

Identity makes the World go round: Social Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis.

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1 Introduction

Statements such as ‘the world is in turmoil’ (cf. Bremmer 2018; Butuyan 2019), “international terrorism is one the most serious threats to international peace and security” (France Diplomatie 2019) or ‘we are currently witnessing the demise of the liberal world order’ (cf. Grey 2018; Colombo 2019; MacKey 2019) are commonly used by government officials, journalists and political analysts. These diagnoses are often followed up with foreign policy advice which is seldom informed by any explicit theoretical outlook on international affairs or foreign policy. Many of these politicians, journalists and think tankers implicitly follow realist or liberal interpretations of the world. While practitioners agree on the importance of international relations and foreign policy, the value of theory-based analysis has yet to reach a broad audience outside of academia.

This contrast between public and academic discourse is especially strong, as the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) are driven by theoretical controversies and discussions. Numerous theories attempt to explain state behavior in the international system. Systemic IR theories such as Neorealism (Waltz 1979; Walt 1987), Neoliberalism (Keohane 1984) and systemic Social Constructivism (Wendt 1992) stress the structural incentives for states similar in size, military or economic power, respectively states interacting in the same culture of anarchy, to behave alike. In contrast, FPA focuses on domestic and individual processes that lead to the employment of certain foreign policies. It opens the ‘black box’ of the state and, speaking with Waltz (1959), operates on the first and second images—individual and domestic level (cf. Brummer/Oppermann 2014: 2f.)—instead of on the third—international level—as systemic theories do. Even though FPA originally set out to develop a general theory of foreign policy (cf. Smith 1986), the field today, much like IR, is characterized by theoretical and methodological pluralism.

My work joins the discussion on FPA from a social-constructivist viewpoint. While the different contributions of this thesis expand into various branches of social-constructivism, they are informed by the notion that foreign policy behavior is based on identity constructions, and on specific collectively shared beliefs about what constitutes a threat in the domestic and international system. Moreover, I assume that state behavior is influenced by ideas about what kinds of (historic) responsibilities the country has had to abide to, and what role it should take on the international stage. The aim of my

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research is to show that social-constructivist theory can fruitfully be combined with other social-constructivist approaches and methods beyond discourse analysis, and can provide us with clear methodological proceedings, as well as valuable empirical insights into foreign policy developments and changes of foreign policy. In contrast to other theoretical approaches, social-constructivism can explain change as well as continuity. The guiding question of this doctoral thesis is thus:

How do certain national identity constructions enable specific foreign and security policies?

While this is a common question in social-constructivist research, the innovative strength of this dissertation lies in the engagement with the following sub-questions that emerge from it:

- (1) How are national identity elements (re-) interpreted in foreign policy and security discourses? (A1; A2)
- (2) How do domestic changes influence the perception of possible and desirable international partners? (A3)
- (3) How do changes in national discourse hegemony constitute changes in foreign policy? (A4)
- (4) How can established theoretical models and methods be fruitfully applied to new case studies? (A1; A2; A4)

Question 1 not only explores national identity construction, but also how changes in discourse constitute changes in national identity, thus making new foreign policies possible. In combination with question 4, this allows me to systematically analyze the emerging scope of accepted foreign policy actions for decision makers, as shown in the articles “The international model citizen and the Syrian war: Canadian identity from a civilian power perspective” and “Trump’s Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism vs National Identity Change”. The article also demonstrates how Discourse Bound Identity Theory (DBIT), respectively the civilian power model, can be fruitfully applied to new cases and contribute to solving empirical puzzles. Moreover, in the case of Canada, this dissertation also points out the usefulness of replacing well-established but deficient models, such as ‘middle power’, with social-constructivist ones which can handle change much better.

Articles	Abbreviation
Dück, Elena (2019), The international model citizen and the Syrian war: Canadian identity from a civilian power perspective, <i>International Journal</i> , 74 (3), 387-404. Double Blind Peer Reviewed	A1 (IJ)
Dück, Elena & Robin Lucke (2019), Same Old (Macro-) Securitization? A Comparison of Political Reactions to Major Terrorist Attacks in the United States and France, <i>Croatian International Relations Review XXV (84)</i> , p. 6-35. Double Blind Peer Reviewed	A2 (CIRR)
Dück, Elena & Rihab Kordi (2018), <i>Turkey and Tunisia: building bridges in stormy times?</i> , in Abderrahim, Tasnim et al. (eds.): Tunisia's International Relations since the 'Arab Spring'. Transition Inside and Out; New York: Routledge, p. 169-190. Peer Reviewed	A3 (TIR)
Dück, Elena; Stahl, Bernhard & Katharina McLarren (2019): <i>Trump's Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism vs National Identity Change</i> , in Oswald, Michael (ed.): Mobilization, Representation and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, p. 279-300. Peer Reviewed	A4 (MRRAD)

Table 1.1: Overview of the articles

The article “Same Old (Macro-) Securitization? A Comparison of Political Reactions to Major Terrorist Attacks in the United States and France” explores the link between micro- and macro-securitizations. It highlights how studying securitization from a comparative perspective can help us to explore the re-interpretation of national identity within a global security framework. Furthermore, it also explores how those macro-frameworks are re-interpreted at the domestic level.

The article “Turkey and Tunisia: building bridges in stormy times?” engages with question 2. It is situated at the intersection of liberal and social-constructivist assumptions, as it draws on the notion that liberal democracy’s foreign policy behavior differs from that of autocratic states, but concentrates on the analysis of perceptions and the construction of similarities between states. Additionally, it provides insights into the method of qualitative content analysis, which is also used as part of discourse analyses in A1 and A2. On an empirical level, the article contributes to the sparse literature on Tunisia’s international relations.

In addition to giving insight into the content and relevance of the individual articles, this text aims at situating them within the theoretical context of social-constructivist FPA and ‘letting them speak to each other’. In order to achieve this, I briefly outline the evolution of FPA in chapter 1.1. In subchapter 1.2, I disclose my general theoretical assumptions and the resulting methodological approaches. In chapter 2, I summarize the theories starting with Ontological Security (OS) in 2.1, moving on to Securitization Theory (ST) in 2.2 and Discourse Bound Identity Theory (DBIT) in 2.3. The chapter closes with a comparison of the approaches and a discussion on the merits of applying them to the respective case study. In chapter 3, I contextualize the articles of this thesis. Although the connection between the articles is a theoretical one, all of them also make empirical contributions which are discussed in the subchapters 3.1 to 3.4. I summarize my findings and avenues for future research in chapter 4. As I wrote three out of the four articles in collaboration with co-authors, in chapter 5 I make transparent my contributions and role in the research and writing process of those publications. The publications constituting this dissertation can all be found in the original form of their publication in the appendix.

1.1 Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

Following Christopher Hill, I define foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (2003: 3). This definition takes into account that while states remain central actors in international relations, non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, international terrorist groups and others are also shaping the international system through their interactions with states.

The development of FPA as an independent research field was based on the development of IR as a discipline in the 1950s (cf. Harnisch 2003: 316). According to Harnisch, the concept of *foreign* policy, and hence its analysis, only became thinkable due to the formulation of the central concepts of IR: anarchy and sovereignty (2003: 316). In contrast to the dominant IR theory at the time, realism, FPA drew heavily on quantitative behavioral science (cf. Harnisch 2003: 317). Its goal was to understand

“foreign policy by treating states as members of a class of phenomena and seeks to generalize about the sources, and nature, of their behavior, focusing on the decision-making process in its varying aspects in order to produce explanations” (Smith 1986: 14).

Initially, this new perspective led to the study of the behavior of decision makers (cf. Rosenau 1963; Snyder/Paige 1958), but also to an early demand for pre-theory development (cf. Rosenau 1971) and considerations about the effects of bureaucratic politics

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on decision-making (i.a. Allison 1969). Moreover, early cognitive and psychological approaches emerged, focusing on leaders' perceptions and belief systems (i.a. Holsti 1967).

Scholars such as Rosenau were optimistic that by thinking about and making explicit the general assumptions that all foreign policy analysts implicitly hold, the field would be able "to move to ever higher levels of generalization" (Rosenau 1971: 116). Furthermore, Rosenau argued in favor of a comparative approach to foreign policy analysis in order to overcome a narrow focus on either domestic or international factors for the explanation of certain policies, and to account for the "widespread recognition that the boundaries separating national and international systems are becoming increasingly ambiguous" (ibid.162). Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis (CFPA) hence tries to "serve as a bridge analyzing the impact of both external and internal politics on states' relations with each other" (Kaarbo et al. 2002: 3). However, the positivist, data-driven research designs that followed Rosenau's demand for pre-theorizing failed to develop a general theory. Critics argued that this was not very surprising:

"No amount of data can lead to the entirely separate cognitive act of creating theory. Even had the pre-theory led to an unambiguous ranking of the source-variables for each genotype of state, [...], the assumption that this *would* lead to theory seems unrealistic. [...] [T]he rather naive belief that this route would lead to theory seems very questionable." (Smith 1986: 23)¹

In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, social-constructivist approaches emerged in IR (i.a. Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986; Wendt 1992) as well as in FPA, and gained ground in the following decades (i.a. Campbell 1992; Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Hopf 2002; Hansen 2006). While (neo-)realists emphasized the importance of power and (neo-)liberals claimed that (economic) interests were the decisive factor in IR and FPA, social-constructivists argued that ideas matter, and ostensibly material facts such as interest are constituted by them (cf. Wendt 1999: 92ff.). In the context of FPA, this leads to the assumption that foreign policy problems are not objective facts, but rather "social constructions forged by state officials in the course of producing and reproducing state identity" (Weldes 1999: 219).

