

Religion and International Society
Approaches to including religion in the
International Relations research agenda

by

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I. Introduction

Angles, turns, and puzzles

Religion can unite and divide, it can lead to a strengthening or a weakening of identity and legitimacy. Religion can stoke conflicts but it can also pacify them – within societies and beyond. Religion endures and it can exist independently of states, it can constitute them, and it can provide new forms of states, societies, and empires. Philosophers and sociologists have been tackling these issues for decades, with contemporary thinkers engaging in public debates and revisiting the question of religion and society and the need to redefine secularism in the 21st century (cf. Butler, Habermas, Taylor, West 2011). What these debates do not, however, consider is how religion shapes or even constitutes the international society of states, beyond domestic societies. Ranging from secular to religious states, the “members” of this international society vary greatly and yet have agreed on certain values and practices in the form of institutions at the international level. Whether diplomacy, human rights, or international law, these institutions provide the foundation for the modern international society of states, which has and continues to evolve. Considering religion in the evolution of this international society would thus shed more insight as to how and why this society is evolving. Empirically speaking, religion is intertwined with the great topics of (international) politics: war, peace, sovereignty, order, and justice. Theoretically speaking, however, religion remains nebulous and neglected in International Relations (IR).

For scholars of International Relations there are different approaches to studying international politics. While there are the well-known theoretical schools of thought, within and beyond these schools, scholars also employ angles which help them focus their research. While an angle is far from a theoretical lens, its significance is not to be underestimated, and can be understood as a point of access or thread with which to approach their field of study. An angle in this context is usually a seemingly well-known political or societal global phenomenon or institution. When dissected, however, it reveals complex structures that can be found repeatedly in (international) politics and society. These angles thus allow scholars to study global political and societal developments under a magnifying glass. Examples of such angles are war, governance, democracy or even sport.¹ For scholars of IR such a point of access is particularly useful,

¹ For examples of the respective angles see for example Stahl 2006; Gellner and Horst 2016; Brand, Niemann and Spitaler 2013.

as the subject-matter of examination in this field is limited neither by time nor by space.² Religion, however, is an angle in IR that was shunned at worst and grossly neglected at best in the past decades.

This absence of religion in IR in the 20th century had three main reasons (cf. Fox 2001; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003; Snyder 2011): Firstly, the widely-held belief in modernization went hand-in-hand with the conviction that secularism would prevail, thus rendering religion irrelevant for academia. Secondly, International Relations is a traditionally state-centrist field of study with the international system that evolved from the Westphalian Peace at its core, symbolizing a clear break with religion as a source of legitimation or power. Thirdly, in its endeavor to become an established and respected scientific discipline, an effort the so-called great debates circled around, religion would have added (yet another) discrediting dimension. However, by nature, IR is also a very dynamic (and self-reflective) field of study and thus susceptible to change and innovation – from within the field but also in reaction to evolving international politics. Two developments are crucial in facilitating or even fostering the inclusion of religion in IR: the most recent “great debate” within the discipline and the events surrounding 9/11. The former refers to the discipline’s opening up to a wider spectrum of epistemological approaches,³ while the latter points to a political happening which sparked a public and academic interest and awareness of religion in society and politics.

In line with these developments, with the dawn of the 21st century, academics increasingly accepted that religiosity would not subside, but rather would continue to take on new forms. As the state of the art below indicates, the interest in religion has indeed been kindled, with some scholars even calling out a religious turn in IR (Kratochvíl 2009; Kubálková 2009, 2013; Thomas 2016) and one of the most prominent scholars in the field claiming research was “thriving” (Fox 2020). A caveat is necessary here. While the term “turn” has in part been received favorably within IR, some critics have gone so far as to denounce “...turns [as] bids to become an ‘established heretic’” (Baele and Bettiza 2020: 3). In other words, these critics accuse academics who proclaim turns of merely seeking to increase their positioning in the field. In a more lenient understanding of the term “turn” in connection with religion, the expectation would be that religion has by now been firmly established in IR scholarship, both at an analytical as well

² To very briefly illustrate the scope of this field of study: at the beginning of their studies, IR students are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the Melian Dialogue which took place during the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C. (cf. Brown, Nardin, Rengger (eds.) 2002), while IR scholars have been exploring the politics of outer space or even UFOs (cf. Bormann and Sheehan (eds.) 2009; Set 2016; Wendt 2008).

³Ironically, Lake, who is a strong critic of the debates and likens them to paradigm wars, refers to them as being “quasi-religious” (Lake 2013: 568).

as at a theoretical level, demonstrated in publications, but also in projects and curricula. However, the state of the art also reveals that while research on religion and international politics now exist, religion is by no means firmly established in the fabric – the theories - of IR. Thus, in either reading of the “religious turn,” the outcome is sobering– an observation underlined by the fact that neither the “Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace” nor the journal “Perspectives – Review of International Affairs” which published the articles on the religious turn still exist. In the negative interpretation, the authors proclaiming the turn were merely seeking to elevate their position in the field. In a slightly less negative reading, the authors fell victim to a chimera – hoping that religion would not just feature more prominently in empirical studies, but become firmly integrated in IR theories, which so far has not taken place.

This poses the central and enduring puzzle, namely why religion remains largely absent in theory-guided IR research. The present state of the art unearths the core challenge, for while the puzzle of *why* religion has been neglected for so long has been repeatedly examined, the more specific question of *how* to include it remains to be answered for large parts of IR. This first chapter therefore includes a detailed overview of the state of the art to provide a comprehensive overview of what has been done and what gaps still exist, providing the points of departure for the ensuing research of this dissertation. The overall guiding research question then reads: how can religion be included in the International Relations research agenda? The main aim of this dissertation is not only to demonstrate that religion can serve as an angle with which to approach and better grasp international politics, but to provide specific ways of including it in the IR research agenda. The focus, as the title indicates, is placed on religion and international society. While all articles are guided by the overarching research question, each contribution narrows the focus down to specific theoretical or empirical aspects: The first contribution, which also provides the overarching theoretical framework, explores conceptual ways of embedding religion in the English School. The second article is closely linked theoretically, examining Iran and the Holy See as state-religious actors, introducing the concept of hybrid actors from an English School perspective. The next contribution then follows-up on this concept and develops it further, proposing ways of including “hybrid actorness” in Foreign Policy analysis. The fourth article provides an empirical case of how religion shapes international society in a European context. The final contribution discusses religion in the context of the securitization approach and provides an expansion to the analytical framework. The dissertation is divided into four parts: following the state of the art and the points of departure, part two offers a brief discussion on defining religion in the social sciences and in IR in particular and then introduces a new definition of religion suitable for IR. Part two also establishes the theoretical framework for the

overall dissertation by employing the English School. As just mentioned, the first publication serves as the basis of this theoretical framework, expanding it to include religion by introducing new concepts. Part three follows up on the theoretical reflections on the English School by examining how religion shapes international society, as demonstrated in the other four publications. The presentation of each of the publications is structured to include the scope and context; a short summary of the findings; and a critical discussion of its contribution to the academic debate, linking it to the overall theoretical framework. The conclusion revisits the question of a religious turn in IR; discusses the overall contribution of the dissertation; and offers new avenues of research.

State of the Art

Apart from claiming that a religious turn has taken place in IR, the respective authors also classify the types of research that has been conducted in this field so far. Kratochvíl (2009) for example identifies six different types of how religion has been tackled in IR to date, while Sandal and Fox (2013) speak of four. What both have in common is that they distinguish those approaches which seek to integrate religion in the already existing theoretical and analytical frameworks from those more critical approaches which call for new paradigms. The literature presented here is divided into three categories and is by no means exhaustive, but rather representative in order to provide a comprehensive overview while at the same time identifying the main points of departure for this dissertation.⁴ The three categories can be termed: a) literature which identifies religion as a neglected but necessary angle or element in IR and explaining why it should be included; b) works that seek to provide answers as to how religion might be included in the research agenda analytically and theoretically; and c) research that is empirically-oriented, studying religion in past and ongoing international affairs (and which might be employed for inductive approaches).⁵ The points of departure are then summarized at the end of this chapter.

a. Identifying religion as neglected but necessary

The titles in this category are already indicative of the appeal they make: “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations” (Philpott 2000); “Religion as an Overlooked Element of

⁴Two types of publications not discussed here are textbooks and handbooks, nevertheless, two should be mentioned as they reflect what main aspects have established themselves, namely the “Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics” (Haynes 2016) [a completely re-worked version will be published with another publisher in 2021] and “An Introduction to International Relations” (Haynes 2014).

⁵ Arguably, some of the works listed qualify for more than one category. However, they are grouped based on their main contribution.

International Relations” (Fox 2001); “Religion in International Relations – The Return from Exile” (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003); “Bringing Religion into International Relations” (Fox and Sandler 2004); or “The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations – The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century” (Thomas 2005). The first one in the list is one of the most seminal articles that triggered the debate on including religion in IR, with Philpott (2000) arguing that the creation of the Westphalian system can be traced back not just to material developments but to the power of ideas and in this case religion, namely the Protestant Reformation. He posits that if his argument is true, ideas (religion) have and will continue to play a role in shaping international politics, providing human rights and democracy and an evolving understanding of sovereignty as can be observed in the European Union (Philpott 2000: 245). While not representative *per se* of the contributions in this category, this article addresses a key point that is recurrent throughout numerous publications, namely that of the centrality of the Peace of Westphalia.⁶

Two further significant publications also address the question of Westphalia, but rather identify it as the core of the “problem” of why religion was absent in social sciences in general and IR in particular, labeling it “the long Westphalian exile” (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003: 2). The latter includes contributions by authors such as Hasenclever, Kubálková, Laustsen, and Thomas which are discussed in more depth in this dissertation’s individual publications. The edited volume offers different takes on where religion is to be found in international politics and why it matters particularly for IR scholars.⁷

Fox and Sandler (2004), while also exploring different aspects of where religion appears in international politics, go into more depth on religion and its role in conflicts and address religion as a legitimizing or undermining factor and its potential for mobilization based on its unifying or divisive power.⁸ Similar to most authors (this one included), Fox (2001: 54) argues that his assumption is that religion is hardly ever the sole motivation behind any political event. However, due *inter alia* to the above-mentioned power of legitimization and mobilization, it is a significant factor, or “dimension” that should not be excluded.

⁶ The topic of the Westphalian system, while pivotal when it comes to discussing religion, is often also debated critically, with scholars discussing (and contesting) a Western hegemony both in the discipline of IR but also in international politics.

⁷ See for example Laustsen, C.B. and Wæver, O. (2003): *In Defense of Religion – Sacred referent objects for Securitization*; Hasenclever, A. and Rittberger, V. (2003): *Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict*; or Esposito, J. and Voll, J.O. (2003): *Islam and the West – Muslim voices of dialogue*.

⁸ On religion and conflicts see also Fox 2004 “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001.

Yet another publication in the same series as the preceding two is the one by Thomas (2005) with the title “The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations – The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century.” Divided into two parts, Thomas on the one hand discusses the challenges religion (but also culture) pose and on the other hand examines several different issues within the field such as conflict resolution or development. Thomas is one of the authors who argue that the Western concept of religion is part of why IR is limited in grasping the phenomenon. After revisiting several theories of IR and social theory in general, Thomas ultimately calls for a new theoretical approach, without, however, providing a detailed proposal.⁹ This book could also be classified in the other two categories. However, its main aim is to first of all raise awareness of the wide spectrum of possibilities religion offers (and thus, in a sense, the academic attention it also demands).

What all three volumes have in common is that they “solve” the puzzle of why religion was neglected in the field of IR, arguing that as a result of the European Enlightenment, the discipline suffers from a narrow outlook which focuses primarily on the West, while in international politics the shift from the divine right to other legitimizing factors equally removed religion from the research agenda. The three volumes are part of the Palgrave series on “Culture and Religion in International Relations” which had a surge in publications between 2002 and 2009, though this seems to have waned in recent years.¹⁰ Whether or not this indicates a decline or even failure in bringing religion back from exile permanently is discussed in the conclusion.

Published slightly later, but also during the decade of increased interest in religion, “Religion and International Relations Theory” (Snyder 2011) does not, as the title might suggest, provide detailed ideas on how religion might be included in individual theories of IR. Instead, this edited volume examines how traditional approaches in the field of study of IR are “challenged” by religion and what added value there is in including religion (Bech and Snyder 2011: 209). The individual contributions discuss questions such as why religion has resurfaced and what this implies for world politics and consequently for the field of IR. The main observations include the close link of democratization and secularization in securing the freedom of religion and paving the way for more religious diversity and expression of faith or political demands. At the same time, it is argued that the rise of secularism has also led to strong religious opposition seeking stronger religious/political institutions (Bech and Snyder 2011: 201). One central point that is discussed is whether it suffices to grasp religion as transnationalism or whether religion

⁹ Thomas particularly considers the English School, pointing to its “complacency” towards religion and the impact its resurgence can have on the international order (2005: 155).

¹⁰ Incidentally, the most recent publication in the series – and the first one in six years - by Barbato 2020 includes one of the publications which constitute this dissertation.

requires its own realm, method, or theory in order to be included in IR research. Snyder goes so far as to claim that “religion is one of the basic forces of the social universe, not just an ‘omitted variable’” (Snyder 2011: 3). The contributors agree that “the historical permanence, legitimizing capacity, and transnational nature of religion [...] give it the potential to make significant impacts on world politics” (Bech and Snyder 2011: 203). However, they come to differing conclusions with some convinced that if secularism is not understood to be antithetical to religion, then new frameworks of analysis are not necessary (cf. Hurd 2011). Other authors in the volume, particularly Shah and Philpott, disagree and suggest that “(n)ew assumptions are needed because the most enduring traditions have been highly secularized from their inception and because the resurgence of religion in global politics makes this secularism no longer viable” (Shah and Philpott 2011: 53). The next category follows up on these two different strands – those calling for completely new paradigms and those exploring possibilities of including religion in the existing frameworks of IR theories.

b. Including religion in theory and analysis

The works discussed here are divided into the three sub-categories, including the two just mentioned as well as the category of works which are mainly analytical, rather than following up directly on specific theories of IR. The works selected are also not exhaustive, but rather archetypical of what has been published so far. A conference held at the London School of Economics in 1998 paved the way for numerous of the contributions discussed in this dissertation, two of which are presented in this section. The first is Kubáľková’s article “Towards an International Political Theology” (2000), an example of an author calling for a new approach within IR to be able to include religion in its research agenda. Kubáľková is perhaps one of the earliest and most vocal authors to call for religion to be included in IR. In this first main contribution which has been re-published several times, she places a strong focus on a constructivist approach, providing a definition for religion as well as raising some fundamental issues IR faces and needs to address. A principal observation she makes lies at the heart of many contributions and summarizes the “problem” IR has:

“All spiritual communities, all religions, Western and Eastern, share a distinction between ordinary and transcendental reality. This difference in ontology leads to epistemological and methodological differences between religious and secular ways of looking at the world. Attempting to fit religious experience into a positivist framework can only emasculate it, caricature it, distort its meaning, and underestimate its strength.”

(Kubáľková 2000: 683)

Kubálková's work reappears in several of the publications presented in this dissertation and is therefore not discussed in more detail here. Nevertheless, she expresses a sentiment which other authors share, namely that IR, as it stands, is hardly in a position to include religion.¹¹

Published in the same Millennium special issue Hasenclever and Rittberger pose the question "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict" (2000a). Unlike Kubálková, Shah and Philpott or Thomas, their work use the given IR theoretical frameworks as points of departure and seek to expand it, rather than introducing completely new paradigms. Their main aim lies in identifying and devising strategies for "coping with the impact of faith on social conflicts" (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000a: 672) and what they seek to determine is "when religious faith has an escalating and a de-escalating effect" (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000a: 674). In other words, their contribution adds new insight to the arguably related, but autonomous field of Peace and Conflict Studies, which has experienced an own surge of research on religion.¹² Apart from their observations on the role of religion in peace and conflict, another aspect yields helpful thoughts for dealing with religion in IR in general, for they distinguish three different ways of how religion is generally grasped, terming them "primordialists", "instrumentalists", and "constructivists". The first type believes that "differences in religious traditions should be viewed as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent interactions in and between nations" (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000a: 641). Huntington (1998), in his depiction of civilizations, which are characterized by religion, is one of the most prominent examples of this type. Instrumentalists, by contrast, believe that religion is rarely the main cause of conflict, but that it can be instrumentalized, observing that "the politicisation of religions leads to the escalation of given disputes and never to their de-escalation" (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000a: 647). Finally, constructivists (the approach the two authors seek to defend in the article (*ibid.*)):

"...view religion as an intervening variable, i.e., as a causal factor intervening between a given conflict and the choice of conflict behaviour. In this way, the impact of religious traditions on conflict behaviour is deeply ambiguous: they can make violence more likely, insofar as a reading of holy texts prevails that justifies armed combat. On the other hand, they can make violence less likely."

(Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000a: 649)

¹¹ In a similar vein, but ten years later, Shah and Philpott, for example, suggest that "(n)ew assumptions are needed because the most enduring traditions have been highly secularized from their inception and because the resurgence of religion in global politics makes this secularism no longer viable" (Shah and Philpott 2011: 53).

¹² See for example the work by Baumgart-Ochse and Wolf (2019) on the mediating role of religious NGOs.

A third volume that needs mentioning in this section and sub-category of embedding religion in existing approaches was published in 2013 as part of the Routledge Series “Studies in Religion and Politics”.¹³ In their publication “Religion in International Relations Theory - Interactions and Possibilities” Sandal and Fox systematically discuss the main theories of IR and how they could potentially include religion. To do so, they examine Realist, Liberal, English School and Constructivist schools of thought, by analyzing religion in connection with worldviews, legitimacy, actors and interactions within these approaches. They conclude that the English School particularly lends itself to including religion, similar to the claim which Thomas (2005) makes and which this dissertation follows up on. The reader might surmise that if such a book exists then what is still lacking? While the book itself offers a very thorough look at various theories and explains how religion might fit in, it can be seen more as a point of departure rather than a solid inclusion of religion in these various frameworks. What is more, not many scholars who represent these schools of thought have followed suit.¹⁴

Moving away from the theory-oriented works to mainly analytical approaches, the edited volume “Rethinking Religion and World Affairs” by Shah, Stepan, and Toft (2012) also needs mentioning in this section, although some of its empirical contributions are presented in the next category. The main point of departure is secularism and its implications. The book parts are divided into “Religion, Secularism, and Secularization”, “Religion, Democracy, and “Human Rights”, “Religion, Conflict, and Peacemaking”, or “Religion and the Media” to name a few. At first glance the collection of titles strikes the reader as a “typical” edited volume as the contributions are merely linked by the term “religion”. However, in a nascent phase, such an edited volume is just the right type of publication, as it serves to identify avenues of research, raise fundamental questions, and question the significance of the topic itself.¹⁵

In the volume’s contribution on “Why Religion? Why Now?” for example, Hehir (2012) retraces what he terms the “major changes” which occurred during the shift from “medieval universalism” to the modern system of sovereign states established with the Treaty of Westphalia

¹³The series editor, Jeffrey Haynes, is one of the most productive IR scholars in this field and his work on transnational religious actors (2012) or his selection of essays (2011) is mentioned again in the various publications.

¹⁴ There are, of course some individual (and very convincing) attempts, for example the edited volume by Troy (2014) “Religion and the Realist Tradition from Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back” or the publication by Bain (2020) “Political Theology of International Order” based in an English School approach.

¹⁵ The “Politics, Religion & Ideology” special issue on “The religious as political and the political as religious: the blurring of sacred and secular in contemporary International Relations” edited by May et al (2014) is another example of a collection in this vein and provides valuable research on the term secularism and whether or not religion and politics can be separated.

(Hehir 2012: 16).¹⁶ While this development was “distinctively Western” (Hehir 2012: 17), the ideas expanded. “The expansion of Westphalia – to some degree, a universalism of a different kind – has been embodied in the United Nations, an institution that exemplifies the sovereign and secular elements of the new order” (ibid.). Hehir’s argument is that, so far, social science and IR in particular has focused mostly on the sovereign states. Only now are scholars shifting the gaze to secularism which arguably cannot be examined without considering the other side of the coin – religion. Hehir observes that the inclusion of religion in IR “has been considered more a threat than a promise” (ibid.). The publication also does not offer an overall discussion of its findings, most likely owing to the broad spectrum of topics tackled in the various chapters, and the fact that the chapters range from theoretical to mainly empirical.

One area which is glaringly absent in this category is religion and Foreign Policy Analysis. Individual chapters have been published on this topic such as “Foreign Policy and Religion: An Overview” (Warner and Walker 2011)¹⁷; “Religion and Foreign Policy” (Sandal 2016); or “The Four Religions of Foreign Policy” (Rees 2015). An online version of the former was published in 2019 and an earlier version of the handbook chapter by Sandal has the same title but was written by Haynes (2008), indicating that there has not been a proliferation of research on religion and FPA. This does not mean that there is no research on individual states and what role religion might play in impacting or constituting their foreign policy as is mentioned in the next category. However, at the analytical level, this remains an under-researched area.

c. Implementing empirical research on religion

This final category is the one in which research has been proliferating. A lot of “early” research on religion and international politics focused on its role in conflicts, but this has seen a clear shift towards more differentiation of religion and its role or position in international politics. The trend at first was to publish edited volumes which covered a broad spectrum of aspects concerning religion and international politics, often with the aforementioned focus on conflicts. Later publications then focused more on individual issue-areas, with research especially by think tanks and research institutes increasing noticeably. One of the earliest publications in this category, and arguably of all research in this realm is the edited volume by Johnston and Sampson (1995) titled “Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft”. Based on different

¹⁶ The changes are: “gradual emergence and spread of state sovereignty, the consolidation of state power within a defined territory [...] different from the medieval pluralist structure of overlapping powers and conflicting loyalties”; the “Protestant Reformation”; and the “substantial erosion of a unified conception of moral norms to direct and restrain politics and war” (Hehir 2012: 16).

¹⁷ This work seeks to provide an analytical framework based on positivist IR theories, therefore it does not include *inter alia* the English School.

case studies, this book offers insight *inter alia* on religion's role in transition and conciliation processes, but also what foreign policy implications this has and what this means for the world religions.¹⁸ It links domestic developments with world affairs, particularly by looking at the role of "World Religions and Conflict Resolution" (Cox et al 1995). Opening up the black box of states by considering religion and its role in society and politics is a common theme in all of the works discussed. However, it is also an example of how the research agenda is evolving and becoming more inter-disciplinary and perhaps attempting to fill a gap which the field of IR has left wide open.

Another edited volume on empirical cases of religion in international affairs is the book on "Religion and International Relations" by Dark (2000). Its overall aim, as stated in the introduction, is to widen the spectrum of what religions are studied and how they are studied, arguing that in previous research they had mainly been considered in national contexts and religion in the "West" had been largely neglected. The book does not, however, offer a general conclusion or discussion of the findings. The collection of case studies mainly focusses on one religion and its role in international politics respectively, including chapters such as "Church of England in International Affairs: 1979 to mid-1997" (Williamson 2000), "The Churches and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia" (Palmer 2000), or "Hindu Nationalism and the International Relations of India" (Ram-Prasad), while the chapter by Thomas (2000) is an example of studying religion and conflict in international politics, in this case by exploring the link between weak states and strong religions.

Later publications then started focusing more on issue areas, as mentioned above, which include development; migration; or interreligious dialogue. To begin with the latter, material on inter-religious dialogue, particularly in the context of conflict resolution, is no longer a niche area of research, taking on a dynamic of its own, albeit not necessarily within the actual academic discipline of IR itself.¹⁹ In his contribution "Interreligious Dialogue and International Relations" in the edited volume by Shah et al (2012) for example, Banchoff examines how such a dialogue impacts or even shapes international relations. The author provides the dialogue between Catholics and Jews in the USA and its foreign policy towards Israel as well as interreligious dialogue and relations between EU und Turkey as two examples, linking domestic and foreign policies.

¹⁸ Some examples include the relations between France and Germany after WWII or the role of religion in Nicaragua or South Africa.

¹⁹ Numerous institutes in this area have been established in the past two decades, which represent a bridge between academia and politics in practice, such as the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs; the Cambridge Institute on Religion & International Studies; or the Religions and International Relations program hosted by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (IPSI).

The contribution is mainly descriptive; however, it offers a better understanding of how inter-religious dialogue can be grasped, “Dialogue can have a strategic dimension; it can serve to preserve and extend the size of one’s own community. But its primary aims are not to prevail over the other but to reduce conflict and promote understanding and cooperation across issues of common concern” (Banchoff 2012: 204-5). This is a notion which can already be found in the publication by Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000) discussed above and is revisited several times in the ensuing publications of this dissertation.

As previously mentioned, Banchoff’s chapter is exactly that – one chapter among a collection of chapters of an edited volume on various aspects of religion in world affairs. This is representative of the state of research on this topic. While there are individual contributions which address the subject of interreligious dialogue and international politics (see for example Lehmann 2020; 2021), these are usually publications in the area of sociology, religious studies, or by policy-oriented institutes, but there are no major publications within the field of IR.

Looking at the research on issue-areas such as migration or development confirms this observation, considering for example Tomalin’s work on “Religions and Development” (2013) or Mavelli and Wilson’s edited volume “The Refugee Crisis and Religion: Secularism, Security and Hospitality in Question” (2017) which are both representative of other work published in the respective areas. Both volumes address issues central to the field of International Relations and perhaps having other disciplines such as development studies, migration studies, or religious studies tackle these topics makes further study unnecessary. But that is precisely the main point of departure of this dissertation – IR can and must provide further insights, interacting with other fields in both directions.

Points of departure

The main finding of the state of the art is that there is a general consensus that religion deserves, indeed requires, more research and that research with a mainly empirical focus has been increasing. However, there are still great gaps in the field. One main gap is that of religion and Foreign Policy Analysis and more needs to be done when it comes to integrating religion in various theories of IR. One aspect which so far has not been tackled at all is how religion shapes international society.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to filling those gaps and more specific literature reviews and points of departures are identified in the individual contributions. However, what the existent research provides in terms of general points to follow up on, but also to learn from within the context of this work, are the following: a) religion appears to be dialectic, not only when

studying the debate about secularism, but also when examining where it appears in international politics, namely both as source and as solution to conflicts; as a foundation of and as competition to state structures; or as a uniting and dividing element of identity. At the same time, it is to be found at all three levels of analysis. When considering the very different ontologies and epistemologies of IR's theories, it is not surprising that defining religion poses a challenge. Another point of departure is that b) religion takes on a marginal role in foreign policy studies - and Foreign Policy Analysis more specifically. Opening up FPA, meaning if it were less state-centrist and more transnational-oriented, would tentatively boost its relevance considering the evolving international (global) society. And, finally, c) the international system - which is viewed as a result of the Westphalian Peace - has so far been grasped as a purely secular structure with the academic debate gradually moving towards terming it as a post-secular sphere. This is based on the assumption that religion unequivocally disappeared (or was actively removed) from the *inter-national* sphere, since it was now a society of nation states. Coming back to the observation that even in the 21st century more than half of all states either have a state religion or give certain religions a preferred status, it would appear mistaken that religion plays no role whatsoever in shaping this international society of states.

II. Theoretical framework

“Religion as ‘prime’ institution of international society” (McLarren 2021)²⁰ provides the theoretical framework for the overall dissertation. In this section, a (new) definition of religion is presented and the main arguments and findings of the article are outlined and discussed, before proceeding to summarize and link the other four articles to these main themes. The chapter thus follows up on the departure points by a) providing a definition of religion and b) examining more closely how religion and the evolution of the international system to an international society are linked. This first article is therefore presented slightly differently than the other four publications. To come back to the overall conclusion of Snyder (2011) presented in the State of the Art, this dissertation adheres to the idea that while it is not necessary to devise new theoretical approaches, “incorporating religion would in each case [of the three traditional international relations paradigms] enhance subtlety, accuracy, and power of these approaches rather than undermine them” and including religion should be understood “as an opportunity to loosen the grip of the traditional paradigms, use them more eclectically” (Bech and Snyder 2011: 208).

²⁰The article is currently under review and is included in Appendix I.

Defining religion

By including religion, so the argument reads, more insight can be gained as to how international society is constituted and how it has been evolving. Before progressing with the proposed addition, however, the term religion needs clarification. Discussions on the definition of religion abound in the social sciences in general (Marx 1844; Durkheim 1915; Clark 1958; Brubaker 2015) and political science/IR in particular (Fox 2000; Kubáľková 2000; Kinnvall 2004; Haynes 2014). The term religion itself is contested, however, as becomes evident in Weber's attempt not to define it for fear of essentializing it (Giesing 2002: 83-4) or in Thomas' warning of a limited Western understanding, arguing that 'the very concept of religion is itself the invention of liberal modernity' (2005: 23). Maclure and Taylor similarly point out that "(i)t is not uncommon for the definition to lean toward the three major historical monotheisms" (2011: 84). What, then, was the field of International Relations not including? A very simple definition would be to understand religion as the institutionalization of faith in the divine. However, more specifications on values, practices, and the formation of community are helpful. The classic (sociological) definition proposed by Durkheim in "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life" views religion as "...a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (1915: 62). While from a sociological perspective this definition offers an understanding of how faith is practiced within a community, it indicates little as to how wide-reaching religion can be beyond its own community of followers. A contemporary definition proposed by an IR scholar mentioned previously, expands this slightly more, defining religion as

"...a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to (...) explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one's position in the world, (...) thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalise them fully."

(Kubáľková 2000: 695)

The two definitions indicate how a shared faith is constitutive of a community, for example based on the common practices informed by the respective beliefs. The added aspect of contextualization (or self-perception) is especially relevant when studying religion and international politics. While the former does not include this particular aspect, the latter fails to make any reference to the divine, which is arguably necessary, when differentiating between ideology, culture, and religion. Drawing from these and other existing definitions such as those provided by Haynes (2014) or Kinnvall (2004) which also underline the unifying force of religion and

its institutionalization to differing degrees, in the context of International Relations, and the English School in particular, the following definition is therefore proposed:

Religion is the institutionalization of faith in the divine, expressed in a framework of values and rules based on which the constitutive community of followers interacts with its respective social and natural environment, linking the transcendental with the transnational. Religion often provides ideas on existence and mortality, purpose and significance, order and justice, leading to a sense of identity and hope.

This definition includes the key aspects which make religion relevant for IR, namely its role in delineating existence and identity, its transnational character, and linking faith with global questions. The first aspect is one of the central points which distinguish religion from culture, since culture does not provide answers on existence.²¹ The link with the transcendental is an equally significant aspect in comparison with an ideology, as it can lead to various forms of, *inter alia*, fatalism; sense of mission; or source of legitimacy, identity, or hope. Some additional points are noteworthy here: The definition implicitly allows for religion to be understood and examined as both a pre- and post-state form of institution, as it can exist without a state, but it can also provide the foundation of a state. A second observation from an IR perspective is that the levels of analysis risk becoming blurred. However, this definition also allows for the levels to continue to be considered separately, at the same time they can be bridged, especially when the transnational elements come into play as will be seen later in the discussion on the articles regarding expanded foreign policy. Understood in this way, it becomes apparent how and why religion can have a fundamental impact on international society, *in extremis* constituting states and their acceptance or rejection of primary institutions and thus the very existence of the international society. Another “extreme” form, understood here as completely different from what has been previously studied within the paradigms of IR, is that of transnational religious communities. These are two aspects the English School can integrate well.

Religion and the English School (Scope and context of the article)

A few main assumptions of the English School are identified here in order to then better embed the new concepts this dissertation seeks to contribute. The Westphalian system is commonly understood to be the foundation of modern international society. A system in which states - rather than religions - determine politics. And a society in which states have agreed upon a minimum common set of values upheld by abiding to written and unwritten rules. While most theories of International Relations (IR) see the Westphalian system as a point of departure, the

²¹This point is presented in more depth in the summary of the article on religion and securitization as it features in Laustsen and Wæver 2000 and is discussed in the respective context.

