding the Atlantic Community were spiritual rather than racial” (15).³⁷⁹ Thereafter, the most important ties (or elements of the binding values) are listed:

Respect for the intrinsic value of the human being [...]
liberty of a morally responsible individual who recognizes the existence of a law superior to himself [...]
a sense of solidarity which admits its obligation to fellow-men in the material and spiritual spheres [...]
tolerance and free discussion of all opinions [without tolerance of opinions which can destroy] those institutions which make liberty and tolerance possible [...] (15).

The aim of the community is to guard the values and itself against forces which might destroy it. Hence, the respective nations have to live up to these ideals, to promote them throughout the world, and to defend them against any kind of danger (15).³⁸⁰ As it is Streit himself who reports on this conference and dedicates so much

³⁷⁸In September 1957, the Conference on the North Atlantic Community was held in Bruges, hence it was called the Bruges Conference. In the course of this, a plan for an Atlantic Institute was drafted and adopted in the final report. This Atlantic Institute should have four principles: (1) a “cultural response to challenge [...] communism and totalitarianism”, (2) the promotion of “a sense of community and adequate leadership among Atlantic countries”, (3) it should “offer a clearing house for research on Atlantic issues”, and (4) it should strengthen democratic institutions by becoming a “vehicle for private Atlantic-wide efforts to share social values and techniques” (Aubourg 100). As can be seen by these goals, one of the main topics at the Bruges Conference was cultural ties and the development of the Atlantic community.

³⁷⁹However, as “racial ties” are mentioned in this context as well, the possibility of them affecting the closeness of the Atlantic nations is admitted.

³⁸⁰Lester B. Pearson, who later became the Canadian Prime Minister, also is quoted in *Freedom & Union* in this context, although he also does not make the values explicit: “We have common ideals, common values, common traditions and common interests. There *are* Atlantic values to be safeguarded by common action through common institutions. There *is* a western heritage to be preserved in the face of a menacing threat to it. There *can* be greater unity – if the will to bring it about is strong enough.” (Pearson 17). Thus, he also confirms the existence of specific Atlantic

effort and space in his magazine to explain the values of the Atlantic community in detail,³⁸¹ it can be assumed that Streit regards this conclusion of the Committee as plausible and agrees to its outcome. The values described by the Bruges commission go in line with those of the “Atlantic Spiritual and Cultural Committee” of the Atlantic Congress in 1959.³⁸² It finds a “moral unity which expresses itself through common principles [...] [r]espect for human dignity [as an] inalienable basis of civilization [...] natural transcendent law governing communities and individuals alike”, the importance of human rights, and the “duty to bring material and spiritual well-being progressively within the reach of all at both national and international levels”. However, these values could be expressed differently “by different peoples according to their various traditions” (*F&U*037 18). Thus, the values described are very similar, even if other vocabulary is used. What is important is human dignity, natural law, the obligation towards others in terms of material and spiritual well-being, and – if only stated indirectly – the tolerance of diversity both in opinions and ways of life. These are also values Streit wants to have fulfilled in ‘his’ Union and sees them as prerequisite for an admission of a nation to the Union.

The existence of such subcommittees in both conferences dealing with the broad concept of ‘common values’ alone indicates that there must have been a understanding among the participants that common values play an important part in the life to the people of the respective community they refer to. As Streit both supports the ideas of the Bruges Conference as well as the Atlantic Congress, *and* he himself publishes and writes most of the reports on this topic in his magazine, it can be deduced that he also is convinced of the validity of the values described. He wants to promote an understanding in the world that those really *are* the Atlantic or western values, although there is no precise definition of them. Nevertheless, all

values.

³⁸¹The reports on the Bruges Conference of 1957 get a report of 15 pages in total in *Freedom & Union* from November 1957 until February 1958 (C. K. Streit, “Bruges Proposes Atlantic Institute” 12-18; “Outline of an Atlantic Economic Community” 19-20; “The North Atlantic Community” 14-17). Considering that each of those issues only has 25 pages, this is quite an extensive coverage.

³⁸²The Atlantic Congress of June 1959 was held in London and attended by people from 14 NATO nations. The main topic was the further development of relations between the Atlantic nations inside the NATO area and their relations with the rest of the world. During the Congress, the question of the “Atlantic Community in the next ten years” was dealt with in three divisions: spiritual-cultural, political, and economic, of which the “Atlantic Spiritual and Cultural Committee”, thus, is one branch (P. K. Martin, “Eminent Citizens”).

the founding nations of the nucleus have to share these common values as otherwise, the founding of the Union or even an understanding on the underlying principles of this new polity is not possible. Yet, as the founders claim to defend those values for the whole world, it is debatable whether they should remain only ‘western’ – which implies that there are also ‘eastern’ values that are completely different – or if they should become universal.³⁸³ The latter case would mean that the western values can and must be imposed on the rest of the world that does not yet live according to them because the western values are considered better.

Language

In terms of language, Streit regards the founding nations of the original nucleus as more or less as an entity since “[l]anguage divides them into only five big groups, and for all practical political purposes, into only two, English and French” (*UN39* 7).³⁸⁴ Those groups are: English, French, Scandinavian, Dutch, and Finnish. Yet, “most educated people among the latter three already know some English or French” (*UN39* 107). This may be an indicator of the fact that in the long run, the most important languages would be English and French. Nevertheless, Streit points out that the “value of a common language for the purposes of organizing inter-state government has been over-rated” as common principles were more important (106).³⁸⁵ This seems a bit surprising as the argument of the common language(s) can be understood in the exact opposite way: one (or more) common language(s) indeed *are* very important if the Union is to be implemented because not everybody in all nations speaks English or French, which makes their integration in the whole community harder.³⁸⁶ However, Streit also argues that the existence of several languages in the Union would encourage people to learn even more languages and “enrich their individual culture by learning to speak other languages” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 139).

³⁸³The idea of whether western values should be universal or not also comes up in *Freedom & Union* (Danielou 11; Roepke 12).

³⁸⁴See also C. K. Streit, “How to Organize” 22.

³⁸⁵In fact, Streit says that everybody can keep their mother tongue, but should also learn another language to further communicate – and bond – with peoples from other language groups (*Freedom’s Frontier* 139).

³⁸⁶Still, the people who speak the English language as their mother tongue seem especially well-suited for founding the Union, since this language is identified with freedom and union, according to Streit (*UN41* 119-21; see also p. 189 here).

Hence, different language groups do not present an obstacle but they even bare great opportunities and chances for the Union and its citizens.

Once more, an imagined community between the United States as well as Britain and its former settler colonies is built in terms of language:

We who speak the English language speak the **language of the Rights of Man**, not the language of one race³⁸⁷ alone. Our pride is that our speech and thought and blood come from no single fraction of mankind, but from all races. Our line, like our language, stemmed from a thousand years ago from Celts, Romans, Vikings, Germans, French. [...] [T]here is no other line or language that embodies, as ours does, *all* humankind. [...] Since our line was born a thousand years ago it has never once been conquered, except by those who spoke its **language of freedom**. (*UN41* 52-53; emphasis added)

Streit wants to remind the reader that the English language was shaped by various other European languages in the past – a fact which cannot be denied. Yet, the reader gets the impression that he regards the English language as superior to the other languages it was influenced by. At the same time, he not only considers the English language to be on a higher level than other languages, but he also claims for the English-speaking peoples to be able to speak for “*all* humankind.” To him, people who speak English, also are the “*most jealous champions of local government – and yet, they are the most zealous advocates and builders of inter-state government*” (121). This also puts them on a higher rank than people from other language groups and represents them as the ‘natural’ leaders and decision makers for the future of the world. As the future should be realized in a federal union, of which the English-speaking peoples are champions, it seems commonsensical to Streit in 1941 that Britain and the U.S. should only “invite the men and women of the other democracies *that speak our language*” to found the Union (4; emphasis added). This is suggested despite the previous apprehensions and doubts in 1939 and 1940 (*UN39* 105-06; *UN40* 77).³⁸⁸ Yet, as people from other language groups would only be *invited* into an already existing polity but would not start the Union, it would definitely *not* be shaped by *non*-English-speaking peoples. Thus, the Union would mainly be dominated by the English-speaking peoples in terms of language.

³⁸⁷Note that here, the term “race” is used explicitly.

³⁸⁸Previously, Streit argues that having a single language in the Union would make it seem exclusive and deprive it of its necessary strength from the onset because not as many nations would be included (*UN39* 105-06; *UN40* 77).

It is questionable whether other people can fully fit in if the English language is prevailing in the whole Union. This domination would probably happen just because of the big majority of English-speaking peoples within the Union, even if French became a second official language. All the English-speaking nations would have no difficulty at all understanding each other language-wise and, therefore, would be able to communicate more quickly and easily. Hence, even if other languages officially are regarded as equal, the people who have English as their mother tongue always form a very strong group which could not be fully accessed by others – if this is possible at all. Consequently, it again has to be questioned whether this community of the English-speaking nations is only imagined or indeed real.

History

The connection via a common history might seem natural and would not bear much further explanation especially for the nations that (once) belong(ed) to the British Empire or the nations of the European continent. However, Streit has a larger theory: In 1961, he declares that an Atlantic Union would be a *reunion* of “most of the Hellenic and Roman worlds, and of that of Charlemagne” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 169). This implies several notions: All the founding nations already belong to one ‘nation’ whether they know it or not. They are seen as descendants from the same “worlds” of the past and, therefore, also share a common history and have a common origin in nearly ‘mythical times’, which constructs an imagined community among them. Thus, their current disunion is an unfavorable condition which would be ended by an Atlantic Union. Yet, Streit does not reflect on the fact that those “worlds” never belonged together at the same time, but their respective combination represents different empires of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and that not even all the members of this nucleus can be included in these “worlds”.³⁸⁹ Still, this argument suggests that these big empires of the past should come together ‘again’ and find their ultimate destiny in an Atlantic Union. People who are impressed by the power of those long-gone empires and do not think thoroughly about this argument might have been convinced by this reasoning, but it is hard to believe that it can be

³⁸⁹The following table outlines the parts of the fifteen NATO nations which formerly (partly) belonged to the respective empires. Streit’s wording is being repeated.

persuasive once the readers think it through. Additionally, Streit asserts that by forming the Union with the nucleus of 1961, the “Italians and French, the French and British, the British and Americans, the Americans and Canadians” (169) would be reunited.³⁹⁰ Despite the fact that the argument does not bear clear logic, Streit is nevertheless convinced of its truth. Since he claims that only bigger entities can survive in the future,³⁹¹ these ‘reunifications’ are a more or less ‘natural and vital process’ for Streit which cannot be objected by anyone.

The English-speaking nations among the founders do in fact share a special tradition and history: the British Empire. This is a tie no other group of nations among the founders has and which lets the English-speaking nations feel connected more closely than any other group of nations in the world. Especially after World War II, the British Empire no longer was as powerful as before and first the dominions and later other former colonies became independent. Yet, the bond continues to exist until today. However, Streit assesses the successor organization of the British

	Hellenic World	Roman World	Charlemagne
United States			
Canada			
Britain		X	
France		X	X
Belgium			X
Netherlands		partly	X
Denmark			X
Norway			
Iceland			
Luxembourg			X
Germany		partly	X
Greece	X	X	
Italy	X	X	X
Portugal		X	
Turkey	X	X	

As can be seen here, the nucleus of 1961 would not at all be a ‘reunion’ of the past empires as not all parts belonged to these. The big and powerful states (United States and Canada) have belonged to none, but are still seen as indispensable parts of the nucleus. The only explanation why he comes to this conclusion traces back to the question of ‘race’, meaning that Americans as well as Canadians are seen as “transplanted Europeans” (*Freedom Against Itself* 80) and, therefore, have the same history (see footnote 372).

³⁹⁰The references are probably made to the following eras of history in which certain parts of these states once were united: The House of Savoy ruled over parts of today’s Italy and France, in the Angevin Empire, the English kings also ruled over parts of France, the U.S. was part of the British Empire until 1776, and, finally, Streit might have referred to the American colonists who split up into Loyalists, who remained loyal to the British crown and often went to Canada after the Revolutionary War, and Patriots, who stayed in those parts of North America that later became the United States.

³⁹¹This idea is very similar to the empire peace thesis of the 19th century, see p. 33 here.

Empire – the Commonwealth of Nations – to be “neither Empire nor British in name” (*Freedom Against Itself* 19). Apparently, he does not *fully* believe in the uniting tie of the Empire history and culture in the 20th century, although the bond of history seems quite important to him. Nevertheless, a common history can never be denied and the links between the Commonwealth Nations are partly very strong until today – roughly 65 years after Streit’s assessment.

Among the English-speaking nations, however, the United States is a special case again. Not only did it become independent from the British Empire already in the 18th century, but it is more closely connected to the European nations as many Americans descend from there. Consequently, many people in the U.S. until today feel connected to the nations of their ancestors, in particular the European nations. This is reflected in Chase Osborn’s article in *Freedom & Union*, where she presents this close connection between the Americans and the “North Atlantic Peoples” as a given fact (“Peace and Freedom” 8). Americans could get the impression from *Union Now* that by founding the Union, their European ancestors and they themselves could be reunited and the historical and national ‘break’ of this connection could be ended.

Summary

As has been shown in this chapter, Streit regards the founding nations of the Union as very closely connected. This applies a bit less to the founders of 1961, but it is still argued that they belong together closely enough. In the Union of the Free, it would finally be possible to end the ‘abnormal’ disunion among the nations, which results from the existence of several nation states. The Atlantic cannot only be bridged “politically, militarily, economically, monetarily” but also “spiritually” (*UN49* 318). However, as mentioned before, Streit is convinced that the Union can only have enough stability from the beginning if not *any* group of nations starts the Union but only those with the closest ties. The founding nations are regarded as perfect for this purpose:

No other group of peoples is joined together in such a combination of community-making ties – spiritual, political, economic, financial, historic, geographic, cultural, linguistic, racial, military. In no other region have such strong and varied forces been

knitting the people of so many nations together for so many centuries. Nowhere else is this knitting together advancing half so fast today. (*Freedom Against Itself* 80)³⁹²

Thus, the nations have been seen as well-connected for a very long time in several aspects so the constructed imagined community is not of recent origin, but has existed for a very long time in Streit's conceptualization. Additionally, the nations have come closer together again recently. Therefore, it can be said that both tendencies reinforce each other: Because they were well-connected in the past, their connections intensified; because of this intensified contact, the connection became ever closer. The center of this connection is the United States, which is presented as a kind of 'natural' leader by Streit in his writings (see also C. K. Streit, "Big Four" 3).

The English-speaking nations, Britain and the U.S. in particular, have closer ties in nearly all the aspects Streit mentions and they are regarded as more important than all the others for the founding of the Union. This cannot least be seen in Streit's statement that "peace [in the world] depends on continued united action particularly by the Atlantic democracies who control such immense power" (*UN43* 260-61). It is important to know that the reference to the democracies who control this power is made to the United States and Britain but not to any other state. This shows, on the one hand, that they together definitely *are* the most important part of the nucleus and they have to fulfill a (Manifest) destiny in the whole Atlantic community if not in the whole world – they need to spread their own ideals as far as possible. On the other hand, the expression "*continued* united action" indicates that some form of collaboration has already existed and is acknowledged. It is however unclear whether Streit refers to the simple fact that they were allies in the war, that they had by then signed both the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration (D. Thompson, Meyer, and Briggs 189), or if he describes something else. Furthermore, the ties between all the English-speaking nations cannot be compared to any other group of nations. Apart from the more 'rational' arguments discussed especially in chapter 6.4, the impression of them being an (imagined) community is shaped by several aspects: a culture with many common elements, common ancestry (at least for the elites in the nations), a common religious, Protestant background,

³⁹²Note that this quote refers to the "original" nucleus, not to the fifteen NATO nations of 1961.

the common language, which simplifies any kind of contact, and, of course, a common history. This leads to the conclusion that what Streit actually wants – despite his repeated reassurances that this was not the case – is a Union of Britain and America or of all the English-speaking nations. All the other nations of the nucleus do not fully fit in this group as naturally as the English-speaking ones do, and he partly struggles to explain the opposite.

7 The Significance of *Union Now*

Joseph Preston Baratta states that “[i]f ever a book made a movement, *Union Now* was such a book” (*World Federation I* 53). The following chapter analyzes to what extent this assertion can be regarded as true or if it is more wishful thinking than reality.

7.1 The Organizations Founded to Support the Proposal of *Union Now*

Naturally, Streit’s ideas could not have been spread without organizational structures dedicated to this task. In the U.S., there basically were two organizations created for this aim: Federal Union Inc. and the Atlantic Union Committee. On an international level, Streit also founded the International Movement for Atlantic Union.

7.1.1 Federal Union Inc.

Shortly after *Union Now* was published in 1939, local “Union Now Committees” were founded in the U.S. to support Streit’s endeavor; the first chapter was formed on March 28, 1939³⁹³ in New York City (*F&U*058 13). Several of those chapters then met in New York City from July 15-17, 1939 and established a national organization on a provisional basis: the “Inter-Democracy Federal Unionists”. It planned a larger “more representative Convention” that took place in Cleveland in June 1941

³⁹³Note that *Union Now* was published on March 2, 1939, only 26 days previously. Thus, it can be assumed that the founding of the chapter was planned beforehand since it is very unlikely that this would have happened so quickly and spontaneously.

(*F&U039*; *F&U062* 13). The organization was renamed to “Federal Union Inc.” on 31 July, 1940 (Doenecke 45; Baratta, *World Federation I* 54).³⁹⁴ In *Union Now With Britain*, Streit states that by 1941 there already were organizations in New York City, London, Victoria (CAN), Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, Auckland (NZE), Johannesburg, County Wicklow (IRL), Bangalore (IND), and Buenos Aires (*UN41* vi), so the idea had already spread across many parts of the world. Doenecke finds that by March 1941, there were 60 chapters in the U.S. and 250 in Britain (Doenecke 45). By 1949, there also were Federal Union organizations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg (Wooley 111). *Freedom & Union* reports of a Turkish organization founded in 1948 as well (*F&U004*). This is particularly surprising given the fact that by 1948, Turkey was nowhere near being considered a founding state. In 1955, *Freedom & Union* also mentions the German organization “Union Atlantischer Föderalisten” (Wagner).³⁹⁵ It, thus, can be claimed that Streit’s proposal had gained a lot of publicity by the late 1940s and 1950s and apparently also a lot of firm believers. Doenecke quotes a Gallup poll of 1941 which found that around eight million citizens of the U.S. believed in the practicability of an Atlantic Union along Streit’s lines (Doenecke 45), which already is quite a high number. Additionally, the fact that the Atlantic Union was asked about in a Gallup Poll speaks for the people’s awareness of the idea.

The aim of the non-profit organization was to educate people around the world on the benefits of a worldwide federal union and to convince as many people as possible of the necessity of an Atlantic Union. This is the reason why its president

³⁹⁴In France, the supporting group was called “Le Comité d’Action pur l’Union Fédérale des Peuples Libres”. In Britain it was called “Federal Union” like in the United States. However, this group was not founded *because of Union Now* but already during the Munich crisis in 1938 (*World Federation I* 73). The British Federal Union organization had similar aims like the American one – the founding of a federation of states instead of another league to secure peace for the future – and also worked together with Clarence Streit until at least 1940. Yet, its focus of the planned federation was on Europe, which made the organization “on the whole uncooperative with the more radical American world federalists” (76-77, 82). The British Federal Union organization started to decline in 1940 and was formally disbanded in 1963, although the idea continued to live on in other organizations like the Lothian Foundation, which was founded in 1987 (77, 98). In the following, whenever “Federal Union” is spoken of, it refers to the American organization unless indicated otherwise. For more information on the British Federal Union organization, see Kendle chapter 6; Burgess, *British Tradition* chapter 6; Bosco, “Lothian, Curtis, Kimber.”

³⁹⁵It has to be noted that apart from *Freedom & Union*, no evidence of this organization of the “Union Atlantischer Föderalisten” could be found. Streit has certainly not invented it, but on the other hand, if there is no further evidence of it, it can hardly have been influential.

Streit³⁹⁶ started his first transcontinental speaking tour in June 1939, with others to follow (*F&U* 058 13; see also chapter 7.2.1 here). Finally, Federal Union Inc. also wanted to work as a pressure group to influence primarily politicians in the U.S. as they were the ones who could first and foremost change the political system on the national as well as on the international level and American politicians probably were easiest to reach by an organization based in the United States.

Although Streit continued to write pamphlets and held correspondence with his followers, membership numbers quickly dropped in the early 1940s so that Woolley comments that “at least the organization was being kept alive” (92), which makes it sound as if this alone was a big achievement. According to *Freedom & Union*, the reason for this drop in membership is the fact that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, people had to fight in the war and, thus, could no longer actively support Federal Union. Consequently, the financial situation deteriorated which led to a shortening of staff (C. K. Streit, “For Christmas Cheer” 2). However, this sounds like an excuse. If one really supported a cause, it would be possible to back it in some way, maybe ‘only’ financially or by recruiting new members for a corresponding organization. Additionally, this explanation seems far-fetched and given in retrospect because if this drop really happened *because* of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the goal of one million members would not have been pronounced at the convention of Federal Union Inc.³⁹⁷ in Peoria in 1943 (Baratta, *World Federation I* 56).

Already before the United States’ entry into the war, the movement started to split over the question of partial or universal federation for future global politics.³⁹⁸ The division between the idealistic members and Streit, who is described as more “pragmatic” by Baratta (58),³⁹⁹ had widened after the publication of *Union Now*

³⁹⁶Streit was president of Federal Union Inc. from 1938 until his retirement in 1978.

³⁹⁷From time to time, Federal Union Inc. held conventions that were general meetings of its members who held several panel discussions. They debated the further progress of the movement and set themselves goals for the future.

³⁹⁸The latter group was led by Vernon Nash, Mildred Blake, and Tom Griessemer. They, too, had founded a committee shortly after the publication of *Union Now* and then became part of the “Inter-Democracy Federal Unionists”. Yet, the differences between Streit and this group already started during the very first meeting in March 1939 on the discussion about the title “Committee of Correspondence for *World Federal Union*” (*World Federation I* 56).

³⁹⁹“Pragmatic” has to be understood here in such a way that Streit most likely knew that a universal union would never be founded in one step. Yet, Streit still was not pragmatic enough to see that the founding of ‘his’ Union also was very unrealistic, although Baratta leaves this fact out of his analysis.

With Britain. At the Federal Union Convention in Cleveland in 1941, Streit continued to advocate a Union with Britain instead of with *any* democracies in the world, which intensified the discord. By December 1941, the split group had founded a new organization called World Federalists. Still, the main press attention during the war was on Federal Union Inc., although the World Federalists began to grow. At the Federal Union Convention in Pittsburg in November 1945, Federal Union officially got divided and the universalists joined the United World Federalists (UWF)⁴⁰⁰ in 1947 (54-59). Baratta claims, however, that the split between the two wings of the organization was not too important for Streit (58). This statement has to be questioned. In an article for *Freedom & Union* in 1956, Streit informs his readers about the development of his publications and the movement this subsequently started *without* mentioning *Union Now With Britain* at all. Thus, he completely left out the plans for a unification of only Britain and the United States of 1941 (“To Get the Union Now”). This can be seen as an indicator that he indeed realized that this book was at least problematic for his followers because, if it was *unproblematic*, Streit would at least have referred to it in any way in this general recount of the idea of *Union Now*. The assumption goes in line with the repeated ‘apologies’ for the 1941 edition in all the following books (see chapters 4.4.5 and 4.4.6) and the fact that a year after the UWF was founded, a lengthy explanation why a partial approach is better than a universal one appears in *Freedom & Union* in 1948 (Vernon). Apparently the discussion about *Union Now With Britain* was still going on even among the subscribers of the magazine. Yet, Streit proudly announces in 1961 that

⁴⁰⁰Baratta states that the UWF were the “populist line” in the new organization (*World Federation I* 54). The organization was founded in February 1947 by the following organizations: World Federalists, U.S.A., Americans United for World Government, Student Federalists, World Republic, Inc., the Massachusetts Committee for Federal World Government, and the World Citizens’ Committee of Georgia. If the membership numbers of these single organizations are added up, the UWF had roughly 18,000 members at the start (Hamer, “Agreement” 22). In contrast to Federal Union, the UWF believed in the necessity of peace before freedom and a *universal* world government from the beginning – which is why they are called universalists. After its founding, there were only two major membership organizations left in the U.S. to work for world government: the UWF and Federal Union (C. K. Streit, “Union – Not Empire” 2). Their relationship seemed to be strained. Already by October 1945, at a conference in Dublin, New Hampshire, where possibilities of an improvement of the U.N. Charter were debated among world federalists, Streit and his supporters had isolated themselves from the rest of the participants of this meeting. Federal Unionists insisted on realizing Streit’s proposal, whereas the others tried to work together and really find solutions to their questions regarding the problems of the Charter (Baratta, *World Federation I* 145-49).

although he had to fight within the Federal Union association for his position of *not* opting for an immediate universal world federation, his belief in this opinion is still right (*Freedom's Frontier* 148-49). This might indicate that he hoped that the 'lost sheep' – the UWF members – would come back to his organization eventually once they realized that a partial Union was the *only* way towards a world federation.

Another group which was first created to support Streit's cause was Student Federalist. Its later president Harris Wofford started recruiting members after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the organization officially was founded on 24 March, 1942. As Wofford mainly campaigned among students, he probably presented an important value for Streit. After all, students often are very active and promote their endeavors with much enthusiasm and, thus, they possibly can reach a lot of people especially at a younger age. Additionally, they also represent the future decision makers in a society. Wofford himself was "a bit of a national figure" after some time and even attended the U.N. Convention in San Francisco in 1945 (Baratta, *World Federation I* 60-62). Within a year, Student Federalists could send nine chapters to the Federal Union Convention in Peoria (1943), having about 150 members in total (62). When they were incorporated in the UWF in 1947, membership had already grown to 4,380 (Hamer, "Agreement" 23). Streit himself was enthusiastic about this group because of its initiative and energy (Wofford, "World Federatlists"; Baratta, *World Federation I* 62). In his speech at the 1964 Federal Union Convocation, the split of the Student Federalists from Federal Union is not mentioned by Streit, but Student Federalists are still celebrated as one of the groups that guided the way out of difficult periods for Federal Union ("Winters" 23). Thus, Streit obviously still regarded them as a great asset for him.

By 1948, Federal Union merely "consisted of unorganized readers of his [Streit's] journal [...], but they were the nucleus of an organization that in another year [...] would be a major contender with UWF" (Baratta, *World Federation II* 363).⁴⁰¹ Nevertheless, the group was also seen as "a kind of gadfly on the right" in the 1950s (*World Federation I* 56).⁴⁰² Streit again gained followers when the Cold War became

⁴⁰¹The UWF as a whole claimed to lead "all world government groups on the political scene in the early Cold War" (*World Federation II* 363). Thus, it was no insignificant challenger to Streit's Federal Union.

⁴⁰²This impression is also reflected in a review of *Freedom's Frontier* (Armstrong).

more intense around the time of the founding of NATO (Wooley 90). Livingston Hartley, a long-time contributor to *Freedom & Union*, also sees the importance of the movement growing in the 1950s: The resolutions introduced in Congress (see chapter 7.3) at the time were harshly criticized. Yet, “only when a movement becomes a real political factor [...] organized groups take the time and trouble to try to obstruct it” (“Wide Perspective” 13). Hence, there was a clear gap in perception between the inside and the outside of the organization Federal Union. Nevertheless, in the December editorial of 1954 in *Freedom & Union*, Streit has to admit that there are “no signs of growth” of the movement any more, although he still is hopeful that this shrinking period of Federal Union will be over soon (“For Christmas Cheer” 2). By the 1960s, however, there no longer was widespread support for Streit’s cause and “unionist political ranks were thin” (Wooley 131). Yet, even though some people probably were annoyed by Streit and his followers by then, it can be seen as an achievement that he was still listened to by the platform builders of both major parties in the U.S. in 1964, when he wanted to persuade them to take an Atlantic Union as one of the their topics for the upcoming election (C. K. Streit, “For a Plank to Call Atlantic Convention”; “For A Democratic Pledge”). This shows that he was still taken seriously enough by some politicians to get the opportunity of being heard in this context. Had he succeeded there, his proposal and his organization might have had a new upswing, but unluckily for him, an Atlantic Union did not become a topic in the next election.

