

Ruth Tigges

**Professionals and governance: juggling actors
in the reform of the Cambodian administration**



Dissertation submitted at the
Department for Southeast Asian Studies II, Faculty of Philosophy
University of Passau
January 2009

For Stella Maite

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES	5
LIST OF ANNEXES	6
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	7
ABSTRACT	11
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	12
1. INTRODUCTION	14
1.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	15
1.2 INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTION CRITERIA	23
2. PROFESSIONALS AND STATE-FORMATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE	24
2.1. PROFESSIONALS DURING THE ANGKOR PERIOD	24
2.2. THE EARLY MODERNIZERS: PARAPROFESSIONALS AND NATION BUILDING.....	27
2.3. PROFESSIONALS AND LEFTIST MOVEMENTS	29
2.4. THE FIGURATION OF STRATEGIC GROUPS AFTER THE KHMER ROUGES	32
2.5. COOPTATION OF PROFESSIONALS? FROM BUREAUCRATIC POLITY TO BUREAUCRATIC CAPITALISM	35
2.6. CONCLUSION	38
3. PROFESSIONALS TODAY: A STRATEGIC GROUP?	39
3.1. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND	39
3.2. OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS: WHERE ARE THEY NOW?	43
3.3. CASE STUDIES	45
3.3.1 CASE STUDIES OF PROFESSIONALS WORKING AS CIVIL SERVANTS.....	45
3.3.2. CASE STUDIES OF PROFESSIONALS WORKING FOR DONOR ORGANIZATIONS.....	47
3.3.3. CASE STUDY OF A PROFESSIONAL IN A NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO).....	50
3.3.4 A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF A PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR	51
3.3.5. ANALYSIS	52
3.4 PATTERNS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	53
3.5. COGNITIVE STRUCTURES AND LIFEWORLDS: HOW CAMBODIAN PROFESSIONALS THINK	55
3.5.1 SIMILARITIES IN LIFESTYLES AND COGNITION.....	56
3.5.2 DIFFERENCES RESULTING FROM VERTICAL INTEGRATION	59
3.6. BEHAVIOR AND PRACTICES WITHIN THE CAMBODIAN BUREAUCRACY	64
3.7. LACK OF COMMON STRATEGY?	68
3.8. PROFESSIONALS: A CAMBODIAN STRATEGIC GROUP?.....	70
3.9 PROFESSIONALS: A GLOBAL STRATEGIC GROUP?.....	71
3.10 CONCLUSION	74
4. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POST 1993 CAMBODIA: IMPLICATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING	76

4.1. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND ITS ACTORS	76
4.1.1 THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATION LEVEL: CDCF (UNTIL 2007 CG).....	78
4.1.2 THE SEMI-POLITICAL, TECHNICAL LEVEL: <i>GOVERNMENT DONOR COOPERATION COMMITTEE</i> (GDCC)	79
4.1.3 THE TECHNICAL LEVEL: TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP (TWG).....	80
4.2. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND ITS OFFICE	81
4.3. HISTORIC CONTEXTUALIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.....	83
4.3.1 THE PRIORITY MISSION GROUP (PMG).....	90
4.3.2 THE MERIT BASED PAY INCENTIVE (MBPI) SCHEME	91
4.4. POLITICAL TENSIONS	92
4.4.1 POLITICAL CONFRONTATION AT THE GOVERNMENT-DONOR COORDINATION COMMITTEE (GDCC) LEVEL	93
4.4.2 POLITICAL CONFRONTATION AT THE CDCF LEVEL.....	96
4.5. CONCLUSION	101
5. PROFESSIONALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: A CONTESTED NEGOTIATION PROCESS	103
5.1. THE POLITICAL TENSIONS AND THEIR BASIS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	103
5.2. THE CONTESTED ISSUES: JOINT MONITORING INDICATORS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS.....	105
5.3. THE JOINT MONITORING INDICATOR’S RELATIONSHIP AND THEIR DYNAMICS OVER TIME. 106	
5.4. ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP (TWG) ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (PAR) MEETINGS.....	109
5.4.1 JOINT MONITORING INDICATOR 1: IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED "JOINT GOVERNMENT-DONOR STRATEGY" FOR PHASING OUT SALARY SUPPLEMENTATION PRACTICES IN CAMBODIA	110
5.4.2 JOINT MONITORING INDICATOR 2: IMPROVE PAY AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.	116
5.4.3 JOINT MONITORING INDICATOR 3 AND 4	129
5.5. CONSENSUS FINDING 2008	132
5.6 CONCLUSION	134
6. CONCLUSION	137
BIBLIOGRAPHY	141

List of Figures and Tables

FIG. 1: NUMBER OF CAMBODIAN STUDENTS STUDYING OUTSIDE CAMBODIA	41
TABLE 1: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAMBODIA GRADUATES	43
FIG. 2: PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR OCCUPATIONAL SPHERES	42
FIG. 3: THE THREE INTERFACES FOR POLICY NEGOTIATIONS	77
FIG. 4: CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DOCUMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM	85
FIG. 5 THE KEY COMPONENTS OF THE STRATEGY TO RATIONALIZE THE CIVIL SERVICE	86
TABLE 2: CHRONOLOGY OF THE MEETINGS OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM	108

List of Annexes

ANNEX 1: MAP OF CAMBODIA	148
ANNEX 2 : INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE	149
ANNEXE 3: TRANSITION OF POLITICAL, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA	151
ANNEX 4: SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF SELECTED PROFESSIONALS	155
ANNEX 5: STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNITED MOVEMENT JANUARY 1999	164
ANNEX 6 : CAMBODIAN TYCOONS IN THE SENATE AND THEIR ACTIVITIES	167
ANNEX 7: “IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR”	168
ANNEX8 : SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO HIS EXCELLENCY SOK AN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE OFFICE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE CEREMONY TO CONFER HIS HONORARY DOCTORAL DEGREE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CHAMROEUN UNIVERSITY OF POLYTECHNOLOGY (CUP) DELIVERED BY H.E OM YENTIENG	169
ANNEX 9: KEY PROFESSIONAL FIGURES OF THE “RUSSIAN GENERATION”: DR MONIROTH AND DR. CHUON NARON	172
ANNEX 10: NUMBER OF CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL SERVANTS BY MINISTRY	177
ANNEX 11: STRUCTURE OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA	181
ANNEX12 : LIST OF THE JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS IN CAMBODIA	179
ANNEX 13: ACTION PLAN OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 2007	180
ANNEXE14 : THE OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (OCOM)	182
ANNEX15 : LIST OF INTERVIEWEES	183
ANNEX 16: THE RECTANGULAR STRATEGY	185
ANNEX 17: TIMELINE OF LYCÉE SISOWATH'S HISTORY	186
ANNEX18: KEY CAMBODIAN UNIVERSITIES	188

List of abbreviations

AAA	Australian Alumni Association
AFEC	Alliance for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia
ASCOJA	Asian Council of Japan Alumni
ADA	Appui de Développement Autonome
Ad Hoc	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association
APSARA	Authority in charge of the Management of Angkor and the Region of Siem Reap
BSAF	Base Salary and Allowances Framework
CAR	Council for Administrative Reform
CCHR	Cambodian Center for Human Rights
CDC	Council for the Development of Cambodia
CDCF	Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum
CDRI	Cambodia Development Resource Institute
CG	Consultative Group
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIB	Cambodian Investment Board
CICP	Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action Authority
COM	Council of Ministers
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank)
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP	Cambodian's People's Party
CRDB	Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
D&D	Deconcentration and Decentralization
GDR	German Democratic Republic
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development

EC	European Commission
ECSP	European Commission Support Election Process
EIC	Economic Institute of Cambodia
EPSCB	Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building
EDECC	European Delegation of the European Commission to Cambodia
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLE	Faculty of Law and Economics
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni Nationale pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif
GDCC	Government Donor Cooperation Committee
GRUNK	Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchéa)
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation Agency)
HRM	Human Resource Management
HRMIS	Human Resource Management Information System
HRD	Human Resource Development
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDF	Institutional Development Fund
IDP	International Development Program
ITP	International Team Project
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAC	Japanese Alumni of Cambodia
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KPNLF	Khmer People National Liberation Front
KPMG	Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
KPRP	Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party
KYA	Khmer Youth Association
MBPI	Merit Based Pay Incentive
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MTWF	Medium Term Wage Bill Framework
NGO	Non Governmental Organization

NIDA	National Information Communications Technology Development Authority
NPAR	National Program for Administrative Reform
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
NUM	National University of Management
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OBSSES	Economic, Social and Cultural Observation Unit
OCOM	Office of the Council of Ministers
PAR	Public Administrative Reform
PFM	Public Financial Management
PMG	Priority Mission Group
PPA	Paris Peace Accords
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PWHC	Price Waterhouse Coopers
RSA	Royal School for Administration
RSJP	Royal School for Judicial Professions
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RUPP	Royal University of Phnom Penh
RULE	Royal University for Law and Economics
SAO	Special Operating Agencies
SEILA	Aid mobilization and coordination framework to support Cambodia's decentralization and deconcentration reforms. It was launched in 1996 as a joint UNDP/government experiment in poverty alleviation in rural areas. <i>Seila</i> means 'foundation stone' in Khmer Sanskrit
SNEC	Supreme National Economic Council
SPSS	Strategy on Phasing out Salary Supplementation
SSP	Salary Supplementation Practices
SoC	State of Cambodia
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNOHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human

	Rights
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNWCC	United Nations War Crimes Court
USA	United States of America
WPK	Worker's Party of Kampuchea

Abstract

After two decades of almost complete isolation, Cambodia was rather suddenly integrated in 1991 into the global 'free world'. As a result, the function and the role of the administration had to be modified. These transformations in the name of modernization and development have led to a significant rise of professionals, as these provide the necessary knowledge to manage the ongoing socio-economic and political transformations. Due to their educational socialization in urban centers and overseas, they consider themselves the most modern section of their society. Their common objective is to make the organizations they work for less rigid and to reform them along lines of technical-pragmatic concepts. Especially for the professionals working within the Cambodian state, the movement towards more efficiency and effectiveness in the administration and the strengthening of the rule of law is seen as a means to increase credibility of the Government on one hand and to attract foreign investment on the other. However, due to their functional specialization and expertise, professionals in Cambodia are marginalized from the overall socio-political changes in their environment. This has led to the reduction of their possibilities to communicate and organize effectively. Instead, their knowledge is applied to serve the requirements of their organizations/ patron-client networks and not as a resource to form alliances on a national or on a transnational level. A potential exists though for the professionals working in the state administration to either form a strategic group through processes of hybridization, or to form a 'neutral' rational administration after the ceding of the 'old guard' and thus their 'disentanglement' from old clientele structures.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank Rüdiger Korff and Tamara Skolnik-Korff whose support and encouragement gave me the courage to start this formidable academic journey. Professor Korff has supervised me with admirable commitment and patience. Without his readiness to read numerous messy drafts, the completion of the dissertation would not have been possible. Since Hohenheim he has always been an inspiring scholar whose critical and innovative ideas have helped me dare to ‘unravel the indefinable’. I am grateful for his influence in shaping my view on the world.

I also want to thank the ‘good soul’ and artist of the chair, Christa Gottinger for her tremendous moral and emotional support. Thanks as well to all the colleagues and staff at the chair for Southeast Asian studies for offering an inspiring environment and for their stimulating discussions. A special thank goes to Jum, Hannah, Sandra and Martin for help with proofreading. For asking and giving sharp questions and friendly comments, I thank Martin, Janine and Tilman. They helped me a great deal reflect on important issues and restructure them in a new order.

In Cambodia, I particularly want to thank members of the *Council for Administrative Reform*, the *World Bank*, JICA and the GTZ who were always co-operative, notably Thomas and Karin, Rob and Sophy, Eichiro and Tola for their friendly and effective help at various stages of my work and who gave me new precious insights into the Cambodian scene. I specially want to thank Sophy and Sekano, two extraordinary people, who allowed me to accompany them on many field trips and meetings. They added much to what I could learn about Cambodia, its people and institutions.

Moreover, I wish to acknowledge the generous mental support and patient forbearance of my beloved mother Melanie, my grandmother Margret, my sisters Emilie and Maxie and my valued friends Heidi and George. They constantly reminded me of my goals and helped me stay in pace with the time frame. Thanks also to Mach and my dear parents in law Elsa and Rafael who took care of Stella in Phnom Penh, Passau and in Bogotá. Without their help I would not have been able to carry out the field work and the following intensive interviews.

Finally, my warmest thanks go to my wonderful daughter Stella and husband Mauricio. They gave me the necessary energy, motivation and discipline to undertake the study; they were supportive from beginning to end and always encouraged me to follow through. Without them none of this could have happened. I am deeply grateful for their patience and love.

[...] transformation requires a reflexive critique, or critique turned upon oneself. Reflexive critique sees through the purportedly atemporal and universal validity of the procedural, evaluative, and interpretative categories which govern an agent's field and allows the agent to discover the true nature of these categories as "symbolic capital". As symbolic capital, a field's categories of understanding are tools of dominance suited to certain historical situations and tailored to the needs and abilities of agents from certain social spaces, these being the social spaces that produce agents who will dominate within that field. It is the recognition of symbolic capital within their field, and of how much of it they possess, that allows agents to stop cooperating in their own domination and in the domination of others.

James Cunningham, 1993

1. Introduction

After two decades of almost complete isolation, Cambodia was suddenly integrated in 1991 into the global “free world”. As a result, global dynamics are affecting the Cambodian society and require specific adaptations. This transformation, in the name of modernization, includes an economic change towards a market economy and a political change from a socialist to a democratic governance system. Such a process is based on internal pressures initiated by self-organization within the bureaucracy, and external pressures with regards to problem solving, not the least initiated in Cambodia by foreign donors. Thereby, the function and role of the administration have to be modified. The modernization of the bureaucracy can, according to Weber (1978) be described as a rationalization process in which efficiency, predictability, calculability, nonhuman technologies, and professionalism become important. In other words, this implies that highly educated professionals, who enjoy considerable work autonomy and economic security, become essential within the bureaucracy. It is thus suggested that during the successful transition towards a modern bureaucracy, professionals and knowledge-based discourse play a dominant role.¹

Evers citing Moore (1978) describes the professional as being committed to a calling, i.e. he treats his occupation as an enduring set of normative and behavioral expectations; he furthermore identifies with his peers, often in formalized organizations and is in the possession of useful knowledge and skills based on specialized training or education of exceptional duration; He finally is also committed to rules of competence, conscientious performance and service and least but not last he enjoys autonomous working owing to his high degree of technical specialization. As Evers (1978) rightly points out these definitions of the professional are more or less congruent with, or at least overlap largely with, definitions of ‘modern’ man: ‘modern man has faith in Science and technology, he believes in man's domination of the environment [...]; he plans his life and is punctual, regular and orderly in organizing his affairs [...] He is an individualist, reads the newspapers, prefers to live in urban areas and makes his way up the social ladder through own achievement, starting off with a good education [...]. Education is indeed the most powerful factor in making man modern. In short, we have a very close interdependency between professionals and modernity’ Evers, 1978:4.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the transformation of the public sector at the national level with regard to the question: to what extent is it developing towards a rational administration based on professionalism or, in other words, to what degree are professionalism, efficiency, and knowledge substituting ‘traditions’ and values as basic rationalities of administrative work? While looking at ‘modernization’/development, processes by which structures are changed play the important role. The question is thus who changes the structure, who has enough political relevance and a key position in the society to induce change. Using Cambodia as a case study, the goal is not to provide a thorough analysis of Cambodia’s administration but to use it as a case study to relate to the relationship between agency and structure within processes of administrative reform.

¹ While over-bureaucratization implies that ‘traditional’ bureaucrats and their vested power play the main role.

Professionals in Cambodia, particularly young professionals, are at the interface between national and global, between politicians and development actors, between bureaucrats and businessmen, and between the past and the future. They are, on one hand, part of the ‘traditional’ bureaucracy,² and on the other, agents of change towards a modern administrative system. Their rise is certainly a result of the demand to manage the ongoing specific socio-economic and political transformations.

1.1. Theoretical framework

The modernization of the Cambodian administration in the last two decades has involved a large element of global mainstreaming through the importing of technical-economic institutions from OECD states.

However as pointed out by Neubert (1999a), the transfer of European/North American models of democratic, multiparty systems has often overlooked existing socio-structural requirements for their functioning. Basically, state structures and regulations can neither be planned nor decided upon. They occur and proceed in combination with social change and internal dynamics, because internal restructuring implies new power-differentials among different actors such as bureaucrats, different units, and requirements made on the civil servants³.

Certainly structure and agency can hardly be discussed separately. As Giddens (1986) has put it, the constitution of social structures can hardly be understood without human agency. In other words, social life is more than just the accumulation of micro-level activity but the continuous alteration and reproduction of social structures-such as traditions, institutions, and moral codes- by the repetition of the acts of individual agents. At the same time, these acts are continuously determined by the structures they seek to alter. Human agency and social structure, hence, share a dialectical relationship.

Similarly the transformation from a ‘traditional’ administration to a modern administration in Cambodia is not linear and clear cut. Mixtures of administrative forms evolve because changes affect different parts (departments, ministries, levels etc.) and actors in diverse ways. Thus, the co-existence of modernity and ‘tradition’ or forms of ‘hybridization’ is the rule. Syncretist rather than distinct forms of administration evolve in which ‘traditional’ aspects, such as patronage, are combined with modernization⁴.

To understand this ‘syncretist’ nature, the *Strategic Group Approach* developed by Evers & Schiel (1988), the *Patron-Client Concept* used by Eisenstadt (1981, 1984), Roninger & Gunes-Ayata (1994) and the *Actor Oriented Approach* developed by Norman Long (2001) provide interesting conceptual tools.

² Co-opted into bureaucratic patronage networks on the basis of their qualifications.

³ Another relevant factor is external pressures, for example, from donor organizations. However, these as such do not affect changes within the administration, but are translated into internal factors.

⁴ See the study on ‘The Bureaucratic Polity’ by Riggs (1966).

The *Strategic Group Concept* initially developed by Evers (1966, 1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1982, 1983, 1988, 1999, 2001, 2006) and later taken up by Schiel (1988, 1992), Korff (1986, 1990, 1992), Berner (1991, 1995), and Tetzlaff, Vennewald, & Schubert (1994) aimed at providing a theoretical framework that merges elements of the social class analysis with elements of the classical elite analysis. Thereby they claim the vertical networking of persons beyond their social class.

Evers (1982) argues that globalization or capital accumulation on a global scale has not led to the formation of a single universal social order. On the contrary, vastly different special formations and political systems have evolved, whose differences rather than similarities need explanations. Essentially, the formation of a state or a political system and the exercise of political power need organization. Hence, collective action is taken by different groups who are bound to each other by a common interest in the preservation or expansion of their control over material and non-material resources.⁵ The common interest produces strategic behavior—a long-term program for the preservation or improvement of their appropriations chances (Evers, 1988).

Strategic groups emerge in societies where resources become available after organizational/geopolitical change, a power vacuum, or technological innovation (Evers & Gerke, 2006, Evers, 2001). At the first stages of group formation, incumbents of new positions have little in common and form what Evers (1983a), using Dahrendorf's category, calls 'quasi groups'. Horizontal alliances through the formation of a common identity are at first weakened by the identification with the immediate social surrounding. This is changed after a sudden increase of members, major socio-political upheavals, and dramatic events that affect members of a quasi group in a similar way. These changes lead to internal reconfiguration and organization of quasi groups into strategic groups, which are then bound together by a common interest to secure the resources that ensure their self-reproduction.

As a result, they develop strategies that have the power to mold the political, social, and economic structures of a society in order to secure the long-term acquisition of national resources⁶. In other words, during and after processes of social change, they aim at establishing a superstructure, i.e. political, economic, and normative system that is most suited to their interests.

Following Korff (1986, 1990, 1992), strategic groups develop from social differentiation. Their emergence implies the formation of new concepts, consciousness, experiences, and social positions. It also indicates the creation of new social systems that connect positions with actions and thus foster the emergence of new social groups that constitute a distinct lifeworld. These groups try to improve their position or maintain their status quo by gaining additional resources and strength.

⁵ Such as goods, power, prestige, knowledge, or religious interpretations.

⁶ As Evers & Gerke (2006: 5) put it "[a] strategic group defines itself through a common interest in maintaining, or if necessary, expanding the resources that will ensure the functioning of the entire complex of the strategic group, but does not necessarily imply the existence of specific links through interactions. The membership in a strategic group is therefore a theoretical construct. It does not necessarily create an identity or assume the existence of social interaction among actors through interactions".

Strategic groups, like professionals who base their mode of appropriation on a personal mode, seek to create organizations that would best promote their interests. These organizations can be professional or job-specific, such as chambers of commerce or alumni associations. Following Evers (1978a), they also favor a political system in which political parties play an important role as these parties enable them to shape the political system. Professionals in Cambodia however, are active in just a few parties such as the *Cambodian People's Party* (CPP) and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). However in Evers and Schiel's (1988) concept of SG, professionals are dealt with in an ambivalent way due to the focus on individual professionals on one hand and their societal differentiation into for example the state administration, the private sector and civil society on the other. These differences put obstacles on professionals in organizing on the horizontal level.

In contrast, strategic groups, such as government bureaucracy and military, tend to pursue a collective mode of appropriation so as to increase their share of resources by enlarging their power bases, namely their state organizations. These organizations are used to shape the political system in such a way that it benefits their structures of appropriation. As pointed out by Evers (1973), civil servants might be the most coherent strategic group as they draw their resources from the state budget.

Strategic groups that increase their appropriation chances through a corporate mode of appropriation, such as businesses, tend to build political support through "resource" and patronage networks (Evers, 1982).

All three types of strategic groups can enhance their modes of appropriation by either processes of hybridization or by forming effective alliances with each other. Similarly Schubert, Tetzlaff & Vennewald (1994) argue that modernization (in general) and democratization as one of its variants is a result of changes in the inner-social power relations between these strategic groups. In this process, different endogenous or exogenous factors such as the degree of integration into the world market, cultural legacies, and foreign policy dependencies that extend or reduce the social structural distinction, can strengthen or weaken the relative power position of a single group or several groups. To analyze the conditions leading to political change, it is hence important to identify these groups and understand their agency. Schubert & al (1994) argue that the formation and organization of political opposition is necessary for the introduction and particularly for the successful consolidation of a democratic reform process. When the opposition is lacking, the regime determines the speed and the quality of the democratic transition.

The regime refuses to share power and only induces a controlled liberalization of its system. As a consequence, the democratization of the society is delayed and, in the worst case, blocked. But what happens in a case where a potential strategic group, such as professionals, is not split along the binary lines of Government and Opposition but are instead scattered all over the different institutional fields of a given society?

Strategic groups such as professionals are supposed to produce practices that are not consciously organized but fluid and indeterminate. The specific orientation of the set of practices can be defined as 'strategizing'. This reflects the fact that actors do have goals, interests, and motivations according to their own experience and their practical sense of logic,

i.e. reality. Their strategies, in this view, are the continual interactions between different lifestyles and the constraints and possibilities of reality. Thus, they become a product of the lifestyle that is not based on conscious calculation but on unconscious dispositions towards practice and power (Korff, 1992).

The basis of this practical sense of logic is generated through negotiations at specific 'interfaces' (Long, 2001) of different knowledge systems. In the age of globalization, national groups of actors, such as minorities, tend to build alliances with international and transnational organizations to pressure their respective states to consider and secure their livelihoods. Similarly, as professionals become highly globalized and well connected on the national and international level, they develop the potential to form alliances with international professionals/donor organizations to push their interests as one global strategic group. However, even though professionals in donor organizations have a strong impact on state formation, Cambodian professionals find it difficult to 'interface' with donor agencies, as their integration into different organizational and vertical networks determines their allegiances.

Following Long (2001), 'interfaces' are arenas in which interactions center on problems of bridging, accommodating, segregating, or contesting social, evaluative, and cognitive standpoints. Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of common interest, they usually generate conflict due to contradictory interests and objectives, or to unequal power relations between actors who represent particular constituencies, groups, or organizations (Long, 2001). In this view, social actors are not simply 'disembodied social categories' or 'passive recipients of intervention'. On the contrary, they follow patterns of 'strategized' agency by negotiating, interacting, and engaging in social struggles with other institutions and actors.⁷ Interface analysis hence makes a useful contribution to understand how these processes first enter the lifeworlds of the actors involved and then come to form part of the resources and constraints of the social strategies they develop. It highlights the nature of contests over the dominance and legitimacy of particular socio-cultural paradigms or discourses.

The *Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum* (CDCF), the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee* (GDCC), and the *Technical Working Group* (TWG)⁸, constitute three of these 'interfaces'. These three levels represent the policy arenas where, since the early 1990s, negotiations have been held between aid agencies and the Cambodian Government. Thereby, policies are formulated and operationalized not simply as technical processes or within the frames of specified plans of action and guidelines, as it is often implied, but within the frame of a highly contested political exercise with no predefined outcomes.

The professionals that met between 2005 and 2007 at one of these interfaces, namely the *Technical Working Group*, to negotiate the conceptualization of the *Public Administrative*

⁷Actors who influence their situations, actions, and outcomes either directly in face to face encounters or indirectly through established frameworks.

⁸ Comprised mainly by professionals.

Reform did not have the feature characteristics of a homogenous group, but were a group of multiple social actors with different realities and experiences. As a result, interaction and negotiations were accompanied by conflicting social and normative interests and discontinuous configurations of knowledge.

Following Korff (1992), knowledge is always dynamic and unequally shared between all actors within a network. From this it follows that no agency external to socio-political processes can exist to define neutral or objective knowledge, truth, and reality. Hence in order to understand human agency and its embeddedness in social structures, it becomes important not to understand the “truth”, but to depict the practices resulting from power interactions and knowledge differentials.

An important part of Foucault’s (2002) power/knowledge is the belief that those in power have specialist knowledge. In Cambodia, the production of knowledge and the exercise of administrative power are intertwined. Thus, the reform of the bureaucracy reflects the use of different strategies supporting, and supported by different types of knowledge.

Indeed, owning specific and ‘right’ knowledge implies controlling the attributions of meaning and convincing the other to accept one’s own frame of meaning. For Baudrillard (1995) knowledge is, in a sense, the codification of simulacra, defining what practices are real and those that are not. It is not a given material thing that is owned by actors, but a result of dynamic interactions and struggles over meaning and representations and more importantly, over the control of strategic resources (Long, 2001). Since the overall aim of strategic groups is to impact state formation, i.e. on the institutionalization processes within the state, they need specific technical knowledge as their main means. However, this knowledge is not ‘just’ produced as the Actors Network Theory argues, but is itself the result of power differentials. In this regard, professionals in Cambodia stand in an ambivalent situation as they have the knowledge to define the normative frames but on the same time remain co-opted by the guidelines and political agendas of their own organizations.

Foucault (2002) interprets discourse as the combination of knowledge and communication with practices⁹. If practices are included, power differentials are addressed. Thus, knowledge implies power over others and the power to define others. Furthermore, as institutions regulate the ability to communicate, they also become connected to power. In other words, institutions are the ‘infrastructure’ that provide continuity of power differentials. Foucault (2002) ideas of power/knowledge illustrate that in the field of specialized knowledge, such as in the field of Administrative Reform, actions are governed by the constituents of the power structures. Similarly Giddens (1986) who maintains that power is the ability to act, or to do something, defined practices not only as actions but also as practices of applying power. The explanation and the attunement/affinity or understanding of practices among different people is mediated through communication. In order to avoid the clarification and definition of interaction meanings each and every time, this attunement is established or ‘institutionalized’ in a more lasting way.¹⁰ Through the institutionalization of these relational practices, knowledge is re-

⁹ It is generally assumed that communication and acting (or practices) are two different spheres: what people say they will do or are doing does not necessarily imply that they are doing so. Discourse however combines both spheres.

produced. However sometimes agents involved in these processes, are unable to recognise these new relational practices. As a result *meconnaissance*¹⁰ is generated.

This relationship between power and knowledge resulting in various social differentials are most obvious within the *Council of Ministers*. Interestingly, professionals working within the *Office of the Council of Minister* (see Annex 14) are those who continually define and redefine what is within the competence of the state and what is not. They thereby demark themselves from other bureaucrats by the use of specialized knowledge. However, this knowledge advantage does not yet confer to them a power base from which they can make political decision on their own. The reasons for this are manifold and will be discussed later. But before we continue, let us have a brief look at the *Office of the Council of Ministers*.

The *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*, which is mainly staffed with members of the *Cambodian People's Party (CPP)*¹¹, represents the institutional focus of power in the Cambodian political system. Important strategies for administrative reform are drafted under its supervision. The OCOM itself is based on various networks that compete for agents with technical-pragmatic know-how so as to implement their agendas; in other words, networks that compete for professionals. These patron-client networks are characterized by moral and emotional obligations, the sharing of common 'pure pristine values' (Eisenstadt, 1984), and the emphasis on trust and empathy. They are generally based on hierarchical differences between the patron and their protégés. But even here, a moral equality is implied. Similarly Korff (2006) argues that clientelism is a "specific form of the institutionalization of interpersonal relations and trust. [It] emerges in those societies where the degree of internal cohesion and solidarity within a society as a whole, as well as among the elites, remains limited" (Korff, 2006:77). Following Roniger (1994) patronage and clientelism are characterized by a certain logic of social exchange. They are built around asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions and predicated on the differential control by social actors over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies. In some cases they produce a social order of their own.

Since the transformation of Cambodia from a socialist system to a market system during the last 30 years, monopolistic power domains have been challenged and alternative clientelistic avenues have developed as new sources of bargaining for clients. New patrons of various sorts emerged: politicians, administrators, and organized bodies such as political parties.

Indeed professionals have turned into patron-brokers that constantly have to demonstrate their close relations with the powerful, here the leaders of the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP),

¹⁰ *Meconnaissance* or misrecognition is a term coined inter alia by Pierre Bourdieu. According to Acciaioli (1981), Bourdieu invests it with a specific sense that is not captured by conventional concepts such as misappreciation. *Meconnaissance* describes a process whereby agents involved in a given field share 'misrecognition' of the true relations between the structure of that field and the structures of economic and political power. More generally, it denotes the rejection of ambiguities or the rejection to recognise something. More precisely, it describes an objectifying process through which the group teaches and conceals from itself its own truth. Thereby the group inscribes in objectivity its representation of what it is (Bourdieu, 1977).

¹¹ The CPP also known as the *Kanakpak Pracheachon Kâmpuchéa (KPK)* is the current ruling party of Cambodia around Prime Minister Hun Sen.

who at the same time are the most influential leaders in the Royal Government. As shown during a visit to Takeo, they invest energies and resources to express hospitality, generosity, benevolence, and concern for their clients. The public display of wealth and grandeur are also extremely important for conservation of the power position (Günes Ayata, 1994).

Indeed, the CPP is one very important means of establishing patron-client relationships. It creates at an ideological level a strong sense of belonging and hence a new kind of identity, serves as a potential means of access to power centers and provides mechanisms for establishing networks in which the resources are preferentially allocated. For professionals party patronage and clientelistic networks are seen as an important pragmatic avenue of controlled freedom, useful for advancing in social, economic, and political domains that are regulated by competition for access to power, resources, and services (Roniger, 1994).

These patronage networks encourage and reward party activists by offering public offices in accordance with politically sensitive stances. Within such a framework, clientelistic commitments can be converted into political influence and can become entrenched in the actual workings of democratic polities. They are useful in the competition for power and, once power is achieved, for effectively formulating and implementing long term strategies

Furthermore Roberts (2001) argues that this system of clientelism seeks to maintain the power base of the political leadership by lower ranks. Loyalty, he maintains, passes upwards thus ensuring that leaders remain leaders. As a result, positions within the administration and thus security and privileges are passed downwards as rewards. Likewise the *Office of the Council of Ministers* is marked by a series of hierarchical relationships that are determined by politics. Roberts (2001) further argues that the administrative organization in Cambodia is the legacy of a vast system of bureaucratic patronage that constitutes the main means by which ordinary people gain access to a guaranteed personal social security net.¹²

This special type of interpersonal relation exhibits an ambivalence towards formalized, organized structures; hence, we observe tensions emerging from personal loyalty/complementarity versus general reciprocity and interpersonal trust versus trust in the anonymous institutional matrix. The lower the social cohesion and integration, the more are relations arranged according to personal selection criteria (Eisenstadt, 1984). In the same way, the higher the degree of trust exists within a given society, the less hierarchical the relationships are within it. Trust is then used as a security mechanism to assess the consequences of certain types and patterns of behavior, and to allow for calculability.

Despite their rationales, these relations are often treated by the current modern governance systems of OECD countries as negative illustrations of collective forms of organization. They are seen as differing from the corporate kind of relations emphasized in the dominant discourse of New Public Management.

Neubert (1999a, 1999b) warns of falling in the trap of reducing patron-clients networks to backward and traditional products of an “uncivil nationalism”. In the same vein, he warns against equating them with corruption or nepotism (Neubert, 2004).

¹² “[...] more of the population generated a greater degree of personal wealth through a combination of an expanded bureaucracy and private economic freedoms, the nature of the hierarchy around them [...]” (Roberts 2001:33).

Similar to small farmers in Kenya and Mali, those in Cambodia, who constitute the majority of the population, live for the most part from self-sufficient farming, wage labor, and petty trading. As a result, party politics are structured in a distinct way and patronage becomes an effective means to secure the flow of information and resources from the local level to the central level and vice versa. In other words, the patron represents the local interest of his regional constituency of origin. He is part of a wider chain of patron-client relationships and networks that reach from the village to the cabinet. National resources are thus distributed along these channels. Since these networks are based on temporary personal relationships, they require few institutional prerequisites, and trust and control are related to few known persons. Thereby, trust in anonymous organizations and abstract institutions become irrelevant.

As further pointed out by Neubert (2004), with the introduction of multiparty systems, patrons are held accountable to their clients and are challenged by other patrons. The voters are thus not voting for anonymous political programs but for publicly known political figures who are able to secure them access to contacts outside their localities for the further acquisition of power and resources and who are willing to share their resources. Where the formal instrumentalities for popular control are, if not absent, at least weak, Riggs (1966) argues that national politics become a struggle for power as an end itself among competing cliques and factions. These cliques generally consisting of friends and long-standing acquaintances know each other from school or universities. Sometimes they also include kinship ties, often through marriages. "In [this] context such ideas as 'right' and 'left', 'conservative' and 'liberal', 'clerical' and 'anticlerical' have no meaning. The question is merely 'who rules' not 'what does he [she] stand for?'"(Riggs,1966:212).

Election campaigns are thus used as a legitimate arena of contestation and political struggle for the different patron-client networks (Neubert, 1999a; 2004). This kind of political/competitive clientelism consisting of formal participation through elections and informal participation through patron-client networks can be described as an innovative reaction, a result of increased participation and public communication. It allows for an effective socio-political mediation between the private and the public sphere. Because they are based on a voluntaristic model (Neubert, 2004), these patron-client networks break rigid bureaucracies and allow for dynamic contextualization and adaptation to new situations. Through the provision of a certain level of information, they further cross the distance between 'center' and 'periphery' within centralized political and administrative system (Korff, 2006). At the same time, because of their low institutional requirements, these patron-client relationships remain effective only as long as resources are available. Contrary to what was believed in the 1970s, they do not disappear with the establishment of democratic regimes or with economic development and modernization; while some types of patronage may disappear, new types constantly add to the already existing and great variety of forms of patron-client networks (Eisenstadt, 1984). These networks, which include highly qualified professionals, cut across different levels of economic development and perform important functions within modern frameworks of administration. Professionals working within key state agencies are an integral part of most bureaucratic patronage systems. At the same time,

they are members of political parties and professional organizations; they also fill roles of key negotiators and policy makers at the interface with donor organizations.

1.2 Instruments and selection criteria

The collection techniques used were drawn from documentation and secondary data analysis on one hand and participant observation coupled with intensive expert interviews on the other. Prior to my field research I established various contacts with professionals working at the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform*¹³ located at the *Office of the Council of Ministers* and the *Royal School for Judicial Professions*, and scrutinized the available literature on governance reform in Cambodia. The fieldwork itself was split into two periods. During my first field research, contacts were made with professionals from different organizations and agencies, alumni associations (Australian, Japanese, Fulbright, AIT Thailand, L'IDEE KHMER), research and extension organizations (CDRI, CICP, EIC), academic institutions (*Royal School for Judicial Professions*, *Royal Academy of Cambodia*, *Build Bright University*), different departments (Secretariat General of the *National Strategic Development Plan* at the *Ministry of Planning*, *National Institute of Statistics*, *Cambodian Development Council*), bilateral and multilateral agencies (*German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)*, *Swedish Development Agency (SIDA)*, *Department for International Development (DFID)*, *Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)*, the *World Bank Office* and the *United Nations Development Program*), NGOs (*Cambodian Center for Human Rights*, *Licado*, *Ad Hoc*, *NGO Forum*, *Buddhism for Development*, *Community Legal Education Center*), and the private sector (textile, construction, tourism, and trade). During the first period of fieldwork in Phnom Penh Cambodia, which lasted from November to March, I spent half of each day with a young professional at the *Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform*, and the other half of the day at the head office of the GTZ. The second part of my fieldwork was dedicated to intensive open interviews with selected professionals from different occupational spheres.

¹³ The Secretariat of the CAR has the mission to plan, implement and evaluate the administrative reform agenda of the *Royal Government of Cambodia*.

2. Professionals and state-formation: continuity and change

Professionals have always played an important role in state-formation processes in mainland Southeast Asia. Their position is marked by a cyclic dismiss and surge over time within the prevalent social structures. In other words, their position is either reduced, increased, or polarized depending on both the type of political system and the prevalent type of administrative structure introduced.

The professional's role has continuously been to mediate between the 'cosmos' or the vision of a better life, and everyday life, the ruling class and the population at large, the centre and the periphery, the protectors and the protected, and those who produce social riches of which others receive a share. This role implies that they have to connect everyday practices with 'cosmological' reason and vice versa. In the Angkorian period, this role was played by priests or brahmans and the Buddhist clergy. With the rise of modernity, the cosmological order was replaced by instrumental rationality (science, technology), and the intellectuals of the past became professionals who connect every day practices with the technical, pragmatic order. In this context they change, shape, and impact the institutional arena in which they act. At the same time they are themselves influenced and conditioned by these structures.

2.1. Professionals during the Angkor period

Proto-professionals such as brahmans, monks, and priests that emerged during the so-called Indianization process,¹⁴ appear to be the first group in Cambodia that used economic and symbolic capital to influence various processes of state-formation. Thereby the power to attribute meaning or '*Sinngebung*', i.e., giving agency and objects a specific meaning was combined with the appropriation of land, temple treasures, and other resources. In other words, they linked horizontally disparate agricultural regions into an expanding economic network and generated cultural symbols to vertically connect the higher and the lower levels of the Khmer society at that time (Hall, 1985).

Following Chandler (1993), the emergence of the Khmer state was closely connected to the introduction of 'new Indian' institutions and the emergence of elaborate hierarchic temple networks.¹⁵ These networks were crucial for territorial domination and the legitimization of more or less centralized rule and state formation.¹⁶

Several early Southeast Asian societies went beyond these primary levels of integration, developing organizational mechanisms for the acquisition, control,

¹⁴ Where Indian cosmological concepts were merged with existing 'indigenous' ideas (Coedes, 1968).

¹⁵ The prevalence of rice terraces nearby temples during this period suggests that common ritual centers that connected networks of villages had already emerged.

¹⁶ Although these multiple centers (organized into a what Tambiah has coined the 'galactical polity') predominantly acted independently from each other and derived their wealth from coastal trade, various alliances between the decentralized segments for collective activities, such as the cultivation of rice, and thus systematic irrigation, the mobilization of war force, and especially common rituals became important (Korff, 1990).

and disposal of resources in pursuit of collective goals, most of which were political [...] The Khmer state [...] demonstrates this transformation thesis. Especially noteworthy is the development of Khmer temples as centers of redistribution and the “continuous and massive movement of products” from villages toward temples [...] With the temple network as its base, Khmer society went beyond primary redistributive integration and reached a higher level of centralized economic control.

(Hall, 1985:136).

Along this increased coherence, population growth, and protracted peace, peasants became the major source of labor power and agricultural products. The increased production of surpluses for the temples and the court had a direct influence on the political institutions structuring the state. Hence during this time, the region around Angkor, *Aninditapura*, grew in importance and hierarchical structure, while administrative procedures and rituals intensified with the increased extraction of surpluses (Korff, 1990).

This pooling and administration of resources from villages within the temple system, as mentioned agricultural surpluses and labor force in the form of slaves, led to the emergence of supra-village organizations that were controlled by priests. Similarly Chandler (1999) refers to the existence of books in Sanskrit and archival texts referring to priests residing in the cities. Priests had control over the rites and symbols used for the legitimization of these states.

Their responsibilities included such various tasks as assisting at land demarcation commissions,¹⁷ administering religious foundations, dispensing feudal patronage and the court affairs of high dignities, controlling the labor for the construction of public buildings and infrastructure, securing agricultural improvements, guaranteeing fertility, and collecting taxes.

Although separate mechanisms of administration were developed in each temple, Khmer temples were never autonomous from Khmer society and its stratified political order. At the primary level, Khmer temples were subject to the authority of a landed elite and were an instrument by which the elite reinforced its economic and political control. Temple staff [priests, etc.] were often members of the local landholding elite who entered the clergy or by priests who owed their positions and their prosperity to continued patronage by that elite.

Hall, 1985:137

Beside their tasks of administering the flow of resources and allowing for greater interconnectedness between different rural units, the proto-professionals of the Khmer state had the important task of mediating between the elite ‘descending from the gods’ and the commoners, the *nak ta* or ancestral people without family names (Chandler, 1993). In other words, the temples and their staff were also responsible for the ‘redistribution of symbolic capital (Hall, 1985:137).

By constructing complex symbols for collective identities marked by a vocabulary of religious grandeur, praising the kings by magnifying and transforming them into divine and poetic figures of legend (Mabett, 1977), they reflected their conceptions and realities of the social

¹⁷Recording the demarcation of bought or donated land or slaves.

order. High sounding titles, myths of origin, and religious *devaraja*¹⁸ cults simulated the grandeur of Southeast Asian rulers and described a political system that represented what Geertz (1980) has coined 'theatre state'.

[...] priestly and bureaucratic functions, seldom separate in practice, were institutionalized. Government sponsored religious foundations became conduits for Government revenue and largesse in ways that remain obscure but that probably were connected with the power of priestly bureaucratic families around the king.

Chandler 1993:43

State power was indeed based on ritualized redistribution of resources, the loyalty of the provincial officials, and the ability to raise armies for short-term military campaigns (Evers, 1987). Interestingly, the priests were not mere propagators of new cosmologies and ideologies, but also clients in powerful networks of their time. In order to extend its territorial control, the ruler had to surround himself with competent, loyal friends and clients whom he would assign the role of administering royal affairs in exchange for honor, dignities, land, and royal patronage. In this context, priests were either direct beneficiaries of the ruler¹⁹ or clients of the powerful local landholding elite.

Normally the consolidation into an estate of an elite's land rights in regional agrarian communities was legitimized by the construction of a temple, with income from specified estate lands designated to support the temple's activities. Collections, gifts, and offerings flowed to the temple as part of a cycle of economic redistribution. They flowed outward in the form of support for the performance of rituals and construction and in so doing reinforced the prowess of the elite as patrons of the temple deity and as the source of prosperity in the eyes of the local inhabitants.

Hall, 1985:137

However, the multiplication of competing city/temple systems in the region, the increased challenges posed by population growth, and the silting of the irrigation system (Schiel, 2007) weakened Angkor in the fourteenth century. During the following centuries, no similar Khmer state emerged that was powerful enough to unify the region or to define a center of power.

At the end of the Angkorian Empire the landholding, priestly elite was transformed and partly replaced by patron-client elites interested in trade (Mabett, 1977). Moreover, state organization changed towards patrimonialism (Korff, 1990) as the Cambodian state was periodically subjugated and torn between Champa and Ayutthaya.

¹⁸ Although many scholars have translated the term as 'God king', Schiel (2007) based on Golzio's personal communication contends that the *devaraja* cult represented the cult of a special God, the *kamrateng an jagat ta raja*; a God that would protect the king. In other words, 'devaraja' in his view rather means 'God of the King'.

¹⁹ Following Mabett (1977), brahmins frequently married into the royal family thereby securing their privileges and indirectly guaranteeing the union between 'castes'. People were identified by their castes within a complex social network divided into three groups, one comprising the ruling elite. There were four hierarchical levels from the capital down through provincial centers to villages. The king and his entourage lived in the palace. His court, including its brahmins, consumed the produced surplus (Mabett, 1977).

Professionals, qua para-professionals,²⁰ resurged to play a major role again only during the colonial administration. During the first decades of the twentieth century, they actively engaged in political and social struggle for independence and nation-building (Evers, 1982; Korff, 1998). Thereby, they wielded considerable political power, as they pushed for change and the introduction of a political culture of parliamentary democracy. Indeed, besides their relative position, vis-à-vis other potential power elites, their emergence as a sufficiently large group was an essential precondition for the establishment and maintenance of a multi party democratic system.

2.2. The early modernizers: paraprofessionals and nation building

Independent or free professionals founded their first platform for self-organization at the *Institut Buddhiste*, Cambodia's first research and publications institution on Buddhism and Khmer culture, in the early 1930s. The Institute's journal, *Kambuja Surya*, thematized political issues²¹ of the time. Another weekly journal, the *Nagara Vatta*²², founded in 1936 by three young intellectuals—Son Ngoc Thanh (see Annex 4), Pach Chhoeun, and Sim Var—reported and informed readers about the activities of Cambodia's educated elite. The paper advocated more participation in commerce by Cambodians as well as greater educational opportunities for all (Vickery, 1982). During the 1940s and 1950s, Thanh represented an important figurehead for the progressive urban Khmer.

The goals of the Thanh-Nagaravatta nationalists seem moderate today, but they shocked the traditionalists and may have contributed to the alacrity, even enthusiasms, with which the latter greeted British, then French troops who began [...] to disarm the Japanese [...].

Vickery 1982:10

Generally, the urban intellectuals who led the country towards independence had some experience in the colonial administration, which helped them shape their visions of new political and administrative orders after independence. However, this proved to be more difficult than expected. Instead, after the dissolution of the colonial system, legitimacy and support from the people to build a new administration and economy was derived from the charisma of the new leaders (Korff, 2003).

²⁰ Para-professionals or the 'Literarti' were generally less specialized and could thus act in various fields. They would primarily be the classical intellectuals.

²¹ Especially issues affecting Khmer monks in Cochinchina.

²² The newspaper opposed and cautiously criticized French colonial policies, their in-egalitarian tax policies and their foreign domination of the economy. They also criticized the privileged position of the Vietnamese in Indochina and urged Cambodians to awake and compete with the Chinese and Vietnamese minorities in commercial life. The paper was forbidden in July 1942 following the participation of Thanh and 700 people, among them 500 monks, in an anti-French march during the Japanese occupation against the *Resident Supérieure*, who had ordered a few days earlier the arrest of two Cambodian monks in their orange robes, of whom, one died in custody—an act that was perceived as despising the symbols of Cambodian identity.

The occupation of Cambodia by the Japanese military opened new space for the action of the newly organized professionals and with them, diverging visions of the how to modernize Cambodia emerged. Some favored armed resistance by forming the anti-French *Issarak* movement, while others opted for a process of dialogue by formulation of a national policy, a declared set of ideas, and a national organization in the form of the *Democratic Party*. However, professionals involved in both movements felt that they were working for the same goals, while using different means.