English School is interested in how this Westphalian system came about and how the societies which have evolved from it continue to do so. The English School (ES) is one of the few theoretical approaches in IR which has a strong focus on history and identifying patterns of how the international system/society has emerged over centuries, particularly in terms of anarchy, hegemony, or empire.²² The ES differentiates between international systems and societies as well as world societies and places the emphasis on international society.²³ Keil and Stahl (2022) observe that the stability – and thus legitimacy - of such a society goes hand in hand with how content states are with the status quo, quoting Watson’s “raison de système” (ibid.: 5). To better understand the constitution, evolution, and legitimacy of such societies, ES scholars study what they term “primary” and “secondary” institutions which not only constitute international societies but the states who make up the society (cf. Buzan 2014). A central assumption is that

“(i)f units share a common identity (a religion, a system of governance, a language), or even just a common set of rules or norms (about how to determine relative status, and how to conduct diplomacy), then these intersubjective understandings not only condition their behaviour, but also define the boundaries of a social system.”

(Buzan 2004: 8)

In other words, these institutions reflect and constitute what the members of an international society have agreed upon in terms of shared values and practices. Primary institutions “are constitutive of both states and international society, in that they define not only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, as well as the criteria for membership of international society” (Buzan 2014: 17). Classic primary institutions include sovereignty, war, diplomacy, but also international law or the balance of power (cf. Buzan 2014). These traditional (Westphalian) institutions have been expanded to include nationalism, human rights, democracy or environmental stewardship (cf. Buzan 2014). To sum up: these institutions are constitutive of contemporary international society. Secondary institu-

²²There is a debate to be had as to what type of theory the ES represents (for example constitutive or providing a lense (cf. Kurki and Wight 2010), depending on how “wide” or “narrow” the understanding of theory is (cf. Stahl 2020), and where it might be positioned in the spectrum of IR theories, considering its Realist past (e.g. Carr 1946 or Bull 1977) and increasingly Social Constructivist leanings (e.g. Dunne 1995 or Reus-Smit 2018). One description is that “...the English School purports to offer an account of IR which combines theory and history, morality and power, agency and structure” (Dunne 2010: 136). A helpful approach to positioning the English School within IR is provided by Smith (1987) who reconstructs the evolution of IR as a social science both in the USA as well as in Britain based on how closely linked political events and perceptions thereof impacted the respective theoretical approaches. What is more, this debate is most prominent within the ES itself, as the proliferation of self-reflective work by representatives of the ES in the past quarter of a century reveals (cf. Dunne 1998; Linklater and Suganami 2006; Williams 2011; Wilson 2016; etc.). Perhaps using the term “tradition” rather than “theory” to grasp the English School, as Wight himself does (Wight 1991), is the most suitable solution.

²³Adding yet another element such as religion will arguably add to the parsimony of this theory. Yet when it comes to the question of parsimony of theories, King, Keohane, and Verba point out that parsimony is never a good in itself (1994: 20) and a “theory should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggest” (ibid.).

tions are those which result from the primary ones and that are generally referred to as international institutions, e.g. the UN. Finally, while the English School is based upon a mainly state-centrist approach, it also accommodates other forms of actors, such as non-state and/or transnational actors. This means the English School has several options more than other approaches in IR: a) there is no limitation to studying the era since the Treaty of Westphalia, as the ES is just as interested in how civilizations evolved up until then and since then; b) while it appears to have a strong state focus at first glance, the approach is by no means limited to only considering states as members who shape international society; c) as is revealed by the English School's concept of world society, this approach is not limited to the three levels of analyses generally applied in (traditional) IR theories (cf. Waltz 1959).

One of the main points of departure identified in the state of the art was the secular understanding of the international system. Based on the deliberations on the English School and what it has to offer in better understanding the evolution of the international system, the first article presented here seeks to expand its framework to include religion.²⁴ In order to do so, the article systematically examines past and contemporary ES work to determine whether and how religion is featured. The observation is that when it does appear, it is rather idiosyncratic, with the significance, understanding, and role ascribed to religion differing greatly (cf. McLarren 2021). The article establishes that the ES offers great potential in studying classic and modern primary institutions of the English School, be it the origins of modern diplomacy; the moral foundations of (just) war and international law; or the common conviction to protect the environment. Apart from primary institutions, religion can also be considered when looking at the origins and the rise and fall of states and empires, given the understanding of religion that it can outlive states. Finally, religion can allow for new primary and secondary institutions to be established.²⁵ Hence, considering that religion can shape the constituting elements (states) of an international system and can inform the values and practices that are institutionalized, religion can be said to enable a system to evolve to a society. This implies overcoming the anarchy of the international system – the core issue of International Relations.²⁶

Based upon this insight, the article then introduces the concept of a “prime institution” and the “quilt model” in order to embed religion in the framework of the English School tradition. The

²⁴The manuscript is currently under blind review with “International Studies” (effective 9 September, 2021).

²⁵ Interreligious dialogue might be considered as a primary institution and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as a secondary institution in this context.

²⁶ Or, as Vasquez summarizes Morgenthau, “International relations is the struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it is the purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial” (2004: 37).


former term is deliberately chosen to resemble existing English School terminology, since the concept itself is closely related to primary and secondary institutions. A prime institution is thus defined as a framework (or “layer”) that

“can provide the constitutive foundation for individual states or political units as well as for international societies as a whole. A prime institution can exist independently of this international society and political units can have this prime institution as its foundation without being a part of the international society (for example failed states or new forms of states that are not internationally recognized).”

(McLarren 2021: 12)

This concept allows for a stronger differentiation of the constitution and positioning of states within (or even outside) an international society. One could, for example, identify sub-types by distinguishing between states that are a) founded upon or have a (de facto) state religion (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Greece, the UK, Israel, Russia); b) states that are not directly based upon religion, but have a religious past or engage with religion (Germany, India, Ireland); c) states that reject the influence of religion domestically and internationally (e.g. China, Cuba, North Korea); d) states that have a strong religious foundation, but a weak state (e.g. Yemen; Somaliland; the Islamic State). This spectrum of states reflects a tremendous source of dynamism within and beyond the international society. It also helps to understand why primary institutions are not set in stone, but rather reflect a process of contestation, acceptance, but also of strengthening and weakening (cf. McLaren 2021: 13).

These findings go hand in hand with the “quilt model” which is also introduced in the article. The “quilt model is intended to better illustrate the concept [of a prime institution] and contributes to identifying new avenues of research, as it allows for the dynamics within and beyond the international society and its states” (McLarren 2021: 14). The quilt model does not reflect a static image of the international society, “the proximity of the layers and the shape and constellation of the segments and thread can vary over the course of history” (McLarren 2021: 13).



The image of a quilt is used to symbolize the various layers which constitute states and evolving international society: The top layer of the quilt is made up of individual pieces of cloth representing the states of international society. As is the case in a quilt, patterns can arise when these

individual shreds of cloth (states) resemble one another either in shape or color. This resemblance reflects the similarity of states based for example upon their shared political systems, their history as empires or as colonized states, their acceptance of human rights, their ideologies, or – most importantly in this context - their religions. They are all sewn together by thread which represents the primary institutions they have agreed upon and practice, as for example their membership in the United Nations indicates.²⁷ How states became members of international society and agreed to adopt and contribute to upholding it can vary, usually depending on common historical experiences (e.g. colonialism) and political developments (e.g. democratization). The stitches are especially tight among those states that are strongly integrated in the international society as a whole and this might be due to their strong identification with the primary institutions (e.g. democracies that pro-actively pursue the protection of human rights). The strength of the thread and the stitches stems from the middle layer or what is often the “filling” of a quilt. This middle layer represents the transnational society, additionally strengthening the integrations of (states) in international society (top layer) due to an increased identification with other members based on shared values and beliefs. Examples of such transnational, international society-enforcing “threads” or foundations for identification can be found in the realms of *inter alia* culture, environment protection, business, ideology, and religion (cf. Tedeschi et al 2020; McLarren and Stahl 2021). In other words, if states not only share the common denominator of seeking to overcome anarchy and maintaining peace by forming an international society, but share a common history or political system, this will strengthen their acceptance of the international society and thus the society itself. If, in addition, these states are shaped or at least influenced by a common transnational identity, such as believing in universal human rights or fighting for climate change, this conviction (thickness of the thread) will augment how firmly established they are in the top layer. This transnational layer can also lead to societies being formed within international society, as a proposed union of democratic states or the Islamic Organization of Cooperation illustrate.

Finally, the bottom layer, the foundation, is connected to the other two layers and strengthens some of the patterns discernible in the top layer. This foundational layer represents the prime institution of religion and, depending on the type of state as outlined above, the segments of the top layer will vary in how strong their connection to the foundational layer is, but also what their position in (or outside of) international society is. “Unlike a well-crafted quilt, the foundational layer in this case is not evenly connected to the top layer and its size may not match

²⁷ Not all members of international society are also members of the United Nations and, vice versa, as the cases of Taiwan, Kosovo, Palestine or North Korea highlight, yet this is a topic for a separate paper.

that of the top layer” (McLarren 2021: 12). Particularly this last layer is tackled in the following publications, for example when studying the interreligious dialogue between the Holy See and Iran or when examining the importance of freedom of religion.

In this publication-based dissertation, the empirical and analytical driven publications all meet the theoretical framework of this chapter. At the same time, it also reflects the results of some of the contributions, for this article was devised as a second paper following from the publication discussed next ("The Holy See as Hybrid Actor"). Throughout the research process, the article went through several re-structuring phases, since in a first version religion was considered in three different constellations, linking religion with types of actors, types of societies, and types of institutions. The concept of prime institution then evolved from the process. As previously mentioned, not all of the ensuing articles are based upon an English School framework. However, keeping the concept of religion as a prime concept and the quilt model in mind, the ensuing articles illustrate how and why religion matters in international society. The four publications follow up on how a common religious identity (“foundational layer”) can lead to a strengthening of and even creation of new primary and secondary institutions. This is linked with the notion of expanded foreign policy, especially of state-religious actors as studied in various contexts. Finally, an article on US foreign policy reveals how the value of the freedom of religion has evolved into a primary institution itself.

III. Examples of religion shaping the international society (Summary, findings, and critical discussion of the publications)

The most prominent common thread of the following contributions is religion in international politics and how it contributes to shaping international society. Owing to the explorative possibilities of a publication-based dissertation, the various articles differ in their theoretical and methodological approaches. This allowed the author to delve into an array of empirical and theoretical aspects and to establish which of these are particularly rewarding and deserve further academic attention. It also enabled the author to discern how religion features in international politics and IR research and to thus inductively develop a definition of religion as well as analytical concepts which can be employed to extend existing theoretical approaches in IR. While each article seeks to make a contribution in its own right, taken together the articles also underline the fundamental notion of how religion contributes to shaping the (not so) secular international society and adds a significant primary institution, namely that of religious freedom among states, so far not identified in IR research.

The articles are presented in the following order: a) The Holy See as Hybrid Actor: Religion in International, Transnational, and World Society; b) Hybrid Actors and expanded foreign policy – when state foreign policy goes transnational; c) Der Vatikan und die europäische Integration heute: der Dialog als Lösung [*The Vatican and European Integration today: dialogue as solution*]; d) Invoking Religion in Securitizing Moves: Five Cases in US History. The individual parts include an overview of the context and scope of the articles, a brief summary of the main findings and a critical discussion of the contributions, linking them to the points of departure identified above. They also offer a short discussion on the added-value the research offers to the overarching theme of how religion shapes international society.

- a. The Holy See as Hybrid Actor: Religion in International, Transnational, and World Society

Context and scope of the article

The English School not only studies the international system, it examines how an international society can evolve from such a system and beyond that it also considers the notion of a world society. However, these different forms do not necessarily represent a linear development, for they can also co-exist. The aim of this article is twofold – on the one hand, it seeks to better understand the link between international and world society. On the other hand, it aims to introduce the concept of “hybrid actors” to better grasp actors who are states and religious and thus potentially contribute to shaping both international as well as world society. The article is founded upon an inductive approach, studying the case of the dyad between Iran and the Holy See to generate new insight/hypotheses on including religion in the theoretical framework of the English School.

As a part of the edited volume by Barbato (2020) “The Pope, the Public, and International Relations: Postsecular Transformations”, the main point of departure for the article is the book’s overarching theme of“(…) whether religion is a constitutive or a temporary element of the public discourse [and] whether an actor like the pope was part of the public sphere not only a thousand years ago, but has always played a role in public and politics. Such an answer will also have an impact on the image of international relations as a domain of secular nation states alone” (Barbato 2020: 16). The chapters of the book therefore study aspects of media and diplomacy to tackle these two questions. As the final chapter of the book, the article on hybrid actors offers a conceptual contribution, by transferring the observations made regarding the

pope and the (international) public to the concepts of international, transnational, and world society.

The overall puzzle of the article is how two diverging actors such as Iran and the Holy See have succeeded in not only maintaining peaceful relations, but have actively contributed to forming (new) forms of international relations or what might be termed a “transnational society”, a term coined by Buzan (2004) and embedded within the English School. The research question asks “how such actors contribute to linking the international (diplomatic) system with a transnational or even world society (public)” (McLarren and Stahl 2020: 190). The case selection of the Holy See and Iran is based on the assumption that these two actors are an example of units that “share a common identity” (Buzan 2004: 8) and have agreed on a common set of values and practices of interaction, thus establishing the foundation for a type of society. This follows up on what was stated earlier in terms of how international societies are formed and the role primary institutions play. While there is a strong emphasis on the Holy See owing to the nature of the edited volume, the dyad with Iran nevertheless is central to the article, as it illustrates what the common values and agreed-upon interaction is and how this is institutionalized, namely in the form of interreligious dialogue.

Summary of findings

The first main finding of the article is that a common identity of being religious (not to be mistaken with a common religious identity) can provide the foundation for new forms of institutions, thereby strengthening, changing, or even expanding international society, in this case in the shape of interreligious dialogue. It suffices for actors to have the common identity of being religious, in this case Iran as a country representing Shia Islam and the Holy See as representing the Roman Catholic faith. As the definition of religion introduced earlier indicates, these two actors have in common that their values and (ritualized) practices are informed by their beliefs in the divine, as is their sense of mission and self-perception of their position in the world, among other aspects. This is an added layer of a common identity that goes beyond what the states of the international society have in common and thus also allows for even stronger forms of cooperation to be institutionalized. The particular institution of interreligious dialogue examined here can vary in the forms it assumes, the actors involved and the levels at which it takes place (at a local level for example in ecumenical forms of celebrating religious rituals; at a national level for example when negotiating peace between conflicting parties; or at the international level when tackling global issues such as climate change). The actors involved can range from local individual believers to global religious leaders/dignitaries, but also to atheist

political leaders willing to engage with religious representatives. Interreligious dialogue thus bridges international and a world society, by creating a transnational society with not just states coming together to shape international politics. “Interreligious dialogue thus arguably becomes an institution in itself and a transnational society is created which seeks to directly impact international politics (tackling climate change, alleviating poverty, supporting refugees, etc.)” (McLarren and Stahl 2020: 198).

The second main finding is that actors such as Iran or the Holy See have expanded foreign policy capabilities as opposed to traditional nation state actors, as the example of establishing and engaging in an interreligious dialogue indicates. The term “hybrid actors” is therefore introduced to classify actors that are “legal subjects of international law [and] the transnational realm(s) is integrated in their foreign policy” (McLarren and Stahl 2020: 195). Owing to its hybrid character, these actors can address audiences and issues that transcend state borders, such as the ones listed above. What is more, these actors have a very different range of resources at their disposal as compared to traditional state actors, among them time; channels of communication; sources of hope and legitimacy, etc. The initial research question sought to establish how these two hybrid actors link the international system with the world society. The findings of the paper indicate that by interacting, identifying common values and institutionalizing their cooperation, these two states do not link the two spheres of international and world society, but rather create a transnational society from within the international society in which they are established, thereby arguably bridging the two.

Critical discussion of the contribution

To date this is the only study within IR literature that focuses on this dyad and seeks to generate new insights as to what might be learned from examining such an unusual cooperation. A main point of criticism might be that these are indeed unique actors in international politics and thus there is little potential or scope for generalizing. Another area which remains insufficiently analyzed is that of the terms international and world society as well as transnationalism and how these are linked. While it would be easy to blame this on the shortcomings of the English School and what it does or does not provide in terms of clear concepts, this is an aspect which would have deserved more attention. What the article does, however, contribute is a case of how institutions are created and thus international society is maintained and continues to evolve. Such an unusual dyad, which nevertheless reveals a common identity of being religious, can be better understood using the concept of a prime institution and illustrated in the quilt model. In other words, the “foundational layer” of religion on the one hand shapes these states, but is also

allows for them to interact beyond the international society, namely in a transnational realm. Further debate as to whether interreligious dialogue can be termed a primary institution is followed up on in the conclusion.

- b. Hybrid Actorness and expanded foreign policy – when state foreign policy goes transnational

Context and scope of the article

As the previous article indicated, there are actors in the international political sphere who have additional, or what might be termed “expanded” foreign policy possibilities due to their transnational constitution. Within the context of an international society, studying this transnational aspect is crucial, as it reveals how the society has been evolving - be it in terms of who and how values and practices are promulgated and agreed upon or sources of legitimacy. Since this has not been systematically researched, the concept of “hybrid actorness” is tackled in more depth in the following article. It was most recently presented in an online session of the DVPW working group on Foreign and Security Policy (July 2021) and is in the process of being submitted for review with a journal. The puzzle therefore is an explorative one, seeking to discern how foreign policy has been evolving in an increasingly ‘transnational environment’ (Hill 2003, 193). While the main point of departure was the concept of (religious) hybrid actors as established in the previous article, further so-called transnational realms are identified and explored, namely: ideology, media, and business. The assumption is that the transnational element is constitutive of the foreign policy actorness and enables an expanded foreign policy. The main aim of the article is to introduce an analytical concept that will help better grasp an evolving foreign policy in an increasingly globalized world.

To establish this new concept more thoroughly and to make it compatible with existing foreign policy research, the paper is divided into three parts: in a first step actorness and in particular transnational actorness in Foreign Policy Analysis is re-visited in order to identify points of departure. While transnationalism and transnational actors (TNA) have become established concepts in IR and FPA literature, only little has been done to specifically link this transnational realm with state foreign policy, with Baumann and Stengel (2014) being some of the few to do so. Another caveat is necessary here – ample research has been conducted on transnationalism, particularly on the public-private nexus. What is lacking, however, is a look at what this means in terms of foreign policy actorness. In a next, more conceptual step, expanded foreign policy is delineated more clearly by defining the above-mentioned transnational realms and hybrid

actorness. This conceptual part is then substantiated with a selection of cases, such as Russia and Gazprom; Germany and its political foundations; or Qatar and Al Jazeera. These cases are studied using three criteria to establish their hybrid actorness, namely to what extent the following have been expanded: recognition; capability; and presence. The cases are used to establish sup-types of hybrid actorness.

Summary of findings

What distinguishes hybrid actorness from traditional foreign policy actorness is that “(n)ew (foreign policy) channels are opened, thus extending the scope and reach of what Carlsnaes (2002: 335) refers to as ‘beyond their territorial legitimacy’” (McLarren and Stahl 2021:8). Taking the above-mentioned aspects into account, this can lead to “(1) strengthening the state, expanding its power, impacting its *recognition* (e.g. Gazprom and Ukraine); (2) finding new forms of *presence* (e.g. second track diplomacy in conflict resolution); (3) increasing *capabilities* (a social example here are diaspora communities)” (McLarren and Stahl 2021: 8). A definition of hybrid actorness therefore reads: “Hybrid actorness denotes the particular constitution of a foreign policy polity of both state and transnational elements resulting in an expanded foreign policy increasing recognition, presence, and capabilities in the international sphere” (McLarren and Stahl 2021: 17). While several different transnational realms are identified, hybrid actorness can be manifold in that its constitutive transnational element need not be limited to one realm. In the case of the Holy See and Iran discussed in the previous publication, the transnational element which constitutes the respective hybrid actorness is that of religion. However, the United Kingdom, Russia, or Saudi Arabia are examples of foreign policy actors who draw their hybrid actorness from several (differing) realms. Incidentally, these are also states listed earlier in the context of religion as a prime institution. Taking together the various transnational realms the states combine and considering religion as a prime institution helps better understand how and why these states assume particularly powerful positions in the international or respective regional international societies.

What is more, the autonomy of the state or transnational elements can be grasped as a spectrum rather than being predefined. Such a spectrum may also help more clearly categorize foreign policy actorness. At the one end of the spectrum one might speak of a “pure” state, i.e. a state with hardly any control over or constitutive of transnational elements such as for example Switzerland. The other end would be marked by an actor largely dominated by its transnational constitution with only “symbolic” state attributes, such as for example the Holy See and the

transnational Catholic Church. The overall finding then is that both the state and the transnational elements are constitutive of the actor's foreign policy and without either of these realms, the foreign policy actorness would change. In other words, "Russia's foreign policy would look different without Gazprom, as would the UK's without the BBC, but also the Catholic Church would be a different actor without the Holy See's credentials [of] being a state" (McLarren and Stahl 2021: 9).

Critical discussion of the contribution

One of the most significant contributions this article makes is to complement and thereby expand existing FPA approaches. At the same time, it builds upon the concept of hybrid actors introduced in the previous article and thus also presents an additional means of including religion (and other transnational elements) in the English School, since there is room for expansion when it comes to the ES' understanding of actorness. By contrast, FPA pursues a traditional and arguably limited approach in how it grasps the state, reducing it "to nothing more than the various actors responsible for foreign policy making" (Alden and Aran 2017: 20).²⁸ The ideas introduced in this article allows FPA to differentiate and thus broaden its state and actorness understanding. Based on the assumption that the transnational sphere is not solely a form of denationalization, including the concept of expanded foreign policy in the shape of hybrid actorness enables a more comprehensive study of how states are exploring ways to maintain what they might perceive to be a loss of power in an increasingly globalized world (and evolving international society) using an expanded foreign policy.

As just mentioned, the findings are particularly valuable for the English School. By including hybrid actorness in the framework of the English School, significant new topics could be tackled, since it not only offers a broadened understanding of actorness, but also provides an analytical means of better grasping the transnational realm. Examples of new areas of research for the English School would be studying the foreign policy of empires, a field so far neglected, but highly relevant for the English School. This point also goes hand in hand with the question of how primary institutions are shaped by transnational and hybrid actors. Vice versa, including a concept such as religion as a prime institution in FPA would provide new insight into sources and polity of foreign policy, as well as partners and prioritization of issues.

An avenue of further research which would have gone beyond the scope of the paper would be to more closely examine the correlation between regime type and hybrid actorness. An initial observation which needs further exploring is that authoritarian regimes more actively pursue

²⁸Incidentally, this second edition of a "classic" FPA book does not mention religion once.

transnational foreign policy options (often in more than one transnational realm). An additional realm worth studying is that of diaspora communities in the past and present. Cases which come to mind are for example Baltic diaspora communities during WWII; Israeli diaspora communities; or countries with diaspora communities which are larger than the population living in the country of origin (e.g. Lebanon). Another avenue of research would be to study to what extent the transnational realm is ad hoc/situational or institutionalized as this would help reveal more about a state's foreign policy polity. This final point is particularly promising, since research on foreign policy polity remains sparse.

c. Der Vatikan und die europäische Integration heute: der Dialog als Lösung
[The Vatican and European Integration today: dialogue as solution]

Context and scope of the article

Chronologically viewed, this article precedes all others and could therefore be taken to represent the foundation for the ensuing research, in particular as it examines the relations between the Vatican²⁹ and the UK as well as the Vatican and Germany within an EU context. In the framework of the overall dissertation, however, it shall serve to provide empirical examples of how international society is constantly evolving – here at a regional level - and how engaging with religion potentially contributes to strengthening a common identity and hence such a society. While the overall subject of the edited volume is regional integration, from an English School perspective this would be regarded as a regional form of an international society. The empirical examples then lead to further considerations on how common values are established and practices agreed upon in particular due to religion, potentially leading to a stronger integration. The article was published in the edited volume “Europäische Integration – Beiträge zur Europaforschung aus multidimensionaler Analyseperspektive” (*European Integration – Contributions to European Studies from a multidimensional analysis perspective*) (Göler, Schmid and Zech 2015). The contributions of the volume tackle various aspects of European governance and (foreign) policy issues, linked with challenges of European integration. One recurring assumption of the book is that the EU faces considerable challenges or is facing multiple crises (cf. Schneider 2015: 24; Lucke 2015: 149). At the time of publication, the British referendum on leaving the European Union had not yet taken place, though the idea had been launched two years previously by then-Prime Minister Cameron.

²⁹Unlike in the previous articles, Vatican, Holy See, and the Catholic Church are used synonymously here.

The underlying puzzle of the article is the role of religion in the European integration process, as it has taken on a very ambiguous role. On the one hand, it serves to unite society beyond religious affiliations, for example with the Catholic founders Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer and de Gaspari referring to its inclusive nature (cf. Holmes 2009: 62). On the other hand, it has led to chasms, particularly when it comes to integrating non-Christian parts of society or including a country such as Turkey in the Union. One of the main assumptions of the chapter is that the Holy See is in a unique position to initiate dialogue. Due to the ambiguous role of religion in the EU, another assumption is that a dialogue with the Holy See will inevitably lead to a self-reflection of the EU on its values and principles. The chapter therefore aims to more closely examine how the Vatican contributes to or triggers a dialogue in which common values and principles are identified within the European Union and how this might strengthen the integration process and possibly tackle future crises. In an English School understanding, such a dialogue is a practice (institution) through which a regional international society is established and potentially strengthened.

To begin with, the article briefly outlines how integration and identity are inextricably linked. A key aspect considered here is one proposed by Wæver (2000) who posits that by considering the own past as an “other”, can help in establishing one’s own identity. This is used as the foundation for the ensuing analysis of dialogues which the UK and the Vatican as well as Germany and the Vatican engage in. These two exemplary cases were selected to illustrate what common values, principles, and policies are identified in such a dialogue in the European context. In a final step, the chapter discusses the role of the Vatican in initiating a dialogue in the context of (European) integration.

Summary of findings

Empirically speaking, the article’s main findings can be summarized as follows: in the case of the United Kingdom, whose head of state is at the same time also the head of the Church of England, the dyadic relations with the Holy See have been chequered. The ongoing dialogue between these two European foreign policy actors has gradually increased, with the UK and the Vatican identifying common values and priorities, expressed in policy areas in which the two seek to work together more closely. However, the joint agenda-setting is not only targeted towards foreign policy goals such as disarmament or conflict prevention, but also towards a better understanding between the Catholic and the Anglican Church (cf. Vatican 2012; Baker n.d.). This is a case which illustrates how, despite past schisms and fundamental differences, a dialogue leads to identifying commonalities. However, it merely indicates how a dialogue between

the Holy See and the UK has evolved. A second case is required to better grasp how this dialogue pursued by the Vatican is embedded in the EU context. The main finding in the case of Germany and its interaction with the Vatican³⁰ is that even a secular state, when engaging with a religious actor or within a religious context, will identify religion as a significant foundation of (European) society (cf. Merkel 2011; 2013). At the same time, the Vatican appears to ascribe Europe a vital role in the world, the Pope emphasizing the importance of a just Europe in the world (Merkel 2013). Both findings are strong empirical cases of “society-building” in practice, with the prime institution of religion providing the foundation based upon which common values and priorities are identified.

From a more analytical perspective, the findings of this chapter indicate that the foundations for a common (European) identity are to be found in what scholars and Merkel (2011) term a pre-political space. The chapter also shows that religion serves as a bridge-builder, either from the past to the present, or from the societal to the political. This leads to the theoretical findings which follow-up on Wæver’s notion of engaging with one’s own past as “the other” in order to determine and strengthen one’s identity. The two cases of the UK and Germany engaging in a dialogue with the Vatican reveal that while religion can divide, as it did in the past of both states, it can also unite, when those engaged in a dialogue agree to focus on identifying the common values and principles. But, even more importantly, there is an (often unspoken) turning away from the common past and a commitment to joint future projects, or in this case policies. The UK and Germany are merely two examples within the European context and what the Vatican does bilaterally would deserve to be studied in the wider context of the EU (and Great Britain) as a regional international society. Both Weiler (2007) and Wæver (2000) raised the point that the EU would need to engage more with its own (religious) past in order to establish what its present identity is – a point also worth considering in future ES research on sub-global or regional international societies. A first hypothesis here might be that the EU is often silent regarding its (religious) past, preventing it from further progressing with integration, as it is not prepared to or capable of verbalizing and thus identifying its common values and principles explicitly beyond what has already been established. From an English School perspective, such a practice could lead to a weakening of a (regional) international society.

Critical discussion of the contribution

In the context of this dissertation and the English School, the article provides helpful points of departure already presented in the previous chapters. This contribution illustrates an example

³⁰or with the closely linked organisation Sant’Egidio, which is only mentioned in passing in the chapter

of how international society evolves and how primary institutions emerge or change (in this case at the sub-global or regional level). The English School assumes that societies are constituted based on interaction between states during which common values and principles are established and which lead to common practices which are institutionalized. Both cases depicted in this chapter are examples of such institution-building, leading to the strengthening of an international society at the regional level. The dialogue in the two dyads is in itself already an institutionalization of interaction, for example in terms of how it is practiced (where it takes place, who is a part of it, what is addressed, how it is conveyed externally, etc.).

The manuscript of the article was submitted before Pope Francis addressed the EU parliament or before he repeatedly called upon European leaders to show solidarity with refugees since 2015. These would be rewarding cases to study to identify what common values are called upon here and how the European regional international society reacted, referring to well-established common values or identifying new ones. What the article is missing is a reference to the debate around religion and the Lisbon treaty, as this would have provided helpful insight into how religion is mentioned by whom and, again, which common values and principles were listed. Another aspect which would have deserved a few comments would have been the approaching EU referendum in the UK at the time and the role of religion in the debates surrounding it. A hypothesis that can be drawn when examining the discourse around Brexit and based on the interaction with the Vatican might therefore read: Religion plays a role when it comes to EU enlargement (see for example Turkey), however, it plays no role when it comes to European-ness, i.e. once states are members of the EU (see for example the United Kingdom and a sense of belonging within the EU). Without explicitly employing an English School framework, the chapter provides useful empirical evidence as to how common values and principles are named and practices are established. More research would reveal when and how religion appears in the European regional international society in contrast to the context of the EU and how secular the latter is.

d. Invoking Religion in Securitizing Moves: Five Cases in US History

Context and scope of the article

Though published in another context and using a very different approach, this article also identifies how religion offers a common ground for common values and principles, beyond a common religion, leading to the creation of institutions shaping the international society. In this particular case five cases from U.S. history are employed to understand the role of religion in a

security context. The edited volume on “Securitization in Statebuilding and Intervention” (Bonacker et al 2017) adheres to a declared social constructivist theoretical agenda and examines how “(...) the politics of security play a crucial role in these [state-building] international interventions” (Bonacker et al 2017:9). The securitization analysis framework employed in the volume *inter alia* identifies referent objects from different so-called sectors which can be existentially threatened, as conveyed in speech acts to respective audiences. If this existential threat is accepted by the audience, i.e. if they are convinced by the securitizing actor who communicates the threat, this paves the way for extraordinary measures to be implemented and *in extremis* the international system to be affected. In other words, the securitization framework examines the process of topics being propelled from the political agenda and becoming security issues that require immediate attention and action. The most prominent example is that of the US administration (securitizing actor) convincing the US public and arguably members of the Security Council (audience) of the immediate and existential threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in 2002/3 leading to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (extraordinary measure) and alliances being shifted (Germany and France were not part of the Coalition of the Willing).