This changed the sorts of questions asked in FPA. While realist and liberal approaches were positive that they could answer 'why- questions', social-constructivists focus on 'how- questions'. By challenging the notion that statehood or threats are objective conditions (cf. Campbell 1992: 1), they also call into question the very categories of FPA. Social-constructivists argue that we have to analyze how these concepts come

¹This critique, even though launched thirty years ago, is remarkable relevant in the context of recent developments in the social sciences and the discussion about the opportunities and limits of 'big data', as well as the (im-)possibilities of deriving theory from such data sets.

into being through discourse and social practices. This shift in research questions has also led to new methodologies in FPA, as the role of language was taken much more seriously, and discourse analysis was introduced as a method (e.g. Doty 1993: 302). In contrast to the FPA approaches in the 1950s and 60s, such as cognitive decision-making approaches, social-constructivism does not focus on the first-image, but rather bridges the domestic and international levels by exploring the link between national discourses (e.g. Doty 1993; Larsen 1997; Hopf 2002; Hansen 2006; Stahl 2017) and/or role concepts (e.g. Harnisch 2012; Cantir/Kaarbo 2016a) and foreign policies.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, feminist (e.g. Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1990; Harding 1991) and critical approaches also emerged in IR and FPA. While critical approaches are characterized by their focus on power relations and, according to Cox “can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (Cox 1996: 2010), there are a great variety of theoretical feminist approaches², ranging from liberal to postcolonial, from radical to postmodern (cf. Whitworth 2008: 104ff). Feminist scholars taking a discourse-oriented approach to FPA focus on the discursive production of certain ideas about femininity, masculinity, war and rationality (e.g. Cohn 1987).

While social-constructivist approaches have firmly established themselves in the field of FPA, like other new theories before them, they have not replaced older ones. No single theoretical school has gained absolute dominance over the others. Despite constant theoretical development and refinement of existing models, no overarching theory of FPA has developed. To speak in Kuhnian terms (1970: 10f.)³, there have been no real paradigm shifts in IR and FPA. As a result, FPA is characterized by a pluralism of theoretical (and thus methodological) approaches (cf. Harnisch 2003: 313). The theoretical range of articles published, for instance, in the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, reflects this plurality: The latest publications include quantitative hypotheses’ testing of leadership decision-making processes (Özdamar/Eciyas 2019), as well as an article informed by Lacanian psychoanalysis (Wojczewski 2019).

1.2 Theoretical Assumptions and Methodology

In line with the social-constructivist approaches outlined above (e.g. Campbell 1992; Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Hopf 2002; Hansen 2006), my research follows a constructivist ontology by exploring “how-possible” questions in foreign policy analysis. Ontologically, I assume that there is no *social* reality independent of discourses, in which I include

²As Jackson points out, what is unique about feminist scholarship, regardless of the theory and methods used, “is the attentiveness of authors working in this tradition to the social location from which they theorize” and their conviction that the results of their research are “positive contributions to the transformation of society” (2016: 204).

³For a critique of the decontextualized use of Kuhn’s work in IR see Jackson 2016: 70ff.

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language, as well as practices such as foreign policy behavior. Furthermore, due to the “productive nature of language” (Hansen 2006: 17), discourses rely on certain problems and subjectivities—for instance, security, sovereignty, etc.—but they also produce them (cf. *ibid.*).

Moreover, on an epistemological level, I assume that “the external world does not present itself unproblematically to the observer. Instead, we always understand our environment in a meditated fashion, through a process of interpretation” (Weldes/Saco 1996: 368). This does not mean that I do not believe in a physical material world that exists independently of language and human interpretations. However, following Purvis and Hunt (1993), I argue that only in discourse do these physical realities and occurrences become meaningful in the social world (cf. also Weldes/Saco 1996: 374).

Thus, in the words of Laclau and Mouffe:

“To call something a natural object is a way of conceiving it that depends upon a classificatory system. Again, this does not call into question the fact that this entity which we call stone exists, in the sense of being present here and now, independently of my will; nevertheless the fact of its being a stone depends on a way of classifying objects that is historical and contingent. If there were no human beings on earth, those objects that we call stones would be there nonetheless; but they would not be “stones”, because there would be neither mineralogy nor a language capable of classifying them and distinguishing them from other objects.” (Laclau/Mouffe 1987: 82.)

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I assume that language is central to this process of categorizing and interpreting reality, as it constitutes the medium as well as the “web of meaning” (ibid.: 371) in which beliefs and ideas about the world can be expressed and become intelligible. Thus, discourse is not “simply a medium for the expression of an individual’s thoughts or beliefs; rather it is a social practice through which thoughts and beliefs are themselves constitutes” (ibid.).

From this epistemology follows my methodological commitment to discourse analysis. According to Balzacq, “[...] discourse analysis focuses on the situated and social aspects of the text; in other words, the text emerges out of an intersubjective context” (2011: 51). Moreover, in contrast to content analysis, “[...] discourse analysis insists on the constructed character of meaning [...]” (ibid.). While I rely heavily on the method of qualitative content analysis in my articles, I understand the material I analyze as being part of a larger, historically situated discourse. Therefore, I am not so much interested in the content of one particular document, but in how it can be situated within this historical contingency, what discursive formations the arguments used in it belong to, and what it can tell us about shifting discursive hegemonies. As I use different theoretical approaches throughout my dissertation, the particular theoretical framework varies. However, my fundamental understanding of the role of text and language as part of a larger discourse remains constant.

Within the content analyses, I combine different kinds of source material, such as interviews, public speeches and even tweets, which would not be feasible in a pure content analysis. I carried out all analysis in a structured way that grants transparency and avoids excluding statements or text passages that might challenge my theoretical assumptions. In line with the theoretical approaches chosen, I follow Milliken’s assumptions that there are “privileged storytellers” (1999: 236) to whom, due to their position in the political system, “narrative authority is granted” (ibid.). Of course, as Milliken points out “[n]o individual study can deal with all aspects of discourse productivity” (ibid.). In all my cases, there are other sources of discourse that are worth exploring, and the reader of my articles should be aware that media discourses, dissenting voices without representation in parliament, as well as identity constructions within popular culture, are (mostly) excluded. As with any discourse analysis, my analyses only show part of the discourse.

In addition to discourse analysis, in A2, Robin Lucke and I also compare two cases of securitization in order to shed light on the macro-securitization of the War on Terror (WoT). We propose that further engagement with comparisons in the study of securitization can be fruitful in order to identify global discursive structures in which national security issues can more easily be related to and thus be subjected to extraordinary measures.

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Finally, while I analyze vastly different countries in my articles, all of them are democracies—albeit in the case of Tunisia, a very young one, and in the case of Turkey, a defect one. Even though it is not always made explicit in the theories I apply, most of the analysts using and developing them focus on liberal democracies. While I believe that ontological security, securitization and discursive national identity construction also take place to some degree in other regime types, I argue that applying discourse analysis to those cases raises far more issues: Firstly, there might not be any parliamentary debates, and if there are, we cannot assume them to be as free as in a liberal democracy. Secondly, in the case of securitization, it is far more difficult to answer the question of audience acceptance, as people might simply not dare to state their disagreement with government policies (and nobody will ask them). The same holds true for identity-bound discourse analysis: while we can reasonably expect contesting discursive formation in democracies, contestation to the hegemonic (i.e. the government discourse) is rather unlikely to be publicly voiced. Moreover, in autocratic states the cost of ignoring the “logic of appropriateness” provided by identity construction might not be as high, as the government is not dependent on elections. Therefore, we cannot conduct discourse analysis on the domestic level in non-democratic countries in the same way we might in democratic countries.

2 Theoretical Perspectives of the Articles

An extensive discussion of the development of OS, ST and DBIT could fill books, and would go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the following I briefly summarize the evolution, as well as the main works and assumptions, of each theory. I clarify my own understanding of the concepts of the theories if competing interpretations exist. The theories are presented in the order of the articles in which they appear, starting with OS, moving on to ST, and lastly presenting DBIT.

2.1 Ontological Security

While the concept of OS originated in psychology (Laing 1959), Anthony Giddens imported it into sociology (Giddens 1984; 1990; 1991), from which it “quickly spread into the social sciences” (Ejdus 2018: 884). In the 1990s, social-constructivist scholars such as Wendt (1994), Huysmans (1998) and McSweeney (1999) first imported it into IR—in one of the field’s many endeavors to integrate sociological concepts into IR theory. A second wave of scholars working on OS emerged during the 2000s (cf. Ejdus 2018: 885), and I primarily draw on their work in my dissertation.