The *Issarak* who marked the first certain appearance of communist or Marxist organizations included professionals who had studied in France, in Thailand, and at the Buddhist Institute as well as Cambodian leftists, Vietnamese leftists, and anti-monarchical nationalists loyal to Son Ngoc Thanh. Among them were Nuon Chea Son Ngoc Thanh, Son Ngoc Minh, and Tou Samouth (see Annex 4). Support came from the *Indochinese Communist Party (ICP)* and the *Communist Party of Thailand* (Slocomb, 2003).

The *Democratic Party* in the mid-1940s, headed by Dr. Sisowath Yuthevon, introduced an European-type parliamentary system (Vickery, 1982) and made a serious effort to organize and mobilized thirty-one regional and provincial branches, effectively taking advantage of traditional patronage and communications networks in Buddhist monasteries, schools, ministries, and Government services. These communications were largely word-of-mouth, among people who trusted each other. The party also took care to nominate candidates who commanded widespread local support, often choosing former monks or achars, whereas its leaders were drawn from Cambodia's elite (Chandler, 1993). Many of the men who joined the *Democratic Party* had been educated at the prestigious French Lycée Sisowath in Phnom Penh.

Intensive networking of democrats, their linkage with monks and activists with charismatic leaders such as Prince Yuthevon and Son Ngoc Thanh (see Annex 4), and their literacy fostered their ability to create a new sense of solidarity among the Cambodian professionals (Chandler, 1999). The professionals within the *Democratic Party* presented themselves as carriers of modern values, of equality, justice, progress, and as the critics of nepotism and corruption. Social, upward mobility along the lines of competence and qualification became important thereby challenging long-standing hierarchies. This period marked their first appearance as a group that aimed at changing the existing state structures according to their understanding of a “good life”.

An important step to materialize their vision was to conceptualize a new constitution that was based on the French model of the time. Another step was to modify the structure of the administration. However, the democrats of the first ‘vintage’²³ were soon weakened and challenged politically by an alliance of right-wing groups in the early 1950s.

Indeed the right-wing groups grew quite rapidly, and eventually out numbered the democrats within the *National Assembly*, thereby incrementally changing the political rules. The rapid

²³ A term introduced by Egon Kunz (1973;1981) for different groups of people, specially refugees that made the same experiences in a certain period of time in a particular place.

dominance of the alliance of landowners, members of the military, and conservative bureaucrats ruled the country, destroyed all opposition, and introduced an authoritarian political culture that lasted for almost two decades (Vickery, 1982).

As the political role of professionals declined, parliamentary democracy broke down and was replaced by an authoritarian, one-party regime²⁴ led by the charismatic Prince Sihanouk. His charisma, amplified by his breakthrough during negotiations for independence, was never however really quotidianized (*veralltäglicht*). During his reign, the bureaucracy was limited to larger cities; control over the country and its resources was rather low. When he proclaimed the independence of Cambodia in 1954, half of the country was under the control of the *Khmer Issarak*.

After the conference in Geneva that proclaimed officially the independence Cambodia, most *Issarak* fighters, among them Nuon Chea (see Annex 4), were relocated to North Vietnam. Khmer Communists such as Keo Moni, Sieu Heng, Tou Samouth, and Son Ngoc Minh (see Annex 4), as well as three of Sar's friends from Paris, Sien An, Rath Samseunn, and Yun Soeum were also evacuated to Vietnam. A handful of these Khmer, including Tou Samouth and Sieu Heng, came back to Cambodia in 1955-1956. The rest remained in Vietnam for many years, only to return sixteen years later in 1970 to overthrow Cambodia from the pro-American Government under General Lon Nol alongside the *Khmer Rouges*²⁵ (Slocomb, 2003). Other former guerrillas, including Sok Knol and Saloth Sar, were sent to Phnom Penh to work for the Indochina Communist party.

2.3. Professionals and leftist movements

As Chandler (1999) maintains, to many of the young professionals, communism promised a better future. Some of them, while they were young students at the French *École Miche*, *College Norodom Sihanouk* and *Lycée Sisowath*, had supported the early Democrats in their struggle for Cambodia's independence. During their studies in France between 1951 and 1953, they had joined the *Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers* and became members of the *French Communist Party* (Chandler, 1999).

The adaptation of leftist ideologies, combined with the grandeur of Cambodian history, played important roles in the development of the resistance movement. For them, Cambodia's modernization program could only be reached through a Marxist-Leninist framework. They perceived the monarchy as a doctrine that gave power to a small group of people who did nothing to earn their living but exploited the greater population at every level. In effect, they believed that the monarchy was an unjust political system that had to be eliminated.

²⁴ Known as well as the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* ('People's Socialist Community')

²⁵ The majority of the party was purged during the *Democratic Kampuchean* regime. At the time of the purges Cambodia lost a whole mass of highly trained, experienced, and committed cadres (Slocomb, 2003).

Another important source of recruits for Cambodia's communist movement was Cambodian university students from France. Between 1945 and 1960, several hundred of these young men and women, drawn largely from the country's small elite, were exposed to an intoxicating mixture of radical politics, personal freedom and anticolonial solidarity.

Chandler 1993:183

However although all followed the same vision, the different groups chose to follow different strategies to reach their aims.

While radicalized professionals such as Keng Vannsak and Thioun Mumm (see Annex 4) focused on operating within the remnant structures of the *Democratic Party* (Kiernan & Boua, 1982), other radicalized professionals such as Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, Khieu Ponnary, Khieu Tiririth and Son Sen (see Annex 4) infiltrated the education system to mobilize students from schools, universities, and the Buddhist order, thereby creating a network of militants and potential cadres (Chandler, 1999). Those who were attracted to these networks came from the urban middle-class and shared the same vision to renovate Cambodian social arrangements and to enlighten the population in cities. According to Chandler (1993), by 1969 hundreds of young Cambodians had joined the communist movement.

The third group of communist professionals, among them Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim (see Annex 4), similar to the Democrats of the 1940s, perceived the need for a more flexible political approach through legal struggles, including a process of dialogue and cooperation with Sihanouk's *Sangkum Party* and its administration (Kiernan & Boua, 1982).

However, in the second half of the 1960s, Sihanouk condemned the left-wing press, closed their newspaper down and imprisoned their editors, including Khieu Samphan. Hou Yuon fled to the countryside joining a group of antigovernment insurgents. Shortly after, Sihanouk changed his strategy and re-invited several radical intellectuals, to run in the National Assembly elections. In the early 1960s, some leftist professionals opted for an anti-Sihanouk stance and joined the underground insurgency led by Saloth Sar at the Vietnamese border.

In the meantime, bureaucrats who had grown wealthy through their uncontrolled appropriation of resources from state industries and nationalized enterprises during the 1960s (Vickery, 1982) could not maintain their power position within the state and were overthrown by the military and urban business elite in 1970. Their newly introduced harsh policies against communists and the War in Vietnam that involved an intensive bombing of Cambodia, provided increasing legitimization for the radicalized professionals' ideologies. Indeed because the Government's territorial control remained restrained to bigger cities, the *Khmer Rouges* around Sar, Sary, Samphan and the Ponnary sisters could quickly gain power. Their aim was to rapidly build Cambodia into a developed industrial country with great strength for national defense by means of a 'super great leap forward' (Kiernan, 1982).

After taking over Phnom Penh in 1975, one of their first moves was to establish the *National Front's Council of Ministers* to draft a new constitution and elect a new Government. One of the first reforms of the new Government was to extend territorial control over the whole country by restructuring the administrative division.²⁶ A party political commissar was placed at each administrative level. In their vision, control had to be exercised through cooperatives, run by solidarity production teams,²⁷ based in the communes (Slocomb, 2003). Other organizations, such as the *Youth League*, the *Women's Association*, the *Farmers' League* and the *Trade Union Federation*, were introduced as mass organizations to mobilize popular support. Interestingly political studies in schools, on the radio, in magazines and theatrical performances were maintained to raise socialist consciousness.

To break with unjust past ideologies and start a new era, the radicalized professionals unleashed an unsystematic onslaught against liberal professionals who they regarded part of the old feudal, exploitative system. This differed from the systematic purges at *Tuol Sleng/S 21*, which were primarily directed at eliminating internal cadres²⁸ who were suspected inter alia of treason by cooperating with the Vietnamese administration. In fact, some professionals were spared from the purges, as the new Government needed their technical expertise for its industrial plan. However, the radical policies of the *Khmer Rouges* effectively disrupted the development of a vintage of professionals, albeit for a brief period of time.

The salient velocity and intensity of their reform, combined with the complete dissolution of personalized networks of relations and the fatal loss of control over the administration, the military, and the economy led to the catastrophic implosion of all mechanism of control and redistribution.

The central leadership attempted to monopolize power from Phnom Penh. Information and goods moved between the capital and the regional zones, but rarely between the zones. This hub-and-spoke system proved to be extremely inefficient, impeding what the Khmer Rouges claimed to want most, the integration of its various regions into a seamless cooperative system. It was also counterproductive in that it undermined the leadership's effort to ensure centralized control. [...] in the absence of any local bureaucracies or indeed of decent communications with Phnom Penh, the individual zone secretaries rose to positions of unprecedented regional power. In the end, the Party had only one way to control events in the countryside: the removal and execution of the zone secretaries [...].

Gottesman 2003:29

²⁶ The former administrative system was replaced by a system of zones/regions (Slocomb, 2003). The zone, *phumipheak*, was divided into sectors: *damban*, the sectors into districts; *srok*, the districts into communes; *khum*, and the communes into villages; *phum*. On each level, except for the commune level, a Party Political Commissar was nominated and a Committee that was in charge of its administration.

²⁷ Each solidarity team comprised ten to fifteen farming families. The people in the cooperatives were divided into *Permanent Labor Teams* and *Mobile Labor Brigades*.

²⁸ Like Hou Youn and Hu Nim.

In 1978, in a desperate move to correct the disastrous results of their policies, the Khmer Rouge leaders ordered the reintroduction of former organizations and institutions such as the *Technological University*²⁹ and primary schools within cooperatives. Geography textbooks and mathematics came into use and plans were formed to reinstate a mixed-currency economy in 1979. Amnestied people connected to the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes were re-employed in these newly created positions to legitimize the weakened regime. In this respect, the Central Committee hoped to increase their anti-Vietnamese allies (Chandler, 1999).

Although executions of former cadres increased during this period, the situation of the average Cambodian generally improved in 1978: intellectuals were better treated, the distinctions between “new” and “old” people became less severe, more food was allocated for domestic consumption and Sihanouk’s name began to be used again in Public.

Metzl 1996:106

However, these reforms came too late, and in 1979 former *Khmer Rouges* cadres³⁰ trained in Vietnam overthrew the Government of *Democratic Kampuchea*.

2.4. The figuration of strategic groups after the Khmer Rouges

Once the former *Khmer Rouges* seized power, with Heng Samrin as its leader, they immediately started with the aid of the Vietnamese administration to rebuild a new administration. Cadres and future professionals were recruited from the camps around the capital. However, these groups were too small in number and the main administrative tasks had to be completed by Vietnamese adviser³¹ at the national and provincial level. Many former soldiers of *Democratic Kampuchea* were integrated into the new administration.

[...] the selection of people to enter the ministries [was made] without a clear understanding of their personal histories and is instead based only on requests from particular persons that they come to work [...] the bureaucracy was growing uncontrollably because state officials were making decisions to put people to work with a salary without any clear discussion as to how many will enter the organization.

Gottesman 2003:52

²⁹ Under the leadership of Thiounn Mumm a former member of the *Democratic Party* and student in France (see Annex 4).

³⁰ Soldiers included former *Issarak Fighter* such as Chea Soth, Penn Sovann and Chan Si, individuals who had deserted from *Democratic Kampuchea*, such as the former Regimental Commander of the *Khmer Rouge Army* Hun Sen, former *Khmer Rouge Party* Secretary Chea Sim, and the former Khmer Rouge Commander of the *Fourth Division* of the Eastern Zone, Heng Samrin. A small number of professionals and bureaucrats of the former the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes joined them as well.

³¹ The employment of ‘privileged’ Vietnamese experts caused considerable tension in the Ministries. As a consequence each year, from 1979 on, hundreds of cadres were sent to Vietnam for the new administration. Two years later, in 1989, their number was reduced considerably.

The new Government's efforts to recruit professionals, who had survived the last four years, remained fruitless. Frustrated by the reappearance of a communist rhetoric and being subjected to the leadership of partly uneducated revolutionaries, many migrated outside the country or fled to the Thai border. Others integrated into the newly created state positions.

At the provincial level, the *People's Revolutionary Committees* implemented policies of the *Political Centre* under the supervision of the *Provincial Party Committees*. On one hand, the *Provincial Party Committees*, composed of three to five officials, had generally the task to secure 'the base', frame and supervise agricultural production, and formulate viable working plans. On the other hand, the *Provincial Mass Organizations of the Front* had the same functions as those of the Centre, namely to recruit party members and mobilize the masses. In this context, the *Provincial Party Secretary* usually acted as the chief of the *People's Revolutionary Committee* and held direct responsibility for the economy and livelihood of the people. Similarly, the *Political Commissar of the Battalion* was also a member of the *People's Revolutionary Committee* but in charge of Military Security. Other members of the *People's Revolutionary Committee* were in charge of organization and monitoring, on one hand, and propaganda, education, culture and social action on the other.

However, despite this more differentiated organization of the state at the central and provincial level, overall territorial control remained difficult to realize. According to Gottesman (2003), the Vietnamese authorities found fewer Cambodians who had been refugees in Vietnam or spoke Vietnamese as they went further up the administrative pyramid. As a result different political factions could emerge within the *Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party*.

The creation of positions in the state administration in the 1980s as well as in the 1990s became rewards for loyalty. The need to reward loyal followers for the purpose of pacification and to share resources through civil-service salaries—even where this only meant, as Evers (1987) argues, the 'sharing of poverty'—became the major reasons behind the rapid bureaucratization. In Thailand these positions were commonly referred to as "inactive posts"³². The hope of gaining a civil-service position was a major motivating force and source of individual ambition for leaders and followers alike. Having a position within the bureaucracy was not perceived as merely occupying an office position, but as a means to first secure one's own livelihood and second, to push forward political agendas through the targeted control and allocation of aggregated resources.

However a career within the administration was only possible through protection by superiors and the loyalty of subordinates, in other words through patron-client networks. Cadres who raised to higher positions kept their power position by funding those who put them in power. Hence a source of income came from within the administration itself (Hugues, 2007). On the same time, for officials in higher positions, having a powerful client base was necessary for successfully handling conflicts; for the subordinates, the protection of higher officials

³² One might call it, using Geertz terminology, 'administrative involution' (Evers, 1983b, 1987).

facilitates a swift and quick advancement within the administrative system towards important positions.

In the 1980es, as skilled cadres were still rare, the party committees were granted the right to choose their staff for the various sections through patronage networks. Thus, departments within the same ministries sent their correspondence to the leadership instead of directly to the responsible departments causing the relationship between the Ministry and the Provincial Departments to remain ambiguous (Slocomb, 2003).

In the second half of the 1980s, a new group of ‘progressive’ cadres within the *Cambodian’s People Party (CPP)* emerged around Hun Sen, Cham Prasid, Sok An (see Annex 8), Hor Namhong and Keat Chon (see Annex 4). Its political agenda centered on the peaceful withdrawal of the Vietnamese administration from Cambodia, the integration of opposing military forces such as the *Khmers Rouges* and the introduction of a market economy. These new directions were somehow in contrast to the political agenda of the other, older cadres of the *Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)* like Chea Sim, Say Phouthang and Heng Samrin.

Indeed the provision of positions within the state administration after the fall of the *Khmer Rouges* was the base for pacification after the political crisis and civil war situation. By offering a position within the administration of the *Royal Government*, the CPP could disarm the *Khmer Rouges*. Later, this strategy was applied again with the integration of former FUNCINPEC party. Thereby, people obtained employment, had a share of influence (power) and status, and their support could legitimately be demanded, because the administration had to serve the Government.³³ .

In contrast to the older cadres-who used his position to appoint hundreds of police, prison officers, interrogators, and other security officials into his *konchau*³⁴- the ‘progressive’ group demonstrated an affinity to bureaucratic patronage.

I agree with what comrade Hun Sen has suggested, that there be at least one assistant for every comrade. So it is necessary to request more cadres to help the Council of Ministers. In the future, each Deputy Prime Minister shall have two or three assistants who will be cadres with good, firm political stances, who know how to keep secrets, and who are highly educated and have clear expertise.

Dang Long cited in Gottesman 2003:133

A second feature, which distinguished them from the other high cadres of the Party, was their focused leadership role in the provinces.

I propose that comrade prime minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers[...] visit, examine and follow the situation in the provinces and that in accordance with this work system, we visit the provinces two months out of the year.

Dang Long cited in Gottesman 2003:133

³³ As Hugues remarks “given the increased number of politicians and the need [in 1998] to accommodate them in positions of power and authority from which to generate cash remuneration, the solution layed in creating more jobs while at least maintaining the forms of the democratic process. In accordance with this, a new political structure was created on the form of bicameralism” (Hugues, 2007:38).

³⁴ According to Gottesman (2003) the ‘children and grandchildren’.

This practice of spending two months of the year in the countryside (from the province to the communes) is still followed today, especially before elections.³⁵

Moreover, the new leadership of the CPP was aware that the preservation of their domination was, and still is, highly dependent on the development of a considerable national economic surplus. Hence a crucial point in their economic reform was the need for qualified young professionals to attract effective Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), to implement administrative reforms, and to develop the domestic market strategies. They were further aware that a strong and competent administration from the top level to the field level generally governs more effectively and efficiently, and thus is more capable to manage expected economic growth.

Consequently highly qualified professionals were given positions in key state function in order to orchestrate, transform and adapt the economic framework of the country to international standards. The strategy employed so far has been successful; Cambodia's economy gained momentum and dynamism by growing on average 9.4% per annum during 2000-2006. Specifically, economic growth peaked at 13.5% in 2005 and economic growth was at 10.8% in 2006. The average per capita income almost doubled from 288 USD in 2000 to 513 USD in 2006. The country's international reserves have increased a threefold, from about 500 million USD in 2000 to more than 1.5 billion USD (Cambodian Embassy, 2008).

Although bureaucrats around the CPP dominate the political and economic space,³⁶ economic development and the transformation of the economic landscape have led to the emergence of an important private sector. Indeed, the rapid transformation of the Cambodian society during the last two decades can also be understood as a continuous re-institutionalization of inequality towards patterns of domination and subordination, and inclusion and exclusion of different groups of actors. The formation of the business sector as a strategic group is certainly a result of these structural changes.

2.5. Cooptation of professionals? From bureaucratic polity to bureaucratic capitalism

The Cambodian administrative structure resembles what Riggs (1966) has coined the bureaucratic polity, a style of politics in which the actual political arena, the struggles for power, prestige, social status, and wealth are dealt with by the bureaucracy. In other words, a bureaucratic polity evolves in a situation where the bureaucracy dominates the economic and political sphere (Korff, 1998, 2003). Hence, it is not a rational, legal bureaucracy in a

³⁵ In 2006, I participated in a 'field visit' with five professionals of the *Council of Ministers* who went to see the work in progress of the school and football field they had financed in 'their commune'. As they explained to me, every bureaucrat of the CPP was assigned to a team of four to six persons responsible for one commune. The aggregated teams with their superior were responsible to the district etc.

³⁶ Indeed the CPP and still is successful in maintaining political stability and economic growth on one hand and by successfully controlling counter movements. As Evers argues, 'political stability' through an alliance between strategic groups [...] might produce economic growth but also increased chances for enrichment and exploitation, which in turn provoke reactions, movements, uprisings and possible revolution. Controlling these movements from below and checking the growth of counter strategic groups thus becomes a major aspect of the political system (Evers, 1982: 7-8).

Weberian sense, but as a system that tends to value itself. Korff (1990:187) citing Scott notes: “Standards of performance do exist, but they are essentially political rather than administrative. Thus an official does not evaluate his subordinates’ performances by how efficiently they do their work, by how closely they adhere to regulations, or by their technical virtuosity. He is instead likely to value them according to how loyal they are to him personally, how effectively they advance his interests and those of his allies, and how useful their own network of personal contacts may be to him.”

Access to a position within this bureaucracy allows further admission into a wider range of other resources. The tenure of an official position within the bureaucracy is not only seen in the Weberian sense as a position of service or a place for clerical work, but also as a multifaceted place where elements of a home, court, and place of business are brought together. Thus, Cambodia shows on one hand elements of a functionally specialized state that controls itself and is thus immune to external control, and on the other elements of a dynamic and competing system of personalized relationships, such as patron-client networks and networks based on friendship (Eisenstadt 1981, 1984; Korff, 2006).³⁷ The latter complex patterns of personalized vertical and horizontal linkages³⁸ energize the internal mechanism of the administrative system and connect the bureaucracy to the society at large. Hence, we have a situation in which the formal organs of state power such as the *Council of Ministers* act with considerable effect, but where rights and obligations follow personalized line of relations. At the same time, the formal organizations of representation remain without any effect and power.

Interestingly, this bureaucratic polity increasingly has taken characteristics of what Weber has coined bureaucratic/political capitalism, a system in which the military and the bureaucracy extends its agency into the corporate economy. Thereby the demarcation between public service and private interest becomes distorted. As a result, various officials either control major banks, industries, and businesses or participate in the distribution of their profits.

In the Cambodian context alliances are forged between high-ranking bureaucrats and wealthy, generally Sino-Khmer business families (see Annex 7). These business families who are closely related to each other through kinship or joint shareholdings have a strong power base in the control of the economy, controlling most of the enterprises and financial institutions. To change the economic institutions and state regulations or ‘normative system’, they engage in relations with high-ranking civil servants and politicians. Being ‘connected’ to the high ranks of the bureaucracy or even being directly involved in politics allows for an easier access to loans, good price determinations, licenses, etc.

³⁷ Horizontal networks include graduates of the same faculties such as the *Faculty of Law and Economics*, friends from the same region, family members, etc.

³⁸ To keep this alliance among the different fractions of high officials, alliances have been formed through intermarriages: Hun Sen’s daughter, Hun Malay, is married to the son of Sok An the Minister of the *Office of the Council of Ministers*. His son Hun Manet is married to the daughter of the Secretary of State of the *Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs* Piech Sophan. Both studied together in the US. Manet is currently completing his PhD in Economics in London. His other son, Hun Manith, is married to the daughter of the Secretary of State of the *Ministry of Rural Development* H.E. Yin Chy Lee. Both studied together in Singapore. His other son, Hun Manith is married to the daughter of the police chief, Hok Lundy. His second daughter, Hun Mana, is married to the son of the Secretary of State of the *Ministry of Defense*. Both also studied in Singapore (see Annex 7).

Indeed, on one hand the businessmen/women needs the political elite's support and protection, as the legal frameworks for business are yet to be fully formalized and institutionalized. In other words, processes of hybridization instead of functional differentiation take place. On the other hand, the political elite, particularly the CPP, needs big businesses to finance their political agendas. The relations between business groups and the CPP are regulated through trust and hence, are highly dependent on the calculability and accessibility of the other group's behavior.

These networks of relations are organized horizontally as well as vertically, thus incorporating elements of friendship and paternalism. So far, both groups see gains in pooling their resources, namely capital and connections on the one hand, and security, peace, charisma, legitimacy and prestige on the other.

Hence, valuable public assets are put under the private control of individuals who are themselves part of the political elite. In an illustration of this overlap between politics and business, six of the most prominent tycoons (see Annex 6) have recently been appointed senators for the CPP. The six are Kok An, Kong Triv³⁹, Ly Yong Phat, Yeay Phu's husband Lao Meng Khin⁴⁰, Men Sarun, and Mong Reththy⁴¹ (Global Witness, 2007).

Essentially, professionals are important for both groups-the political leadership and the business people surrounding them- as both seek to develop the economy. Indeed, economic development implies the need for an efficient management and thus the demand for 'managers'. Similarly, the bureaucracy develops a need for efficiency and coordination as big businesses increasingly pose demands for security and calculability. As a result, professionals become important for the effective running of key state and business organizations.

³⁹ Oknha Kong Triv, a senator of the CPP and Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh city, is said to be one of the richest businessmen in Cambodia. Founder of the KT- Pacific Group Limited, the senator has set up a business network that in 2004 consisted of ten associated companies in Cambodia and eighteen joint ventures. He is shareholder and chairman of British American Tobacco, president of Eastern Steel Industry, president of the Cambodia World Trade Centre, president of VEGA Asia Trading Co. Ltd., president of Cambodia Electric Import Export Co. Ltd., Chairman of Kwang Fu Computer Label Weaving and Tatsumi Knitting Cambodia Co. Ltd., shareholder of Societe Concessionaire de L'aéroport, shareholder of the Pacific Commercial Bank and trading representative of Mercedes Benz and Mitsubishi Electronics.

⁴⁰ Lao Meng Khin and Choeung Sopheap (also known as Yeay Phu) run Pheapimex together, arguably Cambodia's most powerful company. Through its logging and economic land concessions, Pheapimex controls 7.4% of Cambodia's total land area.

⁴¹ Oknha Mong Reththy, senator of the CPP and member of the agricultural sector of the *Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce*, known as the 'rubber tycoon' and the 'palm oil king' is founder of the Mong Reththy Group Co. Ltd. His Group comprises the Mong Reththy Investment Cambodia Oil Palm Co. Ltd., the Oknha Mong Port Co. Ltd. at Sihanoukville,⁴¹ the MRT-RML Livestock Co. Ltd., the Mong Reththy Group-Tiwanon Construction Joint venture Co. Ltd., the Mong Reththy Steel Industries Co. Ltd. and the Samnang Khmeng Wat Construction Co. Ltd. The senator, a good friend of the prime minister, was born in a rural family from Takeo. He started his career at the *Ministry of Public Affairs* from 1979 to 1989. With the withdrawal of the Vietnamese administration, he founded the Import Export Company and is said to have been illegally trafficking drugs. Today the Mong Reththy Group is the first exporter of rubber, palm oil and livestock, build roads and buildings and operates its own port.

This leads us to the question whether their rise as a group potentially enables them to modify the social structures that facilitate and constrain the agency of bureaucrats, the military, and big businesses. In other words, it leads us to question their formation as a strategic group.

2.6. Conclusion

Professionals have always played an important role to modify and conceptualize given state structures. Their positioning is marked by a cyclic dismiss and surge over time and thus has been either reduced, increased, or polarized depending on prevalent political system.

One reason for this cyclic dismiss and surge over time could be a dynamic of fragmentation and differentiation or integration among them. There is an interdependency between integration as a strategic group and enhanced political power in terms of decision making and fragmentation and reduced political relevance. One aspect that can lead towards fragmentation or loss of integration are vertical relations-relations to political or economic elites into which professionals are always integrated.

The rise and demise of the professionals during and after the struggle for independence can be discussed in terms of the competition of various groups for the inheritance of former colonial power positions. A growing bureaucracy and military soon replaced independent professionals who led to the formation of the parliamentary democracy.

The reconfiguration of the social structures in the last two decades reflects the re-figuration of the bureaucrats and the military, and the (re)emergence of professionals as well as other new groups such as business groups and aid agencies. In fact, we currently observe a merger of interest of the politically powerful military-bureaucratic elite with the economically strong group of businessmen/women into business ventures. However, whereas the business sector increasingly denotes characteristics of a consolidated strategic group, professionals still lack a strong horizontal institutionalization of their agency to promote and push forward their interest in a long-term perspective. Rather, they still seem to exist as instruments to modernize and adapt the interests of the business sector, the aid agencies, the bureaucracy, and the military.

3. Professionals today: a strategic group?


Young professionals today in Cambodia are dispatched in diverse occupational fields. All share common traits of apolitical functional specialists. Although they act as leading groups of modernization, they also tend to consolidate and push their vision of the ‘urban good life’ and thus foster the continuous process of social differentiation and inequality between the urban and rural space (Evers, 1978c) by translating global inequalities into national ones and vice versa. At the same time, their expertise is required on one hand for the reform and conceptualization of new state institutions and on the other hand for the introduction of development concepts to realize the ‘common good’ of society. This puts them in an ambivalent situation. To solve their paradoxical condition, in which they have to start a political career but prefer to remain apolitical, they have chosen to create a ‘modern’ life for themselves in a process we have coined ‘the secularization of professionalism’. This process diminishes their agency as it reduces their potential for communication and self-organization. As a result they follow different strategies.

The arguments presented in this chapter are based on secondary data from the *Ministry of Education* and data from first hand interviews. For the study, forty young professionals (see Annex 15) in leading positions in the Cambodian society were interviewed over a period of two months using specific questions formulated as general guidelines (see Annex 2). These rather intensive interviews lasted between two and three hours and were kept open. The interviewees did not see the questionnaire as I memorized them before the interview.

3.1. Educational background

After the consolidation of the Cambodian bureaucrats and military under the supervision of the Vietnamese administration in the middle 1980s, the modernist fraction within the Government turned its attention on the formation of skilled professionals by promoting programs for overseas studies. This emphasis on university training was based on the newly adopted ideology of economic pragmatism and technological necessity. As a result, in the mid-1980s many Cambodian students were officially sent to study economics and engineering in socialist countries like the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Vietnam.

Fig. 3.1. Number of Cambodian who studied in the former Soviet Union




Source: Ministry of Education, 2005

Since the mid 1990s, the number of private students has increased significantly. Still, the majority of students specialize in economics. The second largest field of studies is technical sciences such as engineering. Professionals of both fields of study become the major carriers of instrumental rationality, a shared quality of the group. However, despite this distinguishing feature, they remain politically irrelevant. In effect, they are unable to transform symbolic power into economic and political relevance and they become what Evers (1973) coins “politically castrated technocrats”.

Structurally, three vintages of young professionals can be identified, despite the fact that they were socialized in different political settings, and share this similar ideology of technical, economic pragmatism. The first-vintage are graduates from the Soviet countries, the second studied in Asian communist countries and other countries of the OECD such as Japan. The last vintage, the youngest, children of the urban wealthy mainly study in elite universities in the United States, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia.

Fig. 3.2. Number of Cambodian students who studies outside Cambodia



Source: Ministry of Education, 2005

I distinguish between the old Vietnamese generation who is against technology, use of computers, who accepted the French, then the senior Russian generation of young professionals who uses English as a working language and who is open and dynamic, then finally on one hand the junior Japanese generation of young professionals who is struggling to survive in the government, and on the other hand the junior Australian generation of young professionals [.] The younger graduates constantly bring in new knowledge, and sometimes work as civil servants for economic matters but they prefer to work for NGOs and the private sector. They are very successful in leading their own businesses. Interestingly most of the returnees from the United States work for civil society organizations when they come back.

Deputy Director General of Finance and Accounting of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, 2006⁴²

Within professionals' circles, the first-vintage of professionals is known as the 'Russian professionals of the professionals of 'I'IDEE Khmer'.⁴³ Indeed, its prominent figures⁴⁴ graduated with PhDs in economics in Russia during the 1980s and were the first 'intellectuals' chosen by the state and integrated as clients into networks of very high cadres of the CPP, including those of the Prime Minister. They are now for the most part

⁴² This reflects comments made by professionals that participated in case studies directly related to this study. See section 3.5.

⁴³ The alumni association of the first-generation of professionals among them the prominent officials of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* who studied in Russia; the majority graduated with PhDs.

⁴⁴ Such as Aun Porn Moniroth, Hang Chuon Naron (see Annex 9), Him Sahip.

counterparts of the *World Bank* and other important donor agencies at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)*. Initially, these members did not belong to the established economic and political elites. However, they orchestrated the transition from the planned economy to the market economy by which state-owned enterprises were privatized,⁴⁵ state assets were transferred into private ownership, and price and trade policies, among others, were codified. New Government Offices and Agencies were created under their leadership, such as the *Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC)* and the *Cambodia Investment Board (CIB)* under the *Council for Development (CDC)*. Their expertise was crucial for the introduction of new laws on investment and taxation and hence for the constant average GDP growth of 10% from 2005 to 2007 (Hughes, 2008). The fact that they studied in systems with a planned economy does not hinder them from working within liberal economic systems. The different departments in which they work could potentially become politically important since they design policies that have an impact on politics. The most prominent figures of this group (see Annex 9) are often mentioned as role models for other younger professionals who admire their open, egalitarian, and horizontal working style.

The second and even more so, the third vintage, are more professionally diversified and engage in different fields of occupations. Professionals employed in key positions within the *Council of Ministers (COM)* and other related agencies generally were students from the second vintage, whereas the professionals from the third vintage can be found in all sectors of society. In contrast to the second vintage, the third vintage, with some exceptions, has successfully been integrated into the growing private sector. Interestingly, professionals of the first two vintages are eager to court these highly qualified professionals into their own organizations. They tend to recruit from within their own, in an attempt to create horizontal networks, by bringing in other, much younger professionals to implement the reforms they are working towards. Their aim for modernizing these sectors is to catch up with other dynamic economies of the region, such as Thailand, thus increasing Cambodia's regional standing.

The age distribution of professionals working within the state shows that most of those working in the civil service after studying abroad were less than thirty-nine years old in 2005. In a national survey of the *Ministry of Education*, among the 365 civil servants who had graduated abroad from 2000 to 2005, the majority was strikingly below the age of thirty-five.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Interestingly an important number of state enterprises and collective land went into the property of the CPP as party property as well as into the hands of CPP officials.

⁴⁶ This is partly due to the specific context of the Cambodian history; during the Government of *Democratic Kampuchea* (Khmer Rouges (1975-1979)) most of the professionals were either wiped out or had to flee outside the country.

Table 3.1. Degree distribution of Cambodia graduates

	Bachelor in %	Master in%	PhD in %
2000	66	21	13
2001	37	50	13
2002	66	23.4	10.6
2003	37	51	12
2004	20.6	69	10.4
2005	51	42	7

Source: Ministry of Education, 2005

The number of PhDs has slightly diminished over the years and the number of graduates and post-graduated alternates each year: in one year, most of the civil servants graduate with a bachelor and in the following year the total number of postgraduate is higher than the total number of undergraduates. This probably stems from the fact that most students who finished their bachelors, go on to complete a masters.


Similar to those studying during the sixties, who later became critical of the Government, young students, mostly men, received their professional education at universities in larger cities abroad, and this greatly affected their outlook. After their return, they tend to cluster in the capital Phnom Penh where the division of labor is more complex and the degree of occupational specialization high. Bureaucratic elites are also more generally concentrated in these urban centers, which makes living there a precondition for access to higher positions in the administration of Government and business organizations. Cities enable them to realize their aspirations, to climb the social ladder, or at least to open the doors for their children's potential upward social mobility. Furthermore, the capital is the centre where administrative agencies as well as large-scale organizations-such as global business firms and international NGOs- converge and thus, power is concentrated. Highly professionalized experts are necessary for any international aid package and entrepreneurial skills are expected from professional managers in Government Agencies and consulting firms that deal with the conceptualization of a national legal framework for investment practices or state reform programs.

3.2. Occupational fields: Where they are now

Essentially the three vintages of professionals are dispatched in four different occupational spheres: : the official sector (*Council of Ministers, Minister of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Commerce* etc), the academics (RULE, NUM, CDRI , EIC etc) and those working for development agencies(*World Bank, UN Organizations, AusAid DANIDA, JICA, GTZ, UNOHCHR* etc), the private sector (KPMG, PWHC, DHL, British Tobacco etc) and those active on the NGO scene (CCHR, Licadho, Ad Hoc etc). These groups are not mutually exclusive, and sometimes overlap, while others are cross cutting. Thus, professionals working for the Government also prepare consultations for donor agencies or joint projects with parastatal think tanks.

Upon completion of their education, the majority of first- and second-vintage professionals are employed in higher administrative functions within the state. Professionals, except for those associated with the NGOs and some donor organizations, lecture at universities and have strong connections to high party cadres with whom their relationships are structured along hierarchical lines. Their alliance with other professionals is limited to personal levels and social gatherings and events such as marriages, Buddhist ceremonies, and similar get-togethers. Few professionals have started to network on a professional's basis, such as CamPro,⁴⁷ to discuss policy options for the economy. However, political solidarity does not appear to be an important issue, at least not at the present stage. Government organizations- specifically the think tanks- are organized on hierarchical lines, whereas NGOs, donor and business organizations are more often organized in horizontal lines, a feature paradoxically praised by all professionals including those working within state agencies.

Fig. 3.3. Professionals and their occupational spheres



Interestingly, professionals of the Human Right scene- such as Kem Soka and Ou Virak, the American-Cambodian Secretary General of the *Alliance for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia (AFEC)*, and current Director of the *Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)*- are directly or indirectly affiliated with the former *Son San Party*. Issues on their agendas include fierce critiques of nepotism, corruption, illegal practices of the CPP, and essentially of the Government. They are in favor of a radical ‘modernization’ of the political system towards a liberal democracy. Professionals in the CCHR introduced in 2002 public ‘open forums’ in each of the Cambodia’s eighty-five districts, and opened one of the few non-state controlled radio stations. The organization gained the support of volunteers in each of the 1,621 communes and engaged in broad sensibilization campaigns for people’s rights and also for Democracy, during which it gathered complaints and organized public gatherings in almost each commune.

As the campaigns were very successful, the professionals founded the *Human Rights Party (HRP)* in 2007 with Kem Sokha at its leader. Ou Virak took over the leadership as president

⁴⁷ A loose association of professionals working in donor agencies such as the *World Bank*, Ministries such as the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* and of Consultants.

of the CCHR and in the last elections, in July 2008, the HRP officially gained three seats in the National Assembly. Kem Sokha, who studied chemical engineering in Prague, was involved in politics since the departure of the *United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)*. First he was Secretary General of the *Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party*, the former *Khmer People National Liberation Front (KPNLF)* of Son San (see Annex 4).⁴⁸ In 1995, the party changed its name into the *Son San Party*. In 1999, when the Son San Party merged with the FUNCINPEC Party, Prince Rannaridh appointed Sokha as Deputy Secretary General in the 'new' FUNCINPEC Party. Later on he was appointed senator and chairman for the *Commission on Human Rights and Reception of Complaints* in the Senate. As he saw this type of activity as unconstitutional, leaving the Government to form the *Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)* in 2002 with the support funding from USAID, to focus on human rights education and forums for open dialogues.

Professionals working for NGOs and especially for Human Rights NGOs-such as the *Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR)*, ADHOC, *Khmer Youth Association*, *Alliance for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia*, *Cambodian Defenders Project*, and Licadho- are generally perceived as the de facto opposition. Their rhetoric, funding, and entourage reflect the structure and feature of classical opposition parties. They generally do not have any ties to the administrative and political elite as they come from a politically and economically marginalized strata of the Cambodian society.

3.3. Case studies

Although professionals in Cambodia come from different backgrounds, at one point in their lives they have made similar decisions that have had an important impact on the formation of new worldviews and the adoption of similar lifestyles. In the case of state employed professionals, three different vintages with similar social backgrounds can be identified. In the donor organizations and non-governmental organizations, professionals with various social backgrounds exist within their administration. Comparable to state professionals, there are also three different vintages that studied abroad and were later recruited to work for the aid industry.

3.3.1. Case studies of professionals working as civil servants

With the exception of the first-vintage, professionals working within the state administration have a tendency to share specific characteristics with regards to their respective backgrounds. Indeed, the first-vintage had a situational advantage during the early 1980s. As qualified individuals were rare in these years, the opportunity to study abroad was generally offered to

⁴⁸ The tri-party, anti-Vietnamese, coalition was set up in 1982 along the Thai-Cambodian border. It was also comprised of the royalist FUNCINPEC led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge party headed by Khieu Samphan. This Government -in-exile was officially recognized by the United Nations and it occupied the Cambodian seat at the United Nations until the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. The party was founded in October 1979 to oppose the Vietnamese occupying forces and Vietnamese installed Government in Phnom Penh. He joined the negotiation process resulting in the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991 that paved the way for the United Nations supervised elections in 1993. Just before the election, the KPNLF was renamed into the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party.

individuals who could prove their intellectual performance. In contrast, the second- and third-vintages differ as a result of social change. Due to an increase in social standing and a more stable political system, coming from a privileged background increased their chance of entering elite and private universities. Currently, the Government tends to recruit graduates from these privileged backgrounds; thereby it fosters the formation of a group of professionals that share common high social standing.

A prominent figure of the first-vintage, the so-called ‘Russian vintage’ was born in 1965 in Phnom Penh, during the ‘Golden Era’ under Sihanouk. After Hun Sen’s nomination as Prime Minister of the *People’s Republic of Kampuchea* in 1984, he was awarded a scholarship to study in Moscow/Russia. In Russia, he obtained a Master of Arts (1990) and a Doctoral Degree (1993) in Philosophy and Political Science from *Moscow State University* as well as a *Diploma in International Business* (1992) from the *Moscow School of Business*. In 1993 he returned to Cambodia and directly entered the state administration at a very high position as the Assistant to the newly elected co-Prime Minister, following the first democratic election. Shortly after, he moved into a position with the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* as Advisor to Senior Administrators, one of whom was in charge of the *Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB)*. Later he was employed by the MEF and by 1999 he was elected Secretary of State and appointed Member of the Board of Governors for the *National Bank of Cambodia (NBC)*. In 2001 he was then nominated as Chairman of the *Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC)* with the rank of Minister, and in 2003 he was nominated as an Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the *Council of Governors* for the *Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)*. He is regarded as the role model for the younger professionals, as he represents the idea that as a professional one could be successful within the bureaucracy on the basis of knowledge and qualification as opposed to ‘sole’ connections.

The current Team Leader of the *International Team Project (ITP)* of the *United Nations War Crimes Court (UNWCC)* and Deputy Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* belongs to the second vintage of professionals that studied abroad. Born in Kirivon/Takeo in 1976, to a relatively wealthy Sino-Khmer family, his father owned an import-export business trading with rice, petrol, medicine, and other basic consumption imported from Thailand. His wife, who was raised by relatives in Singapore, comes from a Sino-Khmer family of diamond traders and jewelers. Until the departure of the *Khmer Rouges* in 1979, he and his family lived in a refugee camp near the Thai Border. After the intrusion of the Thai army into the camp they fled to Siem Reap where they stayed until 1983. Afterwards, they moved to Phnom Penh where he enrolled in the *Primary School of Tuol Sleng* and went to the *Svay Prey High School*. After high school he received a highly competitive scholarship from the state to study at the *Faculty of Law and Economics*, now the *Royal University for Law and Economics (RULE)*. Hence he went on to study at the *Royal School for Administration (RSA)* from 1998 to 2000 where he graduated with a *High Diploma in General administration*. Parallel to that, he attended night classes at the *National University of Management* (see Annex 18). As a direct result of his high score on an exam taken at the end of his studies, he was recruited by the COM to work at the *Council for Administrative Reform*

(CAR).⁴⁹ In his function as personal assistant⁵⁰ to the new Secretary General of the CAR, he was responsible for preparing the diagnostic report on corruption and to develop the *Government Action Plan (GAP)*. After the successful approval of the GAP, he was assigned to work on the coordination of the Governance Project. His mother then introduced him to the minister in charge of the COM during a Katan ritual⁵¹ in 2001. From that time on, he became a special “protégé” of the Minister. In 2003, he was awarded a German scholarship from *InWent* to complete a *Masters in Public Management* in Potsdam. After his return, he began his work as Deputy Secretary General and joined one year later *Khmer Rouge Tribunal* as Team Leader of the international team of administrators.

Similarly, the Chief Deputy of Office Fourteen of the *National Audit Authority (NAA)* who belongs to the third-vintage of professionals, was born to a rather wealthy family. His family owns a large construction business, and his father is a well know businessman in Phnom Penh. After graduation from the prestigious *Lycee Sisowath* (see Annex17), the former school of the early democrats and intellectuals such as Keng Vannsak and Ieng Sary in the 1940s and 1950s, he went on to complete his *Bachelor in Business Administration* at the private *Norton University*. Following his studies, he worked at the *Information Computer School* for two years and in 2002 was assigned to work at the *National Audit Authority*. In the meantime he passed the *International Certificate of Public Accounting (ICPA)* and started his *Masters in Business Administration* at the *Charleston University*. In 2003, he created his own company dealing with *Remote Management Systems*.

3.3.2. Case studies of professionals working for donor organizations

In contrast to the professionals working within the state administration, professionals employed in donor organizations come from various social backgrounds and hence form the most socially heterogeneous subgroup. Within this subgroup are represented professionals from the same upper middle class as the state professionals as well as professionals with a rural background that ‘received’ their social calling during the early phases of the UNTAC Mission. They also differ from the first-vintage evident among state professionals who were recruited in the mid to end 1980es, at a time when the Government recruited all trained professionals as a means to extends its intellectual base. For professionals from the second and third vintages, donor organizations are highly attractive. Donor agencies offer the freedom to make decisions, to take initiative regarding the policies that are pursued and are financially rewarding. However in the short run, the majority engaged in the aid industry wishes to improve its knowledge, i.e. increase its cultural capital rather than its economic

⁴⁹ At the end of the studies the students have to pass an exam, from which the scores are ranked. Students with the highest score of *Royal School for Administration* go to the *Council of Ministers*, the second best go to the *Ministry of Interior* and the last group goes to the other line Ministries.

⁵⁰ Together with the Canadian advisor contracted by *CIDA*.

⁵¹ A monthly ritual that aims at collecting donations for the Buddhist temple; here networking alliances are formed as predominant members of society are expected to attend.

base. Similarly to the other groups of professionals, financial resources are acquired through processes of hybridization.

To illustrate, the Economist at the *Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit* of the *World Bank* in Phnom Penh, comes from a rather 'wealthy' background. His father works at the *Ministry of Mine, Industry & Energy*. After the departure of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, his family moved to Phnom Penh, where he enrolled in the *Revolution School*. His parents then enrolled him in the *Secondary School at Wat Ko (Island Pagoda)* and the prestigious *Lycee Sisowath*. After his graduation in 1990, he was admitted to the *RULE*. There he graduated at the top of his class in 1995 and, as a result, was recruited by the *National Cambodian Banks Association* and was assigned to work at the *Pacific Bank*. At the bank, he worked in the agro-credit department as a finance officer. Six months later he was appointed to work at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)*. There he had worked as an economic assistant in charge of writing the quarterly macroeconomic reports for the Minister. In 1998 he received a scholarship to complete his *Masters in Economics and Trade* in Australia, following his family's educational pattern of obtaining high-level degrees in economic related fields at universities abroad. He came back in 2000 and went to work for the *Cambodian Development Research Institute (CDRI)* for two years. In 2002, he applied for a job at the *World Bank* and was the successful applicant out of 120 others. There, he holds the position of Country Economist responsible for updating information on trade regulations. He enjoys his current professional environment and at the moment he does not want to go back to the MEF. His incentive for working at the *World Bank* rests on his belief that he can learn a lot as the position provides numerous training opportunities, which he believes are very important to improve his knowledge base. He thinks that the *World Bank* further offers a good salary and a perfect working atmosphere.

Similarly, the Governance Program Assistant at the *Japanese Donor Agency (JICA)* whose father is the Chairman of a state shipping company in Sihanoukville and official at the *Ministry of Mines, Public Work and Transport*,⁵² comes from a privileged background. He belongs to the third vintage of professionals. Born in 1979 in Phnom Penh after the departure of the *Khmer Rouges*, he completed schooling in 1996; in the same year he received a state scholarship to study at the *National University of Management (NUM)* where he graduated in 2000. After his graduation in 2000, he worked as a manager in a garment factory where he was in charge of controlling the quality and the production process. However, he decided to further his studies and applied and received a scholarship from Japan, where he completed a *Masters in International Trade*. After his studies in 2003, he was offered a scholarship from the *International Monetary Fund* to study at the prestigious *Keo University* in Japan but he refused the offer and applied⁵³ for a position within the *Cambodian Development Committee (CDC)*, although the position was poorly paid. At the CDC he received some insights into the drafting process of the *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)* and had his first professional encounters with international experts. He also realized that he did not like the

⁵² He used to be a medical doctor before he worked at the Ministry.