The framework of analysis originally devised by Buzan, de Wilde, and Wæver (1998) only fleetingly discusses religion. In their article “In Defense of Religion – Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization” Laustsen and Wæver (2000) follow-up on the discussion and examine the power of religion in enabling the securitization of a referent object. Religion, they argue, “deals with the constitution of being” (Laustsen and Wæver 2000: 719) and propose three ways in which religion appears in a securitization context and thus deserves an own “sector”. Consequently, if faith is perceived to be threatened or if a “religious group is considered to be a threat to the survival of the state” (Laustsen and Wæver 2000: 720), a successful securitization is even more likely than if “merely” a particular culture and thus a form of identity were under attack. Since faith is rarely only observed and practiced locally, such a threat to religion has reverberations far beyond the domestic society. In other words, due to its transcendental and transnational character, a securitization process that is linked with religion consequently has an impact on the international and even transnational society. By expanding the analytical framework, the article generates an additional way in which religion can be considered within the securitization framework. This is derived from studying five cases in which U.S. presidents employ religion in their respective securitization processes. Viewed from an English School lens, the cases presented here indicate how the freedom of religion has emerged as a primary institution.

Summary of findings

When studying the speech acts of U.S. presidents leading to interventions, a pattern becomes discernible: not religion, but the freedom of religion proves to be a powerful referent object, one that increases the sense of “us” and “them”. The five cases studied are F.D. Roosevelt shortly before the USA entered WWII; J. Carter and the US intervention³¹ in Afghanistan; R. Reagan and the support of so-called freedom fighters known as the Reagan Doctrine; G.W. Bush and the invasion of Iraq; as well as B. Obama and the fight against ISIL. The language is analyzed to ascertain how religion features and how it enables extraordinary measures. From an English School perspective and similar to the preceding article, this offers insight into the dynamic practice of how states establish and continuously amend their shared values and rules which shape the international society. The article thus also (implicitly) sheds light on how the international society shapes and is shaped by hegemonic powers, considering the United States’ position to establish generally accepted and enduring values and sources of legitimacy.

A pattern of employing faith language emerges which reflects certain elements of U.S. American identity, such as the self-understanding of being God’s country or the belief in an impending apocalypse (c.f. Lefever and Hunt 1982; Judis 2005). The world is divided into good and evil and is equated with those who uphold the freedom of religion and those who seek to destroy it. The audiences in these five cases are not limited to the U.S. public, but can include anyone who believes in upholding the freedom of religion. Empirically speaking, a main finding of the article is that “religion is routinely brought into play by non-religious securitizing actors in the US, who frequently refer to their country’s deep-rootedness in religion” (Lucke and McLarren 2017: 97). An added insight of the article is that the common value of the freedom of religion is a strong unifying value that transcends cultural, political, and religious borders – an issue which is discussed in more depth for example in the contribution on hybrid actorness. The most important contribution of this article is that it builds upon and expands Laustsen and Wæver’s list of three ways in which religion impacts international (security) politics (religious group as a threat; faith threatened by non-religious entities; faith threatened by other religious entities (Laustsen and Wæver 2000:720). The article proposes to add a fourth point, namely when the “(f)reedom of religion (nationally and globally) is seen as threatened by a radical ideology (secular or religious)” (Lucke and McLarren 2017: 85). The significance of the freedom of religion

³¹Intervention understood here as defined by Reus Smit (2013): “Importantly, this principle need not be territorial: it could be functional, for example. International intervention is the transgression of a unit's realm of jurisdiction, conducted by other units in the system.”

then links this article to the overall context of the English School as is discussed in the following.

Critical discussion of the contribution

What the article contributes is new in several regards, as it expands on existing theoretical approaches, especially considering the dynamics of international society, how it is shaped and how enduring its institutions are. Particularly the value of freedom of religion raises numerous issues worth pursuing further, for example to whether this might in itself pose a prime institution of a post-secular international society as significant as state sovereignty (discussed in the conclusion). Empirically, the chapter offers a new take on studying faith language in the U.S. foreign political context, all the more so as cases over a period of several decades are included in the analysis. This study also confirms the persisting assumption that the identity of being religious, rather than belonging to a particular religion, already poses a strong foundation for a common identity, and thus, arguably, also for an international society. This is a recurring issue not only during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was seen as an atheist, even anti-religious power, but also since 9/11 when being (peacefully) religious became a foundation for cooperation and identification, strengthening common primary institutions and building new secondary institutions to face the threat of violent religious extremism. At the same time, when viewing this article from an English School perspective, it becomes clear that the international society can also regress, weaken, or split up. Religion, as a pre- and post-state (“prime”) institution, proves to be more enduring than an international society of states. Maintaining the freedom of religion within the international society can therefore go hand in hand with strengthening of the society itself.

An aspect in the article which would have deserved more attention in the context of religion would have been that of what are termed facilitating conditions, i.e. studying the audiences more closely as this would have allowed for a better understanding of the power and also the legitimacy religion holds/lends/bestows, leading to a successful securitization. However, even though the levels of analysis inevitably become blurred when studying religion in international politics, in the context of this dissertation, the focus is placed on the interaction among state and non-state actors at the international and transnational level, rather than at the domestic one.

IV. Conclusion

If a religious turn has taken place, then the findings in the state of the art and of the individual articles indicate that it has either peaked or is stagnating, for it has only provided limited viable analytical and theoretical solutions to including religion in the IR research agenda. However, the overall finding of this dissertation is that religion can indeed be grasped, both analytically as well as theoretically. It can be defined. And it strengthens existing IR paradigms. The dissertation provides a definition based upon which religion is then introduced as a concept in Foreign Policy Analysis. Furthermore, religion is integrated into the theoretical framework of the English School in the form of “hybrid actors” and as a “prime institution”. While the former expands the understanding of actorness within the English School, the latter adds an analytical layer. Finally, the Securitization framework of analysis is expanded. By revisiting the publications, the dissertation is able to identify next steps in terms of avenues of research to be pursued as is outlined in the following. Finally, the dissertation reveals areas of study which contribute to increasing the pertinence of IR, particularly of the English School. The focus is placed on religion in international society, i.e. the foundations it (continues to) provide(s) states with and thus its impact at an international level on the one hand; and how it contributes to shaping common institutions which ultimately allow anarchy to be overcome, at least from an English School perspective. How exactly these institutions assume shape or evolve is more closely studied in the various publications. The three overall points of departure were identified as: a) the lack of a suitable *definition of religion* in IR; b) the marginal role of *religion in Foreign Policy Analysis*; c) the need to integrate religion into an IR framework to better understand the *evolution of international society* which is not only made up of secular states.

The first contribution this dissertation provides is a *definition of religion* suitable for the IR context, as it links the institutionalization of faith in the divine with external interaction. In other words, it links the transcendental with the transnational:

Religion is the institutionalization of faith in the divine expressed in a framework of values and rules based on which the constitutive community of followers interacts with its respective social and natural environment, linking the transcendental with the transnational. Religion often provides ideas on existence and mortality, purpose and significance, order and justice, leading to a sense of identity and hope.

The definition itself indicates how adding religion to IR research can provide additional insight and expand the research agenda. When examining the nexus of faith and politics, new dimensions become discernible, for example those of time, hope, and possibly salvation. Rather than blurring the classic levels of analysis, the definition allows for these levels to be connected.

At a more analytical level, this dissertation seeks to introduce *religion in Foreign Policy Analysis* by means of the concept of “hybrid actorness”, though this can also be adopted in theories of IR as is demonstrated in the case of the English School. While not limited to religion, hybrid actorness indicates how rewarding the transnational sphere is for FPA, for it not only reveals additional foreign policy instruments, but also how foreign policy is evolving in an increasingly globalized world. To name two examples apart from those presented in the dissertation: Including religion in FPA would shed more light on Ukraine-Russia relations, considering the momentous split of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Russian Orthodox Church in 2019. It could also contribute to better understanding the behavior of states and the dynamics in secondary institutions in the MENA region following the Arab Spring in 2010.

Finally, the third point of departure is tackled from two different theoretical approaches, though the English School is the focal theory of the dissertation. The *evolution of the international society* can be studied more closely when including the new concept of a prime institution and depicted with the help of the quilt model. However, it can also be understood by examining the development of primary institutions and the role religion plays in shaping them. In addition to the English School, the dissertation was also able to contribute to expanding the Securitization framework, namely by identifying freedom of religion as powerful as faith itself in leading to a successful securitization process. Based on the findings of the various articles, two additional primary institutions should be included in the English School list of classic and modern primary institutions, namely that of interreligious dialogue and that of the freedom of religion.

Research desiderata

The dissertation also raises some fundamental issues and establishes further avenues of research which deserve more attention. At the empirical, descriptive level, more research needs to be conducted on interreligious dialogue, providing a systematic overview and establishing best practices.³² Such an overview would provide insight as to which actors are involved and establish whether the constellation matters, i.e. state-religious; religious-religious; hybrid-state; etc. It would also include what practices have been established and which issues are given priority. Based on the aspects of time and hope included in the definition of religion, such a study could also offer new pathways for secular actors in their foreign policy approaches.

³²A chapter on “Interreligious dialogue as a new form of diplomacy” is planned as part of a forthcoming handbook on diplomacy.

At the analytical level, more systematic research on (religion in) the polity of state foreign policy would be beneficial. Iran and the Holy See are clearly extreme examples of the intertwining of religion and state. Yet as the two contributions show, little research exists on the polity of foreign policy. This could potentially also contribute to better studying the foreign policy of different regime types. Another related aspect is the state-centrism in FPA which would profit from being opened up – in a first step to including hybrid actors, but in the long-term to including other types of actors. This would also go hand in hand with more research on the foreign policy polity of contested states or failed states, which could again be linked with religion.

Finally, there are numerous theoretical discussions to be had. A next project could be to compare the position of the freedom of religion and that of sovereignty as two central primary institutions in the international society. Without either of the two, the international society would not exist in the way that it does, i.e. they are both constitutive of the international society. Several of the publications discussed in this dissertation demonstrated that the freedom of religion is the prerequisite for (peaceful) international politics to occur. And considering that more than half of all states have a strong religious affiliation, the freedom of religion at the international level may be as important as that of sovereignty. Establishing freedom of religion as a primary institution in the English School or awarding it a comparable status in other IR theories would also be a “simple” way of tackling the question of a post-secular international system and how anarchy is overcome or perceived.

This study also confirms the persisting assumption that the identity of being religious, rather than belonging to a particular religion, poses a strong foundation for a common identity, and thus, arguably, also for an international society. This is a recurring issue not only during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was seen as an atheist, even anti-religious power, but also since 9/11 when being (peacefully) religious became a foundation for cooperation and identification, strengthening common primary institutions and building new secondary institutions to face the threat of violent religious extremism. The latter, especially in the form of transnational terrorist networks also deserves more attention and IR would benefit greatly if it included religion in the ways outlined in this dissertation. Using the typology introduced together with the concepts of a prime institution and the quilt model would help understand where such actors are positioned in the international system and in relation to the society (strong religious element, very weak state element, very strong transnational element). Including such actors also reveal that the international system and society are not mutually exclusive and the evolution from a system to a society is not a one-way road.

This leads to a final avenue to pursue and links the analytical with the theoretical, namely studying how democracies, freedom of religion and the strengthening of the primary institutions in the international society are linked. This inevitably will lead to looking more closely at the transnational society and how pronounced secular democracies can strengthen the international society by expanding their foreign policy. This could be done by adopting approaches from religious actors, such as thinking long-term, providing hope, and an inclusive identity. In line with the so-called established heretics, the conclusion of the dissertation is that adding religion to the research agenda with specific analytical concepts and embedding them in theoretical frameworks can, indeed, increase the knowledge to be gained and even contribute to the relevance of the discipline itself.

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Annex I: Overview of author's contribution to the publications

- a) McLarren, K. (2021): *Religion as 'prime' institution of international society*. Manuscript currently submitted for review with International Studies; an earlier version of the paper was presented at the 4th European Workshops in International Studies (EWIS) in Cardiff, UK (June 2017).

The article was solely written by the author herself.

- b) McLarren, K. and Stahl, B. (2020): The Holy See as Hybrid Actor: Religion in International, Transnational, and World Society, in: Barbato, M. (ed.): *The Pope, the Public, and International Relations*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.189-201. doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46107-2

The co-authors jointly developed the conception and research design of the article. While the analytical concept introduced in the chapter was devised together, the author herself conducted the empirical research and prepared the theoretical framework for the chapter.

- c) McLarren, K. and Stahl, B. (2021): *McLarren, K. and Stahl, B. (2021): Hybrid Actor-ness and expanded foreign policy – When state foreign policy goes transnational*. Working paper presented at the DVPW Working Group on Foreign and Security Policy Colloquium, 16 July 2021.

The co-authors jointly developed the conception and research design of the article, with both authors contributing empirical research for the respective realms presented in the article. The authors equally contributed to linking the concept with Foreign Policy Analysis and work on transnationalism.

- d) McLarren, K. (2015): Der Vatikan und die europäische Integration heute: der Dialog als Lösung [The Vatican and European Integration today: Dialogue as Solution], in: Göler, D., Schmid, A., Zech, L. (Eds.): *Europäische Integration – Beiträge zur Europaforschung aus multidimensionaler Analyseperspektive*. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag., pp.221-241. doi.org/10.5771/9783845260570

The chapter was solely written by the author herself.

- e) Lucke, R. and McLarren, K. (2017): Invoking Religion in Securitizing Moves: Five Cases in US History, in: Bonacker, T., Distler, W., Ketzmerick, M. (eds.): *Securitization, Intervention and State-Building*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp.77-103. doi.org/10.5771/9783845285825

The co-authors jointly devised the conception and research design of the chapter. The introduction and conclusion were prepared by both co-authors, while the theoretical and empirical parts were equally divided among the two co-authors: Robin Lucke was mainly responsible for drafting the section on securitization and the author herself was mainly responsible for the section on religion in International Relations. The subchapter on “Approaching Religion in Securitization Studies” was developed together by both co-authors.

Annex II: Publication manuscripts

a) Religion as ‘prime’ institution of international society

Katharina McLarren

Abstract

Religion features in early English School work, disappears, and then re-appears in more recent literature. Arguably, it has not yet found a solid place in this theoretical framework, even though the English School is known to provide angles on the evolution of international society other approaches lack. Religion can unite and divide, it can lead to a strengthening or a weakening of identity and legitimacy. Religion endures and it can exist independently of states, it can constitute them, and it can provide new forms of states and societies. Employing previous English School ideas from early as well as contemporary English School scholars as points of departure, religion is introduced as a ‘prime institution’. Based on the English School’s understanding of primary institutions as constituting international society, this concept of a ‘prime institution’ provides an additional layer to international society. Such a prime institution helps grasp the multifacetedness of religion in the context of international society; identify patterns of the (in-)significance of religion for primary institutions; and examine the difference between religious and religion-averse states within the international society. This prime institution is illustrated with a so-called ‘quilt model’ which depicts the multiple layers of international society.

Introduction

More than 80 states either have an official state religion (43) or actively support one or more religions (40) (PEW 2017: 4). If one grasps religion as the institutionalization of faith, outlasting civilizations and transcending state borders, it is surprising how little religion features in the theories of International Relations, particularly that of the International Society approach, also known as the English School. Apart from identifying historical patterns, the English School seeks to better grasp the dynamics that shape the constantly evolving international order manifest in systems and international, transnational, or world societies, focusing on what they term primary institutions. Since religion arguably contributed significantly – whether by design or unintentionally – to shaping primary and secondary institutions, one might expect English School literature to foster a pronounced interest in religion.

This article argues that while invaluable work has been done, the potential of including religion in English School thought has by no means been exhausted and thus seeks to explore further pathways of doing so. In a first step, past and current English School literature is revisited to provide a general overview of what has been done in terms of including religion, thereby identifying points of departure. The literature is reviewed chronologically, i.e. sorted by generations

of scholars and not concepts, as the English School is understood more as a loose grouping of scholars, rather than a rigid theoretical framework. The points of departure are then built-upon in a second step in which the concept of religion as a ‘prime institution’ is introduced and illustrated by employing the so-called ‘quilt model’.

Religion in past and contemporary English School thought

Religion in International Relations

In the past two decades the debate on including religion in theories of International Relations can be said to have peaked, with some scholars arguing that a religious turn did indeed take place (cf. Kratochvíl 2009 or Kubálková 2009). Apart from Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, promising attempts by Kubálková (2000, 2013), Laustsen and Wæver (2000), Dark (2000), Philpott (2000), Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000), Thomas (2001, 2005), Petito and Hatzopoulos (2003), Fox and Sandler (2004), Haynes (2009, 2011), Snyder (2011), Troy (2014), or Sandal and Fox (2013) in particular contributed to this endeavour. Fox and Sandler (2004:29) summed up the main challenge of religion in IR theory in the following, ‘For an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble.’ Based on their ontology, realist, liberal, but also constructivist approaches have difficulties conceptualizing religion – be it based on their state-centrism, or, in the latter case, based on the belief that reality is constructed by humans, not a divinity (cf. Fox and Sandler 2004:29-30). One proposal was to grasp religion as institution or socially constructed edifice (Kubálková 2000:682). In her work on International Political Theology Kubálková defines religion as ‘a system of rules...and related practices’ (2000: 695) which provide meaning, identity, an idea of one’s place in the world as well as guidelines which to live by (ibid.). This definition is discussed later in the article. To sum up, IR theory – at least the main approaches rooted in the strictly secular Anglo-Saxon and European traditions - face the challenge of including that which they sought to exclude for so long, believing that state and religion - or science and religion for that matter - should be separated. This brief summary by no means implies that religion is not being included in IR research, particularly in empirical work (cf. Johnston and Sampson 1995; Shah et al 2012; Mavelli and Wilson 2017). It does, however, underline the fact that religion has not found a prominent or clearly defined place in IR theories.

Religion and the English School

As mentioned above, religion has and continues to feature in English School literature, though mostly not explicitly. A greater emphasis is rather placed on culture, identity, norms, or the

question of civilization (see for example Buzan 2010, 2014; Williams 2011; Reus-Smit 1999, 2018; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017; Linsenmaier 2018), which all serve as points of departure for the debate on religion. The English School is in a similar predicament as other IR theories, as Jackson observes, pointing out that ‘Westphalia removed religion from international politics...’ (2000: 166). He repeatedly underlines the fact that the international society is a society of states, nevertheless he concedes that ‘(t)he important role of religion in our subject is not always recognized by contemporary international relations scholars’ (Jackson 2000: 156). While mainly state-centrist and considered to be a *via media* between realism and idealism, there are, however, significant aspects which allow the English School to stand apart from other IR theories: For one, it does not only look at the Westphalian system, but rather is characterized by the fact that it considers various types of past and present international systems and societies. Secondly, while the main actors considered are state actors, the theoretical framework is flexible enough to consider other forms or types of actors. What is more, there is the matter of institutions – both primary and secondary, which goes beyond what other theories take into account.

In the following section, English School literature is reviewed to establish points of departure to include religion to better understand how the international society has been evolving in recent times. While it is difficult to review what does not exist, the criterion for the texts reviewed was that they might have been expected to mention religion. For example, a work which includes chapters on ‘The Byzantine Oikoumene’ or ‘The Islamic System’ (Watson 1992) or a book with the title ‘International Systems in World History’ (Buzan and Little 2000) might be expected to have sections which expressly discuss religion – the former does not while the latter does. Admittedly, this is a vague criterion and the material selected does not claim to provide a complete review of religion in all of English School literature. Rather, it seeks to provide a solid understanding of what role religion has assumed in order to then build upon this knowledge in the ensuing section. There is a debate as to by whom and how the English School was ‘founded’ (cf. Dunne 1998; Knudsen 2001; Wilson 2016); in this article the English School is understood as an evolved transnational society with a weak degree of institutionalization but a strong degree of common understanding.

Early English School work

‘Christian Pacifism’ (Wight 1936), ‘Christianity and History’ (Butterfield 1949), ‘Christianity, Diplomacy and War’ (Butterfield 1953), are works by some of the most prominent founding scholars of the English School. Drawing on their own faith, looking at religion as a foundation

of values, or a means of interpreting history, religion features prominently in these works. Butterfield understands religion - at least Christianity – ‘as a religion of the spirit, other-worldly if you like, preaching charity and humility, trusting Providence and submitting to it, and setting its heart and its treasure in heaven’ (Butterfield 1949: 169). According to his work on ‘Christianity, Diplomacy and War’, ‘The international order is destroyed because we cannot achieve genuine consent over the effective field of interrelated powers’ (Butterfield 1953: 87). He places great emphasis on the idea of order, regarding the international system as similar to a social order which ‘by inhibition as well as prohibition, [...] operates to restrain a predominant power’ (Butterfield 1984: 201). Religion, in particular his own faith, thus features prominently in Butterfield’s works – both as a means of understanding human history – or destiny - as well as providing a moral compass.³³ A point of departure discussed later in this article is that of how religion either emphasizes or helps overcome the destruction of the international order Butterfield identifies.

Martin Wight, who joined the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics thanks to Butterfield, was also a ‘devout Anglican’ (Thomas 2001: 906). Thomas explains that Wight’s faith led him to more closely examine ‘the role of religious doctrines on ideas about war and peace, the impact of religious doctrine on national churches and national consciousness, the evolution of diplomatic practices in the states-systems of different civilizations, and the role of a common culture in different state-systems in history’ (Thomas 2001: 925). A Christian pacifist himself, Wight was highly skeptical of the principle of just wars and critical – or even disillusioned – by the role religion and in particular the Christian church played in international politics. ‘The League of Nations is the common-sense solution of international anarchy, and it is the organization of the just-war doctrine; future historians will record the irony that one of the chief reasons for its failure to establish peace and justice was the Roman Catholic Church’s refusal to give it support,’ (Wight 1936, 19). He did, however, believe that religion could contribute positively to shaping international society. According to Wight, Hall (2015:135) notes, ‘Christianity provided a unique – and uniquely good – foundation for international society in the past, and might do again in the future.’ Since Hall (2006, 2015) and particularly Thomas (2001) extensively examine Wight’s take on religion – the latter in his article ‘Faith, history and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English school of International Relations’, it is not further elaborated on here. Unlike Butterfield and Wight, however,

³³ In his article on Christian Realism Jones (2003) offers extensive insight not only into Butterfield’s thought but also the larger context of the role of religion in the great debates of IR and how within the English School a more religious terminology was replaced by a secular one, the notion of society rather than community for example gaining ground.

Carr was highly skeptical of religion. In 'The Twenty Years' Crisis' Carr briefly mentions religion and dismisses it, though arguably it would have fit well into his discussion of realism and utopianism (1946; cf. Wilson 2012).

Second generation English School work

Hedley Bull, arguably one of the most prominent thinkers of this school, did not include religion in his works either, even going so far as stating 'I have often felt uneasy about the extent to which Wight's view of International Relations derives from his religious beliefs' during the second Martin Wight Lecture (Bull 1976: 115). In contrast to the Christian pacifist, Bull thus had a very different approach to understanding and engaging with international politics. In 'The Anarchical Society' (1977), Bull seeks to understand the 'nature' of order and also presents alternatives to the contemporary order. Throughout his book, Bull mentions neither Christianity nor religion in general. He does, however, look at the role of ideologies in the chapter on 'Alternatives to the Contemporary States System'.³⁴ One alternative he discusses here is that of a states system 'marked by ideological homogeneity, as distinct from the ideological heterogeneity that prevails in the states system at present' (Bull 1977: 243). Examples for past and contemporary ideologies he lists are those of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation or of Communism and Anti-Communism, though he is critical of how such a homogeneity might be attained and how such an order would look in the long-term. While advocates of political ideologies believe a homogenous states system would lead to a more peaceful order, Bull also points out that these are at the same time those who are calling for war (cf. Bull 1977: 243-4). As with Butterfield and Wight before him, Bull also grapples with the question of what they term division, disunity or heterogeneity respectively and which at its core raises the question of what a society must be able to agree upon for it to endure or even exist.

To sum up Bull's work in the context of religion, his considerations on alternative states systems serve as a point of departure discussed in part two of this article.

Though religion also does not feature prominently in Adam Watson's works, he does mention it in several contexts. In his work on 'Diplomacy' (1982) Watson pursues ideas very close to those by Bull presented above when he also underlines the lack of homogeneity of the current states system of the 1980s. He observes that not all states – but also includes 'active political

³⁴ Unfortunately, he did not live to experience the role of the Catholic Church in supporting Solidarnosc and bringing about the fall of Communism in Poland, which possibly would have warranted consideration in this context.

entity' (Watson 1982:37) – pursue the same peaceful goals. 'They may have revolutionary governments, or at least governments who consider it their duty to change the way in which other states are governed (e.g., to spread communism, or democracy, or a religion like Islam)' (Watson 1982: 37). In 'The Evolution of International Society' (1992) Watson considers various types of society in which a 'divine' element appears, usually as a means of legitimizing rule or spreading civilization. He does not, however, address religion as such, thereby dismissing the possibility of elevating it to an explanatory factor. Yet Watson provides valuable points of departure for including religion in the analysis of past international systems and society, such as the Byzantine or Islamic systems mentioned above. Just as importantly, however, is his work on diplomacy. The role of religion in establishing institutions such as diplomacy is further discussed in the second section.

Contemporary English School work

The end of the Cold War triggered several English School publications, which may have been expected to include religion as they look at international society after the collapse of the USSR. In Fawn and Larkins 1996 edited volume 'International Society after the Cold War –Anarchy and Order Reconsidered' Wæver is the only one to explicitly use the term religion when considering Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future developments in the region (Wæver in Fawn and Larkins 1996:239). Linklater's 'The Transformation of Political Community' (1998) for example looks at the changes underway since the end of the Cold War. The title and the six book parts clearly expand the scope of analysis to include more than states, also considering the issues of universality, ethics and 'Citizenship in the Post-Westphalian Era'. Once again, though, neither religion nor faith are mentioned in any general sense or as a point of discussion, however, he does observe and include two important considerations: Linklater identifies what is at the heart of the Stoic-Christian tradition, namely ensuring that 'no individual or group interest is systematically excluded from moral consideration' (Linklater 1998:57) as 'the purpose of cosmopolitanism' (ibid.) as well. 'The state-building project which aimed to secure national frontiers and to create highly protected and integrated national economies undermined earlier conceptions of Christian or European international society and precluded attempts to widen the moral and political boundaries of community' (Linklater 1998:214). These two considerations indicate how the modern states system evolved away from religiously based values, guided more by securing boundaries, which now Cosmopolitanism again seeks to overcome. In a post-secular world, it is worth re-considering how these values are being upheld and by whom.

This widened spectrum of analysis is further pursued and arguably deepened by Buzan and Little in 'International Systems in World History - Remaking the Study of International Relations' (2000). Not only an essential work for (the re-defining of) the English School, but equally for the discipline of IR as a whole, the volume clearly demonstrates how the English School has an approach to international relations which is by no means limited to the Westphalian states system. What is more, like some of the predecessors, they also do not limit their understanding of actors to state units. Buzan and Little examine how societies over tens of thousands of years came to be and continue to evolve. They consider kinship but also religions' role, stating that 'the main identity core of these civilizations [ancient and classical] was almost always a common religion. [...] religions were a feature of international systems from the very beginning of civilization' (Buzan and Little 2000: 236). They identify a major achievement of what they term universal religions to be the ability to not only overcome deeply ingrained traditions, but also to transcend cultural or linguistic barriers, and that they have been able to span hundreds – even thousands – of years. They also consider how universal religions enable interaction to take place between societies, 'religion can have a profound effect on regular transactions within and between societies because it becomes possible to draw on a culturally defined supernatural dimension to reinforce the import of a message communicated through more conventional channels' (Buzan and Little 2000: 203). Though they call them universal, they do not consider any of them to have constituted a world society. They also concede that 'classifying any religion is problematic' (ibid: 204), with Hinduism being a prominent example. Religion therefore does receive some attention, but it is kinship, among others, which they see as a factor which continues to have a shaping impact (Buzan and Little 2000:376). The fact that religion could have, but was not, explored in more depth in this volume and the one by Linklater (1998) was criticized for example by Thomas (2001) and Bethke Elshtain (1999) respectively.

In his 1999 chapter on 'Religion and international society, his 2001 article on Wight and his 2005 publication 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations' Thomas considers the English School and the question of religion. He underlines that '(t)he kind of observations they [Wight and Butterfield] asked about culture, religion, and identity have now become some of the most important ones in the study of international relations' (Thomas 2005: 17). He points to the English School's 'complacency' (Thomas 2005: 152) despite the fact that '(t)he global expansion of international society, the incorporation of non-Western cultures and societies into a global international society, and global resurgence of religion have brought into prominence the role of religion and culture in international cooperation' (Thomas 2005: 155). Ultimately, Thomas proposes devising a 'social theory of religion'

which would go beyond what either the English School or other IR theories have on offer, namely attempting to grasp religion with the concepts available to them (Thomas 2005: 72). While Thomas demonstrates the prevalence of religion in international politics and the need to grasp it analytically and theoretically, Sandal and Fox examine various theories of IR and how they might include religion in their framework of analysis in their book on 'Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities.' They argue that of all IR theories, the English School lends itself particularly well to including religion, based on its focus on 'human rights, moral roots and implications of international interactions, intervention, international order, and justice' (Sandal and Fox 2013: 118-9). They focus on the different worldviews religions offer and what this means for interaction in an international political context. What is more, they present how religion lends legitimacy in such a context, be it at the domestic or international level.

Some contemporary scholars, already mentioned above, revisit the question of faith and how it impacted for example early English School scholars' work (cf. Thomas 2001; Hall 2006, 2015; Jones 2003; Sharp 2003). While other authors have focused on one religion in particular: 'Islam in the International Order' (Piscatori 1984); 'Islam and Europe' (Roberson 1998), or 'Islam, the Middle East and the Pan-Islamic Movement' (Hashmi 2009). Reus-Smit's 2018 publication on culture was listed in the introduction and is included here because he repeatedly includes religion in the discussion and many of his points, arguably, can be transferred to including religion in the English School framework. The debate between what he terms 'culturalists' believing in cultural unity as the foundation of the international order and 'pluralists' who posit that diversity among states is inevitable and international society is merely functional is a case in point. The overview provided here reflects the highly heterogeneous attitudes and approaches to including religion in English School thought. Following up on Dunne (1998: xv) who stated that the English School's 'recognition that all theory is normative theory, that forms of human association are changing, and that order without justice is ultimately unstable, are themes which contemporary critical international society theorists have taken up,' this article suggests that religion is an issue which potentially is linked to all points mentioned. Earlier English School scholars may have excluded religion from their considerations, based on their more realist views or a more pluralist approach to the international system. With Linklater, Buzan, and Little for example, the spectrum of analysis was widened in order to better understand how institutions were evolving and identities and interaction were being shaped. Rather than looking at only Christian foundations, but expanding the view as Buzan and Little do, the next step is to follow-

up on previous English School ideas and concepts and consider religion as a – if not *the* – ‘prime institution’ of international society.

Introducing the concept of a ‘prime institution’

Religion, when it does feature in English School work, appears in manifold - sometimes even seemingly contradictory - ways. Based on the points of departure identified above, religion either polarizes or unites; strengthens national identity or provides an identity that transcends national borders; it can merge with, replace, or be replaced by political entities – be it nation states or empires. Religion appears in the form of (transnational) actors or as structure. Religion has been identified as providing the foundation of primary institutions, societies, or civilizations, at the same time it can be the source of their demise. At first glance, including religion’s multifacetedness would thus hardly contribute to strengthening the parsimony of a theory. However, this multifacetedness is what makes religion so remarkable and thus provides the key to including religion in this particular theoretical framework. This section is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the concept of a ‘prime institution’ and argues that religion can be understood as such, basing this on and expanding the English School’s idea of primary institutions. To better depict and embed this new concept, the second part then presents the ‘quilt model’ which illustrates how religion, as a prime institution, provides a foundational layer of the ‘quilt’ of the international society of states.