Even though Federal Union’s influence diminished over time, Baratta claims that it was one of the groups which had a bigger influence on politics between 1939 and 1947 than the UWF, for the simple fact that it had existed longer and, thus, had started to shape politics in an earlier and at the same time crucial period during and shortly after World War II (*World Federation I* 247). This goes in line with the contemporary assessment by Thompson, Meyer, and Briggs of 1945, who indicate that Streit’s organization was important at the peak of “inter-war utopian movements” in the early 1940s. However, they also observe that it was no longer taken very seriously after 1945 (158). Naturally, *Freedom & Union* regards Federal Union’s influence as more far-reaching and tries to stress this in order to win over

new supporters. The magazine claims that the organization's members were responsible for the following developments and events: the founding of the Atlantic Union Committee (1949), the Declaration of Atlantic Unity (1954), the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (1955), the Bruges Atlantic Conference (1957), the London Atlantic Congress (1959), the U.S. Citizens' Commission on NATO (1960), the Atlantic Institute (1961), the Atlantic Convention and the Atlantic Council for the U.S. (1962), as well as the Atlantic Quarterly (1963) (*F&U*055 11).⁴⁰³ Later on in 1966, members of the group also helped transforming the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into the North Atlantic Consultative Assembly (Baratta, *World Federation II* 463, 525). However, it has to be questioned whether Federal Union Inc. really was as important as the magazine claims. The Atlantic Union Committee indeed was created by people in the realm of Federal Union Inc., the Atlantic Convention in 1962 was called after a successful resolution which the Atlantic Union Committee had introduced in Congress (see chapter 7.3, p. 308), and the suggestion to convert the Parliamentarians' Conference into a permanent North Atlantic Assembly can be found in the *Freedom & Union* early on (P. D. Streit; Hartley, "A North Atlantic Assembly – Part I" 19; "NATO Legislators Meet"). Still, it seems a bit exaggerated for Federal Union Inc. to take so much credit for the leadership toward all of these organizations and events, especially because the organization conveys the impression that its members were the main, if not sole, driving force. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that people who supported Streit's idea in general actively tried to

⁴⁰³For the Atlantic Union Committee, see chapter 7.1.2. The Declaration of Atlantic Unity wanted to bring attention to the fact that NATO still was mainly a military alliance, but that the next steps needed to be coordinated political, trade, and defense policies within the alliance. It also suggested the creation of an Atlantic Assembly for the discussion of matters of common concern and was signed by roughly 150 "distinguished citizens from 8 Atlantic Pact nations", namely the U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands (*F&U*025 12). The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference started off in 1955 as an informal meeting of Parliamentarians of all fifteen NATO members and later developed into the North Atlantic Consultative Assembly (C. K. Streit, "Atlantic Union Makes Twofold Alliance" 2; Baratta, *World Federation II* 463, 525). For the Bruges Conference, actually Conference on the North Atlantic Community, and the Atlantic Institute, see footnote 378. For the Atlantic Congress, see footnote 382. For the U.S. Citizens' Commission on NATO, see p. 307. For the Atlantic Convention in 1962, see p. 308 and for the Atlantic Council, see p. 265. Although the mentioned "Atlantic Quarterly" is not italicized by the author of the article (*F&U*055 11), it can be assumed that it is a periodical. Yet, no periodical with this title could be found. Still, there is *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, which appeared from 1963-1988. Since the dates fit and it also deals with the idea of an Atlantic community, it can be assumed that the author of the article referred to this periodical and simply used the abbreviation of its title.

shape politics. Yet, had their influence been as great as *Freedom & Union* argues, it would have been pointed out in the magazine more clearly at the time, because it *wanted* to show how important the supporters of an Atlantic Union were.

In 1983, long after the organization's zenith and after Streit's retirement from presidency in 1978, Federal Union Inc. was renamed to "Association to Unite the Democracies" – a change which according to Baratta "almost drove the founder out of his old organization" (*World Federation II* 525). Ira Straus then became the executive director, who also started to publish a new magazine called *The Federator*. Today, the Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD) wants to "reinforce the Euro-Atlantic link working on the issues of NATO/EU enlargement and Transatlantic relations" as well as to "facilitate the spread of democracy and freedom by means of education and cultural exchange" ("A Brief History of AUD"). Furthermore, the Mayme and Herb Frank Scholarship Program was established in 1989, whose target group is students with a focus on international relations and federalism ("Scholarships"). However, no information can be found on whether the AUD has connections with important people around the world or whether it has influenced political and cultural developments in the last years. Assuming that this would be highly stressed on the AUD's homepage – which is not the case – it can be concluded that the organization is largely irrelevant today. This is also reflected by the fact that the contact address of the AUD is placed in Kingsport (Tenn.), a very small town far away from the political center of either U.S. or world politics.

Another organization which today is still associated with Streit and which is cooperating with the AUD is the Streit Council. Although it was not founded directly by Federal Union Inc. or a similar institution, it directly refers to Streit's proposal – as the name indicates. The goal is to publish "analyses, research, and opinion pieced on Euro-Atlantic integration, transatlantic relations, broader inter-democracy relations, and global governance" ("About Us"). In doing so, it has similar aims as Federal Union Inc. had, namely raising awareness of the topic of world federal Union as well as working out practical solutions for policymakers. Yet, the organization no longer wants an Atlantic Union to be founded along Streit's proposal, but it is working towards a closer collaboration within the EU, NATO, G7,

and the OECD, as well as between democracies in general, and to promote freedom and democracy in the world accordingly. Ironically, the Streit Council apparently tries to strengthen alliances instead of trying to found a Union – *the* key in Streit’s proposal, who always said that alliances could not work. Nevertheless, in a conference the Streit Council held in May 2002 in Russia, the idea of whether an Atlantic Union would still be possible was at least discussed and included in the press report (Straus, “Talbot Wants Russia in NATO”). From 2002 until 2012, the Streit Council also hosted events, in the course of which they discussed topics of closer international collaboration together with partly high-ranking guests, such as former French Premier Édouard Balladour (“Streit Council Sponsored Events”). From Winter 2006 to Winter 2012/13, the organization also took up the publication of the magazine *Freedom & Union* – this time as a biannual – with its new editor Tiziana Stella, and it is stated in the very first editorial that Streit’s proposal still presents the ideal goal (“Three Generations of Progress”). Since 2012, the Council has no longer been hosting own events or published *Freedom & Union* but only ran an own blog from June 2016 to November 2017 (“Streit Talk”), which until March 2020 only has ten entries (Council).⁴⁰⁴ In April 2019, it started publishing articles from other newspapers on “Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance” on the website (“What’s New”)⁴⁰⁵ and, thus, informs its supporters about the news from the perspective it favors. However, own reports are no longer written. All in all, the website is not designed very professionally, the structure is not presented clearly, and it is quite hard, if not impossible, to see from the start which information can be generated from it. Additionally, although the Streit Council evidently wants to present itself as an organization that has to be taken seriously in the topic of transatlantic relations, in particular the section on “staff” is less than professional, with different-sized, partly blurred or overexposed, and private-seeming photos in particular of the interns but also the fellows. These facts taken together lead to the conclusion that the Streit Council has lost influence content-wise since 2012 – if it ever had an impact – and also apparently lacks the financial resources to en-

⁴⁰⁴This blog can no longer be found online. The last backup in the web archive dates to March 14, 2020.

⁴⁰⁵These articles are no longer online, either. Their last backup for this page in the web archive dates to April 8, 2020.

gage in effective agenda setting by, for example, hosting events or publishing an own magazine. The design and structure of the website also indicates that there is very little money to work it out properly. Without enough financial resources, it is highly doubtful whether the Streit Council really is influential in the discussion on a new form of (trans-)Atlantic global structure or whether they remain the “gadfly” Baratta has already labeled Streit for the 1950s (*World Federation I* 56).

7.1.2 Atlantic Union Committee (AUC)

In January 1949, a “small group of leading citizens” (Wooley 105) who supported the idea of an Atlantic Union met in New York in order to form a new organization with the aim of promoting a federal Union of democracies. Out of this initiative, Owen J. Roberts, Will Clayton, and Robert Patterson announced the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee (AUC) (105-06). All three men were of conservative background and had great prestige as well as personal knowledge of the highest political ranks in the United States;⁴⁰⁶ the rest of the leadership of this new Committee is described by Wooley as “an impressive collection of solid citizens, the sorts of people likely to gain the respectful attention of congressmen and State Department officials” (105-06).⁴⁰⁷ This, of course, added to the reputation of the organization as a whole and *Freedom & Union* could publish positive reports on the organization very soon (Hamer, “Press Evaluates AUC”; *F&U*010). The goal of the AUC was to transform “basic ideas that *Union Now* and FREEDOM & UNION ha[d] been

⁴⁰⁶Former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts from the start was on the Board of Federal Union and decided to devote his time after his retirement in 1945 to bring about an Atlantic Union (Wooley 102). Clayton was Under Secretary of State for economic affairs from 1946-1947 and is described as the “chief architect of the Marshall Plan” (103). After he decided that a world state was inevitable, he became a member of the advisory board of the UWF in 1947, but decided in 1948 to sponsor the Atlantic Union Committee (102-04). Patterson first was a judge in the federal court, then in the circuit court before the war and became Undersecretary of War in December 1940. After the war, he worked as Secretary of War from 1945 until his retirement in 1947 (104-05).

⁴⁰⁷The AUC’s board of governors in the beginning included “editor and historian Herbert Agar, publisher Gardiner Cowles, scientist Harold Urey, and the editor of *Barron’s*, George S. Shea”. Members of the Advisory Council were, among others, “Warren Atherton, past National Commander of the American Legion, former Attorney General Francis Biddle and former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, Educators Sidney Hook and Milton Eisenhower, and editors William Bohn of the *New Leader*, Russell Davenport of *Fortune*, and Pulitzer-Price-winner Hodding Carter. Businessmen included Percival Brundage of Price Waterhouse, Chester Davis, president of the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis, Paul Litchfield of Goodyear Tire, H.W. Prentis of Armstrong Cork, and Harry Bullis, board chairman of General Mills and influential member of the National Association of Manufacturers” (106).

championing” into practical politics (*F&U*005 6). The organization supported the NATO treaty, but aimed at federally uniting its members since the alliance only presented an emergency measure. Baratta claims that the AUC in general wanted to unite those members of the U.N. which were devoted to “aims of world justice, world peace, and world freedom” (*World Federation II* 470). This means that they still worked for a Union along Streit’s proposal, but at least on the surface, they seemed to be more open to including different nations than Streit proposes in his books. In general, the AUC can be described as the ‘political branch’ of the movement around Streit which mainly wanted to get resolutions passed in Congress.⁴⁰⁸ These were supposed to bring about an Atlantic Convention in order to found the nucleus of a world government along Streit’s proposal (C. K. Streit, “Federal Union, Inc.” 9). The AUC also assisted the founding of the 1955 NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference as well as the establishment of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1966 (Baratta, *World Federation II* 523).

The Atlantic Union Committee quickly started its campaign to influence politics in Washington and mainly addressed the political elite in Congress.⁴⁰⁹ After the first resolutions were introduced to start an Atlantic Union, the AUC tried to work for its passing outside of Congress by gaining publicity,⁴¹⁰ educating the public on the topic, working for higher membership numbers in its local chapters, and trying to convince prominent Americans to speak out in favor of the resolutions. However, no grassroots support developed. Yet, the parts of the American elite who *did* endorse the resolution could still win congressional support (Wooley 112; see also chapter 7.3 here). Furthermore, the AUC managed to get a lot of press encouragement of the Committee as such but also of its goals in the first two years after its creation, which again made it and its agenda widely known across the United States.⁴¹¹ At

⁴⁰⁸For the resolutions, see chapter 7.3.

⁴⁰⁹For example, members of the AUC quickly appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and wanted to get the NATO treaty signed (Hamer, “Close-Up on Capitol Hill”; *F&U*007; *F&U*006). This is probably the reason why Streit regarded the Committee as responsible for the ratification of the treaty with only 13 dissenting votes (“Keep It Rolling” 2).

⁴¹⁰Owen J. Roberts, for example, wrote a letter to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in the name of the AUC to get European support for the resolution. The letter was published in *Freedom & Union* (“AUC Sends Message to Strasbourg”), but it remains unknown how it was received in there.

⁴¹¹Wooley collected editorial backing in the following newspapers and magazines: *Baltimore Sun*, *Detroit News*, *Minneapolis Morning Tribune*, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, *Louisville Courier-Journal*,

a time when fear of the Soviets was increasing, the Americans were quite receptive to this publicity (114-15), although it is hard to judge to what extent an Atlantic Union really would have been supported.⁴¹²

In the 1950s, the Committee was led by Owen J. Roberts, Will Clayton, and Elmo Roper, a public opinion analyst;⁴¹³ Streit, however, remained closely associated and paid attention that the AUC's aims closely resembled his program. The members of the Advisory Council consisted of "educators, clergymen, editors, former government administrators, and a disproportionately large number of businessmen" (115). As the AUC's reputation seemed to be good and because many members had access to both the highest U.S. legislative and executive branches, it could have an impact on American politics up to a certain point. Members tried to keep their influence up by holding press conferences in New York and Washington as well as by personal meetings with the respective Secretary of State and/or President. Yet, this lobbying was not too successful in the end, as neither Acheson, nor Dulles or later President Truman could be convinced to support AUC goals. Still, the Committee could, for example, gain 28 supporters in the Senate and 110 in the House to vote for the 1951 resolution (118-20).⁴¹⁴ This all together indicates that the AUC at least had the *potential* of changing the discursive regime in American politics due to the kind of members it attracted.⁴¹⁵

1951 presented the climax for the Atlantic Union Committee: Its membership numbers and financial contributions were growing and the first national convention could be held in Memphis in November that year.⁴¹⁶ The overall world political cir-

Augusta Chronicle, Brooklyn Eagle, Dallas Morning News, New York Herald-Tribune. Furthermore, there were also articles in the following magazines: *Look, Saturday Evening Post, Kiwanis Magazine, Glamour* together with editorial endorsement by leftist magazines (*Commonweal, New Leader, New Republic*). One big success was the strong support by the (more conservative) *Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the New York Times*, as well as the backing by the Luce Empire, consisting of the magazines *Time, Life, and Fortune* (113-14). For more on the Luce Empire, see p. 272 here.

⁴¹²Wooley mentions that although there were 136 local chapters and four state branches by September 1951, "total paid membership stood at only 8,158" (115). This is not a lot considering the members were recruited from all over the United States.

⁴¹³The third founder Patterson had taken on a more minor role by then.

⁴¹⁴Among them were later President Richard Nixon and Christian Herter, who later became Secretary of State. For the 1951 resolution, see p. 305 here.

⁴¹⁵For more on this potential, see chapter 7.2.

⁴¹⁶Naturally, this convention is described in *Freedom & Union* (Hamer, "Meeting of Minds"). The magazine announces that the AUC had the goal of 20,000 members in 1952 and decided to not widen its field of activity but remain in the political field. This was probably done because it

cumstances seemed to play into its hands, too: Fear of the Soviet Union increased ever more, the State Department was working for a more closely united Atlantic Alliance, and other support groups for an Atlantic Union existed in Canada, Britain, and Western Europe. The problems of the AUC, however, started when the hearings on the resolution in 1951 were denied in both House and Senate because of more pressing issues.⁴¹⁷ This led to a diminished motivation on the side of the supporters in the local chapters, a trend which coincided with growing opposition from patriotic groups (120).

In November 1952, a so-called “Annual Congress of Delegates of the Atlantic Union Committee” was held. Although it was greeted by many important politicians at the time⁴¹⁸ and, consequently, must have been recognized by influential people concerned with the topic of Atlantic unity in general, the congress did not have any lasting effect. It only declared its aims very vaguely, like it would “support all major U.S. legislation which clearly promote[d] the security and unity of the North Atlantic Community” (Hamer, “Federalists Meet in Buffalo”). In the following, only (short) reports on AUC Council meetings can be found in *Freedom & Union*.⁴¹⁹

There is different and contradictory information on the continuation of the AUC after 1961. In February 1963, *Freedom & Union* publishes an article which explains that some members of the AUC founded the so-called “Atlantic Council, Inc.” – among them was one of the AUC’s founders Will Clayton (“History since 1961”). They were confident that “they could advance union better through an

was the field in which the AUC was most effective and ‘educational’ goals were already undertaken by Federal Union Inc. However, since it is not reported in *Freedom & Union* at any point that the AUC achieved this goal in membership numbers, it can be assumed to have been missed – after all, *Freedom & Union* reports on *any* minor success of the movement.

⁴¹⁷These were the Korean War, the question of rearmament of Western Europe, and the hearings of General Douglas MacArthur after he had been dismissed by President Truman (Wooley 120).

⁴¹⁸On this occasion, Owen J. Roberts as one of the AUC’s founders received supporting messages from, for example, President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary General of NATO Lord Ismay, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and President of the U.N. General Assembly Lester B. Pearson, and Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs Paul van Zeeland (*F&U020*).

⁴¹⁹There is no report on a meeting in 1953, the next meetings that are written about are in 1954 and 1955 (*F&U024*; Hamer, “AUC Council Meets in Capital”). After a longer break, *Freedom & Union* reports on the next session in December 1956 (Blackwelder, “A.U.C. Delegates”). This interruption is an indicator that the AUC was getting weaker, less influential, or that it did not have enough financial resources to uphold an annual cycle of conventions. Assuming that *Freedom & Union* could be depended upon to report anything important that happened because of or in the AUC, it seems that the last Council meeting was in December 1956 as no articles on any activity can be found afterwards.

organization that did not proclaim this goal [of an Atlantic Union]”, because people who were not convinced of the necessity of an Atlantic Federal Union could also support the organization (*F&U*052). It is never reflected, though, that *not* clearly stating a goal and still hoping for broad support does not make sense at all. The Atlantic Council then merged with the American Council on NATO and the U.S. Committee for the Atlantic Institute in November 1961 to form the “Atlantic Council”, which is still in existence today. This is the view Baratta and Wooley agree on. The former also explains that the Atlantic Council today tries to “quietly [...] strengthen NATO” (Baratta, *World Federation II* 525; Wooley 131).⁴²⁰ *Freedom & Union* itself, however, tells a different story: Elmo Roper took over the presidency of the AUC after Owen J. Roberts’ death in 1955. In February 1969, it is reported that the Committee decided to end its activities in 1962 and made Federal Union Inc. its heir (Blackwelder, “Elmo Roper Elected”; *F&U*109 3). Nothing is told about the Atlantic Council, Inc. (like Baratta and Wooley do), which allegedly was partly founded by AUC members. This is surprising because it would have been an opportunity for the magazine to show that people who in general supported Streit’s idea of an Atlantic Union continued to be influential even after they had left the AUC. I expected to find more information about Atlantic Council, Inc. in the later issues, especially as Will Clayton was both a founder of the AUC *and* the Atlantic Council, Inc.,⁴²¹ but nothing accordingly was reported in *Freedom & Union*. This may indicate that it was hard for the magazine to admit that the AUC split up after all, lost influential members, and, thus, was not as successful as hoped for: Apart from the passage of the 1959 resolution (see chapter 7.3, p. 306), no U.S. President initiated any further action to start an Atlantic Union and the structure of NATO as an alliance was never changed to a formal union. Therefore, the AUC can be

⁴²⁰According to its own website, the Atlantic Council mainly has been doing educational work and agenda setting since the 1960s and focuses on the idea that “a healthy transatlantic relationship is fundamental to progress in organizing a strong international system” (“History since 1961”). Hence, the Council does not support the idea of an Atlantic – and later worldwide – Union like Streit wanted it but is only based in the transatlantic area and not worldwide. Furthermore, the website does not tell anything about the idea of strengthening the institutional side of NATO. Thus, even if there *was* any impact of Streit supporters in the beginning, it is no longer traceable there.

⁴²¹The Atlantic Council, Inc. is shortly mentioned in Clayton’s obituary in *Freedom & Union* in March 1966. Although it must have been a hard blow for the AUC that this prestigious founder left the organization (*F&U*083 2), no judgment was made on it on this occasion.

assessed to have failed to reach its goals. Nevertheless, whilst it was still active, the Atlantic Union Committee presented both an important and prestigious group for Streit to make his agenda known – even though this might have been the only success of the AUC in the long run.

7.1.3 International Movement for Atlantic Union (IMAU)

In 1958, a year after the Bruges conference, Streit founded a new group to support the goal of an Atlantic Federal Union together with former French Defense Minister Pierre Billotte: the International Movement for Atlantic Union (IMAU). This organization – again under the presidency of Clarence Streit – tried to gain European support for his proposal (Baratta, *World Federation II* 525).⁴²² Furthermore, the IMAU aimed at revising the NATO treaty “to improve political, economic, social and cultural relations” and to “harmonize the foreign policies of member nations, exchange technical information and advance common measures against the recession and economic warfare and for economic expansion” (“International Movement for Atlantic Union Constituted”). Thus, in contrast to Federal Union Inc. and the Atlantic Union Committee, which both had their focus on what could be done *in* the U.S. to achieve an Atlantic Union, the IMAU wanted to be more active in Europe, tried to influence politics *outside* the U.S., and to combine the efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the constitutive session, the main delegates – as could be expected – were members of the Atlantic Union Committee and Federal Union Inc., probably mostly because Streit was the leading figure in all three organizations and had sent out the invitations. *Freedom & Union* reports that the second-most delegates were from the French “Movement pour l’Union Atlantique” and the German “Union Atlantischer Föderalisten” (“International Movement for Atlantic Union Constituted”) as well as from Iceland and the Netherlands (“International Atlantic Union Movement Meets”). So, it can be assumed that many people in all four nations, mainly in France and West Germany, already knew about Streit’s proposal and were in-

⁴²²This is also reflected in the first article in *Freedom & Union* on it, which says that IMAU’s goal is “to develop and to coordinate organized action to this end [a federal Union in the world] *in the various countries of the Atlantic Community*” (C. S. Osborn, “International Movement for Atlantic Union Constituted” 12; emphasis added).

terested enough to attend the constitutive session. The Congress of the IMAU then wanted to meet every two years, however, this was not realized as the second Congress only took place in October 1961 (“International Atlantic Union Movement Meets”). The movement as a whole was governed by a Board of Directors (also called Honorary Council), which had a limit of 40 members “who have held very high office in their country or NATO or SHAPE, who have led in unifying the Atlantic community”, and who supported the idea of a federal Union in the world (*F&U*045). Membership in the Honorary Council was permanent. This Council also established an Advisory Council, which consisted of a wider scope of “eminent citizens” who had already contributed in different fields to the general purpose of an Atlantic Union or who wanted “to make their names count for the Movement’s basic purposes” (*F&U*045).⁴²³ Members of both Councils then got a subscription of *Freedom & Union*, which ensured that the magazine could at least theoretically be read by influential people all over the world. Becoming a member of one of these councils was only possible by invitation (*F&U*045). This could be used to keep the organization elitist like Federal Union and the AUC (see p. 299) and it could also help to change the discursive regime (see chapter 7.2). *Freedom & Union* frequently publishes the names of new members of both the IMAU Honorary and Advisory Council between 1958 and 1969, most likely to indicate the broad footing on which the movement stood. What is missing, however, is any report on *what* the IMAU members actually *did* to achieve an Atlantic Union apart from endorsing resolutions in the U.S. Congress, meeting from time to time, and, thus, making the idea of a federal Atlantic Union slightly better known in their nations or on an international level (*F&U*082; *F&U*091). Instead, the magazine only names all the (new) members and highlights people who were in influential positions, like when all past Secretary Generals of NATO until 1964 were members of the IMAU Honorary Council after the admission of Dirk Stikker (*F&U*063). In May 1969, *Freedom & Union* reports that there were 745 members in the Advisory Council worldwide (*F&U*110). Given the fact that one could only become a member by personal invitation, the number

⁴²³In contrast to the Honorary Council, members of the Advisory Council had to pay for their membership (\$10 a year), which required a slightly higher identification with the cause because more than just showing general approval had to be done – although arguably not a lot, since \$10 a year is not much but it had to be paid anyway.

might seem impressive. However, it does not seem as big after all if it is taken into account that the Board wanted to have worldwide support for an Atlantic Union *and* the members of the Advisory Council apparently simply had to accept an invitation, state that they in general supported an Atlantic federation, and had to pay a small annual membership fee of \$10. Most of the members also seem to have been from the U.S. because most new members that are reported in *Freedom & Union* are Americans. This means that the movement did not really succeed in making it ‘international’, but the focus – like in Federal Union and the AUC – remained on the United States. The last mentioning of new members appears in December 1969 (*F&U*108), which indicates that the movement was no longer as active – if at all – in the 1970s.

7.2 Clarence K. Streit and His Network

Whether Streit really was a significant thinker and how serious he had to be taken certainly depends on the point of view of the reader. Whereas John Foster Dulles describes the group around Streit as “amateurs” at one point in 1953 (qtd. in Woolley 119),⁴²⁴ Streit himself and his firm supporters regarded him as a very rational and intelligent man, whose goals indeed were idealistic, but which could or had to be realized in order to save the world from another war. Naturally, it was his aim to convince as many people as possible of the necessity and feasibility of an Atlantic Union. Thus, this new ‘truth’ had to be established among his potential readership, because it should be believed in and acted upon.

Foucault claims that the establishment of a (new) truth requires a certain power position within a society and each society has its own regime of truth (see chapter 2.1). This term describes the fact that a certain type of discourse exists and is accepted, while others are not. It can determine whether something is perceived as true or false. Furthermore, it ascribes value to certain “techniques and procedures [...] in the acquisition of truth” and the “status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (*Power* 131). Hence, if the existing regime of truth – in the case of what Streit observed: the conviction that world politics can be

⁴²⁴For more information on John Foster Dulles and his relationship to *Union Now*, see footnote 441.

based on the ‘league system’ and the primary entity of politics is the state – is to be changed, specific strategies need to be taken into account. As Streit’s audience was primarily American, Streit had to refer to certain specific American cultural concepts in order to be understood and taken seriously by this audience. Additionally, the “techniques and procedures to acquire truth” are heavily shaped by representatives of universities and the press as well as by politicians, so those groups of people needed to be ‘won’ for Streit’s cause. Finally, the status of those who promote a new truth is highly relevant. This means that Streit needed to specifically define his target group and address especially those who had a high status and should and could work as multipliers. After all, truth “is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (universities, arms, writing, media)” (131). Thus, representatives of these apparatuses needed to be convinced primarily, as truth is “linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it” (132) and both of them – the political and the economic apparatus – each present a system of power and can produce (new) regimes of truth that are accepted within a society. However, this can only work if the “power of truth” – the “political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth” – is dissociated from “the forms of hegemony [...] within which it operates at the present time” (133). In other words: New truths have to be found (something which Streit tried to do by publishing *Union Now*), these have to be established among people not necessarily associated with older forms of hegemony in the society, but still in a powerful position, and the new truths have to be established primarily by people of a high status.

The following subchapters deal with the ‘hype’ that was constructed around Streit and the network of people he built to support his goal of an Atlantic Union. It is intended to show how Streit tried and did or did not succeed in establishing a new regime of truth⁴²⁵ among his supporters and to what extent this could be transported to society so that it would work along this new truth.

⁴²⁵In the following, whenever (Streit’s) regime of truth is spoken of, it describes the conviction that an Atlantic Union along *Union Now* should be established as soon as possible.

7.2.1 The Popularity of Clarence K. Streit and His Contacts

Before *Union Now* was published on March 2, 1939, James Truslow Adams, the renowned historian, published a book review in the *New York Times* on February 19, in which he applauds Streit for being “exceptionally qualified to write on the world situation” and claims that he before has “seen nowhere else so keen an analysis of the reason for the failure of the League”. Although he still is skeptical that Streit’s plan can become a reality soon enough to prevent a new war and criticizes him for not seeing all the problems related to the founding of the Union, Adams also is convinced of the fact that the alternative to Streit’s union is “misery, chaos, untold horrors” (“A Union of the Democracies”). This review is likely to have helped *Union Now* become known in the U.S. instantly after its publication for two reasons: First of all, James Truslow Adams was not just *any* historian, but was widely known and respected at the time for he had won the Pulitzer Prize for his work *The Founding of New England* in 1922 (“History”) and had only published *The Epic of America* some years previously in 1931, which is a classic until today. Thus, he would not have *had* to write a review on any book and the fact that he praised this one in advance probably made its first readership open to or at least interested in what Streit had to say. Secondly, the *New York Times* was not just *any* paper but a quality newspaper with a good reputation and a wide circulation.⁴²⁶ Even if it is considered that Streit had been working for the *New York Times* himself at least until 1935⁴²⁷ and, consequently, it can be assumed that he was known by the editors and some of its authors, it is still remarkable that his book got such a big platform even before it was published. The press, in this case the *New York Times*, is one of the apparatuses that works to establish truth in the sense of Foucault. Hence, it clearly was very helpful for Streit that this prestigious newspaper with the voice of James Truslow Adams constituted that *Union Now* was worth reading and might provide solutions for the world’s problems at the time.

This process worked similarly with other newspapers and magazines: Felix

⁴²⁶According to the paper’s own account, the circulation of 819,845 copies of the Sunday issues in February 1939 was especially large and the “highest average Sunday sale in any month in The Times [sic] history” (“Highest Sunday Circulation”). This was a lucky coincidence for Streit and his book since more people than usual had the opportunity to read Adams’ book review.

⁴²⁷For the confusion about Streit’s time at the *New York Times*, see footnote 130.

Morley, editor of the *Washington Post*, a second, very large and influential newspaper in the U.S., also wrote a very positive review on *Union Now*, which was published on March 5, 1939, only three days after the publication of the book (“A Plan of ‘More Perfect Union’”). Furthermore, the so-called Luce Empire⁴²⁸ also supported Streit’s *Union Now* because *Life*, *Time*, and *Fortune* strongly advocated an Atlantic Union. In April 1939, Russell Davenport wrote an editorial on the book in *Fortune* (“Clarence Streit’s Vision”), in which he repeats Streit’s main arguments and reasons why the Union has to be founded with this particular group of nations. *Life* published a portrait of Streit and his book in October 1939 (“United States of the World”) and by November 1939, *Time* magazine apparently rated *Union Now* as one of the 16 “classics” that were published that year (*F&U*034 18). This magazine also published two cover stories on Clarence Streit in 1941 and 1950 and, thus, made him well-known among its readership (“War and Peace”; “Elijah from Missoula”). Hence, both the person Streit and the book *Union Now* were made sure to be largely known in the U.S. within the first year of its publication – also beyond the group of first supporters of the proposal. These would have subscribed for the *Union Now Bulletin* and were informed on Streit’s ideas anyway, but the newspapers and magazines described above had a larger and broader readership, which provided a huge potential for possible new supporters, since this press had enough power and prestige to do so.