OS is based on the notion that states do not only pursue physical survival, as realists would argue, but also strive for ontological security (cf. Steele 2008: 3). According to Mitzen, as “[a]ll actors require a stable sense of who they are [...] ontological security is a prime drive in every social actor” (2006: 272). Hence, social actors reflexively create a stable, autobiographical narrative in order to provide themselves with ontological security (cf. Oppermann/Hansel 2019: 83). In contrast, situations in which decision makers cannot know the outcomes of their actions, as they are faced with infrequent or novel events and thus have to call into question their ability to act rationally, generate ontological insecurity (cf. *ibid.* 272f.). Following Giddens, Mitzen further argues that routines help individuals to “bring our threat environment under cognitive control” (*ibid.* 273). In the words of Giddens: “The maintenance of habits and routines is a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties [...]” (Giddens 1991: 39). Similar to Mitzen’s focus on the effect of routines, Berenskoetter and Giegerich argue that “[a]lthough narratives are discursive constructs, the basic principles they emphasize are affirmed through corresponding practices” (2010: 420). By using discourse analysis, Steele (2008) shifts

the focus from these practices to the discourses that shape “a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions” (ibid. 3)⁴. From an analytical viewpoint, there are thus works pertaining to OS that focus on routines and institutionalized practices (cf. Mitzen 2006), or a combination of discursive and foreign policy analysis (cf. Steele 2008; Oppermann/Hansel 2019).

Like Role Theory (cf. Harnisch 2011), OS assumes that identity has endogenous and exogenous components. On the one hand, there is an idea about the Self that is independent from interaction with other states (ego-part) and an international, relational part⁵ is in a certain sense that with which we do identify ourselves. [...] The “I” is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the “me” is the organized set of attitudes of which one himself assumes.” (ibid.: 174-175). However, unlike in Role Theory, the “I” in Mead’s work cannot be said to be independent of social interaction with others, as it is the entity acting in social situations. Moreover, while Role Theory assumes that ego- and alter-part form a role which creates certain predictability of the actions that a state might take, this is not the case in the concept of Mead. While we would expect a Civilian Power to prefer diplomacy over military action, Mead states that the “response of the “I” is something that is more or less uncertain” (ibid.: 176).’ (alter-part). According to Szkola, identity should hence be treated “as layered and simultaneously constituted on mutually interacting levels of intersubjective meaning making” (2018: 228). Identity is then constituted by negotiating the difference between “domestic and international, identity and difference, or self and other” (ibid.).

In spite of the many contributions that numerous authors have made to the concept of OS during the last decade, there remains a remarkable vagueness or broad variety of interpretations when it comes to some of the core concepts of the model. Firstly, there is no single interpretation of what a narrative is, and secondly, there are at least two positions on the issue of who is in need of ontological security.

What is the autobiographical narrative of a state, and how is it formed? While scholars agree that it is (re-) produced thought discourse and practice, there is much less clarity about its normative dimension. Is it a narrative consciously and instrumentally constructed, does it emerge from existing tropes in the discourse (and are bearers of discourse hence limited in their ability to consciously shape a narrative), or are we simply unable to answer this question? On the one hand, Subotić argues that “[n]arratives, of course, are highly selective and purposefully constructed” (2016: 612), and

⁴This is in line with Giddens’ concept of “[t]he narrative of self-identity [which] has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly changing circumstances of social life, on a local and global scale” (1991: 215).

⁵Szkola (and Role Theory in general) refers to ego-part as “I” and the alter-part as “me”, relating to Mead’s terminology. Mead defines the “me” as “essentially a member of a social group, and [it] represents, therefore the value of the group” (Mead 2015: 214). In contrast, the “I

hence stands for an instrumental understanding of the speech acts that are used to legitimize foreign policy action. On the other hand, Berenskoetter and Giegerich put forward the following notion:

“An idea of order lays out a certain ‘logic of appropriateness’ that functions as a guide for foreign policy makers and as a marker by which society judges policies acceptable and, hence, *is both enabling and constraining* [emphasis added]. This logic is embedded in a biographical narrative giving meaning to the past and allowing for an orientation toward the future by anchoring those basic principles in pertinent lessons and desirable visions” (2010: 420)

In addition, they mention that national identities “tend to be contested domestically” (ibid.) and may gain discursive hegemony (cf. ibid.). Hence, their concept of a narrative is rather close to the concept of a discursive formation (cf. Nadoll 2003: 117) as employed by DBIT (see chapter 2.3). Then again, Steele assumes that

“actors must create meanings for their actions to be logically consistent with their actions. This means that state agents must explain, justify and/or ‘argue’ what a policy would mean about their sense of self-identity” (2008: 11).

This definition leaves ample room for interpretation. Are state agents aware of this necessity to create a stable meaning, hence consciously choosing one narrative over another as proposed by Subotić, or is Steele alluding to a logic of appropriateness in the sense of Berenskoetter and Giegerich? These examples illustrate the range of meaning of ‘narrative’ in the literature on OS.

Further difficulty emerges from the question of who precisely seeks ontological security: citizens and policy makers, or states as social actors themselves? Oppermann and Hansel, with reference to Mitzen 2006, argue that

“[w]hichever rationale one adopts, the assumption that states are social actors who act in the international system as if they were ontological security seekers has proven useful in exploring the different patterns of interstate relationship in international politics” (Oppermann/Hansel 2018: 84).

While I agree with the usefulness of the concept, I also think that research drawing on it would benefit from more clarity concerning the question of who is seeking ontological security. I argue that it is more plausible to assume that citizens and policy makers are the ones striving for this form of security, rather than taking the common anthropomorphism of states so far as to claim that they are in need of ontological security. In my view, this obscures the fact that the actors with privileged access to the discourse are primarily policy makers and media outlets. States are, in my under-

standing, socially constructed entities, “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) that can provide humans with physical and ontological security (or threaten them in their pursuit of security), but they do not have any psychological needs themselves. To some degree, this same anthropomorphism can also be found in Role Theory, in which the socio-psychological assumptions that Mead makes about humans are transferred to states. However, scholars have pointed out that it is not the state, but rather “members of a society [...] that perform a variety of roles which are commonly defined as a set of norms meant to guide behavior” (Cantir/Kaarbo 2016b: 3; cf. also Harnisch 2012: 52; Holsti 1970). While it can be useful to treat states *as if* they had the same needs as humans, we should be aware that in fact the humans within the states are the ones actually in need of ontological security or a concept of their state as a Civilian Power. Only if we understand the term ‘state’ as a reification of communities or collectives does it make sense to talk about a state as striving for ontological security.⁶

A second debate within OS focuses on sources of insecurity: Do states experience ontological insecurity because they are fundamentally insecure about their identity, or are interactions with other states the main source of their insecurity (cf. Ejodus 2018; Zarakol 2010: 6)? While I take a ‘middle-ground approach’ (cf. Zarakol 2010: 8) in assuming that both the Self and Others can be sources of ontological insecurity, my article focuses on the Canadian discourse about the Self.

Concerning the issue of the definition of narratives, I do not share Subotić’s instrumental approach to narratives. For epistemological reasons⁷, I do not think that IR or FPA scholars can systematically produce knowledge about the underlying reasons of foreign policy actors to voice certain statements or engage in certain practices. Therefore, I believe it is more fruitful to study how discourses can change, and which actions are made possible by these changes. However, I do think that we must be aware of the power that is inherent in discourse—for instance, who is the privileged storyteller, who is heard and who is silenced?—and the (re-) production of hegemonic practices that are facilitated by certain discourses. I thus follow Berrenskoetter and Giegerich’s understanding of a narrative as described above.

2.2 Securitization Theory

The publication of Barry Buzan’s “People, States and Fear” (1983) marked “a major shift in the academic debate on the concept of security and its merits” (McSweeney 1999: 52f.). In it, Buzan argued for a wider approach to security than the “traditional focus

⁶For an in-depth discussion of the ‘security seeker problem’, see Roe 2008a.

⁷Besides, even if it was possible from an epistemological point of view, it would be a methodological challenge to uncover the hidden motives of state leaders, which might not even be consciously known to themselves.

on national military policy” (Buzan 1983: 10). Instead, he proposed to investigate what security *means*, and what its referent objects are (cf. *ibid.*). He further developed this new framework for security studies in collaboration with Ole Wæver (Buzan/Wæver et al. 1993), which led to the name Copenhagen School (CS), as many authors were members of the *Centre for Peace and Conflict Research* in Copenhagen (cf. Lucke 2019: 8).