Religion as ‘prime institution’

For the sake of clarity and before proceeding, the term ‘religion’ in this context requires clarification. In the introduction religion was presented as institutionalized faith. Neither the field of sociology nor that of political science offers *the* one definition of religion. Kubálková’s (constructivist) definition, mentioned above, in full reads, ‘(...) a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to (...) explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world, (...) thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalise them fully’ (2000: 695). This definition is quite similar to the one provided by Durkheim in his work on ‘The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life’, ‘(a) religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ (Durkheim 1915: 62). Finally, a third understanding of religion shall be presented here and followed-up on later. Gandhi referred to religion in the singular, positing that ‘(t)his religion

transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them and gives them reality' (Gandhi 1958: 59). To illustrate his understanding, he describes it as a tree, '(r)eligion is one tree with many branches. As branches, you may say, religions are many, but as tree, religion is only one' (Gandhi 1958: 63). In the context of religion and the English School, the tree here can be taken to represent the prime institution, which is discussed again in the context of the quilt model. What is more, this understanding of religion in the singular rather than the plural is adhered to in the paper. The former two definitions point to the shared practices and beliefs which are institutionalized or, in other words, constitutive of the religion and thus a community, while the latter sees it as constitutive of humanity or a world society. All three definitions allow religion to be grasped as both a pre- as well as a post-state institution, i.e. it can exist independently of a state and is thus a pre-state formation; sometimes constituting the foundation of a (nation) state; it can exist beyond the state, but it can also take the place of a state once it has failed. This understanding of religion shall be employed as the basis of the following deliberations.³⁵

In English School thought primary institutions 'are constitutive of both states and international society, in that they define not only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to each other, as well as the criteria for membership of international society' (Buzan 2014a: 17). Buzan identifies and labels 'sovereignty, territoriality, the balance of power, war, diplomacy, international law and great power management' (Buzan 2014a: 16) as the 'classical "Westphalian" set' (ibid.), as they are understood to have constituted the society of nation states which was established by the Westphalian Peace. Such institutions are presented as being constitutive of states and the international society and the debate as to how they evolved was touched upon briefly above. If religion is understood as constituting communities or even political units and of providing the foundation of respective values or a moral compass of these communities or humanity as a whole (cf. Butterfield 1953; Gandhi 1958), removing religion from the equation of how primary institutions and thus international society/(-ies) evolved and continue to evolve, becomes nigh impossible – especially if one bears in mind that even today over 80 countries either have a state religion or officially support one or more religions.

Based on the fluid understanding of religion as an institution beyond but also constitutive of some states, religion can shape (classical) primary institutions by providing the moral foundations and guiding principles of interaction beyond the own community. War, international law,

³⁵ Thomas argues that 'the very concept of religion is itself the invention of liberal modernity' (2005: 23) a point which the author would gladly discuss further in future work.

or diplomacy are examples of such classical primary institutions that have evolved from, *inter alia*, religious foundations. Looking at past or present forms of international society it becomes clear that no international society was ever constituted of purely nation states or religious states. In other words, primary institutions are a constant process of states contesting, accepting, or introducing values and legitimate behaviour and religion can be found as a prime institution or additional layer to the formation of these international societies. Diplomacy, as just one example, has religious origins (cf. Black 2010; Watson 1982), was formally institutionalized as an international treaty among states in the shape of the Vienna Convention in 1961, and has continued to take on new forms such as faith-based diplomacy (cf. Scott 2005). More recent primary institutions that have evolved are nationalism, human rights, democracy, or environmental stewardship (cf. Buzan 2014a). For each of these, religion can be taken as a point of departure for analysis, considering for example a debate triggered by the concept of universal human rights or states agreeing on an Islamic Declaration of Human rights; or the question of the environment and human's responsibility towards it.

Not only did religion contribute to shaping (some of) these institutions, it is the only type of institution capable of doing so. One might argue that the market - or trade - is an equally enduring institution, but it lacks the moral foundations religion can provide and while it might offer structure and guiding principles of behaviour, it is never a source of identity or constitutive of a community or society. The concept of a 'prime' institution shall therefore serve to better grasp how 'a system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things' (Durkheim 1915: 62) not only constitutes a community – a religion –, but at the same time contributes to shaping the prime institutions and therefore international society itself. The term prime in this context indicates that this type of institution exists before and independently of states and the international society.

Finally, an aspect that has not surfaced in English School literature regarding the common or divisive nature of religion and to what extent a common 'culture' is crucial for an international society to endure, is that of religiosity itself serving as a common identity. Religion is deliberately referred to here in the singular for two reasons: on the one hand, it is discussed as a concept, at the same time, it is understood similarly to Gandhi's understanding presented above. It can also be treated in the singular if one assumes that the trait of being religious can lead to an augmented understanding and thus cooperation among states. Empirically speaking, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) indicates how religion can lead to the formation of what the English School terms a secondary institution. The OIC, whose members are states either with Islam as official state religion or have designated Islam with a privileged status, could

equally be considered as another international society, or what Buzan would term a sub-global or transnational society.³⁶ This of course is an example of just one common religion. Inter-religious dialogue, especially when conducted or promoted by states, indicates that a form of institution has evolved which is based on the shared identity of being religious or at least valuing religion, regardless of the religion in question. While the beliefs, practices, and ideas of position in the world may differ (possibly even compete), being religious in this case is the foundation for different means of identifying and agreeing upon common values and what is accepted as legitimate behaviour within international society and beyond. Inter-religious dialogue is not only pursued by states with an official state religion (Iran and the Holy See), it is also pursued by states that officially separate church and state (Germany, or South Korea). Inter-religious dialogue can therefore be understood as an additional primary institution. Here, again, religion can be grasped as a prime institution, providing a common identity and added means of strengthening the international society.

To sum up, a prime institution, in this context, is understood as a layer (or, in Gandhi's terms the tree's stem) that can provide the constitutive foundation for individual states or political units as well as for international societies as a whole. A prime institution can exist independently of this international society and political units can have this prime institution as its foundation without being a part of the international society (for example failed states or new forms of states that are not internationally recognized). In this particular case, religion can contribute to shaping new primary (and even secondary) institutions, what might be termed the 'thread' that holds together international society. Religion can also lead to the creation of new types of society, capable of bridging state and transnational realms.

The 'quilt model'

Similar to what has become known as Watson's pendulum/sphere model, the 'quilt model' also aims at better illustrating what is meant by a prime institution and spheres or layers of international society.³⁷ The top layer of a quilt is usually made up of individual segments of fabric that are unique in some way and conformable in many other ways. They are stitched together with

³⁶ In his work on international and world society, Buzan introduces the idea of a transnational society and presents a spectrum, one he calls a weak-to-strong spectrum, i.e. on the one end a society in which states dominate, going as far as suppressing transnational actors. At the other end of the spectrum would be very strong transnational actors who recognize each other, accepting the respective varying types of actors. He calls this ultimate status 'pure transnational neomedievalism' (Buzan 2004: 136). For example, Buzan argues that '(a) handful of religions, most notably Christianity and Islam, have succeeded in creating vast subsystemic communities' (Buzan 2004: 210). The OIC can be viewed as both such a subsystemic community as well as a transnational society due to its hybrid character of state and religion. Further discussion as to the dependency of transnational actors on states would provide helpful insight.

³⁷ To come back to Gandhi, arguably, the quilt is to international society, what the tree is to humanity.

thread to create a blanket and often have patterns. A quilt also has a bottom layer or what might be termed a foundation, which is connected to the top with further thread which often enforces the patterns visible at the top.

Each segment of fabric represents a state within the international society of states. The thread that binds these states together and creates patterns can be grasped as the primary institutions. Several segments, i.e. states, may resemble each other more than others or be positioned in a certain constellation and can represent regional or sub-global societies, while the top layer as a whole can be viewed as the international society of states. In this model the bottom – foundational – layer stands for religion as prime institution. Unlike a well-crafted quilt, the foundational layer in this case is not evenly connected to the top layer and its size may not match that of the top layer. There are different types of segments: Some of the segments will be sewn on very tightly to the bottom layer, while other states are not connected to the bottom layer at all. In other words, some states have religion as a foundation and this basis can but does not have to greatly influence how they are positioned in the international society – it can both strengthen as well as weaken their belonging (e.g. Iran, Israel, Greece, UK). Another type of states, though not necessarily based on religion, may have a religious past or engage with religion (India being a case in point). There are also states who actively seek to minimize the influence of religion in the international society and would seek to sever ties to the prime institution completely (e.g. China, Cuba, North Korea). Finally, there are those segments (perhaps better conceived of as shreds in some cases) strongly attached to the bottom layer, but not included in the top layer, either because they have come loose (e.g. the Islamic State) or they hope to be added (e.g. as was the case with South Sudan before being internationally recognized). For the sake of completeness, the middle layer, what is usually the ‘filling’ could be compared to what Buzan introduced as transnational societies, i.e. there might be threads (institutions) running along this layer in addition to the top layer of international society that connects states beyond their borders.³⁸

This quilt model does not only offer a status quo image of international society, the proximity of the layers and the shape and constellation of the segments and thread can vary over the course of history. During the Cold War, for example, the segments in the top layer would have been arranged very differently compared to now and large parts of the bottom layer would have been

³⁸ ‘In principle, a transnational world society could exist in the absence of states (notwithstanding the nonsense that would make of the term transnational itself) and is therefore a possible alternative to international society. It can also exist in conjunction with states, as now, when transnational and international society overlap and inter-weave’ (Buzan 2004: 126-7).

completely disconnected from the top. The US proclaiming its solidarity with the Afghan people under Reagan (Reagan 1982) based on the common identity of being religious which needed to be defended against the anti-religious Soviet regime is one empirical example of this bottom layer surfacing in manifold ways. The bottom layer, i.e. religion as prime institution, would continue to exist even if the top layer were to dissolve. The top layer could also continue to exist without the bottom layer, however, the ties between the states would have to be strong enough to endure the loss of the foundation. Based on this image, religion arguably lends the international system a certain dynamic as it can strengthen individual segments, provide new institutions and sources of identity.

Conclusion

Ranging from directly influencing English School scholars' thought to a passive neglect of the subject, religion has featured in English School work in very different ways and to varying degrees. While Butterfield saw religion as potentially either emphasizing or helping to overcome divisions that led to the destruction of the international order, Wight examined how a unity of mankind can be achieved. Bull, while not addressing religion explicitly, considered alternative states systems and Linklater elaborated on religious values, the modern states system and Cosmopolitanism. More recent work, notably that by Buzan, Buzan and Little, Scott or Sandal and Fox offers more concrete points of departure, for example by widening the scope of analysis and grasping religion as a source of identity and legitimacy – within and beyond the state. To sum up, religion features as transnational actor, as source of conflict or as enabler of peace; religion provides the moral foundations for discussions on justice and order in the international society; and it offers competing versions of political organisation within and beyond the international society.

Numerous scholars discuss alternative or complementary types of societies and institutions. The concept of a prime institution is founded in English School thought and at the same time seeks to expand it, thus building upon these ideas of what exists beyond the states system and how international society has and continues to evolve, thereby possibly bridging different IR theory approaches. This concept allows religion to be grasped analytically and is still broad enough to examine a multitude of aspects, such as the state within international society, the foundations and change of primary institutions, or interaction between the international and transnational spheres. The quilt model is intended to better illustrate the concept and contributes to identifying new avenues of research, as it allows for the dynamics within and beyond the international society and its states, and potentially to consider the state from a new angle.

Such new avenues of research could explore patterns of religions' significance, determining how primary institutions (have) change(d) when religion is absent or especially prevalent in international society. Another pattern might be that of identifying which states are prone to upholding classical primary institutions or striving to introduce new ones when considering how closely intertwined they are with religion, the same goes for questions of justice and order within international society. These aspects lend themselves to further exploring religion and questions of governance. Considering religion-averse states and their adherence to primary institutions, by contrast, might also offer interesting new insights. The question of a common identity of being religious, as previously mentioned, offers multiple paths of further research, such as what new types of primary and secondary institutions or even societies are evolving and to what extent this poses a strong or weak sense of identity within international society. Understanding religion as a prime institution could thus add additional insight to recent debates within and about the English School (cf. Wilson 2016), which have a strong focus on the solidarist-pluralist debate (cf. Knudsen 2016), the question of how primary and secondary institutions are evolving (cf. Navari 2016), and the ongoing debate on world society³⁹ (cf. McKeil and Stivachtis 2018; Buzan 2014a). Finally, understanding religion as a prime institution can also lead to simply re-visiting the concepts of primary institutions and exploring how religion shaped and continues to shape them (the question of sovereignty in the 21st century as just one example here).

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³⁹ Which, admittedly, would have deserved an own chapter or even article.

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b) The Holy See as Hybrid Actor: Religion in International, Transnational, and World Society

Katharina McLarren and Bernhard Stahl

*"Peace is, above all, a gift from God, which is sought in prayer, but it is also the result of the efforts of people of good will. In this perspective, believers of every religion have a special responsibility and can play a decisive role, cooperating in common initiatives. Interreligious and intercultural dialogue is a fundamental path to peace."*⁴⁰

Prayer, gifts from god and peace are a likely choice of words coming from a Pope. What makes this message remarkable is that it was written by Pope Benedict XVI in reply to a letter from President Ahmadinejad who sought closer ties between Iran and the Holy See. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the Holy See date back to the seventeenth century, they were formalized in 1954 under the regime of Sha Reza Pahlavi and endured the Islamic Revolution in 1979, with an intensification of visits and meetings in recent years. The differences between these two foreign policy and religious actors are undeniable – one was labelled a rogue state and despite a large-scale international agreement, sanctions are still in place based on its purported ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. The other, though oftentimes also viewed critically, has a reputation as a soft power⁴¹ and has recently been commended for contributing to the easing of relations between the US and Cuba or for raising awareness for environmental issues. Iran is among the twenty largest countries of the world and over 90% of Iran's 80-million population is Muslim (Shia). The Holy See, by contrast, is a *sui generis* construction that allows the papacy to act as a legal subject in international law. The papacy has a mini state at its disposal, the Vatican City State, an Italian enclave. Papal diplomats have the citizenship of the Vatican. However, the papal power base are 1.3 billion members of the Catholic Church.⁴² These two seemingly diametrical opposites maintain not only diplomatic relations; they are also active in initiating interreligious dialogue. While both actors can be said to be foreign political actors

⁴⁰ Benedict XVI, *Letter of His Holiness Benedict XVI to His Excellence Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 3 November 2010.

⁴¹ Timothy A. Byrnes, "Sovereignty, supranationalism, and soft power: The Holy See in international relation," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 15, 4 (2017): 6-20; Jodok Troy, "Die Soft Power des Heiligen Stuhls. Unsichtbare Legionen zwischen internationaler Gesellschaft und Weltgesellschaft," *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 3, 4 (2010): 489-511.

⁴² For a helpful overview of the unique and at the same time complex status of the Holy See and the Vatican State in international law see for example Barbato "A State, a Diplomat, and a Transnational Church: The Multi-layered Actorness of the Holy See" and Friedrich Germelmann, "Heiliger Stuhl und Vatikanstaat in der internationalen Gemeinschaft - Völkerrechtliche Praxis und interne Beziehungen," *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 47 (2009): 147-186.

with foreign political goals in the classical sense (negotiating to end sanctions, calling upon states to prevent global warming, etc.) and thus part of the international political system, they are not merely diplomatic actors, as most schools of International Relations thought would perceive them due to the secular presumption for all diplomatic actors engaging in international affairs. The religious element in both cases has a significant impact on the norms and values of the respective actors, and therefore also immense implications for their actorness, arguably transcending state boundaries.

In this chapter we argue that both Iran and the Holy See are examples of what we term ‘hybrid actors’⁴³ – actors, in this case based on a religious element, who have expanded foreign policy possibilities based on their state and transnational constitution. The question we seek to answer is how such actors contribute to linking the international (diplomatic) system with a transnational or even a world society (public) and how religion intervenes in politics. In order to do so, we base our analysis on the theoretical framework of the English School.

In a first step we briefly review the challenge religion poses in International Relations and what attempts have been made to tackle it. As the post-secular debate has been discussed at length, we directly move on to the English School and examine its potential and advantage in grasping religion in International Relations. We particularly focus on the questions of transnational societies and actors and what significance these have in better understanding the Holy See and its international role. Consequently, we explain the concept of hybrid actors and apply it to the Holy See. Empirically, we focus on the relations between the Holy See and Iran, as this is a prime example of how religion has and continues to be not only present in international politics, but also shapes transnational society. We seek to show how patterns of interaction emerge throughout history, indicating that religion has and continues to be present and arguably contributes to shaping international and transnational society.

Religion in International Relations

“For an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble.”⁴⁴ Discussing religion as a factor in political science and International Relations in particular, poses a challenge which stems from the fact that from a political science

⁴³ Katharina McLarren and Bernhard Stahl, “‘Hybrid Actors’ – Religion and the Shift towards a World Society”. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference (Montreal, 2015). In contrast to Jodok Troy’s understanding of the Holy See as a hybrid actor we do not only combine religion and politics as the markers of hybridity. Our concept understands the dichotomy of diplomacy and public, the international and the transnational also as part of the notion of hybridity. Jodok Troy, “‘The Pope’s own hand outstretched’: Holy See diplomacy as a hybrid mode of diplomatic agency,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, 3 (2018): 521-539.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

point of view, and an IR one at that, it was not perceived necessary to take religion into account as a separate element. If anything, it was reduced to being viewed as a part of culture. And yet religion is present at all levels of analysis which the field of IR examines – it is mentioned in international declarations; it plays a role in inter-state conflicts; religion is included in foreign policy debates; and it is found in the lives of individual statesmen. Why then, does IR theory not include religion? There are two possible answers: either the various schools of thought do not see a need to include religion or the respective theoretical frameworks are devised in a way that they are not capable of doing so.

One of the main challenges already arises when trying to find an adequate definition of religion. In their 2000 contribution to *Millennium*, Laustsen and Wæver offer an attempt based on Kierkegaard's thoughts:

“Religion deals with the constitution of being through acts of faith. [...] Religion is a fundamental discourse answering questions like, why being, why law, why existence? It is difficult not to pose such questions. Answers to such questions have the character of transcendental justification, and as such anchor being (and societies).”⁴⁵

In her article “Towards an International Political Theory” also published in the same edition of *Millennium* as the above, and subsequently in Petito and Hatzopoulos' book *Religion in International Relations - the Return from Exile*,⁴⁶ Kubáľková may offer a solution, at the same time expanding Laustsen and Wæver's proposed definition. She quite clearly states that it almost goes without saying that religions, when viewed as institutions, are simply socially constructed edifices. And similar to Fox and Sandler, she criticizes that in International Relations theory religion is usually treated as nothing more than a type of organization – both at the national as well as international levels.⁴⁷ She warns of the two threats of either being led astray by a solely state-centrist approach, which would very (too) closely link states and religion, no longer differentiating between the two but using the term civilization to refer to both; or alternatively by an approach which completely separates states and religion. As with Laustsen and Wæver, Kubáľková's understanding of religion goes beyond shaping identity, it offers the *raison d'être*.⁴⁸ However, the outcome of the deliberations on including religion in IR theory was the realization

⁴⁵ Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Wæver, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization”, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 29, 3 (2000): 738.

⁴⁶ Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds) *Religion in International Relations. The Return from Exile*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

⁴⁷ Vendulka Kubáľková, “Towards an International Political Theology” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29, 3 (2000): 675–704.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 695.

that including religion is crucial, though how to actually go about this remains unclear, so that Thomas put it quite fittingly – in the end a new theory would be the most obvious answer.

Yet before giving up on finding possibilities in the already existent theories, in his book *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*⁴⁹, Thomas repeatedly considers the English School. He argues that:

“the global resurgence of religion challenges the English Schools’ complacency about the kind of challenges that face the international order. The global expansion of international society, the incorporation of non-Western cultures and societies into a global international society, and global resurgence of religion have brought into prominence the role of religion and culture in international cooperation.”⁵⁰

The English School holds that the formation of society requires common values, common institutions, etc. This implies a common culture or religious foundation,⁵¹ however, as we show later, the trait “religious” as such, as opposed to one common religion, may suffice to provide such a foundation. While the international system and society are largely understood to be constituted by states, the English School does not, per se, exclude non-state actors. When considering actors such as the Holy See and the religious sphere, therefore, the English School offers theoretical possibilities of expanding the scope of analysis of International Relations.

The English School, Religion, and Transnational Society

Employing the English School in this chapter serves two purposes: on the one hand, it offers a theoretical approach in IR which examines historical developments or different forms of institutions, on the other hand, and more pertinently, it expands the scope of analysis beyond the international (state) system. Here we limit our analysis to the ideas of Barry Buzan.⁵² We employ the foundations provided by Buzan in his book *From International to World Society – English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* to look at general starting points, as Buzan mentions religion several times, always in combination with a strengthening/intensification of identity, but also when considering transnational actors. In other words, we mainly focus on Buzan’s work because it helps theoretically grasp and link the Holy See with the public and international politics, which may help better understand the Holy See’s role and contribution to an international, transnational or world society.

⁴⁹ Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁵⁰ Ibid. 155.

⁵¹ Ibid. 94.

⁵² Andrew Hurrell’s notion of a transnationalization of governance would be fruitful alternative starting point. Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

As mentioned above and as underlined by Thomas (2005), including religion was never a completely alien notion to the English School, however, it was neither ever prominently included in the theoretical framework.⁵³ While analysing the concept of institutions and which role religion played in shaping for example diplomacy would be one avenue of considering religion in international politics,⁵⁴ we will focus on Buzan's idea of bridging the international and world society with a transnational one, as this is arguably what the Holy See takes an active part in. Buzan points out that the English School must take into consideration "questions about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared, how and why they are shared, and by whom."⁵⁵ In other words, in order to conceptualize world society, he seeks an "escape from the Westphalian straitjacket,"⁵⁶ by proposing to include non-state action within the international system in English School research.⁵⁷

What then, does world society encompass, according to Buzan? His "starting position is that there is not much to be gained, and quite a lot to be lost analytically, from simply using world society as a label for the totality of human interaction in all forms and at all levels. Globalisation fills that role already."⁵⁸ Buzan shifts the focus to the actions and relations of transnational actors. What is significant about them is that they represent an interaction among all three domains (interhuman, transnational and interstate). Additionally, transnational actors can work together, particularly based on shared norms, rules and institutions. Buzan takes a closer look at transnational interaction, speaking of transnational societies, for he suggests that the central question is "how transnational actors relate to the society of states."⁵⁹ He suggests that here too is a spectrum, one he calls a weak-to-strong spectrum, i.e. on the one end a society in which states dominate, going as far as suppressing transnational actors. At the other end of the spectrum would be very strong transnational actors who recognize each other, accepting the respective varying types of actors. He calls this ultimate status "pure transnational neomedievalism."⁶⁰

⁵³ As opposed to Wight or Butterfield, Bull was particularly sceptical of religion. In 1980, Bull "spoke of 'our commitment to a modern outlook' which favoured the 'secular, scientific' perspective over a 'religious, magical view of the world' as a subset of western values." See Robert Ayson, *Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 175.

⁵⁴ C.f. Adam Watson, *Diplomacy – The Dialogue Between States* (London: Methuen, 1982) or Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, *Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities* (London: Routledge 2013) 118-144.

⁵⁵ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Buzan is of course not the first to suggest this, Bull never excluded looking at actors within or beyond the state, however, the English School traditionally had a strong focus on state actors, not only in research but also in its normative approach: Andrew Linklater and Suganami Hidemi, *The English School of International Relations – A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 80.

⁵⁸ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, 2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 137.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 136.

Who are these transnational actors and how do they interact? And how does religion play into this scenario? Significantly, identity assumes an important role in these musings. “If units share a common identity (a religion, a system of governance, a language), or even just a common set of rules or norms (about how to determine relative status, and how to conduct diplomacy), then these intersubjective understandings not only condition their behaviour, but also define the boundaries of a social system.”⁶¹ Buzan later mentions what he labels as “interhuman identities,”⁶² which indicates both the complexity, but also the significance of transnational actors, as they shape the interplay of a myriad of factors.

We next look more closely at Buzan’s consideration of religion, which we argue is limited to being linked to identity and how this shapes the behaviour of transnational actors. Buzan argues:

“Although it is true that patterns of shared identity among human beings can and do occur in large scales, the historical record shows pretty clearly that the creation of the larger “imagined communities” such as nations and religion depended heavily on states and TNAs [transnational actors] to promote them (the Christian churches, the later Roman Empire, the Abbasid Caliphate, etc.).”⁶³

Buzan’s main argument is that religion helps strengthen identity, similar to what Laustsen/Wæver and Kubálková imply in their definitions of religion. However, Buzan does not delve into an identity-theory approach and offers an explanation, but rather, true to the English School manner, he examines historical patterns. For example, Buzan argues that, “A handful of religions, most notably Christianity and Islam, have succeeded in creating vast subsystemic communities. Some civilizations (Western, Confucian) hold a similarly sized scale, but less intensely. In matters of identity, parochialism still rules. Despite some breakthroughs to larger scale, universal scale identity remains strikingly weak.”⁶⁴ In essence, this means that the wider a transnational society spreads, the weaker it becomes, unless it is based on religion, which provides a greater “intensity” as Buzan calls it. Unfortunately, Buzan does not explore the idea of religion further; he only mentions these two religions, as though in passing. Instead, he lists examples of transnational actors who suffer from this parochialism – such as “clubs, firms, lobbies.”⁶⁵ He pinpoints the weakness in its organisation, i.e. because they are organized locally, the shared norms or values tend to weaken with increasing geographical distance. While these transnational actors, in particular INGOs, can achieve a global scale, today all the more so due to increasing technology, he does not see a strong bond based on common values and rules. In

⁶¹ Ibid. 8.

⁶² Ibid. 8.

⁶³ Ibid. 136.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 210.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

conclusion, Buzan encourages English School scholars to focus more strongly on the sub-global level.

We would add to this that including religion in the research would provide even stronger arguments of how transnational societies are formed and how they shape or even effect a shift from one type of society to another, as we discuss later. Taking Buzan's ideas about the interplay between the different domains into account, we finally come to the Holy See as a hybrid actor that is capable of shaping not only institutions but also the shift from international to transnational or even world society.

The Holy See as Hybrid Actor

In this next step we briefly clarify the term hybrid actor before examining the Holy See and specifically its interaction with Iran as a case study of how international, transnational and global public spheres interact and how they are shaped. In the introduction, we already hinted at the fact that both Iran as well as the Holy See fulfil certain requirements which qualify them not only as diplomatic subjects of international law with political aims but also as transnational public actors with a religious identity. We argue that this is due to the very strong religious elements, which shape/constitute the two respectively. In addition to the structures and international legitimacy these actors gain from being legal subjects of international law, the transnational realm(s) is integrated in their foreign policy polity to some extent. In the case of hybrid actors, the adjunct transnational actorness has borrowed credibility from the diplomatic international level and may be recognized as a substitute or even proxy actor of the transnational identity on the international level. As a consequence, for the diplomatic actor, new channels of information, of negotiation, and of influence open up. As the religion is not confined to the territorial borders, these political actors are not only part of an international system, but also address a transnational public. In both cases we have heads of state who are religious leaders, each elected by a body of religious representatives/clerics. Both internal judicial systems are based on religious law. While the pope is elected for life, the supreme leader is elected for a period of eight years, however, he can be re-elected an unspecified amount of times. This seemingly minor aspect has one prominent implication – policies need not be limited to short-term solutions, but can be based on long-term visions, which potentially greatly impacts how these actors go about international politics. Buzan argued that a common religion helps strengthen identity, we however argue that simply the fact that both actors are inherently/constitutively religious, provides a foundation for interaction, most prominently in the shape of interreligious dialogue.

Both hybrid actors take an active part in shaping an interreligious dialogue. In 2010, for example, the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Tauran, headed a delegation which went to Iran to attend a Christian-Islamic meeting. On this occasion Tauran delivered a message from the Pope to the Iranian President. President Ahmadinejad sought to strengthen the ties between the Holy See and Iran. And more recently, both President Rohani as well as Ayatollah Khamenei have underlined the importance of pursuing policies which lead to peace, as the Iranian ambassador to the Holy See, Rabbani, stated in an interview:

“Either the Holy See, as a religious institution that guides the Catholic Church, or His Holiness, Pope Francis, can propose a diplomacy geared to attaining peace. Justice, peace and development in the addresses of Pope Francis and in those of Ayatollah Khamenei illuminate our life to reach a collaboration that I would describe as multilateral religious diplomacy.”⁶⁶

He goes on to refer to the Holy See Secretary of State who had spoken of diplomacy as the art of hope: “In my opinion, this vision must be promoted in the world, because today we are living a critical situation which can only be resolved by a diplomacy that gives hope. This type of diplomacy also belongs to the political program of President Rohani.”⁶⁷ And a year later he stated: “With divine help and the help of the great Abrahamic religions, especially with Pope Francis, Iran—as the country that heads the nations which are not aligned with the West, it could form a global alliance against violence and radicalism to promote lasting peace in the world.”⁶⁸ What is remarkable here is that religion and foreign policy goals are so clearly linked. In 2014 Rabbani was succeeded by Naseri who clearly listed the priorities Iran seeks in its cooperation with the Holy See:

“Our priorities include, above all, the building up of further cooperation between the two Abrahamic religions, Islam and Christianity, and cooperate on matters of common interest, viz. justice and peace in the world. We also intend to cooperate with the Holy See in cultural, scientific and religious fields. This requires mutual visits and meetings between the two sides. We have already set about this.”⁶⁹

Based on these assertions by Iranian diplomats the scope of cooperation becomes even more evident. These are actors with long-term, global goals, who have a huge scope of possibilities of how to interact, not exclusively on a political inter-state level. Their cooperation transcends

⁶⁶ Mohammad Taher Rabbani, “Iranian Ambassador to the Holy See Hopes for Peace through Dialogue. Interview with Federico Cenci”, *Zenit*, 23 December 2013.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ “Rohani’s Iran looks to Francis for a peace alliance,” *Vatican Insider/La Stampa*, 11 February 2014.

⁶⁹ Ali Akbar Naseri, “The relations between the Iranian Embassy and the Holy See. Interview with Serena Sartini”, 30 August 2011.

national borders, it is transnationalized so to say, for example by leading an interreligious dialogue. While diplomatic ties have existed for centuries, the forms of cooperation have evolved, and an institutionalization of this transnational cooperation has taken place. The relations between the Holy See and Iran pose a particularly interesting case as they are both hybrid actors but based on different religions. Nevertheless, or perhaps because of this difference, a cooperation has taken place beyond state and religious borders. One might argue that this is no longer directly linked to international politics. We would turn this argument around and posit that this is an extension of foreign policy and also an expansion of the sphere in which cooperation takes place.

Conclusion

Interreligious dialogue takes on different shapes and takes place at different levels. It ranges from one-off high-level meetings such as the recent meeting between Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, over regular meetings held by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue to encounters between individuals of different faiths and nationalities at events such as the Parliament of the World's Religions. In all cases the bridge between international politics and a world society is built, as people of faith come together to discuss issues which are of political relevance and frequently issue policy recommendations. Interreligious dialogue thus arguably becomes an institution in itself and a transnational society is created which seeks to directly impact international politics (tackling climate change, alleviating poverty, supporting refugees, etc.). While there is a particularly strong sense of identity within the respective religious communities, regardless of the geographic distance, there is arguably also a common identity in being religious and joining in such an interreligious dialogue.

To come back to the initial question of how the Holy See bridges the international system and transnational society, we take another look at interaction beyond interreligious dialogue. The Holy See has engaged in mediation on numerous occasions, either when both or even when none of the conflicting parties were Catholic. More recently, Pope Francis offered to act as mediator in Venezuela, an offer which both sides accepted. What is more, due to its hybrid character, the Holy See, or specifically the pope, can address audiences and issues which are not limited to state borders, such as those mentioned above. The Holy See is equally capable of cooperating with very different actors and drawing on resources not immediately available to states or transnational actors respectively. The aspect of time and long-term planning was already mentioned. What is more, such actors, and the Holy See in particular, can draw upon (local) expertise due to its world-spanning network of clergy and lay-people, which hardly any

other state or transnational actor can provide. It can equally draw upon experience and trust gained over the past, such as mediating in conflicts.