⁵³ The position was low-paying with a very low salary of 35 USD per day, but he did not care about the pay since he wanted to gain some experience in the public sector (2003-2004).

public servant style and preferred to be a manager (time management and quality assurance). After one year, he received an offer from the *Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)*.⁵⁴

Similar to the Governance Program Assistant at the *Japanese Donor Agency (JICA)*, the Research Assistant of the Resident Representative of the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)* belongs to the third vintage of professionals. His father worked as a Government Official at the *Provincial Department for Commerce*. The IMF employee was born in Battambang in 1981 and went to high school in Phnom Penh until 1997. In 1997 he passed the exam to enter the NUM. He studied there until 2001 and received a scholarship to further his studies at AIT in Bangkok and at the *Ecole Supérieure de Commerce* in Paris until 2003. Upon his return in November 2003, he received an offer to work for the IMF in Phnom Penh as Research Assistant.

In contrast, the Program Manager of the Governance Cluster of UNDP comes from a rather modest-family background. His father, a driver for a tobacco company, died during the Khmer Rouge period. He and his siblings hence grew up with their mother who had a hard time securing their livelihood. During his time in public high school, he took extra courses in English at the 'English street' behind the Royal Palace. In 1991 he was recruited by the *Advanced Mission of the United Nations* to Phnom Penh as a communication clerk in charge of the inventory of the communication centre of the mission. Simultaneously, he was often demanded by the civil police to translate issues like Khmer complaints. Shortly thereafter, he was employed as an Administrative Clerk at the civil police of the UN. Afterwards he received a junior position at USAID and later was promoted to a senior position, finally ending as a Project Assistant at USAID. From 1996 to 2000, he took classes at the NUM and graduated with a *Bachelor of Administration*. From 2002 to 2004, he was granted a *Fulbright Scholarship* and went to *Pennsylvania University* in Philadelphia. While in the USA, he volunteered for the *Cambodian Association for Seniors*, which aimed at integrating older Khmer into American society. When he returned from the States, he approached the UNDP advisor at the time, who recommended him for the position of the UN Representative for Cambodia for the Governance unit. He was then invited by the UNDP and passed the regular assessment to enter into service. He works closely with the professionals in the state administration.

Similarly, the Program Officer for *Human Rights and Democracy* of the *European Delegation of the European Commission to Cambodia*, who belongs to the second vintage comes as well from a modest family. He was born in Pret Mey, Kandal Province in 1973 and then moved to Svay Rieng province until 1979 as his family had to flee the *Khmer Rouges*. From 1980 to 1987, they stayed in Kandal province and in 1987 he moved to Phnom Penh where he enrolled in *Sankomut High School*. In 1990, after his graduation, he decided to flee to Australia but was held in Indonesia for two years. Upon his return in 1992, he studied English at the *Royal University of Phnom Penh* until 1997 and then obtained a job as a translator at UNESCO. In 1998 he was employed by the *European Commission Support Election Process*

⁵⁴ His life motto is a Japanese one: *Kaisan*, which means keeping improving on an incremental basis for a better future. The philosophy behind the word was developed in the 1970s by the Japanese automobile industry.

(ECSP) also as a translator. Then he worked for four months in the *Cambodian Association of Manufacturers* as assistant. In 1998 he worked at the UNOHCHR for three years also as an assistant translator. He then worked as a volunteer for the *United Nations Volunteers (UNV)* program and was sent to Eritrea for six months. Upon his return, he took law classes during the night at the *Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE)*. In 2003 he was awarded a *Humphrey Scholarship* but had to wait one year before he could start his studies in the USA. In the meantime he worked at the UNV office for six months in the human rights department. From 2004 to 2005, he completed his *Masters in International Legal Studies* at the *Washington School of Law*. Upon his return to Cambodia, he was employed as a Program Officer for Human Rights and Democracy at the *European Delegation of the European Commission to Cambodia (EDECC)*. He enjoys his current position because it allows him to make his own decisions, take initiative, and openly express his ideas. He particularly likes the management style at the delegation of the European Commission (EC).

3.3.3. Case study of a professional in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

NGO professionals differ slightly from those of both the state and donor organizations but hold more similarities with the latter. They also enjoy the freedom that their organizations offer, but of greatest importance for these professionals is a sense of morality when it comes to their careers. Their educational experience generally led them to spend a long time living abroad, thus gaining further insight into how other societies are administered and organized. Some NGO professionals come from the first-vintage re-entering Cambodian society, after a period of exile. Effectively, they remain ‘outside of the system’ with a critical stance on how Cambodian society should be changed.

The Head of the *Monitoring Section of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC)* belongs to the second vintage and comes from a rather poor rural background. He was born in 1970 in Prey Veng Province, where he went to school until 1989, when he received a scholarship from the former GDR to study in East Berlin, at a time when scholarships were given in a more fair way as the children of the ‘elites’ were too young to study overseas. However after a few months after his arrival, the Berlin wall came down and he fled to West Germany, as he feared that all Cambodian students would be repatriated. In 1990 he fled to Aschaffenburg in Germany where he stayed in the refugee hall for one year. In 1991 he could get in touch with a former professor from the *Humboldt University (HU)* in Berlin. This latter event helped him register for *Law and Political Studies at the HU* and get a scholarship from the *German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)*. He met his wife who was studying German Studies at the HU during this time. In 1999, he successfully passed the ‘*Staatsexamen*’ and applied in March 2000 for a job at a Cambodian Human Rights NGO, AdHoc. Hence, upon his return to Phnom Penh in 2000 he started as the Coordinator of the *Women’s Rights Section* of AdHoc where he prepared teaching material for women in the villages and the statistics for the annual report of the central office. He didn’t want to work for the Government as he knew that he could hardly change their ‘mentality’. Since his time in Germany, he has become used to talking openly and freely and working without strong hierarchies. Moreover, if he worked within the Government, he would have had to join a party and the party could silence his opinions. He also believes that it is better to stay ‘clean’ and

neutral instead of resulting to bribes, so he looked for a position in a organization where he could avoid corruption. In 2002 he successfully published the first annual report of AdHoc. As a result, he was promoted to the Chief of the Monitoring Section (dealing with Women, Land and Human rights). He also created a database system where all the incoming reports on human rights abuses countrywide are kept and managed.

3.3.4. A comparative case study of a professional employed in the private sector

The life story of the current CEO of MAXIMA, a rural and small business credit bank and Advisor to the *Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce*, can be used as a comparative case. This case study underscores the agency that Cambodian professionals have with regard to choice of profession.

The entrepreneur comes from a rather wealthy urban business family. He is a neutral example of the second vintage of professionals. He was born in 1972, and from 1975 to 1979 his family was displaced to Kampong Cham (eighteen km north of Phnom Penh). He remembers being in a cooperative separated from his parents carrying rice, fertilizer, and helping with construction work. However, in 1978, just before the end of the Pol Pot regime, he was able to rejoin his parents. From 1979 to 1980, he stayed north of the Phnom Penh (suburb) working as a farmer and repairing bicycles. He graduated from *Chatomuk High School* in 1989. One year later, he was awarded a state scholarship to study at the prestigious *National University of Management*⁵⁵ (NUM). There, he graduated with a *Masters in Business Management and Economics* in 1995. He then worked at the *American Friend Services Committee*⁵⁶ as an administrative accountant. However, three months later he was appointed by the Government to work at the *Ministry for Fisheries, Agriculture, and Forestry* as the Chief of Cabinet until 1998. In 1998 he was transferred to the *Ministry of Rural Development* as a counterpart to the *World Bank* staff and assistant to the Minister. In the same year he started a one-year English course of the *Australian Language Program*, funded by the *Asian Development Bank* (ADB). After completion of the first course, he undertook another two-year, pre-departure English course-the *English Academic Purpose (EAP)*- funded by the Australian Government with the aim to study in Australia. Upon completion of the second course in 2000, he received a scholarship in Australia and graduated successfully in 2002 from *Victoria University of Technology* in Melbourne with a *Masters in Business Management*. Before leaving for Australia, he and five of his closest friends funded their own micro-credit NGO that they baptized “Maxima”. After he returned from his studies, he was nominated Deputy Chief of the *Asian Coordination Unit* within the *Ministry of Rural Development*. In the same year, his company applied for a credit at the *Rural Development Bank* and from two international NGOs: one from Luxembourg and the other from Italy. By June 2006, he and his colleagues had gathered a budget of 500,000 USD and became one of the most influential and important microfinance operators in the country. In the same year, he was nominated Vice President of the *Australian Alumni Association*.

To some extent, particularly the professionals with an advantageous background, have the ability to choose their career paths. However, in spite of their career choices, they all wish to

⁵⁵ Former *Faculty of Business*.

⁵⁶ An NGO that focuses on rural health care, sanitation, water supply, and community development in Prosat.

improve both their own lives and that of other Cambodians. Thus, modernization of Cambodian society is a key concern for professionals, a fact that unites them across professional boundaries.

3.3.5. Analysis

In short, the professionals in these three subgroups—namely those working for the state administration, those working for donor organizations, and those working in the NGO scene—constitute as well three groups with distinct educational backgrounds⁵⁷.

Professionals working for the state generally have studied in elite universities such as the NUM, the RULE, and the *Royal School for Administration* (see Annex 18) prior to studying abroad. Professionals of the NGO scene, on the other hand, did not have the social advantage of entering elite universities. Thus, many studied at the *Royal University of Phnom Penh* focusing on more reflective and critical subjects such as mathematics, linguistics, and teaching preparation. Finally, the subgroup ‘professionals working for donor organizations’ is the most heterogeneous group, as it included professionals from privileged and elitist background as well as professionals from a poorer background that were promoted during the UNTAC period.

Nevertheless, the similarities between Cambodian professionals go beyond basic common experiences, such as their year of birth (all were born either shortly before or during the Khmer Rouge Regime) or their family’s choice to move shortly after their birth to larger cities such as Phnom Penh. The most substantial linking experience, identified by most as a decisive moment in their lives, was the choice to study abroad.

Furthermore, largely Sino-Khmer or ethnic Chinese, many either have a grandfather or a mother that descends from Chinese migrants. This confirms Kiernan’s findings, which illustrate that in the 1970s Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese were numerically predominant in Phnom Penh (Kiernan, 1982). Ethnicity is another indirect factor for making it into the ranks of the professionals as the Sino-Khmer and ethnic Chinese form a sub-community in Cambodia that has wide-reaching networks in the region and worldwide, and this is often used for the exchange of resources and information. Professionals without a “family” advantage must have contact with agencies or organizations in order to access, or at least facilitate the process of obtaining, scholarships for studying.

These experiences and specifically, the career path they take, creates a dichotomy between state and donor/NGO professionals in Cambodia. Their educational background and their chosen occupational spheres lead to the development of specific cognitive structures, that despite the similarities, lead to a fundamental conflict between the choice of strategies for the respective groups.

⁵⁷ Professionals working in the private sector are used as a comparative case as these have the highest agency to choose their profession.

3.4. Patterns of self-organization: professional organizations

The professional's ability to form organizations and political parties gave them prominence in political life during the anti-colonial struggles. But this does not remain the case in contemporary Cambodia; the political engagement of current young professionals is rather limited: 40% of young professionals interviewed were members of professional organizations, and 20% were committee members of Government bodies that have influence on policy decisions.

The alumni associations are generally used by young professionals to initiate, maintain, and influence their relationships with different social institutions. They function further as platforms or interfaces between alumni, their educational organizations, political actors, business people, and others. The most important are the *Australian Alumni Association (AAA)*, *L'IDEE Khmer*, the *Japanese Alumni Association*, the *National University of Management's (NUM) Alumni Association*, and the *Asian Institute of Technology's (AIT) Alumni Association*. Scholars that go to AIT for graduate studies generally have done their bachelor at the NUM.

L'IDEE Khmer, also known as the *Russian Alumni Association*, was one of the first associations formed by the first-vintage of young professionals who came back from Russia.

In contrast, the AAA forms along with the *Japanese Alumni Association*, the most active associations. The association counts a total membership of 290 alumni and was created by an incentive of the Australian *International Development Program (IDP)*. Australian universities established the IDP in 1969 to represent Australian education overseas and to provide a mechanism for both universities and the Australian Government to channel education and training aid to developing countries in Southeast Asia. The organization is still owned by universities in Australia, but is now independent from the Australian Government and operating internationally.

It has been based in Cambodia since 1992. Since then, it offers English teaching through the *Australian Centre for Education*, student counseling to study in Australia and examination services such as the *International English Language testing System (IELTS)*. It also implements development projects, organizes event management and public activities, and offers alumni support for graduates of Australian universities. Thus, this has fostered the creation of an AAA, which was mainly conceived as a platform to help share 'development' expertise, to create a network of experts to advise Australian and Cambodian institutions on social and economic issues and to share the experiences gained in Australia.

With the increasing number of Cambodians who have studied in Australia in recent years, we have come together to form this association to help each other and at the same time to assist the development of Cambodia into an equitable and prosperous society. As a non-profit and non-political organization, we hope to contribute to the well-being of society.

Charta of the *Australian Alumni Association*, 2006

The association sees itself as an organization that is able to assemble the alumni from Australia to positively implement the association's objectives in a professional and responsible way, and to represent the Australian alumni inside and outside Cambodia. The

members of the association meet on a regular basis for ‘dinners’ where Australian and other experts give specific issues such as strategic planning in Government or perspectives on changes in Cambodia.

In comparison to the first two associations, L’IDEE Khmer and the AAA, the *AIT Alumni Association* is rather young. Its aim is largely to integrate young professionals once they return from Thailand. The association is trying to become more active since the election of their new and young president, a professor of *Pagnasat University*.⁵⁸ The dynamic president intends to create a board of trustees (composed of all the ex-presidents and the current president) in order to secure continuity over time. That trustee committee will act as a consultative group. Furthermore, the association wants to edit a newsletter and to engage in research. With a total membership of 319 alumni, it is divided into four committees; committees for Sport, Business, Environment, and Internal affairs. The members are all graduates from AIT in Bangkok. But the active core consists of 40 to 50 members. The scholarships granted to the AIT students are generally given by donors and especially by the French embassy and the *Swedish Technical Cooperation Agency (SIDA)*. Most of the graduates who receive a scholarship from a donor agency work for that agency when they return; few work for the Government. Scholars that go to AIT for graduate studies generally have completed their bachelors at NUM.

The aim of the association is to build networks and a good reputation, but also to ensure financial support and old values such as respect for elders. As the president points out: through respect, they might gain their trust and still fulfill their plans. Thus, ‘playing the game’ is a feasible solution. Following its president, even though the older generation has a low education, they are making efforts to integrate the younger generation to fulfill their technical tasks. In his view, there is a strong divide between the two generations, observed during the meetings: the older vintage meets to discuss the political issues and the younger, to discuss the technical issues (on conferences, seminars, etc.). In the realm of the political, they stand behind the older vintage. The young people, in his words, are committed to change but remain under the constraints of the older vintage; hence, the former must adapt to, gain the trust of, and give the demanded respect to the latter in order to achieve their goals.

The *Alumni Association of the National University of Management* is one of the biggest associations. It is a rather young and ‘informal’ association, since the initial preparations to give the association an organizational status only began in 2006 along with their representation on the World Wide Web. Having a homepage was cited as vital instrument to share ideas. Alumni of this university maintain the strongest ties after their studies, share information for job purposes, invite each other to their weddings and other ceremonies, or meet for leisure activities. In addition, each class creates a mailing list through which they communicate almost every day.

Finally, the *Japanese Alumni of Cambodia (JAC)* started with ten people in 2000, and as of 2007 had 70 members. The alumni association defines itself as a private, non-profit and non-partisan organization acting as a platform for members to further contribute in the spirits of

⁵⁸ Teaching at the *Pagnasat University* is in English; most of the documents and materials are also in English; thus, in his words, the young generations are constantly confronted with Western values.

intellectual, professional and cultural enrichment and growth. It offers different training to its members, from vocational to college studies (i.e., graduates). Selection is completed jointly by the *Ministry of Education* and *Japan's Ministry of Education*. An entry exam is required mainly in the natural sciences (i.e., mathematics, physics, chemistry and English); after the high school interview, the candidates must first pass an oral interview. From those admitted, approximately 70% study economics, 20% IT, and about 10% social sciences (Ministry of Education, 2006).

The JAC tries to distance itself from the AIT Network and L'IDEE Khmer, thereby criticizing them of being unable to sufficiently fight for a radical change; they think that these alumni association are still very much dominated by seniority principles. On the contrary, JAC pledges for a radical change that must start with the reform of the education system (in primary schools, etc.), and for the introduction of basic values for the JAC such as solidarity, friendship, and brotherhood. The JAC is further connected to international networks through its membership with *Asian Council of Japan Alumni (ASCOJA)* and the *Japan Alumni Network* from ASEAN countries. The association further cooperates with political and diplomatic agencies such as the Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, particularly in the promotion of cultural and educational exchange programs between the two countries. They also cooperate with Cambodian students still studying in Japan, through the *Cambodian Students Association in Japan (CSAJ)*, so as to mobilize financial funds for small development projects.

Beside these alumni association, small and independent professional organizations such as CamPro emerged in the past few years. These associations meet on an eclectic and sporadic basis. CamPro can be described as a loose association and is not an alumni association; however, it gathers key professionals who have generally studied abroad and who work in important institutions such as the *World Bank*, UNDP, *the Ministry of Health*, CDRI, *British Tobacco*, etc. They identify themselves as an alternative intellectual circle that focuses on economic and other important policy issues, regardless of respective political backgrounds, encouraging the development of alternative policy guidelines not only for the Government but also for multilateral agencies such as the *World Bank*.

In spite of their tendencies to organize into professional organizations, most professionals' political role is determined by their membership or non-participation within major political parties such as the CPP or FUNCINPEC. Here, their ability to manage lead organizations has made them attractive to the powerful leadership of these organizations. In other words, it is less a matter of what they studied that forms bonds, but rather where they studied. This is quite similar to what previously happened in the early years (after World War II).

3.5. Cognitive structures and lifeworlds: How Cambodian professionals think

Due to their educational socialization in urban centers overseas, Cambodian professionals consider themselves apolitical technocrats belonging to the most modern section. Their clients are no longer the common population, but the governmental elites, multinational corporations, donor agencies and transnational NGOs, and their chosen professions illustrate this. Hence, young professionals share multiple interfaces with these organizations,

which they impress with their technical expertise and fluency of language; thereby they act as facilitators for foreign aid and foreign investments. Has this special role led to an adoption of distinct political and social attitudes that distinguish them from the local masses and the political elite?

The following section will discuss the characteristics, attitudes, and cognitive structures of professionals working in the Government sector that emerged in the case studies illustrated in Section 3.1. There are few differences and several similarities in the perceptual structures and embodied dispositions that organize the way professionals view the world and how they act within it.

Professionals share quite a lot of characteristics, such as an urban middle-class lifestyle and way of thinking, the means chosen to secure their lifestyles, the integration into the same networks to exchange vital information, and a shared vision for change. The differences mainly concern the approach and strategy they employ in order to achieve the change that they envision. Indeed, in order to get recognized socially it is not sufficient enough to have a high-level degree from a university abroad or to perform well. Seniority still plays a crucial role. The tension arising between the older and rather conservative and the young innovative, dynamic professionals hinders the latter's ability to mobilize politically, since they fear that this could jeopardize their position in society. Here, the professionals working within the NGOs, especially those associated with human rights, demand radical and rapid change while those that work within the Government system argue that change has to be slow, incremental, and from within. This dichotomous approach creates a fracture point among the two groups of professionals who otherwise share very common lifeworlds.

3.5.1. Similarities in lifestyles and cognition

Two clear and common features among professionals are their urban middle-class lifestyle and their cognition patterns. In essence, all have studied in well-known universities and live in cities. They define themselves as hard-working, assiduous, respectable, abstinent, and correct, and are marked by a concern for both material interests and discipline. Interestingly, they carry conventional and conservative ideas as to how women, married men, or elders ought to behave. The nuclear family and a solid education are as important as a good job that would provide enough money, but not too much, so as to live in luxury. Economically, most of them belong to the better-off sections of society, often owning their own homes or living in the homes of their wealthy parents, owning a car or two such as a *Toyota Camry* or *Lexus*, and possessing real estate, usually outside Phnom Penh. Several interviewees owned houses that they rented to international experts and likewise owned land for speculation purposes; indeed, more and more professionals secure their access to local resources by buying land in rural areas.

Their family networks span across the US, Canada, France, and Australia. They watch CNN, MTV Asia, BBC, the Japanese channel NHH, *Discovery Channel*, *Channel New Asia*, listen to RFI, *Voice of America*, *Radio Free Asia*, and read the *Financial and New York Times*, as well as local opposition and Government papers to 'stay informed'. If they have children, they go to international schools, or if they go to public schools, they also visit private schools

where they learn English. At work, a professional appearance is very important and thus many of them wear black trousers, a white shirt, and sometimes a tie for work.

The second similarity lies in the means they have chosen to secure their lifestyles, namely through processes of hybridization. As national politics is not a field where it is easy to legally earn substantial amounts of money, most of the professionals want to either establish their own business or marry into business families in order to secure their finances. This is regarded as a precondition for the successful entry into politics in the future, as participation in the political sphere requires spending substantial amounts of money. In contrast to, for example, politicians in Thailand where politics is a means to gain access to funds by using political position, professionals in Cambodia use the combination of politics and business as an important means to avoid corruption and to be on the safe side.

A third common feature is their integration into the same networks where they exchange information on job opportunities, family issues, and world affairs with many other professionals and actors from other sectors, from other countries. As the Adviser to the *Cabinet of the Prime Minister* pointed out, “networking is an expression of good competence, which for me is different from cronyism or nepotism” (2006).

In these networks professionals distinguish between good friends, generally classmates from university with whom they develop close relations and with whom they plan their long term careers (lifelong friends), and acquaintances:

I classify my friends into two categories: First, the brother type of friend, whom I trust and with whom I share confidence, loyalty, honesty, faithfulness, regular communication, and whom I can count on in any case; second acquaintances which I have to be friends with in order to prevent them from being against me[...]. My strategy is to make friends in various line ministries and universities. Sometime I can ask friends in higher positions to promote other friends in lower positions, a common friend generally. The more I know people the easier it is for me to work.

Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006

I have two kinds of friends: close friends generally my former classmates with whom I share the same ideas and feelings and with whom I have great solidarity. We are honest and loyal with/to each other and I can expect their help in any case. The other category of friends includes many people whom I meet for a drink, to go to Karaoke bars, or with whom I travel on weekends.

Director of the Economics and Finance Institute located at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006

The young professionals are very careful to ‘save face’ among themselves, especially when they talk about politics. Interestingly, the size of the network closely correlates to the social background of the people involved.

When you come from a rural family it is very difficult to get friends in Phnom Penh; but the higher your education is, the more social prestige you have, and the more friends you can make in Phnom Penh.

Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 2006

When I meet my friends I do not talk about issues of my work at the Ministry, it will quickly be known and I might get a lot of problems. [...] I follow a different approach: I am mingling quietly for the time being in the government sector and when “the time is ripe”, I will get politically active.

Deputy Director general of finance and accounting of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, 2006

Horizontal networks are used by professionals to share vital information outside the established communication channels of the civil service and generally overlap the networks of graduates of the same Cambodian universities, usually from the same class. The majority, except the professionals in NGOs, has studied in elite universities such as the *National University of Management*, the *Royal University of Law and Economics*, and the *Royal School for Administration*, prior to studying abroad. These universities are elitist in nature; in order to gain entry a potential student has to meet stringent qualifications, including successful completion of an entrance exam. Furthermore, it is also necessary to have pre-existing social connections that would provide applicants with an essential advantage. For example, those who come from a well-situated family are more successful at gaining entrance. Once admitted, professionals generally study law and economics and graduates are automatically recruited into civil service. Once in the Government apparatus, they have access to further opportunities to study in prestigious universities overseas.

Generally, professionals employed by NGOs did not have the social advantage needed to enter elite universities. Thus, many studied at the *Royal University of Phnom Penh*, focusing on more reflective and critical subjects such as mathematics, linguistics, and teaching preparation. This experience put them in direct contact with the NGO sector and essentially enabled them to obtain scholarships to study at well-known universities abroad, such as *John Hopkins* in the USA. The first and second vintages of graduates from these universities were selected by the *Ministry of Education* to work as teachers all over the country.⁵⁹

For both groups, friendship networks created during their academic career are maintained throughout, even after they have studied abroad. This shared experience creates bonds and obligations and determines friendship structures. Upon return to Cambodia, they reintegrate these networks.

A fourth shared common point is their vision for change. They all aspire to develop the country to change it into a flourishing modern society on the basis of Buddhist values. They also share the idea that this change has to come from a new generation, specifically, a new generation that has the knowledge and the energy to make the change. In other words, change has to be brought by them. Consider the following remarks:

Cambodia will change soon and people with [technical] knowledge will have a good life.

Assistant auditor of Audit Office 1 at the National Audit Authority, 2006

⁵⁹ Interestingly, there is a similarity here to the professionals involved in the struggle for independence who were also employed by the *Ministry of Education*.

I think that democracy comes when the people have a better life, when basic needs are satisfied, people have a higher salary, a better education, especially the civil servants who are the “backbone of the society”.

Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 2006

The biggest change for all came from the transition from being a student to being a state professional with responsibility. All the young professionals share a sense of being part of a new generation, defined as hard working and highly skilled, and distinguishable from the old generation. In contrast to their seniors, these young professionals prefer to share their ideas, raise issues openly, and discuss publicly. All have experienced an important change in their working style since their studies. They consider themselves to be members of a young generation that works faster, has better communication patterns both horizontally and vertically, and does a qualitatively better job than their elder colleagues. One professional mentioned that in the past he used to relax and did not worry about his job. But after being abroad he observed other professionals working hard to change their country and their achievements. This motivated him to work in the same way for his country, i.e., in an effective, innovative, and flexible manner.

You never know actually what your next move will be but you have to be prepared for everything and every time.

Deputy Director General of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006

I think the concept of change has to be integrated into all sectors, the young professional outside the government has to make pressure on it, because in a long-term perspective the technocrats inside the government hope to make coalitions with the other young professionals.

Deputy Director General of finance and accounting of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, 2006

3.5.2. Differences resulting from vertical integration

Even though professionals share similar goals, the opinions with regard to which strategies are the best means to reach these aims differ widely. This causes a divide between the two groups, despite the similarities that they may share. Three distinct differences emerge: the first surrounds the pace of change, the second concerns political involvement, and the third centers on the generational divide and how it affects everyday experiences. These are essential problems for professionals in the Cambodian context.

We all [professionals in the government and the NGO’s] have the same objective to meet each other at the political top one day; we will join together because we share the same objectives and the same vision of a “clean society”. At the moment we have different approaches. The other [NGO; Private sector] want a fast change, but you can not push things too much. There is a proverb in Khmer that says *intellectuals are easy to lead but not easy to control, those who have a lower education are easy to control but hard to lead*. You can tell intellectuals to go a

certain way but you have to explain everything; Sam Rainsy [leader of an opposition party in Cambodia] takes advantage of his professional background when he speaks of the “clean” society, with a lot of prosperity and jobs for the young generation. Even I, a member of the CPP, accept his vision. But I do not share his approach. He wants to control the intellectuals but this is going to be very difficult.

Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006

In short, as illustrated by the quote above, the first difference rests on the question of fast, radical change versus adapted, incremental change. Many professionals in leading positions in NGOs, especially those focusing on Human Rights, share common characteristics that are typical among other professionals in similar positions. In their view, if modernization is to occur, then swift, radical change along technical pragmatic lines is needed immediately. In contrast, the non-NGO professionals seek to satisfy their personal needs first. Once they are in a secure position they might consider changing society. They view their studies as an investment in their own person and expect a good rate of return from it. They are eager to apply their newly acquired knowledge in their jobs and to be able to live entirely from it without being financially dependent on their parents. They want to make their own decisions and obtain powerful positions within society. This is an important aim, which may take ten to fifteen years to reach. In addition, reaching this powerful position implies not only the successful practice of their skills but also the willingness to learn and play within the prevalent political rules.

Furthermore, Government professionals believe that their technical skills alone would not allow them to push their ideas through. Their time as professionals in their specific job position is a probation time, a kind of training period; if they perform well they might get further opportunities to work in higher positions within their respective organizations. In order to move forward it is important to obtain more credit in the social environment, such as honor, respect, a good reputation resulting from hard work and quiet attitudes, and to be known as a person that never gets into trouble, one whom you can rely on; in short, to become a role model in the Cambodian context. In this light, they feel that their contribution to society will be different from that of their parents' generation.

In contrast, professionals working for donor agencies or think tanks are somewhere in between, depending on their social background. Those coming from wealthy and well-situated families tend to follow the strategy of professionals in the civil service, whereas those who 'have nothing to lose' share the ideas of NGO professionals.

The second difference surrounds the need to get actively engaged in day-to-day politics. For NGO professionals it is important to be politically engaged now, not in the future, and to mobilize the population at large in support of their own political causes. Indeed, the President of the *Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR)* views himself as a 'glimmer of hope'. He sees himself and his organization as “the fearless, passionate, and uncompromising voice of those who can't speak for themselves in a country where criticism of the Government makes one an enemy of the state and a target for defamation crimes” (2006).

Similarly the President of the *Khmer Youth Association (KYA)*, a Cambodian NGO, is a fervent defender of women rights and political participation. He engages in advocacy projects,

drug prevention, and conflict resolution since he thinks that the Government is not doing enough, but instead chooses to “remain focused on cronyism and corruption”. Before working for the KYA, he wanted to be a businessman, but then felt compelled to engage in social work. This decision was very influenced by an Australian social worker who worked with him at the Initiative for change. He thinks that he is in a position to help society, especially the youth; as the leader of an NGO he is free to discuss issues he thinks are relevant. Moreover he has this position because of his ability, because of his capacity to do the work, and not because of connections.

The other professionals working in donor agencies, think tanks, or state organizations however, have more or less withdrawn, voluntarily or involuntarily, from active politics. Those who want to engage directly in the business sector have rejected the idea completely, whereas others, such as professionals in civil service, have just postponed the move to politics until sometime in the future. The President of *Maxima*⁶⁰ believes that engaging in politics does not provide him as many opportunities as engaging in that business would. His aim is to build a business ‘empire’, and thus he does not want to engage in politics, although he is currently the advisor to *Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce*. He wants to contribute, once he is rich, to his society by building orphanages and child facilities. He wishes to positively influence the next generation by writing books about his own experiences in which he can share his ideas and concepts. He learns everyday and tries to apply the newly obtained knowledge to his everyday practices at work. He also aspires to continue his research in order to find innovative ideas on how to improve the financial mechanisms in order to control the long-term cash flow of people in the rural areas. In the future he plans to set up a business in Australia, and once his children have finished their high school education, he will send them to Australia. He has relatives in Melbourne, Las Vegas, Washington DC, and Paris.

In the same vein, the Secretary General of the *Royal School for Judicial Profession* thinks that he has to wait to enter politics, but in five to ten years wants to begin actively engaging in politics. To be successful in the political field, he is following a pattern: first he needs to build a strong network; second, he must engage in party politics, including participating in campaigns for *Cambodian People Party (CPP)* elections; third, he has to run his own business (for example, a clinic); fourth, he must find a good wife; fifth, he must acquire good social skills (i.e. to be respected and asked by people on the grassroots level what they need for their schools, their irrigation systems, their hospitals, or their cooperatives); sixth, he must distribute the money; and finally, he must build confidence. He thinks he needs more experience in the real world; currently, many high-ranking politicians in high positions do not have managerial skills and are floating in the air. Thus, step by step, he needs to acquire more technical knowledge, which he has the opportunity to do in his current position.

The third and the most problematic difference exists in the valuation of seniority and performance. Although all professionals feel that they belong to a new generation, professionals working for NGOs, such as the *Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR)*, *Licadho*, and *ADHOC*, have a different view on how to deal with this generational divide than

⁶⁰ a well known micro credit bank.

those professionals who work within the bureaucracy. Therefore, they share a common criticism of the older generation, which, to the young professionals, is a visible representation of the previous system. The young professionals accuse their senior counterparts of having a strong hierarchy based attitude, and also of thinking that the younger professionals can not compete in the political arena. Furthermore, the older generation hinders day-to-day routines, with their emphasis on formality and stiff ritualized interactions. Essentially, they can hardly be reached to discuss important issues during working hours, they demand unnecessary protocol, and they blame younger colleagues of employees of being hasty and disrespectful. This stands in full contrast to the international professionals who are open to discussing matters at any given time. They can be contacted directly via email and can be counted on to give a direct and quick response.

There are some tensions between the old generation and the younger, and it is very difficult to change their attitudes [OG bureaucrats]; we [the young professionals] have to please them very much, which I think is very difficult; even when you work hard and have high knowledge they don't accept you. When you stand in a line for example for a while, when they enter the room you have to give them your place (ask them of course if they don't mind coming forward in the line, they expect it); people are not treated as equals like in Western countries; I appreciate very much the Western style and dislike always asking the permission for everything at the top levels and the complicated bureaucracy.

Information and Public Relation officer at the SEILA task force Secretariat, 2006

This is not to say that non-NGO professionals, particularly those working within the bureaucracy, are not aware of the tensions resulting from the generational divide. They realize that the older generation is instrumental as a source of advice and also that bureaucrats and especially their patrons and patron brokers from the older generation still have a lot of power to appoint, transfer, and promote officials; they will only be promoted when these latter decide to do so. Young civil servants who can not get along well with their superiors are still urged to respect them. As a result, they avoid direct competition, which means that they do not challenge or provoke their superiors, which they are demanded to consider as their 'uncles'. Even though they make decisions on what to do, members of the younger generation still ask their senior colleagues for their opinions, if only to give them a feeling of being consulted and valued, and most importantly, they do not mingle in the older generation's (OG) political affairs.

I do not want to have a better position in two years, this is too short. I think I already have a very high position for my age. Some other people from the older generation of the CPP wouldn't accept it anyway, and they would just start to hinder me in my plans and my career. I think I need more experience in the professional, business, and political world; currently there are many high-ranking politicians in high positions who do not have managerial skills and are floating in the air. Step by step I need to acquire more technical knowledge and social skills. I have the opportunity to do so in my current position. In Potsdam I have learned a lot of theories; the challenge is to put these theories into practice, to use the concepts at work. In ten years I will consider being minister or Secretary of State.

Secretary General of the Royal School for Judicial Professions, 2006

Especially as a young person it is important to acknowledge and understand the senior politicians and senior social authorities (coined the “older generation”). The older generation has achieved a lot and have more reasons than the young professionals to be proud in terms of life sacrifices for their country. They have invested far more in the society than the younger generation to get into the positions they are now. If there wasn’t the war, they would have had studied as well, because nobody wants to have a lower level of education.

Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006

Additionally, a Secretary of State mentioned, “the older generation knows that they need to change and to adapt. But they have a practical knowledge which we still need to acquire. They are familiar with a kind of day-to-day knowledge that we still do not master” (2006).

Young professionals in the bureaucracy think that older bureaucrats including their patrons have achieved a lot in terms of social change, prestige, pacification, work, and in internal ministerial organization, even if they did so very slowly, over a long period of time. In their view, without the achievements of the senior ‘uneducated’ bureaucrats, the young professionals would have no basis to start with. One of their competencies (the older generation) is to link the past with the future. Even if this is not efficient, they are able to identify problems very well and know how to resolve them with the people. They are perceived as calm, serious, and as doing things carefully, and it is because of these social skills that they have been promoted into their current positions. In whatever situation, as explained by a young professional from the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, to obtain a responsible, high position you first need the vocation, second the experience, and third a good social network of many people, educated or uneducated, who are connected to each other and who can be mobilized easily.

We generally know the problems, but we do not have the social skills to deal with the people around those problems, and thus do not have solutions to those problems in the eyes of the people. The OG has the ability to negotiate, has good communication skills, discuss a lot the social issues of the people, about religion in the pagodas, about day-to-day problems. This way is very different from the more anonymous, complicated, and technical expertise of the young professionals. The old generation talks in simple words that everybody understands.

TWG Coordinator at the Ministry of Health, 2006

Young professionals in the Cambodian administration think that modernization reform has to start from within the system, within the established networks.

The people of the old generation (OG) think they have a lot experience, they do not listen to the younger generation, they do not let them decide even if they have the knowledge. The OG thinks that we have no experience. I think it is a personality conflict the OG likes to walk, we like to run. The OG doesn’t like changes, they keep the day-to-day things as usual and simple. They think that if there is no problem why change the status quo. We like change. We have the knowledge and thus indirectly the power. We are quick but sometimes make mistakes; however with patience we can fix it and learn from it. I have a lot of conflicts with the OG, however I try to cope with it by listening and by waiting.

However the OG tries more and more to avoid conflicts as well. They are used to facing a lot of problems since they were young. In five to ten years I think there will be a change in the leadership towards a more professional setting. Cambodia has a fast growing economic sector; the economic sector will push for professionalism. I think Cambodia is still at the beginning; We are a small group of very qualified intellectuals who are convinced that the “foreigners are not better than us!”

Assistant Auditor of Audit Office at the National Audit Authority, 2006

Indeed, most young professionals in very high positions within the bureaucracy do not feel that they are competing with the older generation. They (the professionals) are both different and important.

You know, they want us to respect them. They want to ask for our advice, pretend to be in control and to read the papers and books but they do not actually understand the ideas they entail, they just simulate, but they are better informed concerning the everyday practical issues since they have the experience. Only few are very closed and fear to loose their position. They know that the more they run away from us the more they will encounter new problems which they do not understand, since they do not know how to manage the issues, lacking the adequate technical tools. They are actually looking for a symbiosis with us, where they can combine their experience and everyday knowledge of social issues and our technical skills. They expect us to speak frankly to them about those issues. We may be good managers, but we need as well to understand the feelings and needs of our teammates, listen to them and provide solutions to their problems. We need to be good listeners first. The young people have small families and have small needs and problems, the older bureaucrats and politicians have greater families and greater needs and thus need more. A good manager or businessman is not automatically a good leader, especially if he doesn't care about the needs and feelings of the people around him but just tries to maximize his profits and only pushes the people to reach his objectives.

Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006

Seniority, along with its collective responsibilities, is an important issue for young professionals in key positions within the administration. Playing by the rules is the first step to realizing their agendas and is a means to succeed professionally. Thereby, they constantly face challenges by their senior colleagues and superiors within the bureaucracy. Simultaneously, they are exposed to criticism from outside the administration, namely criticism from professionals working for big business, donor organizations, or NGOs.

3.6. Behavior and practices within the Cambodian bureaucracy

This generational divide directly affects the development of behavioral patterns within the Cambodian bureaucracy. Unlike professionals from NGOs, the career of Government professionals is highly determined by the generational divide. Similar to the Thai bureaucracy described by Dhiravegin (1978), the administrative system in Cambodia can be qualified as a time-honored system. In other words, it is a system in which the institutional matrix is built

along established distinctive norms, values, and patterns of behavior; the expectation for behavior directly affects Government professional's actions.

These protocols are a great part of their daily lives. Interpersonal relations within the administration, such as the use of different pronouns to address one's superior/patron, are highly codified. Entering the administrative field involves learning its rules and behavioral codes, such as how to stand, listen, sit, respond, and how to treat superiors/patrons and colleagues in the right way. However, to get in the good favor of the patron to be considered for promotion it is not enough to know how to 'deal with him'; it is also important to know how to approach other actors in his network, such as the patron's wife and his own patron⁶¹. Becoming a close ally with a patron's wife is as effective as getting his favors directly. Young professionals who want to be successful in the administrative game must be willing to act against their individual principles sometimes.

This does not mean that they remain passive, waiting to get promoted whenever their superiors or patrons make the decision; on the contrary, young professionals have to stay alert, study their environment constantly, play the right roles in the right situation, plan their intervention for an adequate amount of time. In other words they must gain local and practical knowledge in the administrative field. Other behavior patterns that enable a quicker rise in the administrative system include: being attentive, preparing and organizing para-professional activities for their patrons (such as going to the markets and choosing the best fight cocks for their bosses private hobby), attending marriages, offering expensive gifts as souvenirs (such as golden cocks for the Chinese New Year), accompanying their patron to political meetings, and most importantly helping them physically, ideologically, and financially strengthen their power base. In other words, their loyalty implies defending and supporting their patron's interests in the political struggles for power. For the majority of the professionals interviewed it is crucial to be part of the support base of powerful bureaucrats or politicians in order to promote their own base. Similarly, as in the Thai bureaucracy described by Dhiravegin (1978), success in the competitive Cambodian administration depends on the ability to follow diverse strategies, handle different people, and learn specific codes of behavior, in order to be pulled by powerful patrons, pushed by many clients, and supported by diverse friends.

Currently, young professionals are within promoted the higher civil service on the basis of their qualifications and their social backgrounds. Until recently, it was necessary to have good connections to the political elite; currently, however, holding a high academic degree or a degree from a foreign institution has become one of the main requirements to enter higher positions in the administration. In other words, possessing a high degree from a university overseas has become the qualifying status symbol for membership in the administrative elite.

Generally, ambitious professionals who want to make a career in civil service or politics, graduate with a Bachelors from an elite Cambodian university (NUM, RULE, or RSA), complete their Masters in the USA, United Kingdom, or Australia, reintegrate into their position in the bureaucracy and/or integrate into elite universities as lecturers. Being a lecturer at a university is viewed as an intermediate and necessary stepping stone on the road to top

⁶¹ See the case of the National Police Commissioner Hok Lundy his relationship to the Prime Ministers wife Bun Rany.

administrative and political positions. These academic activities allow them to integrate the networks of more powerful patrons. Social mobility and functional efficiency within the Cambodian administration is thus achieved through the combination of educational achievement and performance and the integration into competitive and powerful patron-client networks, the result of which is a mixture of favoritism and merit.

The *Ministry of Education*, until very recently, controlled the distribution of highly competitive scholarships, with priority being given to the candidates already working in civil service and children of Government employees. The resource education and its valorization as a prerequisite to enter the higher positions in the bureaucracy have been institutionalized within the administrative practices. Until 2004 members of the bureaucratic elite mainly monopolized this resource. In effect, this change in 2004 presented the possibility to enter the bureaucratic elite while increasing the chances of persons with different backgrounds to advance into the higher positions within the Cambodian administration. Modern and global knowledge has become a decisive qualification in the competitive cooptation of young professionals.

The young professionals have to stay professional when they go back into the bureaucracy and have to take care of the procedures to benefit the future. They do not ask for gift and presents but they receive them anyway and the OG pressures them to accept these gifts. So they make some arrangement, knowing that they can not completely accept the gifts if they follow the laws. So they change some procedures. Then take 60% for the road construction and put 40% in other channels. The quality of the road is then of course not of the best quality.

Deputy Director General of Finance and Accounting of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, 2006

Once employed within the apparatus, the young professionals are not accountable to extra political institutions, but rather are accountable to their respective patrons who are generally bureaucrats/technocrats in higher positions or politicians from the *Cambodian People Party (CPP)*. Different high cadres within the bureaucracy and within political parties, such as the CPP, the *Sam Rainsy Party (SRP)*, and the *Human Rights Party (HRP)*, have been competing to attract young professionals into their networks since the early 1990s. The administrative system's symbolic and material resources, such as prestige, promotions, titles, and financial benefits, have been played out to co-opt the professionals.

The rationale behind these tactics is to encourage loyal clients and to satisfy their demands so that they do not leave. This culture of promotion has been well played by the CPP in protecting their heads and their base. Similar to Riggs' bureaucratic polity in Thailand(1966), the bureaucratic system in Cambodia controls itself and defines its own tasks, policies, and time frames. Only those issues perceived as important by the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* and hence the CPP are added to the political agenda. Their strategies aim at modernizing state institutions to guarantee welfare and security, while adhering to criteria that are efficient and effective for economic growth.

Thus, as the majority of young professionals have explained, it is necessary for them to get involved in economic activities, to get promoted, and to secure their lifestyles. Being involved in a powerful network allows them to improve their own power base vis à vis potential friends

and clients. Interestingly, they have the flexibility to choose their patrons and the networks they want to belong to. In one case, a professional asked his patron to employ a family member, who had the qualifications required for the position. However, after he was employed, the direct superior (another client of the patron) of the relative in question decided to pay the person only 50% of his wage. The patron then intervened and nominated the protégé's distant cousin as Deputy Director General at the *National Information Communications Technology Development Authority* of the *Council of Ministers*, which has the function of monitoring and auditing all *Information Technology (IT)* systems related to running projects. However despite the better offer, the protégé's relative preferred to take a leave for two years and work for an even better paid job at the UNDP.

Due to the high status that professionals enjoy, their views are easily accepted. However the older bureaucrats are usually better known by the people, generally in rural areas, in the communes, and districts. The OG is familiar with the local development problems in the communities. Interestingly, the young professionals, especially those working within the administration, are increasingly trying to monopolize these capabilities through their vertical networks.

Thus, it is not enough to have a title and a high degree and to successfully pass university, but one must hone the social skills required for a leader during their apprenticeship with their political patron. Young professionals hence act as technical advisors to the high cadres of the CPP and, in return, learn from them adequate political rules and behavior codes. These skills are then used when they come in contact with the local communities and ordinary individuals, whom they have to advise and serve in the name of their patrons. In turn, the patrons use the modernizing skills of the young professionals as a means to legitimize their political agendas and ideologies. Many professionals working in the bureaucracy are integrated into communal life beyond their actual assigned work tasks; generally, they are assigned to an area where they have kinship ties and wider acquaintances, most likely from their parents. There they meet regularly with the monks of village temples,⁶² hold meetings to determine needs and develop a vision, and construct schools, football fields, and other collective goods. Hence, the young professionals know the needs and problems of people in their assigned commune or village and articulate these to the higher cadres of the party.

But the professionals themselves use these opportunities where they have to be involved and participate in community affairs and institutional spheres to build their own reputation and thus improve their own image. In other words, the time they spent within communities is used to build their own networks. Once consolidated, these pre-political networks can be mobilized for political purposes. Once professionals are well-integrated into the different networks and prove their technical and social skills, they usually get promoted.

In their view, the movement towards more efficiency and effectiveness in administration and the strengthening of the rule of law is seen as a means to increase the credibility of the Government and to build a professional environment conducive to long-term private sector development. The question of human rights is not raised at all. They think that rights and

⁶² They regularly visit the head monk of the village and listen to his opinion on diverse issues, thus getting involved in the local decision making networks.

obligations are rather closely connected to culture, and thus outside their profession as such. Businesses, in their perception, are an essential part of civil society.

They think that the development of technical plans greatly helps to clarify their organization's tasks and functions, and ensures that key superiors are all 'on the same script'. However, they also know that, far more important than the strategic planning documents, is the strategic planning process itself, which in Cambodia is a political process of negotiation. Thus, they try to combine goal-based planning with issue-based planning in their official work, without the direct articulation and reflection on their organizations underlying vision and values. Thus, sometimes a gap emerges between the actions plans demanded by the cooperating partners and the strategies of their political superiors.

Indeed, their main function is to provide technical knowledge and information on possible options for policy decisions, and thus suggest various normative views to the elite. The SNEC is a prominent example in this case. Bright, younger professionals such as the Deputy Director General of the Reform Committee of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* are regularly recruited to work for that organization.