The publication of “Security. A New Framework for Analysis” (Buzan et al.) in 1998 stirred a major debate about the understanding of security, as well as about weaknesses and desiderata within the framework of securitization theory. Since then, the model has continuously been employed and further developed. Empirically, terrorism has been a strong focus (e.g. Buzan 2006; Aradau/van Munster 2009; Salter 2011; Bright 2012), but other topics such as migration (e.g. Bigo 2002; Ceyhan/Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2006), environmental problems (e.g. Floyd 2010; Trombetta 2011; McDonald 2013) and health (e.g. Sjöstedt 2011) have also been explored. On a theoretical and epistemological level, some dissent about the role of the audience (cf. Roe 2008b; Balzacq 2011; Bright 2012; Floyd 2016) and the meaning of the speech act (e.g. Balzacq 2011) prevail. Moreover, on a normative level, the issue of desecuritization (e.g. Wæver 1995; Roe 2012; Hansen 2012) and the morality of securitizations (Floyd 2019) are discussed in the literature.

The CS defines a topic as securitized if an “issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24).⁸ Balzacq differentiates between two main views on securitization: the philosophical one and the sociological one (2011: 1). As the premise of CS is the performativity of language, he calls their approach philosophical. In contrast, sociological approaches “talk about securitization primarily in terms of practices, context and power relations that characterize the construction of threat images” (Balzacq 2011:1). At first glance, “the difference between the two variants seems rather stark” (*ibid.*: 3). However, Balzacq points out:

“[T]he two variants are primarily ideal types, meaning that studies of securitization do not necessarily fall neatly within a particular category. In other words, examining the development of threats combines philosophical and sociological insights, with the proviso that statements about ‘magical power’ of speech acts are moderated” (Balzacq 2011: 3).

Robin Lucke’s and my article on macro-securitization indeed does not “fall neatly” (*ibid.*) into one category, but combines the two perspectives. While we draw heavily on the CS in our methodological outline, we are also taking into account the policies and practices

⁸Buzan et al. also refer to securitization as “a more extreme version of politicization” (1998: 23). However, I find this term somewhat misleading, as the point is that the securitized issue is taken out of the normal political procedure.

that result from securitization, and we discuss the societal hierarchies they perpetuate. Following Buzan et al., we assume that a *security move* is “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object” (1998: 25). In theory, the *referent objects* can be any “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (ibid.: 36). In practice, the referent object is traditionally the state, respectively the nation (cf. ibid.).

The actors who take the step of presenting referent objects as existentially threatened are called *securitizing actors*:

“A security actor is s.o., or a group, who performs the securitizing speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 40)

The security actors direct their security move towards the audience. As Hansen points out, if one takes a strictly discursive approach towards securitization (or in Balzacq’s term ‘a philosophical approach’), one does not need external, non-discursive factors in order to determine whether a securitization takes place (cf. Hansen 2011: 359). However, drawing on Bright (2012), we assume that a securitization can only be successful if the audience accepts the securitizing move and hence the security measures it entails. As this dissertation is invested in the question of which practices are made possible by certain interpretations of the world, it would not be expedient to only focus on the securitizing move. As such, we use Roe’s concept of ‘active securitization’: A full, active securitization not only requires the acceptance of the audience concerning the ‘securityness’ of an issue, but also of the extraordinary measures resulting from it (cf. Roe 2008b: 621f.). The audience at which the security move, in the form of a speech act, is directed is often implicitly assumed to be the general public. Following Roe’s concept of the ‘duality of the audience’ (2008b: 620), we argue that securitizing moves are directed towards the public, but in many cases also to the national parliament. While we assume that securitization can only be called successful when the audience(s) accepts the security move, we do not assume that the audience is extra-discursive (cf. Hansen 2011: 360f.). It is precisely because the audience is *not* situated outside the discourse, but taking part in the weaving of the ‘web of meaning’, that I assume that different national audiences might respond to different codes or ‘grammars of security’. Hence, a macro-securitization needs to be ‘translated’ to the discourse realm of a specific country. Stritzel calls this the local context into which the “‘alien’ texts become productively appropriated and incorporated” (2011: 345) into the “consolidated discursive realm” (ibid.).⁹

⁹While one might be tempted to interpret the terms ‘context’ or ‘facilitating conditions’ as extra-discursive, in my understanding—like the audience—they are not. While there may be material events (more violent attacks), it is only through discourse that they become meaningful to a society.

The focus of many securitization works, including our article, is on the discursive (linguistic) construction of security. Therefore, “[t]he obvious method is discourse analysis” (Buzan et al. 1998: 176), which allows us to uncover “the grammar of security” (Stritzel/Chang 2015: 550). However, as Buzan et al. point out:

“Discourse analysis is not the exclusive method of securitization studies. A complete analysis will also include more traditional political analysis of units interacting, facilitating conditions, and all the other dimensions of the security complex theory” (Buzan et al. 1998: 177).

For instance, in order to determine audience acceptance, opinion polls are often included in the analysis. Besides, the focus on spoken and written language as being representative of the discourse is rather narrow, and some authors are advocating for the inclusion of images into the analysis (cf. Vuori 2010; Hansen 2011). In our analysis, we used discourse analysis focusing on privileged storytellers in order to compare the French discourse to that of the US. Opting for a ‘traditional’ approach, we did not include visual representations.

2.3 Discourse Bound Identity Theory

The emergence of social-constructivism and discourse analysis not only spurred scholarship challenging well-established concepts such as security, but also works on the nexus between beliefs, identity and foreign policy. Beliefs had formerly been studied in a positivist fashion, often treating them as intervening variables, while language was treated as a “transparent medium which convey[s] meaning” (Larsen 1997: 9). In contrast, authors such as Henrik Larsen (1997) and Ted Hopf (2002) focused on the frameworks created by discourse (Larsen 1997: 21), respectively the identities that are discursively produced (Hopf 2002: 1) and the consequences for foreign policy.

DBIT follows the notion that “[f]oreign policy discourse conditions future moves” (Wæver 2005: 35). Rather than focusing on how foreign policy reproduces certain state identities (cf. *ibid.*), it explores how national discourses make certain foreign policy decisions (im-)possible in the first place. In contrast to psychological or cognitive approaches, DBIT is not interested in what decision-makers are ‘really’ thinking (cf. *ibid.*). Instead, as discourses make certain policies possible, DBIT is interested in discourses as being the connecting link between identity and (foreign policy) behavior (cf. Stahl 2006: 56). In this context, ‘discourse’ is understood as a communicative interaction in which discourse bearers seek to argumentatively link the elements of identity and behavioral preferences in accordance with the societally accepted logic of appropriateness—which is based on national identity (cf. Nadoll 2003: 173). Unlike Wendt’s understanding of identity, DBIT does not conceptualize identity as the product

of communication and interactions between national states on the international level (cf. Nadoll 2003: 167). As it is interested in the differences in foreign policy behavior—and not in the construction of a shared international culture, as Wendt is—it situates national identity constructions at the domestic level (cf. *ibid.*). In contrast to Role Theory and OS, the focus is on the endogenous construction of identity. However, state identity does not *cause* foreign policy behavior in a positivist way, as “identities are produced and reproduced through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity prior to and independently of foreign policy” (Hansen 2006: 26).

Identity, according to Nadoll, consists of different *identity elements* which can be active or inactive (2003: 168). Identity elements are arguments about the Self that do not require any further justification in a specific national discourse (cf. Stahl 2006: 54). For instance, in the case of Canada, ‘supporter of the rule of law’ in world politics is an identity element, which is indisputable in Canadian discourse. In order to identify an identity element using discourse analysis, one thus has to trace back chains of arguments until one finds the element that has not been argumentatively deduced, and hence constitutes the starting point for the whole argumentation (cf. Stahl 2006: 54).

While active identity elements are currently used in the political discourse to legitimize certain actions, inactive elements are not used at the moment. However, those dormant elements can be re-activated by bearers of discourse, while active identity elements can lose their meaningfulness and become inactive (cf. Stahl 2006: 55). Therefore, identity is not constant over time, but a “polymorph accumulation of identity elements” (Nadoll 2003: 168, own translation) and open to changes. Besides, identity is not homogenous, as different identity elements can be active at the same time. Thus, the theory is able to conceptualize discursive contestation of national identity (cf. Stahl/Harnisch 2009: 41). Moreover, “[i]dentity does not cause action but rather makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so” (Barnett 1999: 10). Foreign policy behavior and national identity are thus mutually constitutive (cf. Nadoll 2003: 170). National identity is the framework which provides members of a society with a shared understanding of what kind of foreign policy behavior is appropriate. While policy makers and governments are able to leave this framework, by doing so, they risk strong contestation (cf. Nadoll 2003: 171) and may lose future elections.