What we try to show in this chapter is that there are indeed societies which transcend state borders and possibilities and that the Holy See, as a hybrid (international and transnational, diplomatic, and public, political and religious) actor, offers a prime example of how this is achieved. These actors are present in all major international institutions, at the same time they fulfil actorhood criteria which other transnational actors do not: they have clear representatives; they can sign treaties; it is unlikely that they will dissipate in the near future; etc.

Moving towards a more identity theory explanation, these actors recognize shared goals, values, and have a wider variety of possibilities of interacting. And coming back to Buzan's reference to interhuman societies – they also offer a bridge between the three domains of the individual, the state and the international level. Buzan argues:

“Given a numerous and geographically dispersed population, the processes by which humans interact seem inevitably fated to form collective entities each of which encompasses only a small part of the total human population. These entities might be collective units of some kind (possessing actor quality), and/or they might be patterns of shared identity (religious/ethnic, etc.), with network types of association amongst individuals poised somewhere in between.”⁷⁰

Hybrid actors like the Holy See play an important role within the reality of this framework and need to come more into focus in empirical and theoretical research. To conclude, a clear notion of what world society is, still has not been given, but including transnational societies in the debate is most definitely a helpful step for future research. Equally, or perhaps even more importantly is the role of religion and including this in the IR research agenda. Religion, as Buzan hints at, but only marginally elaborates, provides a strong foundation for building societies – and this must not be limited to just one religion, but rather is open to include a multitude of religions. However, religion not only offers a strong set of long-term and enduring goals, values, and rules; it also impacts the constitution of actors and their possibilities of interacting. Our short example of the dyad Iran—Holy See offers a mere glimpse of an almost parallel society, namely that of religions interacting in varying degrees of institutionalization and having an impact on international politics. Hybrid actors provide a bridge between international, diplomatic, and political actor with a status of legal subjects in international law and religious transnational non-state actors of the public sphere, which have and will continue to play a vital role in the future. These hybrid actors clearly did not suddenly appear on the international stage, on

⁷⁰ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 123.

the contrary, they have been there and what is more, they are well-equipped to continue to shape the evolving international, transnational and world societies, reaching an ever-growing public that transcends state and religious borders.

c) **Hybrid Actors and expanded foreign policy – when state foreign policy goes transnational**

Katharina McLarren and Bernhard Stahl

Abstract

The interplay of states and transnational actors has found its way into Foreign Policy Analysis. At the same time, the call for new typologies of foreign policy actors has become louder. In this paper we present the concept of ‘hybrid actorness’ which alludes to foreign policy actors with both state and transnational dimensions and thus pursue what we term an ‘expanded foreign policy’. The basic assumption is that the transnational element is constitutive of such a foreign policy actor. In order to approach a model of hybrid actorness, the article first, benefits from neighbouring disciplines which have dealt with transnationalism, actorness and some form of hybridity. Second, four illustrative case studies phenomenologically demonstrate some sub-types of ‘hybrid actorness,’ i.e. state-religion, state-ideology, state-business and state-media hybrids. We argue that this concept will help better grasp an evolving foreign policy phenomenon in an increasingly globalised world.

Introduction

Al Jazeera, Gazprom, Comintern, and the Catholic Church are featured more frequently in the media or documentaries than in International Relations (IR) or Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature. However, in this paper we argue that especially the latter should consider these actors more closely, for they are examples of transnational actors who are intertwined with state actors, resulting, in extremis, in what we term ‘hybrid actorness’ and an ‘expanded foreign policy’. In this paper we introduce the concept of this type of foreign policy actorness, which is empirically neither a new phenomenon, nor does it qualify as a new trend transforming foreign policy (Keukelaire&Schunz 2015, 66ff.). In other words, the fact that British foreign policy may push beyond its weight with the help of the BBC, that Germany makes use of its party foundations as a kind of second track diplomacy and Russia instrumentalizes Gazprom to reach its foreign policy goals are well-known in any country-specific literature. Yet these observations have been regarded as being rather idiosyncratic and were attributed to particular states. We posit, though, that these observations represent a pattern. Following up on Morin and Paquet’s (2018, 341ff) appeal, by defining, classifying, and clustering hybrid actorness analytically, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of foreign policy actor categories, possibilities, and instruments.

While the debate on who pursues foreign policy continues, particularly the aspect of transnational actors (Smith et al 2016; Alden & Aran 2017; Stengel & Baumann 2017) and even the

question of religious transnational actors has been discussed (Haynes 2016), we argue that hybrid actorness combines the foreign policy resources of both state and transnational actors, enjoying the legitimacy, status, and recognition of a sovereign entity, while at the same time pursuing a transnational policy. States may substantially extend their foreign policy resources by shaping for instance: international news coverage and thus the perception of international politics; norms and behaviour regarding energy production and the environment; or by setting up an interreligious dialogue, to name just a few possibilities. We claim that the constitution of their polity, their (qualitative) actorness impacts their foreign policies, as the institutionalized transnational realm expands the foreign policy possibilities available to them. In this paper we approach the phenomenon from two sides. On the one hand, we briefly review the relevant literature on transnational governance, foreign policy making, state authority and actorness. On the other hand, we sketch some empirical cases in order to inductively engage with hybrid actorness. As a result, we synthesise our findings by offering a definition and a taxonomy of expanded foreign policy and hybrid actorness comprising some characteristics. 'Expanded foreign policy' might be defined here as 'a contingent extension of foreign policy to the transnational realm making use of transnational actors leading to an increased actorness of the state'. While 'hybrid foreign policymaking' (Baumann & Stengel 2014, 490) denotes the increased impact of transnational actors vis-à-vis the state, 'expanded foreign policy' represents the other side of the coin meaning increased state power with the help of transnational actors.

We explore this concept of hybrid actorness in three steps: in a first step, we revisit the issues of (transnational) actorness in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), thus identifying points of departure and further areas of potential research. In this regard, the literature on EU actorness which is meant to conceive of EU foreign policy as a non-state foreign policy proved as a useful starting point for our endeavour. Admittedly, we cannot pay justice to the extensive literature on state-building and the role of states in IR here. Yet, in an explorative mode, we will denote a new analytical phenomenon by proposing definitions and a taxonomy. Subsequently, we elaborate our understanding of hybrid actorness sub-types examining several cases when a state is linked with at least one transnational realm in the shape of a) religion, b) ideology; c) media, and d) business. In our conclusion, we resume our argument 'towards a model of hybrid actorness' and then briefly discuss the possibilities of embedding this analytical concept in traditional foreign policy studies as well as FPA.

Actorness in Foreign Policy

Our research in particular follows up on Hill's observation of the increasing relevance of non-state actors and issues and areas that go beyond the political. He speaks of an international system characterized by "constant change, mixed actorness and lack of structure" (Hill 2003, 193). Traditional foreign policy studies - i.e. non-FPA studies – continue to dominate the empirical literature on foreign policy (examples: Cox et al 2013; De Haas 2013; Lanteigne 2010). They usually pursue a history-led approach stressing national idiosyncrasies which can only be understood by certain historical contingencies. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) was founded to overcome such idiosyncratic thinking by introducing theory-led, deductive concepts of foreign policy. By doing so, certain empirical observations run the risk of being neglected if they are not deducible from foreign policy (or even IR) theories. For instance, if a functioning state is simply taken as given for pursuing a coherent foreign policy, state defects tend to be excluded from the theoretical research. Such defects are extensively treated in the literature on fragile and weak states (Rotberg 2004; Newman 2009). For instance, Doyle and Dunning speak of "hybrid actors that possess legitimacy or exercise authority derived from multiple state and non-state sources, including institutional, tribal, ethnic and religious" (2018, 549). Cambanis et al (2019) employ the term 'hybrid actors' when examining armed groups who are neither state nor non-state actors in a similar context. We would argue that such groups would have a limited rather than an expanded foreign policy and thus do not fall into the scope of this article. However, further research on such groups' foreign policy capabilities would be rewarding. However, it is rare for the role of defect, incomplete and dysfunctional stateness or statehood to be addressed by IR and FPA scholars. If so, the studies target specific areas (e.g. Jackson 1990; Risse 2013), providing an ideal-type with regard to modernity (e.g. Soerensen 2001) and multilateralism (e.g. 'cluster state', Alden & Aran 2012, 70ff.), or making an argument for evolving and contested states (e.g. Keil & Stahl 2016). As another consequence, FPA has concentrated on governmental actors in order to shed more light on decision-making. In extremis, the state is just "reduced to nothing more than the various actors responsible for foreign policy making" (Alden & Aran 2012, 9). Analytical studies might have a role to play here by inductively grouping empirical phenomena which serve the double purpose of re-considering empirical observations on the one hand and allowing for fresh theoretical thinking on the other.

We begin our analytical task by adhering to basic understandings of foreign policy, i.e. "(...) the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations" (Hill 2003, 3). The process leads "to the constant evolution of both actors and structures" (Hill 2003, 28).

The most prominent debates in FPA, touched upon above, concern the sources of foreign policy as well as the constantly evolving actors and structures. We start with the observation that “(t) rue actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy” (Hill & Wallace 1996, 13). This can only be achieved if the actors in question are recognized as such. Bretherton and Vogler point out that “(o) nly states could make treaties, join international organizations and be held to account by other states. Legal actorness confers a right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to incur obligations” (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, 14). Albert and Stetter go a step further, on the one hand identifying the significance of being recognized as an actor by others, while at the same time raising the question as to “how the globalized world polity generates its own structures, which in turn facilitate the emergence of new entities in world politics by constructing new forms of actorhood beyond the nation-state” (Albert and Stetter 2015, 91). When actorhood/–actorness is meant to be treated separately from the state, it is no wonder that EU studies have advanced this issue. Similar to Greiçevci (2011), we propose to apply three criteria which have been developed by the EU foreign policy literature. Jupille & Caporaso’s (1998) components of actorness in international politics, namely authority, autonomy, recognition (1), and cohesion serve as a starting point. Moreover, Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006, 24) add elements of opportunity, presence (2), and capability (3) to better qualify actorness in international politics. While this complementary set of criteria is used to analyse EU actorness, we believe it is equally useful to grasp any type of actorness which goes beyond the classic understanding of the state in FPA. We will later revisit the three indicated criteria of recognition, presence, and capability to demonstrate how hybrid actorness present a strong case for foreign policy actors.

This so far indicates little as to the domestic or other (transnational) sources of the foreign policies pursued, not to mention the structures within which they take place. Rosenau (1967) or Stavridis & Hill (1996) look specifically at domestic sources of foreign policy, while Hudson (2005, 2019) places an emphasis on actors, all of which have become recurring themes in FPA. According to Alden & Aran (2017), there continue to be diverging FPA approaches as to the role and significance of the domestic in shaping foreign policy, inadvertently leading to theoretical explanations. When looking at hybrid actorness, however, the link between the domestic and the inter-/transnational becomes easier to grasp, as they are constitutive of the actor’s foreign policy.

Transnationalism is an emergent and growing field in social sciences spanning various disciplines (Portes et al 1999; Jönsson & Tallberg 2010; Erman & Uhlin 2010; Risse 2007). Transnational actors (TNA) are “political, social, cultural and economic agents or groups which have trans-societal relations across borders in pursuit of their goals, to a certain degree independently from domestic governmental considerations” (Thiel & Maslanik 2017, 1 referring to Risse 1995). Hill defines them as “those private groups or even individuals who, while they require physical facilities inside states, do not need governments in order to conduct international relations” (Hill 2003, 189).

Oftentimes, scholars outside the transnational research field lament the limited influence and impact of transnational actors pointing, for instance, to INGOs’ financial dependency on states (Thiel & Maslanik 2017, 260). Moreover, their agendas might be counter-productive when producing additional nationalist resentment (Orenstein et al 2008). However, the literature on the influence of transnational actors departed from the assumption that transnational actorness should be defined and conceptualized vis-à-vis or even against the state (e.g. Babic et al 2017; Breslin & Nesadurai 2018). In the same vein, Della Porta & Tarrow (2005) stress effective TNA strategies with regard to other international actors, primarily states. Going a step further, Baumann & Stengel (2014, 490) concede that “non-state actors have a significant impact on states’ foreign policymaking” and call this “hybrid foreign policymaking” (ibid). This means “a process by which decision makers (...) formulate policy goals and translate them into outcomes and that involves state actors as well as non-state actors” (ibid 495). When moving from the politics to the polity level, the literature on environmental issues also employs hybridity when analysing “transnational climate change governance networks” (Andanova et al. 2009). In their network typology, hybrid ones fill the space between purely private or public ones (p. 60). In hybrid governance networks, public and private actors work together for the purpose of dealing effectively with climate change (p. 62). Here, similar to the field of economic cooperation, “public-private partnerships” which cooperate beyond the state for governance purposes attract attention (Börzel & Risse 2005, 198). Arguably, states are resorting to the possibilities Public Private Partnerships (PPP) or Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations (Quangos) offer. In these cases, however, they are implemented or even instrumentalized by the state. What is more, they are usually situational or focused on one issue area and thus limited in scope or time. This can, for example, occur in so-called quasi-states or what Risse (2013) classifies as states with areas of limited statehood. Regarding the foreign policy of such states with forms of “hybrid governance”, Alden & Aran (2017, 94) observe that they either have less or no access to conventional foreign policy instruments such as those mentioned above. At the same time, they

are much more closely linked or even dependent upon the international system than fully-functioning states are. Yet, as Risse (2013, 9) points out, '(l)imited statehood does not equal the absence of governance, one political social, or economic order'. This process can involve various constellations of actors – be it state or non-state – who co-govern in these areas of limited statehood (see Risse 2013, 11). The actors involved can include public-private partnerships, international or non-governmental organisations, and multinational firms (ibid.). What is significant here regarding foreign policy is the link between state and society and what impact this has for the foreign policy in question.

Transnational actors pursue policy in transnational spaces defined by religion, ideology, language, knowledge or business. For instance, diaspora phenomena have emerged as important field of transnational activism (Kinnvall & Petersson 2010). While some such as TNCs cling to instrumental goals, others strive for common goods (Risse 2007, 252). The booming field of transnational actorness increasingly conceives of the space between the public and the private domain as a blurred one, allowing for different kinds of institutional settings depending on issue area and region. Yet common taxonomies tend to maintain the public-private border as well as the national and international one (Baumann & Stengel 2014, 492). Overall, we tend to share this assumption while adding an actorness element to it. We not only see 'hybrid foreign policymaking' (politics) but also 'hybrid actorness' (polity). While the former is concerned with the increasing power of TNAs, the latter stresses the states' resources to make use of TNAs. In a simple, static way of grasping the blurred terrain between state and TNA, hybrid actorness looks as one way of the states' fighting back defending the Westphalian order – or at least adapting to a changing one, as discussed below. In the terminology of the English School, one could even take the argument a step further and explore how these forms of hybrid actorness represent bridges between the international system and a world society.

A working concept of hybrid actorness

State actors make use of transnational actors which leads to increased actorness. Hence, transnational actorness is adjunct to state actors. For the sake of clarity, we assume the state actor to be the dominant one making the transnational actors to serve state purposes. Admittedly, transnational actors may capture the state which is the case in rent-seeking societies and quasi-states. Yet this reverse relationship is not our interest here since this would possibly lead to diminished stateness and weak states. The focus of this paper lies in demonstrating the extended possibilities of the state – not its limitation due to state capture. Moreover, we do not link our argument

to normative considerations. Whether such an expanded foreign policy makes use of transnational politics to enrich the world's public sphere or whether it goes for hybrid warfare is beyond the scope of the argument.

Hybrid actorness foremost enjoys the usual privileges of stateness since states are present in all major international institutions; they have clear representatives; they can sign treaties; it is unlikely that they will dissipate in the near future; etc. Features of transnational actorness add up on these functions. Speaking of the categories gained above (from Jupille & Caporaso and Bretherton & Vogler), their recognition (1), capability (2), and presence (3) are 'expanded' in the international context. Recognition refers to the degree to which external actors recognize an actor de-jure or de-facto as a legitimate 'Other' for interaction (Jupille&Caporaso 1998, 214f.). In the case of hybrid actorness, the adjunct transnational actors have borrowed credibility from the state and may be recognized as a substitute or even proxy actor. As a consequence for the state, new channels of information, of negotiation, and of influence open up.

'Actor capability' (Sjöstedt 1977, 16) refers to the availability of resources and policy instruments. Moreover, this enables the 'capacity to respond' (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 5) to external threats and challenges. Finally,

'(...) "presence" is a feature or a quality of arenas, of issue-areas or of networks of activity, and it operates to influence the actions and expectations of participants. It can be associated with tangible institutions or groupings, but it can also be expressed in essentially intangible ways which are none the less powerful. A particular presence, then, is defined by a combination of factors: credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy makers' (Allen & Smith 1990, 21).

Hybrid actorness, hence, can build on recognition, capacity and presence which allows for an expanded foreign policy and (from the state's perspective) to better policy outcomes.

The standard state toolkit of foreign policy instruments to choose from includes military means, positive or negative material incentives such as economic sanctions, various forms of self-commitment, symbolic acts or even non-action (Harnisch & Stahl 2009, 19). In addition to these, hybrid actorness may be inclined to an ideology or identity, share goals and values which transcend state boundaries, thus allowing them to (deliberately or inadvertently) widen their scope of foreign policy activity. For instance, expanded foreign policy can make use of the transnational actors' increased discursive capabilities leading to additional inter-subjective power

(Holzscheiter 2005). By building a bridge between state and non-state actors, this can take the form of engaging in types of intercultural/-religious dialogue; it can allow for cooperation with multinational companies or transnational interest groups for example in the preparation of long-term commitments; or it can mean providing and exchanging information and knowledge beyond the state.

Where does hybrid actorness come from? First, it can be understood as being the political result of contingent historical processes. As emphasized by traditional foreign policy studies, nation-building in the West was highly idiosyncratic bringing about not only different forms of democratic governance but also different forms of foreign policy polities. Our case study on the extended possibilities of the Holy See would fit here (McLarren and Stahl 2020). Second, the extended possibilities may stem from domestic power struggles in which the state captures the capabilities of formerly autonomous transnational actors. Gazprom and Russia would be a case in point for this observation. Hybrid actorness thus allows states to play a ‘double game’ in the system of states as well as the world of transnational societies. This leads to a form of expanded foreign policy which we examine in a selection of cases and which we group into sub-types.

Sub-types of Hybrid Actorness

The actors presented here are no new entities; however, the foreign political instruments and possibilities employed have so far not been included in conventional understandings of FPA. These foreign policy actors, so our argument goes, are particularly well-equipped to act in a globalized world or what Hill terms a “transnational environment” (Hill 2003, 193). He argues that such an environment, unlike the international system, is constantly changing and lacks structure: “For their part, governments will be punished by events if they assume that international politics consists simply in negotiating with other states” (ibid). In the following four realms, we show how hybrid actors have extended foreign policy options based on the transnational element of religion, ideology, media, and business. As mentioned above, a hybrid actor can draw its hybridity from more than one transnational realm and we argue that there is a spectrum of how autonomous the state and transnational elements are. By applying the three criteria of stateness we will be able to approach the angles of this spectrum while at the same time proposing sub-types of hybridity.

State and Religion

The two ‘textbook’ examples we look at more closely are Iran and the Holy See. Both of which are cases of hybrid actors. What is more, they interact with each other, which in itself poses a good puzzle for theories of IR as well as for FPA. We examine how they interact and consequently what this means in terms of expanded foreign policy. In both cases we have heads of state who are religious leaders, each elected by a body of religious representatives. Both states’ judicial systems are based on religious law. While the pope is elected for life, the supreme leader is elected for a period of eight years, however, he can be re-elected an unspecified amount of times. This seemingly minor aspect has one prominent implication – policies need not be limited to short-term solutions, but can be based on long-term visions, which potentially impacts how these actors go about international politics. Iran and the Holy See are both recognized states, while at the same time the respective religions of Shiism and Roman Catholicism constitute their transnational foreign policy actorness. Iran is not only a founding member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and active in maintaining and expanding relations with other majority Muslim countries. What is more, the religious realm of its actorness, in this case Iran’s Shia authority, allows for Iran to pursue transnational relations. Examples of how this expands foreign policy means compared to solely state actors are meetings focused on interreligious dialogue which bring together mainly religious representatives, but also state representatives to tackle issues which are not usually of a religious nature: Iran and Japan held such an interreligious meeting, marking the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution as well as the 90th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two states (ICRO 2019); similarly, a series of conferences were held in cooperation with South Korea and which included Buddhist and Christian representatives, the most recent held in December 2018 (IQNA 2018). From the Iranian side, these meetings are usually organized by the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO), linked to the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (ICRO 2009).

The same regarding the religious transnational realm applies to the Holy See and its extended foreign policy means. A 2010 Christian-Islamic meeting is indicative of this cooperation at different levels, when the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue delivered a message from Pope Benedict XVI in reply to a previous letter from President Ahmadinejad (Pope Benedict XVI 2010). The Iranian ambassador to the Holy See listed the areas in which these two ‘Abrahamic religions’ seek to work together in order to achieve more peace and justice in the world, namely culture, science, and religion (Naseri 2011). More recently, leading up to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Holy See continuously supported these negotiations; Pope Francis repeatedly encouraged a positive outcome (cf. Pope

Francis 2015). On the same day that the Iran nuclear deal was signed, Bishop Cantú, chairman of the International Justice and Peace Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, drafted a letter addressing all members of Congress in which he pleaded for support of the agreement, referring to Pope Francis and the common goal of a more secure and fraternal world (Bishop Cantú 2015).

Coming back to the actorness criteria recognition, presence, and capability, we can observe that all three areas are extended in both cases due to the religious transnational realm. The recognition of both actors can be found in structures beyond the international system, namely in the religious structures. The presence of Iran and the Holy See in international institutions is uncontested, but unlike traditional state actors, their presence can be found at the individual, the societal, the state and the transnational levels. Finally, their capabilities are hardly limited to diplomatic or military means (albeit not in the case of the Holy See), but include the direct (material) support of societal groups beyond the state's territory (bonyads are an example of charitable trusts in and outside of Iran for example); the ability to reach, mobilize, but also increase the number of followers or believers; or non-conventional forms of peace negotiations. Though the religious element could be expected to have a limiting influence as to whom these actors can cooperate with, past events have shown that the religious element, on the contrary, has led to extended possibilities.

While there are numerous examples of past and present hybrid forms of governance of state and religion (the United Kingdom and the Church of England; the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church; Japan and Shintoism; Israel and Judaism; Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, etc.), we only speak of hybrid actorness, when the element of religion is transnational and institutionalized in the state's foreign policy, i.e. the foreign policy would change considerably if the religious realm were removed. In the case of Japan, for example, Shintoism is not a religion which would significantly transcend borders which makes the transnational realm more limited. In the case of Saudi-Arabia, the massive investment in external cultural policy since 1979 has substantially extended the ruler family's possibilities due to Wahabism's increased importance in the Islamic world. Whether the Saud family will make use of these increased actorness remains to be seen. In sum, these (religious) forms of hybrid actorness indicate long-term, global goals, with an extensive scope of possibilities of how and with whom to interact, not exclusively on a political inter-state level. Thus, the Holy See comes close to an ideal-type of hybrid actorness being present in state and transnational fora at the same time, being recognized in a self-evident way wearing this double-hat, and owing significant intangible capabilities.

State and Ideology

A classic example of a state-ideology sub-type can be found in the early days of the Soviet Union and Comintern, which actively sought to extend the class struggle to other parties and rebel groups around the world. In democratic countries, strong parties may develop some kind of foreign policy. On rare occasions, domestic ideological cleavages can trigger a kind of secondary foreign policy. This was the case in the Italian First Republic when the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano), opposition party between 1945 and 1991, attempted to establish special links to the Soviet Union and other communist countries while actively taking an independent stance vis-à-vis NATO and détente (Schoch 1988, 103, 340-349). In this case, the communist party in Italy - for a long time Italy's strongest party - was excluded from government for decades which made its foreign policy ambitions resemble compensation. Admittedly, this 'secondary foreign policy' did not dance to the tune of the government. Yet overall, it meets the requirements of the expanded foreign policy since it contributed to an extension of Italy's foreign policy space.

Another example of a state-ideology hybrid actorness sub-type with long-term, global goals, who have an extensive scope of possibilities of how and with whom to interact, and are formally institutionalized in the state's foreign policy are political foundations such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) which is closely-linked to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) which is closely linked to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany. The sum of these political foundations provide the transnational ideological realm which classifies Germany a state-ideology sub-type of hybrid actorness. It is thus not one ideology which is significant, but rather the extended means and structures with which these foundations expand Germany's foreign policy. The foundations receive their funding directly from the state (from various ministries including the Ministry of Interior as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), i.e. not via the political parties they are ideologically connected to and this funding has significantly increased within the past 10 years, reaching a total of over half a billion Euros (BMI; KAS; Tagesschau 2018). These foundations only receive funding once their respective parties have been elected into parliament a specified number of times and once they have committed themselves to serving the promotion of a pluralistic political culture within Germany. Their activities are thus viewed as complementing and promoting rather than running counter to state interests. Apart from their domestic responsibility of contributing to and promoting political awareness and democracy education, these foundations have historically also played an important role internationally, mainly in the area of democracy promotion. These

political foundations allow the German state to indirectly fund and support societal actors whom they would not be able to overtly support politically vis-à-vis their international/bilateral partners (increased presence in other country's civil societies).

A past example is the support of various civil society groups and projects by the KAS during Pinochet's rule in Chile in the 1980s (cf. Pinto-Duschinsky 1991). More recently, Tunis became one of, if not the only city in the world in which all six foundations are represented. While Germany never overtly criticized Ben Ali's regime, some foundations had already been active in Tunisia prior to the revolution. Further German political foundations opened offices there following the Arab Spring in order to support the democratization process 'supported by special funds from the Foreign Ministry' (Ratka & Stahl 2018, 135). Areas of cooperation included supporting trade unions, universities, or women's rights. In the context of the Arab Spring, however, offices also had to be closed – the head of the KAS office in Cairo, for example, was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison (Rosbach 2017).

'In fact (sic) the German foundations frequently have a strategy of combining projects relating to parties, unions, mass media, business organizations and cooperatives as part of a coordinated political campaign. Moreover, projects run by different foundations complement each other' (Pinto-Duschinsky 1991, 41).

To come to the three components of recognition, presence, and capability, the state-ideology hybrid also expands foreign policy possibilities in these three areas. In terms of recognition, Germany, as a state, is recognized by the international community and because of this must or does adhere to diplomatic practices. Due to the activities of these political foundations, however, Germany is also recognized by civil society actors as supportive of their (democratic) endeavours. Germany thus becomes present at a societal level and at the same time expands its capabilities. Tellingly, Russia has not only labelled the political foundations themselves as 'foreign agents', but also any Russian NGO which accepts funding from them (Rosbach 2017). As mentioned above, each political foundation pursues its own ideologies and this determines with whom they work together, however, the uniting ideology is that of promoting democracy, working together at a transnational level and thereby expanding Germany's foreign policy scope.

State and Media

A further transnational realm which is institutionalized in foreign policy terms is media. Often referred to as a form of "soft power" (Nye 2008, 98), we view media here as a transnational realm which is constitutive of the foreign policy actors in question, thus qualifying as hybrid actorness. Two prime examples are Qatar and the UK. While Qatar has a population of less

than 3 million inhabitants, its news channel Al Jazeera reaches more than 300 million households worldwide (Al Jazeera 2018; Ginsburg and Stölzel 2011). A subsidiary of the Qatar Media Corporation (Bloomberg 2018), Al Jazeera is state-owned and broadcasts not only in Arabic but also in English. Throughout the Arab Spring it openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood, arguably a transnational/societal network, and has thus been repeatedly accused of promoting terrorism by the authoritarian regimes in the region (Miles 2017). Apart from Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English, the network started broadcasting Al Jazeera Balkans in 2011, claiming the position of ‘first regional news channel’ (Al Jazeera Balkans) and the stated goal of ‘we’re bringing together a region’ (ibid.). Al Jazeera is closely linked to the state of Qatar and its ruling family and the hybrid character of this foreign policy actor, in terms of recognition, presence, and capability, becomes particularly apparent when considering that requiring Qatar to close down Al Jazeera was one of the 13 demands issued by Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis in 2017 (Wintour 2017). The global presence of Qatar has unquestionably been increased manifold owing to Al Jazeera’s popularity. What is more, the (foreign policy) capabilities in question – addressing audiences in their own language, raising awareness for (political) issues - are enormous, given its overall size and other capabilities.

By comparison, the BBC reaches an audience of approximately 370 million worldwide. As a public service organisation, one of the BBC’s main purposes determined in the Royal Charter and Agreement is “(t)o reflect the United Kingdom, its culture and values to the world” (BBC 2018). The speech given by then Foreign Secretary William Hague on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the BBC World Service in 2012 reflects its global presence and the societal/transnational role the BBC assumes in the UK’s foreign policy. Underlining its role as “a source of reliable and impartial information that transcends borders, regions and cultures” (Hague 2012), he also points to how the BBC has been perceived externally, namely as “perhaps Britain’s greatest gift to the World in the 20th Century” (Annan 1999 quoted by The Economist 2014). Not only does the stated purpose reveal the aspired recognition and presence, the World Service was directly funded by the Foreign Office up until 2014 proving the capability aspect (Economist 2014).

In both cases, Qatar and the UK, we have hybrid actorness based *inter alia* on their transnational realm of media, extending foreign policy possibilities. Whether by design or by evolution, these actors are constituted in a way that they are capable of distributing information not just beyond their respective territories, but around the globe. This is not to say, of course, that the BBC and Al Jazeera are similar regarding content and autonomy. Regime type, self-understanding and

the history of the BBC qualify it as a rather autonomous actor vis-à-vis the government subscribing to critical and pluralist reporting, whereas Al Jazeera's structures are less transparent. For sure, the BBC cannot simply be instrumentalized by the government. But it extends the transnational sphere of the English language providing information and raising awareness for British topics. Both media actors' audiences are not limited to those of the same faith, ideology, or nationality, thus expanding their recognition, capability, and presence. This category could alternatively be labelled state and knowledge or information, and media could equally be subsumed under state and business. Hence, state-media hybrids represent an own classification of hybrid actorness as media has assumed a role in (state) foreign policy at least since the United States Office of War Information (OWI) was established in 1942. Further examples of hybrid actorness in this category are Russia and RT or China and CGTN. As we have argued, media is a crucial means of extending foreign policy instruments, as it allows for the foreign policy actors to both reach as well as interact with societies beyond the own territory.

State and Business

While the transnational realms of religion and ideology are based on a common belief or set of values and thus pose a strong transnational link in terms of identity, hybrid actorness based on business draw on other forms of a transnational realm, arguably driven more by profit than salvation. For instance, Russia's oil company Rosneft and its gas company Gazprom expand Russia's recognition, presence, and capabilities: 40% of Gazprom's total gas exports flow through Ukraine and on to Western Europe (Steiner 2018). Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly clashed regarding purported outstanding debts in the past years – be it for the gas supplied or for the transit thereof. Tensions peaked during the Ukraine crisis, when Russia first raised the gas price by 80% in April 2014 (Kirby 2014) shortly after the Maidan Revolution and then cut the gas supply to Ukraine more than once in the ensuing months and years. More recently, a dispute was settled by a tribunal in Stockholm, though this has not been implemented to date (Buckley 2018). Both companies are targeted by US sanctions, nevertheless, they continue to pursue business with European countries, among others, most prominently with Germany, whose former chancellor Gerhard Schröder is chairman of the board of directors of Rosneft, together with Igor Sechin, former deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation (Rosneft 2019). Apart from signing deals with Italy's ENI or Gaz de France, "Gazprom-Media Holding is one of the largest media holdings in Russia and Europe" (Victor & Sayfer 2012, 681-4). This transnational business realm has strengthened Russia's state and more specifically its foreign

policy possibilities compared to other non-hybrid actors, by allowing it to exert new forms of pressure and by expanding its cooperation to the level of a transnational manager class.