This early press attention together with the looming war allowed *Freedom & Union* to present Streit in retrospect as a personality with a wide reputation or even a ‘prophet-like’ figure who had a large audience wherever he spoke and admirers not only across the U.S. but all over the world.⁴²⁹ It is striking in this context that the cover story on Streit in March 1950 in the *Time* magazine is titled “Elijah from Mis-

⁴²⁸The name Luce Empire comes from Henry Luce, the original publisher of the magazines *Time*, *Life*, *Fortune*, and *Sports Illustrated*. These magazines together informed large part of liberal Americans on events in and outside of the United States. Swanberg estimates that by 1944, at least a third, but probably more, of the total literate adult U.S. population got informed by one or more of these magazines (214), so the potential to influence people with the help of the Luce Empire was quite high. It was therefore also very helpful for the cause that both Clare Boothe Luce and Henry Luce II, owners of the Luce Empire, were members of the AUC advisory board (Woolley 113-14), as they could clearly heighten the reputation of *Union Now*.

⁴²⁹Baratta argues that this happened as soon as *Union Now* was published in 1939 (*World Federation I* 53). However, this cannot totally be proved with the sources used here, which is why this argument is not used in this thesis.

soula” (“Elijah from Missoula”). In the Bible, the prophet Elijah can convince the Israelites to accept his god Yahweh instead of worshipping Baal because he proves – in contrast to the prophets of Baal – that Yahweh answers to his prayers and ignites Elijah’s offering. After that, the prophets of Baal are killed (*KJV* 1 Kings 18). If the prophets of Baal are seen as an analogy to other ideas of a world state, Streit’s followers seemed to believe that he – like Elijah – could ‘kill’ those ideas and prove that only his proposal of the Union can work and save the peace. Thus, he would demonstrate to the world that he is the ‘right’ prophet who has always believed in the ‘right god’ of Atlantic Union – which is exactly what Streit and his supporters were convinced of. Considering the fact that in the American civil religion, the chief priest of the nation – the U.S. President – should be followed and listened to, this portrayal of Streit as a ‘prophet’ of Atlantic Union can be expected to especially appeal to Americans. He could become the ‘chief priest’ or, since he would not become the president, the ‘God father’ of the Atlantic nations and, hence, replace the U.S. President in this role in the long run. Furthermore, by presenting Streit like a ‘prophet’, his status is heightened, which once more gives him the opportunity to establish the new truth of Atlantic union more easily.

In a series on the 20th anniversary of the publication of *Union Now, Freedom & Union* cites several articles which claim that Streit gave over 70 speeches across the U.S. in 1939 alone. The audiences were quite big, the largest allegedly comprised about 2000 people (*F&U*034). This indeed is impressive for the first year of the appearance of *Union Now*. It is probably the reason why *Life* states in 1939 that talks about “practicable” plans on a future peace order at the time have a new high and are inspired by *Union Now* (“Peace?”). Additionally, Streit made radio broadcasts, which further enlarged his audience, and another tour through the U.S. was planned right away for 1940. Interestingly, it is also stressed that Streit spoke to “educators and scientists” (*F&U*034 19) – a group which is very important if one wants to have a large impact: Educators and scientists can be multipliers for ideas among their students and also the general public and, thus, are crucial for (new) movements to grow. Another influential group Streit addressed was the Association of Foreign Correspondents, of which he had been a longtime member before he left

the *New York Times* in the 1930s. Naturally, foreign correspondents also could gain large new audiences easily and give Streit and his ideas the attention of the press. These instances together could further have given Streit the image of a ‘prophet’ right away. However, *Freedom & Union* only starts to present him as such in retrospect in the later phases of the movement because reports that convey this image only start in 1959. Hence, the popularity of Streit seems to be constructed in a way in order to present him as ‘the right prophet’ who has had many loyal followers from the beginning. This could result in a perception of the movement as very broad with a longer history than it actually had – at least among its followers who probably would *want* to believe that.

Apparently, the early attention still had made Streit seem important enough for him to be invited to private discussions with both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt (Doenecke 46).⁴³⁰ Thus, he had access to the highest political circles in the U.S., which is essential for the establishment of a new regime of truth. In the following year, Eleanor Roosevelt again had contact with Streit and also his supporter Wofford (Wofford, *It’s Up to Us* 27).⁴³¹ This can be interpreted as a sign that she must have been very interested in the *Union Now* proposal or ideas related to it. The assessment is shared by Wofford, who notes that “she does believe that we [the world as a whole] will gradually evolve into a world federation” (27), as well as by *The Saturday Evening Post* which states that Mrs. Roosevelt sees “no prospect of eliminating war” without a “union of all free democracies, whether English-speaking

⁴³⁰*Newsweek* reports that both of them “are deeply interested in the general idea of some *eventual* alliance and have had several private discussions with Clarence Streit”, but that the Administration cannot openly support this subject until the public has discussed this topic extensively (“U.S.-British Union”). However, note the usage of the word “alliance” instead of “union” in this quote. Either the Roosevelts were not convinced of the idea of a Union and simply called it an alliance, or the author of the article does not know the big difference between those two terms for Streit. Additionally, it also becomes clear in the article that neither an alliance nor a Union along Streit’s proposal was a goal of the near future for the Roosevelts – no matter how pressing it was for Streit himself.

⁴³¹These talks did not go unnoticed in the ‘Third Reich’ either. This further proves that Streit as a person as well as his idea were taken seriously not only in the United States. Giselherr Wirsing, a German author of the Nazis’ *Schutzstaffel* (SS), notes that these talks prove that the U.S. President’s war aims are very similar, if not the same, as Streit’s Union (321-22). This makes Wirsing nervous and aggressive at the same time, because the Nazis also tried to bring the world under their control. Had Streit’s proposal been seen as simply irrelevant or unlikely to succeed, the Nazis – with their own racist and at the same time absurd and base plans – would not have taken such clear notice of it and would not have been as nervous about it. Other examples of Nazi literature on *Union Now* are Jentsch and Herre.

or not” (“Whose America?”). As Eleanor Roosevelt was the First Lady during the crucial time of World War II *and* she was one of the first First Ladies to have their own political agenda, she can be regarded as highly influential in the U.S. as well as in the center of press attention. Thus, counting her among the general supporters of the Union idea was a huge win for Streit because attention to ‘his’ topic was secured, although Eleanor Roosevelt did not necessarily want to realize a Union exactly like Streit wanted it.

Despite the fact that Streit never had such close contacts with a presidential couple after the Roosevelt Administration, he remained heard in political Washington. In 1944, he got the opportunity to speak before the Resolutions Committees of the Democratic and Republican party conventions and tried to convince them to include the goal of a Union of the Free in their planks (Baratta, *World Federation I* 106). Although he failed to persuade them to incorporate it,⁴³² it shows that he and his ideas were taken seriously enough to be listened to in this context. Four years later, he was invited to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs twice in 1948 to talk about his opinion on how the relations of the U.S. to the U.N. should be developed and how the U.N. could be strengthened (C. K. Streit, “Plea to Congress”; *F&U*002). Again, he was able to present his proposal before the Resolutions Committees of both major U.S. parties in that year – but he failed once more to convince either of them (*F&U*003). On several further occasions, Streit spoke in both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, advocating the passing of the respective resolutions for the calling of an Atlantic Convention. Each time, *Freedom & Union* printed his full speech – unlike most of the other speeches given on behalf of the *Union Now* idea by others. This indicates that whatever Streit said in Congress was regarded as especially important by the magazine, which again furthered the image of him as a ‘prophet’.⁴³³ Yet, he failed to convince political Washington to

⁴³²Not only Streit but also the World Federalists were heard before these committees, but they also failed to have their goals included in the planks (*World Federation I* 106).

⁴³³Streit spoke before the whole Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the following dates: February 8, 1950, July 25, 1955, July 11, 1956, and March 23-24, 1966 (C. K. Streit, “Stronger Than Any ‘Chunks of Sun’”; “How to Organize”; “Senate Hears Pro & Con” 12-16; *F&U*087 10-16). On September 22, 1971, he also spoke before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (*F&U*130). Additionally, he gave a speech in front of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 17, 1960, September 8, 1966, July 13 and 15, 1971, and March 26, 1973 (Ganz 12-16; *F&U*077 24-31; *F&U*078; *F&U*123 12-20; *F&U*138). Hence, between 1950 and 1973, Streit repeatedly got the opportunity to secure attention for his topic within the highest political circles

implement his idea of an Atlantic Union.

Streit also tried to advocate his proposal outside of the United States. In February 1951, he started his first speaking tour around Europe in the course of which he wanted to talk to “leaders in major Western European capitals” (*F&U*014), which gave him the opportunity to arouse further interest in his proposal. The fact that he announces this so prominently in *Freedom & Union* indicates that he was proud to be a person who was heard by those leaders. After he returned to the U.S., *Freedom & Union* publishes large lists of people Streit met – however, without saying anything about the outcome of their talks.⁴³⁴ This results in two assumptions for today’s reader: Firstly, Streit wanted to show – if not boast – how well-known he and his proposal were in Europe at the time. As long as the testimony of the meetings as such can be considered to be true, Streit certainly was right that important people had at least *heard* of his proposal. Secondly, however, had the talks been a success and the “leaders” decided to act along Streit’s proposal, the magazine would have stressed this much more and would not just have done namedropping of important politicians, such as Jean Monnet or Michel Debré.⁴³⁵ In 1952, Streit and a delegation around him (most of them members of the AUC) were also invited by members of the Canadian Parliament to discuss the furthering of the Atlantic Union Movement in Canada (*F&U*019; P. D. Streit). This discussion took place in the Canadian House of Commons and included about 60 M.P.s and Canadian Senators, a setting which guaranteed a certain attention by the Canadian public.

of the U.S., which covers the very long time span of 23 years.

⁴³⁴The talks in Europe are reported three times in *Freedom & Union*, but never does the outcome of the discussions play any role in the reports (C. K. Streit, “Europe Revisited” 5-6; “Notes on Europe” 2-3; *F&U*015).

⁴³⁵Streit later even is called an “old friend” of Debré’s, who was French Prime Minister from 1959-1962 and a member of the French cabinet with different ministerial posts from 1958-1959 and from 1966-1973 (*F&U*050 19). If it really is the case that these two knew each other that well and had more contact than just in one meeting, Debré certainly must have heard about Streit’s proposal and both of them probably discussed it. This might have influenced Debré in pursuing his politics – if only as an affirmation that his own views were shared by other (influential) people. Together with Emmanuel Monick, a banker and former Secretary General of the French Protectorate of Morocco, Michel Debré published the book *Demain la Paix* (English title *Peace by Oceanic Union*, translated by Streit’s wife, Jeanne Defrance) in 1945, which was serialized in *Freedom & Union* later (see footnote 216). The book supports the idea of an existing Atlantic community and states that the English-speaking peoples have to be organized in some form on a political level in order to save the peace for the future. However, the authors clearly speak against any kind of Anglo-American hegemony in the later organization of world politics (Debré and Monick, “Empires Lead to Nationalism”; “Oceanic Community No. 1”; “Let the Atlantic Peoples Unite”).

The fact that Streit could say that he had been *near* those people could, once more, provide him with more prestige among the less critical readers of his accounts.

Streit's next – and last – tour through Europe took place in 1965, this time “in the interests of the International Movement for Atlantic Union”. Streit claims to have met “more than 70 leaders” in France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain (*F&U*074). In the author's report on his travels through Europe, he very much tries to give the impression that he had intense talks with close consultants of de Gaulle's. In the conversations, they allegedly agreed that an Atlantic Union would be possible only if the principle of absolute national sovereignty was abandoned because then the concerns about a domination of the U.S. over Europe would be overcome (“Hope for Atlantic Federation”). It is interesting, though, that Streit does not give any report on the meetings in the Netherlands and Britain. The reason for this might be that the talks there were not productive and, thus, were not stressed in *Freedom & Union*. Hence, although Streit *tried* to present himself as very influential, he did not really succeed in influencing politicians to change their policies along his lines.

While it remains unclear whether Streit was really popular with a *broad mass* of people, he certainly made sure to be known by the *elites* mainly in the U.S. but also on the international level – especially in Europe – since he had contact with decision and policy makers in all of these contexts. Two examples may suffice here: Streit reports in 1969 that he had two private talks with Eisenhower in 1951, when the latter still was Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Streit interprets it as if Eisenhower indicated support for the idea of an Atlantic Union in these talks (C. K. Streit, “Eisenhower, de Gaulle”). It is noteworthy, however, that Streit does not report on this in *Freedom & Union* in 1951 right after these talks took place, although Eisenhower's affirmation of support could have been presented as a major coup for him. Thus, it at least has to be considered whether Streit did ‘hear whatever he wanted to hear’ when he talked to Eisenhower and/or whether he tried to convince his followers with such reports that important politicians had been supporting the Union idea for a very long time.

An example of a mixture of contexts, in which Streit was both known and heard, was U.S. foreign policy makers and NATO. On November 15, 1963, the Re-

publican House “Task Force on NATO” met with Eisenhower in order to give recommendations on how to strengthen the NATO alliance. Before this meeting, the Task Force met with several experts, among others Clarence K. Streit, to discuss their recommendations. *Freedom & Union* claims that the meeting with Streit mainly focused on “the Atlantic Union answer to the NATO problems” and describes his audience as having “serious constructive interest” (*F&U*051 7). At least the way Streit sees it, it was not unlikely at the time that the Task Force would recommend steps toward an Atlantic unification to Eisenhower. This would mean that Streit gained supporters or convinced new people both on the national and international level to work for his cause. However, it cannot be proved whether this really was the case.

The fact that Streit got in contact with important decision makers provided him with the possibility of publicity within his ‘own’ media – *Freedom & Union* – but also beyond this scope, like in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, or the *Time* magazine.⁴³⁶ As has been stated before, media is one essential for establishing a new truth, so this fact was vital for Streit. The readers of *Freedom & Union* can be assumed to have already been convinced of the necessity of an Atlantic Union as a first step towards a world state. This was different with other newspapers and magazines. Here, it still was a challenge to convince people of joining the Atlantic Union movement and support Streit’s cause. It is characteristic of the reports on *Union Now* that Streit always plays the main role and his ‘prophet-like’ image thus is further established and maintained. Additionally, Streit must have been a charismatic and convincing speaker. Otherwise he would not have managed to convince as many politicians, journalists, scientists, and other well-educated people of his proposal so that they became engaged in either Federal Union Inc., the AUC, or the IMAU. After all, no matter how persuasive he was, the probability was very low that the Union would really be founded quickly and he still got influential people to support this cause. The fact that he was surrounded by some of them increased Streit’s own reputation even more, also beyond the group of people who supported him anyway: Firstly, he got a wider platform for his ideas and, secondly, it gave

⁴³⁶ *Time* magazine is not considered as Streit’s ‘own’ media here, although its publishers were strong supporters of *Union Now* (see p. 272 here).

the impression that he was somebody who was trustworthy and worth listening to because he was surrounded by influential people. Thus, although Streit started from being a ‘normal’ journalist at the *New York Times*, he worked hard for acquiring a nearly world-wide reputation. Still, he was not influential enough to really establish his regime of truth among people who did *not* read *Freedom & Union*, since otherwise he could not have been considered a “gadfly on the right” (Baratta, *World Federation I* 56), but would have been taken more seriously.

7.2.2 The Network of *Union Now* Supporters

Although Streit may not have been successful in realizing his Atlantic Union, he still managed to establish a large network of people in many influential parts of society who supported his proposal – sometimes more, sometimes less accurately – and, consequently, allowed the idea to be spread further. Maybe this is the reason why Streit says in the postwar edition in 1949 that “[f]ar more people than anyone realizes have privately changed their minds in favor of Union, or become mentally prepared for free federation” (*UN49* 308). Apparently, he still hopes that his proposal would become a reality one day. The impression of many supporters was supposed to be reinforced by the printing of ‘congratulations’ from people around the world on the occasion of any kind of anniversary related to *Union Now* or *Freedom & Union* – for example an anniversary of the original publication of the book, the first publication of the magazine, the founding of Federal Union, or a Congress of the AUC. It once more indicates an alleged broad support for an Atlantic Union by people in many different fields and nations.⁴³⁷

What is striking, however, is that many people who openly supported or congratulated either Streit or his organizations can be characterized as ‘formers’. There can hardly be people found *in office* who actively backed Streit’s proposal but many of them are described as follows: *former* Justice of the Supreme Court (Owen J. Roberts), *former* Undersecretary of State (Will Clayton), *former* Secretary of War (Robert Patterson) – all of them were members of the AUC – as well as *former*

⁴³⁷Examples of such appraisals and congratulations on the several occasions can be found throughout *Freedom & Union*, few of them will suffice here: *F&U*017; *F&U*020; *F&U*059; *F&U*116.

NATO Secretary General (Lord Ismay, Dirk Stikker),⁴³⁸ *former* British Prime Minister (Anthony Eden, later Earl of Avon), who all were members of the IMAU, or *former* Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen and Herbert R. Harper, *former* chancellor of the University of Denver, both members of Federal Union. This gives two impressions: Firstly, it seems as if the active supporters of the idea in many cases were very old, since people can only become an important ‘former’ at a certain age when their careers have either been going for a while or when they retired. Consequently, it has to be asked whether they only really could become convinced of a necessity of an Atlantic Union when they were older and wiser *or* – and this is the second impression – whether they only turned to this vision of the future when they themselves no longer had as much responsibility in their jobs as before. In the much rarer cases of people who supported an Atlantic Union *before* their big (political) career started, the explanation might be the following: Before winning a high political office, many voters from very different backgrounds have to be won, so that many promises are (and have to be) made. These can later be prioritized in different ways and never are all of them fulfilled. As long as a person is not in a high office *yet*, they can still have different visions of the future without being made accountable for all of them right away, but of course they can pledge to work for these visions. In many cases, the circumstances of a political office – like dependencies on lobbyists or other pressure groups – prevent a lot of former promises from being turned into reality. One example of such an early supporter of an Atlantic Union would – in Streit’s opinion – be Richard Nixon. As long as has not yet been President of the United States, he had endorsed the resolutions for an Atlantic Union in Congress (*F&U*084). After he had become President of the United States, Nixon seemed to be a disappointment to Streit, as he no longer showed any inclination to start an Atlantic Convention he had – at least theoretically – supported before.

Based on the publications and messages of congratulations in *Freedom & Union* as well as the members of the three organizations headed by Streit, five fields could be deduced in which support for an Atlantic Union were found. These are: politics

⁴³⁸Paul-Henri Spaak actually was the first Foreign Minister who accepted the invitation to join the IMAU while still in office (Harper 11).

(in the United States, Europe, Canada), science/university/academics, journalism, military (including support from NATO), and economy. Incidentally, these are the apparatuses Foucault describes as essential for controlling (or changing) the regime of truth in a society. The similarities speak for the applicability of Foucault's discourse theory, even though he wrote a long time after Streit. In the following, the respective networks in these five fields will be dealt with separately to show how broad (or small) Streit's network and the support for his proposal was as a whole. Yet, as it is neither possible nor does it provide further insight if *all* supporters are named,⁴³⁹ a selection was made, which still shows the variety of fields from which the supporters came.

U.S. Politics

Naturally, most of the support for *Union Now* among politicians can be found in the United States, since Streit himself was an American and his books as well as the magazine *Freedom & Union* can be assumed to have been read mainly there. Still, it is impressive how many and which people Streit got to back his proposal or at least to listen to him (repeatedly) when he was talking about a possible unification of the Atlantic world. Hence, his goal of changing the regime of truth with the help of the political apparatus could theoretically have become successful. During World War II, it seems as if not much public political support could be gained for *Union Now*, but this changed after 1945. As mentioned above (see p. 274), Streit was invited to private discussions with the Roosevelts and he also got Will Clayton (former Undersecretary of State), Robert Patterson (former Secretary of War), former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, as well as John Foster Dulles to support his cause. Clayton and Patterson even founded the other leading organizations with the goal of realizing an Atlantic Union.⁴⁴⁰ John Foster Dulles, however, later withdrew his support when he became Secretary of State in 1953.⁴⁴¹ Furthermore, Percival F.

⁴³⁹Such a list would be too long and most people are no longer known. Furthermore, it is hard to estimate for most of them how influential they really were in society.

⁴⁴⁰Ickes also became a member of the AUC Advisory Council right after it was founded (Wooley 106).

⁴⁴¹John Foster Dulles at first seemed to be a supporter of the cause: He contributed some articles to *Freedom & Union* in the late 1940s, he even wrote the introduction to *The New Federalist*, and – according to Wooley – also made the AUC's topics part of his senatorial campaign (119). In 1953, Streit still seems happy about his appointment to Secretary of State (“‘Reds Hope’ Jan.

Brundage was a long-time supporter of Streit's Union and founding member of the AUC Advisory Council. He became Deputy Director of the U.S. Budget, which put him in an influential position (C. K. Streit, "Federal Union's Chairman Resigns") and, thus, provided Streit's proposal with at least a theoretical platform. Later on, Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn., Representative 1939-1949, Senator 1949-1963),⁴⁴² Representatives Paul Findley (R., Ill., 1961-1983) and Clement Zablocki (D., Wisc., 1949-1983) as well as Senator Frank Carlson (R., Ks, 1950-1969) became most ardent fighters for a so-called "Atlantic Resolution" to be passed in Congress (see chapter 7.3). Apparently, later President Richard Nixon as well as Nelson Rockefeller also supported the idea of an Atlantic Union idea if *Freedom & Union* can be believed.⁴⁴³ Nixon's councilor in 1969 was Arthur F. Burns, who also was Federal Union Board member and a member of the IMAU Advisory Council (*F&U*104). Consequently, it can be assumed that an Atlantic unification of some form must have been important to Nixon or that he at least was informed about it by Burns.

Many ambassadors of the U.S. also supported or at least were open to the idea

1953" 5). Yet, when Dulles met with Owen J. Roberts and Streit in 1953 to discuss the subject of an Atlantic Union, he argues that an Atlantic Union and the "amateurs" who advocate it disturb the unity of Western Europe and the EDC – indicating that these points were more central for the moment. Subsequently, he distanced himself from the Atlantic Unionists, did not want to work together with them any more (Wooley 119), and was then counted among the people who did not think a "federal set-up among the NATO nations" was "practical politics" (Osborne 8). However, if a European unification or the impracticability of an Atlantic Union really had been his argument for not supporting an Atlantic Union, Dulles could not have thought his position completely through when he supported it earlier: *Union Now* was designed for *not* having a mere European unification first *without* a firmly established link to the U.S. and its supporters were convinced that an Atlantic Union was indeed possible as a first step. Yet, this conversion can also have happened due to the fact that backing a cause theoretically is easy, but if in a position of (political) power, one has to adapt to the realities and work within one's own possibilities. Another explanation can be that Dulles simply got convinced that an Atlantic Union was not as beneficial for world stability in the Cold War and would also be impossible to realize. This is what Dulles probably understood at the latest after he became Secretary of State.

⁴⁴²Kefauver later also became Adlai Stevenson's running mate in 1956 (*F&U*036), which might have resulted in a stronger focus on the Atlantic world in this presidency, had they not lost against Eisenhower. After all, Kefauver seemed to be really convinced of the necessity and practicability of an Atlantic Union, since he otherwise would not have introduced an Atlantic Union Resolution in the Senate three times (1949, 1951, 1955) and co-sponsored another one with a similar goal in 1959.

⁴⁴³Rockefeller expressed his support for an Atlantic Union especially strongly when he addressed the Federal Union Convocation in 1964, but he also continued to emphasize the importance of an Atlantic Union later on (*F&U*057; *F&U*071; *F&U*084 9). Richard Nixon told Representative Findley about the Atlantic Union Resolution that he "ha[d] supported this resolution for many years" (*F&U*084 8), but when he was President, it took him until March 1973 to assure Findley that he still supported the calling of an Atlantic Convention, although three other resolutions with this aim had already been introduced during his presidency (Findley).

of *Union Now*. On the occasion of *Freedom & Union's* fifth anniversary, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Robert Murphy and the High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy congratulate the magazine friendly and regard its work as a general support for an idea that would lead to freedom and prosperity in the world (*F&U017*). This indicates that they knew about the general facts about the proposal, but were not fully convinced of it. In 1964, George V. Allen, who was a former Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency before he became president of the Tobacco Institute, got re-elected for the Board of Federal Union (*F&U061*). Apparently, he was a clear supporter of Streit's ideas and can be assumed to have been taken seriously in his political opinion because of his former positions. In 1969, Richard Nixon gave another one of Streit's followers an important position: Adolph W. Schmidt became U.S. Ambassador to Canada. He had been a member of the IMAU since its founding in 1958 and had represented the U.S. at the Atlantic Convention in 1962. Hence, it seems that Schmidt really supported the idea of an Atlantic Union. Yet, it is not surprising that people who were working in the international field approve of a closer unification of the Atlantic world in general – not necessarily Streit's Atlantic Union, though – since they experience the political process there first-hand and can see inadequacies of this system right away. In particular during the Cold War, for example, the perceived danger from Soviet Russia could only be encountered by a closer collaboration between the nations of the free world. As Streit's proposal first and foremost would have resulted in a closer collaboration of the West, backing of the general idea of a Union among this group of people is more natural than surprising.

It seems that between 1949 and around 1970, Streit could indeed gain supporters in the U.S. political world and, although they were not the broad majority, they could still get attention for the cause (see also chapter 7.3). Additionally, it can be rated as a good sign for Streit that some of his supporters indeed had important positions, for instance as (Under-)Secretary of State or anywhere near the U.S. President – like in the case of Will Clayton. Even if they only formerly had this office, it can be expected that they still could work as agenda setters and were widely respected in general.

Conversely, *Freedom & Union* does not report on supporters among more local politicians. There might be two reasons for it: First of all, local politicians normally are not as widely known and, consequently, do not have as much prestige on the national level. Thus, even if they were supporting an Atlantic Union, they were less likely to convince the broad masses to endorse it, too, because they did not have the necessary reach. Secondly, due to their offices, local politicians very often are not as much concerned with foreign policy and, consequently, have a different focus in their political agendas. Therefore, from a national perspective, they were not too important advocates. Still, they might have had the possibility to convince people more easily because they were closer to them and probably knew more of the personally.

After 1970, however, no new supporters of *Union Now* in the U.S. political field are announced in *Freedom & Union*. As this would have been celebrated by the magazine to show that the movement was still alive and growing, it can be assumed that there really were no new outspoken supporters any more. Consequently, political action or even agenda setting must have become more difficult by then and *Union Now* presumably received much less attention after 1970.

European Politics

In Europe, Streit's proposal could gather support mainly from Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, but there were also politicians from Germany and Italy who at least knew about *Union Now* or *Freedom & Union*. Some of them openly advocated an Atlantic Union, but most of their backing remained on a theoretical level, meaning that they sent congratulations to Streit or some of his followers on special occasions like anniversaries of the book or the magazine.

In Britain, this is the case, for instance, for John Ranking (Labor M.P.), Sir Walter Smithers (Conservative M.P.), and Woodrow Wyatt (Under Secretary of War) who sent their regards on the occasion of *Freedom & Union*'s fifth anniversary in 1951.⁴⁴⁴ In the postwar edition of *Union Now*, Streit states that Winston

⁴⁴⁴Yet, Sir Walter Smithers mainly emphasizes the necessity of an Anglo-American Union and Wyatt only describes the magazine as "interesting" and does not say anything about further support for an Atlantic Union. Ranking, however, claims that the usage of the magazine is "helpful" for his work, which indicates a stronger identification with the overall idea (*F&U*017 8).

Churchill, Prime Minister Attlee, Foreign Secretary Bevin, and Former Foreign Secretary Eden have also become aware of the “need of uniting the free more closely” – something which is re-interpreted by Streit as a full endorsement for the proposal (*UN49* 308). This conclusion is a bit far-fetched because no concrete support for an Atlantic Union by them could be reported about, which means that it most likely remained a theoretical backing of the general idea of an Atlantic Union. Still, Attlee sent a message of congratulations to *Freedom & Union* in which he muses that the U.S. could “pioneer the way for all states [...] to surrender part of their sovereignty to a world authority with the same objectives” as the American Federal Republic had in 1789 (*F&U059*). Although he actually does not mention Streit’s proposal, the message displays that Attlee sees a federation of several states in the world as one possible solution to the problems the world is facing at that time. Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon) also publishes a text in *Freedom & Union* in 1966, in which he clearly speaks out for a federal Atlantic Union between the free nations (“Growing Gap”). Some months later, on the occasion of the 1966 Federal Union Convocation, he comments that Streit’s “Atlantic Union is the ideal objective and we must never lose sight of it, nor cease to work for it” (*F&U090*). So it seems as if he in fact really advocated the idea of an Atlantic Union along Streit’s proposal and wanted to give the author personal support for it – if only by endorsing the idea.

Furthermore, Lord Lothian and Lionel Curtis provided *Union Now* with a more indirect backing. Having worked for an imperial federation themselves in the past (see chapter 3.2.4), it seems only logical that both also endorsed the general idea of an Atlantic Union along Streit’s theory. Curtis and Streit met for the first time in 1939 and discovered that they had reached the same conclusions independently from each other;⁴⁴⁵ Curtis also became a member of the British Federal Union organization (*F&U062* 14-15; Curtis, “World Order” 310; Bosco, “Lothian, Curtis, Kimber” 484) and, thus, probably unintentionally also assisted Streit’s idea of an Atlantic Union, despite the fact that the British Federal Union organization did not fully support Streit’s proposal (see footnote 394). Streit comments on this as follows: “The swift rise of *Union Now* in public consideration throughout the free world owes much more to his [Curtis’] generous efforts than I can say.” (C. K.