Furthermore, as the bureaucracy is the key holder of political power, they are the ones who, under the given political circumstances, are best positioned to initiate reform. They face the problem to reform the administrative system within an established structure. As the Director of the reform committee of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* puts it:

The best way to change a system would be to 'build a new house'; but this under the given conditions is very difficult; so what you do is restore the old house. The old dweller of the house are already there, so what you can do is prove them that the new system is good. The political system is increasingly giving its support and commitment to the new management system; a lot of support is given by the political leadership. The Priority Mission Group is a good example of the new system according to the new principle: it rewards people who behave according to the principle. Often the ambitious come back from their studies with very high expectations, but the system doesn't allow them to fulfill their ideas; they then accept the status quo of the system and prefer to change in the long run, i.e. to adopt a 'sustainable' strategy of change.

Director of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006

3.7. Lack of common strategy?

The professional's objectives, goals, and ideas concerning the political system, state-formation and the role that the administration should play, are similar. Differences emerge concerning the strategies that should be used to achieve them. The differing nature of the roles that professionals play within their respective organizations lead to a division along the lines of different preconceptions of how to conceive the modernization of Cambodian society. The common objective of all focuses is to make the state structure less rigid and to reform it along lines of technical-pragmatic rationality rather than solely on value-oriented rationality. In other words, they share the vision of a society from a value-oriented to an achievement-oriented structure. Therefore, those professionals who experience and face these tensions the

strongest are the professionals working in the bureaucracy. They have to follow routines established by the old generation, even though these are in contrast and contrary to their own understanding of pragmatism.

Some, like the current Director of the Reform Committee of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* who studied in the United States, see a potential for social change in the adoption of old principles into a new system. The Director illustrates his argument with the driving attitudes of people in different countries. For example, people in Cambodia drive without respecting the conduct of others and without respecting any traffic rules. Whereas in the USA, where the traffic system is more organized, people adhere to the rules and stop at the red lights. If people want to bring about change, he says they have to change the mind of the people. Only then can they introduce a new system, based on checks and balances, a system that would support local process and that is not based on penalty or conditions. You need two elements, he says, if you want to bring about any change; without the principle and with just the system people will not follow the system. In his view people are more important than institutions; the real challenge lies in training people, in learning to stand up, to raise voices, and to give presentations. Hence it is crucial to identify the status quo of a society and to understand it. In his opinion, Buddhist principles may help to change the 'old attitudes'. If these principles are adopted through education, for example, then things can become more efficient and effective.

Likewise, the Advisor to the *Prime Minister's Cabinet* thinks that although it is not the case in Cambodia, politics should not have an influence on the exercise of their professions. He thinks that it is vital to reform civil service, to review its competence, to enhance the living standards of civil servants, and to modernize the bureaucracy. In fact, all bureaucrats should care about their performance and work like employees in the private sector, or at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)*, where civil servants complete a high quality of work. As a result, they are well paid. This leads to less corruption, more political stability and economic growth. Every qualified person could just work for the Government on the basis of his/her qualifications.

Similarly, the Deputy Secretary of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* thinks that if all professionals would sit together and "talk the same language", then they might solve the issues of poverty and corruption, etc. In his view, just the fact that they would agree to sit together and talk would already clear their differences by 50%.

In contrast, the Director of the *Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)* thinks that the current state uses its power to repress real democracy and freedom, thereby undermining the rights of the majority of its population.⁶³ Professionals who support the state by working within the bureaucracy maintain the authoritarian structures. In order to realize a Cambodian civil society where human rights and democracy are fully respected, corrupt practices and nepotism ought to be eliminated and an independent judiciary should be established.

Professionals working within the private sector prefer to remain apolitical altogether. Their concerns lie in self-betterment and modernization initiative by individual motivation. In this

⁶³ His view is widely shared with many representatives of donor organizations.

sense, professionals who chose to work in this sector are more concerned with the economy and leave politics to the state administration.

3.8. Professionals: A Cambodian strategic group?

In sum, Cambodian professionals do not yet form a strategic group in a strict sense. However, they are neither a quasi group (Evers, 1983a) as they are beyond the first stages of group formation and share a common identity. After the social transformation, confusion and conflict over the last twenty years, group cohesion and a certain degree of solidarity has emerged among professionals. This solidarity is manifested in a distinct lifestyle and the formation of professional organizations such as the various alumni associations. Yet, professionals do not challenge the societal normative and political structures by articulating and promoting their own economic and political goals. Nor have they become, to use Evers' words, "a recruiting field for political leadership" and a political pressure group at the same time (Evers 1973:114). Whereas bureaucrats and the business sector have ready-made instruments of power in the form of large-scale organizations, professionals tend to work alone or in small groups. Because they have no command over others, they do not yet qualify for inclusion in the political elite.

Indeed the mechanisms for horizontal alliances are challenged by vertical integration into competing systems of bureaucratic patronage that secure the disbursement of Government funds and positions. Professionals are co-opted into bureaucratic patronage networks as soon as they start to study at the elite universities. The development of independent professionals that provide political leadership is rather slow.

Thus, young professionals in Cambodia find themselves in an ambiguous situation. First, their pursuit of personal interests on one hand and their beliefs in professional ethics on the other, are pushing them to combine politics and business as independent spheres⁶⁴. Second, to solve their paradoxical situation in which they have to start a political career but prefer to remain apolitical, they have chosen to create a "modern" life for themselves, and a process we have decided to coin the secularization of professionalism. In addition, because of their peculiar position, they have adopted political and social attitudes, which distinguish them from the local masses and push them to consolidate their own social status and power rather than to work for the "common good" of society. Paradoxically, even though young professionals act as spearhead groups of modernization, they also tend to consolidate and push their vision of the "urban good life" and thus to foster the continuous process of social differentiation and inequality between the urban and rural space by translating global inequalities into national ones and vice versa (Evers, 1978c).

Hence, professionals in Cambodia have "some" influence but no political power. Indeed, for the time being they remain, in Evers' words, 'servants of power' (1973). Their main function is to legitimize the strategies and visions of their respective organizations/networks. This is reached through economic success of development efforts and by maintaining the ideology of technical and economic pragmatism.

⁶⁴ However, these spheres are not independent yet, as politics and economics are still embedded.

3.9 Professionals: a global strategic group?

Over the last two decades, during the transition toward a market economy, a quasi-strategic group consisting of international professionals working for aid agencies has been legally and strategically influencing the shaping of state institutions in Cambodia.⁶⁵ However, Cambodian professionals have not joined their counterparts in donor organizations to articulate and conceptualize national development strategies and policies, as their self-reproduction is dependent on their loyalty to their organization/vertical networks. Hence Evers (2001, 2006) finding according to which development experts in general form a globally operating strategic group,⁶⁶ does not fully apply for the Cambodian case. On the contrary, professionals or experts from donor organizations have found it quite difficult to form alliances with Cambodian professionals, despite their similar educational background and lifestyles. One reason for this certainly lies in the different rationales of their respective organizations.

On one hand professionals from aid agencies have argued that if Cambodia is to sustain social and economic development, then improvement of governance according to Good Governance principles is necessary. Hence technical and financial assistance on the basis of various conditionalities as to how to implement the reform and how to spend the development funds has been provided by various international agencies to help the Government.

On the other, Cambodian state professionals have argued that a strong intervention into the Cambodian state affairs negates their sovereignty and national integrity, as it is precisely the function of bureaucracies to decide and implement political agendas and to control the allocation of state resources. Hence for the professionals in Cambodia the question whether a sovereign state can decide for itself what style of administration it wants to establish, or if this should this be done by external forces like donor organizations, became a crucial point of contention.

This tension, which basically resulted from the question of who should control the administration, has its background in the recent history of Cambodia. When UNTAC revealed its mandate in 1991, it was assumed that the state in Cambodia was nearly non-existent as the Vietnamese advisors and troops had withdrawn end of 1989. At the time, it was the 'international community', led by the *United Nations (UN) Agencies* that argued that intervention was required as Cambodia faced depleted human capital, devastated physical infrastructures and a fragmented political system (Houn, 1998).

Therefore, the evidence of failed/fragile states or incompetent states implied the need for external intervention into state functions by donor organizations. A failed state does not own sovereignty; it can neither supervise nor control and does not have any authoritative resources. These are then provided by the donor organizations, who assume that, as the

⁶⁵ See the study from Evers and Gerke on the emergence of experts as a global strategic group (2006) and Evers article on *Macht und Einfluß in der Entwicklungspolitik* (2001).

⁶⁶ Thereby they define what 'right' development is and turn themselves into the appropriate and indispensable specialists who can implement 'development'. As a result, they can impose the payment of high salaries and other revenues as legitimate actions.

resources come from them, they should control them. Therefore, UNTAC had to impose elections and take over state responsibilities like, policing (internal pacification), control of the bureaucracy, etc. Even though an administration did exist, it was assumed that it was in need of far-reaching rebuilding. The *State of Cambodia* could not fulfill its state tasks, which UNTAC had to take over.

Hughes (2007) argued that it was precisely this intervention by donor organizations into Cambodian politics and conflicts by incorporating elections or popular referenda into the UN peacekeeping activities that offered a means to wipe off criticism about interventionary policies as violations of sovereignty.

International sponsorship of elections could be and was portrayed as a restoration of sovereignty rather than a violation of it, as sovereignty was regarded as appropriately located in the “will of people” rather than in the will of its leaders. This view of sovereignty reversed previous conceptions of the relationship between sovereignty and democracy. Whereas democratic arrangements had previously been viewed as matter for sovereign states, in the 1990s, international respect for sovereignty rather became dependent upon the ability of government to demonstrate that they had been constituted by appropriate democratic procedures.

Hughes, 2007:45

Furthermore Roberts (2001) maintained that although the official purpose of the United Nations was to settle the political conflict in Cambodia by implementing the ‘liberal project’, intervention by UNTAC served the non Cambodian political interests, namely those of the Sino-US, anti-Moscow axis who consequently rejected a Cambodian solution to the conflict.⁶⁷ Their goal was to settle their own conflict and that meant first bringing back the *Khmer Rouges* into the arena of Cambodian politics and second to marginalize the established political power, namely the *State of Cambodia* (Roberts, 2001).

[...] the great powers, particularly China and the United States, played a spoiling role, maximizing their influence with and support of their Cambodian protégés to outflank the regional diplomacy. Negotiations at great power level, in Paris and especially in the UN Security Council, displaced the regional ones, returning the Khmer Rouges to the diplomatic forefront. Such a UN settlement [...] could now be imposed on Cambodia.

Kiernan, 1993:191

⁶⁷ Roberts argues that “the United States [State Department] played a key role in the collapse of the Hun Sen-Sihanouk alliance by not offering Sihanouk support if he cut ties with the Khmer Rouge and its sponsor, China[...] The Hun Sen alliance offered an opportunity to achieve what UNTAC later could not. Hun Sen would not have been challenged; Sihanouk would have presidential power immediately” (Roberts 2001:21). Similarly, Kiernan (1993) argued that the intervention by the UN was seen as a means by which the United States and Chinese administrations of the time could undermine regional, particularly Southeast Asian diplomacy that aimed at excluding the *Khmer Rouges* from political power

Indeed, the deployment of UNTAC was seen by the *State of Cambodia* as an imposed settlement and a threat to its further existence. A threat that would marginalize the vast system of bureaucratic patronage it had established, hence leading to the socio-economic and political marginalization of its supporters.

[...] the intended separation of the bureaucracy from the incumbent party of the State of Cambodia [CPP], led by Hun Sen, aggravated this problem by having the effect of separating mutually interdependent patrons and clients. Whilst this could be argued to be deft planning and deliberate policy to overcome a cultural and economic platform of resistance to democratization [...] the organizers of the Paris Peace Accord miss several crucial issues in their attempts to democratize Cambodia.

Roberts, 2001:34

Then, after having taken control of some central state functions, the ‘donor community’ assumed that to achieve their objectives of internal pacification it was necessary that they had to control and re-structure the state apparatus. Hence the bureaucrats (CPP) under the pressure of the imposed *Paris Peace Accord (PPA)* were expected to pass over their control of the state organs⁶⁸ (Roberts, 2001). However, before UNTAC’s late deployment, the *People’s Republic Party of Kampuchea* renamed itself the *Cambodian’s People’s Party (CPP)* and kept control of functions over all aspects of state activity from the military, to the police and secret services, to the foreign office and civil and political organizations in the communes.⁶⁹

The various organs of the state of Cambodia had been transformed such that real power lay elsewhere [namely in the Office of the Council of Ministers and not in the ministries], denying UNTAC the capacity to neutralize the political environment. It was naïve to assume that a party as entrenched in political power as the CPP would relinquish that control when its political future depended largely on securing support for itself through the labyrinthine networks that were characteristic of the communist model of bureaucracy [...].

Roberts, 2001:39

Consequently UNTAC’s intervention marked the beginning of a contested and ambivalent era of ‘development cooperation’. This ambivalence was maintained even after the withdrawal of UNTAC during the following policy negotiations between donor organizations and the Cambodian Government. Thereby the state professionals were still reluctant in welcoming

⁶⁸ UNTAC’s civil administration component that aimed at separating the CPP from the organs of the state oversaw the operation of five core areas including the *Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Public Security and Information*. A further ‘specialized control’ group oversaw the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture and Transport.

⁶⁹ Furthermore most of the civil administrators employed by UNTAC were from Phnom Penh and members of the CPP (Roberts 2001:76).

any plans from various donor organizations to reform the civil administration.⁷⁰ A reluctance that was rooted in unsolved questions of trusteeship and legitimacy, and hence reluctance to accept ‘imposed aid’.

This reluctance was best observed in the negotiation on *Administrative Reform*. There the question of how to institutionalize the control of development resources and their use became a point of contention. On one hand, donor agencies found it crucial to control the funding mechanism of the reform processes; while on the other, the Government insists on its right of ownership. Development experts argued that the *Royal Government* could not be granted full control over development funds, since corruption practices through channels of patronage would abuse their use. Conflicts hence emerged between on one side functionality of administration, i.e., formal, generalized structures based on functions and on the other side personalized/patronage relations as the functioning principle of the bureaucracy. In the first case, money is used as an incentive to enhance functionality through professionals; in the second case, remuneration is used inter alia to strengthen patronage networks.

Thus in a historical sense, donor organizations initially existed as a strategic group. They pressured the Cambodian Government to accept their terms, when it came to foreign aid. The professionals working for these organizations believed that regardless of sovereignty, Cambodia’s administration needed to be reformed, in order for modernization of society to become realized. Once international pressure forced donor organizations to recognize national sovereignty, the Cambodian state was further able to withstand, or at least slow down, donor professional’s modernization plans.

3.10 Conclusion

Professionals of donor organizations could be relevant for Cambodian professionals for two reasons. First, as indicated by the case studies in chapter 3.3, many Cambodian professionals work for donor organizations in high positions; thus they provide attractive career opportunities for Cambodian professionals. Second, professionals in donor organizations basically follow strategies that should fit the interest of the Cambodian professionals. Cambodian professionals are at the interface and even part of quasi-strategic groups. Hence, a strategy for Cambodian professionals could be to use the donor organizations as they are integrated into global networks, have access to information and other relevant resources (e.g., finances, knowledge, support), common ties, and the same experiences to make alliances with the international experts to push through their national agendas. Indeed, a strategy to play a political role on the national level could be to unite at the regional and even supranational level. This in fact increases agency in forwarding interests, as a large collective has more power than various fragmented groups.

⁷⁰ As Roberts puts it, the CPP was clearly taking measure in the interest of the bureaucracy to undermine the ‘neutral’ democratic education programme of UNTAC (Roberts, 2001).

However, even though professionals in donor organizations have a strong impact on state-formation, state professionals find it difficult to interface with them as their integration into different organizations and political networks determines their allegiances. Particularly, their recruitment into the state apparatus determines that they have to be respectful of the political agendas of their organization. For these professionals, there is a very thin line between pushing for modernization and disrespecting the political traditions of the state.

Thus this historically rooted divide leads to a political deadlock. Professionals, in general, are not able to move beyond the level of quasi-strategic group, as they cannot find the means to unite their vision while at the same time, respecting the occupational spheres. The following case study of administrative reform is an illustration of the inability of state professionals and professionals within donor organizations to form a global strategic group. In contrast, both groups follow distinct strategies, which is an indication of their vertical integration into organizations. This in turn limits the possibilities for the Cambodian professionals to rise as a single, unified strategic group.

4. Administrative reform in post-1993 Cambodia: Implications and institutional setting

The administrative reform is at the heart of the Royal Government strategy to implement the NSDP and it is urgent to radically transform the Civil Service into an effective provider of services and a trusted development partner.

Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, 2004

The administration as such is certainly the result of and, at the same time, the main driving force for state-formation; on one hand, it is the core entity with regard to state-formation, explaining why the bureaucrats are often defined as a strategic group; on the other hand it is an outcome of processes of socio-cultural and political change. Under the condition of a bureaucratic polity, the administration can be seen as a strategic means for bureaucrats to gain and maintain political domination. In Cambodia the administration is more a result of the strategies of various strategic groups like aid agencies and businesses. Due to its central role for the state, attempts towards administrative reformation are indicators of the figuration of these strategic groups. In the bureaucracy, professionals, such as technocrats, have gained important positions without however gaining control over its regulation. Indeed, through patron-clients networks their strategies are closer to the interests of their patrons and organizations than to other professionals. In the following, administrative reform will be discussed as a case study of the figuration of development organizations, professionals, and the bureaucracy.

The policy negotiations for administrative reform in Cambodia have been institutionalized into three distinct 'interfaces' (Long, 2001), namely the *Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum* (CDCF), the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee* (GDCC), and the *Technical Working Group* (TWG). For the donor organizations, the reform of the administrative system was viewed as a purely technical exercise along the lines of New Public Management theories, whereas for the Cambodian Government, the reform of the administration entailed modernizing its procedures for political stability and consensus. Similarly as to the early 1990s, the Government continued to question the donors capacity, power, and legitimacy to claim trusteeship⁷¹ for reforming its state apparatus.

4.1. Institutional setting of development cooperation for administrative reforms and its actors


Since the early 1990s, bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the national and international aid agencies and the Cambodian Government occur at three interfaces/levels: the political (1), the semi-political/semi-technical (2), and the technical (3) level.

⁷¹Thomas (2000) using Cowen and Shenton's categories defines *trusteeship* as "the intend which is expressed, by one source of agency (the actions of individuals or groups, and their capacities to influence events), to develop the capacities of another. It is what binds the process of development to the intent of development", Thomas 2000:41

1. The political level consists of the *Consultative Group Meeting (CG)* that was renamed in 2007 the *Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*. The CDCF is an overarching, high-profile, and media-attracting event attended by officials from capitals and headquarters of bilateral and multilateral development partners and agencies. It is also a mechanism for stock-taking and the evaluation of Cambodia's overall progress and challenges in a broader context and with a long-term perspective.
2. At the semi-political/semi-technical level, the *Government Donor Consultative Committee (GDCC)* monitors and discusses the progress of the CDCF policies.
3. At the technical level, *Technical Working Groups* composed of professionals, operationalize the policies defined by the first two levels through further discussions and consensus finding.

At all these interfaces, the reform of the administration has centered questions about the effective political control over the ‘development budget’, out of which the major bulk of the civil servants’ additional income is paid. Indeed a central theme for discussion and negotiation between professionals, politicians, diplomats, and representatives of donor organizations was the *Remuneration and Employment Policy*. Even though professionals agreed during these negotiations on the necessity of introducing performance-based salary allowances, they have failed to find a consensus on how to operationalize the civil service remuneration procedures.

Fig. 4.5. The three interfaces for policy negotiations



4.1.1. The political negotiation level: CDCF (until 2007 CG)

The *Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*⁷² is the highest political forum for high-ranking Diplomats, high-level Representatives of aid agencies and Government Officials such as the Prime Minister and his Deputy Prime Minister. The discussions and bargaining within this interface are made on the background of documents prepared by the Government and thematic papers prepared by development agencies.⁷³ Thereby they center around key areas for reform. These key areas for reform are then endorsed as *Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMI)*.

Looking at the history of meetings between the Government and the donor agencies, a shift in power-differentials between the respective actors took place. Initially, the donors could define objectives in consultations with the Government. Then the Government took over the leadership, with the donors still playing an important political role. In other words, in the CDCF the Government becomes dominant, not the least by adding further actors into the forum besides the donor agencies.

Essentially, the CDCF meetings are no longer prepared and organized by the *World Bank*, which has traditionally been its organizer and chair. The task to organize the meetings, provide documentation, etc. is now given to a Cambodian body -the *Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB)*. In general, this board has the task to formulate and implement the *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)*. As such, it has access to all relevant data and documents that are used as background information in the *Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)* meetings. The donors are represented in the preparation of the meetings through a Lead Donor Facilitator. This role is held by the *World Bank*. Consequently, even though the position of the *World Bank* has certainly been weakened, it still plays the main role as consultant to the *Royal Government of Cambodia* and as Representative of the donors.

Shifts in power relations within the meetings are well-shown in how projects are now promulgated. Formerly, donor organizations more or less supervised the Government; now, after the *Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declaration*, the Government increasingly coordinates the donor organizations.

[...] the RGC [Royal Government of Cambodia] believes that, by moving to assume greater responsibility for the consultative process, this will lead to a further strengthening of RGC's ownership and leadership, while retaining the fundamental characteristics of partnership that underpin RGC's relations with its development partners.

Unofficial translation of the document, approved by the Prime Minister on 28 September 2006

⁷² Formerly the *Consultative Group (CG)*.

⁷³ Such as on the macro-economic performance by the *World Bank*.

As to 2008, the *Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB)* prepares and circulates so-called pledge sheets. In these, the donor agencies individually indicate what programs mentioned in the *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)*⁷⁴ they are willing to fund and to what amount.

For the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)*, the *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)* was defined as the basis for negotiation with all donor agencies. The acceptance of the plan by the donors was enhanced by the *Rome/Paris Declarations*, as these demanded harmonization and alignment of the various development agencies. Thus, the RGC fulfilled demands formulated in the global development discourse, and applied it as a means to gain a level of independence from the donors. To account for these changes, the *Consultative Group* was renamed the *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*. The semiotics of the name already indicates a higher level of independence, and the move from consultation towards an open forum for cooperation in development organized by the Cambodian Government.

With these changes, more flexible and political mechanism to focus on key strategic policy issues or on broad areas were introduced. Thereby, it was expected that quicker progress and critical evaluation of policies would be enabled. For the future, the Government plans for further changes in order to enhance its positions in the meetings with the donors. The *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)* shall be changed into the *Cambodia Development Forum (CDF)*. Removing *cooperation* from the name for these meetings illustrates that ‘development’ interventions in Cambodia are decided by the Cambodian Government.

Nevertheless, the Forum should still serve as a consultation mechanism for Royal Government of Cambodia and development agencies. However, the scope is widely extended as well, as the CDF will include a broader range of participants like businessmen, investors, etc. to facilitate dialogue and consultation on diverse issues that relate to both public and private sector development.

4.1.2. The semi-political, technical level: *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)*

The *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)* is mainly a political forum. However, it is structurally below the highest political level the *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)* and above the operational/technical levels. Its task is to translate the action plans from the lower operational levels into policy indicators for the highest political level and adjust these same action plans to the policy guidelines. At the same time, it

⁷⁴ Part of the process by which the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)* gained a stronger position in the negotiation processes was the promulgation of the *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)* in 2006. This plan brought together the *Poverty Reduction Strategy* from the World Bank, the *Socio Economic Plan* of the ADB, and the *Millennium Development Goals* for Cambodia from the UN-agencies.

has the task of resolving the technical problems that remain unresolved at the operational level. This ambiguous character has made it very difficult to function effectively.

The GDCC deliberates and agrees upon the set of *Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs)*. Once the set of JMIs, which is derived from the action plans of the lowest levels the *Technical Working Groups (TWG)*, is deliberated and agreed upon by the GDCC, they are submitted for endorsement to the higher political level the *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*.

Structurally, the GDCC is co-chaired by the Minister of the *Ministry for Economy and Finance* and the First Deputy Secretary General of the *Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)*. It is further attended by Ministers, Heads of Government Agencies, Ambassadors or Heads of Diplomatic missions, and Country Representatives of Multilateral Institutions.

This semi-political, semi-technical level oversees and monitors the work of seventeen⁷⁵ *Technical Working Groups (TWG)*. It sets priorities and is supposed to resolve the problems and issues raised by the TWGs.⁷⁶

4.1.3. The technical level: Technical Working Group (TWG)

The *Technical Working Groups* are the ‘playing fields’ of the professionals. Each of the seventeen *Technical Working Groups* (see Annex 12) are co-chaired by a Senior Royal Government Official and a Lead Donor Coordinator/Facilitator.

Essentially they were introduced at ministerial levels to share information and pursue action-oriented targets at the sector level between donor and Government Agencies. Thus, they are ‘technical’ and operational forums used to discuss, agree upon, and pursue clearly defined action plans and measurable targets. The respective terms of references of each TWG are defined through the *Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation*.

Due to its nature and its focus on the role of professionals in the transformation of the administration, this study focuses on the *Technical Working Group (TWG)* working on *Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*.

The *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*, created in 2004, is located at the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* and consists of professionals in the CAR’s Secretariat and the *World Bank*, UNDP, JICA, DANIDA, AusAid, the EC delegation CIDA, GTZ, and the IMF.

⁷⁵Since 2006, the number has been reduced from eighteen to seventeen TWGs.

⁷⁶ For the first time, in 2006, the preparation and the formulation of JMIs that were to be submitted to the *Cambodian Development and Cooperation Forum (CDCF)* meeting (political level), was led by the *Royal Government of Cambodia* in a discussion that had representatives from the respective development agencies in attendance through the *Technical working Groups (TWG)*, and the semi-political, semi-technical level of the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee*. Consequently, the decision of the *Royal Government of Cambodia* to head and lead the CDCF in the future emerged from this experience.

The CAR Secretariat’s mission is to put reform in practice in accordance with the Minister of the *Office of the Council of Ministers*. Its tasks is to develop, implement, and follow-up on short-, medium-, and long-term projects with regard to Administrative Reform, and to report to the Government on approved projects. It also has the task to review and ensure the coherence of further reform programs in other Ministries and Institutions. This last task has been specifically by-passed several times by donor agencies that have so far preferred to directly negotiate and cooperate with the Ministries or Institutions without consulting the CAR Secretariat.

Fig.4.6. The Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)



As mentioned, the work of the *Council for Administrative Reform’s* Secretariat is completed in accordance with the Minister in charge of the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*, a key political figure in Cambodian politics.

4.2. The Council of Ministers and its Office

The *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* is the administrative centre of the Government and thus of the *Council of Ministers*. It is the political and institutional centre for

policy making in each sector of the Cambodian society. Interestingly almost each Ministry has its counter-part agency within the OCOM (see Annex 14).

The *Council of Ministers* is the top executive organ of the *Royal Government of Cambodia* and comprises twenty-six Ministers and two Secretariats and is headed by the Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers. After the 2003 elections, and the following twelve month deadlock, the twenty-four Ministries were divided to seventeen Ministers from the CPP, eleven from FUNCINPEC and four co-Ministers⁷⁷ with two Ministers from each party. After the last election in July 2008, the CPP retained the coalition structure although it had ordered the leader of its coalition partner, the royalist FUNCINPEC Party, to stand down.⁷⁸ The Council itself is officially appointed by the King through a royal decree after the *National Assembly* has given it a vote of confidence, for a five-year term.

Essentially, it is collectively responsible to the Assembly, and reviews and coordinates the work of Government agencies at all levels on specifically defined issues, such as the approval of the state budget. Interestingly, these policy institutions have been inherited almost one-to-one from the *People Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)* in the 1980s. The COM officially convenes twice a month, but in practice meets weekly for restricted sessions, the Inter-Ministerial or Executive Meetings, under supervision of the Minister in charge of the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers. The Deputy Prime Minister is not just the Minister in charge of the *Council of Ministers* (see Annex 8). He is also known among the Cambodians as the ‘brain’ of the Prime Minister, as he oversees the daily work of the OCOM, which consists of preparing, facilitating, coordinating, unifying, and guiding all activities of the individual ministries and localities. He also oversees and chairs the *Council of Administrative Reform*, the *Fonction Publique*, the *Civil Aviation*, the *Anti-Corruption Unit*, the *APSARA Authority*, the *Council on Food Security*, the *Council on Mine Clearing*, the *Tourism Unit*, NIDA, the *UNESCO Working Group*, the *Working Group on Board and Land Issues*, the *National Land Dispute Authority*, the *Cambodian National Petroleum Authority*, the *Council of Jurists*, the *Council for Judicial Reform*, the *Working Group on Small and Medium Enterprises*, the *Khmer Rouge Task Force*, the *Cambodia Training Board*, the *Royal Academy*, and the *State Investment Board on Rubber Enterprise*. In sum, he is the nexus for all important state programs, the private sector and international politics. To understand this strategic position, let us consider the chains of command within the Government.

All Ministries send their policy drafts and budget proposals to the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*, where they are evaluated in specialized committees and councils. For all-

⁷⁷ At the *Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior*.

⁷⁸ “The CPP retains that coalition to avoid instability, and because it says it is incompatible with the opposition SRP, which snared at least 26 seats at Sunday’s polls and is the second most popular party in the country. Funcinpec was expected to comply [...] Funcinpec plummeted from 26 seats to just two on latest preliminary estimates, but despite the CPP dominance, axing a coalition which has existed since the first democratic elections in 1993 would potentially cause deep political instability [...] Bhun Chhay [who played a major role in the ousting of former FUNCINPEC president prince Ranaridd], an army general with the reputation of being a military bulldog, a love of former king Norodom Sihanouk but no royal blood, will be the first non-royal leader of Funcinpec” (Cambodian Information Center, 2008).

important Ministries, a Council or Committee is established within the OCOM. The task of these Councils is to evaluate the drafts from the Ministries and prepare recommendations for the OCOM. If the council supports the draft, it returns it to the Minister of the OCOM. If the proposal is approved by the OCOM, it is sent to the respective Ministry. Then, the Ministry sends the draft to the *National Assembly* where specialized committee discusses the proposal with a Representative of the Ministry. If an agreement is reached, the proposal is forwarded to the plenary of the *National Assembly* for improvement. If no agreement is found, the proposal is returned to the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* for amendments, following which, the OCOM returns the amended proposal to the Ministry, where it is reformulated as a draft and the procedure starts again.

Hence the OCOM is not only the nexus of all policy programs but, it is also the most dominant body in Cambodian politics. At the same time, it is the most contested body in the Cambodian state. Clearly, the OCOM tends to be more relevant than the *National Assembly*. The majority of important bargaining which seeks to find a compromise and consensus, occurs within its structures. The OCOM has tremendous influence on policy formulation in other Line Ministries and Institutions. In fact, the professionals of the OCOM define policies and procedures of the Ministries, and thereby hold the most dominant political role in Cambodia.

The central position of the OCOM does not only imply that it is the most politically powerful apparatus. Due to its exalted position, it provides, next to the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*, the best possibilities for careers and is most attractive for aspiring young professionals. The professionals are integrated into powerful networks of high *Cambodian People's Party (CPP)* Officials of the OCOM; access to these networks is granted through personal connection or through 'investments' practices. These career possibilities are strongly connected to competence and qualification on the one hand, and to loyalty and performance on the other.

Indeed, since 1991, competition for civil service offices is more difficult, and higher civil servants are increasingly recruited on the basis of their qualifications. Professionals that are well connected to the *Cambodian People's Party (CPP)* have increasingly moved into the highest positions traditionally reserved for members of the political elite and the royal family. Thereby they have played a crucial role in reforming the *Public Administration*.

4.3. Historic contextualization of Public Administrative Reform

The *Public Administration Reform (PAR)* has centered around the daily experiences made in the Ministries and on different discursive levels produced by the donor agencies frameworks for Governance Reform. The recurrent and key theme has been the *Remuneration of the Civil Service*. Indeed, during the whole negotiation process, remuneration of, transparency and control over the bureaucracy remained the main issues of disagreement between the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)* and the donor agencies.

Although both sides 'spoke the same language' and both followed the same goals, meconnaissance was generated with regard to the interpretations and implementations of the

shared concepts. On one hand, the RGC engaged in a political, multi-faceted approach where different issues were simultaneously dealt with, while on the other hand, the different donor organizations focused on technical issues, according to their specific areas of expertise, generally defined by the headquarters outside Cambodia. Different meanings and logics were constructed from the respective experience made through different arrays of representation, images, and cognitive understandings.

The first attempts to reform the administration were made in 1993, after the promulgation of the new constitution and Cambodia's entrance into the global world of 'liberal democracy'. However, the reformists did not foresee the drastic consequences of the dissolution of established power structures and the introduction of new political forces into the political arena. From 1993 until 1997, political parties began competing for power within the newly created framework and sought to reorganize and re-legitimize their own ideologies and agendas. Indeed, after the breakdown and expulsion of *Democratic Kampuchea* in 1979, the Cambodian administration was rebuilt based on the Vietnamese model, which was rested on socialist concepts.

During the 1980s, a specific Cambodian structure of bureaucracy emerged around the *Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP)*. After 1984, this administrative formation was reopening the country to global regimes until in 1991, where international donors became influential in defining national policies, pushing for the replacement of the Vietnamese administration.

The re-entrance of new actors on the Cambodian political stage such as the *Khmer Rouges*, prince Ranaridd and his father, King Sihanouk, and the introduction of multi party politics during the early 1990s, provoked internal conflicts between competing patron-clients networks, making party affiliation and loyalty key criteria for joining the newly founded parties⁷⁹ and for entering the state apparatus. The struggles for loyalties and networking among the various parties on different levels marked the race for political power and legitimacy of Cambodian elites from 1993 to 1997. The 'competition' more or less ended in 1997, when the military and political bodies of the CPP dismantled the FUNCINPEC and several key figures of the party were integrated into the Cambodian People's Party; other former FUNCINPEC members such as Sam Rainsy did not see any advantage in joining the CPP and formed their own parties. As a result, the royalist party remained without resources and turned into a one-man party surrounding Ranaridd. In 2007, the Royalist Party was completely dismantled after its head Prince Ranaridd was accused of corruption in the 2006 sale of the front's Phnom Penh headquarters by general Niek Bun Chhay.⁸⁰ Basically, the competition between the different clientelistic networks were an innovative mechanism for political participation and public communication. As maintained by Neubert (1999a, 1999b, 2004), because they are based on a voluntaristic model (Neubert, 2004), these patron-client networks break rigid bureaucracies, allowing for a dynamic contextualization to the new situations since 1993 and greater flexibility to access new resources.

⁷⁹ Such as the FUNCINPEC and the *Son San Party*, or the up to then, the powerful and established *Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party*, later renamed the CPP.


⁸⁰ Just before the corruption scandal General Chhay had made efforts of rapprochement with the CPP.

In the logic of the former *Kampuchean People’s Revolution Party (KPRP)*, having a position within the state mainly guaranteed the access to a range of a multitude of other resources. However, this political aspect was more or less ignored by the various donor organizations that saw the reform of the state apparatus as a technical matter. In their approach, key policies sought to integrate the different and various administrative units and agencies into one structure. This was to be done through the assessment of the composition of the bureaucracy, the selection of a core group of civil servants according to their qualifications, and the formulation of a legal and management framework. But for the CPP, ‘reform’ meant dissolving its constituency, which was busy redefining its affiliations and relation to new and old patrons. Consequently, no real negotiations for reform could take place between the donor organizations and the *Royal Government* until the first dismantlement of the FUNCINPEC and the cooptation of key *Khmer Rouge* figures into the CPP could be fully realized.

The official Reform Process of the Administration could hence only start in 1998 with the formulation of the *National Public Administration Reform (NPAR)*⁸¹. The NPAR presented both the overall goals for Civil Service Reform and the agenda for its undertakings. It was followed, in 2000, by the *Governance Action Plan I*, in short GAP I and in 2001, by the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)*.⁸²

A central issue of the *National Public Administration Reform (NPAR)* and the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)* was, and continues to be, the remuneration of civil servants.⁸³

Fig. 4.8. Chronology of key documents for Public Administrative Reform (PAR)



⁸¹ From 1999 on, the RGC engaged in the rationalizing and downsizing of the public sector, stabilizing the number of civil servants to around 160,000 in 2007.

⁸² The NPAR and the GAP were revised in 2004 and 2006, into the NPA II and GAP II (DANIDA, 2004).


⁸³ Transforming the administration into a more operational, productive and responsible one, with an acceptable level of remuneration of civil servants.

The *National Public Administration Reform* (NPAR) I strategy first focused on the documentation and control of the composition and distribution of the workforce; second, on the development of instruments to manage and motivate personnel; third, on assessing the needs of each Ministry in relation to corporate services; fourth, on completing of the preparations for the de-concentration process; and finally, on strengthening its own capacity to plan and manage the reform.

Phase one of the NPAR was terminated in 2001. At that time a *Civil Service Census* had been completed under the aegis of the *World Bank*; personal ID cards were distributed to the civil servants; approximately 9000 ‘ghost workers’ had been removed from the civilian payroll, 12,900 ghost soldiers and 105,000 ghost children had been removed from the military payroll;⁸⁴ and finally a legal framework for the civil service as well as an automated payroll application had been introduced (Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, 2000).

The NPAR was followed then by the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service* (SRCS) also known as the *Civil Service Reform* and the *Pay and Employment Reform*. Essentially, the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service* (SRCS), can be divided into two components: first, the *Employment and Management Reform*; and second, the *Pay Reform*.

Fig.4.9. Key components of the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)



In order to investigate options for accelerating employment and pay reforms the *Royal Government of Cambodia* (RGC) gave a mandate to the *Council for Administrative Reforms* (CAR) to carry out six studies. These studies aimed at collecting factual information and preparing an analysis upon which decisions could be made to accelerate the *Pay and Employment Reform*. The six studies were on:

1. Improving public services delivery;
2. Benchmarking the labor market;

⁸⁴ This is in line with the program for demobilization.

3. Reviewing operations;
4. Enhancing remuneration to support performance;
5. Enhancing employment to support service delivery;
6. Strengthening the management of the civil service work force.

In April 2002, the *World Bank* agreed to finance the first five studies. The Terms of Reference for these studies were agreed in March 2003, and funding from the *World Bank* was secured in May 2003 (CDC-CRDB, 2002). For the donor organizations, these studies were seen as an important source of information for the formulation of a comprehensive reform of the *Remuneration System for the Civil Work Force*. The study on *Improving Public Services Delivery (1)* was completed in September 2003. The last study on *Strengthening the Management of the Civil Service Work Force* was supported with the technical and financial assistance of Brunei and the European Commission (EC).⁸⁵

The second component of the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)*, namely the *Pay Reform Policy (PRP) or Remuneration Policy*, was to become the ‘stumble stone’ of the *Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform*, thus leading to its dissolution in early 2007. The *Remuneration Policy* basically dealt to optimize the *Base Salary and Allowances Framework (BSAF)* - a mix of a basic salary and a mix of allowances, according to performance and merit based principles.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ The *Operations or Operational Review (3)* that aimed at documenting and complementing the work underway in line Ministries (*Ministry of Education, Health, Agriculture, Justice*), stock taking of progress and developing a replicable methodology and framework to carry out such reviews was not never fully carried out as to 2008. Nor were the *Labor Market Study or the Remuneration Policy Study* (that was piggy-backed on the *Operational Review* and the *Study on Employment Policy*, that aimed at strengthening the existing information base on employment needs and to design mechanisms to effect necessary adjustments in the configuration of the Civil Service (CDC-CRDB, 2002))⁸⁵, ever finished. Concurrently, these three studies were continuously postponed, since it was clear that such an analysis would lead to the removal of politically needed partners. For the donors, this second step was, and still remains, an important prerequisite for reorganizing and restructuring the Ministries based on the assumed qualifications, skills and competence of the civil servants.

⁸⁶ The different forms of allowances:

1. PMG (Priority Mission Group, around 100 USD) allowances and MBPI (Merit paid payment incentives, around 800 USD)
2. Functional allowances (to those who perform their duties). They are paid according to their position and length of service or work experience
3. Risk allowance: monthly extra pay for exposure to hazards, accidents, diseases, etc.
4. Mobility allowances
5. Official expense allowance (from the Undersecretary of the state upwards), representation allowance (advisors to the cabinet)
6. Education allowance (for foreign services, for example when they are sent to the provinces)
7. Travel expenses (pocket money, food, accommodation)
8. Salary Supplement.
- 9.

The BSAF was launched as a policy guideline for a new remuneration system for civil servants.⁸⁷ However, the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* made it clear from the beginning, that the actions of the *Royal Government* would be based on two basic principles. First, any changes had to respect the principle of relativity among the various categories of Government employees (political, civil servants, military, and security). Second, they had to be financially sustainable over time within the fiscal framework. Accordingly, increases in remuneration had to remain dependant upon available funds and thus on Government revenues (CDC, 2004). It further stated that the Government's commitment to increasing remuneration would be by ten to twenty percent annually. The available resources would then be targeted on priority-needs through instruments like the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*⁸⁸ program and a system of allowances that would complement base pay.

Consequently, a new classification system with four categories was introduced for the calculation of base salaries. Entrance into and promotion within this system was to no longer to be based on *seniority* but rather on *education and competitive examination*. Here, a shift became evident from bureaucrats influencing the administrative regulation to professionals using their credentials as means to accede position within state organizations. Hence, promotions through *seniority* were interchanged with promotions through *selection*, according to the provisions provided by the particular statutes of each body (DPADM, 2004). Usually, the minimum period of time required to obtain a promotion was two years. However, since 2002, in cases where a civil servant was recognized for the exceptional quality of his work, promotions were automatically granted on the basis of performance. Moreover, in the case of a change from one civil service body to another higher-ranked body, the civil servant had to take a competitive entry examination. In that case, the salary level was to be the same as or immediately above the civil servant's last salary level.

In addition, a *New Career Path System* (classification system) was introduced in 2002. This system aimed at facilitating better management and the progression of careers within the administration. Here again, the number of diplomas and years in school determined the entry points within the classification. The new classification system was complemented by special initiatives⁸⁹ such as the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, targeting specific units of key civil servants.

The PMG was initially introduced by the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, to target key workers -such as teachers, senior doctors, managers and advisors -and to counter the salary supplementation practice of the donor community.⁹⁰ However, the donor organizations

⁸⁷ Currently only functional and pedagogical allowances are paid, but the idea is to introduce risk allowances, as well as mobility allowances and family allowances.

⁸⁸ See ch. 4.3.2.

⁸⁹ In total three: the 'AA' scheme, the *Performance Incentive Scheme* under the *Priority Action Programme (PAP)* and the establishment of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, which proved to be the most prominent and challenging initiative.

⁹⁰ However, donors are expected to fund a large part of the PMG /MBPI initiative.

involved in the Reform of the Administration remained unsatisfied with the initiative and with the way the reform was handled by the Cambodian Government. They criticized the reform process' lack of a proper pay policy and concept, as they did not adequately tackle the issue of low salaries of the civil servants.

Although the Government has taken an important initial step toward reform by laying out a multi-year framework and providing moderate pay raises to civil servants, there remains a concern as to whether the current scenario would go far enough to address the low pay problem, a fundamental issue for Cambodia's civil service reform. It is widely recognized that the most serious obstacle to improving civil service performance is the lack of adequate incentives to motivate and retain talented, capable staff within Cambodia's public administration. Extremely low remuneration across grade levels saps morale throughout the civil service and leads to high absenteeism, corruption and, particularly for skilled professionals, brain drain.

World Bank at the Cambodia Consultative Group (CG) meeting, June 19-21, 2002

Hence they suggested drafting a policy concept that would allow a higher pay-raise and a stronger vertical-decompression in order to retain and motivate senior-level officials and young professionals to implement their assigned work.⁹¹

The *World Bank* and DANIDA suggested two measures to tackle the pay issue: first, self-financing through the cutting of employment over a few years; and second the pooling of donor resources 'traditionally' applied to salary supplements for civil servants working in their projects into a *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* scheme instead of establishing *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)*.

The Council of Administrative Reform interpreted the donors attitude as follows:

The PMGs were in development for about two years. They are flexible instruments to marshal resources where they are needed most- priority missions. Bank staff discounted the sheme from the start and refused to collaborate. It did not fir a paradigm that would have revolutionized the Administration and severed its roots. Only when they were confronted with the PFM [Public Financial Management Programm at the Ministry of Economy and Finance] did the staff turn to the PMG mechanism.

Letter from the CAR to the World Bank, Phnom Penh, 14th November 2005

Indeed the donor organizations and the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* ended up considering the PMG scheme but just to enable the implementation of their *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* scheme. This root causes of the divergent choices led to continuous tensions within the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*. But before we turn a detailed analysis of these tensions, let us have a look at these two models.

⁹¹ However, this raises the question of incentives and motivation for young professionals in the Cambodian society. What motivates young professionals to work within the Cambodian civil service? Is it linked to higher remunerations?

4.3.1 The Priority Mission Group (PMG)

The *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* aims at promoting results-based management and capacity development within a systematic and transparent setup. In theory, this is achieved by providing financial incentives to teams of Government officials based on their performance in predefined key sectors of reform such as Education and Health. The idea behind the concept is to help ministries and councils accelerate their reform agenda through the mobilization of a highly motivated core group of civil servants to implement key development programs with “greater energy, skill, and dedication”(CAR, 2006).

Thus the PMG, legally defined in *Sub decree 98*⁹², targets officials working on identified ‘priority missions’. As such it is designed as a flexible interface to accommodate the needs of individual ministries and potential external partners.

The allowances paid by the Government range from 150 USD for grade A, 100 USD for grade B, and 50 USD for grade C in a period of one, to one and a half years. Donor agencies interested in supporting the scheme can pool their salary supplementation resources into a special fund administered by the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*.

The PMG [Priority Mission Group] program could be a useful stimulus to civil service performance if it is well designed and tightly focused. The primary objective assigned to PMGs should be to catalyze change rather than to become mechanisms for modest pay reform. PMGs need to act primarily as change catalysts, working as small teams from within individual ministries to trigger better management practices and more effective approaches to service delivery.

CAR, 2005

The program is monitored by three Committees: the selection Committee,⁹³ the Monitoring Committee⁹⁴, and the Audit Committee.⁹⁵

One of the six Deputy Secretary Generals of the CAR explained in 2006 that the procedure to get the temporal incentive goes as follows.

Key ministries interested in the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* scheme send their project proposal to the CAR Secretariat, where professionals of a PMG team review the technical issues and make sure that the documents are in line with the *Rectangular Strategy* and the

⁹² The *Sub Decree 98* enacted in August 2005 provides policy guidance on how Ministries are to negotiate on salary supplementation issues. It is the tool for conducting sector level negotiation with development partners on *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)*.

⁹³ Chaired by the Undersecretary of State of the *Fonction Publique*.

⁹⁴ Chaired by one of the Secretaries of State of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* H. E. Ouk Rabun. Ouk Rabun is said to be a close friend from Prime Minister Hun Sen since the early 1980s. The rivalry between H.E Rabun and the professionals around H.E. Dr. Aun Porn Moniroth and Dr Han Chuon Naron is an open secret at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)*. The *World Bank* and DANIDA, however, mainly work with these professionals in the context of the *Public Financial Management Program (PFM)*. As to 2007 the professionals of the MEF were hence not really involved in the working procedures of the *Council for Administrative Reform*.

⁹⁵ Chaired by Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* H.E. Ngo Hongly H.E Hongly is also the Vice Secretary General of the *Anticorruption Unit*.

National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). After an agreement is reached, the Secretariat sends the proposal back to the Ministries where public announcement calls are made. Then the applicants from the Ministries send their CVs to the responsible focal points within the ministries (black board, meetings). Once they receive the applications, the ministries start with the selection and send their result to the Secretary General of the CAR. Next, the Secretariat sends the list of potential candidates to the Selection Committee.