Formal rules and procedures within a society predefine the most influential speakers. In democratic countries, the constitution determines partly who these actors are, but parties and the media are also influential (cf. Stahl 2006: 57). This discursive path, including the important persons, groups and institutions, is called *discursive structure* (cf. *ibid.*). Following Milliken’s (1999) concept of privileged storytellers, DBIT assumes that actors with a prominent position within society, like the president of a country, for instance, will have more influence on the communicative production of systems

of meaning. Identity elements provide privileged storytellers with argumentations; however, these elements can be used within different argumentative patterns, even leading to fundamentally different foreign policy recommendations (cf. Stahl 2017: 443). Once these identity elements and argumentative patterns are discursively linked to foreign policy recommendations and become stable over time, they are effectively *discourse formations* (cf. Nadoll 2003: 177). From an ontological perspective, discourse formations are the link between actor and structure (cf. *ibid.*). If certain argumentative patterns and (foreign policy) recommendations become the dominant interpretations of foreign policy (and hence what is considered ‘normal’), they have gained *discursive hegemony* (cf. Nadoll 2003: 52). Thus, identity change also entails a shift in power relations, as discourse bearers who represent the former discursive hegemony lose their hegemonic position (cf. Stahl 2017: 443).

As different discursive formations can come to similar or even the same policy recommendations, albeit for different reasons, there is also the possibility of *discursive alliances*. This means that two discursive formations join their argumentation advocating for a certain foreign policy behavior. These alliances are especially likely if no single discursive formation is able to achieve discursive hegemony (cf. Stahl 2017: 442)¹⁰. Identity change can be observed when new discursive formations occur, i.e. new connections of identity elements, argumentative patterns and policy recommendations (cf. Stahl/Harnisch 2009: 47). Moreover, identity change can manifest itself through a new discursive hegemony (cf. *ibid.*).

2.4 Discussion of the Theoretical Approaches

In summary, the concept of OS provides an explanation to the question: “Why do states form national identities and behave in accordance with them?” It hence provides the motives of the social actor. As OS stresses the importance of stable self-narratives and routines, at first glance it seems to provide a foundation for continuity rather than change. As I will show in chapter 3.1, however, changes via re-interpretation of core elements of the narrative are nevertheless possible.

ST focuses on the question of how issues are moved out of the political process and into the realm of security, thus making extraordinary measures possible. While some critical interpretations of ST also assume that securitizing actors act purposefully, this is not the focus of the theory. Rather, it is interested in the content of the security moves, and engages with the question of audience acceptance. In the context of change vs.

¹⁰According to Stahl, frequently shifting discursive alliances can be a sign of an identity crisis (cf. Stahl 2012: 577). Moreover, as discursive alliances are less stable than discursive hegemonies, they can lead to erratic, rapidly changing foreign policies (cf. Stahl 2017: 442).

continuity, macro-securitization provides an overarching framework which creates a 'security template'. However, macro-securitizations also experience re-interpretations, and are adapted to the specific historical and political context on the domestic level.

DBIT assumes that identities are not fixed, but discursively constructed and contested. In contrast to structural social-constructivist approaches and Role Theory, it situates the construction of identity at the domestic rather than at the international level. It conceptualizes discourse as the link between national identity and foreign policy behavior. Therefore, the theory calls for the application of qualitative discourse analysis. Finally, it provides us with an understanding of why states may pursue different foreign policies and why the foreign policy of a country might change over time. In contrast to some strands of OS, it does not make assumptions about the motives of the bearers of the discourse.

Hence, there is a certain tension between OS and DBIT. While the latter is rather careful about its assumptions, OS is comparatively 'bold'. Its assumption that states (or state representatives) collectively experience ontological security cannot be verified or falsified by FPA or IR. Therefore, OS is a rather presuppositional approach to FPA. From the standpoint of DBIT, one can argue that it does not really matter *why* states form certain identities, as long as we can show that they *do* form them, *how* this happens, and that they *act in accordance* with them. However, one could also argue that it is rather unsatisfactory not to have any underlying concept for the reason of identity constructions¹¹.

All three approaches assume that there are 'privileged storytellers', and the use of discourse analysis is expedient within their frameworks, as is the additional analysis of foreign/security practices stemming from those discourses. They also allow for the bridging of the domestic and the international level. While DBIT is less open to analyzing interactions on the international level, it nevertheless assumes that foreign policies feed back into the domestic discourse. Therefore, the domestic discourse is not a closed system, but linked to the international system. In the case of ST, employing the framework of macro-securitization allows for a broader understanding of global security discourses, rather than just focusing on the case at hand. In comparison, OS is the concept that has integrated interactions (and the insecurities that might arise from them) most deeply into its conceptual framework¹². Moreover, all three approaches are

¹¹While OS and DBIT are not in principle incommensurable, some interpretations are. For instance, Subotić's critical approach to OS and her instrumental understanding of narratives cannot be brought in line with approaches in OS and discourse-bound theory that argue, as I do, that we cannot know why actors use certain narratives, and should rather focus on analyzing the production of those narratives and their consequences instead of speculating about the motives of the speakers.

¹²The focus on differentiation also raises the question of whether or not a Schmittian view on (world) politics can be overcome, or if we have to assume that the world is inherently conflictual due to constant processes of othering and creating insecurity.

2 Theoretical Perspectives of the Articles

fit to conceptualize re-interpretations and changes in foreign and security policies.

3 Summary and Contextualization of the Publications

In this chapter, the theoretical and the empirical contributions of each article are discussed. Therefore, I briefly summarize the aims, the methodological proceedings and the results of each article.

3.1 A1 The international model citizen and the Syrian war: Canadian identity from a civilian power perspective

Relevance and Research Aims

The research article titled “The international model citizen and the Syrian war: Canadian identity from a civilian power perspective” was published in *International Journal* Vol. 74 (3) in October 2019 after a double blind-peer review. The article aims at answering the question of whether Civilian Power elements play a role in identity construction and resulting foreign policy actions in the Canadian discourse. On an empirical level, the article contributes to the literature on Canadian foreign policy behavior and discourse in the Syrian war, as well as the discussion about the difference and continuities in foreign policy between the conservative government of Stephen Harper and the liberal government of Justin Trudeau. On a theoretical level, it challenges the notion that (material) power resources (capabilities) are the primary determiners of a state’s foreign policy. In contrast, I argue that Canadian identity is constructed around Civilian Power elements (Institution Building, Rule of Law, Military Action as Last Resort, Multilateralism, Forgoing of Autonomy and Willingness to Shape the International Order). Hence, if an administration wants to change the established ways of Canadian foreign policy (as the Harper administration did), it needs to re-interpret these identity elements in order to provide the image of a stable narrative of Canadian identity, and to ensure ontological security. Thus, the article contributes to the conceptualization of foreign policy change, and it adds to the literature on OS. It also shows how the concept of OS can serve to explore the tensions between change and continuity, as ontological security is provided by a narrative of a *stable* identity, but change is nevertheless possible through re-interpretation of narrative elements.

Method & Structure

The article challenges the well-established notion that Canadian foreign policy is best understood and analyzed using the middle-power approach. While there is a wide range of definitions and different theoretical approaches to the middle power concept, including ideational ones, the concept originates within a realist ontology. It is hence originally based on the assumption that a state's behavior is determined by its capabilities.

In a social-constructivist understanding, middle power is interpreted as a role certain countries take in their interactions with other states in the international system. The concept of civilian power was originally formulated in the context of Role Theory (cf. Kirste/Maull 1996). However, I argue that the civilian power elements can also be understood as discursive elements that provide a stable sense of Self and a “logic of appropriateness” that functions as a guide for policy makers and as marker by which society judges policies acceptable” (Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010: 420).

In the introduction of the article, I state my research question: “How do Liberals and Conservatives (re-) interpret civilian power elements?” and present my theses:

- T1 Both Liberal and Conservative governments refer to civilian power elements in justifying their foreign policy action.
- T2 While Liberal and Conservative governments anchor their foreign policy decisions in civilian power elements, they stress different elements.
- T3 Conservatives and Liberals interpret the individual civilian power elements differently. I expect Liberals to lean toward an internationalist interpretation, while Conservatives are likely to stress the importance of the alliance with the US.
- T4 Conservatives and/or Liberals do not use civilian power elements or reinterpret them so strongly that they no longer fit the civilian power framework.

In order to test my theses, I analyzed and systematically compared official statements by members of the Harper and the Trudeau administrations regarding the War in Iraq and Syrian war. I included official statements addressing the Canadian public, as well as statements directed to the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. The timeframe for the analysis was 24 May 2011 to 16 April 2018. The first date marks the point in time when the Harper government officially categorized the situation in Syria as a crisis by taking action in the form of sanctions. On 16 April 2018, the last major attack against civilians to which the Trudeau government reacted, took place in Ghouta. Using MAXQDA, the documents were first coded deductively, searching for representations of the Civilian Power elements *Rule of Law*, *Multilateralism* and *Willingness to Act*. I excluded *Forgoing of Autonomy* from the analysis, as I see it as a foreign policy behavior

that results from the integration of multilateral processes and international institutions. In a second step, I inductively coded all un-coded sentences.