⁴⁴⁵Curtis and Streit also held regular and very friendly correspondence (Lavin 282-84).

Streit, “Lionel Curtis – Prophet” 11) Hence, what Curtis did – in Streit’s opinion – was twofold: backing the British Federal Union organization and, first and foremost, opening a platform and giving rise to discussions not only on his own writings but also on *Union Now*. The British Ambassador to the United States Lord Lothian also supported *Union Now* right after it appeared (P. Roberts, “Lord Lothian” 121-22), pursued similar ideas as Streit, and kept him informed about the progress of support for *Union Now* in Britain (Bosco, “Lothian, Curtis, Kimber” 486-89).⁴⁴⁶ Hence, it can be said that both Curtis and Lothian continued their work of the early 20th century and used – as well as *were used by* – a platform that promoted similar aims.

In France, the reactions of those who congratulated *Freedom & Union* have a wide range. In 1951, Vice Premier and Defense Minister Georges Bidault endorses the general idea of a larger union, Jean Monnet states that an Atlantic Union is necessary as soon as Europe was federated, and Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador to the U.S., claims that he shares the endeavors of *Freedom & Union* to build a world federation in order to secure peace and freedom in the world (*F&U* 017 3-4, 8). Given this ‘half-way’ promotion of his idea, Streit could celebrate a bigger success for his agenda in 1963, when Robert Schuman accepted the invitation to join the IMAU Honorary Council (“Canada’s Pearson” 6) and can, therefore, be seen as a supporter of the general idea of an Atlantic Union despite the fact that he was actively engaged in European integration. Other important federalists in France who had personal contact with Streit were Emmanuel Monick as well as Michel Debré (see footnote 435). As Debré and Schuman were widely known in France (and beyond) due to their political career, it can be assumed that especially those two but also Monick, were agenda setters for the topic of Atlantic unity.

Apparently Streit’s proposal made a good impression among some Dutch politicians. In 1951, Senator P.A. Kerstens (former Minister of Economic Affairs) and the President of the Dutch Senate, R. Kranenburg, both clearly endorse Streit’s idea of an Atlantic Union and declare to be keen readers of *Freedom & Union*. Dirk U. Stikker, then Dutch Foreign Minister and later NATO Secretary General, also is convinced that a “new social, economic and political order” would be established in

⁴⁴⁶However, Billington notes that this support quickly became an embarrassment for Lothian and he had his name removed from the list of *Union Now* supporters quickly (137).

the world in the future, which might also happen along Streit's proposal (*F&U017*). 15 years later, he again is quoted in *Freedom & Union* for sending a message to Streit on the occasion of the 1966 Federal Union Convocation. Stickker expresses hope that Streit might reach his goal of an Atlantic Union. By this point he is joined in his greetings from the Netherlands by Prince Bernhard, consort of Queen Juliana. The Prince also supported the idea of an Atlantic Unity and valued Streit and his proposal highly (*F&U090*).⁴⁴⁷ Considering this high-ranking endorsement, it can be assumed that the topic as such was in debate in (parts of the) elitist circles in the Netherlands at the time.

Among Belgian statesmen, Streit mentions Paul van Zeeland and Paul-Henri Spaak as advocates of closer union between the free nations in the world (*UN49 308*). This is certainly true, given the fact that both of them worked for closer collaboration and integration in Europe – if not necessarily for an Atlantic Union as a first step in this development. Former Premier van Zeeland had – like Spaak – worked for Benelux collaboration. He also endorses the 1955 resolution for the Atlantic Exploratory Convention (SCR 12, see p. 305 here) and states that an Atlantic Union is the final goal after a European union has been realized (*F&U029*). Spaak, who dedicated his political career to closer unity of the Atlantic world, also backs the 1955 Atlantic Union Resolution and declares hope that an Atlantic Union would become a reality soon. After having been NATO Secretary General, he joined the Honorary Council of the IMAU. In 1968, he received the so-called Federal Union Atlantic Union Pioneer Award at the organization's convocation, where he also was the principal speaker (Spaak; *F&U102*).⁴⁴⁸ Both van Zeeland and Spaak can be

⁴⁴⁷Prince Bernhard, however, promoted the idea of a closer transatlantic cooperation – or better: of transatlantic unity – in the Bilderberg Group, where he became the first chairman (Gijswijt 34). This group was an organization that wanted to “improve and solidify relations between Western Europe and the United States through secret, non-partisan discussions” (2). Its members came from all NATO member states and held high offices in “various political groupings, trade unions, the business and financial world, civil society, and government” (3). After 1954, they met annually in an informal, non-public setting – the Hotel de Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, Netherlands – to discuss transnational cooperation among their nations and to get a better understanding of each other's opinions on these matters. Only at the end of the meetings, press conferences were held, but no journalists were allowed to cover the meetings (61-62). This method can rightfully be described as informal diplomacy and, according to Gijswijt, contributed to a more democratic and broad transatlantic foreign policy elite in the 1950s and 60s (3).

⁴⁴⁸However, as Streit's laudatory speech for Spaak is quite impersonal, it is probable that they did not know each other very well. If this had been the case, Streit would have certainly stressed this in his speech, since this would have made himself appear more important and influential.

assumed to have given an impetus in Belgium to discuss the topic of Atlantic unity. However, they are the only Belgian people who speak out for an Atlantic Union that are mentioned in either any edition of *Union Now* or in *Freedom & Union*, so there seems to have been no widespread support for an Atlantic Union in Belgium even among politicians in the international field.

Finally, there was some recognition and support for Streit in Germany and Italy. Walter Hallstein, then Secretary of State for West Germany, congratulates *Freedom & Union* on its fifth anniversary, however, he focuses on the necessity of a European union in his text (*F&U*017 4). This means that although a high state official knew about the magazine, he was not convinced of the feasibility or even necessity of an Atlantic Union – in contrast to a European one. Furthermore, the German former Finance Minister Franz Etzel also sent a message to Streit on the occasion of the 1966 Federal Union Convocation. However, he remains very vague on what he is congratulating Streit for and does not mention an Atlantic Union at all (*F&U*090). Thus, Etzel does not seem to have supported the proposal, although it is implied in *Freedom & Union*. Franz-Josef Strauß, then Defense Minister, apparently stated that a European union alone would not be strong enough to deal with the Soviet Union and that NATO should be further developed to “a political association of mutual interdependence bound together by destiny” (*F&U*044). Despite the fact that this is no clear endorsement of an Atlantic Union along Streit’s proposal, it is still quoted in *Freedom & Union* and interpreted as such. Yet, it cannot be proved whether Strauß really favored Streit’s Atlantic Union as a solution to international problems. Nevertheless, although the support by German politicians may not really have existed, the fact that they are presented *as if* they backed an Atlantic Union can have implied for people in other parts of the world that there indeed was German support for Streit.⁴⁴⁹

In Italy, the main protagonist who was in favor of a federal proposal was Gaetano Martino, Italian Foreign Minister from 1954-57, later President of the European Parliament (1962-64), and member of the IMAU from 1963 onward (C. K. Streit,

⁴⁴⁹The aforementioned “Union Atlantischer Föderalisten” may have given the same impression – after all, it seemed as if there indeed was a larger German movement. Yet, apart from *Freedom & Union*, no report of any kind could be found on this organization, so it remains doubtful whether it really had influence on any debate.

“Canada’s Pearson” 6). Martino states in a letter to Streit in 1966 that the Europeans would no longer hesitate to work more closely together with the U.S. once the latter suggests closer collaboration. This is interpreted by Streit as general European support for the idea of an Atlantic Union (*F&U*092). Yet, Martino himself only talks about the general idea of an Atlantic community and cannot speak for all of Europe, because he is in no position to do so. Still, the impression in *Freedom & Union* of a full backing for Streit’s proposal is solidified by two short congratulations by Martino on the occasion of *Union Now*’s 25th anniversary in 1964 as well as for the Federal Union Convocation in 1966 (*F&U*059; *F&U*090). However, no other high-ranking politicians – let alone the broad mass – in Italy seemed to support *Union Now*, since there are not such reports in the magazine.

All in all, what Streit achieved was to at least get the attention of important politicians in Europe – mostly in those nations which were also actively participating in European integration. On the one hand, this is natural since the idea of European unity is not too different from the notion of an Atlantic unity in the respect that both focus on closer collaboration. Consequently, it was perhaps easier to find people open to the general suggestion of *Union Now* in this field. On the other hand, what Streit very often did, as was shown in this section, was to exaggerate the support for an Atlantic unity and present the people’s views as if they were fully backing his proposal. Hence, although the support in Europe may seem widespread to readers of *Freedom & Union*, it most probably was very small.

Canadian Politics

In contrast to Europe, Canada seems to have had more advocates for an Atlantic Union. Apart from the fact that the Canadian Senate passed a motion on an exploratory convention to find ways of uniting the NATO states in a federal way,⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁵⁰At the same time as Kefauver first introduced a resolution in the U.S. Congress in 1949 (see p. 304 here), Canadian Senator W.D. Euler started a motion in the Canadian Senate in which he also asked for the calling of an Atlantic Convention to explore “how far their peoples and the peoples of such other democracies [the NATO states] [...] can apply among them within the framework of the U.N., the principles of free federal union” (*F&U*012). The wording of this motion is very similar to the correspondent resolution in the United States. This is not incidental, since there were close connections between the AUC in the U.S. and some Canadian Parliamentarians. This can, for example, be seen by the fact that Euler clearly referred to the House and Senate resolutions of 1949 by Kefauver and the other Representatives in the U.S. when he spoke in favor of his own motion on May 9, 1950. Since Euler also was convinced the U.S. should take the initiative to get an Atlantic

some Canadian politicians seemed open to the idea of an Atlantic Union. Senator W.D. Euler, who introduced this motion in 1949, gives much credit to *Freedom & Union* for convincing many Canadian senators to vote in favor of the motion (F&U017 7). This would mean that the magazine must have been read by several Canadian senators at the time. This impression is confirmed by the Canadian Government Leader W. McL. Robertson, who also states that the magazine contributed to the approval of the motion. However, he also claims that even if many Canadian Senators are convinced that some new political instrument has to be found on an international level, he himself remains doubtful whether an Atlantic Union would really be supported (4).

When Lester B. Pearson, former President of the United Nations General Assembly, became Canadian Prime Minister in 1963, Streit had high hopes for him to set the ‘right’ agenda and soon give the necessary impetus for an Atlantic Union (“Canada’s Pearson”). Pearson and Streit seemed to have known each other and Pearson also was a member of the IMAU, so it can be assumed that his general support for Atlantic unity was assessed correctly by Streit. However, when Pearson congratulates his “friend” Streit on the 25th anniversary of the publication of *Union Now* in 1964, he only talks of a necessary alliance between both nations and does not openly advocate an Atlantic Union along Streit’s proposal (F&U059). It is

Convention started (F&U012), it probably made the passing of the motion in Canada easier. Even after it was passed on June 29, 1950, no action had to be taken, but Canadians could still wait for the U.S. to call the initiating convention. Two years later, the Canadian Parliament debated on ways to further the Atlantic community and adopted a resolution in which it urged national legislatures to form a “North Atlantic Assembly” in order to implement Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty (P. D. Streit). *Freedom & Union* shows that the topic of the so-called “Canadian Clause” was dealt with repeatedly in the following years. In February 1953, hearings were held in the Canadian Senate on how to implement this ruling (F&U021; C. K. Streit, “Canada in Lead Again”), yet without any immediate success. Prime Minister St. Laurent subsequently proposed in Bonn in February 1954 that ways of “closer integration of national resources and of their machinery of government” should be explored (F&U022). In the same year Canadian Senators and members of the House went one step further and established the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. (Note that a similar body was only established in the United States in 1959, see p. 307 here) This body was supposed to implement Article II of the NATO treaty by establishing contact with other such national assemblies and, thus, educate people in the NATO nations on the importance of a common understanding among them; the final goal was an “Atlantic Parliament” (Nicholson). Yet, this parliament was never realized. Another Canadian attempt to found an Atlantic Union was made by Liberal M.P. Hugh Faulkner, who wanted to explore this possibility for the fields of “essential common interest” – “foreign policy, defense, economic relations and aid for underdeveloped countries” (F&U085). However, this also was not successful and no further reports on advancing an Atlantic Union in Canada can be found in *Freedom & Union*.

very likely that Streit once more over-interpreted Pearson's conviction in an Atlantic unity. Yet, in 1966, it seems as if more Canadian Cabinet ministers backed the idea of an Atlantic Union as seven of them were members of the IMAU⁴⁵¹ (*F&U*085). Thus, it can be assumed that 'Atlantic topics' played a part in the discussions in this Cabinet. Two years later, Canadian politicians are celebrated for counting many IMAU members among them and for having decisively furthered Article II of the NATO treaty (M. S. Osborn; P. K. Martin, "There Is Need Now"). All in all, it seems as if there indeed was a favorable mood among Canadian politicians of high rank, but – like in the U.S. – widespread support could not be found because there is no report in *Freedom & Union* on any further Canadian enthusiasm for the idea of an Atlantic Union.

Science/University/Academics

A network within the field of science or university in general provided Streit and his idea with a lot of prestige since this is the field from which most people expect an opinion that is facts-based, the result of a longer process of research, and which can be relied upon. This focus on science and research makes this apparatus so very important in establishing and maintaining a regime of truth, so Streit's tactic of gaining supporters from this field seems viable. Additionally, finding advocates in the broad field of education – of which universities are an important part – can have a very useful multiplying effect for any idea and they also have the possibility to shape and sustain a discursive regime. Consequently, encouragement for Atlantic Union by people in this broad field is stressed very much by *Freedom & Union*. When the AUC was founded in 1949, historian Herbert Agar was made member of the Honorary Council right away, and educators Sidney Hook (New York University) and Milton Eisenhower (then President of the Kansas State University) became members of the Advisory Council (Wooley 106). In 1964, Leonard W. Bucklin, Vice President of the West Virginia Wesleyan College, was appointed Assistant to the President of Federal Union (*F&U*060), which means that the organization then had

⁴⁵¹These members were Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (Honorary Council), Foreign Minister Paul Martin, Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp, Defense Minister Paul T. Heller, Industry and Defense Production Minister Charles W. Drury, Secretary of State Judy LaMarsh, President of the Privy Council Guy Favreau – all Advisory Council (*F&U*085).

a supporter in an important and decisive position of the educational system. However, it remains unknown whether Bucklin really used his influence to further spread Streit's proposal by, for instance, giving the impetus for discussions on the topic. Furthermore, Robert Strausz-Hupé, Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, also was a member of Federal Union (*F&U*056 15) and was a frequent author in *Freedom & Union*. He made his opinion heard in this forum, so that everyone who was interested in what he was thinking should have had little difficulty finding out about it.⁴⁵²

There were also early advocates for *Union Now* in Europe, namely William E. Rappard, Rector at the University of Geneva, who clearly was a great admirer of Streit and his proposal (*F&U*017 6), and Maurice Allais (Professor at l'Ecole des Mines, Paris), who repeatedly wrote articles for *Freedom & Union*.⁴⁵³ Furthermore, Streit also claims that historian Arnold J. Toynbee promotes the idea of an Atlantic Union as 'naturally' as Curtis, since Toynbee's hypothesis in *Civilization on Trial* (1948) is that the western world will unite in the future and that this union is inevitable (Toynbee 127, 157-58). However, in Streit's own description of Toynbee's 'support' in *Freedom & Union*, it becomes clear that both did not know each other very well ("The Toynbee Verdict").⁴⁵⁴ Thus, it is also possible that the general discussion on Toynbee's hypothesis – which probably took place, since Toynbee was a well-known and prestigious historian – may have been unintentional agenda setting for Streit's book from Toynbee's side but nothing more. Nevertheless, Streit tried to use Toynbee's hypothesis to indicate that other thinkers had come to the same conclusion: Union was inevitable. Still it remains unsure whether this happened with Toynbee's consent. In general, voices from Europe in favor of an (Atlantic) Union could again be helpful to convince people or strengthen the belief in it on

⁴⁵²Strausz-Hupé published articles in *Freedom & Union* from time to time but not on a regular basis (e.g. Strausz-Hupé, "The Vision"; "The Red Strategy"). He also actively participated in political discussions on the topic of the advantages of an Atlantic Union (e.g. *F&U*065 9-11; *F&U*088 18-19).

⁴⁵³The articles were published from February 1949 until July-August 1964 (Allais, "Evils of Nationalism"; "Atlantic Common Market"). The articles are written partly from a French perspective (e.g. Allais, "Why France Delays on EDC"), but most of them focus on the general theory of the idea of an Atlantic Union (e.g. Allais, "Economic Aspects"; "Federal Division of Power").

⁴⁵⁴Curtis claims in his article "World Order" that Toynbee and Streit met in 1921 in Constantinople and that Toynbee had "not yet read Mr. Streit's book" ("World Order" 315). It cannot be said whether Toynbee ever read it.

both sides of the Atlantic: Americans could see European endorsement of ‘their’ project, and Europeans could perhaps be convinced that Europe would not ‘lose’ but gain from an Atlantic Union.

In the field of natural sciences there were two well-known advocates: One of them was Harold C. Urey, who is celebrated and quoted by *Freedom & Union* quite often. Having first been a supporter of the UWF and a member of the Honorary Council of the AUC at the same time, he left the former and ‘fully converted’ to the Atlantic Union Committee in 1950 (C. K. Streit, “Urey Quits UWF”). This was a big coup for the AUC because, firstly, Urey was a well-known atomic scientist and, thus, was expected to know about the dangers of this new power and hopefully also about how to avert them. Secondly, the story of a ‘convert’ is always good press. It can be used to show that one’s own group ‘has always been right’ and reasonable people – among which scientist are usually counted – see the ‘truth’ at some point. From that time onward, Urey was an important advocate of Streit’s proposal and contributes to *Freedom & Union* several times. In 1963, Urey was joined in his support for an Atlantic Union by Edward Teller, another atomic scientist.⁴⁵⁵ Both Urey and Teller had been members of the Manhattan Project and had contributed a lot to the development of the atomic bomb, which again gave them prestige in the U.S. and beyond. Although their opinion on an Atlantic Union was not based on knowledge in the fields of political sciences, they still assessed the danger coming from the Soviet Union in the field of development of weapons and were convinced of the necessity of a preponderance of power on the side of the free. Hence, although it might not seem logical at first sight, they still were seen as experts for the aspect of necessary military strength in an Atlantic Union. This is why Teller also spoke in favor of the Atlantic Union resolutions in Congress (e.g. Teller, “Atomic Scientist Teller”; *F&U*123 9).

Finally, there also was a group of attorneys and justices who backed the vision of an Atlantic Union. The most high-ranking of them was Owen J. Roberts, who was a Supreme Court Justice until his retirement in 1945. Streit claims that Roberts retired in order to be fully able to devote all of his time to the realization

⁴⁵⁵Teller subsequently is quoted frequently by the magazine (e.g. *F&U*053; *F&U*064; Teller, “Passage of Atlantic Bill”).

of *Union Now*, yet no according quote by Roberts himself could be found and it has to be doubted whether this really was true.⁴⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Owen J. Roberts, together with Clarence Streit and John F. Schmidt, another attorney, wrote *The New Federalist* and Roberts also became a founding member of the AUC. Naturally, a former Supreme Court Justice has a lot of prestige, so Streit never forgets to emphasize that Roberts was a “former *Justice*” (e.g. C. K. Streit, Editor’s Foreword xi; emphasis added; “Justice Owen J. Roberts”) and tries to present him in the spotlight whenever possible. Furthermore, there were other attorneys who supported *Union Now*, like former attorney General Francis Biddle, a founding member of the AUC Advisory Council, Joseph Donohue, who had managed Senator Kefauver’s campaign for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1956 and became a member of the Federal Union Board in 1964, or Richard A. Given, who was U.S. Assistant District Attorney for New York City and a member of Federal Union by 1968 (Wooley 106; *F&U*061; C. K. Streit, “1968”). The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York County Lawyers association also endorsed resolution HCR 48 of 1968 (*F&U*100; *F&U*105). This probably let more lawyers be introduced to the idea of the resolution, even if it is unclear how influential this association was.

Journalism

It can be assumed that the field of journalism was the one which was most easily accessible for Streit since he was a journalist himself as well as a member of the Association of Foreign Correspondents. This gave him the chance to access and use this apparatus to change the regime of truth and make ‘his’ Union seem desirable to ever more people. The fact that James Truslow Adams wrote the review on *Union Now* for the *New York Times* before the book was published indicates that Streit must have been known among people working there even after he left the newspaper. Furthermore, he had contact with Felix Morley, who was an editor of the *Washington Post* in 1939, also wrote one of the early reviews on *Union Now* (“A

⁴⁵⁶In the obituary Streit writes for Roberts in 1955, he claims that the former justice had forbidden him to announce publicly that his support for an Atlantic Union was the reason for his retirement (“Justice Owen J. Roberts”) and he repeats this claim two years later (“The Diplomatic Potential” 126). However, as Roberts no longer was alive by then, he could not correct Streit’s assertion, so it still remains doubtful whether Streit is really telling the truth.

Plan of ‘More Perfect Union’”), and later published articles in *Freedom & Union* (e.g. “Uncle Sam’s Achilles Heel”). Apart from that, there was support from the Luce Empire (see p. 272 here), in particular in the magazines *Life*, *Time*, and *Fortune*. Russell Davenport, part-time editor of *Fortune*, also seemed to have been in contact with Streit and published some articles in the early period of *Freedom & Union* himself (e.g. Davenport, “Economic Brotherhood”; “Freedom First”).

When *Freedom & Union* had its fifth anniversary, messages of congratulations are published in the magazine. Naturally, a preselection of those will have taken place. This might have resulted in messages from journalists of the most important magazines and newspapers being stressed more strongly than others, which might not have been printed at all. Messages from the following English-speaking journalists were printed: Erwin D. Canham (editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*), Lansing Warren and Arthur Krock (Paris correspondent and chief Washington correspondent, both *New York Times*), Whitelaw Reid (editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*), Ernest Lindley (Washington correspondent for the *Newsweek*) as well as Richard Scott (foreign editor of the *The Manchester Guardian*). Additionally, congratulations are published by Huber Beuve-Méry (managing director of the *Le Monde*, Paris). Hence, it can be assumed that journalists in media with a wide range at least had heard about *Freedom & Union* and its purpose and, consequently, they also must have known about the main ideas of *Union Now*. There also were several other journalists who actively advocated the idea of an Atlantic Union along Streit’s proposal and joined the AUC right at the beginning. These were publisher Gardiner Cowles and editor of *Barron’s*, George S. Shea (both members of the Honorary Council) as well as editors William Bohn, Hodding Carter, Clare Boothe Luce and Henry Luce II, all members of the AUC Advisory Council (Wooley 106). These supporters provided Streit’s ideas with the potential of a broad platform, which partly was also used.⁴⁵⁷ The advantage of large publications on either Streit, his proposal, or any of his organizations in these media was that they could reach a lot of people across the world. Yet, ideas presented in national or international press might also seem remote to the readerships of those newspapers and magazines so that the connection to people’s personal lives and their possible personal involve-

⁴⁵⁷See, for example, the cover stories of Streit in the *Time* magazine, p. 272 here.

ment may not be seen as evident or pressing.

However, not only ‘big’ media gave a platform to *Union Now* but also smaller local ones. Although they do not have as wide a range as the previously mentioned press, they do have the advantage of being able to address their target group much more accurately. This again can make ideas sound more relevant to the readership. One example of this is an article in the *Denver Miner’s Magazine* on November 14, 1962, which reports on a visit by Streit during which he explained his proposal to his audience (qtd. in Harper). The title of the article, “Union Now – and You”, indicates that the purpose was to fully address the readership personally and to convince it to work for a Union of the Free. In the beginning of the article, the representation of the States in the Union Congress is explained in detail and only afterwards, other supporters like James Truslow Adams or Nelson D. Rockefeller of a federal idea are quoted. Thus, structure-wise the article first catches its readers’ interest by addressing their suspected specific concerns and then gives them the impression that there is large-scale support for the idea of an Atlantic Union by influential people in the United States. Hence, the readers are given the idea that they are ‘not alone’ in their belief if they are convinced of the feasibility of Streit’s proposal. Although this structure could also have been used in any newspaper with a broader scope, its intention probably works better on the local level as the author of the article is not perceived as being ‘too far away’.⁴⁵⁸

To keep up journalistic support for an Atlantic Union, many journalists also were invited to events hosted by Federal Union Inc., the AUC, or the IMAU;⁴⁵⁹ some of them even became members of one of those organizations.⁴⁶⁰ All in all, endorsement by and a good relationship to the press was vital for the whole movement around Streit since it was dependent on good press that was interesting for the people and read by a broad audience. After all, the audience, meaning the potential

⁴⁵⁸Other examples of local newspapers backing Streit’s cause are the *Philadelphia Bulletin* (M.F.F.), the *Detroit News* (Kelsey), the *Cincinnati Enquirer* (F&U086; F&U120), the *Des Moines Register* (F&U122), or the *Missoula* (Montana) *Missoulian* (Talbot).

⁴⁵⁹Such an event could, for example, be a luncheon sponsored by Federal Union Inc. or the so-called Federal Union Convocations taking place biannually from 1964 to 1970.

⁴⁶⁰One example is Mrs. Istvan Botond, a magazine writer, who joined the Federal Union Board, or Edward J. Meeman, an editor of the Memphis (Tenn.) *Press-Scimitar*, who not only joined Federal Union Inc. but also decided to let his foundation sponsor the newly-installed Estes Kefauver-Award in 1966 (F&U061; C. K. Streit, “Two Eds”).

citizens, were the ones the Atlantic Union would be based on.

Military

Apparently, the idea of an Atlantic Union could – in Streit’s perception – find high-ranking advocates among the military both in the U.S. and in NATO, which is another apparatus vital for changing a regime of truth.⁴⁶¹ As has been mentioned before, Streit had already had private conversations with Eisenhower at the time when he still was NATO Commander-in-Chief, even if it must be highly doubted whether Eisenhower *really* supported an Atlantic Union along Streit’s proposal⁴⁶² (C. K. Streit, “Eisenhower, de Gaulle” , see also p. 277 here). Still, the fact that he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, knew about this proposal, *and* became President of the United States only a few years later makes this contact seem important because it is possible that Eisenhower at least recognized this movement as a pressure group and had to deal with it in this politics.

Other military men were more outspoken in their endorsement of – in this case – *Freedom & Union* on the occasion of the magazine’s fifth anniversary: Both General Lucius D. Clay (former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany) and Stephen F. Chadwick (former National Commander of the American Legion) congratulated the magazine on playing an important part in developing the world order after World War II and bringing the goal of world peace nearer (*F&U* 5, 7-8). Although this does not mean that they supported an Atlantic Union based exactly on Streit’s proposal, what it *does* mean is threefold: Both of them knew the magazine, they must at least have been aware of the overall goal of an Atlantic Union, and they were convinced that this agenda played an important part in the world. Further-

⁴⁶¹Although NATO is an alliance based on an international political treaty, its field clearly is the military, which is why it is included among the military network. As Eisenhower first pursued a NATO career before becoming President, he is included in this section, too.

⁴⁶²Streit claims that by 1969, Eisenhower’s support for Atlantic Union was lost, but that he had endorsed the idea before. One example was Eisenhower’s report to NATO (April 2, 1952) in which he says that “[p]eacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient” (“Eisenhower, de Gaulle”). Although this is in no way a declared belief in *Union Now*, it is interpreted by Streit as such. He claims that in their previous private talks, he got to know Eisenhower and, therefore, knew what the latter meant by this remark (see p. 277 here). Later on, President Eisenhower signed the resolution to call an “Atlantic Convention” (see p. 306 here) in 1960 and claimed to “strongly favor” Findley’s resolution (HJR 769) to explore Atlantic Unity in 1966 (Eisenhower see also p. 309 here).

more, General George C. Marshall – also both politician and military man – openly advocated the idea of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention in 1955 (C. K. Streit, “Big Four” 4, see p. 305 here), which can probably rightfully be interpreted in the way that Marshall was convinced that at least exploring ways to unite the Atlantic nations could be productive. Finally, the IMAU also had members associated with the military field. Among others, these were all three former Secretaries General of NATO by 1964: Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Dirk Stikker (*F&U*063) – something which can be seen as a big achievement.

Economy

People in the field of economy – in the widest sense – also backed Streit’s proposal and, thus, could have been helpful in establishing Streit’s Atlantic discursive regime. In the 1950s, *Freedom & Union* quotes the following for congratulating the magazine on its anniversary: James W. Wadsworth (Chairman U.S. National Security Training Commissions), Philip D. Reed (Chairman of the Board, General Electric Co.), Harald Hamberg (chief Director SKF Ball Bearings, Goteborg, Sweden), Paul W. Litchfield (Chairman Board Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.), and Ward M. Canaday (President Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.) (*F&U*017). It seems as if businessmen from a broad range of businesses supported *Freedom & Union*, although their number admittedly is very small. The year before, Paul Litchfield had already become a member of the AUC Advisory Council, together with other industrialists like Chester Davis, H.W. Prentis, and Harry Bullis. This means that the AUC itself also got endorsement from the economy. In 1964, W.H. Oppenheimer, senior partner of the investment bank Oppenheimer, Neu & Co., was introduced as vice president of Federal Union (*F&U*056 14). Thus, this organization even had elected a banker to one of its highest positions and guaranteed him influence there. The professions of these men were varied, so that the impression could emerge that apart from the broad categorization in this chapter in general, a wide range of people within the economic field supported *Union Now*. Consequently, many people would be able to identify with one branch or the other. Additionally, having advocates in the economic field can also be associated with a stronger financial backing as well as an easier access

to ‘their’ lobbies, which is very often beneficial for making one’s ideas being heard. However, it has to be stressed again that *Freedom & Union* does not mention many people from this field and it is unclear whether there simply were not more of them or whether the magazine simply was more concentrated on the other fields, which were discussed above.