In a second step, the selection committee forwards its decision to the Secretary General of the CAR, who sends the second list of candidates to the Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committee sends its comments back to the CAR.

In a third step, the results are sent to the Auditing Committee. After their commenting, the Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* makes his final decision and submits the list to the Minister of the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* for approval. Following the approval by the OCOM, the CAR informs the Ministries about the selected projects and personnel. Finally, the Ministries then sign a performance contract with selected persons and pay the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* allowances from their own budget. At the same time, the pay roll division of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* registers the professionals on the national payroll, sends a copy of the print-out to the Ministries and the Ministries claim their budget by the Treasury. The Treasury then confirms the list with the Secretariat of the CAR, and pays the salaries directly to the ministries. Although very bureaucratic, the *Priority Mission Group* model appears to be convincing at first glance as it takes into consideration the existing constraints and challenges of the Cambodian administration while introducing a performance and incentive based management system.

4.3.2 The Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) scheme

In contrast to the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, the *Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* was not developed by Cambodian professionals, but by the *Incentives and Organizational Change Consultancy (IOCC)* that was contracted by the *World Bank* and *DANIDA*. The aim of this incentive scheme is to improve the incentive structure in which civil servants operate and introduce higher pay coupled with meritocratic selection and performance management into the civil service. First introduced in 2005 as a pilot initiative at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*, it was designed as an accelerated and selective pay reform scheme on the basis of international best practices to push forward Civil Service Reform at the Line Ministries.

During the pilot phase, the Government agreed to pay an increasing share over time and eventually to assume the full cost in the future. In Phase I (lasting six months), donor organizations finance the scheme completely. In Phase II (lasting fourteen months), the donor organizations pay 80% of the allowances and the Government assumes the remaining 20%. The participation rates are planned to be three hundred USD per month during stage I and 270 USD per month in stage II, in contrast to the average one hundred USD per month of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* program. Hence, the control over the resources allocated was

directly tied, not to the CAR, but to the MEF and the actors⁹⁶ involved in its *Public Financial Management Program (PFM)*.

This high difference in the monthly pay-rate was highly contested by the *Council for Administrative Reform* who feared that its scheme would lose its appeal. They fear that as a result, civil servants would then prefer to work on projects promoted by donor organizations rather than on projects implemented by the Government. Another contested point is the fact that the MBPI is based on a manual developed by the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* and not by the *Council for Administrative Reform*. The MBPI would hence be supervised by the *Ministry of Economy and Finance's Reform Committee*⁹⁷ and not by the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*. Hence these two points, the higher rates of the MBPI and the control over the allocation of resources by the MEF, led to a strong reluctance from the CAR to consider the MBPI as a feasible option.

To conclude, two distinct, although similar in nature, pay-incentive schemes were proposed by professionals of the CAR on one hand, and by professionals from donor organizations on the other. These hinged on the concept of merit but conflicted on the basis of their operationalization, resulting in an open conflict between the CAR and the donor organizations working with the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*, particularly the *World Bank* and *DANIDA*. Although the donor organizations included the PMG as new semantics into the new name of their performance and merit based model⁹⁸, they did not remove the root causes of the tensions. As the conflicts were not resolved, direct cooperation between the donor organization and the *Council for Administrative Reform* was resumed in early 2007, when the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration* dissolved and the *World Bank's Representative* resigned from the working group.

4.4. Political tensions

The political nature of the conflict became highly visible once it became clear that a resolution could not be determined at the operational level. Hence, the tensions were forwarded to the semi-political level where, as illustrated by the ninth meeting of the *Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC)*, a solution could not be easily found. Thus, the conflict was forwarded further to the political interface, the *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*, held the 19th of June 2007. There leaders negotiated a new resolution that would consolidate both the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* and the *Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* schemes.

To illustrate the nature of the conflict, an analysis of the speeches of both parties at both events has been done. Although the speeches are veiled by the use of idioms of objectivity,

⁹⁶ Donor organizations such as the *World Bank* and *DANIDA* as well as Cambodian professionals.

⁹⁷ More precisely by its *Incentives and Recruitment Subcommittee*.

⁹⁸ Now, PMG/MBPI.

neutrality and rationality, they address issues which are political in nature. These ‘political problems’ are removed from the realm of political discourse, and reshaped into a neutral technical language. The narratives are respectively backed and legitimized by symbolic references that suggest an understanding that ‘sounds right’. Each side defines ‘valid knowledge’ by overlapping their perceptions with their experiences. Thereby, they illustrate the dynamic interactions and struggles over meaning and representations and, more importantly, over the control of strategic resources.

The discursive contention between the *Royal Government* and the ‘donor community’ defining how the reform of the bureaucracy should be implemented, reflects the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, different types of knowledge. In fact, both sides struggle for the codification of Administrative Reform, for the power to define what practices are valid and which are not. Both sides use distinct verbal means to justify their basic assumptions of how Administrative Reform should be implemented. These assumptions are framed within different discourses. Donor organizations regard it as a mainly technical exercise, whereas Government officials define it as a political one. The speakers presented below are either high-ranking Diplomats or leading politicians in the Government. Similarly to confrontations between political parties, the speeches manifest both critics to the ‘other’s side’ understanding and implementation of the reform and respective political agendas to transform certain ideas into concrete social action. Thereby, the ‘donor community’ takes features of an ‘opposition party’ by using distinct linguistic structures with specific strategic functions that denote resistance, opposition, protest, delegitimization of the Government’s agency, and interestingly, coercion.⁹⁹ In the same vein, the Representatives of the Government paint the donor organizations as naïve, irresponsible, impatient, and unwilling to respect the sovereignty of their organizations.

4.4.1 Political confrontation at the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) level

At the ninth Meeting of the *Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC)*, the Australian Ambassador harshly criticized the pace of the Reform of the Public Administration. In her opinion, the resources the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)* devoted to the *Reform of Public Administration* did not appear to take into account the seriousness of the problems within the Cambodian administration.

The poor state of the civil service is one of the key binding constraints on public sector performance, growth, and poverty reduction in Cambodia. Given the seriousness of the problems afflicting the civil service - low pay, low skills, poor management, and thus low capacity - more reform is needed, and it is needed at a faster pace. Unfortunately, the pace of public administration reform -and the resources that the Royal Government has devoted to it - do not appear to match the seriousness of the problems caused by Cambodia’s weak civil service

⁹⁹ Through various conditions for further ODA.

H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007

In her view, effective *Civil Service Reform* first needed to improve *Civil Service Pay*; second, it required to rationalize *Civil Service Employment*; and third it demanded to strengthen *Civil Service Management*. However, two of the most important *Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMI)* were off track. The *JMI* on improving *Pay and Employment Conditions* did not receive serious attention. The current policy of 10-15% annual increases on the base civil service salary did not constitute a realistic strategy to significantly improve pay for Cambodia's civil servants. In this scenario, a civil servant earning thirty-five USD per month in 2007 and receiving a 12% annual increase would have a salary of just one hundred USD per month in 2016. That was clearly too long to wait for *Civil Service Reform*. She further argued that the resources resulting from higher economic growth rates, rising tax collections, and oil revenues should be made available to increase civil service salaries in a fiscally sustainable manner.

What is perhaps most disappointing is that CAR does not appear to be showing much interest in developing policy options to address these important issues, in spite of the support provided by donors. For example, in spite of agreements on their Terms of Reference, consultants have still not been provided with data on the numbers of civil servants by category and Ministry, and their average pay levels. This is merely aggregate data that is publicly available in almost every other country. Providing it would in no way compromise requirements for confidentiality about the particulars of individual civil servants. And yet the failure to provide this data has stalled this important policy development work.

H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting, 12 February 2007

In addition, she felt that it was unfortunate that the establishment of *Priority Mission Groups (PMGs)*, and *PMG/Merit-Based Pay Initiatives (PMG/MBPIs)* in the *Ministry of Health* was off track.

Development partners have repeatedly expressed their concerns about weaknesses in the design and implementation of the PMG model to CAR – but there has been little evidence of interest in improving the model. Until the PMG model is improved, few donors are likely to support it financially.

H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007

With this speech, the donor agencies represented by the Australian ambassador stated their disappointment with the work pace of the Government and demanded for reinvigoration of the *Joint Monitoring indicators*.

In his reply, the Secretary General of *the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)* thought that on the contrary the CAR had been doing well in the *Reform of Public Administration*. In his view, many targets of the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)* had been met between 2002 and 2006. To illustrate, he went on to give some figures: average salaries had

increased by 130% since 2002, over two and a half times the Gross Domestic Product rate of growth during the period, to reach forty-five USD per month. The size and composition of the civil service had been stabilized. The legal framework was in place. The *Human Resources Information Management System (HRMIS)* and the payroll were effective. The *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* scheme covered over one thousand civil servants in fifty-two projects. And more importantly, all this had been achieved with little assistance from donor organizations.

On the contrary, he thought that the steps taken by the CAR were vital to modernize the *Public Service* in ways that were best suited to the Cambodian conditions. If donor organizations wanted to support the CAR, it was important that they deploy significant, predictable and timely assistance in a way that would best suit the existing conditions. But most importantly they would have to support the principles of national ownership, leadership, and Cambodianization. These principles were vital for overall sustainability on one hand, and the reduction of the Civil Service dependence on external assistance in the long term on the other hand.

The quality and timeliness of resources deployed, including assistance to strengthen internal capacity, will largely determine success. We just heard that the resources devoted to the reform by the Government do not match the seriousness of the situation. I might add that the resources devoted by our partners on the PAR TWG fall well short of their rhetoric. Only one of the members has targeted the reform as a priority. The PAR TWG agreed on the JMIs over a year ago. Resources and assistance necessary for their realization became available during the summer and we are still awaiting resources necessary to implement the strategy to phase out salary supplementation. (H.E. Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007)

He then argued that the course set out by the CAR had been clear for some time. However, some of the donor agencies continued to ignore their work. Instead, they narrowly focused their attention on a few elements of reform that met their own agendas. In his view they continued to push forward unsustainable and impractical reform options.

[The donor organizations] are trapped in unrealistic technical approaches that do not correspond to Cambodia's needs and reality. It is clear also that the PAR TWG has been dysfunctional for some time. It has not been able to mobilize the necessary resources in support of the Government agenda and the joint indicators. It is more of a hindrance than a supporter and facilitator contrary to the principles behind their establishment.

H.E. Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007

Concerning the phasing out of *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)*, the donor organizations were not able to provide the requested means to capture and analyze the data generated from the questionnaires, this despite numerous requests. As a result, any further work to implement the approved strategy had to wait for the completion of this initial step.

With regard to the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)/Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* for the *Ministry of Health*, the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* had to make sure that the MBPI scheme met the interests of the national Government and those of Departments in the provinces. The Government was looking forward to primarily paying allowances to civil servants working in the rural areas and not only to civil servants working in the capital.

I should add that it shall follow sub-decree 98 which specifies that the establishment of a PMG is a first step which could be enriched through a special salary allowance funded by donors if they so desire [...].To conclude, please allow me to quote front a letter H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform sent to Mr. Porter in response to a letter he had sent making essentially the same points made by the Australian Ambassador. “Continuing misunderstanding between Bank staff and the Council for Administrative Reform is becoming increasingly counter productive. The Council for Administrative Reform is proud of the progress made to reform the civil service. The targets set by the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service, 2002–2006, adopted by the Royal Government in October 2001 have been met.” [...].Reforming the civil service is a political exercise NOT a technical one. It is the art of the possible. It is about marshaling resources and people towards a common goal. [...] One cannot strengthen the Civil Service by focusing narrowly on salary. It is a strategic error and an illusion.

H.E. Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February12, 2007

In his view the CAR team did not need any further instructions or ‘assistance of substitution’. What they needed was assistance to complement and develop their own capacity. He then finished his speech by reminding the Representatives of the various donor organizations that in 2003, they had agreed to listen to the Government, to align their strategies, and to have realistic expectations. For the future, the CAR looked forward to working in real, constructive partnerships.

However, despite these two meetings no constructive dialogue could be established as both sides were unable and unwilling to cede to the other’s view causing the tensions to escalate further.

As the tensions escalated, the conflicting issues were forwarded to the annual *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)* that was held the 19th of June, 2007 chaired by the Prime Minister and the head of delegation and the Ambassadors of the various donor organizations.

4.4.2 Political confrontation at the CDCF level

This time the American ambassador spoke in the name of all donor agencies, reiterating the comments that had been made by the Australian ambassador. He emphasized the seriousness of the low pay, low skills, low representation of women, and the poor management problems of the civil service. Above all, he insisted that reform was needed more quickly.

Unfortunately, the pace of public administration reform and the resources that the Royal Government has devoted to it do not appear to match the seriousness of the problems caused by Cambodia's weak civil service [...] The development partners are concerned about the lack of progress and respectfully request a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Sok An to discuss how we can work together to support civil service reform.

Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007

He repeated many issues raised by the Australian ambassador at the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee* and re-emphasized that it was urgent to improve the civil service pay, to strengthen civil service management, to ensure that wage expenditures were subject to full budget control and to rationalize civil service employment, so that human resources were deployed in priority sectors and functions.

He reiterated that donor agencies were still disappointed with the *Public Administration Reform* process at the TWG PAR.

Development partners feel that there has been no meaningful dialogue on how to address these important issues. Engagement on the government side has been limited to the Council of Administrative Reform Secretariat. There is a need to revisit the TWG composition to include other key ministries such as the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the State Secretariat for Civil Service, and other ministries that are actively engaged in a range of public administration reform measures. Unfortunately, development partner support has been waning over the past year, due to the inability of CAR to engage partners in a meaningful dialogue. Resources in the form of grants and projects have been provided over the past several years, but there is a sense that they have not been used effectively: outputs have been minimal and of questionable quality.

Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007

He further criticized that little progress was made to developed new MBPIs in other ministries.

The other JMI that is off track is the establishment of Merit Based Pay Initiatives (MBPIs) in other ministries [...].Development partners stand ready to support implementation of the MBPI. Resources are available, but it is important that the Government bear an increasing share of the costs over time, or sustainability will be at risk. In the case of the PFM MBPI,¹⁰⁰ the Government is currently bearing 11% of the costs of the MBPI, but its share will increase annually, arriving at 35% by 2011. If the Government were to adopt the same approach in other line ministries, the overall quality of the civil service could be improved greatly at reasonable cost. The current policy of dedicating an annual sum to small but across the board pay increases could be modified to dedicate increasing funds to

¹⁰⁰ The MBPI pilot project at the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

rolling out MBPI while also preserving an across the board raise necessary to meet or slightly exceed inflation. This would guarantee an annual pay increase for all civil servants while allowing the Royal Government to use higher targeted increases through the MBPI to actually improve civil service performance and thereby provide better services to Cambodian citizens.

Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007

He emphasized that until the PMG model was improved, few organizations would be willing to support it financially.

In his reply to the American ambassador, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister in Charge of the *Council of Ministers*, recurred to the findings of the 2007 *World Bank* report. In his view, the report showed that no clear consensus could be reached on how best to allocate the resources between investments in infrastructures and current expenditures. For him, the reason was simple: allocating resources was a political exercise emerging from the local realities of a certain society.

Allocating resources is a political decision that can only be anchored in a country's reality. As reforming is essentially a political venture, it is imperative that government leads and owns the reforms.

H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting, June 19, 2007

The different perspectives on how to realize the Administrative Reform between the donor organizations and the RGC stemmed from a different interpretation, a different perception of Cambodia's reality and what to do about reforms in general.

We see the glass half full; our friends see it half empty. Our approach to reform is a participative one involving all ministries and partners wishing to be involved; it is based on consensus and step-by-step implementation. [...] Government is progressing well with the implementation of GAP II. Progress may seem slow for those with unrealistic expectations or with too simplistic solutions.

H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting, June 19, 2007

Similarly, to the Secretary General of the CAR, he cited the latest statistics and pointed out that the achievements realized were an average salary increase of 163% since 2002. Furthermore, a legal framework for the integration of civil servants into the new regime had been completed, and a new policy on Public Service was under implementation. The RGC was committed to further engage in a multi-faceted approach within the *National Program on Administrative Reform*.

Remuneration is foremost a revenue issue. Salaries must be sustainable and fiscal balance must be maintained. We all know the difficulties in raising revenues. As we say, we cannot sell the bear skin until the bear is killed. Coherence among state institutions is imperative. Our approach to remuneration targets all civil

servants and particularly those on the front line. [...] We had set out, at the beginning of the mandate, to increase basic salaries by 10 to 15% a year. We have done much better, as we have seen. Now the Prime Minister has already clearly announced a core element of the medium-term policy. Base salary will increase by 20% a year. Yet, this is not all that is being done. The allowance system will continue to complement base salary to improve support to priority operational requirements. The pension system is also being reformed.

H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting, June 19, 2007

In fact, he thought that the Government was confident that revenues would sufficiently increase to provide sufficient room for increasing remuneration in a fiscally prudent manner that would respect coherence among institutions. Despite differences, the Government was looking forward to complement increases of the base salary through targeted allowances such as PMGs *and* MBPIs.

This morning, the Prime Minister has asked that we find ways for MBPI to complement the PMG program of the Government and for the two programs to work together. I think this is a very important issue. The government approach to reforms will continue to be prudent covering a wide front of mutually reinforcing initiatives – step by step focusing on what CAN be done, not what SHOULD be done and setting realistic and sustainable targets. Pacing is foremost a matter of capacity and available resources.

H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting, June 19, 2007

However, if MBPIs were to be considered, he further argued, a constructive dialogue and partnership based on mutual respect and accountability would be required. Constructive inter-ministerial dialogues had already been reached.

Finally after both speeches, the Prime Minister endorsed the speech of his Deputy Prime Minister and urged all parties to look for a consensus on the use of MBPI scheme as a complement to the PMG.

I am aware that MBPI has some additional special features comparing to the concept of Priority Mission Group (PMG) that the Royal Government is implementing at the same time in a number of ministries and agencies of the RGC. Therefore, to ensure the clarity of concept and policy as well as effectiveness and continuity in implementation, I would like to request relevant ministries/institutions of the RGC and our development partners to organize a national workshop as soon as possible to discuss and to find consensus on a political and conceptual framework, as well as evaluate the progress and the needs to take some accommodations aimed at speeding up and accelerating this important reform agenda.

Prime Minister's address at the First Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), Phnom Penh, 19 June 2007

The donor agencies and the CAR thus agreed to organize a national workshop in October 2007, to lay down core principles of PMGs and MBPIs with the goal to find a consensus on how to use targeted allowances. The workshop was followed by follow-ups on the generic principles of a unified PMG/MBPI scheme. As a result of the workshop, *Sub-Decree 98* was revised to incorporate a unified and sustainable incentives system for all strategic reform programs, incorporating merit based principles. In addition a *Sub-Decree 29* on the *Implementation of Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI)* was passed in 2008. The new Sub-Decree specified that under the procedures for approval of MBPI schemes, Ministries and Institutions would have to submit their proposals to the *Council of Ministers* and the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*. The CAR Secretariat would then be responsible for approving, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of the MPBI schemes. However, each Ministry and each institution that initiates a MBPI scheme has to ensure that donor organizations “transfer their salary supplements funds to support the implementation of the MBPI scheme” (Royal Government, 2008). These supplements are then paid into the personal account of the targeted civil servants using the banking system.

Despite the political will to consider the integration of the MBPI scheme, the Government has excluded the experts of the donor organization in the operationalization of further policies, i.e., in its internal working process. The *Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform* was not revived and the CAR Secretariat continued selected cooperation on a bilateral basis with “partners” from France,¹⁰¹ CIDA, and the EC. Beside bilateral cooperation, the CAR has started to work more closely with other ministries such as the MEF and line ministries such as the *Ministries of Health, Land, Interior and Commerce* to expand the coverage of the MBPIs.

In the last counter, as to March 2008, the CAR planned to focus on a third instrument to enhance performance in the delivery of public services, the *Special Operating Agencies (SOA)*¹⁰². The goal was to apply the scheme to a future employment agency. In the meantime, the scheme was piloted at *Health Centers* in the provinces, without however the ‘advise’ of most donor organizations.

In a comment in August 2008, Representatives from DANIDA wrote: “although a Sub Decree 29 on *Merit Based Performance Incentives* was adopted on 02 April 2008, there is still a lack of clarity from the *Council for Administrative Reform* on the differences between ‘strategic’ MBPI reforms, ‘operational’ PMGs and ‘service-delivery’-oriented *Special Operating Agencies*” (DANIDA, 2008).

¹⁰¹ The *French Cooperation* finances the development of one *Special Operating Agency* pilot for *Health Centers* and the preparation of a compendium of core information on public services.

¹⁰² The SOA concept is a Canadian concept. Interestingly, the Secretary General of the CAR is advised on a daily basis by a French Canadian CIDA cooperant since 2003. The Canadian advisor has a office at the CAR and appears during policy negotiations with donor organizations as member of the *Royal Government of Cambodia* and not as CIDA expert. In the past he used to be a senior executive of the *Canadian Federal Service* in the *Natural Resource Department*. Since the 1990s he has however been a full-time consultant working as a Senior Advisor to the *Royal Government*.

4.5. Conclusion

Looking at the history of the meetings between the Government and the donor agencies, a shift in the power-differentials between the respective actors took place. Initially the donors could define objectives in consultations with the Government. The RGC then took over the leading position in 2006, with donors still playing an important political role. In the political negotiations, the Government becomes dominant, not the least by adding further actors into the forum besides the donor agencies. In other words, the RGC gained a stronger position in the negotiation processes by fulfilling demands formulated in the global development discourse, and applying it as a means to gain a level of independence from the donors.

The actual interface of political struggle and negotiation within the RGC is situated at the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*. The OCOM is not only the nexus of all policy programs but as well the most dominant body in Cambodian politics. As the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* is a sub committee of the OCOM, negotiations at CAR can be discussed at negotiation of the OCOM. However, the OCOM is also the most contested body in the Cambodian state. It has a tremendous influence on policy formulation in the other ministries and institutions. Next to the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*, it offers the best possibilities for careers and is most attractive for aspiring young professionals. However, the career possibilities within higher bureaucracy position are strongly connected to competence and qualification on one hand, and to loyalty and performance on the other. This is important to keep in mind when looking at the Administrative Reform process starting in the 1990s.

For the donor agencies who are involved in the reform of the administration, but remain outside the negotiation processes within the OCOM, the completion of the *Operational Review*, the *Remuneration Study* and the *Labor Market Study* were regarded as a vital prerequisite for the conceptualization of any policy on remuneration and employment. The Government's strategy, on the other hand, is to work on a broader agenda in which the priorities and sequencing of policies are others than those of donor agencies. Priority is first given to the *Strategy to Phase out the Salary Supplementation Practices* of the donor agencies and a policy for better *Service Delivery* in the rural areas through the introduction of PMGs. The Remuneration Policy has to be completed as well but as a last step. In the same vein, donor agencies push for the implementation of the *Merit Based Pay Incentive* model.

The political éclat between the donor organizations and their diplomatic Representatives and the high Officials of the RGC that culminated in 2007, shows how different agendas came together with distinct claims in the administrative reform. Claims that derive from different understandings on how to control the allocation and appropriation of national resources, the incompatibility between the instrumental technical claims of the donor organizations and the political claims of the RGC. Indeed, topics that were avoided had to be addressed at one point of the negotiations. As the donor organizations were unable to address the political aspects of their interventions, tensions emerged.

The tensions raised at the political level were primarily the product of failed communication patterns and the continuous construction and maintenance of *meconnaissance* within the *Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform*. Even though professionals from

both the donor organizations and the state bureaucracy were very close in terms of knowledge, practice, and education among others, the integration into different organizational settings limited their possibilities for horizontal alliances. They could reach a consensus with regard to the ends, or the vision of how Cambodia should develop, but not on the means and strategies to achieve them.

5. Professionals and administrative reform: a contested negotiation process

Reforming the Civil Service is a political exercise NOT a technical one. It is the art of the possible. It is about marshaling resources and people towards a common goal. We all agree to deepen and widen the reform as it is essential to the success of the Rectangular Strategy, the NSDP and GAPII. It is essential to realize the government's objectives of sustainable development, social justice and poverty reduction [...] One cannot strengthen the civil service by focusing narrowly on salary. It is a strategic error and an illusion.

H.E.Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform.
Speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007

For the records, administrative structures are rarely developed on the basis of efficiency alone. In Cambodia as in other countries they are the results of difficult balancing to accommodate a variety of factors. These include the absolute need to secure peace and political stability. The resolution of the situation following the last general elections is a very small price to ensure the formation of an effective government

Letter from the CAR to the World Bank, Phnom Penh, 14th November 2005

The inability of the members of the *Technical Working Group on Public Administrative reform* to find a common consensus can be traced back to their integration into different organizational and thus vertical structures. On one hand, professionals in the Cambodian bureaucracy followed requirements posed by politics based on, for example, the necessity of being a member of the CPP and thus of established bureaucratic patronage networks. In contrast, professionals of donor organizations follow technical requirements from their headquarters outside Cambodia. This crucial differentiation along divergent rationalities is based on the necessity of the self-reproduction of the respective organizations/networks to which they belong.

5.1. The political tensions and their basis within the Technical Working Group on Public Administration

Tensions that were made visible on the political level in the speeches of the Minister in charge of the *Council of Ministers* had their basis in the failure of the professionals to develop a common strategy within the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*. As a result, as illustrated in section four, the TWG PAR was dissolved in early 2007.

The dismissal of the TWG illustrates the ambivalent position of its participants. Professionals negotiating at the *Technical Working Group* were indeed in a dichotomous situation as they represented the discourse and rhetoric of their own organizations, but had to meet the expectations of those with whom they had negotiated. As a result, different 'knowledges' linked to specific interactions and practices remained.

The data presented in this section, represent the results of ten TWG PAR meetings, seven speeches by Representatives from both sides and extensive ethnographic data from participant observation during a four-month internship at the *Council for Administrative Reform*.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, different logics and expectations were presented. On one hand, professionals representing donor organizations regarded the completion of the operational review, remuneration and labor market studies as a vital prerequisite for the conceptualization of any further reform that could result in the introduction of a coherent *Policy on Remuneration and Employment*. Alternatively, state professionals believed that it was crucial to work on a broader agenda in which: first, transparency on the amount on resources spent by external actors within the state agencies was created, and second, the attainment of concrete Service Delivery was realized as soon as possible in the provinces and districts. Following this logic, the implementation of an *Operational Review* and a *Remuneration Study* would have been counterproductive, as it would have destabilized the fragile political consensus within the state apparatus.

Basically, on one hand donor agencies pushed for the implementation of a Merit Based Pay Incentive model, whereas on the other hand the *Council for Administrative Reform* wanted to see the *Priority Mission Group* model realized. Donors pushed for shorter-term measures, i.e. greater increases in payments within a shorter period of time whereas the professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform* worked on introducing long term policies that were congruent to Government's and thus the CPP's 'development' agenda. This included a gradual raise in salary for a broad range of civil servants and inter alia the establishment of *Health Centers* in the provinces. Donor professionals argued that immediate measure would be more effective if they targeted few highly-qualified civil servants in key positions within the Ministries on the national level, whereas the Government thought that civil servants willing to work in rural areas should be financially promoted.

In addition, professionals at the *Council for Administrative Reform* opposed the construction of an Administrative Reform as a purely technical endeavor to improve the 'corrupt', 'inefficient' and 'ineffective' bureaucracy pervaded by 'unfavorable' networks of patronage. In their view the aim of Administrative Reform was not primarily to enhance efficiency to rationalize the bureaucracy but to increase efficiency in satisfying the demands of the middle bureaucrats while still exerting political control¹⁰³ over them. Ideas on prospective methods to achieve this were strongly influenced by national political developments such as party politics and global economic processes.

Although professionals of both sides pursued the same goal of modernizing the bureaucracy by introducing performance and merit based incentive schemes, meconnaissance was generated and tensions evolved. Different ideological paradigms and practices led to different interpretations of the reform practices within the administrative system. This was not a fundamental flaw, but once the different performance based management concepts had to be operationalized, tensions emerged, including:

¹⁰³ Indeed, as formulated by Evers (1987), the combination of redistribution and control within the bureaucracy constitutes the power base for dominant strategic groups.

1. Tensions between the concept of the program for administrative reform as a technical endeavor and as a provider of funds for the Government to implement its own political agenda.
2. Tensions between professionalism and its ethics on one hand, and the massive lack of resources on the other.
3. Tensions between ownership, leadership and sustainability, and alternatively the need for salary supplementation to fulfill these principles.
4. Tensions resulting from the inclusion and exclusion of different suggestions about issues to be included in policy documents.
5. Tensions rising from the integration of suggestions made by the donor agencies and omission of RGC's opinions in international policy papers and conversely, the exclusion of donor suggestions in the favor of inclusion of young professionals concepts in the policies of the RGC.
6. Tensions emerging from organizational constraints and guidelines.

5.2. The contested issues: Joint Monitoring Indicators and their implications

During the 2004 negotiations of the TWG on *Public Administrative Reform*, topics reflected the political guidelines and frameworks of the political and the semi-political/semi-technical levels. These policies were summarized into four *Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs)*. These JMIs are not just indicators but also, in fact, policy guidelines; under the guise of 'indicators', policy priorities are defined. As a result, policies follow the indicators, not the other way around. This has important implications for their operationalization. Even so-called neutral 'indicators' are highly contested among the involved actors. They have far-reaching policy implications with regard to the power differentials that exist between the Government and donors.

The following indicators were the subjects of negotiations:

- *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1: Implement the approved Joint Government-Donor Strategy for Phasing out Salary Supplementation Practices in Cambodia.*
- *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2: Improve Pay and Employment Conditions in the civil service.*
- *Joint Monitoring Indicator 3: Design and implement a Human Resource Management policy and action plan to improve merit and performance management.*

- *Joint Monitoring Indicator 4: Enhance Service Delivery* through developing a *One Window Offices (OWOs)*¹⁰⁴ policy, a consistent legal framework and implementation plan.

A distinguishing feature emerged from the identification and definition of these indicators; both groups of professionals align with very specific indicators, arguing fervently for their conceptualization of change. In sum, the *Royal Government* was predominantly interested in *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1*. The issue was important for the Government as far as it had established the *Council for Administrative Reform* to oversee all institutional changes and financial transactions within Cambodian State Agencies. Conversely, donor organizations such as the *World Bank* and DANIDA¹⁰⁵ focused on *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2*. For them, JMI 2 had to be operationalized into the *Remuneration/Operational Review*; thereby JMI 2 represented a tool to get an overview over the functioning and structure of the bureaucracy. As no consensus could be reached as to the operationalization of JMI 1 and 2, tensions emerged. Consequently, the professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* shifted the negotiations from JMI 1 and 2 to JMI 3 and 4 as these were politically more neutral.

5.3. The Joint Monitoring Indicator's relationship and their dynamics over time

The primary reasons tensions appeared is that *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* and *Joint Monitoring 2* were competitive and not additive. These indicators had far-reaching implications as they were connected to specific, competing interests of the donors and the *Royal Government*. The objective of *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* was to obtain transparency and control over funds distributed by donors to civil servants involved in their respective projects. In contrast, *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2* aimed at identifying the functions, backgrounds and levels of professionalism of the civil servants working in the public sector. In this context, the implementation of base line studies would have need to form the foundation from which decisions could have been made regarding whether specific incentives should or even could have further improved administrative efficiency.

While *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* requests transparency from the donors it does not provide a clause that stipulates the same for the *Royal Government*. Therefore, *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2* embodies the donor's desire for transparency from the Government, without demanding the same from the donors. In both cases, vested interests play a role. The donor organizations want to maintain the possibilities of working together with 'efficient and loyal'

¹⁰⁴ The *One Window Service Office* is divided into a Front Office, where all the transactions with the citizens are handled, and a Back office where competent experts in the different areas of activity work. On a board in the *One Window Office*, the citizens can read which fee they have to pay for which service.

¹⁰⁵ In this context, the *World Bank* and DANIDA were supported by UNDP, AUSAID, and the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*. Other donors namely from the *French Embassy*, the *European Delegation of the European Commission* and *CIDA* were more or less neutral concerning *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 1* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2* and rather focused on *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4*, which were generally less problematic and therefore, essentially uncontested.

civil servants, whereas the Government wants to maintain patronage networks within the administration without interference from donors.

From a neutral and external viewpoint, both positions make sense and are reasonable. Understandably, the Government is well-aware that, at present, patronage networks are crucial for the functioning of the bureaucracy, even though efficiency might be reduced. Furthermore, these networks establish the loyalty needed by the Government to maintain, at least, pacification. Conversely, the donor's desire for a system where they are in control is also understandable. They fear that if the Government can control the funds it would lead towards corruption and reduced efficiency.¹⁰⁶ Even though both understand the position of the others, it is difficult to find a consensus.

Essentially, *Joint Monitoring Indicators 1 and 2* were the main topics for discussion within the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR)* during 2005 and early 2006. This shifted in May 2006 with the discontent of the *Council for Administrative Reform's* team over the reluctance of the donor organizations to support their work in an 'effective' way. From this point on, the discussion within the TWG focused mainly on *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4*. However, the tensions generated by *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI)1* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2* could not be ignored and thus the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR)* was dissolved in early 2007. After the dissolution of the TWG, negotiations to reform the administration were postponed by the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)*. As these were ineffective, they were relocated to the highest political forum, namely the *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*. To get a good overview of the dynamic development of the meetings, each meeting is summarized in the table below.

¹⁰⁶ In the CPIA report 2005 the World Bank writes: “ *Civil service regulations are meritocratic but are not implemented. Instead, patronage based practices prevail in nearly all government[...] Rent seeking, including the sale of positions, is entrenched and regarded as normal*”(CAR; 2005). In response to that point in the CPIA report the CAR responded by stating that: “*This statement is evidently false and malicious [...] Existing rules and regulations are routinely implemented. There may be instance of patronage practices but they do not prevail. Cambodia is a career civil service that is based essentially on seniority once one has joined the service through examination. While the system corresponds to Cambodia's culture and tradition and was very useful to create a unified civil service.*(CAR; 2005)

Table 5.2.: Chronology of the meetings of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform

Issues discussed	7.9.2005	29.9.2005	11.5.2005	6.12.2005	5.4.2006	26.5.2006	31.5.2006
Joint Monitoring Indicator 1	X	X	X	X	X	Letter of discontent from the Secretary General of CAR to members of TWG PAR	X
Joint Monitoring Indicator 2	X	X	X	X	X		X
Conflict over Resources							
Joint Monitoring Indicator 3			X		X		
Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 4					X		
Conflict over the CPIA report World Bank							
Issues discussed	14.6.2006	20.9.2006	18.10.2006	01.2007	12.2.2007	19.6.2007	4.3.2008
Joint Monitoring Indicator 1	GDCC Speech disappointment by the donor			Resignation of co leader of the TWG PAR (World Bank)	GDCC Political confrontation between the Australian Ambassador and the Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform	CDCF Political confrontation between the Ambassador of the USA and Minister of the Office of the Council of Ministers	GDCC Consensus to use PMG/MBPI in line ministries
Joint Monitoring Indicator 2	“Community”	X	X				
Conflict over Resources						Intervention by the Prime Minister	Administrative Reform: bilateral cooperation France, Canada, EC
Joint Monitoring Indicator 3			X				
Joint Monitoring Indicator 4							

5.4. Analysis of the meetings of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)

The meanings of different knowledge/truth constructs such as ‘salary supplementation’, ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘transparency’, ‘performance’, ‘sustainability’, ‘ownership’, and ‘service delivery’ are not as fixed in negotiations as they appear to be. Instead they are communicatively negotiated between the different parties involved. During 2005 and 2006 asymmetrical relations were first maintained, reinforced, and then reversed. Although a common vision for a potential joint action plan was conceived, donor agencies on the basis of their economic power base dominated the discursive space giving the professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* no other option than the exit strategy. After the emergence of the first tensions within the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR)*, the distribution of discursive power shifted in favor of the CAR professionals.

Basically, the emergence of different realities resulted from different cognitive, emotional, and organizational experiences and interpretations. Problematic situations and their solutions were experienced differently. The cultural repertoire of the young professionals entailed elements of both: discursive practices from the leading donor agencies and from their political superiors. Moreover, power tactics were exercised during the discussion on the disbursement and use of funds and while defining the agenda and the content of the meetings; thereby the use of languages such as English or Khmer shifted.

In addition, several processes of inclusion and exclusions were officially and unofficially distorted and reconstructed over time. Within the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* Secretariat, tensions emerged between the senior professionals and few young professionals regarding the transparent use of allowances and funds for the CAR Secretariat staff itself.¹⁰⁷ In the same manner, differences emerged between the Cambodian professionals and the expatriate professionals within donor agencies. Simultaneously, differences based on how to proceed with negotiations with the CAR Secretariat materialized between the *World Bank* and *DANIDA* on one side, and the *French Cooperation*¹⁰⁸ and *CIDA* on the other. Many donor Representatives were not convinced that their interests were sufficiently represented by the lead co-facilitator for the TWG PAR. Thus, a situation of multiple asymmetric divisions of tasks and decisions emerged as well. However, more importantly, the professionals working for *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* had to take into consideration national politics, whereas the professionals of the aid organizations systematically excluded politics from their systems of reference. For them, the political processes were defined as technical.

To illustrate this problem, the analysis will focus on the meetings of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR)*, before the éclat between the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* and donor organizations. As illustrated in the preceding section, *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1*, aiming at the phasing out of *Salary Supplementation*

¹⁰⁷ Tensions that had to be resolved by their patron in the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)*.

¹⁰⁸ French Embassy.

Practices (SSP), and especially *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2*, aiming at the reform of the *Pay and Employment Practices*, were the most contentious as they were connected to specific interests of the donors or the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)*.

5.4.1 Joint Monitoring Indicator 1: Implement the approved "Joint Government-Donor Strategy" for Phasing Out Salary Supplementation Practices in Cambodia

Negotiations on *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* ended in a deadlock. In fact, *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* basically represented a policy request by the Cambodian Government for more transparency and control over the allocation of resources from donor organizations within the bureaucracy. The Cambodian Government's demands were supported by the *Monterrey Consensus* and the *Rome/Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness*, which placed donor agencies under increasing pressure to find new ways of working with the recipient countries. In Cambodia, before a common mechanism on how to structure practical cooperation at the interface between the aid agencies and the state was found, old structures, which had so far favored nontransparent and bilateral cooperation, had to be phased out. However, the process of making disbursements 'transparent' appeared to be a sensitive issue for several donor organizations.

At the meeting on the 7th of September 2005, the Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* emphasized that the *Royal Government of Cambodia* wished to formulate a policy that would bring consistency over time in the *Salary Supplementation Practice (SSP)* of all donor organizations. The Government expressed the wish to 'optimize' the SSP and Representatives of the donor organizations did not oppose the demand. In fact, an agreement was made to create a working party with Representatives from both sides.

At the following meeting on September 29th, the Secretary General of the CAR informed the participants that during the preceding *Inter-Ministerial Meeting* of the *Council of Ministers*, the Ministers had indicated that they were not aware of persons receiving salary supplementations from donor organizations in their Ministries. As a consequence, the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* had sent a letter to all Ministries asking them to report on any known *Salary Supplementation Practice (SSP)* within their establishments.

Following this, the *Draft Policy on Phasing out Salary Supplementations*¹⁰⁹ prepared by the CAR was presented to the audience for comments. Once the issue was opened up, divergent opinions were expressed by both sides.

For the professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, the strategy should have enabled the different Line Ministries to reach an agreement on phasing out the SSP in their action plans. They thought that the matter was complicated and inconsistent throughout the Ministries. In the *Ministry of Health*, for example, larger amounts of money were spent on per diems rather than on the salaries themselves.

¹⁰⁹ Prepared by selected members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR)*.

The Assistant Secretary of the *European Commission Delegation* raised the issue of how a definite target date for this process could be agreed upon. The *World Bank's* Representative replied that it would be difficult to set that target that very day, but that further studies would facilitate this matter. The Resident Representative of the *International Monetary Fund* asked what the purpose was of gathering information about *Salary Supplementation Practices* and, also, how would the sustainability of pay change be established.

The CAR Secretary General reiterated that the Ministries did not know what salary supplements were given and that it was important to know the total volume of resources allocated and then to look at whether the supplementation was being used in the best possible way. The strategy that had received recent endorsement by the *Prime Minister* would enable the Government to direct the development priorities through setting up *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)* staffed with qualified personal. Although it was not possible to set a firm date for phasing out *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)*, the immediate objective of the Government was not to replace SSP, but to clarify how they were being spent. Cambodia would eventually get to the point where any kind of SSPs would not be needed. Thus, for the time being, Cambodia would need SSPs to continue.

The minutes of this meeting indicate the importance and the priority of the *Council of Ministers* to get a clear picture about the volume of resources that are paid to civil servants. However, both the donor organizations and the *Council for Administrative Reform* agree that at the present stage no clear date to phase out the *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* can be set. The disclosure of information pertaining to SSPs is not that much a problem between the donor organizations and the Cambodian Government, but rather a sensitive issue among the different donor organizations themselves. Here it is important to mention that although many steps had been taken under the direction of the *United Nations Organizations*, the *World Bank* and *DFID* to harmonize and align the 'donor community's practices', differences and disagreement on certain issues prevailed among them.

A sensitive issue that exists between different aid agencies is indeed the reform implications of the *Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declarations*, which aim to increase aid effectiveness. Thus, by laying down a practical action-oriented road map for all organizations to improve the quality of aid and its impact, room to set own priorities at agency level and possibilities has been reduced. This has led to an atmosphere of competition between various aid agencies on the "development market". Another reaction has been to follow exit strategies vis a vis powerful multilateral organizations and their 'selected' partners. For example, not all decisions made by the *World Bank* and *DANIDA*, which occupy a leadership position on Governance Reform and have a strong influence on the choices and policies of other aid agencies, are based on a full consensus between all donor organizations. However, because of the alignment dictum, donor agencies have to speak with one voice.

One way some aid agencies have used to counter this dictum was to delay handing over the questionnaire that stressed the Government's desire to know more about *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)*. It had been sent to all donors for comments to help facilitate the process of reform. Thus, when the Secretary General asked for feedback from the questionnaires at the following meeting in *November 2005* some failed to report their findings, as an indirect means to prevent JMI 1 from being fully realized. Following

DANIDA (2004), disagreement prevailed already in 2004 between donor organizations on the kind of information they would have to disclose. Some organizations only saw the necessity to share their guidelines for salary supplement rates; whereas others wanted to go a step further and track salary supplement payments made to individuals.¹¹⁰ Moreover, disagreement prevailed on the how to re-channel these supplements. Some donors argued that they simply did not have the mandate for direct support for pay reform, others perceived re-channeling as a stop-gap measure with limited benefits or negative effects in the sense that it might delay the reform process; a last group of seven donor organizations considered re-channeling of *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* funds as a means to secure “their commitments in Cambodia as their irregular SSP were jeopardizing the future of their program” (DANIDA, 2004: 10).

At the same meeting in November 2005, just before DANIDA’s Representative urged all donors organizations to fill in the questionnaire as soon as possible, the *World Bank* Representative reported on the *Donor Lunch* that was held on 27 October 2005 to discuss the draft strategy prepared by the CAR to phase out the donor’s salary supplementation. The rough minutes had been circulated to donors for comment and the *Council for Administrative Reform* was informed that it would have the final minutes in the near future. In general, donor organizations thought that the strategy needed firmer language and time-bounded benchmarks on the work to would be undertaken. It also covered the related international work on harmonization issues (e.g., the Rome/Paris Declaration). Although the *Sectoral Approach*¹¹¹ was welcomed by some, potential difficulties were raised in some sectors where *Technical Working Groups (TWG)* were less effective or there were perceived capacity difficulties. Thereby, the root causes of the difficulties to rationalize the *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* were not primarily located in the different rationales of the donor organizations, but in the technical shortages of the Draft Strategy prepared by the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*. At the end of the meeting the Secretary General of the CAR announced to dissolve the *Technical Working Group(TWG)* on *Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* as no constructive dialogue could be reached. This seemingly sudden announcement was actually based on the strong dissatisfaction with the recently published Country Policy and Institutional Assessment of the World Bank.

Here we see that although all parties agreed on the need to create transparency, cautious reservations were expressed by the donor organizations, which were reluctant to make information about their *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* public. In fact, they threw the ball to the Khmer side by arguing that a strategy to phase out the SSP could only be approved once certain technical requirements were fulfilled. This discussion followed a tactic of conditionality and postponement. The behavior pattern of the donor agencies was one reason

¹¹⁰ Ranging from the tracking of all payments made to the listing of names and recipients.

¹¹¹ In Line Ministries such as *Ministry of Education, Health, Agriculture and Justice*.

and the CPIA report prompted the Secretary General of *the Council for Administrative Reform* to threaten to suspend the forum in its current form.¹¹²

In a letter to the World Bank the CAR wrote on the 14th of November 2005:

The CPIA is a flawed instrument that seeks to score a country based on subjective and arbitrary criteria and it is a questionable process that gives too much weight to the view of the Bank's staff and little weight, if at all, to the views of duly elected and sovereign governments. Justifications given are misleading and, at times, evidently wrong. One is left to wonder about intentions. Is the CPIA a mechanism to justify political choices and give them the appearance of objectivity? [...] The evaluation of Bank staff is based on subjective criteria opened to arbitrariness and widely differing interpretation [...] It provides subjective snapshots of the situation as perceived by staff that does not make justice to progress being made in the reforms. The rating is based on preconceived notions of an ideal state of affairs and reflects a poor understanding of Cambodia [...] Bank staff should not comment on the nature of the Cambodian government and imply that it could explain what it judges to be weak coordination mechanisms. Internal mechanism for policy coordination function effectively. Various councils and interministerial committees are in place to facilitate dialogue among ministries, to facilitate the emergence of a consensus and to ensure coordination. It is hard to understand how Bank staff here to assist the country does not fully appreciate the extent and effectiveness of governmental coordination mechanisms with the Council of Ministers at the moment. One can only presume, it is because of lack of time, if not of a lack of interest and professionalism [...] Policy coordination issues lie much more with development partner among themselves and between them and government. Their practices are often anarchic and dysfunctional. Rather than listen to government and base their interventions on government policies, too many continue to seek results that are more in line with their national interests, their perception of issues and their ready made solutions.

Letter of the Secretariat General of the Council for Administrative Reform, Phnom Penh 14 November 2005

At the following meeting on the 6th of December, the Country Manager of the *World Bank* attended the discussion to mediate and smooth the ruffled feathers. The resource person¹¹³ outlined the progress to date, namely the development of the *Draft Strategy on Phasing out SSP*, the collection of the information questionnaire and their circulation to Ministries and donors for comment. The regular Representative of the *World Bank* in the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* reiterated the comments that had been

¹¹² Another important reason was the reluctance of donor organizations to fund the activities of the CAR and the inability to find a consensus on the performance based merit scheme.

¹¹³ The resource person was hired by UNDP to coordinate the activities of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*. However his function remained symbolic as he was increasingly excluded from the actual activities of the Council.

made by donors at the *Donor Lunch* in October 2005, where they had discussed the draft strategy. He said the donors' views had been taken into account in producing a revised draft strategy for the *Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)* to consider and it was going to be presented to the CAR in the near future. Some of the particular suggestions that were incorporated into the new draft involved: first, closely linking the *Supplementation Strategy* with the new *Remuneration Policy*; second, tightening timelines; third, allowing for the completion of the information questionnaire until the end of January 2006; and fourth, the need for the production of a *concise guide* about the operation of the *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)*. He suggested that, if possible, the strategy should be tabled at the semi-political, semi-technical level, the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)*, the following week.