State-business hybrids are a further indicator that the constitution of these actors is by no means ad hoc and such actors pursue long-term global goals, thus excluding Public Private Partnerships. Further past and present examples of state-business hybrids include the United Kingdom and the East India Company in the early 19th century; France and Elf Aquitaine and the latter's role in Africa, or Italy and ENI before the companies were privatized. Further cases to be discussed might be Turkey and Turkish Airlines or Saudi Arabia and Saudi Aramco. Such state-business hybrids become far more versatile and can engage with a greater number of partners in different fields. What is more, cooperation is enabled not based upon a common cultural, religious, or regional identity, but rather based on the shared fate of having access to the same resource – as such also creating a new form of identity or joint responsibility.

Towards a model of hybrid actorness

In this paper we introduce the concept of hybrid actorness as a new typology for foreign policy actors to describe a phenomenon which has existed in international politics for centuries, and which has arguably become more 'fashionable' as transnational issues become more prominent. The state and transnational elements are constitutive of foreign policy hybrid actorness. Such foreign policy hybrids are not limited to traditional forms and instruments of pursuing interstate relations. Instead, they have means which allow them to function well in an international system as well as a transnational environment. This hybrid polity of foreign policy may take different shapes - be it institutional 'double hats' as leader of states and religions; ideological proximity as in the case of the political foundations or state-owned, state-sponsored media agents. Our illustrative cases have revealed some sub-types of hybrid actorness: state-religion, state-media, state-business and state-ideology hybrids. In all of these cases, the transnational actors serve the state actors and are adjunctactors of the country's foreign policy. With their help, the state is now able to play an additional game in the transnational realm, e.g. negotiating with other actors, finding other transnational partners and speaking a distinct language beyond the caveats of diplomacy. Analytically speaking, the state may systematically spur its global presence, foster its international recognition and increase its capabilities. Hence, we propose to speak of an 'expanded foreign policy' here. 'Expanded foreign policy' is defined above as 'a contingent extension of foreign policy to the transnational realm making use of transnational actors leading to an increased actorness of the state'. Unquestionably, the polity of expanded

foreign policy requires further research. By which means is the transnational actor tied to the state?

A critical point should be raised here. Does this so-called 'expanded foreign policy' simply mean that certain foreign policy instruments might be added to the state's toolbox? Admittedly, the state can expand its possibilities by investing in new policies e.g. cultural policies or public diplomacy. Moreover, it can find 'insular' or 'embedded agencies' within the state bureaucracies in order to exert influence (Breuning 2007, 118). Yet, in all of these cases we would still speak of governmental or quasi-governmental organisations. In the case of hybrid actorness, the state employs transnational intermediaries making use of their legitimacy in the transnational realm. It is another dimension, another channel for foreign policy. Moreover, the transnational actors possess a certain degree of autonomy which – in an unlikely case – might lead to policies independent from the state. These two attributes speak against a mere extension of foreign policy instruments but constitute a qualitative and substantial foreign policy complement. When analysing the state's capabilities in foreign policy with regard to autonomy, we may come across a spectrum beginning with the 'pure' state at one end and an entirely autonomous transnational actor at the other end of the spectrum. On such a spectrum we would thus locate a very strong transnational actor with state attributes (e.g. the Holy See with its dominant transnational Catholic Church) towards one end – it is a pure hybrid actor. Yet a state with very limited control of transnational actors in foreign policy (e.g. Switzerland) would be at the other end of the hybridity spectrum. Our argument reads that the actorness in question is hybrid in the sense that both elements are constitutive of its foreign policy and – so our counter-factual argument goes - without either of these state or transnational realms the actorness would change significantly. To put it differently, Russia's foreign policy would look different without Gazprom and as would the UK's without the BBC, but also the Catholic Church would be a different actor without the Holy See's credentials being a state.

We therefore propose the following definition of hybrid actorness:

Hybrid actorness denotes the particular constitution of a foreign policy polity of both state and transnational elements resulting in an expanded foreign policy increasing recognition, presence, and capabilities in the international sphere.

The concept is meant to cluster formerly idiosyncratic phenomena of foreign policy studies making them accessible to FPA and theoretical reasoning on foreign policy actorness. Speaking of traditional foreign policy studies, particularly the English School could integrate these actors, taking into consideration the fluidity of hybrid actorness in the international system, society and

world society, arguably building bridges or even constituting these forms and spheres of international politics. A further aspect are empires and their realms of transnational foreign policy or the notion of primary institutions and which role hybrids assume in shaping these. Finally, an example of a critical approach in which hybrid actors would easily find a theoretical home is the Neo-Gramscian one. Placing a focus on social forces and transnational relations beyond the state and linking the second and third level of analysis in IR, the realms of religion or ideology and business or media fit right in. Such an approach could give the concept a different spin, for example when considering how hegemonies are pursued or achieved and how institutions are one mechanism of doing so (Cox 1983, 172).

How could the idea of hybrid actorness find a way into FPA? First, when analysing the decision-making environment oftentimes only ‘constraints’ and ‘caveats’ are taken into consideration (e.g. Mintz & DeRouen 2010, 25-31). The presence of hybrid actorness not only changes the polity of foreign policy but also gives rise to the question of politics, in other words, how do governments make use of such transnational actors? In this regard, hybrid actorness constitutes the polity of foreign policy – ‘the terrain on which foreign policy decisions are made and actions are taken’ (Webber & Smith 2002, 29) - in a certain way. Our recommendation would be – alluding to the tension between FPA and traditional idiosyncratic foreign policy studies mentioned above – to define a ‘minimal’ set of foreign policy instruments all countries share (FPA relevant), while adding such foreign policy forms which are country-specific and may include hybrid actorness (traditional FP relevant).

Second, we would push Albert and Stetter’s (2015, 92) plea to ‘conceptualize foreign policy in an arena of not fully consolidated actorhood’ further by adding phenomena such as contested statehood, statehood before and beyond the state as well as hybrid actorness to the theoretical debate. By doing so, we would also avoid the impression of understanding foreign policy as a mere extended sub-type of an ideal-type ‘state’. Rather, as we intended to demonstrate, the state may own capabilities to increase its actorness.

Third, studies on hybrid actorness can complement the growing literature on transnational actors and even ‘foreign policy’ of transnational actors. In our understanding, the growth of the transnational community cannot only be grasped as pure de-nationalization but consider that states seek to counter-act and react to their perceived loss of power by pursuing an expanded foreign policy. As already explored in the case of hybrid transnational climate change networks, these two research perspectives might merge and enhance our understanding of the complex relationship between state and transnational actors.

Finally, linking the cases of hybrid actorness to the liberal school of thought, a point which deserves more research is the correlation between regime type and hybrid actorness. A first hunch is that the more authoritarian a regime, the more realms of transnational foreign policy options it pursues, resulting in a spectrum of hybrid actorness reaching from a weak to a strong state. One criterion for hybrid actorness is that the transnational realm must be constitutive of the foreign policy actor, thus, when considering further cases, one must examine to what extent the transnational realm is merely situational or institutionalized. In the cases presented, each realm we look at leads to transnational possibilities which extend beyond the religion, ideology, media, or business so that the expanded foreign policy is not limited in issue, situation or time. These are the vehicles with which these otherwise state actors succeed in overcoming or transcending the limits of state-to-state foreign policy and engaging with non-state actors which can assume a multitude of forms. To conclude, the concept of foreign policy actorness presented here on the one hand helps grasp an actorness which is not only present in international politics as well as transnational relations, but also shapes these areas, at the same time it can help detect areas in which state and non-state actorness might adapt or expand their own foreign policy means to react to a changing global environment.

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d) Der Vatikan und die europäische Integration heute: der Dialog als Lösung

Katharina McLarren

“Das Christentum ist die stärkste Kraft bei der Wiederherstellung der geistigen Einheit Europas, und zwar durch seinen universalistischen Charakter, durch seine Synthesekraft...und durch seine Fähigkeit, Orient und Okzident zu verbinden, durch seine Fähigkeit, den Kräften der Spaltung zu widerstehen, integrierend zu wirken und den echten Geist der Solidarität zwischen den Menschen und den Völkern zu verbreiten.“⁷¹

1. Einführung

In Zeiten der Krise, sowie in Debatten über die Zukunft der EU, so Sonia Lucarelli, sei es üblich, dass sich die zentralen Akteure der EU Außenpolitik oft auf Werte und Prinzipien beziehen, die charakteristisch für die EU und ein Fundament für deren Rolle in der Weltpolitik bieten sollten.⁷² In dem eingangs aufgeführten Zitat, bezieht sich Guido Gonella, späterer Justizminister Italiens und Abgeordneter des Europäischen Parlaments, im Jahr 1948 nicht nur auf geteilte Werte, sondern stellt ganz eindeutig das einende Potenzial eines geteilten Glaubens in den Mittelpunkt. Die römisch-katholischen Gründerväter der EU, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer und Alcide de Gaspari, maßen der Frage nach Identität einen hohen Stellenwert bei. Das von ihnen konzipierte Rahmenwerk verpflichtet sich grundlegend pluralistischen Identitäten, das über Konfessionen oder säkularen Ansichten hinausgeht,⁷³ wie es auch Gonella bereits angedeutet hatte. Auch heute befindet sich die EU in einer Krise und es werden durchgehend Debatten über die Zukunft der EU geführt, sodass Werte und Prinzipien wieder in den Mittelpunkt gerückt werden. Friedrich Kratochwil identifizierte als eine der zentralen Fragen im Existenzkampf um die europäische Einigung: „Wieviel Symbolik und Idealismus verträgt sich mit real-politischen Gegebenheiten? Wie lange kann das gemeinsame politische und

⁷¹ „Il cristianesimo è il più potente ausilio alla restaurazione dell’ unità spirituale dell’ Europa: per il suo innato carattere universalistico, la sua potenza di sintesi...; per la sua capacità di collegare l’Oriente a L’Occidente, di resistere alle forze della dispersione e di fare opera di integrazione, di instaurare un vero spirito di solidarietà tra gli uomini a tra i popoli.“ (Chenaux, Philippe: *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome*, Bruxelles 1990, p.57. (Deutsche Übersetzung in: Durand, Jean-Dominique: *Christliche Demokratie und europäische Integration in: Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen*, 1 (1994), S.168.)

⁷² Lucarelli, Sonia: *Introduction – Values, principles, identity and European Union foreign policy*, in: Lucarelli, Sonia/Manners, Ian (Hrsg): *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, Oxford 2006, S.2-3.

⁷³ Holmes, Douglas: *Experimental identities (after Maastricht)*, in: Checkel, Jeffrey T./Katzenstein, Peter J. (Hrsg): *European Identity*, Cambridge 2009, S.62f.

kulturelle Erbe der Europäer den Sparzwängen, Rettungsschirmen und Hilfsfonds standhalten?⁷⁴ Wenn neben dem gemeinsamen politischen und kulturellen noch das religiöse Erbe hinzugezogen wird, so würde Gonella diese Frage wohl mit „noch lange“ beantworten. Welche Rolle dabei die römisch-katholische Kirche, oder genauer der Vatikan⁷⁵ als Akteur, gespielt hat oder auch einnehmen wollte, wurde in der Forschung zur Entstehungsgeschichte sowie der Entwicklung der EU Integration untersucht, hier sind im deutschen Bereich beispielsweise Stefan Hörner, auf Französisch Philippe Chenaux und im englischsprachigen Raum Peter Katzenstein aber auch Joseph Weiler zu nennen. Nach wie vor wird die Rolle der Religion in der Disziplin der Internationalen Beziehungen, aber auch insgesamt in der Politikwissenschaft weitestgehend vernachlässigt. Allerdings gibt es das Bestreben, diese analytisch zu erfassen, wobei dies nach wie vor, vor methodischen Herausforderungen steht. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, wie der Vatikan (möglicherweise unbeabsichtigt) einen Beitrag dazu leistet, dass zentrale Akteure in der EU zunehmend Bezug auf geteilte Wertevorstellungen nehmen. Dies könnte wiederum zu einer verstärkten gemeinsamen Identität und somit zu einer besseren Integration führen. Der Beitrag zielt nicht darauf ab ein christliches Fundament der EU aufzuzeigen. Vielmehr geht es darum aufzuweisen, welchen Beitrag ein Dialog leisten kann, geteilte Werte und Ziele zu identifizieren. Joseph H. H. Weiler fordert diejenigen Akteure, die an der europäischen Integration beteiligt sind, dazu auf, sich nicht nur mit Fragen der Demokratie auseinanderzusetzen, sondern auch mit dem christlichen Erbe. Er deutet darauf hin, dass dieses Erbe (heritage) nie zur Sprache gebracht wird. Dabei fordert er lediglich eine Auseinandersetzung, nicht zwingend eine Übereinstimmung mit den christlichen Ideen.⁷⁶ Ein solcher Akteur wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht – Bundeskanzlerin Merkel stellt genau diese Forderung auf politischer Ebene. Gleichzeitig untersucht dieser Beitrag, wie der Vatikan absichtlich oder sogar unbeabsichtigt, dazu führt, dass eine solche Auseinandersetzung stattfindet.

Zunächst werden Überlegungen zum Begriff der Integration unter dem Aspekt einer gemeinsamen europäischen Identität vorgestellt. Des Weiteren wird kurz dargelegt, welche Rolle der Vatikan seit den fünfziger Jahren gegenüber der europäischen Integration eingenommen hat.

⁷⁴ siehe Friedrich Kratochwils Beitrag in diesem Band

⁷⁵ Mit den Lateranverträgen von 1929 wurde beschlossen: „Der Heilige Stuhl mit dem Papst als Oberhaupt der katholischen Kirche wird als eigenständiges Völkerrechtssubjekt mit dem Recht auf diplomatische Beziehungen anerkannt; dem Staat der Vatikanstadt wird auf 0,44 km² mit eigener Verwaltung eine staatliche Basis garantiert [...] So ist der Vatikan vor allem das Symbol für die Unabhängigkeit des Heiligen Stuhls“. Sommeregger, Andreas: *Soft Power und Religion – Der Heilige Stuhl in den internationalen Beziehungen*. Wiesbaden 2011, S.46.

⁷⁶ Weiler, Joseph H.H.: *A Christian Europe? Europe and Christianity: rules of commitment*, in: *European View* 6 (2007), Nr.1, S.145.

Anschließend wird mithilfe einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse ein aktuelles Beispiel dieser Auseinandersetzung mit dem gemeinsamen identitätsstiftenden Glauben untersucht. Untersucht werden Reden von britischen Regierungschefs, sowie auf deutscher Seite Reden Angela Merkels, jeweils anlässlich der Papstbesuche in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik. Zudem wird auch kurz auf Äußerungen des Papstes Benedikt XVI eingegangen. So soll ein Dialog nachgezeichnet werden, indem eine Auseinandersetzung mit christlichen Vorstellungen und Werten, sowie eine Zielsetzung stattfindet. Ein Dialog kann dazu führen, dass sich die Teilnehmer besser kennen- und verstehen lernen und je nachdem, mit wem der Dialog geführt wird, dass eine Abgrenzung stattfindet. Inwiefern dies auch eine Möglichkeit oder gar eine Realität innerhalb der EU ist, soll abschließend diskutiert werden.

2. Identität und Integration

Weiler zufolge handelt es sich bei Integration um ein europäisches Ideal, wie Beziehungen zwischen Staaten ausgestaltet werden sollten, in der Hoffnung, ein gemeinsames Schicksal zu teilen. Damit geht einher, dass innerhalb der einzelnen Nationen, aber auch innerhalb der Union bestimmt werden muss, wie diese anderen gegenüber agieren soll.⁷⁷ Laut Weiler gilt es daher nicht nur die Mittel, sondern vor allem auch die Ziele der Integration zu untersuchen.⁷⁸ Worin genau jedoch die Integration besteht gibt beispielsweise Rosamond vor. Er unterscheidet dabei vor allem zwischen der wirtschaftlichen und der politischen Integration. In beiden Fällen geht es um eine herausragende internationale Zusammenarbeit und die damit einhergehende Institutionalisierung zwischen mehreren Staaten.⁷⁹ Im Falle der politischen Integration wirft Rosamond die Frage auf, ob Integration letztlich nicht eine Übereinkunft über geteilte Grundwerte sei.⁸⁰ Die eben auch institutionalisiert wird. Dabei erfüllt die Institution „elementare Funktionen der Bedürfnisbefriedigung (Sinngebung, Orientierung).“⁸¹ Eine Institutionalisierung also der gemeinsamen Werte und Normen? In seinem Werk „Der Vatikan und die Neuordnung Europas“ bietet Hörner eines dieser Ziele, nach denen Weiler sucht: “Die Sache einer Nachkriegsordnung, ein stabiler Friede und wirtschaftliche Prosperität, dies ist das Ziel, das Mittel ist die europäische Einigung. Die europäische Integration soll also nicht als Selbstzweck betrieben werden. Sie hat ihren Zweck erfüllt, wenn Friede und wirtschaftlicher Aufbau gewährleistet sind. Es steht kein Ideal, das realisiert werden soll im Vordergrund, sondern Pragmatismus, die

⁷⁷ Weiler, A Christian Europe, a.a.O., S.146.

⁷⁸ Weiler, A Christian Europe, a.a.O., S.145.

⁷⁹ Rosamond, Ben: Theories of European Integration, New York 2010, S.10.

⁸⁰ Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, a.a.O. S.11f.

⁸¹ Stahl, Bernhard: Warum gibt es die EU und die ASEAN? Faktoren weltpolitischer Institutionalisierung in vergleichender Analyse, Baden-Baden 1998, S. 18.

verständlichen Bemühungen, eine Katastrophe, wie sie der Zweite Weltkrieg darstellte, Europa in Zukunft zu ersparen.“⁸²

Kann solch eine Integration jedoch den von Kratochwil aufgezählten Sparzwängen und Rettungsschirmen standhalten? Wie sieht es mit der Identität aus, die in diesen Institutionen der europäischen Integration manifestiert wird? Checkel und Katzenstein zufolge ist die Identität nicht nur hier zu suchen, sondern möglicherweise auch in alltäglichen Verhaltensweisen.⁸³

Waever geht einen Schritt weiter und spricht von einer zusätzlichen „Lage“ (layer), welche die Identität der Nationalstaaten nicht ersetzt, sondern vielmehr ergänzt. Er spricht im Falle Europas von sogenannten „post-souveränen Qualitäten.“⁸⁴ Um das Verhalten von Staaten zu verstehen, ist es sodann notwendig die Identität zu erforschen um somit auch die Zielsetzung aufzudecken. Waever schlägt vor, dass ein „other“ nicht zwangsläufig ein anderer Akteur sein muss, es kann auch die eigene Geschichte sein – oder wie im Sinne Weiler ein bestimmtes Erbe – mit dem man sich auseinandersetzen muss, um die eigene Identität besser zu verstehen, zu stärken.

Dieser Beitrag behandelt die EU als eine normative Macht, wie sie von Manners beschrieben wird, nämlich eine Macht, die Normen im internationalen System mit bestimmt und auch ändert.⁸⁵ Auch hier ist es notwendig, die Ziele dieses Akteurs aufzudecken. Um Ziele zu verfolgen, um handlungsfähig zu werden, müssen diese Ziele jedoch erst formuliert, gesetzt werden. Wie bereits erwähnt, soll die (angestrebte) Rolle des Vatikans im europäischen Integrationsprozess weitestgehend ausgeklammert werden. Im Vordergrund der Analyse steht die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Glaube, die im Zusammentreffen mit dem Pontifikat hervorgerufen wird. Der Vatikan war seit Entstehung der EU daran interessiert, eine Rückbesinnung auf das christliche Erbe Europas zu fördern. Pius XII erhob Hörner zufolge Anfang der 1950er Jahre die Forderung nach einem katholischen Europa, verfasste sogar das Schreiben „Rettung der europäischen Kultur durch den katholischen Glauben“. Vor allem angesichts des kommunistischen Ostens sollte der Vatikan eine entscheidende Rolle in der europäischen Integration spielen. Hörner bewertet diese Ansprüche folgenderweise: „Welch großer aber auch welcher unrealistischer Anspruch. Wie sehr überschätzt der Papst seine Einflußmöglichkeiten.“⁸⁶

Anlässlich eines Treffens mit Vertretern der Europäischen Volkspartei im März 2006 sprach sich auch Papst Benedikt XVI entschieden dafür aus, sich auf die christlichen Wurzeln Europas

⁸² Hörner, Vatikan und Neuordnung, a.a.O., S.61f.

⁸³ Checkel, Jeffrey T/Katzenstein, Peter J. (Hrsg): *European Identity*, Cambridge 2009, S.4.

⁸⁴ Waever, Ole: *The EU as a security actor*, in: Kelstrup, Morten/Williams, Michael (Hrsg): *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration – Power, Security and Community*, Oxford 2000, S.279.

⁸⁵ Manners, Ian: *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (2002) Nr.2, S.252.

⁸⁶ Hörner, Stefan: *Der Vatikan und die Neuordnung Europas – Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die katholische Kirche im europäischen Integrationsprozeß 1948-1958*, Frankfurt am Main 1996, S.223.

zu besinnen: “At present, Europe has to address complex issues of great importance, such as the growth and development of European integration, the increasingly precise definition of neighbourhood policy within the Union and the debate over its social model. In order to attain these goals, it will be important to draw inspiration, with creative fidelity, from the Christian heritage which has made such a particular contribution to forging the identity of this continent. By valuing its Christian roots, Europe will be able to give a secure direction to the choices of its citizens and peoples, it will strengthen their awareness of belonging to a common civilization and it will nourish the commitment of all to address the challenges of the present for the sake of a better future.”⁸⁷ Zum einen ist hier festzuhalten, dass auch er, wie anderswo von Lucarelli beobachtet, auf geteilte Werte Bezug nimmt, wenn er über die Zukunft und die Herausforderungen der EU spricht. Zum anderen aber sollen die gemeinsamen Werte auch handlungsweisend fungieren, also Richtlinien vorgeben, um Ziele zu formulieren. In einem nächsten Schritt soll nun kurz skizziert werden, wie die Beziehungen jeweils zwischen dem Vatikan und Großbritannien, sowie dem Vatikan und der Bundesrepublik gestaltet sind, und welche Reaktionen die jeweiligen Papstbesuche hervorgerufen haben.

3. Der Vatikan im Dialog mit Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik

3.1 Der Vatikan und der Heilige Stuhl – konstitutiv besonders

Wenngleich die innenpolitischen Prozesse des Vatikans für diesen Beitrag weitestgehend irrelevant sind, der Staat also als *black box* behandelt werden kann, so ist seine Komplexe Konstitution von höchster Relevanz, da er für die Beziehungen zu anderen Staaten und seine Akteursrolle entscheidend ist. Seit 1970 werden diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen der EU und dem Vatikan gepflegt. Seit 2006 ist eine EU Delegation im Vatikan vertreten. Zwischen dem Vatikan und der EU finden Dialoge zu verschiedenen Themen statt, darunter fallen Armut und Entwicklung, ökologische Nachhaltigkeit, aber auch Dialog zwischen Religionen und Kulturen.⁸⁸ Welche Rolle nimmt der Vatikan, oder der Papst in der EU ein? Von Anfang an hat er sich in der ambivalenten Rolle des staatlichen und zugleich religiösen Machthabers befunden. So verfügte er über die Macht, Staatsoberhäupter zu krönen. Einige Jahrhunderte später liegt die Krux des Papstes nach wie vor in dieser zweifachen Rolle als Staats- und Kirchenoberhaupt. Darf ein

⁸⁷ Papst Benedikt XVI: Address of his Holiness Benedict XVI to the members of the European People’s Party on the Occasion of the Study Days on Europe, 30.März 2006 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/march/documents/hf_ben-vi_spe_20060330_eu-parliamentarians_en.html, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

⁸⁸ European Union External Action: Holy See (Vatican), o.O., o.J. (http://eeas.europa.eu/vatican/index_en.htm, letzter Zugriff August 2014).

Kirchenoberhaupt eine Rede vor dem Parlament halten? Ist die Generalvollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen das richtige Forum für den Papst? Ähnlich ambivalent war die Diskussion um den Papstbesuch 2011 in Deutschland. Bundestagsabgeordnete der Fraktion Die LINKE boykottierten seine Rede im Bundestag, einerseits mit der Begründung nicht mit seiner Politik einverstanden zu sein, gleichzeitig darauf verweisend, dass es sich um ein Oberhaupt einer Religionsgemeinschaft handle.⁸⁹ Die Konstitution des Vatikans/Heiligen Stuhls führt zu einer Herausforderung für Akteure, die politisch mit ihm zusammenarbeiten, gleichzeitig führt es zu einer ganz besonderen Beziehung, da eben beide Rollen entscheidend sind und keine außer Acht gelassen werden kann. Diplomatische Beziehungen des Heiligen Stuhls kommen durch Konkordate, d.h. völkerrechtliche Verträge zustande. Ziel ist es: „die religiösen und kirchlichen Interessen einerseits und die staatlichen Interessen andererseits im gerechten Ausgleich so gegeneinander abzuwägen und in dem Vertragswerk festzulegen, dass die volle Gegenseitigkeit verbürgt ist.“⁹⁰

Dieser kurze Umriss soll die Komplexität der Konstitution dieses Akteurs verdeutlichen. Diese Konstitution hat einerseits zur Folge, dass der Vatikan eine enorme Flexibilität/Breite an Handlungs- und Einflussmöglichkeiten hat. Er beschränkt sich nicht darauf, ausschließlich mit Staaten zu handeln. Gleichzeitig hat er den großen Vorteil, als transnationale Organisation auch auf Staatenebene zu agieren. Ein staatlicher und sogleich transnationaler Akteur. In diesem Beitrag nimmt er die Rolle eines Dialogpartners, aber auch Dialoginitiators ein. Vielleicht ein Katalysator, der andere dazu anregt, über eigene Werte und Ziele zu reflektieren, wie es anhand der folgenden zwei Fallbeispiele deutliche gemacht werden soll.

3.2 Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik – historisch besonders

Diese zwei europäischen Staaten wurden für die Analyse gewählt, da sie trotz ihrer nicht unkomplizierten religiösen Vergangenheit, jeweils den Papst erst in den letzten Jahren empfangen haben und mit ihm einen Dialog führen. Beide Staaten existieren heute nicht mehr so, wie sie es zu Beginn der diplomatischen/politischen Beziehungen zum Heiligen Stuhl getan haben. In beiden Fällen kam es zu einem klaren Bruch mit der Kirche. Bereits im 11. Jahrhundert spielte das Pontifikat eine entscheidende Rolle in den politischen Entwicklungen Europas und darüber hinaus. Aufgrund seiner Konstitution hatte das Pontifikat säkulare sowie geistliche Ambitionen,

⁸⁹ Movassat, Niem: Demo anlässlich der Papstrede im Bundestag, Berlin 2011 (<http://movassat.de/716>, letzter Zugriff: 03.08.2014).

⁹⁰ Deutsche Botschaft beim Heiligen Stuhl: Konkordate, o.O., o.J. (http://www.vatikan.diplo.de/Vertretung/vatikan/de/03/Deutschland__Hl.Stuhl/seite__konkordate__NEU.html, letzter Zugriff August 2014).

was wiederum zur Folge hatte, dass die weltlichen Akteure immer wieder die eigene Stellung zu diesem Akteur neu positionieren mussten: „In Western Europe, an understanding by lay rulers of the distinction between foreign and domestic in terms of territoriality was important to a sense of independent political legitimacy and thus foreign policy. Rulers had to define their position towards the Holy Roman Emperor, which, from its revival under Charlemagne (r.768-814), claimed an over-lordship over Western Christendom. The idea of a Christian empire [...] became influential as a notion of statehood.”⁹¹ Wenngleich die Position eines europäischen Staates gegenüber dem Vatikan heutzutage keine entscheidende Rolle mehr spielt, so haben sich beispielsweise Cameron und Merkel klar zu ihren jeweiligen Positionen geäußert. Die Religion nahm und nimmt eine zentrale Rolle in den Beziehungen ein. Die Geschichte dieser zwei Dyaden kann auch als eine Geschichte der Emanzipation betrachtet werden. Heute, emanzipiert und in ihren jeweiligen staatlichen Strukturen gefestigt, scheinen die Beziehungen innerhalb der zwei Dyaden stärker, oder zumindest stabiler, als je zuvor zu sein. Es besteht ein reger Austausch von Besuchen, Dialog, Kooperation. Beide Staaten bekennen sich offen zu geteilten Werten und Zielen, die in einem Dialog zum Vorschein kommen.

3.3 Großbritannien im Dialog mit dem Vatikan

2010 fand der erste offizielle Staatsbesuch eines Papstes in Großbritannien statt. Papst Benedikt XVI traf sich sowohl mit Premierminister David Cameron als auch mit Königin Elizabeth II. Und zwar zu einer Zeit, in der die roten Doppeldeckerbusse atheistische Banner durch London fuhren und die politische und intellektuelle Linke laut ihre Kritik kundtat. Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und zunächst England reichen bis ins 15. Jahrhundert zurück, als John Shirwood, der spätere Bischof von Durham, von König Edward IV als Botschafter nach Rom entsandt wird. Dies war nicht nur der erste Botschafter am Heiligen Stuhl, es war zugleich die erste diplomatische Beziehung der englischen Krone überhaupt. Seit Beginn der englischen Monarchie herrschten die Könige nach dem Prinzip der „divine right of kings“, d.h. des Gottesgnadentum. Es bestand also schon immer eine enge Verquickung von Staat und (römisch-katholischer) Kirche. Im 16. Jahrhundert weigerte sich Papst Clemens II, die Ehe des König Heinrich VIII zu annullieren, woraufhin der König die Kirche von England gründete. Dieser starke Bruch mit dem Papst in Rom war nicht von Dauer, denn schon König Heinrichs Tochter Maria I, selbst Katholikin, heiratete den katholischen Thronfolger Prinz Phi-

⁹¹ Black, Jeremy: A history of diplomacy. London 2010, S.25.

lipp von Spanien und bemühte sich darum, die Beziehungen zum Heiligen Stuhl wieder aufzubauen. Diese diplomatische Beziehung in Person von Sir Edward Carne, dauerte bis in die Regentschaft von Königin Elizabeth I an. Elizabeth setzte sich jedoch stark dafür ein, die Kirche von England aufzubauen und es kam erneut zum Bruch mit Rom. Unter der Herrschaft von Elizabeth etablierte/emanzipierte sich England als protestantischer Staat, wobei die Verbündeten auf dem Kontinent nach wie vor katholisch geprägt waren. Mit dem *Act of Settlement* wurde 1701 die Thronfolge bestimmt. Demnach darf der Thronfolger nur Protestant sein und keinen Katholiken heiraten. [Diese Regelung wurde 2013 (!) durch den Succession to the Crown Act aufgehoben] Diese Abkehr von der katholischen Kirche sowie die inneren Konflikte führten dazu, dass die Beziehungen in den folgenden Jahrhunderten nur informeller Natur waren.

Großbritannien nahm erstmals 1914 offizielle diplomatische Beziehungen zum Heiligen Stuhl auf, diese wurden jedoch erst im Jahr 1982 vollständig anerkannt. In diesem Jahr besuchte der damalige Papst Johannes Paul II das Königreich, allerdings als Kirchenoberhaupt, es handelte sich nicht um einen Staatsbesuch. Das 30jährige Bestehen wurde kürzlich nicht nur gedacht sondern gefeiert.

Die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Akteuren war rückblickend schon immer wechselhaft, aber sie hat die Jahrhunderte überdauert. Vor allem seit dem 20. Jahrhundert kann von einem Dialog zwischen diesen zwei Akteuren die Rede sein. Ein Dialog, der aktiv gepflegt wird und der dazu beiträgt, dass gemeinsame Werte und Ziele festgelegt werden. Im heutigen Großbritannien sind 10% der Bevölkerung Katholiken. Im Jahr 2010 besuchte, wie erwähnt, Papst Benedikt XVI offiziell als erster Papst Großbritannien.