In the first part of the article, I introduce the concepts of OS and civilian power. In accordance with Harnisch and Maull (2001), I understand civilian powers as characterized by the following features: Civilian powers act as institution builders, they support the rule of law, they only use military power as a last resort, they are in favor of multilateralism and are willing to forego autonomy. Furthermore, they are willing to shape the international order. In contrast to Harnisch and Maull, I do not focus on foreign policy behavior or interaction with other states, as Role Theory would require. Instead, I treat these civilian power elements as structuring elements in an autobiographical narrative that provides Canadian foreign policy makers with ontological security. This allows me to focus on the ego-part of Canadian national identity construction, which I believe to be promising as there is a vast body of literature on the influence that the US in particular has on Canadian foreign policy.

In the second part of the paper, I describe my methodology. As with the other contributions to this dissertation, my analysis focuses on the statements of “privileged storytellers” (Milliken 1999: 236), which is in line with analyses using the civilian power model and those using the concept of OS. Hence, I analyzed statements by the respective prime minister, the Conservative foreign ministers John Baird and Rob Nicholson, and the Liberal foreign ministers Stéphane Dion and Chrystia Freeland.

In the third part of the article, I summarize the development of the Syrian war and the Canadian foreign policy response to those events. Canada imposed sanctions against the Assad regime in May 2011 and joined the coalition against the IS in 2014. Harper repeatedly expressed his concerns about the crimes of the Assad regime against the Syrian people, however, no military action followed. After his electoral victory in 2015, Justin Trudeau promised that he would end the combat mission, but would continue Canadian engagement in Syria in a responsible way by focusing on training missions and humanitarian efforts. In accordance with these statements, Canada shifted from airstrikes to the provision of military intelligence, medical services, and the training of Iraqi security forces.

Results

The discourse analysis yields the following results: The analysis confirms Thesis 1, that both governments use civilian power elements in their discourse. The elements that were most frequently used were *Rule of Law* and *Willingness to Act*, while *Multilateralism* and *Institution Building* were used less often, and mostly in connection to the two dominant elements. Thesis 2 was confirmed as well: Conservatives and Liberals indeed stress

different elements. While the Harper administration emphasized Canada's *Willingness to Act*, Liberals stressed the *Rule of Law*. Thesis 3 is also confirmed, that Conservatives and Liberals interpreted the civilian power elements differently. For instance, Liberals often referred to a subcategory of the *Rule of Law* that emerged from the inductively coded *Protection of Civilians*. In contrast, Conservatives leaned towards a more legalist interpretation of the category *Rule of Law*, mostly related to sanctions and UN resolutions. Moreover, Liberals linked *Protection of Civilians* to gendered policies, which allowed them to add a 'liberal trademark' to Canadian engagement in Iraq and Syria, thereby shifting the focus of the *Willingness to Act* from a militaristic one to a humanitarian one. Conservatives stretched *Multilateralism* to its limits by strongly connecting it to a partnership with the US, representing a continentalist approach rather than a truly multilateral one. However, as they still linked this partnership to multilateralism, I argue that Thesis 4 is not confirmed: Neither party excluded civilian power elements from its discourse.

Further research should investigate the question of whether or not *Rule of Law* is generally dominant in Canadian foreign policy identity, or if this finding is due to the nature of the conflict, and other elements become dominant in different contexts. Moreover, the analysis strongly indicates gendered narratives, with Harper trying to establish a more 'masculine' Canadian identity. Research from feminist perspectives, as well as engaging with past failures of Canadian foreign policies and their impact on the Canadian Self narrative, such as Somalia, might be fruitful.

3.2 A2 Same Old (Macro-) Securitization? A Comparison of Political Reactions to Major Terrorist Attacks in the United States and France

Relevance and Research Aims

The research article "Same Old (Macro-)Securitization? A Comparison of Political Reactions to Major Terrorist Attacks in the United States and France" was published in *Croatian International Relations Review* Vol. XXV (84) in 2019, after a double-blind peer review process. We started working on this article as we were puzzled that even though the US WoT is widely regarded as a failure, France's reactions to the 2015 attacks in Paris evoked strong parallels to the US case. This led to our thesis that the acceptance (or hegemony) of the macro-securitization of the WoT constituted this interpretation of the murders. In order to explore this thesis, we chose to compare securitization in the US—as the starting point for the macro-securitization of the global WoT—with securitization in France.

While the focus of the article is on contributing to a better empirical understanding of

the securitization of terrorism in France, as well as on a better understanding of the persistence of the WoT by conceptualizing it as a macro-securitization, it also makes a methodical contribution. On the one hand, using macro-securitization allows us to link the national discourse on terrorism to a hegemonic, global meta-discursive formation. On the other hand, choosing a comparative approach also enables us to account for national nuances in the discourses on terrorism, and sheds some light on further possible research questions worth exploring. As Stahl et al. point out, using securitization

“[...] as a comparative and methodological tool for comparing security policy bears some innovative potential. Conceived as a travelling concept for comparative foreign policy analysis, securitisation provides opportunities for meaningful comparisons, in particular for such crucial factors as threat perception and emergency measures in emerging conflict situations” (Stahl et al. 2016: 15).

In the article at hand, the question is about how we can explain similar threat perceptions under different national (and global) circumstances. While DBIT would propose that national discourses on security threats might strongly differ, using the concept of macro-securitization provides a theoretical explanation for the similarity of said discourses.

Method & Structure

In the first part of the article, we introduce our empirical puzzle and clarify our methodological proceedings. In order to explore our research question, we employ discursive analysis and, like Bennett and George (2005), utilize a structured and focused comparison of the US and French cases. Due to the historic differences and France's initial rejection of the WoT securitization in the case of the Iraq War 2003, we relied on a 'most different' case selection. 'Structured' refers to a consistent catalog of criteria and questions, in our case the following ones: Which emergency measures were taken? Which foreign policies followed from the securitization? Did the audience accept the securitization? What was the content of the security moves? How was the referent object described? How was the securitizing subject described? The comparison is focused, as it concentrates on answering the question of whether there was a strong similarity between the two cases, and whether we can thus reasonably assume that the WoT has been established as a macro-securitization.

We then introduce our theoretical framework of ST, drawing mostly on the CS. In accordance with the theory, we defined the US and French governments as security actors, and, as we were dealing with a presidential and a semi-presidential system, focused on statements by George W. Bush and François Hollande. Furthermore, we

included statements by the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in the US case. While there is an ample body of literature on the securitization of terrorism in the US case, which we also took into account, literature on the securitization of the Paris attacks was rather sparse at the time of our analysis. Therefore, the focus of our analysis lies on the French case. We included speeches by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense. The texts were scanned and inductively coded for security moves. We first discuss the US case, starting with a short summary of the security measures taken after the 9/11 attacks, followed by a description of the security moves that were taken in order to gain the audience's acceptance for those measures. We proceed in the same way in the French case, and compare the cases along the questions discussed above. In the third part of the article, we summarize our results and discuss their normative and theoretical implications.

Results

Firstly, our results show that the French case amounts to a full-securitization. Secondly, there were several links to the macro-securitization of the WoT: the emphasis of its global dimension, the aim to destroy the perpetrators, the link to foreign regions, and the self-description of being the epitome of the 'civilized' world, "the motherland of human rights" (Hollande 2015a). These are all examples of strong similarities between the US and France as far as the description of the nature of the attacks and the perpetrators, as well as the governments' decisiveness to deal with the threat. The French government defined the attacks in Paris as "acts of war" (Hollande 2015b), and furthermore claimed that France was "a new kind of adversary" (Hollande 2015a). US government officials had described the attacks of 9/11 in the same way fourteen years earlier (cf. Bush 2001a, Bush 2001b). In both cases, the goal to totally destroy the enemy was announced. However, we also found several differences: In contrast to the US case, there was no orientation toward worst-case scenarios in France. While the Bush administration extremely dramatized the situation and took corresponding foreign policy actions (the Afghanistan War 2001, the Iraq War 2003), the French bombings in Syria were little more than symbolic. Moreover, there was a stronger shift of power from the legislative to the executive branch in the US than in France. The US strongly institutionalized securitization by establishing the Department of Homeland Security, while France's new anti-terrorism law is only applicable until 2020, when parliament will decide about its prolongation.

Overall, our findings indicate that the WoT macro-securitization persists, and it provides a potent framework. Its logic seems to be easily accessible for audiences, especially as the image of the Muslim 'Other' is well established in Western societies. Additionally, the comparison allows us to show shifts in macro-securitization itself, or re-interpretations that better fit the temporal and national settings: In contrast to the US, there was no

strong religious connotation in the description of the terrorists, and the foreign policy implications drawn from the attack were not as far reaching. Due to the different circumstances, the need for domestic surveillance and measures against ‘the enemy within’ in the French case became strongly emphasized, as was made apparent in the debate about citizenship withdrawal.

Therefore, we believe that the French case is a further example of how the securitization of terrorist attacks blurs the line between a state of emergency and ‘normal’ politics, and hinders a meaningful debate about the underlying social and global problems that lead to terrorism. Furthermore, we argue that there is a desideratum when it comes to the ‘flexibility’ of macro-securitizations and their adaptation in the national context. We also argue that future studies should investigate the link between micro- and macro-securitizations. A comparative perspective can help us to explore the questions of why some (macro-) securitizations are accepted in one country but not another, and what role historic discourses on the respective issue play in this.