The Secretary General agreed that a process guide on *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* would be developed and the timelines reviewed for the questionnaire. The CAR Secretariat's objective was to complete all policy work by mid-2006 so that stronger focus could be placed on Reform Implementation.

Despite the *éclat* of the previous meeting, both parties agreed to continue working within the frame of the TWG without specifying how they would do it. Interestingly, the Representatives of the donor organizations used the opportunity to emphasize the link between *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 on Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* with the successful implementation of *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2*¹¹⁴ on the *Pay and Employment Policy*.

At the *April 5th meeting in 2006*, the *United Nations Development Program (UNDP)* Representative informed the meeting about her group's work on SSP, including the establishment of a data base, the review of supplementation arrangements, and the efforts to harmonize practices across *UN Agencies*. She then, however, asked when the *Operational Review/Remuneration Study* would be completed and was told that it would be done by the end of June.

After congratulating the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* on their work progress, the Representative of the *World Bank* emphasized the importance of following up the implementation of the *Strategy on Phasing out Salary Supplementation (SPSS)*, including the questionnaire sent to the donor organizations to fill in information on their *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)*. He suggested that the CAR write to donors to outline the necessary action and that this should be followed up by making this matter an item for discussion at the next meeting of the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)* in June 2006.

¹¹⁴ The *Remuneration Policy* and the *Studies* accompanying it, are a recurring theme throughout all JMI negotiations. The donors recognize that the implementation of JMI 2 is a sensitive issue as it is a political process. By making the full disclosure of information on their *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* dependent on the realization of studies on the *Functional Analysis/ Operational Review*, including the *Remuneration Study*, of the state bureaucracy, and the formulation of clear *Guidelines for the Priority Mission Group*. In doing so, they exert pressure on the *Council for Administrative Reform* to fulfill their agenda. For further discussion on *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2* see chapter 5.4.2.

Yet again the link between phasing out the *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* and the *Pay and Employment Reform* was made. Thus, pressure was exerted by the Representatives of the donor organizations on the staff of the *Council for Administrative Reform CAR* to provide information and transparency over the processes and posts within the bureaucracy. It was made clear again that the donor organizations are not willing to disclose information as long as they had no clear picture i.e., transparency over the processes and structures within the administration. Interestingly, the suggestion was made for the second time by the donor organizations, to transfer the negotiation to the higher semi-political, semi-technical level of the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)*. However, the professionals of the CAR did not cede to the pressure and opted for a strategy of confrontation by writing the following letter to the members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG)* on *Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*, on May 26, 2006:

Now it seems that the Technical Working Group has a fundamental systemic problem. This is that, by comparison with the large amounts that it has been possible to find in other areas of governance, it does not seem to be possible for our development partners to generate the relatively modest level of funds needed to support our common agenda on a timely basis. Instead, the Council for Administrative Reform is expected to scrape by largely through relatively small contributions generated from a range of sources. This is not a satisfactory way to support a fundamental and far reaching program of public administration reform that requires adequate and sustained support.

Letter of the Secretary General of the CAR to the members of the TWG PAR, 2006

At the following meeting on the 31st of May 2006, all parties met again and the professionals of the donor organizations made some new suggestion to support the strategy to phase out the *Salary Supplementation Practice (SSP)*; in this vein, DANIDA proposed to provide 38,000 USD for data entry work and for the planned review of the *Strategy for the Phase out SSPs*. The *World Bank's* Representative explained that the remaining funds required could be provided through the already running *Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building¹¹⁵ (EPSCB)* program. The professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* replied that this would not be possible, as the budget for the EPSCB has already been planned for other activities.

In sum, the meeting could not end with a consensus on how to proceed with the phasing out of the *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* of the donor organizations as no essential funding could be mobilized. In addition no agreement could be reached on the institutional framework and responsibilities for its implementation. Hence, the implementation of *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* failed as no consensus could be reached on the institutional anchoring for information/data sharing and administration. Moreover, donor organizations thought that reallocating or re-channeling resources from *Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)* to

¹¹⁵According to the *World Bank*, the project aims to bridge the Government's reform efforts toward a second generation of reforms. While the project is a small operation, it aims to play a catalytic role by focusing on capacity building on the ground with an emphasis on training, knowledge transfer, and assumption of responsibilities by Cambodians in the place of or complementary to, the provision of foreign advisors, including introducing a *Global Development Learning Network (GDLN)* facility. The fund was also used to finance the *Remuneration and Employment Studies*.

support for the wage bill was not straightforward in operational terms as it raised questions of fiduciary risks.

5.4.2 Joint Monitoring Indicator 2: Improve pay and employment conditions in the civil service.

In a similar manner, the negotiation on *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2*, on the Remuneration Policy, ended in a deadlock. At the beginning, the professionals of both the donor organizations and the CAR favored increasing the salaries of civil servants, based on both the current performance and an incentive for improved future performance. However, frictions and tensions emerged over selecting the model to be applied. The Representatives of the donor agencies were in favor of a *Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI)*, while the CAR pushed to establish the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* model. Although discussed mainly as technical issues, in fact, both models had far-reaching political implications with regard to who has control over resources to finance the administration. In the PMG model, Cambodian politicians and high-ranking civil servants decided the allocation of funds, while, conversely, the MBPI model left this decision making power mainly to the donors. In addition, the MBPI model allowed the donors to choose their counterparts.

In the meeting minutes of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*, technical issues dominated the discussion. However, because these technical issues were directly connected to political issues implicit in the models, no consensus could be reached and increasingly, the political positions became more explicit.

At the *September 7th meeting in 2005*, open issues concerning *Sub decree 98* were discussed. As the CAR Secretary General explained, the decree demanded that the old pattern of bilateral *Salary Supplementation Practices* shall be phased out and substituted by a merit and performance based system of salary increases. As many ministries were not ‘ready’¹¹⁶, the donors offered alternatively to the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, the *Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* scheme, but only if the salary supplements were agreed upon jointly by the donors and the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*.

In addition, the donor organizations informed the CAR that a PMG/MBPI pilot was started at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* covering three hundred staff members, with the Government paying PMG allowances for 80 staff and the donors the remainder of the allowance cost plus an extra, enhanced, performance incentive allowance on top of the PMG rate. However, although they welcomed the idea of re-channeling the SSP resources, the CAR professionals thought that a pilot approach was not appropriate as these were not evaluated. Furthermore, they were concerned that the MPBI model would necessitate increased Government accountability.

¹¹⁶ ‘Ready’ is defined as: having a credible reform program jointly agreed by government and donors, and having agreement on: phasing out salary supplementation in that sector, the pooling approach (including the % to be funded by donors and government alike), and the details of the pay and employment reform pilot.” (DANIDA, 2005).

Then the discussion went on to cover the *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)*. The UNDP Representative raised the issue that guidelines were needed for the implementation of the PMG in their organizations. However UNDP and the Representatives of the *World Bank*, AusAid, and DANIDA were ready to assist in formulating potential guidelines. As a result, it was agreed to set up a working party for the formulation of a draft directive. This working party comprised one young professional from the *Council for Administrative Reform*, the CAR' Secretariat's Principal Advisor contracted through CIDA, the Resource Person of the *Technical Working Group (TWG)* financed by UNDP, and respectively a Representatives from the *World Bank*, AusAid, DANIDA, GTZ, and UNDP.

The Representative of the *World Bank* then suggested that the CAR Secretariat would be better off engaging in a 'two-track proposal'¹¹⁷ instead of a 'one-track reform', since only a small number of ministries were ready to proceed to the PMG model. Other Ministries needed to first to focus on harmonization of tasks, functions, budgets, etc. The Representative of AusAid noted that, indeed, the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* was fortunate enough to have clear priorities and thus harmonized structures. However, the *Ministry for Agriculture*, in contrast, was less advanced in this regard.

The Secretary General of the *Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)* rejected the two-track approach, stating that this method could encourage some Ministries to delay reform. Instead he saw a need for a one-track approach, namely the full implementation of *Sub decree 98*, at varying paces, sector to sector. Even if some sectors would take longer, each sector should be expected to come up with a firm action plan for achieving, step-by-step, the necessary change, with most applying PMG rates and some applying the MBPI rates. The expert from GTZ and the Representative from DANIDA demanded that the guidelines specifically explain exactly what was intended by phasing out, as well as demanding a clarification of what was regarded "merit-based".

The Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* reiterated that the *Sub Decree 98* was a starting point for a step-by-step negotiation. The purpose was to reach a consensus rather than to impose one. First, he needed the feedback from the ministries on *Sub Decree 98* before any further discussion could take place. An important target of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* was to get competent people to work in the countryside, for example, in the *Health Sector*.¹¹⁸ But an immediate concern for the Government was to develop a better understanding of what was happening in all sectors.

During the meeting, the focus lay on setting of guidelines; it was not a discussion of what model should be adopted. Certain tensions emerged among the different groups and the most obvious, resulted from the debate over the use of either a two- or one-track approach. A second underlying tension that came to the forefront was whether the whole process should be based on consensus reached by negotiations with the Ministries, or whether the guidelines

¹¹⁷ Track 1= Phase out salary supplementation; 'pool' and fund merit based pay reform pilots in ministries/sectors that are "ready". Track 2= Rationalize salary supplementation in sectors that are not ready for track 1. This means: first gaining greater clarity on the current situation at the sectoral level by collecting information on rates and practices by donors through selected Technical Working Groups; second agree on a *Strategy for Alignment and Harmonization of Rates and Practices*.

¹¹⁸ Not just the *Ministry of Health*.

should be imposed. Thirdly, although seemingly as a side remark, tensions emerged between bringing competent personnel into the Ministries in Phnom Penh or/and to the provinces and districts with explicit reference to the *Health Sector*, another recurring theme from the Khmer side. Fourthly, the need for understanding what was going on in the ministries prior to defining guidelines was also mentioned.

In the follow-up meeting on the 29th of September 2005, a young professional on the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* outlined the progress to date on studies of the *Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)*. The *Operational Review* of the Ministries was underway for low and high positions within the Ministries. Staff from twelve Ministries was trained to use the review methodology developed by the contracted consultant. The *World Bank* Representative asked how the line ministries reacted to the *Operational Review*, and whether the CAR should have provided mentoring for Ministries. In response, the CAR stated that it was a sensitive issue as additional management capacity and financial assistance was needed. The Secretary General of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* provided a similar response when the AusAid Representative inquired whether the *Operational Review* was linked to the *Decentralization and Deconcentration (D&D) Policy*. The Secretary General insisted that in the context of the *Operational Review* it was vital first to understand the situation in context and then to work on possible solutions such as the *One Window Approach*, the *Decentralization and Deconcentration* possibilities, or privatization. Once the *Operational Review* had assessed the current situation, each Ministry's use of resources could then be examined. But, above all, it was important for more civil servants to work in the provinces. It would then be necessary, for example, to draw private doctors to work in new *Health Centers*. In addition, more training was needed for civil servants in the provinces.

The Representative of the *World Bank* asked whether there was a concern in the *line Ministries* about the possible loss of employment, as this particular issue had already come up during the implementing of the *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* reform at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)*. The Secretary General explained that there were other Human Resource policies that could help to address the issue. For example, if a person lost his position he would just not receive the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* allowance. He said that only competent and engaged civil servants would be selected to work in PMGs.

He then returned to the subject of Health Centres in the provinces and districts by informing the donor organizations about the creation of a PMG for *Health Centers* in *Kampot province*. The resident Representative of the *IMF* insisted that it would be helpful if it was explained how the PMG process might be wound up over time and would become part of the normal pay system. Similarly, the Representative of AusAid raised the need to remove uncertainty about how these PMGs are intended to operate. After discussion, it was agreed that the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* would provide further guidance for donor agencies on using the PMG mechanism. Then, the Resident Representative of the IMF asked if the PMG was project-based, in the sense that the allowance ceased when the project ceased, or if it was function-based. The Secretary General explained that the problem was less about the function of the Ministry than it was about getting the particular Ministry to accept responsibility where a work problem arose. The *World Bank* Representative reiterated that he

was looking at Terms of References for further studies that were needed as part of meeting the *Remuneration Policy* benchmark.

In close, the Secretary General argued that any *Human Resource* change had to take into account the reality of the country. The evaluation of merit would continually need to be based on an exam, but there was a need to strengthen its quality without making the standard unreasonably high. The Representative of AusAid outlined the *Australian Public Service's* approach to test merit through job criteria, interview, and provisions to avoid discrimination. CIDA's Head of Aid informed that the Canadian experience was based on an exam, interview, and a reference check. However, he felt that relying solely on exams did not provide a good enough indication of abilities.

Following the theme that is evident in the minutes of this meeting, the *Operational Review* is a 'sensitive issue'. It seems though, that the donors are not aware or less aware of this sensitivity. Nevertheless, the Representative of the *World Bank* interprets the problem as fear of loss of employment and remuneration, especially for the older personnel who are less competent. Interestingly, the issue raised by the Khmer side was to use incentives to bring more qualified personnel to the provinces especially for *Health Centers* was raised again. Even more, although the guidelines for the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* were not yet defined, the PMG had already been applied in *Health Centers* in the countryside. This rather rapid implementation of PMG was taken by the donors with surprise and cautious critique. A problem of mutual understanding was expressed with the question, whether the salary supplement (PMG) should be implemented project based (only while the project lasts) or function based.

In November 2005, the young professional in charge explained that an *Operational Review* was being completed in the *Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Land* and should be finished by the end of November 2005. A large amount of material had been produced and needed to be translated into English -a compendium on the methodology would be made available to all Ministries. Terms of references for two other studies had recently been agreed upon and recruitment was underway. The *World Bank* Representative reiterated the importance of the involvement of the respective Ministries within these studies. The launching of the *Establishment and Control Study* was however made dependent on the completion of a *Human Resource Management guide*.

With regard to other potential *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* pilots for the *Ministries of Health, Lands and Commerce*, an extra meeting would need to take place to assess and discuss the progress made. He emphasized the importance of fully involving the Ministries in the preparation of the MBPIs.

The Secretary General informed the meetings' participants about the current situation of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*. A budget had been established to cover employing 305 civil servants. Agencies considered for PMGs included the *Council of Ministers (COM)*, the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, the *Ministry for Women's Affairs*, the *Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Health* and 'One Window' Services in Battambang and Siem Reap. The *Ministry for Economy and Finance (MEF)* also had the PMG/MBPI and would receive the results of its selection of 263 staff.

However, the Representatives of the donor organizations expressed once again their reservations about the PMG model. While some were concerned about understanding the model, more substantive problems were also raised by others about the PMG being overly bureaucratic; they argued that the proposals to create PMG took much time to gain approval and to implement; advantages were rather seen in the implementation of the *PMG/MBPI model*. Moreover, they were disappointed that the Secretary-General was not able to attend the last *Donor Lunch*.

In response to these comments, the Secretary General said the PMG process was clear and that the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* had made considerable effort over a number of years to explain it to Ministries and donors. However, if the current donors still needed to have an explanation, he would be happy to arrange a presentation for donors. The meeting welcomed the suggestion.

The *World Bank* Representative again reiterated that the donor agencies felt that it was difficult to support the PMG scheme. First, they were implemented on a project basis and were therefore relatively short term. They were wondering what would happen to the work and staff involved at the end of the project and would it be sustainable. He recommended that the *Council for Administrative Reform* look at how the model could be revised and streamlined. Similarly, the Representative of DANIDA added that his organization supported the PMG concept and had tried to work with the PMG model but had however experienced major difficulties. He felt that the selection process for the PMG was too complex. Unless improvements were made to the PMG model, some donors including DANIDA would continue to resist using it.

As a response, a professional of the CAR Secretariat stressed the fact that the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* concept was not new and that it was not the organization's fault if it was not understood. However, the Government needed donor support to increase the number of PMG members. The processes of the PMG that were interpreted as bureaucratic by the donor agencies were conceptualized to minimize risks of inappropriate selections. He argued that it is essential that the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* sets proper standards for the operation of PMGs.

The Representative of UNDP added that the mission of the PMG scheme needed to be derived from the *Operational Review*, since Ministries ownership of the mission was needed to be stressed.

During this meeting, interesting tensions were mentioned only in passing. The Khmer side was already implementing PMG on a larger scale, without waiting for the studies to be completed. The remarks from the *World Bank* can be interpreted as astonishment or as a moderate critique of this practice. Nevertheless, it seems that a highly sensitive spot had been pitched, as the response by the secretary shows. Still, open conflict was avoided, as the Secretary General pointed out that not only the donors had difficulties with PMG, but several Ministries had experienced similar problems. A reason, for this, might be that the implementation of the PMG by the Government was based on funding by the donors.

But the meeting did not end on such a consensual tone. In fact, an *éclat* followed when the Secretary General finally announced that the CAR was not willing to continue with the

Technical Working Group (TWG) in its present form, and that the meetings should be terminated. He pointed out that, at the moment, the CAR believed that it was not effective or useful. The current action plan was largely the donors' priorities and did not deal with issues of greater concern to the *Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)*. As there was little financial assistance from the TWG or donors for the CAR's project, it was considering returning to bilateral arrangements. A greater sense of joint partnership was needed in the TWG, with an action plan that was jointly owned and not determined by the donors. The original idea of creating TWGs was to mobilize resources for shared ownership, constructive partnership, joint action and alignment, following the *September 2003* donor retreat. Unfortunately, the expectations that the CAR had for development cooperation had not been realized. The CAR Secretariat did not want to waste time in a TWG process that was not closely linked to achieving key reform priorities.

The CAR professional in charge of *Employment and Remunerations Studies* added that the *Joint Monitoring Indicators* did not include the resources to do the work. He mentioned the difficulties that the CAR Secretariat had advancing its own important work priorities, like its *Service Delivery Policy* and the *Human Resource Development Master Plan*, which were under *Joint Monitoring Indicator 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicators 4*; until the present, the CAR had not receive substantial project support from donor organizations. So far, the CAR had only received a *Priority Mission Group (PAR)* allowance from the *Royal Government*.

The Representative of DANIDA welcomed the frankness of the discussion. She agreed the sense of partnership was important. However, donors did not have a good understanding of what the CAR was doing. Moreover, the members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* had continuous difficulty marketing the importance of its work to other donor agencies because of the 'image problems' of the CAR. Donor agencies had to see a mutual benefit in project work. Their pre-occupation was *Poverty Alleviation*. The linkages between the work of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* and *Poverty Alleviation* were not always clear to them. Hence their concern rested on the impact that would be met by supporting particular project work. In other words, they wanted to see results.

The Secretary General explained that he realized that the donors did not understand that the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* often played a vital role as a coordinator and initiating policy making for change, as with the one window initiative (JMI 4 for service delivery). He said that the CAR Secretariat had achieved many results. It was involved in *Poverty Reduction*, although indirectly. Of course did the reform to reach salary increases, to regulate the Civil Service, to introduce *One Window Offices* in Battambang and Siem Reap, and create a PMG for the *Health Centre* in Kampot indirectly contribute to *Poverty Alleviation* in Cambodia.

The Representative of DANIDA agreed that it might be more of an issue of marketing than actually making the link to *Poverty Alleviation*. She said that donors would support the CAR in playing a more facilitative role in reform beyond the policy development work. She said that if the Council could better explain its policies it would have a more beneficial impact. She said the frankness of the discussion would help all parties to address how to improve the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* work.

The Secretary General then answered that he would work on the 2006 *Work Program* of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* and hoped to send it on to TWG members as a basis for further discussion on possible benchmarks and project work.

The Representative of DANIDA noted that donors would want to make an assessment for themselves of the benefit of involvement in particular project proposals. There had to be a shared interest. However, she agreed that there needed to be stronger linkages to the CAR Secretariat's work program. She had some funds that DANIDA could use to support the TWG's work program. She added that the strong trend in development cooperation was away from bilateral approaches. Similarly, the UNDP's Representative indicated that she wanted to develop a better understanding of the CAR's work on capacity development, including the project's possibilities.

However, the Secretary General reiterated that ultimately, the CAR Secretariat did not need to continue with the TWG as it was, because up to now it did not receive any assistance through the TWG. He couldn't see until now how the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* would help the CAR to mobilize resources. Hence, more mutual support was needed for the reform agenda to advance its work. He would share the work plan with donors in the near future.

The Representative of DANIDA welcomed further discussions on possible benchmarks for 2006. It was important that there were in fact shared priorities for the future work.

The tension at the end of the meeting illustrates several of the implicit misunderstandings that occurred between the participants of the *Technical Working group (TWG)* and the implicit dissatisfaction with the CPIA report of the World Bank. Obviously, the Khmer side expected financial support for their work in a double sense: support of their policy priorities (*Joint Monitoring Indicator 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator 4*), and, in terms of *Salary Supplements* as recognition for their performance and as an incentive. Following the priorities of the CAR, the discussions of TWG did not translate into support, and thus were *irrelevant*.

The donors pointed out that even though the hard work of the CAR is recognized, unfortunately, the priorities that direct its work were not in line with the priorities of the donors, and their general organizational and development frameworks. Thus, the task of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* would be to show that the priorities that they were working on were closely connected to those of the donor organizations.

Following this, another meeting took place on the 6th of December. The *World Bank's* Country Manager emphasized the importance of making progress on the creation of *Merit-Based Pay Incentives (MBPI)* by mid-2006. The young professional in charge of the PMG scheme informed the meeting about the CAR's recent work on *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)*. He had recent discussions on MBPIs with the *Ministries of Health and Education*, and had also received a report from the *Ministry of Commerce*. Good progress was being made in all cases. He also outlined the progress that had been made so far in setting up PMGs in eight Ministries (*Justice, Women's Affairs, Finance, Health, Industry, COM, the CAR Secretariat; one window facilities in two provinces*). In 2006, the approval level set by the Government for PMG membership would reach 1270 civil servants.

The Secretary General reiterated the need for donor support in setting up *Health Centers* in the provinces. In particular, the Government wanted to pursue the *National Expert Initiative* developed in the *Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)* to introduce *Merit-Based Pay Incentives (MBPI)* schemes across other areas of Cambodia. The Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* also wanted to see more MBPIs at a provincial level. The most recent report of the consultant on MBPI proposals in the *Ministries of Land and Commerce* was circulated at the meeting. The Secretary General informed that the *Ministry of Land* already had a performance incentive scheme. It now needed to become a *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*.

The Country Manager of the *World Bank* noted that using the PMG and the MBPI mechanism would lead to great transparency. The Secretary General added that while it was beneficial to have transparency on supplementation arrangements, a greater challenge was the resistance to change that would have to be faced and dealt within Ministries in implementing reforms. The Secretary General informed the attendees that the CAR would continue to work on developing a work plan for 2006 in the later part of the week at Siem Reap. He would then set up a team to develop a draft that would be circulated to donors, and intended for the plan to be realistic and keep expectations down. The CAR needed to finish off policy work by mid- 2006, and then focus more on implementation. This would also include new roles for better communication.

He further reiterated the large range of work that the CAR had undertaken over the course of 2006. Despite the consistent lack of personnel, the work program was on track. Nevertheless the CAR Secretariat needed more qualified staff.

Right after, DANIDA's Attaché said that more publicity was needed to be given to the importance of the CAR's work. Demonstrating linkages between that work and the new *National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)* was one way to do this. Other sectors needed to appreciate that reforms in governance were beneficial to them as well.

The Secretary General then informed that the CAR Secretariat needed better information from donors, for example, on projects that they were designing where they included *Public Administrative Reform*. It also needed to be better informed on *Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* problems that came to the attention of donors if it was expected to help. It planned to work with *DFID* and the *Ministry of Health* on PAR issues in the *Health Sector*. In this context, *Health Centers* played quite a crucial role. In each of the meetings they are repeatedly mentioned and discussed. Again, the Secretary pointed out how important it was to have salary incentives in the *provincial regions*.¹¹⁹

The *World Bank* Country Manager suggested that the Secretary General might want to make a presentation to a donor lunch early in the New Year.

After the confrontation of the preceding meeting, things seemed to be rather smooth again, and the participants were looking for compromises. The donors did not oppose *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* and the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* showed how to combine PMG with *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* schemes, as demanded by the *World*

¹¹⁹ Why these issues are so prominent is difficult to analyze, and may have to do with certain political priorities of the CPP.

Bank. All participants showed their willingness to cooperate, without solving or addressing the problems that had led to the *éclat*. They returned to a language of *meconnaissance*; all could agree without making explicit what was meant by what the parties had agreed upon.

However, on the 5th of April, the Secretary General expressed his concern about the recent report he had received from the consultant working on the *Operational Review*. He felt the report included inappropriate comments and criticisms and that these views needed to be corrected. The *World Bank* Representative noted that the consultant's contract was with the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, hence he had the possibility to talk directly to him.

The CAR professional in charge of the *Remuneration and Employment Studies* outlined the work that was being undertaken to manage this complex project of *Operational Review*, including meeting with all ministries involved. Indeed, the communication and information sharing -i.e. translation of the political negotiation occurring in the ministries - took more time than the CAR Secretariat expected. The Secretary General noted that the *Operational Review* was difficult to undertake in a larger Ministry and it may have been preferable to start with a smaller one. In addition, the Secretariat was soon to contract consultants to undertake studies on *Employment, Remuneration and the Local Labor Market*. This would lead to new policies being prepared in Remuneration and Redeployment. In closing this part of the *Technical Working Group (TWG)*'s discussions, the Secretary General informed that the *Labor Market Study* was soon to get underway. The study would look at what was happening to new entrants in the workforce; the results could then lead to further civil service reform to accommodate more new entrants to the labor market. In any case, the Government had met the targets set in 2001 for the Rationalization of the Civil Service and was maintaining the level of civil servants at 165,000 people (see Annex 10).

In his comment to the presented information, the Representative of the *World Bank* noted the need to follow-up the *Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* proposals; the *Ministry of Commerce* (after the *Ministry of Economy and Finance*) was now looking again at an MBPI proposal. He added that he would welcome a meeting to discuss progress on the *Operational Review*.

The first secretary of AusAid welcomed the presentation on the work of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* and asked for information on the *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)* that had been set up and whether there were any lessons to be learned up to now.

The Secretary General outlined the PMGs created at the *Council of Ministers (COM)*, the *Ministry of Women's Affairs*, and some other Ministries. After that he emphasized that the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* could not achieve all the priorities set out in the CAR's *Work Plan* without significant donor support. He sought the support of all members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* for the work that needed to be done in 2006. The Head of Aid for *CIDA* suggested that the TWGs should be given guidance on the content and format for action planning for more consistency.

In the meeting, all contested issues were raised again. Obviously, the intent to compromise was rather short lived: firstly, the *Operational Review* was demanded by the donors and disputed by the CAR Secretariat; secondly, the other studies requested by donors

(Employment, Remuneration, Labor Market) were still not under way; thirdly, the donors had not received any information about the implementation of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, while the donors want to introduce *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)*; fourthly, the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* Secretariat still had not received any substantial financial support for its work.

On May 26, 2006, five days before the scheduled meeting of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*, the Secretary General of the CAR sent a letter to all donor organizations:

It is very disappointing to see that almost half way through the year, the PAR TWG has yet to mobilize the resources necessary to meet the objectives it set for itself in January. These objectives were subsequently reflected in the Joint Monitoring Indicators agreed to at the last Consultative Group meeting. We had understood that the development partners were to make every effort to mobilize the resources required to support implementation of the Joint Monitoring Indicators [...] Now it seems that the Technical Working Group has a fundamental systemic problem. This is that, by comparison with the large amounts that it has been possible to find in other areas of governance, it does not seem to be possible for our development partners to generate the relatively modest level of funds needed to support our common agenda on a timely basis. Instead, the Council for Administrative Reform is expected to scrape by largely through relatively small contributions generated from a range of sources. This is not a satisfactory way to support a fundamental and far reaching program of public administration reform that requires adequate and sustained support [...] Is this problem because current programming and funding practices of individual partners seem to be overly restraining to allowing for timely support to the reform? Or is it a lack of engagement in PAR on the part of individual PAR TWG members or the donor community more generally?

Secretary General of CAR, letter to the donor organizations, May 2006

At the following meeting five days later, the Representative of the *World Bank* informed participants about a meeting held by Representatives of the donor organizations that had taken place the day earlier to discuss issues raised by the Secretary General's letter. They thought that the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* was working better than last year and wished to recognize the progress that was being made.

However, they also acknowledged that the resources were inadequate and that ideally the situation should be different. They wanted to improve the funding situation and look at mobilizing additional resources. Yet, it was difficult to generate additional resources until those currently available had been spent. Nevertheless, he said that donors had some suggestions on how to respond to short-term funding issues faced by the TWG and also were prepared to work with the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* to develop a long-term solution. The Representative of the *World Bank* answered that there may be scope for greater flexibility in using existing funds, through reprogramming. He noted the changes that the *World Bank* had already agreed to, with respect for funding studies. He also noted that the funds of the *Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building (EPSCB)* could be used for this purpose.

One of the Deputy Secretary Generals pointed out that the EPSCB fund had already been planned for other activities and could hardly be used to fund the recurrent expenditures of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*.

Again, the Representative of the *World Bank* emphasized that as the donor organizations were looking to work with the CAR in looking at longer term options, he would outlined possible options for achieving a long-term approach to support the TWG. An interesting mechanism to realize this could be the establishment of a joint Trust Fund. The *World Bank* had experience with the use of Trust Fund mechanisms. This could be further explored but it may prove to be a rather difficult way to manage funds. Another solution could be to establish a *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* for the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*. For this, donor organizations were prepared to mobilize the necessary funds. However, the MBPI would need to be developed to support a work program for a period longer than one year.

UNDP's Governance Representative maintained that the donor organizations needed a better understanding of the existing supplementation arrangements within the CAR in order to better define the funding requirements for a MBPI. Moreover, CAR needed to develop an MBPI proposal, together with a defined budget. While the donor agencies, were favorably disposed, they still needed to see more detail. Likewise, the Second Secretary of AusAid and the Attaché of DANIDA said that the donor organizations had a very useful discussion but were frank about the limitations that they faced in mobilizing new funds quickly. While donors had set priorities for funding in particular sectors, they recognized that the reform of the *Public Administration* had to be given priority because of the impact that *Public Administration* issues had across all sectors. In the absence of mechanisms to co-ordinate the relatively small amounts of funding that was all that some donors were able to generate, there were difficulties. She wanted the CAR to understand the constraints that donors had to operate under. The Assistant Secretary of the *EC* delegation said that EU funding needed a long lead time to get approved, usually two years. In addition, it was difficult for EU to act bilaterally with the Government.

In sum, the letter written by the Secretary General was successful in putting the donor organizations under pressure. The CAR Secretariat had gained the ability to define the agenda to quite a degree, and the donors responded accordingly. However, as a response the donor organizations engaged into postponement tactics. They seemed to be willing to support the CAR financially, but remained unable to provide the demanded funds. They were willing to support the CAR, but demanded a long-term perspective, as they argued that they could not "make small amounts of funds available in the short term".

At an informal meeting on the *20th September, 2006* the members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* and the Secretary General of the CAR noted that there were difficulties sometimes with departmental Representatives reporting back to senior levels in Ministries. He also indicated that the CAR was working with relevant Ministries on a number of *Remuneration Policy* issues for 2007. These included discussions on military and police salaries. While some increases in salary and allowances were considered, the numbers in the civil service were likely to be stabilized at around 170,000 in total, including the police force. Recruitment in 2007 was likely to be frozen, except in a few priority areas or where staff retired. Targeted increases in salaries and/or allowances were

being considered in a few priority areas such as *Ministry of Economy and Finance* and the *Ministry of Health*.

The Government was examining remuneration options that encouraged more civil servants to move to the countryside. In addition, it was also looking at possible ways to reform the retirement pension scheme to increase the pension rate, with the objective of encouraging civil servants who wanted to take retirement. The participants were informed that the *Remuneration and Employment Studies* would commence in early October and would then lead to related policy work. The *Labor Market Study* on new entrants to the workforce would also commence in near future.

The Secretary General noted the difficulties associated with obtaining the necessary ministerial support to enable the *Operational Review*. The *World Bank* expert informed the attendees about the extension of the IDF grant until March 2007. By then, the funds had to be spent. It was reiterated that consultation processes between the partners needed to take place in order to address the issue of resource requirements, particularly in the context of implementing the new civil service policy framework.

Next, the meeting discussed issues related to *Health Centers*, in particular, the recent visit by the *Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)* Secretariat, *Ministry of Health* officials and development partners to the *Kampot Health Centre*, which had been set up as a PMG. The Secretary General said there were ongoing discussions with the *Ministry of Health* and DFID, the *United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)*, the *World Health Organization (WHO)*, and the *World Bank* on service delivery possibilities in the *Health Sector*. He said some weaknesses in the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* performance had been identified and these would be addressed. The *Council of Administrative Reform (CAR)* wanted to clarify the process for setting up a PMG and managing its performance. He added that the PMG procedures were to be rewritten with the objective of simplifying them, since *Health Centers* in rural areas had become an important priority. It was important that Cambodians did not always had to go to the Capital, Phnom Penh, for treatment. He said the Government wanted to see good quality in the services provided in the provinces. CAR intended to increase the numbers employed in PMG for *Health Centers*, with some places to be paid by the Government and the majority by donors. For his reason, a *Health Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* proposal was being considered. However, setting up MBPIs was proving to be sensitive.

The *World Bank* Representative agreed that there was no point in pushing on if the ministries were not interested. He further informed that the *Public Finance Management Program* at the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* was confronted with emerging challenges concerning the MBPI; in fact, the issue was raised on how to sanction staff who abused the MBPI scheme. The CAR Secretariat's advice was needed or perhaps a workshop was needed to be planned. The Representative of the *World Bank* invited the CAR to be involved in the upcoming independent evaluation of the MBPI in the *Ministry for Economy and Finance*, thus, demonstrating his personal willingness to cooperate with the CAR.

The Secretary General answered that he planned to call a meeting of Ministries to review progress on MBPIs/PMGs. He said that Ministries were not familiar with how to implement *Sub Decree 98* (2005).

Again, *Health Centers* and the countryside are mentioned by the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*, an issue not taken up by the donors. The role of the CAR as agenda setters became even more obvious. As a means of compromise the CAR offered an MBPI for *Health Centers* in the provinces. This offer could have been taken as an attempt to reduce pressure on all sides because MBPI was favored by the *World Bank*, as the PMG clearly favored by the CAR.

On the 18th of October, the meeting discussed the importance of progressing the revision of the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)* procedures to make them much shorter and easier to use. Two related issues were also raised: the need for a training program for staff that would start to work in a PMG; and the need to overcome capacity constraints faced by some agencies in writing *Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI)* proposals, possibly through building up a small panel of experienced local consultants who could advise the Ministries.

The Secretary General went on to outline the work going on in respect to proposed PMGs and MBPIs. He planned to suggest to the Minister of the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* to convene a meeting of interested Ministries. He also described the negotiations that were ongoing in the *Health Sector* with regard to the MBPI. The *Royal Government* had a strong interest in establishing more *Health Centers* in rural areas and was itself prepared to finance up to 300 PMG places. However, he wanted to know what support the donor agencies could give to establish more PMGs. He urged the members of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* to help the CAR conclude the negotiation in the *Health Sector* this year. The expert from DFID welcomed CAR's demand but wanted to ensure that the chosen solution was sustainable.

The CAR professional in charge of the *Operational, Remuneration, Employment, and Labor Market Studies* informed that inception reports were being prepared for each study. Answering the question of the Second Secretary of AusAid on the progress to date of the *Operational Review*, he informed that the cooperation with the Ministries was ameliorated after a letter was sent by the Minister of the *Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)* to all Ministries concerned. The international consultant would be involved once the local consultant's work was completed. The *World Bank* Representative emphasized that the raw material that had been produced in these ministries needed further analysis. The *Operational Review* of the *Ministry of Economy and Finance* was also stagnating because of the lack of scrutiny. He asked that this should be followed up.

Interestingly, although an offer had been made to establish MBPI for *Health Centers* during the preceding meeting, at this meeting the suggestion was withdrawn. The large number of *Health Centers* where PMG had been introduced already is also surprising. Interestingly, the donor organizations indirectly showed their reluctance to finance MBPI for *Health Centers* in the provinces. For them, the MBPI was regarded as a tool to be used in the Ministries in Phnom Penh. Similar to the policy of postponement of the donors with regard to financing priorities of the CAR Secretariat, the CAR also used a policy of postponement with regard to

the *Remuneration and Employment Studies*. As could be expected, this led to multiple frustrations on both sides.

At the end of the meeting, the CAR professionals remained unsatisfied as the donor organization professionals proposed no substantial change. Moreover, no clear financial support for CAR's work was provided. This deadlock combined with the impasse that had emerged from negotiations on *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* led to the resignation of the co-lead facilitator to the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* from the *World Bank*. This was evidence of what happened in the political tensions described in section 4.

5.4.3 Joint Monitoring Indicator 3 and 4

While initially the discussions during the meetings were dominated by *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 1* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2*, *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4* became an issue much later on. Their relevance was based, on using them as an exit strategy because no consensus could be reached. In order to avoid too much influence by the donor organizations in the operationalization of these two policy guidelines, the professionals of the CAR pursued a strategy of bilateral cooperation with selected partners who seemed more 'willing' to cooperate.

Joint Monitoring Indicator 3 on Human Resource Management (HRM) was addressed quite late in *November 2005*. At the meeting, the Secretary General of the CAR noted that the *HRM Guide* would be completed in *December 2005*. Work on a *Human Resource Development (HRD) Master Plan* was also well advanced. In response to the UNDP Representative's request for information on the *HRD Master Plan*, the Secretary General informed that the information was available on the website. He explained further that as the implementation of *Civil Service Laws* began, a need to improve *Establishment Controls*¹²⁰ emerged. If the methodology that was being tested in central agencies was effective, then the same approach would be applied in an incremental way, agency by agency.

As shown in this meeting, the Government was already implementing potential models for *Establishments Controls*. Whether donor organizations were involved remained unclear.

After the first éclat on *Joint Monitoring Indicator 1* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator 2*, *Joint Monitoring Indicator 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator 4* were addressed again on the 5th of *April*.

At the meeting, the CAR Secretariat proposed to use the *Front and Back Office* concepts to improve *Service Delivery*. The Secretary General added that the CAR was now involved, with the support of France and CIDA, in developing new policies regarding the *One Window*

¹²⁰ "Governments have devised various institutional arrangements to ensure that the right number of public sector staff is hired, at the correct grades and with the right mix of skills for the tasks at hand. This is conventionally referred to as establishment control. Governments have developed public service pay scales that provide a consistent set of rules for matching personal emoluments to staff grades" (World Bank, 2008).

Office Service and on *Special Operating agencies (SOA)*¹²¹). He outlined staffing issues affecting the *Ministry of Health*. The priority was to enhance Service Delivery in rural areas. The Government wanted to see more qualified staff in the *Health Sector*; more medical doctors needed to be transferred from Phnom Penh to rural areas. The Assistant Secretary of the EC questioned the need to design the one window policy, given the two offices already in existence in Siem Reap and Battambang. The Secretary General explained that these offices were being tested and that no model for the office had been agreed on yet. Again, the Secretary General made it clear that they were looking for their own models and were not willing to just overtake models developed by donor agencies.

Further policies and frameworks in *Human Resource Management*, *Human Resource Development*, and *Capacity Development* were also being worked on. A new curriculum for the *Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building (EPSCB)* project of the *World Bank* had been agreed upon. The construction of the *Cambodian Distance Learning Centre* was being fast tracked during the same year. The Secretary General also referred to the CAR's work to build a *Human Resources Information Management System (HRMIS)*, with support from the EC. He said that he had recently visited Singapore to study e- Government initiatives and had since followed up some ICT possibilities in discussion with the Deputy Prime Minister.

He informed the attendees that the Council's website could be accessed internationally and that it would soon contain the Official Gazette. He further stressed that while the Council had very competent personnel and a high team spirit, they were limited in number with an average of one to two persons working on each project. Nevertheless, they had to work with all Ministries.

The meeting in *April 2005* focused primarily on the technical issues and challenges that were facing the professionals of the CAR. Several important pieces of information were revealed here. First, the intention to increase the focus on bilateral cooperation with selected donor organizations was expressed. Second, it was made clear that the CAR was looking for its own models and was not expecting advice from the *Technical Working Group* on the implementation of *Joint Monitoring Indicator 4*. Finally, the Secretary General revealed the priority policy of the Government was to focus on the development of *Health Sector* staffed in the rural areas with qualified personal. The deadlock of *JMI 2* on the remuneration scheme was directly connected to the reluctance of the donor organizations to support this Government policy and the 2005 CPIA report.

After the second éclat on *JMIs 1 and 2*, donors were under pressure to find ways to maintain the *Technical Working Group* as a joint mechanism of negotiation (31st of May 2006). In this context, CIDA's Head of Aid informed that his organization was considering funding the conceptualization of the *Human Resource Development (HRD)* and *Capacity Development*

¹²¹ A model borrowed from the *Canadian Public Service*, the "*Special Operating Agencies* are operational organisations within existing departmental structures which deliver services, as distinct from providing policy advice to Ministers. As part of their department, they are accountable for their operations through their respective Deputy Head and Minister Responsible. Each SOA operates under a departmentally approved business plan. In addition, an accountability relationship within the department is defined by its framework document, which also lays out target commitments for service levels and financial performance [...] A key aim of establishing an SOA is to give the opportunity, scope and freedom to managers and employees alike to more effectively serve their clientele" (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2008).

processes. The *World Bank* reiterated that funds from the *Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building (EPSCB)* project of the *World Bank* could also be looked at for this purpose. However, these funds were again indirectly connected to the *Remuneration Studies*. The second secretary of AusAid then informed participants that they were considering funding the 44,000 USD required for the immediate work on the development of the *Human Resource Management policy*. However, clarification of the guidelines needed to be completed first. DANIDA also expressed its interest in funding the *HRM* implementation work, however, it was not sure what the timing would be for the funding, expressing that it may occur later during the year.

With regard to the *One Window Office Service*, UNDP's Governance Specialist hoped to raise 50,000 USD for its implementation. GTZ and EU noted that they might be interested in funding the project. However, the GTZ expert reiterated that he would want to be sure that there was Government support and a clear consensus on the model that was being implemented.

He asked how the current work related to the offices being tested in Siem Reap and Battambang. The Deputy elucidated that the Siem Reap and Battambang offices were pilot projects to test their viability. The *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)* was developing a draft *Anukret*¹²² on the *One Window Office (OWO)* that was now being discussed within the *Council of Ministers (COM)*. He explained the different roles of the back and front offices and the linkages between those roles. The *Anukret* would accommodate different variations of the *OWO*, depending on the given situation, within a set of operational principles. The *CAR* would chair a Committee to oversee the *One Window Offices (OWO)* that were created, with the *Ministry of Interior* as Vice Chair. The *Ministry of Interior* supported the work that the *CAR* had been leading. Indeed the *OWO* was consistent with the Government's commitment to *Deconcentration and Decentralization*.

The Representative of *DFID* stressed that he could not commit his organization to fund *OWOs* at the *CAR*, although it was an important element of the *Deconcentration and Decentralization (D&D)* work. He suggested that the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on D & D* and the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* maintained strong linkages.

The reluctance to support the implementation of *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3* and *Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4* and the entailing conditions, namely precise guidelines, etc, of donor organizations such as *DFID*, *GTZ*, *World Bank* and to some degree *AusAid* is striking in this meeting. Interestingly, *CAR*'s reaction to this reluctance was rather defiant, as it decided to leave these demands out of its agenda and form a 'coalition of the willing' namely, *CIDA*, the *EC*, and the *French Embassy* on a bilateral basis.

The last meeting before the dissolution of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* addressing *JMIs 3* and *4* took place on the 18th of October 2006. At this meeting, the Secretary General of *CAR* informed that a *Capacity Development Framework* had been started with the support of *CIDA*; *DANIDA*, *AusAid*, and *France* also assisted the policy work of the *CAR Secretariat*. A progress report on the *Governance Action*

¹²² Sub Decree in Khmer

Plan 2 had been prepared, but only in Khmer, and it was circulated to donors in that form. Donors would have to translate it themselves.

In the final stages of the negotiations, power tactics were exercised on different levels, such as in the discussion on the disbursement and use of funds. At this point, professionals of the CAR did not see the need to translate the *Government Action Plan* into English. Finally, the former construction of the donor organizations as one homogenous group speaking with one voice and led by the *World Bank* and the state professionals was blurred. In this case, along the lines of donor organizations that were willing to cooperate with the conditions set out by the CAR and those were not. With these bilateral arrangements, the necessity for the *Technical Working Group* was reduced. Consequentially, the co-lead coordinator of the *World Bank* resigned in early 2007.

In effect, the dissolution of the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* was a result of various tensions and struggles, including those over the economic resources of the donor organizations but also symbolic and political resources. On one hand, not all donor organizations were willing to finance the *Priority Mission Group (PMG)*, the *One Window Service*, the implementation of the *Human Resource Management Plan* and to proceed with the *Strategy to Phase out their Supplementation Practices* until clear information on the structure, staffing and the internal working of the administration was disclosed. Conversely, the Government represented by the professionals of the CAR was not willing to disclose clear information on its internal political bargaining processes as it saw these processes as a Cambodian affair. Additionally, the Government pointed out the dynamic, incremental and flexible aspect of these bargaining processes. Change and reform, in its view, was not a technical aspect but a political one.

However, because of their political nature, the unresolved dilemmas and the tensions created in the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* spilled over to the semi-political, semi-technical, and political levels. As the Administrative Reform was closely connected to the other areas of development intervention, an overall political *éclat* had to be avoided. As a result, a political compromise was formulated. However, this compromise did not lead reopening the negotiations of the TWG and thus remained quite symbolic.

5.5. Consensus finding 2008

After the deadlock of negotiations during 2007, Representatives of donor organizations, the *Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)*, ambassadors, and professionals agreed to find a minimal consensus. This consensus was made public at the semi-political, semi-technical levels (*Government Donor Cooperation Committee*) meeting on *March 4th, 2008*. During the *Government Donor Cooperation Committee* meeting, the political Representatives of the donor organizations showed their commitment to support a harmonized, Government -owned incentive system, based on meritocratic principles to facilitate national and sub national incentives and to improve Service Delivery. They recognized this as an important first step for a broader systemic reform of the civil service. In the context of the *Rome (2003)* and *Paris*

(2005) *Declarations*, they were looking forward to stop the implementation of projects units and to shift toward the support of sector programs, which required a new salary incentive scheme over the medium term.

We are therefore pleased that, in recent weeks, the Council for Administrative Reform Secretariat and the Ministry for Economy and Finance have indicated their willingness to recommend a unified and sustainable incentive system for all strategic reform programs, incorporating merit based principles, and a gradually increasing RGC contribution, with which all Development Partners can align. We understand that the Council for Administrative Reform Secretariat and the Ministry for Economy and Finance are recommending a redrafted Sub Decree 98 to the Council of Ministers for this purpose. In our view, this, together with the agreement for specific arrangements in a few ministries, would be a significant step forward towards achievement of the Joint Monitoring Indicator on the phasing out of salary supplementation, and the establishment of more sustainable merit based pay initiatives in other Ministries. Should this be agreed soon, development partners would anticipate rapidly concluding agreements with Ministries implementing strategic programs in other sectors.

Public Administration Reform Statement on behalf of Development Partners at the 12th GDCC meeting, 2008

At the end of the meeting, they were willing to first jointly reassess the current situation covering organizational and *Human Resource Management* issues and then to agree on the subsequent steps necessary to re-engage in the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)*. They were furthermore willing to assist the implementation of the broader agenda of the Secretariat of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*. This included the implementation of, on the one hand, the revised *Human Resource Management Policy and Framework*, and on the other hand, the enhanced *Service Delivery* through the establishment of *One Window Offices*.