Im Folgenden kommen auch geteilte Werte und Ziele, sowie ein sogenannter „common bond“ zur Sprache, die dazu führen, dass diese Akteure ein besseres gegenseitiges Verständnis für einander entwickeln, sogar in Ansätzen eine gemeinsame Identität. Zum Abschluss des Papstbesuchs in Großbritannien im Jahr 2010 hielten der Premierminister und der Papst Abschiedsreden in denen ein Ausblick auf die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit geboten wird. Darin wurden die guten Beziehungen nochmals explizit erwähnt. Darüber hinaus unterstreicht David Cameron Werte, die das britische Volk prägen und eine Auswirkung auf die Politik haben:

“Faith is part of the fabric of our country. It always has been and it always will be. As you, your Holiness, have said, faith is not a problem for legislators to solve, but rather a vital part of our national conversation.[...] When you think of our country, think of it as one that not only cherishes faith, but one that is deeply, but quietly, compassionate.[...] And I look forward to ever

closer co-operation between the UK and the Holy See as we redouble our resolve to work for the common good, both here in Britain and with our partners abroad.”⁹²

Cameron selbst spricht von “conversation”, also einem Dialog in der Gesellschaft. Mitgefühl kann nur entstehen, wenn der Eine dem Anderen achtsam begegnet. Er sieht sein Land als barmherzigen Akteur, der sich in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Heiligen Stuhl im eigenen Land sowie international für das Gemeinwohl einsetzen möchte. An einer anderen Stelle in dieser Rede spricht er von „common bonds of unity“, ein Begriff, den der von Papst Benedikt seliggesprochene Cardinal Newman münzte. Worin genau diese bonds bestehen, erläutert Cameron nicht. Eindeutig ist, dass es sich um immaterielle, ideelle bonds handelt. Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang vorrangig, dass solche Verbindungen erkannt werden, da diese ein Anzeichen dafür sind, wie sich die Partner in der Beziehung begegnen und wie die Zusammenarbeit darauf basierend begründet werden kann, wie es Weiler fordert. Auch der Papst geht auf diese Zusammenarbeit ein, unterstreicht die Rolle der nicht-staatlichen Akteure: “I sincerely hope that these occasions will contribute to confirming and strengthening the excellent relations between the Holy See and the United Kingdom, especially in cooperation for international development, in care for the natural environment, and in the building of a civil society with a renewed sense of shared values and common purpose.”⁹³

In diesen Reden wurde auch inhaltlich auf Bereiche eingegangen, in denen man stärker zusammen arbeiten möchte. Anlässlich des 30jährigen Bestehens der offiziell anerkannten Beziehungen gab es ein joint communiqué in dem diese Zusammenarbeit in einer Vielzahl von Bereichen kompakter zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde:

„The Holy See and Her Majesty’s Government [...] agreed on the urgent need for action to strengthen the universal commitment to religious freedom [...]share a commitment to work at the United Nations and other fora to strengthen the international focus on conflict prevention, disarmament, arms control and non proliferation [...]with regard to the changes which have occurred in North Africa and the Middle East, [...] stressed the importance of undertaking real reforms in the political, economic and social realms [...]agreed that the use of violence for political ends is deplorable, and must be set aside in favour of constructive dialogue for the

⁹² Cameron, David: Prime Minister David Cameron's speech to Pope Benedict XVI. Abschiedsrede vorgetragen am Flughafen, Birmingham, 19.Sept.2010 (<http://www.thepapalvisit.org.uk/Replay-the-Visit/Speeches/Speeches-19-September/Prime-Minister-David-Cameron-s-speech-to-Pope-Benedict-XVI>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

⁹³ Papst Benedikt XVI, Pope Benedict XVI's Farewell Address at Birmingham Airport. Abschiedsrede vorgetragen am Flughafen, Birmingham, 19. Sept.2010, (<http://www.thepapalvisit.org.uk/Replay-the-Visit/Speeches/Speeches-19-September/Pope-Benedict-XVI-s-Farewell-Address-at-Birmingham-Airport>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

well-being of the whole community. Both sides look forward to further strengthening their relationship by working together through their respective networks and global partnerships, including the Commonwealth of Nations, to promote the common good.”⁹⁴

Das oben angeführte Zitat zeigt sehr deutlich, dass politische Themen auf der Tagesordnung stehen, damit gehen aber auch die geteilten Überzeugungen einher und sie wollen sich stärker in „networks“ und „partnerships“ einbringen. Sie suchen Dialog und Reformen, nicht Sanktionen oder andere coercive means. Handelt es sich hierbei um leere Worte oder sind sie auch mit Inhalt gefüllt? Der aktuelle britische Botschafter am Heiligen Stuhl ist überzeugt, dass die Akteure auf einander zugehen und mithilfe eines Dialogs auch ein besseres Verständnis erlangen möchten: „There has been a gradual effort in Rome to try and understand better the United Kingdom in all its facets and complications; understand the Anglican Church, and indeed understand Catholicism in England and Wales and Catholicism in Scotland [...]”⁹⁵

Diese zwei Akteure identifizieren ein gemeinsames Regelwerk an Werten, sowie Institutionen, in denen sie diese einbringen können. In einem nächsten Schritt wird angestrebt, diese geteilten Werte in den Institutionen auch umzusetzen. Diese Entwicklung soll nochmals kurz zusammengefasst werden. Mithilfe der Diplomatie haben es zwei Akteure geschafft, über Jahrhunderte hinweg, auf einander zuzugehen, einen Dialog zu suchen und die Beziehung zu vertiefen. Zunächst handelte es sich um zwei Akteure, die immer wieder gemeinsame Ziele verfolgten, die gegenseitig aufeinander angewiesen waren, um die eigene Legitimität zu bestärken, also durchaus materielle Werte (Gottesgnadentum seitens der Krone, Bistümer in England und Schottland als Einkommensquelle seitens der katholischen Kirche). Über die Jahrhunderte hinweg spielte die Diplomatie, sowohl in ihrer formellen als auch informellen Erscheinung eine entscheidende Rolle, sich diese zwei Akteure im Dialog begegnen zu lassen. Inzwischen haben sie sich mithilfe des Dialogs besser verstehen gelernt, ganz im Sinne von Rosamond findet hier eine Übereinstimmung von Werten statt, gleichzeitig dadurch dann eben auch eine Sinngebung und Orientierung, nach Stahl. In diesem Beispiel ging es um zwei europäische Akteure, die durch einen Dialog auf einander zugehen, jedoch nicht um konkrete Bemühungen hin zu einer EU Integration. Dies kommt im nächsten Beispiel stärker zur Sprache.

3.4 Die Bundesrepublik im Dialog mit dem Vatikan

⁹⁴ Vatikan: Joint Communiqué of the Holy See and Her Majesty’s Government following the UK Ministerial Delegation’s Visit to the Holy See, o.J., o.O. (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2012/documents/rc_segst_20120215_comunicato_en.html, letzter Zugriff: August 2014)

⁹⁵ Baker, Nigel, ‘His Excellency Nigel Baker reflects on a busy few years as Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the Holy See’, The Catholic Church in England and Wales News and Media (podcast). o.O.2014 (<http://www.catholicew.org.uk/Home/Podcasts/Catholic-News/UK-Ambassador>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014)

„Ich hätte mir ein klareres Bekenntnis zu den christlichen Wurzeln gewünscht. Niemand bezweifelt, dass sie unser Leben, unsere Gesellschaft maßgeblich prägen. In unserem Grundgesetz heißt es sehr schön: ‚In Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen‘, also ein klares Bekenntnis, dass all unser politisches Tun von Voraussetzungen abhängt, die wir selbst gar nicht in der Hand haben. Ich frage mich: Kann man das Prägende des Christentums für die alltägliche Politik aufrechterhalten, wenn Politik sich nicht dazu bekennt? Aber Europa muss sich mit dieser Frage weiter beschäftigen.“⁹⁶ So Angela Merkel 2007 in Reaktion auf die Debatte um die Frage nach dem Gott- bzw. Religionsbezug in der europäischen Verfassung. Der Glaube nimmt hier wieder eine sinnstiftende und Orientierung gebende Rolle ein. Ihre Feststellung geht mit der Forderung Weiler einher, sich mit dem eigenen Erbe auseinanderzusetzen, kritisch zu reflektieren. Nach einem kurzen Überblick der Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Vatikan, wird auf die sogenannte „faith language“ Angela Merkels eingegangen, sowie auf die Rolle des Vatikans und was eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem christlichen Erbe zur europäischen Integration beitragen kann.

„Herzlich willkommen! Herzlich willkommen in Deutschland! Willkommen Zuhause!“ Mit diesen Worten begrüßte der damalige Bundespräsident Wulff Papst Benedikt XVI zu seinem Staatsbesuch in Deutschland im September 2011. Wulffs Vorgänger, Horst Köhler, war innerhalb von vier Jahren drei Mal zu Besuch im Vatikan und Bundeskanzlerin Merkel war eine der ersten Staats- und Regierungschefs, die bei Papst Franziskus zur Audienz eingeladen wurde. Seit Gründung der Bundesrepublik herrschte ein reger Austausch von Besuchen zwischen Bundespräsidenten/Kanzlern und den Päpsten, was im klaren Kontrast zu den Besuchen in Großbritannien steht. Dabei war die Entwicklung dieser (diplomatischen) Beziehung ähnlich holprig wie die zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und Großbritannien. Auch in dieser Beziehung gab es schon immer eine enge Verquickung zwischen Staat und Religion. 800 ließ sich Karl der Große von Papst Leo III krönen, was zu einem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zwischen weltlichen und geistlichen Herrschern führte und somit die Weichen zum Investiturstreit stellte. Die Höhen und Tiefen erlebten während des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation sowie während dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg dramatische Höhen und Tiefen, auf diese soll hier jedoch nicht näher eingegangen werden. Kurz: der Kaiser hatte bis 1806 einen Vertreter beim Heiligen Stuhl, zudem entsandten aber auch Bayern und Preußen Botschafter dorthin. Preußen wurde unter anderem durch Wilhelm von Humboldt vertreten. Diese preußische Gesandtschaft wurde letztlich „Ausgangspunkt für die Gründung der Deutschen Evangelischen Gemeinde Rom am 27.

⁹⁶ Angela Merkel im Focus-Interview: „Wertewandel mit Plus und Minus“, in: Focus Magazin Nr.4 2007.

Juni 1819⁹⁷ (Deutsche Botschaft). Seitens der katholischen Kirche entstand die erste Nuntiatur, die sich auf deutschem „Territorium“ befand, im 16. Jahrhundert am Kaiserhof in Wien. Es folgte eine Nuntiatur in Köln und in München. Letztere existierte von 1784 bis 1934.⁹⁸ Damit eine solche Nuntiatur oder eine Botschaft eingerichtet werden konnte, musste ein Konkordat verabschiedet werden. Dabei handelte es sich um einen meist permanenten Vertrag zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und dem jeweiligen Staat. Im Fall von der Bundesrepublik wurden Konkordate zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und einzelnen Bundesländern beschlossen und galten als völkerrechtliche Verträge.⁹⁹ Das Königreich Bayern hatte beispielsweise bereits 1817 ein Konkordat mit dem Heiligen Stuhl vereinbart, 1924 wurde dann zwischen dem Bundesland Bayern und dem Heiligen Stuhl ein neues Konkordat beschlossen. 1920 wurden diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und dem Heiligen Stuhl aufgenommen, was zur Eröffnung einer Nuntiatur in Berlin führte. Die bereits erwähnte preußische Gesandtschaft wurde zur Deutschen Botschaft beim Heiligen Stuhl. 1933 wurde das Reichskonkordat beschlossen, was 1957 durch ein Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts wieder in Kraft gesetzt wurde. Bereits 1934 wurden sowohl die bayrische Vertretung als auch die deutsche Botschaft durch das Regime der Nationalsozialisten geschlossen.¹⁰⁰

Offiziell nahmen der Heilige Stuhl und die Bundesrepublik ihre diplomatischen Beziehungen im Jahr 1954 wieder auf. Bundeskanzler Adenauer besuchte Papst Pius XII, ehemaliger Nuntius Eugenio Pacelli in Berlin, bereits 1951. Seitdem wurden die Beziehungen durchgehend gepflegt und vertieft. Der Beitrag der Kirche zum Fall der Mauer soll hier nicht unerwähnt bleiben. Die Beziehung zum Heiligen Stuhl besteht zwischen der Bundesrepublik und dem Vereinigte Königreich länger, als es diese zwei Staaten in ihrer heutigen Form gibt. Genauer: die Beziehungen haben politische Systeme überdauert, zwischenzeitlich hatte der Heilige Stuhl eine direkte Wirkung auf die Konstituierung der zwei Staaten. Der Folgende Abschnitt skizziert die heutige Beziehung zwischen der Bundesrepublik und dem Heiligen Stuhl. Dies wird anhand der Sprache untersucht, um wie im Fall von Großbritannien geteilte Werte und Zielsetzungen zu identifizieren.

3.5 Vertiefung und Perspektiven des Dialogs

⁹⁷ Deutsche Botschaft beim Heiligen Stuhl, Geschichte der Botschaft, o.O., o.J. (Online unter: http://www.vatikan.diplo.de/Vertretung/vatikan/de/02/Geschichte/seite__geschichte__der__botschaft.html, letzter Zugriff: August 2014)

⁹⁸ Apostolische Nuntiatur in Deutschland, Geschichte, o.O., o.J. (Online unter: <http://www.nuntiatur.de/geschichte.html>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

⁹⁹ Deutsche Botschaft beim Heiligen Stuhl: Konkordate, o.O., o.J. (Online unter: http://www.vatikan.diplo.de/Vertretung/vatikan/de/03/Deutschland__HI.Stuhl/seite__konkordate__NEU.html, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

¹⁰⁰ Apostolische Nuntiatur in Deutschland, Geschichte, a.a.O.

Bundespräsident Wulff begrüßte Papst Benedikt mit den Worten: „Willkommen Zuhause.“ Ein deutscher Papst im Vatikan wurde in der Bundesrepublik enthusiastisch gefeiert. Waren diese Worte an die Person Kardinal Ratzinger gerichtet oder an das Amt welches dieser bekleidet? Solch eine Interpretation birgt die Gefahr, den Worten eines Christian Wulffs zu viel Bedeutung beizumessen. Dennoch sendet diese Wortwahl einen Grad an Familiarität aus, eine Vertrautheit, die nicht jedem Staatsoberhaupt zuteil wird. Ein Blick auf Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkels Worte anlässlich des Internationalen Friedentreffens in München 2011 gibt Aufschluss über eine Grundhaltung, die solch eine Vertrautheit erklären kann:

„Vertreter unterschiedlicher Glaubensrichtungen waren auf Einladung von Papst Johannes Paul II. aus aller Herren Länder in die Stadt des Heiligen Franziskus gekommen. Sie wollten den Nationen der Welt eine Botschaft der Versöhnung senden. Dieses Wollen ist in eine Tradition übergegangen. Dies ist eine dauerhafte Botschaft der Versöhnung geworden. Die Laienbewegung Sant’Egidio knüpfte nämlich daran an. Noch immer tragen ihre Treffen den Geist von Assisi in die Welt. Die Botschaft heißt, immer wieder um das gedeihliche Miteinander von Menschen unterschiedlichen Glaubens zu ringen. Dass wir uns heute mitten im geeinten Europa treffen, das zeigt, dass dieser Geist doch schon beträchtliche Früchte getragen hat, auch wenn wir auf dieser Welt noch viel zu tun haben.“¹⁰¹

Während Cameron von Barmherzigkeit spricht, geht Merkel auf die Versöhnung ein. Interessanterweise erwähnen beide die Rolle von Sprache. Bei Cameron war es die „national conversation“, Merkel weist auf eine Achtsamkeit bei der Wahl von Worten hin. Im folgenden Auszug ihrer Rede nennt sie Werte, die in dem zuvor erwähnten geeinten Europa die Basis für das Gemeinschaftsgefühl bilden: „Die Säkularisierung in Europa, auch die Trennung von Kirche und Staat dürfen uns niemals vergessen lassen, dass wir ohne Glauben an Gott – hier sind Vertreter vieler Religionsgemeinschaften – als Menschen schnell überheblich werden und aus den Augen verlieren, wozu unser Leben bestimmt ist. Deshalb sollten wir das immer auch in unseren Worten berücksichtigen, auch in der Tagespolitik. Meine Damen und Herren, Politik kann Zusammenhalt fördern, aber sie kann ihn nicht verordnen. Wir leben von Dingen, die wir selber nicht schaffen können. Die Basis für ein Gemeinschaftsgefühl bildet sich im vorpolitischen Raum. Dort spielen die Kirchen eine zentrale Rolle. Ihre Offenheit für andere, ihr Anspruch der Nächstenliebe, die Akzeptanz, dass Menschen auch Fehler begehen, aber auch aufgehoben sind

¹⁰¹ Merkel, Angela: Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich des Internationalen Friedentreffens am 12. September 2011, München, 2011, (<http://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reden/2011/09/2011-09-12-merkel-friedentreffen.html>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

und Geborgenheit erfahren. All das prägt die Einstellungen für unsere Gesellschaft, auf denen Politik aufbauen kann, die Politik aber nicht selber schaffen kann. An solche Grundhaltungen und ethischen Überzeugungen müssen politische Entscheidungen anknüpfen, sonst laufen sie ins Leere.“¹⁰²

Bundeskanzlerin Merkel war Pfingsten 2013 eine der ersten Regierungschefs, die zu einer Audienz beim neuen Papst Franziskus eingeladen war. Interessanterweise spricht sie auch zu diesem Anlass nicht von der Rolle der Bundesrepublik in Europa, sondern vor allem von Europa als einem Akteur in der Welt: „Ich habe meinerseits noch einmal deutlich gemacht, dass es aus meiner Sicht sehr wichtig ist, dass wir die Grundlagen unserer Gesellschaft immer wieder pflegen und festigen. Politik kann die Grundlagen einer Gesellschaft, von denen sie lebt, nicht alleine schaffen, sondern wir leben alle von Voraussetzungen, die nicht in unserer Hand liegen. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt die katholische Kirche aus meiner Sicht eine zentrale Rolle. Ich glaube, dass Papst Franziskus auch insbesondere deutlich gemacht hat, dass Europa auf der Welt gebraucht wird und dass wir ein starkes, ein gerechtes Europa brauchen.“¹⁰³

Auch hier spricht Merkel nicht von Staaten, sondern von einer Gesellschaft und eben von Europa als Akteur in der Welt. Der Heilige Stuhl scheint von der Vorgehensweise der Bundesregierung überzeugt zu sein und diese vollkommen zu unterstützen. Anfang 2013 fasste es der Doyen des Diplomatischen Corps, Nuntius Périsset in folgende Worte:

„Sehr geehrte Frau Bundeskanzlerin, wir bewundern Sie, wie Sie – auf der nationalen wie auf der europäischen und der Weltebene – in Ihrem Handeln über ein Gespür für das Beste, das Sicherste und das Zukunftsträchtigste verfügen. Mit Recht heißt es im Buch Kohelet: ‚Wissen ist besser als Waffen‘ (Koh 9, 18).“¹⁰⁴

4. Der christliche Glaube und die Europäische Integration – Problem und Lösung zugleich

Wie bereits eingangs erwähnt, weist Weiler darauf hin, dass eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem christlichen Erbe in Europa zu einer verbesserten Integration führen könnte. Er stellt zudem

¹⁰² Merkel, Internationales Friedenstreffen, a.a.O., (<http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reden/2011/09/2011-09-12-merkel-friedenstreffen.html>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

¹⁰³ Merkel, Angela, Pressestatement von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich ihres Besuchs im Vatikan. Rom, Mai 2013, (<http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2013/05/2013-05-18-merkel-vatikan.html>, letzte Zugriff: August 2014).

¹⁰⁴ Périsset, Jean-Claude (2013), Ansprache von Nuntius Périsset beim Empfang der Bundeskanzlerin für das Diplomatische Corps, Bundeskanzleramt, Berlin, Januar 2013, (Online unter: <http://www.nuntiatu.de/ansprachen/382-13-01-30-ansprache-von-nuntius-perissetbeim-empfang-der-bundeskanzlerin-fuer-das-diplomatische-corps.html>, letzter Zugriff: August 2014).

fest: „It is rather comical (or perhaps tragic) to see those most opposed to any mention of religion or Christianity in the draft constitution battling in the front line against Turkey’s accession to the European Union.“¹⁰⁵ Eine Auseinandersetzung soll zunächst dazu führen, dass ein Dialog zustande kommt, um gemeinsame Werte oder Ziele überhaupt zu identifizieren. Die von Waever nur sehr kurz angesprochene Idee, die EU müsse mit der eigenen Geschichte wie mit einem „other“ umgehen, soll hier auf die Religion übertragen und ausgeführt werden.

Da es sich bei der EU um eine kollektive Identität handelt und somit noch mehr Faktoren bei der Identitätsbildung eine Rolle spielen, müssen dementsprechend auch zahlreiche Konstellationen untersucht und berücksichtigt werden.¹⁰⁶ Weiler zufolge werden diese Konstellationen, sprich wie ein Akteur einem anderen begegnet, aber auch durch die Identität bestimmt. Schafft es die EU, das eigene christliche religiöse Erbe wie ein „other“ zu behandeln, d.h. sich damit auseinanderzusetzen, kritisch zu reflektieren, inwiefern es die EU nach wie vor prägt, welche Gemeinsamkeiten noch herrschen, welche neue Einsichten, Entwicklungen sich ergeben haben, so könnte die EU Klarheit darüber verschaffen, welche Werte Orientierung bieten können und somit auch Ziele vorgeben würden. Da es sich, wie erwähnt, um eine kollektive Identität handelt, resultiert daraus die Herausforderung, wie und mit wem dieser Dialog stattfinden muss. Findet der Dialog zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten statt, wie es ansatzweise bisher der Fall war, entsteht die Gefahr, dass Ansichten in Konkurrenz zueinander gestellt werden. Findet dieser Dialog jedoch mit einem „other“ statt, können sich gemeinsame Werte und Ziele herauskristallisieren. Und dies kann letztlich dazu führen, die Herausforderungen der Integration zu überwinden.

Die oben angeführten Beispiele haben zunächst gezeigt, welche Werte und Ziele sich aus einem Dialog mit dem Vatikan ergeben haben oder stärker zum Vorschein gebracht wurden. Jedoch hat hier immer nur ein Dialog zwischen jeweils einem EU-Staat und dem „other“ – in diesem Fall der Vatikan – stattgefunden hat. Der Vatikan nimmt hier gleich zweifach die Rolle des „other“ ein: er bietet eben ein Gegenüber, gleichzeitig wird hier der christliche Glaube zu einem Akteur, sodass die EU sich unmittelbar in einem Dialog mit diesem Erbe auseinandersetzen könnte. Sowohl Merkel als auch Cameron sprechen ganz klar von gemeinsamen Überzeugungen, Werten und Zielen. Sie erkennen beide das christliche Erbe ihrer Länder an. Sie heben die Signifikanz der Beziehung zum Vatikan hervor und beide Staaten sind darum bemüht, die Beziehung zu vertiefen. Ebenso strebt der Vatikan danach, diese Beziehungen zu fördern. Die

¹⁰⁵ Weiler: A Christian Europe, a.a.O., S.143.

¹⁰⁶ Waever: Security Actor, a.a.O., S. 268.

Weichen für eine Auseinandersetzung der EU mit ihrer christlichen Geschichte, aber viel wichtiger, ein Dialog über die eigene Identität, scheinen gestellt zu sein.

5. Fazit

Wenngleich die EU Integration vor Sonder-Problemen steht, so bieten sich auch Sonder-Lösungen an. Hanns Maull zufolge, „[...] drücken sich [in außenpolitischen Identitäten] tief verwurzelte, nur relativ schwer und über längere Zeiträume hinweg zu modifizierende nationale Interessensdefinitionen und außenpolitische Zielvorstellungen aus, aber auch Präferenzen über die einzusetzenden Mittel und Strategien, die im Kontext einer wirklich gemeinsamen europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik miteinander in Übereinklang gebracht und in kollektives politisches Handeln umgesetzt werden müssen.“¹⁰⁷ Hier stellt sich die Frage, wie diese Wurzeln aussehen und was sie für die EU Integration bedeuten können. Diese Wurzeln, in diesem konkreten Fall die christliche religiöse Geschichte der EU, gilt es besser zu begreifen und darüber zu reflektieren, welche Orientierung sie bieten können. In einem Dialog könnten solche Erkenntnisse erlangt werden. Ein Dialog zwischen der EU und ihrem „other“. Der Vatikan bietet hier einen ungewöhnlichen Dialogpartner und dank seiner besonderen Konstitution ist er auch in der Lage solch einen Dialog zu initiieren oder zu moderieren, sollte er zwischen anderen Akteuren stattfinden. Im Mittelpunkt steht letztlich die Auseinandersetzung mit dem eigenen „other“. Solch eine kritische Selbstreflexion kann auch in einem Monolog geschehen, allerdings erweist sich dies als schwierig, wenn es sich um eine kollektive Identität handelt. Eine Auseinandersetzung ist jedoch unumgänglich, um die Integration voranzubringen. Indem die Wurzeln der EU besser verstanden werden, können heutige Wert- und Zielvorstellungen klarer formuliert und letztlich auch umgesetzt werden.

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e) Invoking Religion in Securitizing Moves. Five Cases in US History

1. Introduction

“Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.”
(Reagan 1983a)

The foundation of American identity is based upon the notion of freedom, in particular the freedom of religion. Once it attained independence, the USA was considered ‘God’s country’. It stood for religious and civil liberty, as opposed to the ‘old world’, which represented tyranny and the repression of religious freedom. The world was perceived as either or – as good or evil – and the reasons why battles were fought were just as clear. This mentality continued to have an impact on US foreign policy in the 20th and 21st centuries and was initially dubbed the “Apocalyptic Premise” (Hunt/Lefever 1982), in particular with respect to Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy. Two decades later it was termed “Millennialism” (Judis 2005: 6) in reaction to George W. Bush’s words and political actions. The authors look at how the idea of an impending apocalypse affects America’s mentality and (political) behavior. Protestant millennialism originated in England and the Netherlands in the 17th century and refers to a belief that world-moving or -changing battles are imminent, that they would take the form of cataclysmic revolutions rather than gradual changes, and that they will have monumental consequences.

This article confronts a mainly theoretical puzzle. The USA is a state actor – not a religious one – within the international system but, over the course of more than five presidencies, securitizing actors appear to have consistently invoked religion (not limited to Christianity) in their securitizing moves. This raises the question of whether and how religion should be considered within the securitization framework. Our hypothesis is that, due to the existential nature of (the freedom of) religion, it is easily securitized even by state actors, though the enemy posing the threat need not be a state actor itself.

More specifically, we aim to study the role of religion in securitization processes that enabled interventions and state-building by the United States. This explorative chapter is structured as follows: first, a section on the role of religion in International Relations (IR) theory is presented, followed by a brief section on the fundamentals of the Securitization framework. We

then proceed to discuss specifically the role of religion within Securitization studies, addressing Laustsen and Wæver's (2000) article on this topic. To conduct the empirical study, we analyze speech acts by US presidents in five cases: President Roosevelt's change of policy to intervene in World War II (WWII), President Carter's case of intervening in Afghanistan subsequent to the Soviet invasion in 1979 (by providing financial and military assistance to the Mujahedeen), President Reagan's support of "freedom fighters" during the final decade of the Cold War, President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq in 2003, and finally President Obama's intervention in Iraq and Syria in 2014, combating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The cases are chosen to reflect a broad spectrum of interventions covering a long time span, initiated by Republican as well as Democratic office-holders, against a range of different enemies: Fascism, Communism, and transnational terrorism. The speech acts are analyzed by means of textual analysis (Buzan et al. 1998: 25; Milliken 1999; Balzacq 2011). The conclusion summarizes and reflects the findings of the cases and puts them into context regarding the theoretical discussion, as well as suggesting how Laustsen and Wæver's notion of the "sacred referent object" might be amended or even expanded.

2. Theoretical Aspects

2.1 Religion in International Relations

"For an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble" (Fox/Sandler 2004: 29). Discussing religion as a factor in political science, and International Relations (IR) in particular, poses a challenge which stems from the fact that, from a political science or IR point of view, it has not been considered necessary to take religion into account as a separate element: if anything, it is reduced to being an aspect of culture. Yet religion is present at all levels of analysis examined by the field of IR – it is mentioned in international declarations; it plays a role in inter-state conflicts; it is included in foreign policy debates; and it is found in the lives of individual statesmen. Why, then, does IR theory not include religion? There are two possible answers: either the various schools of thought do not see a need to include religion or the respective theoretical frameworks are devised in ways that cannot accommodate it.

In the past decade a handful of scholars have called for religion to be brought into the debate on theories. Their publications were intended to initiate a discussion, yet the hoped-for response did not follow. In their book "Bringing Religion into International Relations" (2004),

Fox and Sandler review and assess why religion has posed such a challenge for political scientists. They reach the same conclusion as Hatzopoulos and Petito in their anthology “Religion in International Relations – The Return from Exile” (2003): the most prominent reason for its absence is the very Western-centered approach to political science, which goes back to the European age of Enlightenment. This initial rejection of religion, both empirically and in the realm of (social) science, has continued to characterize research until today. With the age of Enlightenment came the development of the modern state, eventually replacing the idea of the divine right to rule with other forms of legitimizing power. Hatzopoulos and Petito fittingly term this absence the “long Westphalian exile” (Hatzopoulos/Petito 2003: 2). They explain it was not due to a passive neglect of religion, but rather that such a state system regarded religion as “the ultimate threat to order, security, and civility” (ibid.). The authors go as far as to place religion back at the “center of international relations” (ibid.).¹⁰⁸

Fox and Sandler also examine religion and politics from different angles: what role religion can play as a means of legitimizing or undermining power, and what functions religion can assume. These functions can also be used by policy-makers. On the one hand, religion can be utilized to strengthen a sense of unity within a state, increasing support for policies. On the other, religion can be used to shape identity, even define a “political universe for their [policy-makers’] populations” (Fox/Sandler 2004). If politicians succeed in doing this, the population is almost incapable of questioning or opposing individual policies, for they would be questioning the entire (religious) identity which binds the population together. “Thus, a policy-maker who can successfully portray a political cause as a religious one has a powerful tool for mobilizing support and silencing opposition” (Fox/Sandler 2004). The authors then analyze how religion can be instrumentalized to mobilize groups, based upon the so-called theory of primordialism, which posits that myths (of origin, of liberation, of an idealized past) can be very powerful in strengthening the idea of identity. This can equally be applied to religion. While defining religion, particularly in the field of IR theory, will continue to pose a challenge, an attempt is made in Hatzopoulos and Petito’s edited volume. In their chapter titled “In

¹⁰⁸ Perhaps the debate on including religion in IR has peaked; however there continue to be contributions. Especially Scott M. Thomas furthered the debate in his book *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations* (2005). While suggesting that the English School might provide a plausible theoretical foundation to embark from, Scott comes to the conclusion that in the end a new theory would be necessary to include religion in the analytical framework. In 2011 Snyder et al. explore such theoretical notions in the book *Religion and International Relations Theory*, admittedly raising more questions than providing answers, but continuing to spark the debate by providing important deliberations. A more specific and very recent attempt at including religion in IR theory is the edited volume by Jodok Troy, *Religion and the Realist Tradition* (2014), shedding light on how the Realist debate might evolve, when including the unconventional element of religion.