Summary and Criticism

Taken together, Streit seemed to have built up a large network of people who backed his cause. These could especially be found in the U.S. but also in Canada and in some parts of Europe. However, it is striking that Streit mainly focused on people in high positions, who can more or less completely be counted among the (male) elites. Although a top-down approach can be helpful for changing a regime of truth, the focus on this particular group of people can – and probably did – become a problem. On the one hand, having advocates within the elites may provide a movement with a certain prestige and widespread media attention, which makes it easier to establish new truths. Yet, if there is no grassroots support or certain groups are mostly left out – in this case: women, the young generation, and most of all non-whites – a movement can quickly stop to ‘move’ because it literally dies out, becomes irrelevant, or cannot generate new members. Allan F. Matthews, a former occasional author in *Freedom & Union* who knew Streit in person, claims that this was one of the main problems for Streit, whom he still describes as visionary. Yet, he realizes that Streit neglected the fact that grassroots support is vital (qtd. in Baratta, *World Federation II* 525-526). What Matthews describes as “neglect” of grassroots support is called “[o]rganizational problems” by Wooley (120). The result in the end is the same: Streit could only gather parts of the elites to back his cause. Additionally, Streitists very often were “incorrigible idealists” and blind about the realities of world politics (127), which probably made his proposal seem utopian and unrealistic to many other Americans and people around the world.

Maybe because the Streitists recognized the flaw in their personnel, several attempts can be found when they evidently tried to attract new supporters. When Student Federalists left Federal Union in 1947, a large youth organization was miss-

ing. In 1951, there still was a so-called “Student Model Atlantic Union Convention” right before the National AUC Congress (*F&U*018), but this was the last time an attempt is shown in *Freedom & Union* to reach the younger generation for roughly a decade. Consequently, it can be said that the issue was not yet seen as pressing by that time. By the 1960s and 1970s, early advocates apparently seemed to die out in the strict sense of the word, which is reflected by repeated advertisements in *Freedom & Union* that want to persuade people to “remember now in [their] will Federal Union of the Free”.⁴⁶³ This generational change is finally acknowledged in *Freedom & Union*’s series on the 25th anniversary of the publication of *Union Now* because the magazine clearly states that new generations need to be reached (*F&U*055). During the 25th Anniversary Convocation of *Union Now* in November 1964, Federal Union decided to actively search for new ways of finding new members and mainly focused on the youth (*F&U*070 24-26). However, by closely reading the quotes in *Freedom & Union* in this context, it becomes clear very soon that the members did not have trust in young people. Mrs. Chester Wells Clark, for example, says the following:

Young people are a fluid group in this age. They cannot be counted on to provide the steady effort essential to a movement like ours. [...] In every chapter the core should be members [...] the middle-aged and older people [...] and with this core younger people can become attached and learn to work (25).

Later, Mrs. Elligett continues: “I am not sure of the total wisdom of appealing to wild-eyed and immature emotionalism, even with genuine arguments.” (25-26) As these are the only two people quoted from the discussion of how to attract younger people, it can well be assumed that there were not many opposing arguments to this. Since the quotes are printed in *Freedom & Union*, at least the majority of the people in the panel discussion at the convocation and the editors of the magazine seemed to have agreed to these views. Looking at the arguments from the perspective of the youth, however, not being taken seriously and ‘only’ having to listen closely to the elder, makes it very unlikely that these tactics attracted a lot of younger people. Even after the decision was made to find new younger supporters, not much effort

⁴⁶³This request first appears in 1962 and is spread sporadically in the magazine over the 1960s but re-appears in nearly every issue from 1969-1972 and for the last time in the September-December issue of 1973 (*F&U*048; *F&U*137).

in this direction can be seen in *Freedom & Union*: The magazine advertises a \$2,000 prize for the winning of a competition of the best “Atlantic Union Editorial” for students in 1965, the results of which are published in December 1966 (*F&U*066; *F&U*080). In the same year, a cheap flight to Europe for members of Federal Union Inc. is offered (*F&U*075), which probably also was supposed to address mainly but not exclusively, younger people. After all, they normally do not have as much money and having a ‘travel adventure’ often appeals to young people rather than old ones. There seem to have been two attempts to found a ‘young’ organization again: In 1962, it was the “Young Federalists for Atlantic Union” and in February 1972 the “Youth for Federal Union” (*F&U*046; *F&U*126; *F&U*127). However, none of them are mentioned again in later issues of *Freedom & Union*, so they cannot have been too influential or the magazine would have celebrated their achievements. As can be seen, the problem of not being overly attractive for younger members was recognized, but apparently not taken seriously enough or there would have been more effort to gain them for the cause of *Union Now*.

To a lesser extent, the recruitment of women was equally hard with the leading figures of the movement not only being old but also predominantly male. Granted, there were some female authors in *Freedom & Union*,⁴⁶⁴ but the political representation of Atlantic Unionists was dominated by men until the end of the 1970s – the period when *Freedom & Union* was published. There was one organization which specifically should attract women: “Women for Union of the Free”, established in 1953. Yet, although it was represented in several nations, *Freedom & Union* only reports on it once again after its founding (Hamer, “Women for Union of the Free”; *F&U*030 10).⁴⁶⁵ The few articles which directly address women and want to persuade them to become a member of one of Streit’s organizations, display the attitude

⁴⁶⁴The most prominent examples were Helen B. Hamer and Mrs. Chase Osborn, who sometimes was called Mrs. Stellanova Osborn. The latter even was made contributing editor in 1965 (*F&U*072), so she at least got a wide platform.

⁴⁶⁵However, Helen B. Hamer then had difficulty to sound convincing about her opinion that women should engage in international politics by 1955: “Women should logically take to this field because they have a natural deep hate for war [...]. Because of their experience in the everyday business of living and creating homes for others, women are inclined to be practical in their planning.” (“Women for Union of the Free”) Both of these ideas – that women ‘naturally’ hate war (as opposed to men) and that they are good planners because of their ‘everyday duties’ – might have appealed to some women in the 1950s, though no longer today. After all, women would have a hard time being taken seriously by men had they used these arguments.

that it was not seen as ‘normal’ that women actually *could* do something for an Atlantic Union. This is reflected by titles like “Women Can be Heard on World Issues” or “Why Don’t Organized U.S. Women Explore the Atlantic Union Way to Peace More?”, which can both be found in the summer issue of 1970 (White; C. S. Osborn, “Why Don’t Organized U.S. Women Explore”). The titles of these articles sound as if it is not natural that women can be effective in supporting *Union Now* and as if both men and – most of all – women first needed to be convinced of their capability to do so. These failed attempts to win over women together with the much more strict gender roles of the time make it seem understandable why women apparently were not equally represented in the supporting organizations of *Union Now*. However, this was again a large untapped potential, which could have been used to achieve an Atlantic Union.

As can be guessed, the group least represented in the Streit movement were non-white people. Given the political realities of the time, this is not surprising, even though there indeed are some – if only very few – articles by non-white people in *Freedom & Union*.⁴⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the over-representation of white people – white men in particular – mostly with a higher position in society, probably also repelled non-whites to even consider joining or supporting one of the organizations since they were not represented at all.⁴⁶⁷ Additionally, no attempt was made to start a non-white support group for an Atlantic Union – at least nothing of that kind is reported in *Freedom & Union*. Consequently, it has to be asked whether it even was the intention of the Streitists to get these groups’ backing, which goes in line with their racist attitudes in general (see chapter 8).

All in all, even if some new supporters were reached by several efforts, however small, the network altogether remained old, white male, and – first and foremost – elitist. Yet, this seemed to have been the goal since all possible new members that were addressed also belonged to the (future) elite of society: Students would either already be part of the elite or had the potential to become part of it. Those women

⁴⁶⁶In fact, ‘*very few*’ has to be stressed here, since there are less than ten of them in the whole publication history of *Freedom & Union*: e.g. Logan; Givens; Owen.

⁴⁶⁷There is one big exception: Frank R. Crosswaith, Chairman of the Negro Labor Committee of New York, seemed to have been a firm supporter of *Union Now* as he otherwise would not have said that he was “reading *religiously* each issue of F & U” (*F&U*017 7; emphasis added).

who were recruited either were well-educated – like Ms. Hamer and Mrs. Osborn – and/or wives of influential men and, consequently, belonged to the elite of the society anyway. So it has to be concluded that Streit’s network as a whole might seem broad at first sight, but if a closer look is taken, it actually was small, yet still influential. Nevertheless, it apparently was not influential enough to successfully establish the new truth in the American and western society that an Atlantic Union was the only way to universal peace. If this had been the case, more concrete steps in this direction would have been taken. Some of these steps are the topic of the next chapter.

7.3 Political Action in the U.S. Congress to Realize an Atlantic Union and Its Coverage in *Freedom & Union*

The advocates of Clarence Streit’s idea did not limit their action to a theoretical discussion on the benefits on an Atlantic Union in books and magazines but also tried to take further steps towards concrete political action. Streit already announces this in *Union Now With Britain* by saying that the President and Congress have to “initiate the procedure” of re-delegating some of their power to the people so that they can found the nucleus of the future world Union (*UN41* 172). From 1949 to 1975, ten resolutions were introduced in the U.S. Congress⁴⁶⁸ with the goal of calling a so-called Atlantic Convention modeled on the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and, thus, getting the nucleus of the Union founded.⁴⁶⁹ The progress of

⁴⁶⁸To facilitate the reading of the following chapter, only the main or most important sponsors of the respective resolutions will be named.

⁴⁶⁹There are four ways of introducing new legislation in the U.S. Congress: Bills and Joint Resolutions (SJ/HJ), which both can become a law if approved by both houses and the President, as well as Concurrent (SCR/HCR) and Simple Resolutions (SR/HR). Neither of the latter ones has the potential to become a law but they deal with, for example, rules applying to either (Simple Resolution) or both houses (Concurrent Resolution). The latter has to be passed in the same form by both chambers (“Types of Legislation”). Each resolution can be introduced at any time during the two years of one Congress, however, if no hearings before the whole chamber are called on them before Congress adjourns at the end of the year, they have to be re-introduced in the new year. After successful hearings in a subcommittee, a resolution is sent to the Rules Committee, which can report it to the Floor. This means that the whole chamber debates on it. After an approval there, joint resolutions or bills can be submitted to the President who can approve and sign them to become a law. In the period described here, House resolutions had to be introduced individually so that each of them got a single number in order of appearance. In the Senate, co-sponsorship of resolutions was possible. Consequently, Senate (Joint/Concurrent) Resolutions have one number here, whereas there are several numbers for resolutions with the same text in the House. The

these resolutions is closely reported in the magazine *Freedom & Union*, which forms the basis of this chapter. Of course, the interpretation of the events is quite one-sided and obviously shaped by the desire to call the convention as soon as possible. However, as the coverage of the (partly non-existing) progress of each resolution is reported in close detail and the topic of this thesis is the worldview of Streit and his supporters, *Freedom & Union* provides an excellent source to illustrate the Atlantic Unionists' way of thinking.

The first three resolutions were introduced and sponsored by Senator Estes Kefauver in 1949 (SCR 57), 1951 (SCR 4), and 1955 (SCR 12), all three of them with basically the same text.⁴⁷⁰ *Freedom & Union* tries to give the impression that there was broad support for a passing of all the resolutions. This was done, for instance, by stressing the bipartisan backing in Congress, public support (e.g. *F&U011*), or by repeating encouraging reports in other newspapers and magazines.⁴⁷¹ The important resolving part of the first three resolutions says that the President should

invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union (Hamer, "AUC Resolution Reaches Congress" 5).⁴⁷²

As can be seen here, unlike in the postwar edition of *Union Now*, which was published in the very same year as the first resolution, the founders of the Union should already be the sponsors of NATO.

Immediately after the introduction of the first resolution, its supporters point out that the passing does not automatically lead to the founding of an Atlantic Union, but the planned convention would simply be of exploratory nature. Apparently, this was anticipated to be the biggest fear of its opponents. Additionally, the

resolutions introduced by Streit's supporters mostly were Concurrent Resolutions, meaning that they referred to House and Senate procedures and were not submitted to the President, which implies that they could not become a law. Yet there were also five Joint Resolutions which did have the potential to become a law. In the following, whenever the term resolution is used, it refers to a resolution of Atlantic Unionists.

⁴⁷⁰Simultaneously, the same resolutions were presented in the House.

⁴⁷¹*Freedom & Union*, for example, quotes reports on the first three resolutions from the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Washington Post* but also from smaller newspapers like the *Des Moines Sunday Register* (e.g. *F&U008*; M.F.F.; *F&U027*; *F&U028*).

⁴⁷²For the resolution of 1955, the text was slightly changed, which will be explained below.

link to the ‘original’ convention in Philadelphia in 1787 is established right away (“AUC Resolution Reaches Congress” 7-8; *F&U*009). This was probably done to unite Americans behind the idea of a convention and the reference to the Founding Fathers made an opposition to the proposal harder. If the Atlantic Convention was designed in the same way as in 1787, fighting it could be regarded as ‘un-American’ because it would imply that the process and the result of this convention – the U.S. Constitution – did not turn out to be something good. At least this seemed to be the logic of the resolutions’ supporters.

After the failure of the first resolution, the second one (SCR 4) was again introduced by Kefauver in 1951, however, without taking up the criticism on its predecessor (see e.g. *F&U*013 25-26),⁴⁷³ but with the identical text. When this one failed again, a third attempt was made in 1955 by Senator Kefauver (SCR 12) (C. K. Streit, “The New Resolution”). This time, there are some slight changes in the resolving part:

the President is requested to invite the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates [...] to meet in a convention with similarly appointed delegates from the United States and from such other democracies as the convention may invite, to *explore and to report to that extent* their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and *agree to form, federally or otherwise, a defense, economic and political union.* (“*F&U*026;” emphasis added)

As can be seen, the text is almost the same as before, but the exploratory character is pointed out very clearly here. Furthermore, although the scope of the planned convention is more clearly defined (“defense, economic and political union”), the option that it does not *have* to be a federal Union, but the states can be united “otherwise” is given on the surface. This addresses critics who feared being bound to founding exactly Streit’s Union after the resolution would have been passed. Yet, as the resolution emerged from the Atlantic Union Committee, the direction in which the development should go was obvious.

When Kefauver introduced this third resolution to the Senate, he much more focused on the urgency of the Union in his introductory speech than he had done

⁴⁷³The main points of criticism on the resolution are that the Americans are not ready for such a step and that in case the convention establishes an Atlantic Union, there is a possibility of an internal division in the Atlantic Treaty area (*F&U*013 25-26).

before (“To Explore”), but he also was confident that it could be passed this time: He does not see “how anyone who believes in our political system and acknowledges the sovereignty of the people can oppose the convocation of a Convention [...] limited in its function to exploration and recommendation” (*F&U*030 7). Like in the case of the first resolution, the non-passage of it would, thus, be regarded as ‘un-American’ and ‘un-democratic’ because the belief in the American political system and the sovereignty of its people is deeply ingrained in the American mentality and is expressed, for example, in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and also resolution SCR 12. This corresponds with Streit’s understanding of U.S. history (see chapter 4.2).

In the course of the reports in *Freedom & Union*, it becomes clear that the Atlantic Union Committee ‘lost control’ of the resolution when Senator Humphrey changed some parts of it⁴⁷⁴ and “reduced it from a concurrent to a Senate resolution” (*F&U*031 2). In *Freedom & Union*, only a short remark can be found that this was done without consulting the AUC or other supporters (2). Thus, it seems as if there indeed was no close collaboration between the AUC and the Congressional backers of the resolution any more. However, the progress of the resolution still is favorably acknowledged in *Freedom & Union*, even though it becomes clear that further progress of it is regarded as unlikely (3). In the end, the repeated failure of the resolution not being reported to the Floor is not mentioned in *Freedom & Union* and Kefauver never introduced an AUC resolution in Congress again.

On March 19, 1959, Senator Hubert Humphrey⁴⁷⁵ once more introduced a resolution in Congress (SCR 17) “calling for a convention of delegates to explore Atlantic unification” (*F&U*036), and this time, the resolution was co-sponsored, among others, by Senator Estes Kefauver. Its preamble clearly refers to the recommendation of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference of 1957 to form an Atlantic Citizens Conference, a so-called special conference, that should “examine exhaustively and [...] recommend how greater cooperation and unity of purpose [...]

⁴⁷⁴The main change is that Humphrey left out the fact that Congress should call the convention, name the delegation, and provide funds for it. He also wanted to establish a commission consisting of private individuals to explore ways of uniting the NATO states more closely.

⁴⁷⁵Humphrey seemed to generally support the Atlantic Union resolutions but did not work closely together with the AUC.

within the Atlantic Community may be best developed” (*F&U036*). The resolving section was very similar to the three AUC resolutions before, however, without the phrase “federally or otherwise”. On September 8, 1959, Secretary of State Herter declared that the “Department ha[d] no objection to the proposed resolutions” any more, although action should still be deferred until after the next NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference on November 16-20, 1960 (*F&U033*). As hearings for the resolution were called for January 1960 before Congress adjourned, this gives the impression that huge progress was made in favor of the resolution by then.

In January 1960, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the resolution and revised its text, thus lifting it to joint resolution SJR 170 (*F&U040*). The changes were quite far-reaching: First of all, the members of the now so-called “United States Citizens Commission on NATO” should be chosen by both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, no longer by the President of the United States. Furthermore, the commission’s size was reduced to 20 people, who all had to be private citizens, and the time of its existence was limited to January 31, 1962. This commission then should meet several times with similar commissions from other NATO states to work out means of “greater cooperation and unity of purpose”, which they then should recommend to their respective governments (*F&U041*). The fact that it was called a “Commission on NATO” proves two things: Firstly, the reference to the recommendation of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference to form such a commission was made explicit and provided the body with more legitimacy, and, secondly, the idea obviously was not to form a new organization but to work within the framework of NATO. Finally, after its adoption in both houses of Congress (*F&U042*), President Eisenhower signed the resolution on September 7, 1960 (*F&U043*).

This was the first – and only – time that a resolution out of the realm of Streit’s supporters (although Kefauver was only co-sponsor) was adopted and signed by the U.S. President. However, it has to be pointed out that although the original text of the resolution had been very similar to the three previous Atlantic Union Resolutions, the content of this one was heavily changed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As a consequence, it no longer was a resolution the strict supporters of

an Atlantic Union proposal all wanted to back. Streit even had to defend himself for endorsing it during the House hearings on May 17, 1960 (Ganz 12-16).⁴⁷⁶ Thus, it is doubtful whether the resolution was accepted by the supporters of *Union Now* as one of their own or whether they only regarded it as a ‘positive byproduct’ of a discussion for which they had been the agenda setters. Nevertheless, the final goal of starting an “Atlantic Convention” modeled on the 1787 Philadelphia Convention still was not entirely fulfilled because the aim of the Atlantic Convention in 1962 was not to bring about a world federal Union but to generally explore *any* way of an Atlantic unification. Yet, the overall still extensive and favoring coverage in *Freedom & Union* gives the impression that the adoption of this resolution was seen as a sign of progress.

The Atlantic Convention opened in Paris on January 8, 1962 and Streit reports on this approvingly.⁴⁷⁷ However, his evaluation afterwards is that it fell “far short of what it should, or even could, have done” – like including the expression “Atlantic Union” in the convention’s final Declaration of Paris,⁴⁷⁸ making provisions for further meetings, or starting to build institutions for the all-desired Atlantic community. Nevertheless, it also “gave important impetus toward Atlantic Union” (“Atlantic Convention, Rockefeller & Voter”). Yet, the magazine sticks to the goal of realizing Streit’s proposal of *Union Now* for a future world government and its authors do not want to settle with the proposals made by the Declaration of Paris alone to foster the development of a true Atlantic community.

When no quick progress was made in the direction of following the recommendations of the Declaration of Paris, critical voices echo in *Freedom & Union* (e.g. Brundage, “Why Atlantic Union Would Cut Taxes”; C. K. Streit, “Union Without

⁴⁷⁶Streit praised the resolution, although it was an “adulterated product” to him in comparison to the resolutions before (qtd. in Wooley 121).

⁴⁷⁷Although Streit puts great hopes in the convention approach, he warns in January 1962 that the Atlantic Convention might seem as a mockery if it does not produce good results (C. K. Streit, “The Atlantic Convention in Paris”; “Opportunity Always Starts with Zero”; “Convention Offers New Approach”).

⁴⁷⁸The Declaration of Paris is published in *Freedom & Union* in full and has the following main recommendations: 1) definition of the “principles on which our common civilization is based”, 2) creation of a “permanent High Council” to plan policies and to strengthen the North Atlantic Council, 3) development of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference into a consultative Assembly to the “Atlantic institutions”, 4) establishment of a High Court of Justice, 5) harmonizing “political, military and economic policy on matters affecting the Community as a whole” (*F&U*047).

Union”) although hope still is there that the recommendations might be realized sooner or later. It is also favorably acknowledged that one of the recommendations – the development of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference into a consultative Atlantic Assembly – was starting to be implemented early in 1963 (Moore).⁴⁷⁹ Yet, the implementation of the Assembly took over a year to finally get started as it was only urged in November 1964 at the Paris NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference and realized by November 1966 (Huntley 4; Shine).

Whether it was out of frustration about the Atlantic Convention or because a new strategy had to be built up first, Streit’s supporters did not introduce any further resolution to start another Atlantic Convention until 1965. By the beginning of 1965, Streit in his very first editorial in *Freedom & Union* of that year claims that the prospects for an Atlantic Union have improved: The ‘outside threat’ had not diminished⁴⁸⁰ and the Republican Party, which until then was seen as the “major obstacle to such unification”, changed its position and now led the way towards federation.⁴⁸¹ Thus, Streit concludes that if Lyndon B. Johnson as a Democratic President wants to unite Atlantica, he has a huge bipartisan support (“1964 Improved Outlook”).

Finally on October 18, 1965, *Union Now* supporters introduced the resolution in both Senate and House. The same resolution was re-introduced three times later on, each time with Paul Findley as one of the main sponsors. It is described by Streit as the “strongest, most forthright Atlantic Federalist bill”⁴⁸² in comparison to

⁴⁷⁹An interesting side note here is that Moore never mentions in this report of 1963 that an Atlantic Assembly allegedly was a proposal by Streit’s supporters, although he could have done so in this context. After all, Livingston Hartley had already claimed this in 1953 (“A North Atlantic Assembly – Part I” 19).

⁴⁸⁰This threat is composed of the Soviet Union’s lead in space, which proposed a huge threat to the self-understanding of the U.S. as a globally leading superpower, Krushchev’s “abrupt plunge from total spotlight to total obscurity”, the explosion of an atomic bomb in China, the wars in Vietnam and Congo as well as the continuing danger of a monetary crash (C. K. Streit, “1964 Improved Outlook”).

⁴⁸¹However, Streit does not explain how and why he knows that the Republicans changed their position.

⁴⁸²Having the difference between resolutions and bills in mind (see footnote 469), it is striking that Streit calls it a “bill” instead of a “resolution”. Whether this was done intentionally cannot be determined here, but I assume Streit misnamed it on purpose because he was a journalist who knew exactly about the effects of wording. By calling a resolution a “bill”, the matter is presented as more serious and likely to become a law. This again could help to present the resolution’s supporters as proactive in *Freedom & Union* and as really being able to change the course of politics.

the four preceding ones and as a resolution that is also “harder to oppose” (“Atlantic Union Bill’s Strength”).⁴⁸³ The new resolution has three main goals to be realized by a new convention:

- (a) A declaration that the eventual goal of their [the NATO nations’] peoples is to transform their present alliance into a federal union;
- (b) A tentative timetable for the transition to this goal; and
- (c) Democratic institutions to expedite the necessary stages to achieve the objective in time to save their citizens from another war, depression or other man-made catastrophe (*F&U*068).⁴⁸⁴

These goals in various ways mark a new development and understanding among the supporters of *Union Now*. As the first of the three points indicates, the resolution had the intention to *transform* the NATO alliance into a federal Union. Streit’s argument before had always been that an alliance system would not work and could also not be transformed into a federal Union (*UN39* 65-85). This phrase in 1965 demonstrates that the strategy was adapted to the new realities of the existing global political system. The second and third points presumably were supposed to address skeptics who feared being overrun by the development or starting an undemocratic process. By wanting to provide a timetable and the necessary institutions, these insecurities could at least theoretically be dispelled. In comparison to the last Ke-fauver resolution, however, the goal was again named clearly: a federal Union. Thus, a unification “federally *or otherwise*” no longer was an option.

The decisive step for any of those resolutions to be enacted still was the support of the State Department and the signature of the U.S. President. However, the magazine reports that the Johnson administration still opposed the resolution, although for other reasons than before.⁴⁸⁵ This obstacle together with both the

⁴⁸³In the Senate, the main two sponsors of SCR 64 were Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.) and Frank Carlson (R., Kans.); in the House, Clement Zablocki (D., Wisc.; HCR 523), Donald Fraser (D., Minn.; HCR 524), Rober F. Ellsworth (R., Kans.; HJR 768), Paul Findley (R., Ill.; HJR 769), and Albert H. Quie (R., Minn.; HJR 770) sponsored five resolutions with the same content (*F&U*067).

⁴⁸⁴This is the text of the resolving part of the Senate Concurrent Resolution 64. The text of the resolutions in the House was the same but for the Zablocki (HCR 523) and Fraser (HCR 524) resolutions. Yet, although these did not share the exact wording, they substantially had the same goals. Both the texts of SCR 64 as well as the corresponding House resolutions with the same wording are reprinted several times in *Freedom & Union* (e.g. *F&U*081; *F&U*089).

⁴⁸⁵Previously, the main reason for this opposition was the idea that the American people were not yet ripe for such a step. In 1966, Streit claims, it shifted to the resolution being “impractical” because the Johnson administration was convinced that a European unification first had to be achieved for a huge Atlantic Union to follow (“State Department’s Unfounded Opposition”).

Senate's and the House's lack of consent on the resolution led to the reluctant decision to "press no further for House approval in the nine days left before the 89th Congress adjourned" by the end of 1966 (*F&U*079 6).

Yet, early in the 90th Congress, the same resolution was re-introduced in spring of 1967 by Representatives Paul Findley (HCR 232) and Clement Zablocki (HCR 48) in the House with a nearly identical text as the previous resolution.⁴⁸⁶ Its supporters were convinced that if it was re-introduced quickly, the hearings on this resolution could proceed faster because those on the last one with the same text only happened recently in the previous year (*F&U*079). Furthermore, Herbert Humphrey, the sponsor of the 1959 resolution (SJR 170), was Vice President of the United States by 1967. Streit implies that Humphrey has to be in favor of the resolution and can, thus, influence President Johnson accordingly ("The U.S. Word"). Hence, the circumstances for the re-introduction of the resolution and its quick success were interpreted as positive, although from today's perspective it sounds more like wishful thinking.

What is interesting about this resolution in the context here is that there is only very little coverage of it in *Freedom & Union*, which is quite unusual, given the very detailed⁴⁸⁷ reports on the previous resolutions.⁴⁸⁷ This might hint to two possible assumptions: Either the editors thought the resolution would surely be called to the Floor or they did not want to admit that another one of their resolutions would fail in the fifth attempt. Although the outlook for success at first was good, the resolution was not called to the Floor, either.

Given the fact that a resolution with the backing of Streit and his supporters had failed so often by then, it is surprising that they did not lose hope that they would eventually be successful. Especially when Nixon became President, confidence rose once more. He had indicated support for resolution HJR 769 in 1966,⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁶The corresponding resolution SCR 13 was sponsored by Senators Eugene McCarthy and Frank Carlson in the Senate (*F&U*094). The only slight change in this SCR 13 and HCR 48 (not in HCR 232) is that the "democratic institutions" to be created by then are explicitly called "*interim* democratic institutions" (*F&U*095;" emphasis added).

⁴⁸⁷The magazine only lists new backers of the resolutions (*F&U*096; *F&U*103 5) and does not report on other supporters outside of Congress (Drummond).

⁴⁸⁸Nixon wrote a letter to its sponsor Findley in 1966 stating that he had "supported this resolution for many years" (*F&U*084 8) and again urged the adoption of the resolution on September 1 the same year (*F&U*076).

which is repeated again and again in *Freedom & Union*. This is why essentially the same resolution as in 1965 was re-introduced on June 5, 1969 in the House of the 91st Congress, since this was the one Nixon had endorsed (*F&U*106).⁴⁸⁹ Thus, its supporters assumed it would pass quickly this time. In the beginning of 1970, the coverage on the resolution's progress in *Freedom & Union* declines, so that alert readers once more could have guessed that in contrast to Streit's predictions, the chances for success had deteriorated. Although they were planned, hearings never took place (*F&U*112), allegedly because the resolution was introduced too late in the year (*F&U*114). In the end, the readers never get an explanation why the resolution failed again.