As a response to the joint statement, the Secretary General of the CAR Secretariat recognized that although increases in salaries within the civil service were an important step in its reform, they had to be sustainable and coherent among State institutions. That is why the Royal Government had targeted available resources to priority missions, senior management and functions in the *Ministries of Health and Education*.

The fundamentals of the administrative reform were now in place and the future fiscal framework provided room to maneuver. He welcomed the commitment of the donor agencies to harmonize and align their practices with Government priorities using Government instruments and to assume a significant part of the costs.

I believe partners are committed for the long term. We can now look at deepening and widening the administrative reforms to accompany reforms such as D&D, PFM and reforms in every sector. Last week, the Council for Administrative Reform, the Ministry for Economy and Finance, ministries and donor agencies met to agree on the characteristics of MBPI. I believe a document outlining the consensus has already been broadly circulated. With the assistance

of development partners we are now drafting a sub-decree to guide ministries in the use of the MBPI scheme. A similar sub-decree is being prepared for the PMG scheme. The two schemes go hand in hand. All that to say that we are well on our way to resolving the MBPI issue. Very quickly, we will need to focus on another instrument to enhance performance particularly in the delivery of public services.

H.E. Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the CAR at the GDCC meeting on the 4th of March, 2008

In the meantime the CAR Secretariat had conceptualized a new flexible instrument: *Special Operating Agencies (SAO)*. They were currently piloted at the *Health Centers*. The scheme was to be employed in a future *Employment Agency*.

Special Operation Agencies are particularly well suited for such services and where establishing an "établissement public à caractère administratif" is neither useful nor effective.[...]The Deputy Prime Minister is pleased with the progress made and has asked that we keep up the good work. We have reached a watershed point on issues of critical importance to the Royal Government and development partners: how to enhance and manage performance given available means? How to harmonize and phase out current dysfunctional salary supplementation? How to ensure that performance measures are consistent with what is and not upset the unity, stability and sustainability of the Administration?[...]The last few weeks have shown that we can work together and that we can overcome our misgivings. It is time we start to prepare for the next few years of reforms. A revitalized PAR TWG could be a plus. But first, we shall complete the work at hand.

H.E. Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the CAR at the GDCC meeting, March 4, 2008

In sum, despite an apparent consensus with the donor agencies that implied that the *Priority Mission Groups (PMG)* and *Merit-Based and Pay Incentive (MBPI)* schemes would respect similar standards to manage performance, the 'winner' of the negotiations were the professionals of the *Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)*. Indeed, in 2008, they had enough leverage to push forward their policies and priorities, such as establishing incentive schemes to attract civil servants to rural areas, and avoid the highly contested *Operational Review*. They were further able to push through their priorities, namely the conceptualization and implementation of the *One Window Service*, the *Public Service Delivery Policy*, and their *Human Resource Development Plan*. Even more, they were successful in keeping donor organizations out of their work; as of March 2008 the *Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)* had not been reintroduced.

5.6 Conclusion

Even though all professionals (donor organizations, state bureaucracy) were very close in terms of knowledge, practice, education and objectives namely the modernization of the

existing state institutions, their integration into different organizational settings such as f.e. the World Bank and the Council of Ministers limited their possibilities for horizontal alliances. As development knowledge was always dynamic and unequally shared between all actors, the negotiation failed, the TWG PAR was dissolved and all kind of interaction put on hold. In fact the negotiations at the TWG PAR were continuously translated into struggles over the control of strategic resources on one hand and over meaning and representation on the other.

The failure of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform (TWG PAR) hence partly evolved from the inability to recruit local interests, to connect actions/events to policy and to sustain politically viable models such as the MBPI. Essentially to ensure further funding and support, donor managers/professionals (in contrast to the CAR professionals), had to reflect external agendas, 'to bear the stamp of the plan' coming from their headquarters, rather than reflect their own organizational and social reality in Phnom Penh (see the example of the CPIA).

In other words, their orientation was mostly 'upward' as policy frames, benchmarks, results and indicators (development knowledge) came from their centers of calculation/headquarters (Mosse, 2004). As Rottenburg puts it '[...]both development cooperation itself and the organization structures it is supposed to set up, aim to establish reliable technologies for remote sensing, monitoring and control, which enable organized actions [by a center of calculation] from a distance that is independent from local loyalties and priorities. This is in essence an issue of representing reality through technologies of inscription and organizational procedures that have detached from other subsystems of society in such a way that they cannot be subjected, for instance, to social, political or economic criteria [...]' Rottenburg, 2009:xxiii. Without this interpretation practice, generally by consultancy work (for f.e. the operational review, labor study etc), actions and events at the TWG PAR remained without meaning in themselves.

The failure of the TWG PAR can also be traced back to the rejection by the CAR professionals of the technical code/metacode of the donor organizations. Essentially Donor and recipients of development aid can maintain the reciprocity of perspectives only through a metacode, i.e. a universal code that is comprehensible in all frames of reference (Rottenburg, 2009). Without this reciprocity of perspectives no cooperation can take place. During negotiations in the metacode, all statements are regarded as true. Therefore, negotiation processes can only function under the premise that players observe a code of objectivism. In the TWG PAR, this premise was often abandoned before and after negotiations, as the professionals of the CAR refrained from providing reliable information to the donor organizations and sustain what Rottenburg (2009) has coined the technical game.

Indeed the concrete work of a center of calculation (namely making information transferable without deformation for the purpose of control from a distance by introducing a metacode) is generally concealed through the public performance of a technical game. A successful technical game always implies the skilful avoiding of irresolvable contradictions between the accessible and inaccessible sides of the work. In order to do this, cooperation is performed with two different scripts: the official script and the unofficial script. The official script implies the transfer of a socially and culturally neutral knowledge, accessible to everyone

through appropriate training. The unofficial script implies the transfer of a knowledge system that addresses basic forms of social order such as political legitimacy, accountability and good governance (Rottenburg, 2009).

At the same time the technical game renders invisible all of the hegemonic effects on the local frames of reference / cultural codes: 'the conceptualization of a project/program as a technical game is a hegemonic process insofar as the locally self determined definition of how one wishes to live and work does not appear at all in this model' Rottenburg, 2009:184. At some point, when the commitment from the donor representatives to provide adequate financial and technical resources was put into question and the implementation of the CPP agenda was threatened, the CAR professionals rejected the dominance of the technical game, by demonstrating on one hand their fundamental differences in their implicit orientational knowledge and by expressing their interest in developing their own self determined reform concept on the other. Thereby they stopped switching from one script to the other and refrained to contend themselves with a new provisional consensus.

On a more general level, the meetings indicate an interesting cyclic dynamic of compromise/hope, conflict, and technical procedures which is probably common in all such negotiation processes. The starting point is a common goal/vision, a consensus on policy strategies that mobilizes metaphors (of for example partnership, governance) 'whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and to distribute agency' Mosse, 2004:230. Soon, these strategic issues have to be interpreted into action plans based on the organizational backgrounds that create quite distinct meanings. A phase of *meconnaissance* sets in. In this case, the terminology is still used; however, the meaning attached to these terms is already different. As a consequence, when it comes to practices resulting from what has been agreed upon, the different interpretations become obvious, generating conflicts at the technical level. However, due to the interdependency between donors and recipients, such a conflict cannot be maintained for long and a new and slightly different compromise in the strategic sense is reached on the political level with the whole cycle starting all over again.

6. Conclusion

The conclusions are, in a way, quite paradoxical. The modernization of administrative systems implies that these institutions evolve into a functionally differentiated system based on purpose and success orientation. In general, it means that the administration/bureaucracy becomes professional. However, in the Cambodian case, the question remains whether the professionals are the agents of modernity that push forth modernization or if modernization is itself as process of functional differentiation.

Although professionals have played a major role in political and social change at times and have been essential for the development of the culture of parliamentary democracy before and after independence, their role has changed from independent professionals to technocrats. Technocrats who present themselves as the exclusive producers of a particular status culture which is based on academic/intellectual culture and educational credentials. Thereby they use cultural resources and symbols as strategic means to monopolize key organizational positions and to form distinct 'consciousness communities'. Hence, instead of being the most 'modernized' section of the society they tend to become a conservative force. Though they may add to economic growth they do not foster political and social change.

Moreover, they do not constitute the most powerful group and are rather positioned in an intermediate position. As wealth, prestige, and power constitute scarce resources and as their self-reproduction, i.e. obtaining higher salaries, higher social status etc. is intertwined with that of the organization/vertical networks, their aspiration for more than just an equal leads them to integrate powerful patron-client networks. Clientelism is then perceived as an important pragmatic avenue of controlled freedom, useful for advancing in social, economic, and political domains that are regulated by competition for access to power, resources, and services (Roniger, 1994). Thereby, they follow exclusionary strategies towards on one hand other social groups who do not have the relevant credentials by excluding them from privileges or rewards and on the other hand, towards other professionals who do not belong to their networks. As a consequence, they have instrumentalized/restrained themselves from discussing the aims of their agency and use their technical-economic knowledge to pursue the interests of their organizations/vertical networks.

In fact, on the basis of their functional specialization and expertise, they have integrated large scale organizations such as the *Cambodian People Party (CPP)*, where they are encouraged and rewarded with public offices in accordance with politically sensitive stances. In that way they convert their clientelistic commitments into political influence and, once power is achieved, use their new power base to effectively formulate and implement policies for administrative reform (Roniger, 1994). This however reduces significantly their possibilities to organize politically on a horizontal level. In other words with increasing specialization, and thus, with increasing technical and expert knowledge, professionals tend to use their organization's capability and technical knowledge to serve the needs of their organizations/vertical networks.

Hence although professionals in Cambodia share the same vision of how Cambodia should 'develop', far reaching differences associated with the means and strategies persist. Without a mutual understanding of the strategies, chances to evolve as a 'strategic' group are therefore limited.

A potential exists though for the professionals working in the state administration to form a strategic group through processes of hybridization. They already make a career in the bureaucracy and occupy important office positions, secure their private economic interests through material coverage (e.g., marrying into business families) and hope to enter the political stage in the near future to secure their long-term power base. However, this would imply more intensive networking. At the same time, another potential exists to form of 'neutral' rational administration: after the ceding of the 'old guard' and thus the 'disentanglement' from old clientele structures. The civil servants could then find synergetic means with the professionals from the Human Right NGO's and from the private sector. However, for the time being, they all start from different points of reference for their agency. This is specially the case for the professionals at the interface of development cooperation.

For the professionals working within the Cambodian administration, personal politics within the state system are the main reference for action. Their performance is measured by their ability to secure the economic and political reproduction of their networks. For the professionals of the donor organizations' specific guidelines are the main reference. Political proceedings become troublesome factors in the smooth running of the development program (Bierschenk, 1988). Hence, their agency is limited by predefined technical reports that have to be sent to their management units at headquarters. These reports, which for the donor organizations constitute the 'Cambodian reality', determine the nature and work of the professionals working 'in the field'. Korff (2004) points out that the more organizations depend upon flows and networks, the less they are influenced by the social contexts associated with their locations. From this follows a growing independence of the organizational from the societal logic -the predominance of the rationality of means over the rationality of goals.

This ambivalence between the rationality of means and the rationality of goals is most obvious at the interface of development cooperation. There the *Royal Government* aims at influencing national politics whereas international aid organizations systematically exclude politics from their systems of reference. Thereby the Government is unable to define policies of the donor organizations, in formal terms, and conversely, the donor organizations are unable to define the political system or interfere in Khmer politics. As a result the political, moral and social dimensions (ends) are excluded from the direct negotiations at the interfaces of development cooperation. There political processes are essentially defined by donor organizations as solely technical (means).

For donor organizations technologies (means) have a clear advantage over cultural movements. Technologies do fulfill promises to quite a large degree more or less to the satisfaction of most people, as they increase agency to a very high degree and connect incentives to economics. In the combination of economy and technology both are disembedded and produce their own aims and objectives in the sense of more (growth), better, faster, etc. Furthermore, technologies, and similarly economics, allow for modeling, simulation, and calculability. Effects can be analyzed and function as base for political decision-making. Discussion is hence limited to professionals over the most appropriate technical model. Thereby problems are naturalized and defined as technical. Through the translation of issues and problems to developmental jargon, policies and programs, the

political dimension is then isolated. Problems resulting from development policies can be defined simply as a wrong selection, not as a fault of their ontological assumptions. Interestingly Ferguson (1994) advances that ‘development’ programs are set up to provide technical solutions to problems that are not technical in nature. Thereby, the proper policy becomes a selection of the technique defined as appropriate. In this sense, it is hardly possible for donor organizations to make the political context and nature of their intervention explicit.

Similarly, as they exclude the political dimension, so too do they exclude the moral dimension. Reform always implicitly refers to morality as it aims at defining a better future or a ‘better life’. In consequence, if no references to spheres external to society are possible, the definition of ‘better life’ is a social process in which ideas of good and bad are contrasted. Morality, in this sense is not an individual issue but is shared by cultural collectives. Thereby, ‘moral’ has to be institutionalized. Indeed, the moral definition of better life is the institutionalization of power differentials within a society. Sometimes ideas that are linked to promises of a better life contradict each other, because the understanding of ‘better life’ is connected to the social positioning, culture (in the sense of what persons can think about or imagine, cognitive structures), interests and opportunities (which are as shown above already, connected to power in the sense of what can be done).

Additionally, as they exclude the political and the moral dimensions, so do they exclude the social impacts of their intervention on social configurations. Through ‘development intervention’ existing power differentials are either enforced or modified (in the sense that new opportunities generated by development intervention are used by some actors) ,which implies at least relative decline of the current power holders.

In sum, while meaning is defined as apolitical benchmarks for development actors, relevant meaning for the Cambodia population is defined by the political elites (businesses and bureaucrats). Due to a lack of a public sphere, the general population is hardly included. Consequently, instead of an overall consensus, particular groups (high officials from the Cambodian Government, CPP, professionals or donor organizations), have their own specific idea of a better life and thus of development. This has an implication on the perception on the political system, as well as for the groups and the role they play in that political system.

Instead of defining reform and developmental intervention as political, moral and social matters -ideas of a better life – they are defined as benchmarks and indicators. This poses a problem in so far that these benchmarks and indicators can be ‘*sinnstiftend*’, i.e., provide meaning to acting.

Indeed, when we look at the governance system in Cambodia, we realize that different meaning systems with different practical implications compete with each other with regard to how ‘good’ administrative governance and thus state reform should be implemented.

Professionals from donor organizations have argued that enhancing the salaries of civil servants along criteria of efficiency and effectiveness combined with a process of de-bureaucratization has positive effects as they create incentives for qualified personal. This however leads to an automatic process of rationalization of the civil service and thus to an important reduction of the number of civil servants. Normally, de-bureaucratization occurs when the bureaucracy becomes less relevant as both a decision-making and decision

implementing (executing) organization. Thereby, it occurs when development is resulting from economic and social changes with little control by the administration. In an 'imposed' process of de-bureaucratization, the professionals of the CAR contend that if no other avenues for participation are open to departing bureaucrats, opposition emerges which can destabilize the state. In other words, in a post-conflict context where over-bureaucratization serves as a means for pacification by powerful bureaucrats, reducing the number of civil servants can become a political source of conflict. In addition, de-bureaucratization does not necessarily imply that a modern-bureaucracy exists. In fact, in patrimonial systems the bureaucracy can remain very small. Consequently, de-bureaucratization might also indicate return to 'traditional pattern'. In addition, they argue that, while de-bureaucratization is critical on a general and national level, it can have its value and relevance for local and district levels, because 'communitarism' implies de-bureaucratization. The rationalization of the civil service or de-bureaucratization can thus be useful in decentralization giving more autonomy to communities. However, this only works, if these local levels are integrated into a national administration or within the framework of a modern bureaucracy.

These different rationales can coexist for a long period of time until they need to be operationalized. The debate about the *Joint Monitoring Indicators* provides a telling example. Initially, there was a consensus among all actors on technical dimensions that should be implemented. Then a dynamic of *meconnaissance* evolved, when both sides demanded the implementation of their policies. A way to break this cycle and thus to avoid *meconnaissance* could be to find new forms of 'cooperation' that would focus on processes and their reflections rather than on predetermined technical outcomes.

This would imply the democratic creation of communities of meaning (not values) around public agencies to redefine the past and present in terms of an imagined future; meanings that would keep global and national agencies turned to the purposes emerging from and grounded in the public interest. It would also imply encounters with the administrative politics of international development practices to avoid sole technicism and to generate reflexive and creative practices that analyze the uncertain link between intention and outcome on one hand, and that place both programs and policy making back into fields of social relations on the other.

Bibliography

- Baudrillard, J., 1995: *Simulacra and simulation*. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor
- Berner, E. & Korff, R., 1991: *Dynamik der Bürokratie und Konservatismus der Unternehmer*. In: *Internationales Asienforum* 22 (3-4), p. 287- 305
- Berner, E., 1995: *Networks strategies and resistance*. Bielefelder Working Papers no. 218: Bielefeld
- Bierschenk, T., 1988: *Development projects as arenas of group negotiation for strategic groups. A case study from Benin*. In: *Sociologia Ruralis* 28 (2/3)
- Boua, C., 1993: *Development aid and democracy in Cambodia*. In: *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia*. Yale university Southeast Asian Studies: New Haven
- Bourdieu, P., 1977: *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago
- Brown, F. & Timberman, D., 1998: *Peace, development and democracy in Cambodia*. In: *Cambodia and the international community*. Asia society: New York
- CAR, 2004: *Report on five years achievement of the Council for Administrative Reform*. CAR Secretariat: Phnom Penh
- Coedès, G., 1968: *The indianized states of Southeast Asia*. The University Press of Hawaii: Honolulu
- Chandler, D., 1993: *A history of Cambodia*. Silkworm Books: Chiang Mai
- Chandler, D., 1998: *The burden of Cambodia's past*. In: *Cambodia and the international community*. Asia society: New York
- Chandler, D., 1999: *Brother number one*. Westview Press: Boulder
- CDRI, 2000: *Technical assistance and capacity development in an aid-dependent economy*. Working paper 15. Phnom Penh
- DANIDA, 2004: *Rationalizing donor salary supplementation practices in the context of pay and employment reform*. Mission report: Phnom Penh
- Dhiravegin, L., 1978: *The Thai bureaucratic elite: a study of their promotion and career advancement patterns*. In: *Studies in ASEAN sociologies*. Chopmen enterprises: Singapore
- Doyle, M., 1998: *Peacebuilding in Cambodia*. In: *Cambodia and the international community*. Asia society: New York
- Edwards, P., 1996: *Imaging the other in Cambodian nationalist discourse before and during the UNTAC period*. In: *Propaganda, politics and violence in Cambodia*. East Gate Book: London

- Eisenstadt, S., 1981: Political clientelism, patronage and development. Sage publications: London
- Eisenstadt, S., 1984: Patrons clients and friends. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
- Evers, H.D., 1966: The formation of a social class structure. In: American Sociological Review 31(4), p.480-488
- Evers, H. D., 1973: Group conflict and class formation in southeast Asia. In: Modernization in Southeast Asia. Oxford University Press: London
- Evers, H.D., 1978a: The role of professionals in social and political change. In: Studies in ASEAN sociologies. Chopmen enterprises: Singapore
- Evers, H.D., 1978b: The formation of a social class structure. In: Studies in ASEAN sociologies. Chopmen enterprises: Singapore
- Evers, H.D., 1978c: Specialization and Involvement. In: Studies in ASEAN sociologies. Chopmen enterprises: Singapore
- Evers, H.D., 1980: Group conflict and class formation in Southeast Asia. In: Sociology of Southeast Asia. Oxford University Press: Kuala Lumpur
- Evers, H.D., 1982: Sequential patterns of strategic group formation and political change in Southeast Asia. Bielefelder Working Papers no. 14 : Bielefeld
- Evers, H.D., 1983a: Makrosoziologische Anaylse gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung: Strategische Gruppen in Suedostasien. Bielefelder Working Papers no.39: Bielefeld
- Evers, H.D., 1983b: Bürokratisierung und Weltmarkt in Südostasien. Bielefelder Working Paper no. 34: Bielefeld
- Evers, H.D., 1987: The bureaucratization of Southeast Asia. In: Comparative studies in society and history 29(4), p. 666-685
- Evers, H.D. & Schiel, T., 1988: Strategische Gruppen. Dietrich Reimer Verlag: Berlin
- Evers, H.D., 1999: Globale Macht , zur Theorie strategischer Gruppen. Bielefelder Working Papers no. 322: Bielefeld
- Evers, H.D.,2001: Macht und Einfluss in der Entwicklungspolitik. In: Neue Ansätze zur Entwicklungstheorie. DSE: Bonn
- Evers, H.D. & Gerke, S.,2006: Knowledge is power. In: Working Paper Series 8a.University of Bonn: Bonn
- Ferguson, J., 1994: The anti-politics machine. University of Minnesota Press: Minnesota
- Foucault, M., 2002: The archaeology of knowledge. Routledge : London

- Frieson, K., 1996: The politics of getting the vote in Cambodia. In: Propaganda, politics and violence in Cambodia. East Gate Book: London
- Gaventa, J., 2001: Global Citizen Action. Earthscan: London
- Gaventa, J. & Valderrama, C., 1999: Participation, Citizenship and Local Governance. Background note prepared for workshop on 'Strengthening participation in local governance'. Institute of Development Studies, June 21-24, 1999: Brighton
- Geertz, C., 1980: Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bal. Princeton University Press, 1980
- Giddens, A., 1986: The constitution of society. University of California Press: Berkeley
- Giri, A. & Ufford, v. Q., 2003: Reconstituting development as a shared responsibility: ethics, aesthetics and a creative shaping of human possibilities. In: A moral critique of development. Routledge: London
- Global Witness, 2004: Taking a cut. Global Witness: London
- Golzio, K. H., 2003: Geschichte Kambodschas. Becksche Reihe: München
- Gottesman, E., 2003: After the Khmer Rouge. Yale University Press: London
- Haas, M., 1991: Cambodia, Pol Pot and the United States. Praeger: New York
- Hall, K., 1985: Maritime trade and state development in early Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu
- Houn, K., 1998: Cambodia and the international community. In: Cambodia and the international Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore
- Hughes, C., 2003: The political economy of Cambodia's transition 1991-2001. Routledge: London
- Hughes, C. & Sedara, K., 2004: The evolution of democratic process and conflict management in Cambodia. CDRI: Phnom Penh
- Hughes, C., 2007: International intervention and the people's will. In: Conflict and change. Routledge: London
- Hughes, C., 2008: Cambodia in 2007. In: Asian Survey 48 (1), p. 69-74
- Jennar, R., 1995: Les clés du Cambodge. Maisonneuve et Larose: Paris
- Kane, S., Dictionnaire des Khmeres Rouges. IRASEC : Paris
- Kiernan, B., 1982: Resisting the French 1946-1954. In: Peasants and politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981. Zed Press: London

- Kiernan, B., 1993: The inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodia peace process. In: Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia. Yale university Southeast Asian Studies: New Haven
- Kong, S., 2004: Governance and development: good governance in the context of Cambodia. Master thesis presented at the University of Potsdam
- Korff, R., 1986: Bangkok. Breitenbach Publishers: Saarbruecken
- Korff, R., 1990: Trade, city and state. Universität Bielefeld: Bielefeld
- Korff, R., 1992: Macht der Symbole, Symbole der Macht. Working Paper 166. Universität Bielefeld: Bielefeld
- Korff, R., 1998: Zwischen Konsens und Konfrontation. Bielefelder Working Paper no. 286: Bielefeld
- Korff, R., 2003: Politische Systeme südostasiatischer Modernisierung. In: Südostasien. Promedia: Wien
- Korff, R., 2004: State administration and local networks. University of Hohenheim: Hohenheim
- Korff, R. et al., 2006: Patronage, activists and repression. In: European Journal of East Asian Studies 5(1), p.71-100
- Kunz, E., 1973: The refugee in flight. In: International Migration Review 7(2), p. 125-146
- Kunz, E., 1981: Exile and resettlement. In: International Migration Review 15(1/2), p. 42-51
- Leclere, A., 1894: Recherches sur le droit public des Cambodgiens. Challamel: Paris
- Long, N., 2001: Development sociology. Actor perspectives. Routledge: London
- Mabbett, I., 1977: Varnas in Angkor and the Indian caste system . In: Journal of Asian studies 36 (3), p. 429- 442
- McSwite, O., 1996: Postmodernism, public administration and the public interest. In: Refounding democratic public administration. Sage Publications: London
- Metzl, J.F., 1996: Western responses to Human rights abuses in Cambodia 1975-1980. Macmillian Press LTD: London
- Mosse, D., 2004: Cultivating development. Pluto Press: London
- Neubert, D., 1999a: Probleme politischer Transition in Afrika. Zum Verhältnis von Patronage und Demokratie. Internationales Afrikaforum, Heft 1/1999, S. 75 – 83
- Neubert, D., 1999b: Demokratisierung ohne Zivilgesellschaft?. In: Im Schatten demokratischer Legitimität. Westdeutscher Verlag: Wiesbaden

- Neubert, D., 2004: Globalisierung der Demokratie? In: sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf Afrika. LIT Verlag: Muenster
- OCOM, 2004: Address by Samdech Hun Sen on the “Rectangular strategy” for growth, employment, equity and efficiency. First cabinet meeting of the third legislature of the national assembly: Phnom Penh
- Osborne, M., 1973: Politics and power in Cambodia. Longman Australia Pty Limited: Victoria
- Osborne, M., 1969: The French presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia 1859-1905. Cornell University Press: Ithaca
- Piriyarangsarn, S., 1983: Thai bureaucratic capitalism 1932- 1960. Chulalongkorn University Press: Bangkok
- Riggs, Fred, 1966: Thailand- the modernization of a bureaucratic polity. East West Center Press: Honolulu
- Roberts, D., 2001: Political transition in Cambodia 1991-1999. Curzon: Cornwall
- Roniger, L. & Günes-Ayata, A., 1994: Democracy, clientelism and civil society. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London
- Rottenburg, R., 2009: Far-fetched facts. MIT Press: Cambridge
- Royal Government, 2008: Sub Decree on the implementation of Merit Based Performance Incentive. Unofficial translation: Phnom Penh
- Royal Government, 2001: Governance action plan. Supreme Council for State Reform Commissary General: Phnom Penh
- Royal Government, 2005: Governance action plan II. Supreme Council for State Reform Commissary General: Phnom Penh
- Schiel, T., 1992: Strategische Gruppen und widerständige Tendenzen. Working Paper 177. Universität Bielefeld: Bielefeld
- Schiel, T., 2007: Südostasien Festland: das „prototypische“ Südostasiatische Reich Angkor. Unveröffentlichte Vorlesungsreihe basierend auf Golzio's Forschung in Kambodscha: Uni Bonn
- Schrader, H., 1994: Zum Verhältnis von Markt und Moral in westlichen und nichtwestlichen Gesellschaften. Working Paper 217. Universität Bielefeld: Bielefeld
- Schrader, H., 1994: Zum Verhältnis von Markt und Moral in westlichen und nichtwestlichen Gesellschaften. Bielefelder Working Papers no. 217: Bielefeld
- Thomas, A., 2000: Meanings and views of development. In: Poverty and Development. Open University Press: Oxford

Ufford, v. Q. & Giri, A & Mosse, D., 2003: Interventions in development: towards a new moral understanding of our experiences and an agenda for the future. In: A moral critique of development. Routledge: London

Vickery, M., 1986: Kampuchea. Frances Pinter: London

Vickery, M., 1982: Looking back at Cambodia 1942-1976. In: Peasants and politics in Kampuchea 1942- 1981. Zed Press: London

Weber, M., 1978: Economy and Society. University of California Press: Berkeley

Wheatley, P., 1971: The pivot of the four quarters. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh

Online sources:

Cambodian Information Center, 2008: Cambodia's Ruling Party Forms Coalition, But Says Royals Are Out. Source: <http://www.cambodia.org/blogs/editorials/2008/07/cambodias-ruling-party-forms-coalition.html>

Cambodian Embassy, 2008: Message by His Excellency Mr. Hor Nambora, Ambassador of Cambodia to the United Kingdom Denmark-Finland-Ireland-Norway-Sweden. 9 September 2008. Source: <http://www.cambodianembassy.org.uk/index.php?menu=1&link=7>

Council of Jurists, 1997: Model of particular statute of a body. Source: http://www.bigpond.com.kh/Council_of_Jurists/Foncpubl/fpl016g2.htm

CDC-CRDB, 2002: Government's Policy Program. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/7cg_meeting/position_paper_eng2004/7cg_02_1.htm

CRDB, 2006: TWG: Public Administration Reform. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/eighth_overview_public_administration.htm

CRDB, 2008: Synthesis of TWG reports to GDCC. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/twelfth/report_twg/ii_synthesis.htm

DANIDA, 2004: Draft working paper Public administration reforms in Cambodia. Source: <http://www.phnompenh.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/A0325587-3563-4D05-A5CE-6C24EE7BFEE6/0/DanidaDraftWorkingPaperonPARpassw.pdf>

DANIDA, 2004: Merit-based Pay Initiative. Presentation to informal donor lunch. Source: <http://www.phnompenh.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B8216CE1-675B-4C4E-A41B870EA89A2EDA/0/MeritbasedPayInitiativePowerPoint.ppt>

DANIDA, 2005: Rationalization of salary supplementation practices in Cambodia: a two track strategy. Source: <http://www.phnompenh.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/F82A5300-ED31-4F98-A955-F80A76E772E4/0/DonorAgreedTwoTrackApproachpassw.pdf>

DANIDA, 2008: Progress Against 2008 Annual Work Plan and Budget. Source: <http://www.phnompenh.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/11A394C5-BF98-46D9-BF41-9F08C3B758B6/0/ProgressagainstAWPB2008.doc>

DPADM, 2004: Kingdom of Cambodia public administration country profile. Source: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023231.pdf>

Donor Organizations, 2008: Public Administration Reform Statement on behalf of Development Partners at the 12th GDCC meeting in Phnom Penh 4th March, 2008. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/twelfth/twelfth_pars.htm

Donor Organizations, 2007: Development partner's consensus statement on governance for the CDCF

Filipetto, L, 2007:, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/ninth/ninth_australia.htm

Hongly, N., 2007: Speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/ninth/ninth_ngo_hongly.htm

Hongly, N., 2006: Speaking notes at the 7th GDCC meeting . Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/gdcc/seventh_hongly_eng.htm

Hun, S., 2007: Address at the First Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), Phnom Penh, 19 June 2007. Source:, http://www.cnv.org.kh/2007_releases/19jun07_cdcf_first.htm)

Mussomeli, J., 2007:. Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum. Source: http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/sp_061907b.html

Sok, A., 2007: Talk points at the CDCF meeting by the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, Chairman of the Council for Legal and Judicial Reform, 19th June 2007. source. http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/first_cdcf/session1/talk_point_sokan.htm

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2008: Special Operating Agencies. Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/Pubs_pol/oepubs/TB_B4/SOA-eng.asp

World Bank, 2002: Speech at the Cambodia Consultative Group (CG)meeting, June 19-21, 2002. Source: http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/macroeconomic_structural.htm

World Bank, 2008:Establishment Control and Pay Determination. Source: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTADMINISTRATIVEANDCIVILSERVICEREFORM/0,,contentMDK:20133428~menuPK:1919290~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286367,00.html>

[Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies](http://www.essentialaction.org/labor_report/cambodia.html), 2000. Source: http://www.essentialaction.org/labor_report/cambodia.html

Annex 1. Map of Cambodia



Annex 2. Interview Questionnaire

1. When and where were you born?
2. Where did you grow up?
3. Where did you go to school?
4. How long did you go to school?
5. Where did you study?
6. Where do you live in Phnom Penh?
7. Do you have your own house?
8. How large is the house?
9. Do you rent houses to third parties?
10. With whom do you live in your present house?
11. How important is religion for your parents?
12. Are you married?
13. Do you have sisters and brothers? What do they do for a living?
14. What do your parents-in-law do for your living? Do you stay at your wife's house?
15. How would you define a good father? How would you define a good mother?
16. Do you want to become like your parents?
17. Who inspires you? Who is an example for you?
18. Do you possess land or a farm outside Phnom Penh?
19. What does your family do for a living?
20. Who decides in your family about financial issues, personal issues?
21. Which ethnicity do your parents belong to (do you have Sino Khmer members in your family?)
22. What status has the woman compared to that of the man?
- 23.** Whom do you respect in your family?
24. What was for you the most remarkable change during the last 5 years?
25. Who is a role model for you?
26. What do you need to be happy?
27. Do you know someone who is happier than you presently are?
28. What do you hope for the future?
29. Where should your children go to school? To study?
30. What were the most important events in your lives?
31. What is a good life?

32. Do you know any proverbs on respect?
33. Where would you like to be in 5 years?
34. Do you think you might have a better life in 2 years?
35. How often do you go to the shopping malls?
36. How often do you travel abroad, have you ever seen snow, when?
37. Do you have a car? A motorbike? Whose idea was it to buy the item?
38. Do you have friends? Since when do you know them? What do they do for a living now?
39. How important is friendship?
40. How often do you meet with friends? Where do you usually meet (Karaoke, restaurants, bars, at home)?
41. Who is it important to know if you need any kind of service?
42. Who will help you find a better job? Help you if you need money? If you are in trouble?
43. Who do you respect very much and how do you show this respect?
44. Who is invited during wedding and funeral ceremonies?
45. What does a normal day look like for you? What do you usually do on WE?
46. How often do you eat per day? With whom and where?
47. When do you go to bed?
48. How important is religion for you? For your family?
49. What kind of journals do you read? Which radio stations do you listen to? Do you watch TV? How often, and which is your preferred program?
50. Why did you come back from the country where you studied and why did you come back?
51. Could you imagine living in that country?

Annex 3. Transition of political, legal and economic systems in Cambodia

Table 1: Transition of Political, Legal, and Economic Systems in Cambodia

Era System	Legal System	Political System	Political Power	Economic
Pre-1953	French based Civil Code and judiciary	Under the French Protectorate	Held by the French	Colonial type
1953-1970 (The Kingdom of Cambodia)	French based Civil Code and Judiciary	Constitutional Monarchy	Held by Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Prime Minister	Market and then nationalization
1970-1975 (The Khmer Republic)	French based Civil Code and judiciary	Republic	Held by Lon Nol	Market, war economy
1975-1979 (Democratic Kampuchea)	Legal system destroyed	All previous systems abolished, extreme Maoist agro-communism	Khmer Rouge	Agrarian, centrally planned
1979-1989 (The People's Republic of Kampuchea)	Vietnamese-oriented model	Communist party, central committee, and local committees	Cambodian People's Party	Soviet-style central planning
1989-1993 (The State of Cambodia)	Greater economic rights	Communist party, central committee, and local committees	Cambodian People's Party	Liberalized central planning
1993-present (The Kingdom of Cambodia)	French based Civil Code combined with common law in certain sectors	Constitutional Monarchy	Shared between FUNCINPEC and CPP	Transition to a market economy

Source: Compiled from Chandler (1991) and Cambodia Investment Guide (May 1999).

Annex 4. Short biographies of selected professionals

Son Ngoc Minh (Alias achar Mean, Pham Van Hua)

- Born in Tra Vinh (former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer) in 1904, of a Cambodian father and a Vietnamese mother, died in 1972 in Beijing
- Professor of Pali at Wat Unnalom
- 1942 leaves the capital following the Monks' Demonstration.
- 1946 takes the nom de guerre Son Ngoc Minh by capitalizing on Son Ngoc Thanh's heroic reputation and to link himself in people's minds with Ho Chi Minh
- 1951 President of the newly-formed Kampuchean People's Party of Kampuchea (KPLC) ; in this function Commander of the political arm of Cambodia's Communist resistance in the first Indochina war
- 1955 exile in northern Vietnam
- 1972 dies in Beijing
- 1980s honored post mortem as the father of Cambodian Communism in Vietnam, Laos, and the PRK

Tou Samouth (alias achar Sok)

- Born in ca.1915 to a wealthy family in the former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer, killed in 1962, probably on the orders of Sihanouk
- Monk at Wat Unnalom
- 1930es works as a outstanding Buddhist scholar and preacher with Son Ngoc Thanh and Suzanne at the Institut Buddhiste in Phnom Penh
- 1945 joins a communist cell of the Indochinese Communist Party created by Son Ngoc Minh after the Bombing of Wat Unalom by American airplanes
- Works as Interior Minister of the Committee of Liberation of the Southeast in eastern Cambodia
- 1948 takes the revolutionary name of Tou Samouth
- 1962 renames the Kampuchean People's Party of Kampuchea into the Workers Party of Kampuchea
- 1962 arrested by Sihanouk secret police and murder while in custody



Son Ngoc Thanh

- Born into a prosperous Khmer Krom family in Tra Vinh (former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer), died in Vietnam in 1977
- Secondary and tertiary studies in law in Montpellier and in Paris
- Returns to Cambodia in 1933 to join the colonial civil service as secretary of the Institute Buddhist in Phnom Penh
- 1936 founds of the first intellectual platform and newspaper Nagaravatta, closed in 1942 by the French administration

- 1942 exile in Japan under the protection of Emperor Hirohito to represent the Cambodian population except the king and his close associates, the royal family, and the functionaries loyal to France in the Khmer Nationalist Party
- 1945 returns to Cambodia to be Foreign Minister
- Reforms the education system by replacing French with Khmer as the language of instruction in the schools and enactment of laws to support the king and the Buddhiste Sangha
- Nomination as Prime Minister by Sihanouk
- Negotiations to integrate Cochinchina back into Cambodia
- 1945 arrested by the returning French administration after WWII
- 1947 trial in Saigon and condemnation to twenty years' imprisonment
- House arrest in the Poitiers/ France where he completes his law degree
- 1951 returns to Cambodia after the intervention of King Sihanouk
- Refuses the ministerial appointment by the young Democratic Party
- Founds his second newspaper Khmer Krauk (Cambodians Awake); the French ban the publication a month later in February 1952
- 1952 escapes into the maquis in the forest of Siem Reap where he joins the Khmer Issaraks (independence fighters), demanding for immediate independence and declares the Republican Government
- 1970 returns to Phnom Penh after the coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk by general Lon Nol
- Appointed as Senior Adviser and then as Prime Minister in the Government of the Khmer Republic
- 1972 forced out of office in a cabinet shake up
- Exile in Vietnam
- Dies in 1977 in Hanoi



Dr. Sisowath Youtevong

- Born in the old royal Cambodian capital city of Oudong in 1913 and died at Calmette Hospital in Phnom Penh in 1947
- married to a French National Dominique Laverne; double Nationality: French and Khmer
- 1941 graduates from the Faculty of Sciences in Montpellier/ France with a Doctorate Degree in Physical Sciences with high honour (mention très honorable).
- Delegate at the Conference in Hot Springs, USA.
- French Official at the French Ministry of Outre-Mer.
- Active member of the French Socialist Party
- 1946 founds the Democratic Party (along with Son Sann, Chhean Vam, Sim Var, Ieu Koeuss, Huy Kanthoul and Penn Nouth) which wins the first free elections
- Drafts the first Cambodian constitution modelled on the constitution of the French Fourth Republic that introduces civil liberties and parliamentary democracy to Cambodia (he is later known as the Father of Liberal Democracy and Father of the Cambodian Constitution).
- Dies suddenly at the age of 34 at the height of his political career



Son Sann

- Born in 1911 in Phnom Penh into an old 'aristocratic' family (Oknha) originally from Cochinchina/ Kampuchea Krom, died in 2000 in Paris/ France
- Primary schooling at the French primary school Ecole Miche in Phnom Penh
- Secondary schooling in France at the College Saint-Aspais in Melun
- Baccalaureat at the elitist Lycee Louis le Grand in Paris
- 1933 graduate at the École des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) in Paris/ France
- Brief stay in London, learning English in the process.
- 1935 official in the French civil service serving in the provinces of Prey Veng and later Battambang as vice governor
- 1939 joins the business of his wealthy Indian father in law
- 1941 member of the Cambodian Economic Mission to Tokyo to negotiate the rice price
- 1946 joins the Steering Committee of the Democratic Party
- 1946- 1948 Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
- 1946-1947 Minister of Finance in the Sisowath Youthevong Government from 1946-47
- 1950 Foreign Minister
- 1952 crushing of the Democrat Party in 1952, resignation from the leadership of the party
- 1954 advisor to Sihanouk during the negotiations for Cambodia's independence
- Late 1950es member of Prince Sihanouk's Sangkum Party
- 1954- 1966 president of the National Bank of Cambodia
- 1971 exile to France
- 1975 president of the Association of Overseas Cambodians
- 1979 formation of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to unite anti-communist refugees on the Thai-Cambodia border following Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia
- 1982 Prime Minister of the tripartite Coalition Government of Kampuchea with Sihanouk and Democratic Kampuchea
- 1992 formation of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
- 1993 minority member in the Coalition Government between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, and personal Advisor to King Sihanouk
- 1995 renames the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party into the Son Sann Party
- 1997 return to France
- Dies in 2000 in Paris



Hor Namhong

- Born in 1935 in Phnom Penh, current Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Royal Government of Cambodia
- Graduate of the Royal School for Administration (RSA) in Cambodia
- Studies at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales of Universite Paris II/ France
- 1967 First Secretary of the Cambodian Embassy in France
- 1970 joins the GRUNK
- 1973 ambassador in Havana/ Cuba
- 1975 imprisoned at Boeung Trabek (B-32)
- 1979 Co-founder of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)
- 1981 Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1982 Ambassador in Moscow
- 1993 Ambassador of the Royal Government of Cambodia to France
- 1998 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation



Keat Chhon

- Born in 1934 in Kratie, currently Minister of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
- Schooling at the College Norodom Sihanouk in Kompong Cham
- 1950 student at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure du Génie Maritime in Paris/ France
- Member of the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
- 1958 studies at the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) in Saclay/ France
- Engineer at the Ministry for Industry, Public Work and Telecommunication
- 1965 Secretary of State at the Ministry of Economy
- 1967 Minister at the Ministry for Industry and Trade; joins the Communist Party of Kampuchea
- 1970 joins the GRUNK of Sihanouk
- 1975 official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1979 delegate in the Khmer Rouge delegation to the United Nations in New York
- 1981 employed at UNIDO in Vienna
- 1984 UNDP consultant; he breaks all contact with the Khmer Rouges
- 1986 takes the French Nationality
- End of 1980es rapprochement to Hun Sen ; becomes his personal advisor
- 1994 Minister at the Ministry for Economy and Finance of the Royal Government of Cambodia



Ieng Sary (alias Kim Trang, Sou Hav and Comrade Vann)

- Born as Kim Trang into a prosperous landowning Khmer and Sino-Vietnamese family in 1925 in Tra Vinh province (former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer), married to Khieu Thirith; still alive as to January 2009
- At the age of 15 he is sent to live with relatives in the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng. During this time he is given the name Ieng Sary, which sounds more Khmer than his real name, Kim Trang
- 1942 having done exceptionally well as a student, he goes to Phnom Penh for further education
- 1945 scholarship to the prestigious Lycee Sisowath. He soon attracts attention for his intellectual powers and his interest in political action. At the Lycee he befriends the talented Keng Vannsak
- 1946 founds the Cambodia's Liberation Group from the French Colonialism (Groupe de Liberation du Cambodge du colonialism Francais)
- Democratic officials in the Ministry of Education reward him for standing up to the French by granting him a scholarship to study in France
- 1950 arrives in France and looks for his mentor Keng Vannsak who helps him settle
- 1951 marriage with Khieu Thirith in Paris in the 15th arrondissement; joins the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the French Communist Party; member of the Khmer Students Association(KSA) and then of the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
- 1957 returns to Cambodia
- 1960 becomes teacher for history and geography at Lycee Sisowath and at Kampuch' Bot 'Son of Kampuchea', founded by Hou Youn a former student of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers in France
- 1960 introduction to the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Kampuchea
- 1971 delegate sent from the Communist Party of Kampuchea to meet with Sihanouk in Beijing
- 1975 Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs
- 1979 Chief Diplomatic Negotiator of the Khmer Rouges with China
- 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
- 2007 arrested at his home in Phnom Penh on an arrest warrant from the Cambodia Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity



Khieu Ponnary

- Born in Battambang in 1920 to a aristocratic family (her father Norodom Sutharot is a judge with the rang of Preah Ang Machas), dies in 2003. Elder sister of Khieu Thirith. Their father run off to Battambang with a Cambodian Princess, leaving their mother to raise the family. Married to Saloth Sar alias Pol Pot
- Student at the French Lycee Sisowath

- 1940 first Cambodian woman to receive a baccalaureate degree
- 1949 studies of Khmer linguistics in Paris/ France; joins the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers in France, where she meets Saloth Sar; joins the Khmer Students Association(KSA)
- 1951 returns to Cambodia to work as a teacher at Lycee Sisowath;founds the woman's magazine Neary
- 1956 marriage with Saloth Sar (at the anniversary of the French "prise de la Bastille", 14th of july)
- Editor at the English Newspaper Kambuja
- 1965 escapes into the maquis with her husband
- 1970 Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
- 1973 Party Secretary of the CPK in Kompong Thom
- 19756 President of the Democratic Kampuchea Women's Association; diagnosed chronic schizophrenia
- 1979 divorce from Pol Pot
- 1996 granted amnesty from prosecution by the Royal Government of Cambodia
- 2003 death in Pailin



Kieu Thirith

- Born in Phnom Penh in 1931 to a relatively privileged and wealthy family, wife of Ieng Sary and sister of Khieu Ponnary
- Schooling at the French Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh
- 1949 studies English literature at the Faculté des Lettres of the Sorbonne in Paris/France; she majors with Shakespeare
- Member of Khmer Students Union (KSU)
- 1951 marriage with Ieng Sary at the Town hall of the 15th arrondissement in Paris
- 1957 returns Cambodia to work as an English professor at Lycee Sisowath
- 1960 starts her own private English school the Institut Supérieur Khmero-Anglais de Boeung Trabek
- 1975 Minister of Social Affairs and Action
- 1985 Vice president of the Women's Association of the Democratic Kamouchea; later Head of Democratic Kampuchea's Red Cross Society
- 2007 arrested for crimes against humanity



Keng Vannsak

- Born to a less privileged family, although he enjoyed some connections with the royal family in 1925 in a village in the Kampong Chhnang province; dies in December 2008 at the Montmorency hospital in Paris/France
- Married to a French national Suzanne Colleville, who holds several diplomas in the Cambodian, Lao and Thai languages and Physical Science
- Student at the prestigious Lycee Sisowath during World War II, where he excelled in literary studies. There he

- befriended the talented young radical Ieng Sary
- 1946 baccalaureate in Philosophy at Lycee Sisowath
 - Study of Cambodian linguistics in Paris/ France. During his studies Khmer-language assistant at the National School of Modern Eastern Languages (Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales)
 - During his studies, Khmer teacher at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
 - Mentor of Saloth Sar's and Ieng Sary's.
 - 1950 launches at his home the Cercles Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers
 - 1951 graduates of the Faculty of Literature and Human Science University of Paris
 - 1952 returns to Cambodia with his wife as teacher at the prestigious Lycée Sisowath in Phnom Penh and where he stayed until 1958; in the same year (1952) he developed the first typewriter keyboard with Khmer signs in 1952
 - 1954 member of the Democratic Party, aiming at launching an internal reform of the Party
 - 1955 leads of the Democratic Party and representing it in the 1955 legislative elections
 - September 13th to October 10th 1955 imprisonment ordered by Prince Sihanouk. After his release, he published poems he had written while in jail, which had a very strong influence on Khmer writers at the time
 - 1958 teaches at the National Pedagogical Institute, and member of the Secondary Education Khmer Language and Literature Programme
 - 1960s campaigns for the simplification of the Khmer language, thus spurring a decisive will for reforms
 - Professor of Khmer Literature, Culture and Civilisation at the Buddhist University of Phnom Penh
 - 1968 after the Samlaut Uprising, followed by severe reprisals, he is placed under house arrest with an interdiction to teach after being accused inciting sedition among his students
 - 1969 in charge of the Khmer Inscriptions Department at the University of Fine Arts
 - 1970 rehabilitated after Lon Nol's military coup and leader of a Khmer-Mon Institute, founded by Lon Nol ;in the same year he went back to France to prepare a PhD Thesis entitled "Recherche d'un fond culturel khmer" (Research on a Khmer cultural inventory), which he presented the following year in Paris
 - 1971 Deputy Representative of Cambodia's Permanent Delegation to UNESCO and Chargé d'Affaires of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic in France
 - 1974 Cambodian Ambassador to France in 1974
 - After 1975, exile in France