3.3 A3 Turkey and Tunisia: Building Bridges in Stormy Times?

Relevance and Research Aims

The article “Turkey and Tunisia: building bridges in stormy times?” has been published in the edited volume “Tunisia’s International Relations since the ‘Arab Spring’. Transition Inside and Out” (Abderrahim et al. 2018a) after a peer review process.

In contrast to the other articles of this dissertation, it is not a theory-driven contribution, but rather a methodical-empirical one. All the contributions in the edited volume are based on the (liberal) assumption that a change in the domestic system, in this case from an autocratic to a democratic system, is also likely to result in a change in foreign policies (cf. Abderrahim et al. 2018b: 3). Regarding the relationship with Turkey, our article follows the implicit assumption that due to the Muslim identity of Tunisia, the ideological ties between Ennahda and the AKP might lead to the perception of Turkey being an especially attractive partner for Tunisia. Overall, the article provides insight into the general approach taken to inductive qualitative content analysis that I also employed in A2, and in addition to deductive coding in A1.

As Turkey was often described as an attractive model for combining Islam, democracy and economic growth in the early 2010s¹³, our research aim was to answer the question

¹³The Turkish Model has been debunked as a myth by some authors (cf. Sengupta 2014), even before the failed military coup in 2016 and the repression by the Erdoğan government following it. After the protests in Gezi Park in Istanbul in 2013 and the government’s reactions to it, it was already becoming clear that Turkey, under the AKP government, was not living up to its allegedly harmonious marriage

of how Turkish and Tunisian political actors perceive the possibilities for Turkish-Tunisian cooperation, as well as the status quo of the Tunisian transformation process after the revolution.

Method & Structure

In the first part of the article, we outline the development of Turkish foreign policy in order to situate the relationship with Tunisia in the context of Turkish foreign policy, and to provide a better understanding of the Turkish reactions towards the ‘Arab Spring’. These reactions are then described, concentrating on the two visits that president Erdoğan paid to Tunis in September 2011 and June 2013. In the second part of the article, we discuss our methodology and the results of our analysis. The corpus for the qualitative content analysis consists of the speech that president Erdoğan gave during his visit in 2013, and a speech by the Tunisian president Moncef Marzouki given in May 2013 during a visit to Turkey. As there are very few speeches or official statements by either Turkish or Tunisian officials, we also conducted two semi-structured interviews. The interview partners were Muhammad Al-Adil, president of the Maghreb-Turk Forum for Culture and Economy and chairman of the Turkish Arab Association for Economic and Strategic cooperation, and the former minister of foreign affairs, Rafik Abdessalem. Rihab Kordi conducted both interviews face-to-face in Arabic. Rihab Kordi then transcribed the interviews and translated them into English. We proceeded in the same way as we did with Erdoğan’s¹⁴ and Marzouki’s speeches. While, especially in the case of Erdoğan’s speech, we are aware of the risk of meaning getting ‘lost in translation’ due to the indirect translation of the speech into English, in light of the scarcity of sources we decided this was still the best way to conduct our research. With regard to the selection of our interview partners, one should be aware of the fact that both interview partners were likely to be quite supportive of stronger Turkish-Tunisian relations, as Al-Adil is actively promoting cooperation between the two countries through the Maghreb-Turk Forum, and Abdessalem is a member of the Ennahda party, which has expressed sympathies towards the AKP.

Following Mayring (2003), I inductively developed categories. In order to do so, I first paraphrased the material, bringing it to the same language level and transforming it to a grammatical short form. I then summarized the paraphrases into different categories according to their semantic content. Afterwards, I reassessed the categories and, using the original material, refined them. The following six categories emerged from the content analysis:

1. *The ancien régime*: Statements about the Ben Ali regime and old elites.

of Islamic values and democracy.

¹⁴The speech was held in Turkish but dubbed into Arabic by a translator.

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2. *Business cooperation*: Statements about existing business cooperation and prospects for future cooperation.
3. *Challenges and obstacles*: Statements about obstacles for cooperation, but also for the future development of Tunisia.
4. *Cultural heritage*: Statements which highlight the historical bond between Turkey and Tunisia.
5. *Democratic and economic development*: Statements concerning preconditions of democratic development and the progress of Tunisia's transition process.
6. *Friendship and family*: Positive, emotionally-charged statements, and statements about belonging to the same family or being friends.

We then discuss the findings and the contributions of each speaker to each of the categories.

Results

Overall, we found that the relations between Turkey and Tunisia were perceived as being friendly, and that there was the potential for future cooperation. Turkey is seen as an economic model more than a political one. Turkish and Tunisian actors alike stress the importance of economic growth for Tunisian stability. While Tunisia sees Turkey as a potent economy, Turkey perceives Tunisia as a potential door to the bigger market of the Maghreb. Both sides stress the importance of reforming Tunisia's legislative structures in order to facilitate investment. Since the revolution, Turkish-Tunisian intergovernmental cooperation has been consolidated through the opening of an office of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in July 2012 in Tunis. Non-governmental organizations such as the *Hizmet* movement are also active in promoting cultural exchange. However, obstacles persist, especially in the form of bureaucratic hurdles. Meanwhile, due to terrorism and the failing state in Libya, security issues might become more important in future Turkish-Tunisian relations.

Outlook

When we finished writing our article in 2017, an increased focus on security in Tunisia after the attacks in the Bardo Museum in March 2015, and the deadly attacks on a beach near Sousse in June of the same year, was already visible. Further research should therefore take into account what kind of security cooperation is ongoing or planned between Turkey and Tunisia. Moreover, given the persecution of the Gülen movement in Turkey since the failed coup in 2016, further investigation into the activities of the *Hizmet* movement in Tunisia and Turkey's position toward said activities is warranted. From a social-constructivist perspective, it also seems promising to investigate if the

shared history of the Ottoman Empire, which is a strong point of reference in Turkey, especially for the AKP government, plays any role in Tunisian identity constructions¹⁵.

3.4 A4 Trump's Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism vs National Identity Change

Relevance and Research Aims

The article “Trump’s Foreign Policy: Erratic Individualism vs National Identity Change” has been published in the edited Volume “Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy” (Oswald 2020) after a peer review process. The article is the joint work of Elena Dück, Bernhard Stahl and Katharina McLarren (for details see 5). It aims at answering the question of whether or not current US foreign policy is the result of actor (Trump)-driven decisions, or the result of a shift in bipartisan consensus. The relevance of this question lies in the permanence of said foreign policies: If they are the result of Trump’s erratic individualism, we can expect US foreign policy to change again, once Trump’s presidency ends and return to ‘normal’. However, if a shift in bipartisan consensus has occurred, we cannot expect a return to former US foreign policies, but should instead prepare for a lasting change. In this case, Trump’s foreign policies are the expression of a ‘new normal’, backed by a bipartisan consensus.

In the context of this dissertation, the article shows the value of social-constructivist approaches in uncovering underlying discursive shifts that make foreign policy change possible. While not providing causal predictions about future foreign policies, DBIT is nevertheless able to show what kinds of foreign policies are more likely to be able to be legitimized within the dominant discursive formations, and which argumentations are currently losing support and hence less likely to be influential in upcoming foreign policy decisions. On an empirical level, the article contributes to a more thorough understanding of Trump’s foreign policy decisions that goes beyond oversimplified explanations of his character just being unhinged and irrational.

Method & Structure

In the introduction, we take up the common notion of Trump being a ‘foreign policy maverick’ whose actions do not follow any recognizable patterns. Our research question challenges this notion by opening up the possibility of an enduring change in US foreign policy. We introduce our case selection: Trump’s Israel politics, the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, and US-Russian relations. We selected these cases as they represent ‘active foreign policy cases’ which Trump heavily impacted. Moreover, the

¹⁵Innes and Steele also propose looking at the Arab Spring “by consulting ontological security theory for insights into a key example of social change” (2014: 27), as the disruption of authoritarian rule created ontological insecurity.

cases represent foreign policy issues with strong identity reference. In the first section of the article, we summarize the content of real type bipartisan consensus, drawing on secondary literature. We then introduce our theoretical framework: In order to answer our research question, drawing on DBIT (see 2.3), we conceptualize the bipartisan consensus as a discursive hegemony regarding recommendations for foreign policy actions. The discursive hegemony (or, in this case, bipartisan consensus) until the election of Trump was made up by an alliance of the discursive formations “exceptionalism”, “realism” and “internationalism”, while “isolationism” was a counter-discourse and not part of the discursive alliance (see figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1: Discursive hegemony in the US

Hence, at the beginning of each case study, we determine the bipartisan consensus on the foreign policy issue using qualitative content analysis. We do so by analyzing presidential debates and secondary sources. We did not include congressional debates, as they would represent the ‘old’ bipartisan consensus, while presidential debates represent the ideas of newcomers such as Trump, and are therefore more likely to indicate future changes. In a second step, we compare Trump’s statements on the issue prior to the election, as well as during his presidency. Lastly, we analyze foreign policy action taken by the Trump administration. This allows us to then evaluate if these actions were covered by bipartisan consensus, if the consensus is shifting, or if actions were based solely on Trump’s foreign policy beliefs (or whims). Finally, we discuss the result of our analysis and the implications for future US foreign policy.