In the next Congress, on February 17, 1971 the same resolution was re-introduced once more in the House – again – by Findley (HCR 163) and Fraser (HCR 164).⁴⁹⁰ For the first time, not only political, economic, and military possibilities of an Atlantic Union are addressed during its presentation, but also the Union strategy to tackle ecological problems (*F&U*121 9). This can also be read as an indicator for the awareness of a new problem arising in the world,⁴⁹¹ which was regarded as only solvable in an Atlantic Union. Another explanation could be that the resolution's backers wanted to become attractive to new groups of supporters with this new topic.⁴⁹² After a positive report by the subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements – conveniently headed by Fraser, who had introduced HCR 164 – the full committee slightly changed its text and the 'new' HJR 900 then was recommended to the full House Foreign Affairs Committee, where it gained the majority of votes (C. K. Streit, "The Atlantic Union Resolution"; *F&U*115; G. Atlantican). On January 12, 1972 the State Department also dropped its objections to it (*F&U*124). As the State Department's apprehension before had always been one of the biggest obstacles to the AUC resolutions, both main sponsors of the res-

⁴⁸⁹The main sponsors were Findley (HCR 283), Fraser (HCR 283), Morse (HCR 285), and Udall (HCR 286).

⁴⁹⁰Like in 1969/70, Nixon's endorsement of the resolution in 1966 is pointed out. This probably should remind members of Congress as well as readers of *Freedom & Union* of what the President said before and make Nixon stick to his previous comments (*F&U*121 3, 8; C. K. Streit, "A 3d Reversal").

⁴⁹¹After all, the first big Earth Day demonstrations took place in 1970 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in the U.S. in the same year.

⁴⁹²The ecological benefits of an Atlantic Union were also discussed at the Federal Convention in 1971: *F&U*113; *F&U*119.

olution, Findley and Fraser, reacted delightedly. When the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved of HJR 900 and sent the resolution to the Rules Committee in March 1972 (*F&U*128; *F&U*129), the resolution seemed to be progressing fast.⁴⁹³ However, it still failed to reach the Floor – apparently one vote was missing in the Rules Committee – and could, thus, not reach the stage for final enactment (C. K. Streit, “President Nixon’s Two Greatest Opportunities”; “How A.U. Bill, near Victory, Lost”).

A ninth attempt was made to get a resolution through Congress in January 1973, the “Atlantic Delegation Resolution” (Atlantican).⁴⁹⁴ To fully present the proceedings of this resolution instead of reporting on it bit by bit, *Freedom & Union* decided to combine the second and third issue in 1973. Officially, this was done (in such detail) because hopes were still high that the Atlantic Union would be founded and then, “historians [would] seek eye-witness reporting of how this came to pass”. Apparently, other newspapers did not report on the resolution as much as before due to the Watergate scandal (*F&U*134). However, it can also be read as a sign that nothing else in the political world suggested that a global federal Union would be founded any time soon and the editors of *Freedom & Union* wanted to keep up the hopes of their readers.

What probably helped to achieve quick progress of this resolution was Nixon’s renewed assurance to Findley that he would again support the resolution. Findley even claims that the President promised to sign the resolution if it was approved by Congress (“Letter to Nixon”). The hearings in the House Foreign Relations Committee started on March 26, 1973, after which HJR 205 was reported favorably to the Rules Committee. The House resolution finally reached the Floor – something no other resolution of this kind had achieved before – on April 10, 1973, yet the House rejected the rule given to it by the Rules Committee. This meant that there

⁴⁹³The same text as HJR 900 was introduced in the Senate as SJR 217 by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) and Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) (*F&U*125). It was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 29, 1972 and then passed by the Senate (*F&U*132; Atlantican). It accepted the resolution with the minor change of reducing the allowance for the delegation to the convention from \$300,000 in the original resolution to \$200,000 (*F&U*129; *F&U*131).

⁴⁹⁴This time, the resolutions in both Senate and House were joint resolutions with the numbers SJR 21 (Gale McGee), HJR 205 (Paul Findley), HJR 206 (Donald Fraser), and HJR 213 (Jim Wright).

was no vote on the resolution as such and the only possibility to get it enacted then was to alter the text until enough opponents would vote for the resolution or to re-introduce it again and start anew (*F&U*135 25). This was no longer tried, though. In the Senate, SJR 21 was unanimously approved on March 26, 1973. However, it was not passed by April 1974, which shaped reports on it with a stronger sense of urgency because Congress would adjourn by the end of 1974. In the end, coverage on it in *Freedom & Union* stops after April 1974 (*F&U*138) – once more without any explanation.

Finally in July 1975, the last attempt was made to get a resolution through Congress in order to start an Atlantic Convention: HR 606 (Findley). As already stated in chapter 4.4.9, the issues of *Freedom & Union* by then no longer were published on a regular basis. This made close coverage of the following two resolutions harder. The magazine had planned to focus on this in a special “Summer issue” of 1976, yet, this never happens.⁴⁹⁵ The issue of 1977 does not mention anything else about HR 606 any more, so it must have failed again. The reason for this missing report might be that the tenth defeat in this matter could no longer be easily acknowledged.

All in all, if there is something the supporters of these ten resolutions cannot be blamed for, it is quick surrender or lack of trying. They introduced resolutions in the long time span from 1949 to 1975, which already shows that they really were dedicated to their plan even after the ‘first generation supporters’ of *Union Now* had died and would not let themselves be shaken off by a sometimes huge opposition. They were idealists who possibly thought that if they only tried often and long enough, their opponents could be convinced at some point. Yet again, this insistence on an Atlantic Convention also indicates that they did not realize that their plan would never be fulfilled at all. Other international institutions, which they regarded as defective in every way, were already in existence (NATO, U.N.,

⁴⁹⁵The next issue of *Freedom & Union* was only delivered (mostly) to paid-up subscribers and not to, for example, libraries. This makes it hard to get today, so only the table of contents could be obtained. The archive “Sainte-Genevieve” in Paris as well as the British Library both have this issue in their catalog, yet this turned out to be a mistake. For copyright reasons, the only three pages of the issue could be copied or scanned in the U.S. and sent to me. The table of contents shows that the issue mainly contains a celebration of the bicentennial of the first Congress in the United States since George Mason’s first Bill of Rights and the constitutional discussion of the 18th century, but nothing on the resolution HR 606 (*F&U*141).

the Bretton Woods institutions) and worked in their own way. If a certain political structure has already been created, it becomes ever harder to fully change it and start something completely new because, among others, power structures solidify over time and people get used to them. Additionally, a change of political system in one state is hard enough to achieve, but it is very unlikely that a complete restructuring of global politics can happen unless a crisis similar to a worldwide war or economic recession occurs. In such cases, a lot which previously was perceived as true is shattered and people may start thinking of new solutions. As even after World War II, no completely new structure of world politics emerged, it was highly unlikely that this would come about once the new institutions had consolidated. However, this is nothing the Atlantic Unionists realized.

8 *From Imperialism to World State?*

Union Now was written in the 1930s, long after the age of classical imperialism, however, still before formal colonialism officially ended. Its author, Clarence Streit, was an American, which means that he came from the nation which has always claimed to fight imperialism and not to be imperialist itself. Yet, it is striking that there are various notions throughout Streit's writings which seem to be similar to the mindset and language of this very phenomenon. As the hypothesis here is that Streit helped to produce an Atlantic discourse that derived from the Anglo-Saxonism, it would not be surprising if the imperialist discursive strategies of the latter also are used in the former. Streit repeatedly defended himself against accusations of imperialism, which started in 1941 but continued until the last edition of the book (*UN41* 14, 26, 183; *UN43* 250-51, 264; *UN49* 262, 288; *Freedom's Frontier* 159, 162).⁴⁹⁶ In his explanation in *Freedom & Union* about the fact that an Atlantic Union would *not* be a new kind of imperialism, Streit displays a very narrow understanding of this concept as he says that imperialism is understood as "extending the power of a nation or rule over others against their will" (C. K. Streit, "Answering Questions Nov. 1960"). This is very similar to, e.g. W.T. Stead or Andrew Carnegie's understanding

⁴⁹⁶This defensive position is not only articulated by Streit himself, but other authors also emphasize their rejection of imperialism in the *Freedom & Union*: e.g. *F&U*016 22, 24; Domeratzky 21.

of imperialism. Yet, even if this narrow view is applied, it remains doubtful whether the Union would *really* not extend its powers against the will of other nations. Additionally, Streit was criticized for neglecting the imperialist overtones in his book (Schwimmer 15; Doenecke 47), which shows that his contemporaries disagreed with him about his denial of imperialist notions in his proposal. Consequently, it seems worthy to analyze whether – deliberately or not – Streit’s idea in *Union Now* can in fact be read as an attempt to (re-)establish a (new) imperial power in the international political system, which would show that the imperialist elements of the Anglo-Saxon discourse made its way into the Atlantic discourse. Furthermore, the claim can be made that the old imperial powers would take the leading position in the Union and, therefore, imperialist structures in politics and culture for the future would be perpetuated. Therefore, theories of imperialism, different ways to understand this phenomenon and its features will be explained in following chapter. Afterwards, Streit’s ideas and writings will be examined along these features.

8.1 Features of Imperialism

In the late 19th century, empire mostly meant the “clear and overt rule by one nation over others” (Porter 2) and partly also had a positive connotation, as could be seen in chapters 3.2.1 to 3.2.4. Yet, this definition was outdated at the latest in the middle of the 20th century, since it neglects other kinds and more indirect forms of control that still were going on after the end of formal imperialism. This is dated to the end of the 1970s by Cain and Harrison (9), but it actually started much earlier. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the United Nations Charter are two major examples before the 1970s that “enshrined freedom from colonial rule as an ideal” (Springhall 10). However, as becomes clear here, only *colonial*, not *imperial* rule was condemned. The goal of the time was to counter the military competition as well as the fight over resources, labor, and markets by the (former) imperial powers. Hence, a new form of cooperation on the international level needed to be found (Tully, “Lineages” 18). After the League of Nations failed to successfully establish such a system, the question became ever more pressing after World War II. Thus, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions quickly were created. This

network and system, which also includes the former colonies and theoretically gives them a voice in the decisions, can still be described as “contemporary informal imperialism” (“Lineages” 18; see also Tully, *Public Philosophy* 196). The reason for this is that the former imperialist powers now “govern informally through coalitions of various kinds and with various members at different times (roughly among the G20) and through institutions of global governance set up at the end of the Second World War” (“Lineages” 3).⁴⁹⁷ International governance now is exercised by informal means, which ranges from “economic aid, trade manipulation, and dept dependency, to military dependency, intervention, and restructuring” (4). Over time, a semantic shift in European and U.S. imperialism happened: At first, imperialism was “unilateral, often in violation of international law, and explicit about the use of military intervention”. This is a kind of imperialism that is associated with the mindsets of Cecil Rhodes, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Bush administrations. However, there is also the multilateral understanding of imperialism, which obeys international law and is “more reserved and covert about military intervention”. This is exemplified by Woodrow Wilson, the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, and the foreign policy of the European Union (19). The latter form conceals its imperialist notions, but the object still is to adapt the entire world to the western standard of civilization. Constructing a regime of truth that creates the knowledge of Atlantic or western nations being the highest form of civilization is also one goal of the Atlantic discourse. Yet, the term civilization was replaced by other expressions, such as development, modernization, democratization, constitutionalization, freedom, and good government. Although the wording may be different, it refers to the same phenomenon and the corresponding institutions (20). Thus, until today, western imperialism is continued through informal means and institutions of global governance (Bell, “Introduction” 7). These are theoretically open to all the nations in the world and give all of them an equal voice but actually are led by the same powers that constitute the group of former imperialist powers in the world.

If a more concrete definition of imperialism from the perspective of the im-

⁴⁹⁷Tully also includes several NGOs, “civil society organisations working to westernise non-western societies and citizens”, and the NATO among those institutions that maintain the dominance of the former imperial powers (today’s G7) in the world (“Lineages” 5).

perialist power is to be found, one has to distinguish between broader and more narrow views of this term. In a very narrow understanding, empire is the direct political control of one polity over another and imperialism is the “strategy or policy that aims to uphold or expand a territorial empire” (“Ideologies” 536). In a broader perspective, empire includes many more forms of the exercise of control in a system with unequal power relationships. Imperialism in this understanding means “a strategy of policy – or even an attitude or disposition – that seeks to create, maintain, or intensify relations of inequality between political communities” (536). The patterns of thought beneath imperialism are quite similar in the narrow and the broad understanding. Bell describes these patterns as “imperial ideology” (538), whereas he adopts Freedman’s definition of ideologies as “clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups that provide directives, even plans of action of public policy-making” which should change the “social and political arrangements of a state or other political community” (6).⁴⁹⁸ Imperial ideologies can be subdivided into ideologies of justification, governance, and resistance. The first group is relevant here, since ideologies of justification support and uphold imperial activity by legitimizing the “creation, reproduction, or expansion of empire” (“Ideologies” 538).⁴⁹⁹ These are the ideologies which uphold an empire on a theoretical level and work for the acceptance of this power relationship. These ideologies often include the idea of a civilizing mission, for which the justificatory arguments can be the following: First of all, so-called ‘civilized’ people have the *right* and also the *duty* to bring civilization to the ‘backward’ people, because this is what progress demands. Additionally, the superiority of European political and moral orders is proved by their dominance in the military and economic fields in the world. This further legitimizes their spread across the globe because all nations could benefit from a superior system. The ideology also includes the idea of a hierarchical classification of peoples and portrays western societies in a very fashionable way (Bell, “Ideologies” 539-41). This is an imperial ideology that underlies imperialist actions of the past, but also exists until today if only in a weaker or

⁴⁹⁸Examples of such ideologies are liberalism, socialism, republicanism, conservatism but also fascism (Bell, “Ideologies” 538).

⁴⁹⁹A summary of these imperial ideologies of justification can be found in Tully, “Lineages” 10-11.

more concealed form, which is an indicator that several elements of former imperial discourses have survived until today.

Yet, imperialism as such has many more features than the ones mentioned so far, which are changing a bit on the range from narrow to broader views of the concept. Doyle states that an imperial relationship is the control of the effective political sovereignty of another political entity that can be exerted through political, economic, social, or cultural dependence (45). Cain/Hopkins add that a deliberate and conscious (attempted) incursion into another sovereignty is a distinguishing feature of empire.⁵⁰⁰ Consequently, in case this incursion is successful, the relationship between the imperialist and the subordinate power becomes unequal as the latter gets dependent upon the former. Furthermore, the imperialist power perceives itself as superior in an ideological as well as a material way and legitimizes its actions by a sense of mission it claims for itself (54). The driving forces and institutions of imperialism rarely come from one but much more often from different fields, as they can be economic, military, political, social, and also cultural (Doyle 19). Apart from political control with or without military means, Gallagher and Robinson defined the so-called imperialism of free trade as a tactic of 19th century Britain to increase its own power by the incorporation of regions in the periphery that not necessarily had to belong the British Empire. This was easier and less costly than the more complicated and expensive formal imperial rule. Informal imperialism in this form even worked better in some cases because the local elites of the peripheries were included in the ruling of the territories and, thus, guaranteed a continuation of the established trade relations. The colonial officials who held control of the regions all had a similar, British educational background and, therefore, represented the official mind of the government. A military intervention from the mother country was only needed when this official mind was questioned by either the indigenous peoples or rival imperial powers (“Imperialism of Free Trade”; see also Cain and Harrison 14).

⁵⁰⁰Cain and Hopkins claim that a so-called gentlemanly capitalism was the intentional driving force of imperialism since the 19th century. It promoted “expansionist forces of investment, commerce and migration throughout the world, including Europe and the United States”. The main idea was to create an “international trading system centred on London and mediated by sterling”. This intention as such was not necessarily imperialist but could easily develop into imperialism, especially when the target society lacked reforms or structures in which these ambitions could be realized, and when the society was either open to these changes or incapable of resisting them (55-56).

Thus, without costly and dangerous military assistance, an incorporation of larger territories around the world was achieved. In the end, all these tactics together resulted in “recognisably similar institutions and laws, mutual economic dependence, and common protection against external attack” (Darwin 2).

However, imperialism also has a cultural perspective, something which Darwin, in the case of the British Empire, describes as a “diffusion of British beliefs and ideas” that led to “[s]hared political values” within the whole polity (2). These manifest themselves in “specific political, ideological, economic and social practices” (Said 9). This understanding is closely related to the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which means that the power rests more on consent than on open coercion: So-called organic intellectuals, such as churches, schools, families, trade unions, work as “class organizers” and “organize the reform of moral and intellectual life” (Storey 85; Cain and Harrison 20). Hence, they can be used to imitate the dominant power and make it attractive to the rest of the subordinate society. This is the reason why Cain and Harrison claim that the success of European and American domination of the world relied more on the control of representative means than on the means of production (17). What applies to the cultural element also counts for the political and economic fields: The subordinate society needs to be integrated in an already existing system that is determined by the imperialist power.

A newer theory for the phenomenon of becoming attractive to others and, thus, making others work along a dominant power, was developed by Joseph Nye. Although he definitely does not see the United States as an imperialist power,⁵⁰¹ his theory still has to be included in a definition of imperialism, since it would be very naive not to do so. Nye defines soft power as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a nation’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” (*Soft Power* x) The sources of a nation’s soft power are its culture, which is said to be universal in the case of the U.S., its political values and whether it lives up to them, and its foreign policies, which need to be seen as legitimate or having moral authority (Nye, *Soft Power* 10-

⁵⁰¹Nye’s argument is that although the U.S. has more power resources than Britain even at its peak of imperial power, it has less control over the “behavior that occurs inside other countries than Britain did when it rules a quarter of the globe” (*Soft Power* 136). For further reading on the concept of soft power, see also Nye, “Public Diplomacy.”

11). The goal is to make one's own culture and ideals seem attractive and 'seduce' or convince others to follow the strong power's values with the help of attraction and cooperation without having to resort to the methods of threats and payments, since these are associated with hard power (x). In the case of the United States, Nye claims that their ideals of democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are regarded as universal. Hence, he is convinced that whenever the United States tries to enforce these, its operations are seen as legitimate across the world because the underlying values are regarded as attractive. Thus, strong resistance against such actions is not to be expected. However, to be able to influence others, powers need to have a large population and territory, many natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability (2). What is also vital are "intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority" (6). Yet, what Nye does not realize is that this neglects the worth of other cultures than his own and he clearly displays the imperialist ideology of regarding one's own culture and political system on a higher hierarchical rank than those of others. 19th century Britain and the U.S. after 1945 managed to establish a system of international rules that, according to Nye, was consistent with the "liberal and democratic nature of the British and American economic systems: free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations in the case of the United States" (10). This helped them to maintain their hegemonic position in the world, which is why they were and are regarded as imperialist powers in other places of the world.

Thus, the most important features of imperialism are an unequal relationship between the imperial power and the subaltern power together with the imperial ideology of the superiority of one's own culture and political system, which is also depicted in the language used. This also brings with it a sense of mission towards other nations. Additionally, the goal of the imperial power is the effective control over another political entity in terms of politics, economy, and representation in other parts of the world. It aims to become a strong (or: the strongest) economic and military might, which makes it impossible for other parts of the world

to avoid its realm. The imperial power wants to include these in its own system by fostering the creation of institutions similar to its own. Finally, there is the deliberate incursion in the sovereignty of other parts of the world. However, this does not necessarily mean that the imperial power always faces large resistance from the subaltern parts. By working together with organic intellectuals and becoming attractive in terms of values, political institutions, and economic system, a shared common system is created in other parts of the world that complies with the one of the imperialist power.

8.2 The Imperialism of *Union Now*

Unequal Relationship

An unequal relationship between the Union and the rest of the world was clearly intended from the beginning, if it did not exist in the first place before the Union was even founded. The political situation and power relationships in the world around the time *Union Now* was written made this inequality inevitable with the founding nations that were chosen. However, Streit goes one step further. This becomes clear when his explanation of the goal of the Union is considered closely:

The democracies to be united this time are so powerful that their Union would be all powerful and would be the first democratic state that from birth would *dwarf* all the rest of the world. (*UN39* 176; emphasis added)

Hence, apart from saving the world from dictatorship and further war, Streit wants to make sure that the members of the Union remain in a very strong position in the future – a position which existed before, but which would be decisively strengthened by the founding of the Union. Furthermore, he constructs the notion that it would be beneficial mostly for the founders but not only for them. The Union members would be able to control all the relations with outside nations or organizations because there would be no possibility to avoid the realm of the newly founded polity on the international field.

Additionally, the expression “dwarf other nations” reveals that Streit’s intention is indeed to secure a dominant position for the founding nations and *keep* the rest of the world in an inferior position.⁵⁰² This can also have meant that despite

⁵⁰²According to Baratta, Allan F. Matthews, who sometimes also wrote for *Freedom & Union*,

his reassurances that the Union is open to all other nations, the reality would have been different, since it is unlikely that these nations would be included in the Union for two reasons: Firstly, only strong nations can become a new member of the Union because the parliament of the Union needs to allow it and every extension of the Union has to be rated as beneficial. If the rest of the world is “dwarfed” by the Union, other nations probably do not have a chance to become strong enough so that the Union could see their admission as beneficial for itself. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, what Streit does not see is that if the Union intentionally “dwarfs” other nations, their populations would not appreciate these actions of the Union and over time, resentment might develop. After all, other nations would not stand a chance of bettering their situations alone, but only if they accepted their subordinate role or became a member of the, then, disliked Union itself – if they were admitted at all. This would again cause unrest and not contribute to real peace in the world because a strong resentment of the Union would likely develop especially among the weaker nations in the world.

Belief in the Superiority of the Union('s Principles) and Sense of Mission

Streit and his supporters clearly believed in the superiority of their democratic principles, of their understanding of freedom, and their idea to build a lasting peace order. They were convinced that only with the help of western influence, the people in the rest of the world could be liberated and, accordingly, they used this as a discursive strategy repeatedly. According to Streit, this had already happened to Asia and many parts of Africa, which were “*awakened in our time*” and which had experienced a “political, industrial, social, cultural and spiritual revolution” (*Freedom Against Itself* 19).⁵⁰³ Western ideals and principles were strongest in

stated that Streit, in fact, never realized that the founding of the Union would further increase the domination of the world by the global North at the cost of the South (qtd. in *World Federation II* 526). This is a sharp contrast to the assessment here and it is also not displayed by the language Streit used, but it has to be mentioned nevertheless. Although Matthews was not completely uncritical of Clarence Streit, this statement sounds as if the former only insinuates a certain kind of naivité of the latter, without giving credit to the fact that Streit cannot *not* have seen this possible result of an eventual founding of the Union.

⁵⁰³Wooley claims that such racist overtones of the unionists led to suspicion in and outside of America (125). Thus, the problematic arguments were realized by many people, if not by Streit and his followers themselves.

those regions “where civilization [had] early reached high levels” (19).⁵⁰⁴ The idea is constructed that those regions might have had a high level of civilization before, but only with the help of western influence, they had reached a higher level than the other regions in Asia and Africa, and would probably also attain the same level as the West one day.⁵⁰⁵

However, something needs to be stressed here again: The Union and Streit’s idea of the West was based essentially on British-American principles and all the other nations in the world should adapt to them. Accordingly, it was not the *western* principles which were seen as superior but mainly or only *Anglo-American* ones. Although the edition of 1941 officially was an emergency plan, the fact that *only* the English-speaking nations were included indicates that diversity was not intended, although it would have been possible to integrate others from the beginning as well.⁵⁰⁶ Furthermore, it was clear that neither the United States nor Britain or the former dominions would agree to a Union on political principles which were not their own, albeit this would have been required from all the other nations and people in the world. In Streit’s opinion, the ‘really superior’ nations in the world are the United States, Britain and – if at all – the former British settler colonies. All the other founders of the Union might play an important role, but would never have the same status as the English-speaking ones, especially when questions of *how* the Union is to be built would be debated. The same can be argued for the Illustrative Constitution: Although it was mentioned repeatedly that it was only a draft and could be changed at any time if a better solution was proposed, it is hard to believe that Streit himself would have agreed to major changes as he argues throughout his books and articles that the system he proposed is the best possible solution – thus, superior to all other systems or possible constitutions.

Nevertheless, Streit wants to avoid the impression that only English-speaking nations are allowed in the Union or that they would dominate it, so he makes a case

⁵⁰⁴Streit mentions the regions of “Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, Phoenicia, Anatolia, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Turkestan, India and China as well as [...] Japan” (*Freedom Against Itself* 19).

⁵⁰⁵This idea is supported by Hartley in *Freedom & Union*, who claims that people in Eastern Asia can be regarded as “economically and culturally backward” in comparison to Western Europe. However, they can develop further with the assistance of the western powers, who do not only want to help them, but they *have* to due to their sense of mission (“Atlantic or Pacific?”).

⁵⁰⁶See p. 144 here.

for “admitting at the earliest opportunity democracies of other languages” (*UN41* 28).⁵⁰⁷ However, he does not see that this would still make all the other nations petitioners who are dependent upon the English-speaking nations to decide whether to admit them to the Union or not. This is not a position any nation would like to see itself in. Furthermore, Streit clearly states that the Union would take over the position of both the United States and the British Commonwealth in the world (*Freedom Against Itself* 305). This means the following: The United States and the British Commonwealth together have the leading position in world politics and the Union would obtain this place in the future. However, as the Union would be based mainly on Anglo-American principles, it would do no less than solidify their status in the future world order. Yet, Streit does not see that this clearly displays the construction of a discursive regime that constructs the world order as a hierarchical system and represents his own political system and culture – the (Anglo-)American one – as superior to all others.

The wording Streit uses also reflects the fact that he firmly believes in the superiority of the Union nations over the rest of the world. This will be highlighted in comparison to Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden” as it is a classical and well-known example of imperialist language. The first stanza says the following:

Take up the White Man’s burden –
 Send forth the best ye breed –
 Go bind your sons to exile
 To serve your *captives’* need;
 To wait in heavy harness,
 On *fluttered folk and wild* –
 Your *new-caught, sullen peoples*,
Half-devil and half-child. (Kipling 261; emphasis added)

The colonized people are depicted as “captives”, “fluttered folk and wild” who are “new-caught, sullen peoples”. This choice of words clearly reduces the colonized, non-white people to a lower, immature status, who could ‘rightfully’ be treated badly by the colonizers because they were “half-devil and half-child” – thus, they are represented as dangerous and can at the same time not be taken seriously or held responsible as they are “children”. The expression “new-caught” even goes one

⁵⁰⁷Yet, Streit does not specify, *which* democracies of other languages he wants to include first.

step further and objectifies those people who are no longer seen as ‘real’ humans.

Streit uses the following expressions when speaking of people who live under dictatorship or non-democratic forms of government:

Peoples that accept dictatorships must be classified, politically, among the *immature*, or *retarded*, or *inexperienced*, high as they may rank otherwise. In *admitting to be governed authoritatively*, they admit they are *not able to govern themselves freely*. While men accept being governed as *children*, they must be rated as *immature*. (*UN39* 88; emphasis added)⁵⁰⁸

It is as well-intentioned as foolish as trying to preserve the Bill of Rights for *children* by giving *children* the vote. (*New Federalist* 44)

The free are led willy-nilly to arm dictatorship industrially and militarily because [...] [t]he freedom that fostered our machines and weapons is not needed for their exploitation. Once made, *slaves* can soon learn to copy and use them. (*Freedom Against Itself* 127)

In Streit’s statements, the expressions to describe people living under dictatorship are not only from the same semantic fields but even partly the same in the case of “children”. These could not be part of the Union because they have not (yet) achieved the same developmental level as the fifteen founding nations and according to Streit, they are in a state of self-imposed immaturity as they “admitt[ed] to be governed authoritatively”. Therefore, they are rightfully excluded until they have developed the same understanding of freedom and democracy and have embedded it in their every-day life. The reader has to bear in mind that Streit is at least partly convinced that they are living under dictatorship voluntarily and, thus, have given up their freedom and own rights by choice. By admitting that they are governed authoritatively, they *allowed* themselves to be governed in this way without fighting it, which is why he classifies them as “children”. The expression “slaves” is also very striking here, since it tells a lot about Streit’s view of people in non-democratic nations: By depicting someone as a slave, the person is described as unfree, without own rights, not allowed an opinion and regarded as ‘property’ of other people or – in this case – the state. This is very similar to Kipling’s expression of “captives”, which stresses the idea of ‘property’ even more, not to mention that these “captives”

⁵⁰⁸In the same edition of *Union Now*, Streit also explains that the people of Italy “and of the Central Powers” became more and more “retarded and inexperienced in democracy” the longer they were exposed to “absolutism’s degradation of the common man and insistence on blind obedience to state and church and all constituted authority” (*UN39* 299). Thus, even if they had been further developed before, absolutism made them become “retarded”, which is quite a condescending way of speaking.

often later became slaves. Thus, Streit's expression reflects that he ascribed a similar status to people under dictatorship as Kipling did for the colonized people in the 19th century. People living in democracies are considered as superior in many ways: They are free, have and know their own rights, their opinion is important in the democratic discourse, and they are seen as "mature". Throughout his books Streit argues that it is the destiny of the democracies to educate, or 'redeem' other nations, so that in the end, former non-democratic people could benefit from the 'blessings of democracy'. This again is the same idea Kipling and many others had in the days of imperialism and beyond. They regarded themselves as the 'adults' whose destiny was to educate the 'children' in order for them to become 'mature' one day. It does not need further explanation that the time *when* those people would be 'mature enough' would be defined by the already 'superior' nations or people, so the relationship of dependency on them is reinforced once more. These two mind-sets of the 19th and 20th centuries actually derive from the same discursive regime: Others are regarded as inferior and, thus, can and must be governed by superior, Anglo-Saxon, Atlantic, or white people. Bearing this in mind, it again has to be questioned whether Streit really had no ulterior motives in his idea for the world government. It is also possible that he, in fact, wanted was the English-speaking nations (in particular the United States) to dominate the rest of the world and establish a new kind of imperialist rule, although he would never have admitted this. It remains unclear whether Streit really was so naive that he did not *see* this problem or whether he *did* see it but actively ignored it.

