TY - THES A1 - Parra Rodriguez, Juan David T1 - Computational Resource Abuse in Web Applications N2 - Internet browsers include Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to support Web applications that require complex functionality, e.g., to let end users watch videos, make phone calls, and play video games. Meanwhile, many Web applications employ the browser APIs to rely on the user's hardware to execute intensive computation, access the Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), use persistent storage, and establish network connections. However, providing access to the system's computational resources, i.e., processing, storage, and networking, through the browser creates an opportunity for attackers to abuse resources. Principally, the problem occurs when an attacker compromises a Web site and includes malicious code to abuse its visitor's computational resources. For example, an attacker can abuse the user's system networking capabilities to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against third parties. What is more, computational resource abuse has not received widespread attention from the Web security community because most of the current specifications are focused on content and session properties such as isolation, confidentiality, and integrity. Our primary goal is to study computational resource abuse and to advance the state of the art by providing a general attacker model, multiple case studies, a thorough analysis of available security mechanisms, and a new detection mechanism. To this end, we implemented and evaluated three scenarios where attackers use multiple browser APIs to abuse networking, local storage, and computation. Further, depending on the scenario, an attacker can use browsers to perform Denial of Service against third-party Web sites, create a network of browsers to store and distribute arbitrary data, or use browsers to establish anonymous connections similarly to The Onion Router (Tor). Our analysis also includes a real-life resource abuse case found in the wild, i.e., CryptoJacking, where thousands of Web sites forced their visitors to perform crypto-currency mining without their consent. In the general case, attacks presented in this thesis share the attacker model and two key characteristics: 1) the browser's end user remains oblivious to the attack, and 2) an attacker has to invest little resources in comparison to the resources he obtains. In addition to the attack's analysis, we present how existing, and upcoming, security enforcement mechanisms from Web security can hinder an attacker and their drawbacks. Moreover, we propose a novel detection approach based on browser API usage patterns. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy of our detection model, after training it with the real-life crypto-mining scenario, through a large scale analysis of the most popular Web sites. KW - Web Security KW - Computational Resource Abuse KW - Crypto Currency Mining KW - Parasitic Computing KW - Computersicherheit KW - Browser Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:739-opus4-7706 ER - TY - THES A1 - Garchery, Mathieu T1 - User-centered intrusion detection using heterogeneous data N2 - With the frequency and impact of data breaches raising, it has become essential for organizations to automate intrusion detection via machine learning solutions. This generally comes with numerous challenges, among others high class imbalance, changing target concepts and difficulties to conduct sound evaluation. In this thesis, we adopt a user-centered anomaly detection perspective to address selected challenges of intrusion detection, through a real-world use case in the identity and access management (IAM) domain. In addition to the previous challenges, salient properties of this particular problem are high relevance of categorical data, limited feature availability and total absence of ground truth. First, we ask how to apply anomaly detection to IAM audit logs containing a restricted set of mixed (i.e. numeric and categorical) attributes. Then, we inquire how anomalous user behavior can be separated from normality, and this separation evaluated without ground truth. Finally, we examine how the lack of audit data can be alleviated in two complementary settings. On the one hand, we ask how to cope with users without relevant activity history ("cold start" problem). On the other hand, we seek how to extend audit data collection with heterogeneous attributes (i.e. categorical, graph and text) to improve insider threat detection. After aggregating IAM audit data into sessions, we introduce and compare general anomaly detection methods for mixed data to a user identification approach, designed to learn the distinction between normal and malicious user behavior. We find that user identification outperforms general anomaly detection and is effective against masquerades. An additional clustering step allows to reduce false positives among similar users. However, user identification is not effective against insider threats. Furthermore, results suggest that the current scope of our audit data collection should be extended. In order to tackle the "cold start" problem, we adopt a zero-shot learning approach. Focusing on the CERT insider threat use case, we extend an intrusion detection system by integrating user relations to organizational entities (like assignments to projects or teams) in order to better estimate user behavior and improve intrusion detection performance. Results show that this approach is effective in two realistic scenarios. Finally, to support additional sources of audit data for insider threat detection, we propose a method representing audit events as graph edges with heterogeneous attributes. By performing detection at fine-grained level, this approach advantageously improves anomaly traceability while reducing the need for aggregation and feature engineering. Our results show that this method is effective to find intrusions in authentication and email logs. Overall, our work suggests that masquerades and insider threats call for different detection methods. For masquerades, user identification is a promising approach. To find malicious insiders, graph features representing user context and relations to other entities can be informative. This opens the door for tighter coupling of intrusion detection with user identities, roles and privileges used in IAM solutions. KW - Anomalie KW - Authenitifikation KW - Computersicherheit Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:739-opus4-8704 ER -