Results

In the case of Israel, whose support is one of the strongest principles of bipartisan consensus, we found that at the beginning of his presidential campaign, Trump stated that he wanted to be neutral and focus on negotiating a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. During his campaign, his statements became increasingly supportive of Israel, a position that he consolidated once in office. Besides assigning his

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son-in-law, Jared Kushner, the task of negotiating a peace-agreement in the Middle East, Trump moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2019, Trump announced via Twitter that he thought it was time to fully recognize Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Our analysis shows that these steps were backed by a nationalist interpretation of isolationism and the exceptionalist discursive formation, with whom the topoi of a 'chosen nation', as well as the idea that the US can pursue its own independent foreign policy, resonates. As proponents of a realist position do not believe in the power of institutions and binding agreements, they saw Trump's Israel politics as a way to limit adversaries' capabilities. In contrast, liberal internationalism was losing ground. In summary, Trump's foreign policy in Israel was backed by a discursive alliance between realism, exceptionalism and a new nationalist interpretation of isolationism.

In the case of the Syrian war, Trump's stance was very clear even before he started his campaign: he was against the involvement of the US in Syria. In light of the rise of ISIS, in 2016 he made the concession that it was necessary to fight the terrorist organization, however, US troops should return home as fast as possible. Therefore, his timing was more surprising than his general position when Trump announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Syria in December 2018. In contrast to his Israel policies, this step was met with resistance from within his administration, as well as from the Senate. This indicates a more actor-driven decision in the case of Syria. The case also shows that supporters of internationalism, who would recommend future US engagement in order to support the Kurdish allies and stabilize the region, could not assert their position. Again, the analysis shows a return to the isolationist position the US should engage less abroad.

The third case, Trump's foreign policy towards Russia, is the only case strongly characterized by contradictions. We analyzed Trump's position on Russian interference with the 2016 US election, the Ukraine Crisis and Russia's role in the Syrian war. The fact that Congress hindered an end to US sanctions against Russia shows that Trump was neither as tough on Russia as he claimed, nor able to win support in the US for his advances toward Putin. Trump's actions are not backed by bipartisan consensus, nor by a new discursive alliance.




Figure 3.2: New discursive alliance

Overall, our analysis indicates—with the exception of the Russian case—that a shift in discursive formations has taken place. Internationalism is no longer part of the hegemonic discourse (see figure 3.2). Instead, our research shows that the isolationist formation has been revamped in a more nationalist interpretation, and is now part of a discursive alliance with exceptionalism and realism. However, it is questionable if this fragile alliance will be able to endure and become the newly established discursive hegemony.

4 Discussion of the Findings

In summary, this dissertation shows the fruitfulness of engaging with different social-constructivist theories in order to explore questions of continuity and change. It argues that change becomes possible through re-interpretations of existing narratives or identity elements. What can we learn from the results of this dissertation for future research?

In the context of OS, I argue that the concept can fruitfully be combined with other social-constructivist theories that do not give answers to the question of why identities are formed in the first place. Moreover, while it seems to stress continuity rather than change at first glance, this dissertation shows that even in the absence of a deep crisis, incremental change can be conceptualized within the OS framework. This illustrates the general strengths of social-constructivist approaches: they provide a useful framework for explaining and analyzing changes in foreign policy and international politics. The innovative strength of my article lies firstly in its consideration of civilian power, and secondly in its exploration of incremental change, rather than relying solely on the context of 'shock' or 'crises'. Further research focusing on OS could benefit from tackling the issue of whether or not international relations can ever be truly peaceful in light of the ontological insecurity that states inherently face. Engaging with DBIT might be helpful, as it offers past Selves as one possible Other against which states can construct their own identities, rather than exclusively focusing on foreign states as the Other.

In the case of ST, I believe that further comparative studies on macro-securitization can help to increase our understanding of audience acceptance, as well as to broaden our concept of facilitating conditions. So far, facilitating conditions are often excluded from the analysis, or are understood in a rather material way. In contrast, comparative analysis of securitizations sheds light on the connection of certain securitizations to historical discourses and constructions of otherness that might facilitate securitizing an issue in one country while hindering its securitization in others. Stritzel's concept of the 'consolidated discursive realm' offers a link between audiences and facilitating conditions. Comparative research can provide a deeper understanding of the specific discursive realm that might make successful securitization of an issue possible in one country, but render it impossible in another. For instance, nuclear power plants are considered a major security issue in Germany, as became apparent after the Fukushima

4 Discussion of the Findings

accident, but not in France, where the discourses on nuclear power have historically been very different from those in Germany. Hence, facilitating conditions should not primarily be understood in a material way that is somehow independent from discourse, but rather in the context of historical discourses that make securitization possible in the first place.

The comparison of national securitizations, especially when employing the framework of macro-securitization, might also help to answer the question of whether or not we have to broaden our understanding of audiences. While Robin Lucke and I already assumed a duality of the audience (cf. Roe 2008b), there might also be an international audience at which the securitizing moves are aimed. Especially in cases in which international solidarity is demanded within alliances such as NATO or EU, further research concerning the international audience(s) might be fruitful.

Furthermore, this dissertation shows the usefulness of applying DBIT to recent cases in order to explain foreign policy changes, as well as to (carefully) assess their possible persistence. The article on Trump's foreign policy (A4) also shows the general benefit of theory-led analysis: seemingly random occurrences, once structured, become more comprehensible. This dissertation shows that even though we do not take a positivist stance, we are nevertheless able to formulate some (careful) predictions about the likelihood of the durability of changes in FPA. When it comes to avenues for further research, DBIT, and discursive approaches in general, might benefit from investigating the methodical question of how to uncover contestation in non-democratic countries in which opinions cannot be freely voiced. Here, the theory might benefit from a broader conceptualization of discourses, including performative acts and everyday practices of resistance in which counter-discourses are visible, albeit silent.

Overall, this dissertation also shows that the plurality of social-constructivist approaches is not a weakness, or something that renders them incommensurable in general. While authors can and should be more precise about their understanding of key terms, social-constructivist approaches and concepts can fruitfully be combined, compared, and used to shed light on issues from various angles. Moreover, they are able to, as Robin Lucke and I have shown using macro-securitization, overcome the artificial divide between the domestic and international level. In a similar vein, OS and DBIT allow us to understand identity construction as an interplay between national discourses and interactions on the international level. In my view, this is the greatest achievement of social-constructivism from a discourse-oriented perspective: It dissolves the historical division into IR as a theory of the international system and FPA as the analysis of state behavior, enabling us to take a holistic view on state and world society.

5 Description of the Author's Contribution to the Publications

Article 1 I developed the concept for this article individually and wrote the article alone.

Article 2 Robin Lucke and I developed the concept for this article together. Robin Lucke wrote the first draft of the theoretical framework. I later reworked the theoretical framework, taking into consideration the works of Stritzel (2011) and Bigo (2002). Robin Lucke was responsible for the chapter on US reactions to 9/11, to which I later added the insights gained by Richard Jackson (2005) and Adam Hodges (2011). Both authors were responsible for researching the sources and selection of speeches on which the discourse analysis of the French case is based. I conducted the analysis of the French discourse following the Paris attacks in 2015. We wrote the introduction and conclusion together. I was responsible for the submission process and all changes to the article based on the reviewers' comments.

Article 3 Rihab Kordi and I developed the concept and structure of this article together. We wrote the introduction as well as the conclusion together. We were equally engaged in researching primary and secondary sources for the article, as well as in reconstructing Turkey's behavior during the Arab Spring. While I was in charge of writing the 'Historic Overview of Turkey's foreign policy', Rihab Kordi conducted the semi-structured interviews and transcribed them. She also transcribed the speeches by Erdogan and Marzouki. I was responsible for the chapter 'Analysis and methodology', conducted the content analysis and summarized the findings.

Article 4 Bernhard Stahl, Katharina McLarren and I developed the outline for this article together. Bernhard Stahl and Katharina McLarren were responsible for the theoretical framework. I was responsible for the empirical case studies and the introduction. Bernhard Stahl wrote the conclusion of the article and added final touches to the case studies. Katharina McLarren managed the submission process and conducted minor changes requested by the editors.

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Appendix

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Versicherung (gem. § 4 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 5 PromO)

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- dass ich die Dissertation nicht bereits in derselben oder einer ähnlichen Fassung an einer anderen Fakultät oder einer anderen Hochschule zur Erlangung eines akademischen Grades eingereicht habe

Passau, den 18. Februar 2020

Elena Dück