Another similarity between Kipling and Streit, which is also an element of imperialism, is the sense of mission. Both had the idea that it was their destiny to bring their respective worldview to other regions in the world – which is just another explanation of the idea of a 'redeemer nation' – and that this could only be achieved by the "best ye breed". In Streit's case these were the "world's greatest, oldest, most homogeneous, and closely linked democracies, the peoples most experienced and successful in solving the problem at hand" (*UN39* 7). Thus, it was natural for both of them that only the 'topmost' people could actually achieve this high goal of bringing 'civilization' or 'democracy' to 'uneducated children'.⁵⁰⁹ Streit

⁵⁰⁹When Streit reports on the findings of the commissions at the Bruges Conference of 1957,

is convinced that the “*more intelligent among civilized people* seem ready to agree that [the world] do[es] face a problem in world government” (39; emphasis added) and so only they – the fifteen founding nations – can reasonably solve the problem and can actually be “burdened [...] with those [people] least experienced” (88). This line of thinking is reinforced by the statement about the further deterioration of the people under autocracy (see footnote 508) because the continuing decline of the people living under autocracy legitimizes the democracies’ cause even more. The resemblance in the choice of the word burden is remarkable here if it is compared to Kipling’s title of the poem “The White Man’s Burden”. In both cases, the ‘burden’ is generously accepted for the ‘benefit’ of the people or nations which are ‘less developed’. Accordingly, the superior people – the people of the Union, most of all the English-speaking ones, or white people in general – have to ‘redeem’ the others because they would not be able to benefit from this ‘salvation’ of democracy or western civilization without the help of their ‘saviors’. Although the argument basically remains the same, there is a shift in *who* should take over the leading role in the civilizing mission of the white or English-speaking peoples. The ‘burden’ of civilizing the rest of the world originally was mainly carried by Britain, as Streit explains in *Freedom & Union*, but is now taken over by the United States which wants to expand its own union and the Union of the Free. However, in contrast to Britain, this expansion is not regarded as imperialist by Streit (“Union – Not Empire” 1). Thus, he must have recognized that Kipling’s understanding of ‘civilizing’ others had negative consequences on the rest of the world, but Streit does not transfer this knowledge to his theory. It becomes obvious here again that he does not critically assess the United States’ political system but he perpetuates the Atlantic discursive regime: First of all, the United States clearly positions itself against imperialism

he also stresses that the commission on “Religious and Spiritual Values” found that the Atlantic community needed to “convince the people of underdeveloped countries that respect for these standards and principles [was] an indispensable precondition of the realization of their aspirations and to help them towards this end” (“Bruges Proposes Atlantic Institute” 15). Hence, he was reassured that the idea of ‘educating’ people from ‘underdeveloped’ nations on the western or Atlantic principles was broadly shared among the Atlantic community. Later on in the same report – this time on the findings of the commission on “Underdeveloped Countries” – those standards and principles are illustrated: The Atlantic world has a Christian and humanist origin and the “peoples of the underdeveloped areas should be assisted in their effort to secure on the basis of a better material well-being, the human values the Atlantic world stands for, in particular individual freedom, peace and tolerance” (17).

and Streit is convinced that this results from its political system (“What May Has Done” 1). Furthermore, the U.S. as a ‘redeemer nation’ is considered the only nation in the world that can bring progress to other parts of the world, which again is something the rest of the world cherishes in this understanding. Hence, Streit’s argument must have appeared logical to some people in the United States, if not so much beyond it. What has to be remembered, however, is that helping so-called “immature democracies” would also benefit the Union itself: They would be drawn towards the Union by the hope of membership (*UN39* 112-13) and, thus, would strengthen the Union’s position in the world even further. This, again, would even intensify the notion that the Union nations are superior because of their stronger position and the admiration of others.

Control of Representation and Effective Control of Other Nations

The next aspect of imperialism might seem a bit harder to find in the writings of Streit and the supporters of his cause at first sight. However, if one looks closely, there are hints which indicate that Streit’s intention was indeed a control of representation, if only in an indirect manner. It is very important for him that the Union controls communications – meaning postage rates, electric means of communication, the price of press rates as well as shipping, river, rail, road, and air communications (257-58). His argument is that this would lessen the costs of any kind of communication and knit the Union closer together. This would both be possible and perhaps likely because people and nations could get in contact with each other more easily and cheaply. However, if the Union had the monopoly on any kind of communications system, it would also be possible to partly steer the *kind of* information or interpretations of circumstances that are broadcast among the Union and beyond. In fact, this was also partly Streit’s idea if his words are taken literally because he says that the Union would have the “right to [...] *control* or operate other interstate communications” (179; emphasis added). In Streit’s opinion, this would be unproblematic because all the Union citizens would be convinced of the principles of freedom, democracy, and peace. Accordingly, they would come to similar conclusions, which makes a control unnecessary anyway. Conversely, if communications

are controlled, it is possible to suppress any kind of criticism or to deny it appropriate media coverage. This does not mean that there would necessarily be controlled state media in the Union, but the danger remains if the communications *can* be controlled.

One way in which representation in other parts of the world *had* already been shaped was by the fact that many leaders of (especially newly independent) nations

were educated in America, Britain and France, and sp[oke] – and what [was] more important – [thought] in English or French. Add Spanish and Portuguese, and all these considerations apply also to Latin America (*Freedom's Frontier* 50).

What Streit argues here is the following: The leaders of the new nations got their education in the western world and, consequently, have also been influenced by this culture's principles. On returning back to their respective nations, the leaders can influence policies in a way which would more likely be friendly towards the Union and not fall into the hands of the communists.⁵¹⁰ Even if some of the newly independent nations had already turned towards communism, they would soon recognize that this was not the solution to their problems. Hence, by providing the leaders of other nations with a western education, western ideals and principles would be secured in all or most other nations of the world. In the end, this would result in their desire to join the Union.

An example which clearly shows how Streit constructs the idea that the United States (and consequently also the Union of the Free) have to be the leader of the rest of the world, is his comment on the discussion about the abolition of the U.N. veto in the postwar edition of 1949: If the veto was abolished, the United States would then be “morally bound to organize a non-Communist league on a non-veto basis”, a league which would be supplied with mainly American “men, money and material for the war with Russia”. However – and this is the important part – if this were to happen, the U.S. would have

no legal control over them [the other states in the league]. It might well find itself in a small minority. *Control over diplomatic and war policy* would have passed not only out of its hands but out of those of the experienced democracies, and into the

⁵¹⁰However, Streit has claimed before that these new nations would “fall easy prey to the Communist dictatorship” (*Freedom's Frontier* 10, see also 96). This contradicts his conviction that those nations would automatically work closely together with their former mother countries, but this connection is never made by him.

hands of the immature democracies and Latin American dictators who would form the majority in the non-Communist league. (*UN49* 254; emphasis added)

This demonstrates that Streit undeniably is convinced that the control the United States could have over other nations is not only a possibility for him, but it actually is a *necessity*. In his opinion, the U.S. is the only nation that could win an either cold or hot war against Russia and, thus, it has to make decisions which other nations need to follow. In other words, the U.S. has to *control* the other nations' decisions. This applies equally or even more to the Union as this new polity would be more powerful and has a bigger chance of defeating Soviet Russia than any other state or combination of states in the world. Thus, the representation and actions of other, non-communist, nations would be controlled in a top-down way on the international level.

Finally, Streit argues in 1961 that the founding of the Union would have no effect on the voting power of the members in the United Nations, but the "Union government would decide how all these votes would be cast" (*Freedom's Frontier* 144). Although he never specifies how this would work, it can be assumed that the Union government would make a decision and all the Union nations then would have to stick to it – whether they agreed to it or not.⁵¹¹ On the one hand, this could surely make decisions in the United Nations easier as fewer opinions have to be discussed. However, this regulation additionally would secure that the Union nations speak with one voice to the outside, which means that the representations of opinions of the single member nations could be controlled by the Union in a top-down approach as well. This might cause problems if people felt that this produced a democratic deficit. After all, although all citizens in the Union theoretically would have a fairly equal vote and could influence politics of the whole system, the United Nations still

⁵¹¹Streit assumes that the United Nations does allow regional associations and that the founding of the Union and a continued representation of its members in the United Nations would be legal without changing the rules of the United Nations (*UN49* 303; *Freedom's Frontier* 143-44). He explains that the Union would inherit "all the voting and veto power its members now have in the League" (*UN39* 113), a regulation which later apparently should apply to the United Nations. Thus, it has to be assumed that there would be no extra seat in the U.N. for the Union of the Free, but that its members would retain their original seat and voice. The only change would be that they would have to cast their votes unanimously according to the decisions the Union government. All in all, it is very important to Streit that 'his' Union would indeed be a part of the U.N., which is why this is also repeated in his own writings and those in *Freedom & Union: UN49* 285; *Freedom's Frontier* 142; Hartley, "Why Atlantic Union?" 6.

is an organization based on nation states with the rule of “one state, one vote”. If people in one Union state as a majority actually voted against a decision but were overruled by the rest of the Union population, they would not even have the possibility to address their point in the United Nations because their state would have to consent to the Union’s decision there as well. For that reason, the Union would control representation in outside nations of the world by influencing the governing elites of the respective societies, but it would also control the representation of its own members on the international level.

As has been mentioned before, it is important to Streit which nations in the world become founding members of the Union. As they should be highly experienced in democracy and strong in many other ways (see chapter 6.4), their power should be preserved. By becoming a founding member of the Union, they could also control the rest of the world, but this would be legitimized by their experience and high standard (C. K. Streit, “To Unite Federalists” 3). In other words, they do not only know from experience what is best for *themselves* but also for the rest of the world. However, Streit is extremely careful that the English-speaking peoples, most of all the United States, have the strongest representation in the Union. This is secured by them representing the majority of states and people at the constitutive convention of the Union, something which is partly still the case after the change of the founding members to the NATO nations, since the English-speaking nations still have most of the inhabitants.⁵¹² The consequence of this is that *within* the Union, the English-speaking nations or only the United States could determine most of the policies because the representation of others is strictly controlled and any strengthening of it can be vetoed by either the U.S. or the English-speaking nations together.

Strong Economic and Military Power

As has been shown in detail in chapter 6.4, the Union would have an overwhelming power position in the world, which is a vital aspect to Streit. What he does not explicitly say, however, is that this power position of the Union would further

⁵¹²This very tactic is also defended by Livingston Hartley in *Freedom & Union* in 1952 when he muses on the transformation of the North Atlantic Council into the Union constitutive session (“NATO: Another Possible Way to Union?” 29).

strengthen the power of mainly those states, which were imperial powers in the past. After the founding of the new polity, this power would have grown so enormously that “no outside country could withstand the bargaining power of this rich market” (*UN39* 163) or would “dare attack” (“Freedom’s Answer to Sputnik” 1) the Union because of its huge economic and military might. This would result in the fact that the former colonies would have to continue to work for the former imperial powers as their suppliers because the Union would become

the only important market for all other nations. It would be their *best buyer* of raw materials and their *sole source of supply for many manufactured goods*. They could not sell their products to Soviet Russia, not buy what they need from her, nor transport much to or from her. The Union would have to blunder badly to lose any of these nations to the Kremlin. (*Freedom Against Itself* 306; emphasis added)

This quotation explicitly shows that what Streit indeed intends is for the Union to become the biggest power in the world and to make all other nations ultimately dependent on it.⁵¹³ This notion is not even weakened by the claim that there would only be “mutually advantageous trade” (*Freedom’s Frontier* 161). As the Union would be definitely the more powerful economic might, it could decide for itself whether it would trade with weaker economies and would not be dependent on every single one of them. The weaker economies, on the other hand, would have to adapt to the Union’s demands to benefit at least a bit from this unequal relationship. Hence, if this goal had been achieved and the Union had been founded, the former colonies of the Union nations would have had to remain in the economically inferior position and would have severe difficulties boosting their economy or becoming equals with their former mother countries – even more than they have today.

Collaboration with Organic Intellectuals and Soft Power

It is unclear whether Streit deliberately wants to cooperate with organic intellectuals in non-member states of the Union. However, what he wants to do is to present the Union in the whole world as a ‘shining example’ of how prosperous, free, and democratic life in such a political system can be. This requires a certain collaboration with at least the press of other parts of the world, which would inform the

⁵¹³*Freedom & Union* also celebrates the circumstance that the Union would form a market of 400 million people and that, therefore, an inclusion into this market by other nations cannot be avoided (O. J. Roberts, “Practical Way to Peace” 23).

broad population on the Union. However, it can be assumed that the cultural elites of other nations either have contact to their counterparts in the Union or they read and hear more about the Union out of personal interest. These elements of a society could then inform the rest because they very often are multipliers of ideas and can shape the discursive regime in their societies. This means that even though Streit does not strategically plan a collaboration with the organic intellectuals of other nations, it may well be that they still have knowledge of the Union. However, without direct collaboration, it cannot be controlled if they consider the founding of the Union as a positive or negative development.

Streit wants to shape the thoughts, feelings, and desires of the people outside of the Union in a way that they see the Union (and its western or Atlantic culture) as better, stronger, and desirable in comparison to their own culture.⁵¹⁴ This means that he actively wants to strengthen the Union's soft power. However, as Streit always argues that all nations, which would not be included at the beginning, would naturally understand that they were not fit enough yet, he overlooks the fact that this can be (and actually was) interpreted as arrogant. If this is the case, "attraction can turn into repulsion [...] and destroy the real message" (Nye, *Soft Power* x). As Rosika Schwimmer from the Campaign for World Government and several journalists of the time criticized exactly this fact (Schwimmer 4-5; Doenecke 47), it is highly probable that people from other parts of the world had the same opinion. Yet, Streit's hope, of course, is that people in other parts of the world – especially those parts with non-free governments – are so fascinated by the Union and its allegedly universal values that they would start a revolution to overthrow the oppressors in their own nations in order to further their chances of becoming a member of the Union one day (*UN41* 87; *Freedom's Frontier* 162-64, see also p. 223 here).⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁴He is convinced that the Union members would want to live up to western ideals anyway, which shows that he only accepted the notions of the Atlantic discourse he himself helped to construct. The fact that they come from different nations and cultures that might not agree on everything does not bother him, for the Union and this diversity would bring "added strength to protect the rights of the members by this very lack of homogeneity and centralization" (*UN39* 182).

⁵¹⁵Livingston Hartley confirms this view in one of his articles in *Freedom & Union* when he claims that the Union would have some kind of magnetic attraction to other nations and they would "hasten to establish the free institutions necessary for membership" ("Why Atlantic Union?" 8).

Summary

In the end, all the predefined elements of imperialism are fulfilled in Streit's writings and his way of thinking: The relationship between the Union's founding nations and the rest of the world was shaped by a huge inequality and what Streit wanted was to maintain and strengthen this position of the Union for the future. This inequality was also justified by his firm belief in the allegedly superiority of the Union members, the Union's principles, political system, and culture, which is also clearly depicted in his language. Furthermore, the superior Union members seem to have a legitimate sense of mission to 'redeem' the world in his opinion. This would also allow the Union nations – in particular the United States – to control the representation of opinions both on the national as well as on the international level. The result would be that the ideals of Union – which are basically those of the United States – would remain decisive in all aspects of national and international politics and culture. Furthermore, the Union would control the representation even outside its own territory and the communication within its own polity. Additionally, the military and economic power of the Union would be so enormous that there would be no possibility to avoid its influence in the world. This would once more strengthen and preserve its position for the future. Finally, Streit's intention indeed was to make the Union attractive to all nations in the world so that they would want to become a member of it and would also follow its lead – if only for fear of being left behind. Accordingly, it is highly doubtful whether other nations would *choose* to work alongside the Union or if this relationship was only voluntary for one side.

Streit's Union of the Free then would be a continuation of the power relations of the age of classical imperialism. As the arguments, the language, and the results of Streit's imperial ideology are very similar or sometimes nearly the same as those of classical imperialism, it can be stated that there indeed was no clear break in the mode of thinking between the age of imperialism and the time afterwards but obviously this narrative element was continued in the Atlantic discourse. In her analysis of 19th century utopian literature, Matarese comes to the same conclusion that the ideas of the late 19th century are still very much alive a century later (Matarese chapter 5). Thus, my conclusion is not too surprising. Streit did or

could not see the possibility of others not agreeing with him and his principles since he was a subject of the Atlantic discourse. This means that he lived by the core assumptions which the corresponding regime of truth produced. If he is portrayed in a positive way, one could say that he was quite naive and too idealistic: He was so convinced of his proposal that he did not reflect on how others could disagree with him. A harsher assessment could be that he was a white supremacist who did not even notice it but hid behind his allegedly great ideals. It is up to the reader to decide on which end of those two poles Streit can be pinned down, but this analysis clearly points in one direction.

9 Conclusions

9.1 Comparative Analysis of Phases I and II

In comparison, the arguments of the contributors of phase I (chapter 3) and phase II (chapter 6) seemingly share a great likeness which proves that the Anglo-Saxon and the Atlantic discourses are closely connected. The following chapter juxtaposes the similarities and differences between the different proposals and ideas in their respective contexts. Since the arguments on both sides of the Atlantic are so closely related, the *translatio imperii* from Britain to the United States, which had taken place, in the meantime, does not play an important part, but they further emphasize that this way of thinking did not only exist in one of these two big nations. Furthermore, the perception and development of some fundamental elements of the discourses are examined. Whenever the arguments appear different, I will look at whether they are completely new or whether they only developed in another direction over the years but essentially remained the same.

What has to be kept in mind are the circumstances in which the contributors were living in order to understand their way of thinking. Even if this might seem different at first sight, certain elements still were quite similar. At the end of the 19th and the turn of the 20th centuries, the political and social setting changed quite a bit: New technologies, which had actually been invented long before, affected people's lives and, consequently, shaped their imagination. Distances seemed much

smaller because even very faraway regions could be reached much more quickly, and keeping in touch with other people was facilitated. In the time Streit lived, these inventions were no longer new, but communications across large distances still sped up because, for example, airplanes had been invented and were also used for other purposes than for war since the end of the 1920s. Additionally, the network of telegraph cables was expanded ever further. Therefore, Streit must have had the same impressions as the generations before him: Distances became more and more irrelevant, the entire world seemed to be living in the same time frame, and could communicate this with each other nearly instantly. Following Benedict Anderson, this made the imagination and creation of larger communities much easier (24) and, thus, the possibility to govern them altogether in *one* political system was considered feasible.

However, these developments did not only increase the perception of possibilities but also of perils. Naturally, if friends were closer, enemies were, too. Accordingly, the pace and scale of dangers increased. Hence, the maintenance or creation of an ever-lasting peace was a topic all of the contributors dealt with. They also regarded the founding of ever larger polities as the best chance to either enforce peace or prevent war from breaking out – which is in alignment with the empire peace thesis, partly even with the democratic empire thesis (see p. 33 here). As the contributors were convinced of the superiority of their ‘own’ political system, a blueprint for a lasting peace in the world was created along a political system that belonged to Anglo-Saxon political theory in the widest sense. Especially the federal system in the United States was regarded as better than any other existing or possible system in the world and, thus, the notion was constructed that it could be the *only* feasible system that could create lasting peace. Yet, opposing opinions on this point were not reflected; on the contrary, the firm belief in this kind of system was taken for granted among English-speaking peoples which indicates that the Anglo-Saxon and Atlantic discourses were highly persuasive. After all, the federal system was time-tested in the United States by the end of the 19th century and the contributors were convinced of its stability and suitability for tackling the world’s problems. All of them also wanted the rest of the world to adapt to the federal sys-

tem but were not willing to adapt themselves to any other political system because 'theirs' was considered superior to any other.

What the contributors agreed on was that perception that something needed to change. However, Streit's desire to bring about a new system derived from the frustration with the international political system, most of all with the inefficiency of the League of Nations, which he experienced first-hand. The situation 30-50 years earlier was a bit different. Although the contributors in phase I also wanted to change the structure of international politics, they were not *frustrated* with any kind of incapability of the international political system but appeared more hopeful. After all, they were content with the existence of a *Pax Britannica* that could be strengthened by including the United States. Nevertheless, had they been fully *satisfied* with the situation as it was, they would not have wanted to change it. However, frustration or dissatisfaction was not the only driving force behind the new ideas in both phases, but some kind of fear also played an important part. In phase I it was the fear that the British Empire might disintegrate or that the English-speaking peoples would one day no longer be as powerful as they were at the time. The main cause of these anxieties was the rise of other powers, like the United States (as rival to the British Empire), Russia, and Germany. In phase II, Streit putatively argued that it was the whole western, free world that might lose its status. Yet in the end, he mainly wanted to secure the power position of the Anglo-American nations against strong new competitors, like the Soviet Union and the 'Third Reich'. So, the fear all of the contributors in essence was very much the same.

What all of the contributors also had in common is a certain significance and status within their societies which made them part of apparatuses that could theoretically shape the respective discursive regime. Despite the fact that not all of them had a high formal education, they reached a position which allowed them to contribute to the establishment of new truths. Chamberlain, Rhodes, and Carnegie were respected and listened to because of their economic success, the former two also because of their political posts. Curtis and Kerr could shape politics in the highest circles as well, but there is something else they shared with Stead and Streit: their

journalistic work. Hence, all of them were multipliers of ideas in their own ways and theoretically could reach a lot of influential people, who in turn could realize their projects. So, many of the prerequisites for changing the existing regime of truth actually were met from the perspective of the contributors' personal status.

As the scope of the proposed polities together with the imagined community that needed to be constructed clearly widened from phase I to phase II, it might be expected that the intended audiences became broader. The contributors of the first phase sought to influence people across the Anglo-world. This is natural, given their intention to create an English-speaking unification, so they only had to address this target group. Starting with Stead, the theoretical goal was to integrate the whole world in this polity. This did not translate into trying to reach people in other parts of the world than English-speaking ones, since the first step in this procedure should only encompass the English-speaking world. Clarence Streit clearly changed this. Set aside that the core of the Atlantic Union would have been the English-speaking nations, he wanted to get to people in more, if not all, parts of the world. This is reflected by the very early translation of *Union Now* to French, Swedish, and allegedly German (see footnote 172). Although it is unclear how influential these books really were in the nations they were sold in (Baratta, *World Federation I* 84-85), it has to be noted that the *attempt* to reach a readership of other language groups was made. The same can be said about *Freedom & Union*, which supposedly was sold in 51 nations around the world (*UN49* 267). Although the number cannot be proved, it still shows that Streit wanted to gain a much larger audience than the contributors of phase I.

The preselection of contributors for this study was limited to thinkers who wanted to realize a unification Britain and the United States in some form. What is interesting, though, is that the perception of the necessity of incorporating the United States in the future political order changed: Chamberlain merely regarded the U.S. as 'addition' to the Empire that was not as important as a reform of the Empire as such. For Rhodes, the Empire still played the major part, but he reached the conclusion that the U.S. needed to be included into the polity. Stead, however, was the first of the contributors to realize the United States as the indispensable

part of a future world order. Even though Curtis in *Civitas Dei* again proposed a new polity *without* the inclusion of the United States from the start, the United States still was regarded as vital and should be included as soon as possible. As Clarence Streit was an American himself, it is not surprising at all that he wanted to incorporate the U.S. in any future world order. Furthermore, the U.S. was a much stronger power in comparison to all the other powers by the 1930s than at the turn of the 20th century, so any restructuring of the world would necessarily have to include it. Yet, despite the fact that all seven contributors in the end wanted to firmly *establish* an English-speaking hegemony in the world, the tendency to *confirm* this decreased over time. The contributors before Curtis and Kerr openly admitted that an English-speaking polity should be the center of any future international political order. Curtis and Kerr were the first ones who wanted to realize an Anglo-American control over the world *within* the League of Nations, which means that the rest of the world would have been included in the decision-making, at least theoretically. The idea that an Anglo-American unification should be able to dictate the terms of international policy could actually no longer be admitted. One good example of this is Streit, who strongly defended himself against any such claims.

The political system of the United States was ever more perceived as the model for any kind of restructuring of world politics. Chamberlain only wanted to realize a federation in the world and did not specify whether the U.S. was the model for this, but already Rhodes changed his opinion on that, if Stead's account can be believed. After him, the federal political system of the United States was constructed as the ideal form of government by the contributors. This included the idea that all the constituent parts of the federation needed to be federations and/or democracies themselves in order to stabilize the whole polity. This is a notion which started with Stead but never lost topicality after that. There might be various reasons for this changed assessment. The most important ones probably are that the federation in the United States had proven that a peaceful governing of large areas was possible. Additionally, the United States was the strongest of the world's powers in many aspects at the latest after World War I, it was economically successful and democracy was realized fairly well. Thus, if its system was imitated, similar future success was

expected.

Whether the contributors wanted to realize a world state or not,⁵¹⁶ however, did not change one of the most basic assumptions: The first nations to be united – be it in order to enhance the own power position or as a nucleus of a world state – needed to have certain common characteristics. These changed a bit over time, but if they are analyzed closely, they are very similar in both phases of this study. In the following, they will be compared with one another along the Streit’s arguments to show which of them remained or changed over time.

Freedom was the first of the values all the founding nations of Streit’s Atlantic Union needed to represent. Given that he came from the United States that calls itself the “land of the free” even in its national anthem, this is hardly surprising. However, the topic also played an important role for some of the British contributors, mostly for Chamberlain, Rhodes, Curtis, and Kerr. According to them, the love of freedom was deeply ingrained in the English-speaking ‘race’ or people and would definitely be secured in the future if it was united. Hence, this notion is an important element of both discourses they constructed. Nevertheless, whereas freedom needed to be realized in the constituent elements *before* the unification for Streit, it was regarded as the *result* of the unification in the first phase. Thus, the importance of it as basis of a political order increased.

A similar development can be observed for democracy. Once more, its realization as precondition for the creation of a federation was not as important in phase I as in phase II, although Stead and all the contributors after him regarded the democratization – which is also part of Stead’s idea of Americanization – as a positive development that should be supported. Stead and Carnegie were also convinced that the United States already lived up to the ideal of democracy so that it could guide the rest of the English-speaking world in the ‘right’ direction. Already Curtis and Kerr considered the *all* of the English-speaking peoples as democratically governed. Hence, it was a precondition that actually did not need to be stressed as strongly, since it had already been fulfilled. Consequently, all the English-speaking peoples should educate others to become democratic themselves – a task that no longer only was confined to the United States. The justification for this process

⁵¹⁶The idea of a world state first was uttered among the contributors by W.T. Stead.

remained the same from the beginning and it is a reflection of the discursive regime the contributors were subjects of: As the English-speaking peoples had such a long working-experience with democracy, were especially able to govern themselves and others democratically, *and* had superior institutions, they rightfully could obtain the challenge to ‘enlighten’ others and bring democracy to the rest of the world. Yet, democracy was narrowly defined by all contributors as the realization of the idea along the Anglo-Saxon political tradition.

Since the Anglo-Saxon political institutions were considered the perfect form of democracy *and* these very nations should also take over the leadership in the world, Anglo-Americans claimed for themselves to speak for the whole western world, so that ‘western’ in large parts became a synonym of ‘Anglo-American’. Thus, the ‘westernization’ of the whole world meant the same as ‘Anglo-Americanization’ of the world, although it was concealed in an *Atlantic* discursive regime in phase II. Curtis, Kerr, and Streit argued that this was the only way to realize the rule of law on an international level. In contrast to the contributors before them, they had experienced World War I, so it is not surprising that this aim gained importance. Once more, it has to be stressed that all three of them uncritically accepted the notion of the superiority of the western form of democracy and they did not approve of other ways of achieving an international rule of law since it did not fit the discursive regime they constructed. These three also identified unrestricted national sovereignty as one of the main causes of international conflicts, which is why they wanted to abolish it. As the United States Constitution was their model for a world state that would make any of the existing nation states one constituent state of the larger Union, they were convinced that this aim could be accomplished at the same time. Yet, they did not reflect upon the fact that just because nation states would give parts of their sovereignty to a higher level, this would not automatically result in an abolition of conflicts and the resolving of those with peaceful means along the rule of law.

Since the goal of all of their unifications was peace, either among the English-speaking peoples or in the whole world, one could assume that the constituent element all needed to be defined as peaceful. However, this was not the understanding

all the contributors shared. Chamberlain wanted to establish a loose cooperation between the British Empire and the United States in order to reduce friction among them. This means that he must have seen reasons for conflicts that need not always be resolved peacefully. Rhodes' suggestion to start a commercial war with the U.S. in order to force it into a federation with Britain does not speak for the Empire as a peaceful power, either. However, it tells something else as well: Rhodes – like in fact all the contributors after him – was totally convinced that the system he envisioned was the *only* possibility to bring a lasting peace to the world because the Anglo-Saxon regime of truth did not accept other ways of thinking. Consequently, it seemed logical to Rhodes and the other contributors after him that the rest of the world needed to submit to this system and might also be forced to do so. Carnegie, Kerr and Streit exemplify this particularly strongly: The former two openly admit that once several great powers are established in the world, they could enforce peace by imposing sanctions on others as soon as they would not adapt to the new peace order. Additionally, those four to five big powers should build up a police force for the entire world, probably also to keep the rest of the world 'in line'. So, they were convinced of the inter-imperial variant of the empire peace thesis. Although Streit followed hegemonic imperial arguments, his idea still was similar: He also wanted to enforce peace by keeping the rest of the world dependent on one great Union so that no other nation would dare attack it. Thus, the alleged 'peacefulness' of the nations can also be reinterpreted as plain power. Hence, although it might sound differently in particular in Streit's case, peace would not be the precondition but most of all the result of the creation of any kind of unification of the English-speaking peoples. Nevertheless, in the understanding of all of the contributors, their own nation was not aggressive – meaning peaceful – and would only resort to stricter measures if it was attacked in any way.