Defense of Religion”¹⁰⁹, Laustsen and Wæver explore how religion might function as a referent object in the theory of securitization. Based upon the Copenhagen School’s approach, which works with so-called sectors, it is necessary for the authors to determine what exactly religion is. The discussion on religion and securitization follows below: however, the definition of religion as it is used in this chapter is briefly elaborated here. Laustsen and Wæver attempt to find an appropriate definition of religion in this particular debate, which Fox and Sandler do not articulate as clearly. The former lay great emphasis on the fact that religion should primarily be considered as a separate element, not as a community, or as a societal phenomenon. For this purpose they look in particular at defining the religious discourse. One challenge that arises in defining religion is finding an approach which avoids a definition marked by one religion or another. In the end the authors base their definition on Kierkegaard,

“Religion deals with the constitution of being through acts of faith. [...] Religion is a fundamental discourse answering questions like, why being, why law, why existence? It is difficult not to pose such questions. Answers to such questions have the character of transcendental justification and as such anchor being (and societies).” (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 738)

Vendulka Kubálková’s article “Towards an International Political Theology”¹¹⁰ may offer one theoretical answer to Fox and Sandler’s appeal. At the same time, it expands Laustsen and Wæver’s proposed definition. She states that it almost goes without saying that religions, when viewed as institutions, are simply socially constructed edifices. And, similar to Fox and Sandler, she points out that in International Relations theory, religion is usually treated as nothing more than a type of organization – both at the national as well as international levels (Kubálková 2000: 682). She warns of two dangers; either being led astray by a solely state-centred approach, which would very closely link states and religion, no longer differentiating between the two but using the term “civilisations” to refer to both: or, alternatively, by an approach which completely separates states and religion (Kubálková 2000: 694-695). Her proposal is to look at religion from a Social Constructivist point of view. She therefore regards religions as:

1. a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to
2. explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world,
3. thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalize them fully.” (Kubálková 2000: 695)

Here, as with Laustsen and Wæver, religion goes beyond shaping identity: it offers the *raison*

¹⁰⁹ Originally published as Laustsen, Carsten Bagge/Wæver, Ole (2000): In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization, *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29(3), 705-739.

¹¹⁰ Originally published as Kubálková, Vendulka (2000): Towards an International Political Theology, *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29(3), 675-704.

d'être. The understanding of religion in this article is based on these two approaches, for this helps better explain the significance of freedom of religion in the USA, as it was briefly described in the introductory remarks. The fundamentals of Securitization will next be briefly discussed, before looking at how Laustsen and Wæver sought to include religion in the securitization framework.

2.2 Fundamentals of Securitization and Sectors of Analysis

McDonald (2008: 567) aptly summarizes the core of the analytical framework, “securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue.” This summary represents the ‘mainstream’ and basic definition of the theory based on Buzan et al.’s work, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. Within the fundamental theoretical and epistemological debate¹¹¹ on the role of the speech act and the audience’s role in deciding whether or not a securitization is considered successful, we do not have to take sides with either the post-structural (Wæver 1995) or more social-constructivist (Buzan et al. 1998) reading of the theory. As our analysis focuses on the reoccurring theme of religion in a range of *securitizing moves* by different US administrations, we are, naturally, especially interested in the *speech act* aspect of the theoretical approach. The predisposition of the audience – a general openness to accepting religion as a relevant issue in foreign policy – is certainly a precondition for the impact of such speech acts.¹¹²

In Securitization analyses, *sectors* delimit the scope or field of analysis and define the particular characteristics of attempts to securitize an issue within that field. Five sectors are presented and discussed by Buzan et al. (1998): military, environmental, economic, societal and political. These provide the context for the specific dynamics of securitization in a particular area (McDonald 2008: 571) and can be understood as “analytical lenses” (Albert/Buzan 2011: 414; see also: Buzan et al. 1998: 168) that “reduce complexity to facilitate analysis” (Buzan

¹¹¹ For an overview of this debate, see: McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007; see also: Balzacq 2005; 2011: 6-7.

¹¹² Another important theoretical debate concerns the question of normativity, i.e.: Is Desecuritization generally desirable, and should researchers – in the spirit of Critical Security Studies (see, for instance: Mutimer 2010) – work to advance this goal? Here, we adopt the stance taken by Buzan et al. (1998, 34-35), whose approach is mainly motivated by the aspiration to comprehend and explain security issues ex-post. The approach also matches our case-selection, leaning towards more or less recent historical cases of the 20th century, and only two contemporary cases of intervention and state-building.

et al. 1998: 8).¹¹³ While securitization is always about an (alleged) existential threat which puts a particular referent object in danger, “the nature of survival and threat will differ across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form” (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). To that end, sectors serve to identify what form an existential threat takes in each of the areas. Furthermore, sectors help to identify the specific characteristics of typical referent objects in that particular field (Wæver 1999: 335). Wæver (1999: 335) as well as Albert and Buzan (2011: 414) all stress that the decision to include particular sectors in *Security*... is based on inductive reasoning and empirical research, not on a deliberate theoretical decision; i.e., there have been cases in each of the sectors that were observed in reality, cases where one can apply the securitization approach reasonably.¹¹⁴

2.3 Approaching Religion in Securitization Studies

The following question arises with respect to religion: in which of the proposed sectors – if any – can the subject be located? The answer to this problem depends decisively on what one perceives as securitization of religion. Laustsen and Wæver pursue an alternative approach here. Whereas Buzan et al. positioned the issue of religion in the societal (generating identity) and political sector, Laustsen and Wæver propose a separate sector for studying religion. They propose the case when “[r]eligious discourse does not defend identity or community, but the true faith, our possibility to worship the right gods the right way and – in some religions – thereby have a chance of salvation” (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 709). In our analysis, we are not interested in specific religions as referent objects, where religious leaders “claim to be able to speak on behalf of the religious community” (Buzan et al. 1998: 124), nor do we adopt Laustsen and Wæver’s approach of “religion as *religion*” (2000, 739). Instead, we focus on *how political leaders bring the topic of religion into play in securitizing moves*.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ For an alternative interpretation of sectors in Securitization Theory, namely as realms of functionally differentiated systems on an international scale, see: Albert/ Buzan 2011.

¹¹⁴ In the same vein, Stritzel (2007: 358) advocates a pragmatic stance, “leaving it to the empirical studies themselves to work out in detail which element of the framework is, when and why, most important.”

¹¹⁵ In this respect, our approach is closer to one proposed by Mona Sheikh (2014) in response to the Laustsen/Wæver article. She suggests to “make the analytical framework more applicable in various contexts, leave ‘the essence’ of religion to be defined by empirical investigation and enable important comparative studies on which dimensions of religion are especially disposed to securitisation. Doing so would also be one way of addressing the challenge involved in religion – due to its manifold dimensions – being of cross-sectoral relevance” (Sheikh 2014: 267). Thus, her suggestion aims at re-widening the scope of analysis of securitization studies that address the issue of religion, which had been narrowed by Laustsen and Wæver. In contrast to our research interest, however, she is mainly interested in strengthening “the contribution of securitisation theory to the study of religious violence and doctrinal conflicts” (Sheikh 2014: 252).

The first possibility in this regard is the use of religious rhetoric, used to spur dramatization and/or the “politics of enmity” (Williams 2003: 515). Used in this way, religion does not constitute the referent object of securitization itself but is employed by the securitizing actor to strengthen the sense of identity among the audience: ‘us’ against ‘them’, ‘good’ against ‘evil’. The referent object is thus located in the societal sector of security as proposed by Buzan et al. (1998).

The second possibility constitutes the principle *freedom of religion* as the referent object. As an internationally recognized human right, this principle is located on the system-level within the political sector. This referent object becomes threatened when the particular principle is attacked or questioned, by either a large international power or a number of smaller powers.¹¹⁶ Transferred to the empirical case of President Carter’s intervention in Afghanistan, for example, it would not be plausible to argue that – as an isolated case – the principle of religious freedom could be seriously threatened by the invasion itself (as it is confined to a small area of the globe). If, however, a big, radically secular (or religious) and ideology-driven power stands behind such a threat, it *does* become plausible. In the case of Afghanistan, this would have been Communism, whose territorial expansion – from the view of its opponents – had to be contained. The same can be argued for the cases of World War II (Fascism), Iraq (Ba'ath Party) or ISIL (transnational fundamental Islam). These ‘powers’ arguably possessed the capacity to bring the principle of religious freedom to a breakdown, as their worldview is – to say the least – incompatible with freedom of faith. We do not argue that the historic interventions against these powers were enabled decisively because of securitizations of religion or religious liberty, respectively, but we do claim that the latter substantially favored a successful securitization of the overarching “macro-securitizations” (Buzan/Wæver 2009).¹¹⁷ Hence, in addition to Laustsen and Wæver’s enumeration of “three main ways religion can be involved in international politics” (2000: 720), we propose to complement this list with a fourth point:

- “1. A religious group is considered to be a threat to the survival of the state.
 2. Faith is seen as threatened by whoever or whatever ‘non-religious’ actor or process (states, technology, industrialism, modernism, etc.).
 3. Faith is seen as threatened by another religious discourse or actor.” (Wæver/Laustsen 2000: 720)
4. *Freedom of religion (nationally and globally) is seen as threatened by a radical ideology (secular or religious).*

¹¹⁶ See also: Buzan et al. 1998: 154, and the corresponding reasoning with regard to system-level referent objects in the economic sector: Buzan et al. 1998: 107.

¹¹⁷ In this case, the securitizations of Fascism, Communism and transnational fundamental Islamic terrorism are understood as macro-securitizations, under whose umbrella “the more parochial securitisations beneath [them]” (Buzan/Wæver 2009:253) are incorporated.

Regarding the question of relevant securitizing actors, it can be noted that if our object of investigation was a particular religion (with the analysis consequentially located in the sector on societal security), religious leaders would be the relevant actors. However, the suspected securitization of the freedom of religion is located in the political sector, which means that states are the possible securitizing actors who speak for that referent object.

Although we do not follow Laustsen and Wæver's pursuit of studying securizations of religion per se, their approach generates valuable insights for our own research. As we illustrated in the introduction, religion is a fundamental element of US identity. Therefore it has to be stressed that "[i]f the practice of faith is threatened, one's very identity as man (one's being) is endangered. [...] Religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one cannot be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 719). This explains why religion as the referent object is so "easily securitized" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 739), but it also helps to explain why notions of religion or religious freedom can play a significant role in US political leaders' securitizing moves in cases where religion itself is not the main issue.

3. Cases

3.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt – The USA enters World War II

In September of 1939 President Roosevelt proclaimed, "I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance(s) and reassurance that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end" (Roosevelt 1939a). The end of the US' policy of isolationism may have been marked by the US entering WWII, a reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war shortly thereafter. However, this policy change was enabled by an accompanying change in government discourse earlier on. US foreign policy changed drastically in the initial years of WWII. In our first case, we do not argue that a securitization of (a particular) religion led to this exit from isolationism, but that freedom of religion played a substantial role in the grand securitization of the enemy in WWII.

By 1940, the US had begun to step up its war production and President Roosevelt's rhetoric took on a more concerned and urgent tone, in particular regarding areas threatened by the Nazis and the Axis powers. Roosevelt would regularly address the American public via radio broadcasts, in so-called "fireside chats". In December 1940, one year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt found dramatic words to describe the threat the USA was facing. In his speeches, and in this radio broadcast in particular, he warned of "evil forces which have

crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others” (Roosevelt 1940b). The religious references in his rhetoric are significant, for he goes beyond employing the terms good and evil. “It is an *unholy* alliance of power and pelf to dominate and to enslave the human race” (Roosevelt 1940b).

Furthermore, these forces, according to Roosevelt, “try to reawaken long slumbering racist and *religious* enmities which should have no place in this country” (Roosevelt 1940b). They not only put “servants of God in chains” (Roosevelt 1940b), their methods are “the very altars of modern dictatorships” (Roosevelt 1940b). The reference to religious symbolism is striking. By referring to the adversaries as evil powers who put “*servants of God* in chains” and have *altars* of their own, Roosevelt not only explicitly declares the Nazis and the Axis powers to be evil, he implies that these powers are united in a hateful belief system. This system and the guiding laws for its behavior, according to the definition of religion applied here (see Kubáľková above), is therefore nothing but villainous and destructive. “They may talk of a ‘new order’ in the world, but what they have in mind is only (but) a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope” (Roosevelt 1940b).

In January 1941, the recently re-elected president gave his State of the Union Address, which since then has simply been referred to as the “Four Freedoms Speech.” In this speech, Roosevelt, more explicitly than at any point since the outbreak of the war in 1939, beseechingly addressed Congress with a “unique” message. He stressed the necessity and urgency with which the US should focus all its actions “primarily – almost exclusively – to meeting this foreign peril” (Roosevelt 1941a). What is the referent object according to these words? Roosevelt lists four freedoms which the US must secure for the future. Significantly, the second “essential” freedom Roosevelt names, following the freedom of speech and expression, is the “freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world” (Roosevelt 1941a). In light of the abovementioned description of the enemy, which poses such a threat to these freedoms, it is understandable why Roosevelt felt the need to assign religion such significance. Religion here, as Fox and Sandler (2004) state in their definition, serves to unify and at the same time, once again referring to Kubáľková’s definition, poses the very fundament of the rules according to which every individual – but also the USA as a nation – acts. This second essential freedom therefore affects the very core of each (American) individual’s existence.

A few weeks later, in his inaugural speech, Roosevelt’s language took on a further degree of gravity. By providing the “highest justification” for an intervention, he is clearly paving the

way for US engagement in WWII:

“If you and I in this later day lose that sacred fire—if we let it be smothered with doubt and fear—then we shall reject the destiny which Washington strove so valiantly and so triumphantly to establish. The preservation of the spirit and faith of the Nation does, and will, furnish the highest justification for every sacrifice that we may make in the cause of national defense. In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy. For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of America. We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country, by the will of God.” (Roosevelt 1941b)

Though not explicitly analyzed here, Roosevelt consistently took care to refer to the greater context, i.e. identifying the threat to the values, the freedom of Americans, but at the same time emphasizing the entire world’s right to this same freedom, “the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small” (Roosevelt 1941b). In short, Roosevelt, in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attacks, had clearly identified a (sacred) referent object, convincing the American public (and Congress) of the existential threat to essential freedoms, which afforded emergency measures and ultimately helped pave the way out of isolationism and into war.

3.2 Jimmy Carter – US intervention in Afghanistan

The US intervention in Afghanistan – providing substantial financial and military assistance to the Mujahedeen – was preceded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by the end of 1979. The Soviet decision to fully and actively engage so quickly in the inner-Afghan strife for power came as a surprise to the world public¹¹⁸ (Schetter 2010: 100). Within a few weeks, the number of Soviet troops in the country had risen to 85,000 (Schetter 2010: 100). The invasion was motivated by the concern for an ideological reorientation or a replacement of the existing Communist-oriented government in Afghanistan. The opposition of the Islamic Mujahedeen was rooted in the actions of the Afghan socialist government, which had taken major steps to deprive traditional and religious elites of power in the years of 1978 and 1979, and further intensified throughout the Soviet intervention in 1980.

In reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter addressed the American nation on live television via a short, nationally broadcasted speech on January 4, 1980. Early in his speech, he explained, “Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer *the fiercely independent Muslim people* of that country” (Carter 1980a). The stated contrast between the

¹¹⁸ It should be noted, however, that the invasion itself (in contrast to its exact moment and swiftness) was anticipated, if not provoked by the US government, as statements of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates suggest (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/us-jihadist-relations_b_5542757.html).

“heavily armed Soviet troops” and the Afghan people, labeled explicitly as religious (“Muslim”) could hardly be starker. The positively connoted notion of religiousness (“fiercely independent”) ascribes a generally irenic attitude towards the Afghans, which is repeated as Carter declares the Soviet invasion “a deliberate effort of a *powerful atheistic government* to subjugate an *independent Islamic people*” (Carter 1980a; see also: Carter 1980c). The profound skepticism toward Atheism expressed in this sentence is, at first sight, quite astonishing, given that these words are uttered by the president of a country where the separation of Church and State is a generally recognized principle.¹¹⁹

During a White House briefing for members of Congress,¹²⁰ delivered on January 8, 1980, Carter describes the invasion of Afghanistan as “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War” (Carter 1980b). He contrasts the invasion with the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, noting that “[t]his, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, a *deeply religious nation*, and the Soviets *invaded it brutally*” (Carter 1980b; see also: Carter 1980d). As in the case above, his reference to the piousness of the Afghan people serves to underline the antagonism between the powerful Soviet regime on the one hand, and the small nation of Afghanistan on the other. By bringing up the issue of religion in the way Carter does here, the latter is constructed as *innocent* and *good*, especially compared with its invader, which is portrayed as a “brutal”, thus almost *evil*, empire.

References to religion are also prevalent in other top administration officials’ statements. Certainly one of the most prominent examples for this is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s short speech to Mujahedeen fighters located at the Pakistani-Afghan border around 1980 (exact date unclear). In his statement, the influential national security advisor to President Carter declares:

“We know of [your] deep belief in God, and we are confident that [your] struggle will succeed. That land over there [Afghanistan] is yours. You will go back to it one day, because your fight will prevail and you’ll have your homes and your mosques back again. Because your cause is right, and God is on your side” (Brzezinski 1979/1980).

Subsequently, the “Soldiers of God” were provided with financial and military aid in order to support their struggle against the “godless Communists” (CNN 2001).

In a statement on the “Relations with Islamic Nations” held on February 7, 1980, President Carter, in light of the recent developments in Iran¹²¹ and Afghanistan, noted that he had been

¹¹⁹ Moreover, freedom of religion, as a matter of course, also encompasses the right not to believe.

¹²⁰ As a semi-public event (“a few members of the press have been in” (Carter 1980b)), the question of the audience needs to be addressed at this point. Paul Roe (2008: 620) convincingly makes the case of a duality of the audience in processes of securitization. Besides the ‘standard’ audience of the general public, he argues that governmental securitizing moves are, in many cases, also directed at national representatives of the legislature. Following his argument, it seems plausible to assume such a duality of the audience in the case at hand, comprising the US public as well as US Congress.

¹²¹ The Iranian hostage crisis was ongoing during this time.

struck, “personally and in my experience as President, by the human and moral values which Americans as a people share with Islam. We share, first and foremost, a deep faith in the one Supreme Being. We are all commanded by Him to faith, compassion, and justice. We have a common respect and reverence for law” (Carter 1980e). While these comments are not to be seen as securitizing moves, they illustrate the extent to which notions on and of religion colored US foreign policy during Carter’s term in office. The stated connection between Islam, one of the largest world *religions*, and the US as a *state*, is remarkable: “On the basis of both values and interests, the natural relationship between Islam and the United States is one of friendship” (Carter 1980e).

Regarding the Soviet Union's violation of the principle of peaceful conflict-resolution in Afghanistan, Carter notes, “Today, in a Muslim country, Russian troops are making war against a people whose dedication to independence is as fierce as their faith. In a time of grave danger and upheaval, I want to reaffirm what I said a few weeks ago: We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and all who share the faith of Islam” (Carter 1980e). The purely positive depiction of religion is particularly significant in light of the Iranian hostage crisis, to which the president alludes in the following paragraph, “Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events in one Islamic country. I share that indignation. But I can assure you that this just anger will not be twisted into a false resentment against Islam or its faithful. I say that with confidence, because a respect for religious faith is so deeply ingrained in the character of the American people” (Carter 1980e).

3.3 Ronald Reagan – Support of ‘Freedom Fighters’ (Reagan Doctrine)

Ronald Reagan was in office from 1981 to 1989, spanning the final decade of the Cold War. During Reagan’s presidency, the US was directly or indirectly involved in numerous interventions, geographically ranging from Central Asia to Central America, most of which involved “freedom-fighters.” This policy of providing such fighters with arms and funds was anchored in what came to be known as the “Reagan Doctrine.” In 1985, Reagan’s State of the Union Address established the basis for this doctrine. The following section provides an analysis of the threats Reagan identified in this and other speeches. The term “freedom fighters” already indicates that they are fighting for freedom – which also includes the freedom of religion, as the following analysis shows. This policy was a continuation, but also expansion of Carter’s policy of providing support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Not only did Reagan continue

and intensify efforts initiated by Carter: he also extended the latter's presidential rhetoric. Reagan's most famous speech, given in 1983, is known simply as the "Evil Empire Speech" and offers an unprecedented culmination for the depiction of the Communist threat.

Shortly after assuming office, Reagan clearly described the immediate threat faced by the Afghans, among others,

"The Afghans, like the Poles, wish nothing more, as you've just been so eloquently told, than to live their lives in peace, to practice their religion in freedom, and to exercise their right to self-determination. As a consequence, they now find themselves struggling for their very survival as a nation. Nowhere are basic human rights more brutally violated than in Afghanistan today." (Reagan 1982a)

In these remarks, presented while commemorating "Afghanistan Day" – a gesture to annually mark US support for Afghanistan's fight against Communism – Reagan not only justifies supporting the Mujahedeen, but at the same time demonstrates what the Communist threat potentially means for any country, including the USA. Three years later, on the same occasion, the language had hardly changed and solidarity was once again underlined. The solidarity which Reagan is calling for is not limited to countries with a Christian majority. It is freedom in general and the freedom of religion in particular, which all countries should unite in defending. In the Evil Empire speech Reagan states, "While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a *spiritual* one; at root, it is a test of moral will and *faith*" (Reagan 1983a).

This crisis must, according to the American president, be averted in different ways – through prayer and through interventions.

"[L]et us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world." (Reagan 1983a)

Picking up on this rhetoric, the world is clearly divided into good and evil - and it is the responsibility of the USA to fulfill its role as the "force for good" (Reagan 1985a) against "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire" (Reagan 1983a). This worldwide threat is a recurring theme which Reagan mentions in an address to the American public in 1983. "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists" (Reagan 1983c). As the US could not intervene everywhere at once, supporting this fight against evil was essential, either by supplying "freedom-fighters" with arms and funds or intervening with US troops, such as in Lebanon or Grenada. In his State of

the Union Address in 1985 Reagan therefore declared, “Support for freedom fighters is self-defense” (Reagan 1985a). He continues, “We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth” (Reagan 1985a).

Throughout his presidency Reagan employed two complementary elements in his speech acts. On the one hand portraying the Soviet Union as an evil empire which threatened the entire world with totalitarian darkness, while on the other hand emphasizing the unifying wish for a peaceful world, in which every individual can worship freely. As already mentioned, Reagan sought solidarity and support for countries not only with Christian majorities. Additionally, there is one further element which Reagan repeatedly included – underlining the significance of faith in America - thereby implying that the Soviet threat was targeted at the very core of every American individual’s system of beliefs and existence. A final excerpt from his policy-guiding State of the Union Address illustrates this,

“Tonight America is stronger because of the values that we hold dear. We believe faith and freedom must be our guiding stars, for they show us truth, they make us brave, give us hope, and leave us wiser than we were. Our progress began not in Washington, DC, but in the hearts of our families, communities, workplaces, and voluntary groups which, together, are unleashing the invincible spirit of one great nation under God [...] And tonight, we declare anew to our fellow citizens of the world: Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; it is the universal right of all God’s children. Look to where peace and prosperity flourish today. It is in homes that freedom built. Victories against poverty are greatest and peace most secure where people live by laws that ensure free press, free speech, and freedom to worship, vote, and create wealth” (Reagan 1985a).

3.4 George W. Bush – Invasion of Iraq

Following the US intervention in Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq quickly became the next target of the Bush-Administration’s so-called *War on Terror*. In the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush coined the term “axis of evil” (Bush 2002a) to describe adversaries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In this speech he laid the ground for the intervention in 2003 and the subsequent state-building process.

In Bush’s State of the Union Address, freedom of faith, as one of the fundamental principles to be defended by the United States, is explicitly addressed, though no explicit reference is made to a possible intervention in Iraq. “America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and *religious tolerance*” (Bush 2002a; see also: Bush 2002b), Bush’s articulated over-arching goal encompassed the spread of this principle,

“including [in] the Islamic world” (Bush 2002a). The announced fight against “evil,” represented among other cases by Saddam Hussein’s regime, is deeply interspersed with religious references:

“We’ve come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. [...] And many have discovered again that even in tragedy – especially in tragedy – God is near. In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that *we’ve been called* to a unique role in human events.” (Bush 2002a)

In designating the enemy as an incarnation of an abstract “evil,” the president introduces clearly religious motives into the discourse on his administration’s foreign policy. Not only is the US fighting its enemies for national security reasons but it is “God” who has been calling for the US to take on the fight against evil in the world. Bush’s commitment to accept this mission is clear, as he expressed in a speech to West Point graduates on June 1, 2002, “We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it” (Bush 2002b).

George W. Bush’s State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, reveals that the decision to intervene in Iraq – the operations started on March 20 the same year – had already been made at that point. The speech again includes various religious references with regard to the forthcoming “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” The military campaign is not only supposed to serve the goal of security, but also to advance the Bush Administration’s self-imposed missionary goal in foreign policy: “As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make this world better” (Bush 2003a). The contrasting juxtaposition of the US as a “force for good” and Saddam Hussein’s “evil” rule is brought forward by the president once again. Referring to the regime’s use of torture against its own people, Bush declares: “If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning” (Bush 2003a). The divine mission Bush believes himself to be carrying out is spelled out in the closing words of the State of the Union:

“The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity. We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America.” (Bush 2003a)

George W. Bush’s statements reveal his persistent recourse to religiously characterized speech and motives. Yet, his remarks are not primarily marked by references to the *principle of religious liberty* as such, but rather by allusions to Christianity as a particular religion which dominates the president’s as well as his audience’s worldview. Thus, it has to be noted that the

observed approach of including religion in the discourse on foreign policy employed by the Bush Administration is a rather narrow one, compared with the usages of the theme of religion in some of the other cases analyzed in this article.

In spite of repeated assertions that the administration is supportive of religious tolerance, one cannot escape the fact that inherent in the references made to religion is an implied conviction that the United States' role is that of a *moral* leader in the world; a self-proclaimed moral leadership deeply rooted in its identity as a *Christian* nation.

While references to the denial of religious freedoms or to anti-religious actions by the Iraqi regime as part of the securitizing moves cannot be confirmed within the process of the securitization of the country in 2002,¹²² one can observe that the constant inclusion of religious rhetoric, as shown above, does its part to dramatize the issues. It would therefore be wrong to conclude that the question of religion is irrelevant in George W. Bush's securitization of the intervention in Iraq. The consistency in the use of language spanning several presidencies has to be noted as well; from "evil forces" (Roosevelt) via the "evil empire" (Reagan), Bush finally arrives at the term "axis of evil".

3.5 Barack Obama – the fight against ISIL

President Obama's foreign policy with respect to the civil war in Syria and the subsequent rise, there and in Iraq, of ISIL is characterized by his strong reluctance to use US troops to actively intervene. The drawing of a "red line" (Obama 2012) with regard to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and the ensuing controversy around that statement (see: Kessler 2013) illustrate this point. In the summer of 2014, however, after a series of military victories for ISIL, the American standpoint changed and the US military began its intervention, carrying out airstrikes against ISIL; first in Iraq (August) and later in Syria (September) (CNN.com 2015).

In a statement on August 7, 2014, Obama described ISIL fighters as "Terrorists [that] have been especially barbaric towards religious minorities, including Christian and Yezidis, a small and ancient religious sect. Countless Iraqis have been displaced. And chilling reports describe ISIL militants rounding up families, conducting mass executions, and enslaving Yezidi

¹²² In addition to the cited speeches, President Bush's televised statement on the Iraq War troop surge (another milestone in the history of intervention- and state-building-measures in the country by the US), delivered on January 10, 2007, was analyzed for references with regard to the research question. The defense of the counter-insurgency plan, however, contains no relevant material for the analysis.

women” (Obama 2014a). There are mentions of the threatened communities’ religious affiliation (Yezidis, Christians), and the context suggests an easy way to construct religion or freedom of religion as immediately threatened (Yezidis fleeing on a mountain, surrounded by the radical fundamentalist ISIL fighters). However, no securitizing moves can be observed in this particular line of argument. The mention of religion is primarily used by the president *to identify the threatened group* as a community. Even while he warns that “ISIL forces below [the mountain] have called for the systematic destruction of the entire Yezidi people, which would constitute genocide” (Obama 2014a), they are otherwise persistently described as “the *civilians* trapped there” (Obama 2014a). In the same way, Obama declares, “[W]hen many thousands of innocent civilians are faced with the danger of being wiped out, and we have the capacity to do something about it, we will take action” (Obama 2014a). For Obama, the situation constitutes a “humanitarian crisis and counterterrorism challenge” (Obama 2014a).

In a statement held two days later, the president explained that “our humanitarian effort continues to help the men, women and children stranded on Mount Sinjar” (Obama 2014b), thus again concentrating on the people themselves rather than religion. In the same speech, “Christians” are indeed explicitly named as victims of ISIL in other parts of Iraq. “Even as our attention is focused on preventing an act of genocide and helping the men and women and children on the mountain, countless Iraqis have been driven or fled from their homes, including many Christians” (Obama 2014b). Yet, this designation is employed again as a means to identify different regional communities in Iraq – in a nonjudgmental way. On September 10, 2014, Obama pledged aid to “*innocent civilians* who have been displaced by this terrorist organization. This includes Sunni and Shia Muslims who are at grave risk, as well as tens of thousands of Christians and other religious minorities. We cannot allow these communities to be driven from their ancient homelands” (Obama 2014c).¹²³

Thus, in this case religion is mentioned as an identifying factor of the social groups distinguished in the president’s remarks. This approach is remarkably distinct from that of other presidents, whose securitizing moves are either primarily characterized by a specific religious rhetoric (George W. Bush, Reagan) or by the construction of the principle of religious liberty as threatened (Carter, Roosevelt).

4. Conclusion

¹²³ A fourth statement, held on 23 September 2014, the day after the US military hit targets in Syria for the first time, contained no relevant references to religion.

Religion deserves an explicit role in the study of IR, especially in Securitization studies. As we have shown, notions of religion or religious freedom were present in all of the analyzed cases that created the scope of action for different US governments to intervene in a range of situations, from WWII to the fight against ISIL. The meaning attached to notions of religion and their importance in securitizing moves varied between the different administrations. In some of the cases, the principle of religious freedom constituted the center of the argument – most notably in the case of Jimmy Carter, and to a lesser degree in the cases of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. In other cases, religious notions are characterized to a greater extent by articulations of Christian references and values, serving to spur the enmity between the US as a ‘force for good’ and the opposing power. The case of George W. Bush, alongside Ronald Reagan, is the prime example for this type. Religious rhetoric is used as an act of self-reassurance in view of the United States’ own identity as a deeply religious nation. A third type appears to emerge with Barack Obama’s presidency, as he seems to deviate from both models observed in the other cases.

The question this article raises is whether and how religion can and should be explicitly included in the analytical framework of Securitization. While Laustsen and Wæver introduced one way of doing so (granting the issue of religion a separate sector within the analytical framework), we aimed to explore whether there are other ways, in particular when analyzing a state actor who invokes religion (or the freedom of religion) within the Securitization process. We therefore proposed adding a fourth way of how religion can be involved in international politics, which should therefore be included in the Securitization framework: securitizing moves that are based on the notion that freedom of religion (nationally and globally) is threatened by a radical ideology (secular or religious). In reflecting on the crucial elements of the framework, we can note that religion is routinely brought into play by non-religious securitizing actors in the US, who frequently refer to their country’s deep-rootedness in religion. As we have stated above, the receptivity of the audience is probably an absolute pre-requisite for the success of securitizing moves that invoke religion, and yet studies have shown that religiousness is declining especially among young people in the United States (see Pew Research Center 2015). Whether or not Barack Obama’s remarkably (qualitatively) weaker religious references in the case of ISIL in Iraq and Syria are an indicator that this trend is already reflected in the US-leadership’s rhetoric remains to be seen. Therefore, it will be interesting to study whether another trend, with regard to national populations’ religious affiliations – the growing diversity of faiths – will affect the invocation of religion in the future. The movement from a society dominated by traditional Christian faith towards one with a large range of faiths,

including many believers of non-Christian faith as well as growing numbers of non-believers, such as atheists and agnostics, might suggest that the *principle of religious freedom* will move back into the center of attention instead of particular religions.

The cases analyzed can be attributed to the societal and political sectors, not to a separate sector on religion. Laustsen and Wæver have arguably devised one of the most convincing means of including religion in an analytical framework in the field of International Relations. Though we do not limit our analysis to the sacred referent object as they do, their basic idea of including the “sacred” element (i.e. that which relates to the very core of existence) enabled us to uncover an element in US securitizing moves which had been neglected up to now. It was therefore possible to show that (the freedom of) religion did play a role in various securitizing moves in the past decades of US foreign policy.

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