Thiounn Mumm

- Born to one of the most powerful non royal family (Khmero-Vietnamese) in Phnom Penh. His grandfather amassed a fortune as the Minister of Palace Affairs under King Norodom, King Sisowath, and King Monivong. His father was the first Cambodian to earn a Lycee and university qualifications in France
- Enrolls at the French Lycee Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon
- Studies at the University of Hanoi until 1945
- 1946 student at the elitist Ecole Polytechnique in Paris; first Cambodian student to a diploma in Telecommunication Engineering

- Member of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the Khmer Students Association (KSA) where becomes the mentor of Saloth Sar
- PHD (Docteur ès Sciences) at the Sorbonne
- 1951 joins the French Communist Party (Mumm was probably responsible for bringing Sar into the party in 1952)
- 1954 returns to Cambodia to work with Keng Vannsak and Sichau in the Democratic Party. He also renewed contact with Saloth Sar
- 1955 leads the bloodless coup in the Democratic Party, pushing aside several of its founding members and taking over the executive committee.
- Escapes to France
- During the 1960es researcher in nuclear physics in Paris
- 1970 after the coup against Sihanouk in Cambodia he joins the newly formed GRUNK in Beijing as Minister for Economy and Finance
- 1975 Director of the Institute for Science and Technology in Phnom Penh; trains the Government technicians
- 1976 Minister of National Committee of Sciences and Technology
- 1980 Minister of Science and Technologies in the exiles Government of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1983 retirement from public life



Saloth Sar (alias Pol Pot)

- Born in Prek Sbauv in Kampong Thom Province in 1925 to a moderately wealthy family of Sino-Khmer descent; married to Khieu Ponnary; dies in 1998; his cousin Sowath-chhom Norleak Meak is the third wife of King Monivong
- 1935 schooling at the private École Miche, a French Catholic school in Phnom Penh (attended by the sons of French officials and wealthy Chinese, Sino-Khmer and

Vietnamese Families)

- 1941 schooling at Norodom Sihanouk
- 1947 student at the Technical School at Russey Keo in Phnom Penh; in this year he meets Ieng Sary who introduces him to the Democratic Party
- 1949 earns a Government scholarship to study radio electricity at the École Française de Radioélectricité (EFR) in Paris/ France
- 1950 participation in an international labour brigade team to build roads in Yugoslavia
- 1951 member of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the Khmer Students Union (KSU) which had taken control of the Khmer Student's Association (KSA) that same year; Member of the French Communist Party
- 1954 returns to Cambodia without having finished his studies
- 1953 member of the Indochinese Communist Party
- 1954 travel to the Viet Minh Eastern Zone headquarters to work for the mass propaganda section and attend the cadre school in the eastern Part
- 1955 liaison work with radical Democrats such as Thioun Mumm and Keng Vannsak in Phnom Penh on behalf of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP= and making preparations for the 1955 elections
- Publications of articles in the radical newspaper Sammaki (Solidarity), edited by his brother Saloth Chhay

- 1956 marriage with Khieu Ponnary
- 1956 teacher for French poetry (Hugo, Rimbaud, Verlaine, Vigny, Rousseau) history, geography, and civics at the private Lycee Chamraon Vichea ('Progressive knowledge'), in Phnom Penh. About three hundred students attended the four year course at Chamraon Vichea. Both school Chamraon Vichea and Kambuj'Bot soon became a forum for radicals who lacked credentials to teach in the more prestigious and better paying state system
- 1962 arrest and murder of Tou Samouth; Sar becomes the acting leader of the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK)
- 1963 election to Secretary of the Central committee of Workers Party of Kampuchea
- 1963 escapes to the Vietnamese border region to make contact with Vietnamese units fighting against South Vietnam
- 1964 he breaks with Marxism by declaring rural peasant farmers to be the true working class proletariat and the lifeblood of the revolution
- 1966 he renames the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK) into the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK)
- 1976 Prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1977 nominates officially Nuon Chea as Prime Minister
- 1985 official resignation as chief of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)
- 1997 sentenced to life long house arrest
- 1998 death in his home at the Thai border

Hou Youn

- Born in 1930 to a landowning Sino-Khmer family, assassinated by the Khmer Rouges in 1975
- Enrolls at Lycee Sisowath
- 1949 studies of Law in Paris/France
- One of the 5 founder of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers
- Member of the Khmer Students' Association (KSA) and of the French Communist Party
- 1952 sends with Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, and other leftists an open letter to Prince Norodom Sihanouk calling him the "strangler of infant democracy"; Sihanouk terminates his scholarship
- PhD in Economics at the University of Paris on "The Cambodian Peasants and Their Prospects for Modernization" which challenges the conventional view that urbanization and industrialization are necessary precursors of development
- 1956 founds with Khieu Samphan the Khmer Students' Union
- Returns to Cambodia as Director of the private Lycée Kambuj'bot, which he helped establish
- 1958 Sihanouk appoints him Secretary of State at the Ministry for Trade and Industry
- 1959 appointed Secretary of State at the Ministry of Planning and then at the Ministry of Public Health
- 1960 Professor at the Faculty for Law and Economics
- 1962 Minister of Finance
- 1964 Director of the private Lycée Kambuj'bot; creates the Sino-Khmer (Maoiste) Association
- 1967 escapes to Tram Kak with Khieu Samphan after being threaten by Sihanouk

- 1970 Minister of Interior of the GRUNK
- 1974 after raising critics against the other Khmer Rouge he is discharged from his post and forced to work on a farm
- 1975 murdered on the orders of Pol Pot

Hu Nim (Alias Comrade Phoas)

- Born in 1932 to a rather poor Sino-Khmer family, purged from the Communist Party of Kampuchea and killed in 1977 in the prison of Tuol Sleng (S21)
- Schooling at the College Norodom Sihanouk
- 1952 baccalaureat at the Lycee Sisowath
- Teacher at Kambuj'bot
- 1955 studies of law at the Sorbonne
- PhD on 'Les Services Publics et Economiques
- 1967 escapes from Sihanouk returns to Cambodia; works as lawyer and journalist at the Pracheachun Serei
- 1970 Minister of Information in the exiled GRUNK Government of Prince Sihanouk
- 1975 Minister of Information in the Government of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1977 arrested and killed in Tuol Sleng on the orders of Pol Pot

Khieu Samphan



- Born in 1931 to a Sino-Khmer family, still alive as to January 2009; his father was a judge in Tuk Meas
- Enrolls at the College Norodom Sihanouk
- Enrolls at the Lycee Sisowath and later at the French Lycee Descartes
- 1953 studies law and political economy in Montpellier
- 1956 moves to Paris where he starts his PhD in Economics
- Is introduced to the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers by Ieng Sary
- Founds the Khmer Students' Association (KSA); the KSA is closed down in 1956
- 1956 founds with Hou Youn the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
- 1959 PhD entitled 'Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development' in which he advocates national self-reliance and generally sides with dependency theorists in blaming the wealthy, industrialized states for the poverty of the Third World
- 1959 returns to Cambodia to hold a faculty position at the University of Phnom Penh
- 1959 launches l'Observateur, a French-language leftist publication that was viewed with hostility by the Government
- 1960 l'Observateur is banned, Khieu arrested and forced to undress and get pictured in public on the orders of Prince Sihanouk
- 1970 after the Government of Prince Sihanouk is ousted, he joins forces with the now-deposed monarch in establishing an anti- Government coalition known as the Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK)
- 1973 appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander-in-Chief of GRUNK military forces
- 1975 President of the Central Presidium in 1976

- 1976 president of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1979 Leader of Democratic Kampuchea in Thailand
- 1982 Vice-President for Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)
- 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
- 2008 first appearance in front of the Cambodia Tribunal and charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes with his lawyer Jacques Vergès
- Publications:
 - Samphan, K., 1979: Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development. Cornell University Southeast Asia: Cornell
 - Samphan, K., 2007: Reflection on Cambodian History Up to the Era of Democratic Kampuchea. Phnom Penh



Son Sen

- Born 1930 in Cochinchina to a rather wealthy landowning Sino-Vietnamese Family; assassinated 1997 on the orders of Pol Pot
- Schooling in Phnom Penh
- 1953 studies philosophy at the Sorbonne
- Joins the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers through Ieng Sary
- 1956 returns to Cambodia to work as a teacher at the Lycee

Sisowath

- 1957 Vice- Director of Studies at the National Teaching Institute
- 1960 leading member of the reconstituted Workers Party of Kampuchea.
- 1964 escapes to the southwest of Cambodia
- 1968 escapes to the Northeast
- 1972 Chief of Staff of the Khmer Rouge Forces
- 1975 Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense of Democratic Kampuchea and chief of the Santebal - the Khmer Rouge secret police
- 1979 Supreme Commander of the insurgent National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1980 president of the Defense Committee of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)
- 1991 negotiation with Khieu Samphan for a peace treaty with UNTAC and the Royal Government of Cambodia in Phnom Penh
- 1992 removal from power after a dispute with fellow Khmer Rouge leaders over whether to continue the negotiations
- 1997 assassinated alongside 13 members of his family, including women and children, on the orders of Pol Pot



Nuon Chea (Alias Long Bunruot, Runglert Laodi)

- Born into a prosperous Sino-Khmer family in Battambang in 1926 (his father Han Chinese migrated to Battambang trades with rice and corn), still alive as to January 2009
- 1944 law student at Thamassat but he doesn't complete his law degree
- Official at the Thai Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- 1950 becomes member of the Communist Party of Thailand
- 1951 resigns from the Ministry and joins the communist insurgents in Ta Sagn
- 1960 elected Deputy General Secretary of the Workers Party of Kampuchea (later renamed as the Communist Party of Kampuchea)
- 1970s second most important member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea after Saloth Sar
- 1976 'Brother Number Two' during Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Propaganda and Political Education
- 1976 Interim Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea
- 1978 Commander of the Easter Zone
- 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
- 2007 arrested at his home in Pailin and flown to the Cambodia Tribunal in Phnom Penh where he is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNITED MOVEMENT KINGDOM OF
CAMBODIA(DNUM)NATION RELIGION KING

STATEMENT OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SESSION 2
OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNITED MOVEMENT

(Unofficial translation by Lay Putheara of the Documentation Center of Cambodia)

A delegation of 245 people from the capital city Phnom Penh and provinces all over the Kingdom of Cambodia met January 25, 1999 in the General Assembly, Session 2 of the Democratic National United Movement (DNUM) under the chairmanship of His Excellency Ieng Sary, Head of the DNUM. After listening and discussing on various reports from all the sources, the Summit unanimously worked out a general declaration as follows:

On December 25, 1998, His Excellency Khieu Samphan, Former Head of State of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) Regime, and His Excellency Nuon Chea, Former Chairman of the People's Representative Assembly of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) Regime, jointly sent a letter to Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, solemnly declaring their recognition of the royal leadership of His Royal Majesty Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the incumbent Royal Government of Cambodia. They also declared their return into the society as simple citizens in order to help contribute to the national healing and reconciliation by ending the country's internal division and joining in the restoration and building of Cambodia.

Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen has warmly welcomed into the fold of society His Excellency Khieu Samphan and His Excellency Nuon Chea, and he formally reported this favorably significant event of national importance to His Royal Majesty Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Acting Head of State of the Royal Government of Cambodia, and Samdech Heng Samrin, Acting Head of the National Assembly.

King Norodom Sihanouk also was very happy with "this good news", and most profoundly admired Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen for having further succeeded in his new move toward the implementation of the national reconciliation and pacification of the Royal Government of Cambodia, which is aimed to provide the people and the country of Cambodia a thorough peace as well as make progress at a great pace.

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Acting Head of State and Head of the National Assembly, and Samdech Heng Samrin, Acting Head of the National Assembly, both also applauded this significant event.

Former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali met with His Excellency Khieu Samphan December 30, 1998, and welcomed and congratulated the latter for having decided to come and live within society. In addition, while he was in office, the Paris Peace Accords had not been thoroughly implemented, and national healing and reconciliation remained uncompleted, said Boutros Boutros Ghali. He also added that he is happy that now His Excellency Khieu Samphan is back in society and Cambodia has anew yielded a peace and harmony. Other problems in the future are internal ones of Cambodia, and there should be no interference by foreigners.

"Within a short time, however, there have been inspirations for a trial of this person, that person", said His Excellency Ieng Sary adding that, "the wound that has not been completely healed is being poked with a stick." Given this situation, the DNUM would like to declare as

follows:

1. On January 21, 1999, Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, gave a memo "with ideas and considerations in regard to a formula finding approach towards a trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders" to the UN Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia. The memo addresses in full details and seriously a wide range of related problems. This Session 2 of the DNUM Summit is totally in favor of the concept and stance set forth in the memo, especially on points as such:

-Anything that leads to the national reconciliation breakup again should be avoided.

-We need both peace and justice. If a civil war breaks out again as a result of a trial, who will hold the responsibility and how will the problem be settled?

-The cause of the fact between 1970-1998 is the whole of "events" which cannot be separated.

2. The return of His Excellency Khieu Samphan and His Excellency Nuon Chea into society marks the end of the old unfortunate epoch and, in turn, opens a new era for the history of Cambodia. Nonetheless, creating new complex problems in Cambodia is contrary to our common tendency to ensure that the people of Cambodia remain in peace and in the state of relief following the prolonged war and tension of nearly 30 years. When Khmer get in conflict with Khmer, it is said Khmer never get united, but are only good at fighting. But when Khmer get united, Khmer are instigated to fight each other.

3. Cambodia had problems since 1970. It was previously known as "the Island of Peace". In 1970 the Island of Peace was destroyed, replaced with ruins of destructive wars. In 1973, following the existence of the peace agreements between the United States and Vietnam, Cambodia was under heavy bombardments for nearly seven months--two hundred days and nights--without any reason. Cambodian society was turned into upheavals; a phenomenon of violent culture existed and intensified during the war period of 1970-1975. Therefore, given the situation in Cambodia, judgments or experiments should be all made to cover all epoches, starting right from the 1970's, not just confined to any selected option only in favor of or for the sake of any Great Power country's strategy or ideology.

4. The United Nations was the broker of the peace talks in Paris and the Paris Peace Accord, the final product of three years of most tense and repeated negotiations. Every provision and each term in the Accords was very well weighed, that is the 23 October 1991 Paris Peace Accords was an approach most appropriate to the actual situation in Cambodia. The spirit and essence of the Accords was about peace and national reconciliation, not a trial of anybody. Democratic Kampuchea had been a full-right member of the United Nations from 1975 to 1991. As one of the signatories to the Accords, Democratic Kampuchea is equal to the other three Khmer parties. The speech, also based on the spirit of the Accords, as excerpted above of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the 30 December 1998 meeting with His Excellency Khieu Samphan is evidence of this. So, now if they [parties] proceed contrary to the spirit and essence of the Accords, what shall we understand of the role of the United Nations. Those [parties] opposing to implement the second phase of the Accord rationalized that some alliances have used the Accord to deceive [others]. Now, some Great Power countries are burying the Accord and resorting to a trial of some people. Does not this act prove that there has been deception?

5. The historical mistakes made in leading the country should not be forgotten. Yet, the sufferings from the very painful deaths of [our] siblings, children, relatives and friends will never die out easily. The house where people used to live with their grandparents since childhood until the time when they had children of their own, and which has been lost, is an undying regret, though perhaps it may be easy for those born after the year 1979 to forget. This is a human sympathy, which we all should know and respect. But, in reality, in order for our nation to free itself of all the problems and live in harmony together as one, what should we do? What [are the problems] we can solve? What [are the problems] we cannot solve?

What [are the problems] we should settle immediately? What [are the problems] we should leave unsolved for a while? Given the situation in our country where firm stability has yet to be found, with some Super Power countries that never take responsibility [for what happened] pressuring us to follow them in order to serve their strategy and ideology; and given the political atmosphere infested with internal irrational ire in our nation, can justice be possibly found? Can [we] clearly and objectively learn from our past? These are all the problems we need to think about with a sense of responsibility.

4. The historical mistakes must not be allowed repeated. They are, however, such a huge problem that requires a span of time and most comprehensive research as well as scholars in fields like History, Sociology, Law, etc. Given the fragile situation and the current political atmosphere in our country, the Democratic National United Movement (DNUM) sees that a trial of this person or that person is not the solution to the problem. It is only by making judgments and learning lessons from our history in a scientific and objective way that our later generations of children would be able to learn and understand so that the recurrence of the historical mistakes are prevented.

From now on, after the July 26, 1998 election and the nomination [establishment] of a [new] coalition government presided over by Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, Cambodia once again has enjoyed the light of peace. Favorable factors have just existed, following 30 years of the dragged-out civil war. Anything bringing about a loss of the results we have acquired from years of perseverance should be averted, as emphasized in the memo of Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen saying, *{dl;kMBg; lg;TUK}*, which means "the boat collapses just as we arrive at the harbor."


Pailin, 25 January 1999

On behalf of the General Assembly,
Session 2 of the DNUM

Signature
Ieng Sary

Annex 7. 'It's a Family affair'

IT'S A FAMILY AFFAIR



Annex 8. Sincere Congratulations To His Excellency SOK AN, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in charge of the Office of Council of Ministers On The Occasion of the Ceremony to Confer His Honorary Doctoral Degree of Public Policy and Management Chamroeun University of Poly Technology (CUP). Delivered By H.E Om Yentieng



His Excellency Sok An was born on 16 April 1950 in Kampong Village, Preah Bat Chuan Chum Commune, Kirivong District, Takeo Province. He married to Her Excellency Annie Sok An with one daughter and four sons. He finished his upper secondary education in 1967 and soon after started his public employment as a lower secondary school teacher and in 1969 he was promoted to be the principal of Tunlorp College, Kirivong District of Takeo Province.

In 1972, he graduated with a Bachelor Degree of Geography, History and Sociology from the Royal University of Phnom Penh and an Advanced Diploma in Educational Pedagogy from the Ecole Normale Supérieure. From 1973 to 1975, he continued his study in Diplomacy at the National School of Administration.

During the Pol Pot Time, His Excellency Sok An and his family were displaced to Trapaing Thmar village, Poy Char commune, Phnom Srok District, Banteay Meanchey province. His family was living in slavery conditions like all Cambodian families. After the collapse of Pol Pot Regime and in his willingness to serve the people and to contribute to the restoration of the devastated nation, His Excellency Sok An, a surviving intellectual from the regime, started his public employment in the government of Cambodia.

In 1981, he was appointed to be the Secretary General of the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* and Chief of *Office of the Cabinet* of Samdech Hun Sen. In 1983, he was appointed Secretary General of the Cambodian National Committee for Peace.

In 1985, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Cambodia to India. In 1988, he was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1991, he was appointed the Chief of the Cabinet Office of Central Committee of Cambodian People's Party and Vice Minister of Interior and at the same time, he was appointed Secretary General of the National Supreme Council representing the Cambodian People's Party to work on the national reconciliation and peace for the nation.

From the 1993 general election up to the present, His Excellency Sok An has been appointed Minister in charge of the Office of Council of Ministers and elected member of the National Assembly for Takeo constituent. In 1998, he was appointed Senior Minister and in 2004 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. He is also appointed Chairperson and President of National Committees and Authorities, which play an important role in implementing the public policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia and in contributing to the poverty reduction and the sustainable development of the country.

He is also appointed Chairman of Special Taskforce for Khmer Rouge Tribunal of the Royal Government of Cambodia to negotiate with the United Nations on the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea.

The purposes of the establishment are to (1) bring justice to the victims; (2) prevent the reoccurrence, to make remembrance and share knowledge with the future generations; (3) If the Court is successful in undertaking its role, it will be used as a case model for the Cambodia Courts and for the World Court of Genocidal Crimes; and (4) ensure peace, political stability, national reconciliation, social order and protection of national sovereignty.

In serving the nation and the people, His Excellency Sok An actively negotiated with neighboring countries to address bordering issues successfully and to initiate the development of natural resources. With these efforts, he brought considerable achievements to the nation. The Royal Government of Cambodia, under the leadership of Samdech Hun Sen, has expressed high commitment, political

willingness and firm positioning in establishing, maintaining and protecting peace and safety for all Cambodian people.

The immediate needs of the Cambodian people after the availability of political stability and peace are to improve the quality of life and wellbeing, which will ensure the prosperity and sustainable development of the nation. In response to these needs, the Royal Government of Cambodia, under the state reform framework, has firmly and constantly established “a united public administrative system” by implementing the public sector reform program. For instance, all political parties, especially the Khmer Rouge, integrated into the public sector process. The efforts bring historical results to Cambodia and contribute to the national reconstruction after years of internal conflicts.

To better serve the citizens, the Public Sector Reform Program aims to change public sector behavior and traditional practices from acting as “a manager and controller” to being an effective service provider. In order to achieve the goal, the Royal Government of Cambodia requires a qualified, creative, ethical and strategic leader with a balanced state of mind in the process of implementing the public sector reform program.

Under the political guidance of Samdech Hun Sen, His Excellency Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, a Permanent Member of the Supreme Council of State Reform and the President of the Council of Public Sector Reform, is a political leader who actively contributes to the formulation and implementation of policies, strategies and programs that ensure the achievement of the goal of the Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia.

The public institutions at both national and sub-national levels are smoothly functioning under the principles of the rule of law, resulting from the effective implementation of the public sector reform program. Given the unified environment of the public sector performance, all citizens are better able to receive public and effective problem-solving services.

This type of environment facilitates all parties and stakeholders to participate in voicing their concerns and in decision-making, affecting their daily lives. For instance, all political parties, civil society, associations, communities and grass-root people are able to participate in decision making in various ways. Political parties participate in general elections and in Commune/Sangkat elections. Civil society, associations, community and grass-root people can voice their problems and concerns via media and public forums.

Given the effective implementation of the public sector reform program, public institutions at all levels are more transparent and closer to the citizens, more effectively serving their citizens by applying multiple formulas and viable strategies. The Royal Government of Cambodia ensures the existence of transparency in the public sector functioning so that it sustains the use of resources and contributes to the national development.

To ensure the effective functioning of the public sector, the Royal Government of Cambodia has been implementing the Governance Action Plan I (2001-2004) and Governance Action Plan II (2005-2008) as well as other reform programs in consistency with Samdech Hun Sen’s principle “Good Governance is a pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia”.

A decision to confer the Honorary Doctoral Degree of Public Policy and Management upon His Excellency Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, is made based on the results of the implementation of the public policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the public sector reform program, the management and leadership of public sector institutions as well as other responsibilities and achievements undertaken and accomplished by His Excellency Sok An in serving Cambodian people, under the creative guidance of Samdech Hun Sen, and based on the evaluation initiated and participated by the Representatives from the Handong Global University of Korea, the Bansomdejchaopraya Rajabhat University of Thailand and the Edith Cowan University of Australia, Cambodian intellectuals, the Governing Board and Scientific Academic Council and Management Board of Chamroeun University of Poly-Technology, of his capability and achievements, conducted on 5 April 2007 at Phnom Penh Hotel, related to the academic subject of public policy and public management.

This conferral is in honor to and in appreciation of His Excellency Sok An's efforts and leadership. This conferral makes him a model for his qualified, creative, ethical leadership of the country that the public servants can use to better serve the people and to ensure the achievement of the goal of the Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia, leading to prosperity and progress.

Source, CAR, 2007

Annex 9. Key professional figures of the 'Russian generation': Dr Moniroth and Dr. Chuon Naron



PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Name	AUN PORN MONIROTH
Date of Birth	01 January 1965
Place of Birth	Phnom Penh
Nationality	Cambodian
Marital Status	Married with three children
Languages	Khmer (Fluent), English (Fluent), Russian (Fluent)

CURRENT POSITIONS:

Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Finance
 Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office (with the rank of Minister)
 Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council (with the rank of Minister)
 Member of the Board of Governors of the National Bank of Cambodia
 Member of the Board of Governors of the Royal School of Administration.
 Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the Council of Governors of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) .

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS:

- (1990-1993) *Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)*
 Philosophy, Political Sciences
 Moscow State University
- (1991-1992) *Diploma on International Business*
 Moscow School of Business
 Russian Economic Academy
- (1984-1990) *Master of Arts*
 Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences
 Moscow State University

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES:

- (13/01/03) Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the Council of Governors of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
- (11/09/01) Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council (with the rank of Minister)
- (1999) Member of the Board of Governors of the National Bank of Cambodia.
- (23/09/1999) Member of the Board of Governors of the Royal School of Administration.
- (06/02/99) Secretary General of the Ministry Economy and Finance (with the rank of Secretary of state) and Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office
- (02/12/98-06/02/99) Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister (with the rank of Under Secretary of State), Prime Minister's Office, Policy Planner and Senior Economic Official, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Director of Cabinet of the First Chairman of Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC), Adviser to Senior Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of Economy and Finance.
- (6/1996-02/12/98) Policy Planner and Senior Economic Official, Ministry of Economy and Finance Director of Cabinet of the First Chairman of Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC) Adviser to Senior Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of Economy and Finance.

(2/1994-6/1996) Adviser to Senior Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of Economy and Finance.

(9/1993-2/1994) Assistant to H.E. Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the State of Cambodia, and following the election, Co-Prime Minister of Provisional National Government of Cambodia.

PUBLICATION:

(1/1995)"Democracy in Cambodia: Theories and Realities"

(1/1996)"Economic Development in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities".

(11/1996) "Strategy for Cambodia's participation in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)"(Discussion Paper)

(6/1998)"Economic Development of Cambodia in the ASEAN's Context: Policies and Strategies" (Co-author with Keat Chhon)

(1/1998)"Managing the Challenges of Globalization"(Co-author with Keat Chhon and Vongsey vissoth)



PERSONAL DETAILS

Name:	HANG CHUON NARON
Date of Birth:	2 January 1962
Place of Birth:	Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Sex:	Male
Nationality:	Cambodian
Marital status:	Married with two children

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

1988-91: Ph.D. degree in economics (international economics), Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Russia;

1985-88: Masters' degree in economics (international economics), Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Russia;

1984-85: Kiev Institute of Foreign Languages (Ukraine), French Language Courses;

1982-85: Faculty of International Relations and International Law, Kiev State University, Ukraine;

1981-82: Cambodian Institute of Technology, Preparatory courses;

1980-81: High School Certificate, Sisowath High School, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

OTHER TRAINING

2004: Executive Program, JF Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University;

WORKING EXPERIENCE

Present- Secretary General, Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Secretary General, Supreme National Economic Council;
Chairman, Board of Directors and Management Board, Cambodian Reinsurance Company;

2001-2004 Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Economic Assistant to the Prime Minister;
Director, Economic and Financial Policy Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Economy and Finance, responsible for coordinating fiscal reform programs with the international financial institutions (ADB, IMF, World Bank);

2000-2001 First Deputy Director, Budget and Financial Affairs Department; Economic Assistant to the Prime Minister;

Research Fellow, Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace;

1999-2000 World Bank consultant to the Ministry of Economy and Finance; Research Coordinator, Economic Advisory Team;

1995-98: Senior Research Officer, Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh;

1993-95: Research Assistant, Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh;

1992: Training Assistant, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI); Staff member, Supreme National Council (SNC) Secretariat;

1991-92: Part-time consultant, Australian Permanent Mission in Phnom Penh;

1988-90: Attache, Cambodian Embassy in Moscow, USSR.

CONSULTING EXPERIENCE

1. World Bank. 1999-2000: Research Coordinator, Economic Advisory Team, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Kingdom of Cambodia;
2. International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 2001: Economic Planning and Protected Areas: Toward the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources.
3. Institute of Health Sciences.

LANGUAGES:

Mother tongue: Khmer

Foreign Languages: English, French and Russian

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

1. Deputy Chair, Committee on Financial Sector Development in Cambodia;
2. Member, Board of Directors, Electricity of Cambodia (EDC);
3. Member, Board of Directors, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI);

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Royal School of Administration
2001/02 Public Finance

Economics and Finance Institute
2000/02 Public Finance
2003-Present Academic Adviser, MBA Program for the Economics and Finance Institute/
Charles Sturt University;

PUBLICATIONS

Dissertation

Cambodia's Economic Development. 1988. Masters' degree dissertation.
Cambodia's Foreign Economic Policies. 1991. Ph.D. degree dissertation.

Policy Papers

Royal Government of Cambodia. 2000. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, October 2000, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Royal Government of Cambodia. 2001. The Cambodian Economy: A Mid-Term Review and Renewed Efforts to Combat Poverty. May 2001, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Royal Government of Cambodia. 2002. National Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Cambodia: Public Expenditure Management. 23 April 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Economic Planning and Protected Areas: Toward the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources. May 2002. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia's Economic and Financial Reforms: Challenges and Opportunities. January 2003, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Macroeconomic Outlook, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, and Structural Reforms. 7 April 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Industrial Development. 21 April 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Key Development Challenges. 14 May 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Royal Government of Cambodia. 2004. Annual Report on the Implementation of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2004. Draft Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Conference Papers

Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Economic and Social Performance and Outlook for 2003. Presented at the Cambodia-Japan Policy Dialogue on ODA, 24 March 2003, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Basing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper on a Realistic Expenditure Plan. Presented at the National Workshop on the PRSP Outline and Matrices, organized by the Council for Social Development of Cambodia and supported by the World Bank, 28 June 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron. 2002. *Trade Liberalization: A Cambodian Perspective*. Pre-Conference Workshop "WTO: Issues for Developing Countries", February 2002, Canberra.

Hang Chuon Naron. 2002. The Effects of WTO Membership on the SMEs and Garment Sector of Cambodia. Presented at the Public *Forum on Cambodia's Membership in the World Trade Organization*, 21 August 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron. 2001. Poverty Reduction in Cambodia: Achievements and Challenges. Presented at the Workshop on Sustainable Development, Poverty Reduction and Good Governance in Cambodia, jointly Sponsored by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the World Bank Institute, 20 September 2001, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Hang Chuon Naron (2001). Cambodia: A Decade of Nation-Building, Institution Development and Reform. A presentation at the *National Conference on Peace, National Reconciliation and Democracy Building: Ten Years After the Paris Peace Agreements*. Phnom Penh. 22 October 2001.

Hobbies: Tennis and Swimming


Annex 10. Number of central and provincial servants by ministry

	Total Civil Servants		Central Administration		Municipal and Provincial Administration		Percent of Administration in Total Civil Servants
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
1. General Administration							
Royal Palace	268	0.2	268	0.8	-	-	100.0
National Assembly (Gen. Secretariat)	234	0.1	234	0.7	-	-	100.0
Senate (General Secretariat)	187	0.1	187	0.6	-	-	100.0
Council of Ministers	931	0.6	931	2.8	-	-	100.0
State Secretariat of Public Function	112	0.1	112	0.3	-	-	100.0
M. of Foreign Affairs	749	0.5	749	2.2	-	-	100.0
M. of Interior	9,514	5.8	492	1.5	9,022	6.9	5.2
M. of Economy and Finance	5,389	3.3	4,313	12.8	1,076	0.8	80.0
M. of Justice	1,225	0.7	476	1.4	749	0.6	38.9
Supreme Court	87	0.1	87	0.3	-	-	100.0
M. of Planning	1,682	1.0	642	1.9	1,040	0.8	38.2
M. of Parliamentary Affairs and Inspection	117	0.1	117	0.3	-	-	100.0
2. Social Sector							
M. of Education	80,816	49.4	3,057	9.1	77,759	59.8	3.8
M. of Health	18,853	11.5	4,104	12.2	14,749	11.4	21.8
M. of Culture and Fine Arts	3,655	2.2	1,731	5.2	1,924	1.5	47.4
M. of Religious Affairs	714	0.4	182	0.5	532	0.4	25.5
M. of Information	2,614	1.6	1,374	4.1	1,240	1.0	52.6
M. of Social Affairs	1,822	1.1	668	2.0	1,154	0.9	36.7
M. of Environment	1,227	0.8	412	1.2	815	0.6	33.6
M. of Women's Affairs	1,324	0.8	211	0.6	1,113	0.9	15.9
3. Economic Sector							
M. of Agriculture	10,995	6.7	4,273	12.7	6,722	5.2	38.9
M. of Rural Development	2,311	1.4	608	1.8	1,703	1.3	26.3
M. of Public Works	5,784	3.5	2,050	6.0	3,734	2.9	35.4
State Secretariat of Civil Aviation	636	0.4	636	1.9	-	-	100.0
M. of Industry, Energy and Mine	2,699	1.7	943	2.8	1,756	1.4	34.9
M. of Post and Telecommunication	2,114	1.3	1,391	4.1	723	0.6	65.8
M. of Commerce	2,297	1.4	1,355	4.0	942	0.7	59.0
M. of Tourism	1,025	0.6	534	1.6	491	0.4	52.1
M. of Urbanisation	2,466	1.5	655	1.9	1,811	1.4	26.6
M. of Water Resources	1,682	1.0	801	2.4	881	0.7	47.6
Total	163,529	100.0	33,593	100.0	129,936	100.0	20.5
Total (excl. MOEYS)	82,713		30,536		52,177		36.9
Total (excl. MOEYS and MOI)	73,199		30,044		43,155		41.0
Reference:							
Total population	11,437,656		11,437,656		11,437,656		
Civil servants per hundred population	1		0		1		
MOEYS - Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports; MOI- Ministry of Interior Source: Council of Ministers.							

Source: ADB, 2000

Annex 11. Structure of the Royal Government of Cambodia

Figure 1: Governance Structure of the Public Sector in Cambodia, 1999



Source: ADB, 2000

Annex 12. List of the Joint Technical Working Groups in Cambodia

1. Legal and Judicial Reform
2. Partnership
3. **Public Administration Reform (PAR) (doesn't exist anymore since 2007)**
4. Public Financial Management
5. Land
6. Decentralization and Deconcentration
7. Gender
8. Health
9. Education
10. Food Security and Nutrition
11. Mine Action
12. Agriculture and Water
13. Fisheries
14. Forestry and Environment
15. Private Sector Development
16. HIV/AIDS
17. Infrastructure and Regional Integration
18. National Strategic Development Planning

Annex 13. Action plan of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative reform 2007

TWG Action Plan 2006 presented at the Government-Donor meeting in early 2007

The TWG reported that 7 activities were planned to be implemented, and satisfactory progress has been reported on 5 activities:

1. Dissemination of strategy on phasing out of salary supplementation.

Complete information gathering on salary supplementation (behind schedule). Staff has yet to be deployed to develop the data base. More support is therefore needed from individual TWGs for implementation of the Strategy on Phasing Out of Salary Supplementation.

Remuneration and Employment Studies (behind schedule). The studies are underway and will be completed in coming weeks.

HRM Policy Outline. A concept paper was circulated to TWG. A draft policy paper is being prepared for consultation with Ministries and partners.

One Window Office Legal Status. A draft Anukret has been prepared and extensively consulted on within Government. It now awaits COM approval.

HRD Policy Outline. A draft concept paper has been prepared and will be consulted on with Ministries and the TWG.

2. Joint Monitoring Indicators

Implement the approved "Joint Government-Donor Strategy for Phasing Out Salary Supplementation Practices in Cambodia" by: (a) implementing approved sectoral action plans; and (b) establishing Priority Mission Groups (PMGs), and PMG/Merit Based Pay Initiatives (PMG/MBPIs) in MEF, MOH, and at least one other ministry/agency. Recruitment of staff to set up a salary supplementation data base is underway. An MBPI proposal for the health sector involving about 160 Central Office staff has been developed and is being discussed between MOH, the health partners and CAR. Following an independent evaluation, lessons in the MEF with the MBPI have been drawn out and acted on. PMGs covering another 170 civil servants have been approved, with consultations ongoing on other possible PMGs, including in the health sector. There have also been recent discussions on how to improve the operations of the PMG based on experience to date. There has been little progress in implementing action planning under the Strategy for Phasing Out of Salary Supplementation. Greater and more timely support is needed from TWGs.

Improve pay and employment conditions in the civil service by developing and implementing: (a) a medium term strategy and action plan to enhance remuneration; and (b) a redeployment policy and action plan. Non-objection from the WB to the recruitment of technical assistance to undertake the consultancy was received in the week commencing 11 September. The policy work is a priority for completion in 2006.

Design and implement an HRM policy and action plan to improve merit and performance management by introducing an HRM Guide and further developing the Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) for the Civil Service. The draft HRM Policy Concept paper has been developed, as well as a draft HRM Manual. AusAID has provided funding for conducting further consultations within Government on the new policies and recruitment of the necessary staff is now underway. Extension of TA to support the HRMIS has just been approved by EC as part of its ISP project.

Enhance service delivery through developing a One Window Offices (OWOs) policy, legal framework and implementation plan, including establishment of at least 5 OWOs across Cambodia. A draft Anukret on OWOs has been prepared. Consultation within Government on the draft

Anukret is ongoing. Arrangements for establishing a number of OWOs in Phnom Penh and Takeo are being readied for implementation, with French support.

Implementation status of the H-A-R Action Plan

Within the framework of NSDP, sector ministries and agencies develop sector plans and prioritized results based programs, and a sector MTEF. National Public Administration Reform Plan in place. Governance Action Plan No 2 approved by the Government in early 2006. CAR Work Plan also in place. The CAR Secretariat has initiated the development of a medium term plan for public service reform to implement the NPAR.

All sector plans and development programs/projects include an assessment of the existing capacity gaps and a capacity development plan to fill the gaps to achieve targeted development results. CAR's Capacity Plan has been developed and is being implemented, with support from CIDA. Six development modules were delivered to CAR staff within the reporting period. A TA project is being developed to assist CAR in developing a capacity development policy for the Civil Service.

Concerned TWGs develop an implement an action plan to strengthen the technical and policy capacity of relevant institutions to carry out environmental analysis and to enforce legislation. This is a part of the CAR Capacity Plan.


Development partners provide financial support for the application of MBPI/PMG schemes as an element of capacity development strategy. This is envisaged by the Strategy on Phasing Out Of Salary Supplementation that is now being implemented. Active discussions are underway in the health sector.

3. Resource mobilization

The TWG reported that resources to support the JMIs have yet to be fully deployed. Consultations are needed on the resources required to support implementation of the civil service policy framework in 2007 and beyond.

Source: minutes of the PAR TWG, 18 october 2006

Annex 14. The Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)




Annex15. List of interviewees

NGO, think tanks	Donor agencies	Private sector	State agencies
President of the Khmer Youth Association	Programme Manager Governance cluster UNDP	CEO MAXIMA rural and small business credit CEO USK Group co. ltd Advisor to Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce	Director of the Planning Investment department Ministry of Planning
Deputy Director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights Radio Director Voice of Democracy Cambodian Center for Human Rights	Programme Officer for Human Rights and Democracy European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to Cambodia	Entrepreneur, Consultant for Komatsu a Japanese Construction company Founder of agribusiness trading company in Pray Veng province	Director of the IFAD project implemented by the GTZ Deputy director general at the ministry of rural development
Secretary General of Alliance for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia (AFEC) CCHR's Officer for Advocacy and Public Relations	Governance Programme Assistant, JICA	Financial Controller Canadia Bank	Chief of Budget Consolidation Liaison Official in the Reform Committee Ministry of Economy and Finance
Project Officer Programme for People's Initiatives Village Focus International	Research Assistant of the Resident Representative of the IMF	Financial Controller, Canadia Bank PLC.	Deputy Director General of the Reform Committee of the MEF
Head of Monitoring Section, Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association ADHOC	Judicial Assistant of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations	Finance Manager DHL Express Cambodia Ltd	Deputy Director in Charge of Personnel Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts
Professor a the Faculty of Business and Economics, Panasat University of Cambodia	Economist, Poverty reduction and economic management unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank		Secretary General of the Royal School for Judicial Professions
Researcher at the Economic Institute of Cambodia, EIC	Coordinator of the Technical Working Group of the Ministry of Health, Consultant at the UNFPA		Director of the Economics and Finance Institute Ministry of Economy and Finance
Director of the International Institute of Cambodia	Poverty Specialist of the World Bank/CDRI researcher		Information and Public Relation Officer Seila Task Force Secretariat, UNDP and CDC
Research Associate Decentralization Programme Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI)	Programs Officer Economics and Finance ADB Cambodia Resident Mission		Assistant to the Prime Minister Cabinet of the Prime Minister
			Assistant Auditor of Audit

			Office 1-1 National Audit Authority Manager software sales & support ACCPAC ICS smart accounting consultant
			Deputy Director General of Finance and Accounting, Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training
			Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) Council of Ministers (COM)/ Team Leader at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal

Annex 16. The Rectangular Strategy



Annex 17. Timeline of Lycée Sisowath's History

Traditional education in Cambodia was limited to boys and was carried out by Buddhist monks in wats, or temples.

Wat-school education served a broader purpose than literacy. Wat-school education emphasized the importance of work, as students "worked with the monks to build temples, dwellings, roads, bridges, and water reservoirs and to manufacture...furniture and other things" (Torhorst, 1966, p. 154).

Wat-school curriculum usually consisted of "reading and writing Khmer [the Cambodian language], principles of Buddhism, rules of propriety, [and] some arithmetic" (Gyallay-Pap, 1989, p. 258).

Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863 (Osborne, 1969).

1873 The first of "modern" Franco-Cambodian schools was the French-language School of the Protectorate, in Phnom Penh (Morizon, 1931, p. 178)

Franco-Cambodian schools came to be dominated by Vietnamese immigrant children (Forest, 1980). In 1883, for example, only 8 of the 100-plus students at the School of the Protectorate were Cambodians (Forest, 1980, p. 150-151).

1893 The School of the Protectorate was renamed Collège of the Protectorate (Bilodeau, 1955).

Following the establishment of the Franco-Cambodian Norodom School in Phnom Penh in 1903 (Forest, 1980, p. 152), schools were opened in most provincial capitals.

Sisowath ascent to the throne after King Norodom's (his brother) death in 1904.

1905 The Collège of the Protectorate in Phnom Penh, renamed Collège Sisowath (Forest, 1980, p. 152).

A school for girls was opened within the Norodom School in 1911 (Morizon, 1931, p. 185).

At the Norodom School for Girls in 1912 & Norodom School for Boys in 1917, the choice of Vietnamese as the language of education was authorized" (Forest, 1980, p. 156).

A 1916 decree required the attendance of all boys living within two kilometers of a French school (Bilodeau, 1955, p. 17).

1923 The French opened a four-year training course for instituteurs at the Collège Sisowath (Morizon, 1931, p. 187).

1925 The French initiated at the Collège Sisowath a shorter course for instituteurs auxiliares (Morizon, 1931, p. 187)

Only six Cambodians had graduated with baccalauréats from French Lycées in Vietnam by 1930 (Chandler, 1993, p. 160)

As in the 19th century, the Collège prepared students for service in the French colonial administration. The Collège prepared students for the judiciary and the indigenous administration, including the offices of the survey, public works, and post and telegraphs. Students were [also] introduced to mechanical engineering, physics, chemistry, and natural history. Cambodian law and accounting were also taught. (Morizon, 1931, p. 186)

1933	The Collège Sisowath became the Lycée Sisowath (Népote, 1979, p. 775)
1935	Lycée Sisowath instituted an upgraded secondary curriculum in 1935 (Népote, 1979, p. 775)
1939	The first Cambodian students graduated from the Lycée Sisowath with baccalauréats
1953	Kingdom of Cambodia became independent State.
	Only 144 [Cambodians] had completed the full baccalauréat by 1954 (Kiernan, 1985, p. xiii).
1967	Introduction of Khemarak-yeankkam. Ministry of Education took all the measures to use the Khmer language in all education levels (Le Sangkum, 1967).
1970	Khmer Republic
1970	Lycée Sisowath renamed the Lycée 9 October.
1974	Lycée Sisowath renamed the Lycée Phnom Daun Penh.
1975	Democratic Kampuchea
1979	People's Republic of Kampuchea
	Before 1975, the education is a 13 years (6+4+2+1) education system. After 1979, a 10-year education system (4+3+3) was adopted, expanded to an 11-year education system from 1986 and 12-year education system (6+3+3) in the 1996-97 school year.
1989	State of Cambodia
1993	Kingdom of Cambodia
1996	Reintroduction franco-khmere section at Lycée Sisowath.

Source: <http://pages.prodigy.net/skchao/lisa/history/timeline.htm>, 2008

Annex 18. Key Cambodian universities



The National University of Management (NUM)

Currently, more than 10,000 students attend courses at NUM's main campus in Phnom Penh.

- 1983 founding as the *Economics Science Institute (ESI)*, and until 1991 received assistance from the *National Economics University* in Hanoi, Vietnam. During this period, students were enrolled in a five-year undergraduate program with the Vietnamese language serving as the main language of instruction. The curriculum, set by the visiting faculty from Hanoi, included major fields in Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Industry, and Socialist Planning.
- 1990's the ESI is renamed to *Faculty of Business (FOB)*. Initial support for the FOB was provided by the *Asia Foundation* and later through a three years USAID grant (1994 to 1997) by the *Georgetown University* and the *University of Sanfrancisco*. Marketing and Accounting majors were introduced during this period, and the length of the undergraduate program was reduced from five to four years of study. Commercial law course were also added to the curriculum by the *University of San Francisco Law school*
- 2004 the FOB is transformed into the *National University of Management (NUM)* and program offerings are expanded to include the fields of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Finance & Banking and MIS. NUM also opens the first MBA program in Cambodia in cooperation with the *University Utara Malaysia (UUM)*. The NUM also maintains a five year faculty exchange and research program with the *University of Antwerp*. Belgium and has just recently opened a *Center for Entrepreneurship and Development* in partnership with *Fisk University* (Nashville,U.S) and *Tennessee State University*, sponsored by UNCF/USAID
- NUM also operates a full Bachelor of Business Administration degree program in Battambang with more than 700 students attending courses at NUM 's provincial campus.

Source: www.num.edu.kh, 2008



The Royal University for Law and Economics

- 1948 founded as the *National Institute of Law, Politics and Economics*
- 1975 the institute is renamed into the Faculty of Law and Economics by Royal Decree
- 2003 the *Faculty of Law and Economics* is reorganized as the *Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE)*.

- Besides Law and Economics as the core disciplines, the university introduces social, natural and computer sciences
- Currently, the university has four faculties, two graduate schools and one centre. RULE still maintains her position as the premier national university and the leading university in the area of law, economic and business education.

Source: http://www.rule.edu.kh/Brief_His.htm, 2008



The Royal School of Administration (RSA)

- 1956 founded as the *Royal School of Administration (RSA)*.
- 1975 closed by the Khmer Rouge
- 1995 reopened by the RGC under the umbrella of the *Council of Ministers (COM)*.
- Students from this elite school specialize in administration, diplomacy or business.
- At the end of their studies, students have to pass an exam, from which scores are ranked. Students with the highest scores go to the Council of Ministers, the second best go to the Ministry of Interior and the last group goes to the line ministries.
- Before 1975 and after 1996 higher civil servants were/are trained at the Royal School for Administration and were sent to study abroad. Since the mid 1990s, competition for civil service offices is more difficult and higher civil servants are increasingly recruited from wealthy and well-connected families.