As power was so important to the establishment of peace in the world, having powerful constituents of the federation was vital to all the contributors. As already mentioned, the United States became ever stronger in phase I and, consequently, was also ever more regarded as the leading part of the English-speaking world.

Chamberlain was the last of the contributors who did not admit this,⁵¹⁷ but already Rhodes concluded that, despite the fact that he considered the British Empire as more important, the United States was taking over the lead of the English-speaking world. This was not questioned in the 20th century any more. Even if Lionel Curtis did not include the United States *right away* in his nucleus for a world state in *Civitas Dei*, he was convinced that it was the strongest power in the world and needed to be included eventually.

Additionally, all of the contributors were confident that an English-speaking federation could lead, if not dominate, the rest of the world. This reflects the truths in which they believed and which were the product of the regime of truth of the Atlantic discourse. However, once more, there is a difference between both phases. In phase I, this circumstance seemed very obvious to all of the contributors. Chamberlain did not even mention it directly but was totally convinced of the superior power of the British Empire. The following contributors all addressed it explicitly. In phase II, Clarence Streit took great pains to argue that a domination of the world by the English-speaking peoples would *not* be the case, although he repeatedly stressed that they would be the strongest nations within the Atlantic Union. Considering the fact that he claims this early on in *Union Now* and that his proposal still was criticized for it repeatedly, he must have seen that an English-speaking domination of the world would in fact have been the result of the founding of the Union and that the criticism, thus, was not unsubstantiated. Thus, the change of arguments from phase I to phase II shows that the ‘natural’ domination of the world by the English-speaking peoples was no longer commonly accepted in the rest of the world.

Although any member of any federation of the English-speaking peoples should be defined as powerful, what power was defined as altered over time. The first aspect of power that Streit stressed was population and area. This seemed to be immensely important to him but was no topic in phase I, except for Rhodes’ slight remark that the world would benefit from ever more Anglo-Saxons across the world. Apparently, the understanding that a wider scattered area across the world as well as large pop-

⁵¹⁷Chamberlain only envisioned a loose cooperation between the Empire and the United States on equal terms or an admission of the United States to the British Empire as element of secondary importance.

ulation could be an asset, only started to play a major role towards the middle of the 20th century. It can only be guessed whether this has something to do with the experience of World War I, when many more soldiers than ever before had to fight and died, and different military bases across the whole world were strategically used at the same time. If this experience really was the reason why population and area were so important to Streit, it remains unclear why Curtis and Kerr did not regard this question as important in the same way Streit did.

In terms of production, raw materials, trading and military power, the contributors' arguments of phase I also differ significantly from Streit's. To the former, a comparatively stronger position in these fields would be the result of a unification or agreement between the constituent parts but was no necessary condition for an admission to the new polity. Once the parts were federated, the initial power of each constituent would not matter any more. So, although the contributors might have been convinced that both Britain, the British Empire as a whole, and the USA were strong in these respects, they considered a unification of them as the only possibility to improve this position. Streit argued a bit differently. Even if the strengthening of the overall position of the Union nations certainly was the main goal, he did not want to admit nations that were weak in these aspects in the first place. One possible reason for this might be that the threat by *rival* powers, like the 'Third Reich' or the Soviet Union, was perceived as more dangerous than the rival powers of the end of the 19th century. Additionally, the Britons in the 19th century wanted to unite with one of the powers – the United States – that *presented* a threat to their own nation (not in the case of Carnegie, though, since he saw himself as both Scottish and American). Therefore, the British Empire would benefit from a unification with another powerful entity and would not necessarily have to be as strong itself in all respects beforehand.

The last aspect of power Streit dealt with was moral power. To him, this was one of the essential preconditions for the Union members, since it justified the whole endeavor. Interestingly enough, this is an idea Chamberlain also had had in the 19th century. He considered the 'English-speaking race' as the best one from a moral point of view and, thus, it needed to be strengthened. This argument could

be used to legitimize the ever closer collaboration of both the whole British Empire and the United States. However, this reasoning was not repeated by the other contributors of phase I, but they mainly focused on the *effect* on the moral power by the federation. All of them agreed that an English-speaking federation would become *the* most important moral authority in the world that could mediate or arbitrate between different conflicting parties around the world. This would in essence be the same role Britain had claimed for itself in the 19th century when the so-called *Pax Britannica*, a global hegemony of the British Empire, was realized. Yet, the Empire more and more had to give up this position due to internal weaknesses and the rise of at least equally strong powers. Thus, the contributors of phase I all realized that this status could not be upheld in the future if no structural change in the Empire was enforced. Hence, it is hardly likely that they could claim enough moral power for Britain before any closer cooperation with the United States had come about because the Empire had mostly lost its hegemonic position. As it had become clear by the 1930s that no peace order could be enforced without the consent of the U.S. as ‘global policeman’, it would seem illogical for Streit to include other powers in the Union without at least a certain degree of what he defined as ‘moral power’. If this were the case, the position of the United States and its moral justification for its hegemony in the world, that also derives from its own Manifest Destiny, would have been weakened.

Finally, the ties which connected the English-speaking peoples in the opinion of the contributors, can be categorized in the same way, but in most cases, there is a difference between the importance of the argument or the *way* it was argued. Streit’s first category in this field, the geographical *connection* by the ocean, was considered completely irrelevant in the first phase. In fact, Carnegie even actively excluded Australia and New Zealand from his proposal of a federation because they were geographically too far away and could only be included later on.⁵¹⁸ Apparently, technologies did not shrink the world enough in the 19th century for Carnegie. Clearly, the further technological advance had changed this for Streit, since wide geographical distance was no obstacle for him. What is interesting, however, is that

⁵¹⁸Curtis included Australia and New Zealand in his proposal in *Civitas Dei* but did base his argument on the fact that they were closely connected to Britain by the ocean.

Streit still talks about the connection of the *ocean* rather than about flight distances. In the 1930s, planes were already in use and could decrease the traveling time considerably in comparison to earlier eras, but the distances and time it took to cross the oceans by ship was not reduced in the same way between the two phases. So, despite the fact that Carnegie and Streit's estimation of the distances mostly relied on comparatively the same travel time, they had the exact opposite assessment of it. An explanation for this can only be guessed, but it might have something to do with the fact that Streit spent a long time in Geneva and Basle to report on the League of Nations and could experience that a collaboration between many states across the world was indeed possible in such a forum without distances playing an important part. Hence, Streit was the first of the contributors who could imagine the ocean as a connecting tie rather than a separating obstacle.

All of the contributors used the argument of a common 'race' of the English-speaking peoples. However, in phase I, the usage of the term "race" was considered much less problematic. Since Social Darwinist theories were accepted much less critically at the end of the 19th century, the contributors of the first phase could expect the argument of 'race' to be understood and approved of by their audiences without much scrutiny. However, already Carnegie preferred the term "English-speaking peoples" to "Anglo-Saxon race" (Bell, *Dreamworlds* 34), which represents the change of thinking at the time. At the latest with the Nazis' rise to power and their crude realization of their racist ideologies, scientific racism was no longer accepted and could hardly be broadly advocated any more. Nevertheless, Streit claimed that the fifteen founding nations derived from the "same dominant Teutonic-Celtic Stock" (*UN39* 90) and they were "divided practically into only two racial stocks" (106). Although his further explanation of this tie mainly focuses on aspects of culture, this statement clearly shows how deeply he had ingrained racist thinking and how he still continued to construct this discursive element of a common 'race' even in the 20th century. Like the contributors of phase I, Streit was convinced that the 'Anglo-Saxon race' represented the first rank of civilization that had to govern the rest of the world for its own benefit.⁵¹⁹ So, although Social Darwinism was no longer

⁵¹⁹Nominally, Streit claimed this for all of the western, democratic, and white nations, but, in the end, all of them were led by the English-speaking ones and had to adapt to the Anglo-Saxon

en vogue by the 1930s, white supremacy, which is an ‘offshoot’ of this constructed theory, still seemed to be commonly accepted and uttered uncritically by many. This indicates that the Atlantic discursive regime obviously still included this discursive element.⁵²⁰

Yet, these results show something else as well: Especially the United States, but also other parts of the English-speaking world do not have a white population only. However, the non-white people evidently did not play any role at all in the estimation of a nation’s ‘color’ for any of the contributors. This means that they were not regarded as ‘proper citizens’ or even ‘proper people’ at the time because they were argumentatively treated as if they did not exist. Curtis’ idea that non-whites can be ‘educated’ in order to become a member of the ‘British race’ (Gorman, *Imperial Citizenship* 50) basically shows the same idea: Other ‘races’ or people are not of the same status and either need help to obtain this ‘higher rank’ or they can be disregarded completely. The fact that Streit in the 1930s and beyond still used the same arguments despite the criticism of racist beliefs, indicates that this conviction had not changed at all from phase I to phase II. Since racial segregation in the United States at the time still was legal and accepted by large parts of the white U.S. population, Streit probably perceived himself to think ‘normally’ and apparently the idea of a hierarchy between several ‘races’ still was part of the discursive regime at the time. However, this makes his argument no less racist from today’s perspective.

Nevertheless, Streit must have noticed that the use of arguments focusing on ‘race’ had become more problematic by the end of the 1930s because he more focused on cultural aspects of this bond – despite the fact that these still can mostly be traced back to the question of ‘race’ in the case of Streit. What he described as Atlantic or western culture is just a blurry term for what he perceived as white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture like he experienced it in the eastern United States. Streit assumes that through the bonds that hold the Atlantic culture together, this U.S.-dominated idea of culture binds all the rest of the world. So, he neither distin-

political system. This is the reason why the other founders of the Union do not play a part here.
⁵²⁰It has to be mentioned, though, that this was one of the major points of criticism on Streit’s theory right after his books were published.

guishes between different 'races' in the U.S. itself nor between different regions of both the United States and the world. They might have similar ideals like liberalism and democracy, and a set of values shaped by Christianity, but this does not necessarily result in a common, uniform Atlantic culture without any deviations. Yet, Streit did not reflect on this but assumed the whole Atlantic culture to be basically the same as eastern U.S.-American culture. Still, despite the fact that Streit's arguments are not clear-cut in this respect, he much more stressed the aspect of culture than the contributors of phase I.

The aspects of culture Streit mostly concentrated on were religion and values, language, and history. Probably because these three aspects are more tangible, at least some of them had already been mentioned by the contributors of phase I next to the bond of 'race'. Chamberlain, Stead, Carnegie, and Kerr clearly state that to them, Protestant nations were more successful and, not coincidentally, all English-speaking nations were regarded as Protestant. This idea partly was taken up by Streit, but he widened it a bit more and included Christian – Protestant and Catholic – nations as such in his Union. In theory, this could expand the imagined community to include all the nations that should become members of the Union. However, it was important to him that the English-speaking ones were Protestant. Starting with Carnegie, the argument that common values are essential to an English-speaking unity is mentioned repeatedly. As the values of a people are closely connected to its religious origins, however, the argument is very similar. All in all, the focus on common values increased the perception of an imagined community of the English-speaking peoples across the world. As these parts of the world should be politically federated, this imagined community could become an important element that might make people support the federation from a cultural point of view. Thus, the tactic – if it was a tactic that was actively pursued – was the same in both phases.

Language and a common history did not play as much a part in the discussions of phase I as in phase II. If language was a topic at all around the turn of the 20th century, common Anglo-American literature mostly was mentioned, which indeed is an essential part of the language. Streit, on the other hand, more stressed

the common language of the English-speaking peoples as such to show that they were connected. In terms of history, the development is the same. The main reason for this might be the following: The contributors of phase I only wanted to unite English-speaking peoples of the British Empire and the United States, so the fact that they had a common language and history was so obvious that it would have been redundant to mention it. Streit, though, argued why the English-speaking peoples fit together particularly well in comparison to any other group of people in the world. Thus, although the argument is obvious that they speak the same language and have a common history, it was stressed repeatedly and compared to the other parts of the world. Additionally, the English-speaking world no longer was as connected in phase II as it had been in phase I, so the stress on the common language and history can also be interpreted as a reminder why they were so closely related.

All in all, there are quite a few arguments and ideas that had already been part of 19th century Anglo-Saxonism and were transferred to Atlanticism in the following century. The most interesting ones, however, are those which evolved in some way, such as the idea of a superiority of the 'Anglo-Saxon race'. Its existence was common sense in the English-speaking world in the 19th but no longer as much in the 20th century. Yet, the *results* of this understanding for the course of politics did not change considerably, since the English-speaking peoples still mostly ruled the world. This is closely related to the idea of a sense of mission or of the American Manifest Destiny and who this notion referred to. All of the contributors of phase I were convinced of the superiority of the 'English-speaking race', and, consequently, most of them ascribed a sense of mission to the 'English-speaking race'.⁵²¹ This 'race' should bring 'civilization' to 'backward peoples' around the world and train them for self-government. Furthermore, it wanted to take the values of liberty and democracy to all other parts of the world to make them benefit from this superior, Anglo-Saxon political system. The same idea persisted in Streit's era, yet in a somewhat weaker form. Whereas the contributors of phase I wanted to expand those 'blessings' to the rest of the world by force if necessary, Streit favored the approach of an indirect intervention. The simple reason is that imperialism, understood as

⁵²¹The slight 'exceptions' were Chamberlain and Stead, who remained inconclusive in this aspect.

willful intervention into the sovereignty of another people, was not necessarily regarded as negative in the 19th century. Yet, this changed in the 20th century. The development can already be seen in the writings of Stead and Carnegie, who tried to find a weaker form of imperialism and rejected “blatant jingoism” (“Stead, ‘English-Speaking Folk’” 17). Nevertheless, they, but also the Curtis and Kerr later on, still called themselves imperialists. By the 1930s imperialism could no longer be openly supported and Streit tried to counter the accusations of being an imperialist. The fact that he was so severely criticized and subsequently never stopped apologizing for his proposal of *Union Now With Britain* is an indicator of this development. Still, he had the same goal of an Anglo-American or English-speaking dominance in the world and the ‘education’ of the ‘uncivilized’ peoples in the world on Anglo-Saxon values so that it can be concluded that this still played an important role in the Atlantic discourse. Because of the change in perception of imperialism, I argue that Streit *had* to resolve to more indirect methods that today would probably be called informal imperialism or soft power. He wanted the Union to have such a magnetic attraction to the rest of the world that it would be drawn towards the Union ‘automatically’ without direct forceful intervention of the Union powers. Still, the outcome would be the same: a world order shaped by the English-speaking powers to which the rest of the world had to adapt.

The second group the sense of mission of the English-speaking peoples addressed was the other white nations in the world. In phase I, the British did not only shape politics in large parts of the non-white world but also could determine the politics of the white parts of the world. Without Britain’s support, the European balance of power could not be upheld, since the British Empire was the most powerful state in the world at the time. At the latest by World War I, the Americans had inherited this position from their former mother country. Especially after World War II, the United States can be considered at least equally successful in shaping politics in the most other parts of the world because the other democracies followed and looked up to it for guidance. Even after the end of the Cold War, it remained the single superpower in the world and has only recently been challenged by China. Hence, the sense of mission towards the rest of the white or ‘civilized’ world was

transferred from Britain to the United States but it remained part of the overall Atlantic discourse. Once more, this development can be observed in the writings of the early 20th century but it is particularly obvious in the case of Clarence Streit's books. He clearly stated that the U.S. needed to take the leadership of the whole world, including the nations that Streit already defined as 'civilized'.

Another development that happened in the same period was the increasing constitutionalization of both international relations as well as the number of fields for international cooperation. Especially Chamberlain and Curtis did not regard a rigid framework to define the relations between Britain and the U.S. as necessary. Yet, both of them only wanted a cooperation between both nations in specific fields, like the economy or defense. Over time, however, the proposals for a collaboration among the English-speaking peoples included ever more fields of government, which, in turn, made a stricter regulatory framework necessary. Above all, Streit's fascination with the idea of the Union and his disappointment about any less binding treaties and agreements show his frustration with all the broken agreements of the inter-war years. This development might also owe to the perception that more serious and numerous threats endangered the world. This included new powerful weapons and new strong opponents like the Soviet Union or the 'Third Reich'. Accordingly, all the contributors seemed to realize over time that if the (English-speaking) world was made ever more interdependent and bound to treaties that were obliged, such dangers might become minimized: A new common polity would become stronger in many fields of government. Furthermore, the higher the degree of interdependence, the less likely any part of the polity would be attacked, since any integrated part would hurt itself in such a way. Consequently, more fields of government and more states were included plans for a new and constitutionalized international order.

Another development that can be observed concerns the target audience. The *circle* of people all the contributors mainly approached were the elites, particularly the political and educational ones. This was necessary in order to further construct the respective discursive regime. The fact that the contributors all chose similar groups of addressees speaks for the applicability of Foucault's theory of regimes of

truth. Granted, Chamberlain gave many public speeches and attended different kinds of events in his political career. However, given the structure of Victorian society, it is highly unlikely that his speeches reached *all* parts of society alike. People from the working class may have listened to his speeches or read the papers, but it still can be assumed that it was mainly the upper(-middle) classes that intensively devoted themselves to politics given their better financial situation and educational standard. The rest of the contributors in phase I clearly did not endeavor to reach all parts of society but intentionally focused on the elites. This is something which partly changes for Streit. Theoretically, the scope of people that should be reached was wider than just the elites of society, given the intended readership of *Union Now* and *Freedom & Union*. However, this was unsuccessful since the people whom he *did* reach and whom he actively approached mostly belonged to the (American) elites⁵²² and that a larger support in the broad masses could not be achieved. In theory, an elitist, top-down approach is not the worst if one really wants to bring about change, since it is more likely that people *in* a formal power position can actually change the regime of truth and, thus, the course of politics. However, the downside is that all of these ideas lacked huge grassroots support, which would have been necessary.

This is connected with the changed perception of democracy between the two phases. By the end of the 19th century, democracy was still partly seen as a phenomenon that might threaten the own state's existence. Until then, the elites were not used to sharing their power and to obtaining a less influential position in society and the state than before (see fn. 42). Newly enfranchised masses often were distrusted for either not understanding the course of politics at all or for wanting to overthrow the whole system. However, especially after World War I, ever more people were included in the political decision-making and this process could no longer be averted. Consequently, any change that should be brought about needed the consent of the people if social stability was to be maintained and people in political offices wanted to be re-elected. Most likely, this is the reason why Streit, in com-

⁵²²Yet, it has to be mentioned that some of these people later saw an early support of *Union Now* as an embarrassment, as can be seen in the cases of Lord Lothian and John Foster Dulles (see footnotes 446 and 441).

parison to the contributors of phase I, addressed the individual citizens so directly in his writings and tried to convince them to support an Atlantic Union. Nevertheless, his argument always remained the same: If people do not support an Atlantic Union, they are either unreasonable or un-American. Since this is very patronizing and, thus, contradictory to the democratic principle of freely coming to one's own conclusions, it was doomed to failure from the beginning. Furthermore, the organizations he founded and that supported him still had a very elitist approach and failed to reach the masses. What has to be noted, though, is that he was the first of the contributors in this thesis who at least *tried* to reach broader parts of society. Democracy no longer was perceived as something that endangered the own system but which was actually endangered *itself* by other political systems. Accordingly, its perception was altered from possibly disintegrating to supporting a state.

Although many of Streit's ideas may have seemed to be new, they actually derived from the same Anglotopian ideas as those of the contributors of phase I, which were a reflection of the Anglo-Saxon discourse. All of them were convinced of an Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking superiority that has a rightful claim to leadership of the world and that is connected via bonds that are stronger than those of any other group of nations in the world. Given the fact that these ideas persisted for such a long time into the 20th century and together constructed the Atlantic discourse that was still accepted by many people at the time, it is not unlikely that elements of them are still shared by some English-speaking peoples until today and that, for them, the community between themselves is more real than imagined. After all, discourses are open systems that can continue to resonate in new ones that develop out of it, like it happened with Anglo-Saxonism and Atlanticism here.

9.2 A Failed Discussion?

Although Streit's proposal was based on arguments that had a long history and were understood in his cultural context, his overall influence on practical politics in the 20th century was negligible. There are several reasons for that: Firstly, for a very long time the main argument why the Atlantic Union should be founded was based

on the fear of the alternative (Baratta, *World Federation I* 248). However, mainly *positive* visions facilitate the creation of something new. This might be the reason why Streit tried to emphasize the beneficial aspects of a federation more in *Freedom's Frontier* (see p. 156 here). Secondly, the analysis of members of his organizations indicates that – possibly due to a “lack of organizational leadership and backing” (Wofford, *It's Up to Us* 42) – there was no concrete agenda which gave the people specific tasks to do once they had become members (Baratta, *World Federation I* 56). Thirdly, the group around Streit was not willing to compromise enough to get at least parts of the Atlantic Union proposal realized. This becomes particularly clear with regards to the resolutions introduced in Congress. These were re-introduced several times with (nearly) the exact same wording as the respective previous one, although it had failed to get enough backing. Fourthly, an organization can only strive and continue to be strong and influential for a long time if it attracts new members in large parts of a society. As has been shown in chapter 7, Streit's organizations and network were very exclusive and, thus, no grassroots support could be generated. This made his organizations become irrelevant over time. Furthermore, despite what Streit claimed, I have shown in chapter 8 that *Union Now*, in fact, still contains racist and imperialist elements that are traces of the preceding Anglo-Saxon discourse and were also included in the Atlantic one. At some point in the 20th century, these were no longer *openly* backed by many people, although they partly still persisted. Finally, it was very unlikely that this proposal could be realized as it was indeed utopian. Therefore, it was hard to convince people of the benefit of advocating *Union Now*. Hence, it is not surprising, that the ‘movement’ the book allegedly had started stopped ‘moving’.

Nevertheless, utopian ideas about a future stronger political entity of English-speaking nations have not died out yet. Two conferences in Washington, D.C. and Berkshire at the turn of the 21st century by the Hudson Institute, a conservative think-tank, discussed the idea of a contemporary so-called “Anglosphere”. The participants were “Conservative political grandees, press magnates and supportive academics from the US, the UK and Canada”, such as Margaret Thatcher, David Davis, Francis Fukuyama, James C. Bennett, and Robert Conquest (Mycock and

Wellings 5). John Lloyd, a reporter for the *New Statesman*, a leftist paper, comments on the idea discussed there as follows: “[T]he Anglosphere idea pushes so many of the right’s emotional buttons that it seems unlikely to die” (“The Anglosphere Project”). Accordingly, whereas the Anglosphere is seen as a “project to oppose other forms of the West, such as the European Union” in conservative circles, critics on the left regard it as a “neoliberal, imperialist, and at times furtively racist project” (Katzenstein 1). For Bell, claims for an Anglosphere are nothing but proof that “the imperial dream never expires”. This dream is partly mixed with the idea of an American empire, which is seen as a vital necessity to the world and as a “hegemonic stabilizer and civilizing agent” that can rightfully fulfill this role because of an assumed “Anglo superiority” (“New Anglo Century” 50). The three models of the Anglosphere encompass different groups of English-speaking nations: The empire model describes the United States together with those parts of the world that had belonged to the British Empire in the middle of the 20th century, the imperial federal model refers to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and the settler colonial model combines the United States with the imperial federal model (Bell, “Anglospheres” 40-42).

How and why is the so-called Anglosphere constituted as it is? According to the concept’s supporters, it is a group of nations that ascribes itself a common heritage in terms of ‘civilization’ and has its roots in “values, beliefs and practices of free-market economic and liberal democracy”; some advocates add the “linguistic and cultural connectivities in literature, culture, sport and media” as well as “historical familial ties that endure due to continued patterns of population exchange between English-speaking countries” (Mycock and Wellings 1). Kenny and Pearce state that the origins of this idea of an Anglosphere date back to the Victorian era in Britain with the ideas of Greater Britain, an imperial federation and Anglo-Saxonism (3). The arguments I have found in my study mirror the idea of a supposed Anglo superiority that is based on common values, a similar political system and a supposed ‘civilizational advance’. As I have shown, these ideas were not only nurtured in Britain but also in the United States long into the 20th century by, in my example, Clarence Streit and his supporters. This makes it possible that, although

the strongest defenders of an Anglosphere are British, if not to say English today (8), such a concept still finds advocates on both sides of the Atlantic. After all, the Atlantic discourse continued to be constructed in the United States and across the world and was not confined to Britain. Consequently, the idea of an Anglosphere is one which bears traces of both past discourses of my study: Anglo-Saxonism and Atlanticism.

Accordingly, in times when the equality of all people should be taken for granted, related ideas to those which had already been denounced about a hundred years ago – like Anglo-Saxonism with all its racist overtones – still find popularity in a seemingly new form in some conservative or right-wing circles. Kenny and Pearce argue that in Britain, discussions on Brexit made such “forms of national nostalgia which have been marginal or taboo in British politics since the 1950s” (161) become openly supported again. Early in 2016, David Davis, who later was appointed Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, stated the following about the chances in case of an affirmative Brexit referendum:

This is an opportunity to renew our strong relationships with Commonwealth and Anglosphere countries. [...] We share history, culture and language. We have family ties. We even share similar legal systems. The usual barriers to trade are largely absent. (qtd. in Kenny and Pearce 153)

Apparently, he was convinced that Britain could again become the center or at least an important part in a new form of relationship with the other nations of the Anglosphere and that Britain would get a preferential treatment from them. However, this idea was clearly rejected by President Barack Obama and Prime Ministers Justin Trudeau, John Key, and Malcom Turnbull (155) – although the latter two are Conservatives as well. Kenny and Pearce estimated in 2018 that Trump’s election for U.S. President indicates “a renewal of an older version of Anglo-America” that has its roots in “ethno-nationalism associated with the Anglo-Saxonist movement of the 1890s”. This worldview is furthermore promoted by the alt-right network of Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief strategist (162). Hence, it was not surprising that Trump stated to have a “‘special place’ in his heart” (qtd. in Vucetic, “The Anglosphere Beyond Security” 80) for Britain and wanted to support it with a trade deal with the United States after Brexit. In the following, Theresa May took great

pains to be the first foreign leader to meet Donald Trump after his inauguration and, thus, show her willingness for a close cooperation – if not to say her dependence on the realization of such a trade deal Trump had held out. When the world entered an unprecedented health and economic crisis, the strong bonds between both nations once more seem to reemerge: On April 21, 2020, in the middle of the coronavirus pandemic, Boris Johnson and Donald Trump agreed to collaborate in fighting the pandemic – possibly through the G7 – and to sign a free trade agreement between the United States and Britain as soon as possible (Dickson). These talks took place despite the fact that Trump had intensified his course of “America First” in foreign policy, which could be observed when he tried to secure future coronavirus vaccine for the United States *only* (Toose and Bertrand). Thus, although Vucetic estimates that Trump’s inconsistent and chaotic presidency might put an end to all the principles of U.S. foreign policy in the past (“The Anglosphere Beyond Security” 80), the idea can still be constructed that there is a special and close ‘natural’ relationship between both nations, which is founded on the arguments investigated in my study. Therefore, I have investigated discursive elements of the heyday of Anglo-Saxonism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and connected it to the Atlantic discourse of the 20th century. The conviction of the existence of an Anglosphere among parts of the English-speaking societies shows that several of these elements still are accepted as true until today, if only in a far lesser amount and among fewer people. It would be interesting to analyze the discourse of the Anglosphere today when ideas can be theoretically spread much further and, at the same time, several ‘bubbles’ develop and partly become ever more exclusive, especially on social media. But this is left for further studies in this field.

My study has shown that Anglo-Saxonism and the ideas of an imperial federation were widely supported across the political spectrum at the turn of the 20th century. Today, these distressing convictions are only shared among some parts of conservative or right-wing circles and are not taken seriously by the broad mass. Instead, they sometimes come up in a humoristic context that makes fun of the idea of a natural alliance between Britain and the United States. This was illustrated in an ‘update’ of the “Borowitz Report” I have mentioned in the beginning on January

31, 2020:

HRH Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, stated that he & HRH Princess Meghan, Duchess of Sussex, stepped back from their royal duties in the UK to prepare for their new roles as Prince & Princess of what will now be known as The British Commonwealth of The United States of America. The new alliance is expected to render both Brexit & the Tories meaningless, since America has a two-party system, in which the American branch of the Tory party went extinct in the 19th century. In exchange, the USA will no longer have to worry about foreign intervention in elections or health care [...]. In addition, the Prince & Princess will oversee all elections, [...] so that the true voice of the people will be heard. (kittycat1314)

The author of this post on Instagram shows her frustration with certain political aspects in the U.S. and Britain: Brexit, the British Tories, elections in the United States, which, in her opinion, are not always fair, as well as the American health care system. Jokingly, she refers to the idea of a ‘natural’ alliance between Britain and the United States as a possible solution to these problems. In contrast to supporters of the Anglosphere, the idea here only serves a comical purpose and is not taken seriously at all. Accordingly, the idea of a close relationship between Britain and the United States and a possible reunification of the two nations still exists on both sides of the political spectrum as well as on both sides of the Atlantic – the author of the preceding text is American – but it is assessed completely differently. It remains to be seen how British-American relations in a world after corona and Brexit will develop and whether they really will start a new, closer collaboration.

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Eigenständigkeitserklärung (gem. § 4 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 5 PromO)

Versicherung (gem. § 4 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 5 PromO):

Ich versichere hiermit

- an Eides statt, dass ich die Dissertation selbständig angefertigt, außer den im Schriftenverzeichnis sowie den Anmerkungen genannten Hilfsmitteln keine weiteren benutzt und die Herkunft der Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus anderen Werken übernommen sind, bezeichnet habe,
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Kiel, Juni 2021