@article{MandarawiRottmeierRezaeighaleetal.2020, author = {Mandarawi, Waseem and Rottmeier, J{\"u}rgen and Rezaeighale, Milad and de Meer, Hermann}, title = {Policy-Based Composition and Embedding of Extended Virtual Networks and SFCs for IIoT}, series = {Algorithms}, volume = {13}, journal = {Algorithms}, number = {9}, publisher = {MDPI}, issn = {1999-4893}, doi = {10.3390/a13090240}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:739-opus4-8488}, year = {2020}, abstract = {The autonomic composition of Virtual Networks (VNs) and Service Function Chains (SFCs)based on application requirements is significant for complex environments. In this paper, we use graph transformation in order to compose an Extended Virtual Network (EVN) that is based on different requirements, such as locations, low latency, redundancy, and security functions. The EVN can represent physical environment devices and virtual application and network functions. We build a generic Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) framework for transforming an Application Request (AR) to an EVN. Subsequently, we define a set of transformations that reflect preliminary topological, performance, reliability, and security policies. These transformations update the entities and demands of the VN and add SFCs that include the required Virtual Network Functions (VNFs). Additionally, we propose a greedy proactive heuristic for path-independent embedding of the composed SFCs. This heuristic is appropriate for real complex environments, such as industrial networks. Furthermore, we present an Industrail Internet of Things (IIoT) use case that was inspired by Industry 4.0 concepts,in which EVNs for remote asset management are deployed over three levels; manufacturing halls and edge and cloud computing. We also implement the developed methods in Alevin and show exemplary mapping results from our use case. Finally, we evaluate the chain embedding heuristic while using a random topology that is typical for such a use case, and show that it can improve the admission ratio and resource utilization with minimal overhead.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Puellen2024, author = {P{\"u}llen, Dominik}, title = {Holistic Security Engineering for Software-Defined Vehicles}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:739-opus4-14497}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Passau}, pages = {XXIII, 161 Seiten}, year = {2024}, abstract = {With the increasing use of digital technologies in the automotive sector, the traditional automobile is undergoing a structural transformation, requiring new technologies and enabling innovative mobility concepts. In particular, the ability to drive automatically or even fully autonomously, update control software, and remain connected to the environment allows attackers to infiltrate highly critical vehicle systems and take control without adequate protection. Once not only individual vehicles but entire fleets are dominated by software, cyberattacks could disrupt a significant portion of the infrastructure and expose passengers to substantial risks. This work follows a holistic approach to protecting highly automated software-defined vehicles from cyberattacks by designing and implementing security concepts in the main phases of a vehicle's lifecycle. We use SAE level 4 prototype vehicles to evaluate our proposed techniques. We start with a systematic security requirement analysis using the ISA-62443 standard series, demonstrating how threats can be identified in a collaborative, hierarchical process and how the resulting security risks impact the software and hardware architecture of a self-driving vehicle. We show how this analysis process results in concrete requirements whose consideration reduces the overall security risk to a tolerable level. Subsequently, we develop technical solutions for selected requirements. We begin by securing the CAN and FlexRay legacy protocols, which we foresee being used in specific areas of SDV in a transitional period despite technological changes. To enable vehicle-wide security management, we address the management and distribution of cryptographic keys within such networks, mainly focusing on resource-constrained devices. We propose using lightweight implicit certificates for deriving cryptographic group keys that can be used in CAN networks. Additionally, we demonstrate how the slot-based frame structure of the FlexRay protocol allows for efficient "multi-slot" authentication, for which we calculate cryptographic keys using hash-based key chains. SDV use Ethernet-based communication protocols and custom middleware stacks to transmit large amounts of data in real-time. We develop a three-stage security process for the novel ASOA, which enables the development and central orchestration of system-agnostic functional software components on embedded systems and HPC platforms. After the central specification of the security architecture at the data flow level, security tokens are automatically calculated and distributed for runtime protection of the service-oriented, DDS-based data transmission. Our process ensures the strict separation of function and system knowledge, allowing for cost-effective and adaptable security architecture management. The evaluation in four self-driving, software-defined vehicles demonstrates an average runtime overhead of approximately 5.71\%. As the initial risk analysis and actual cyberattacks have shown, protective measures against the compromise of control units must be taken alongside communication security. To address this, we develop a method for verifying and validating the software integrity of control units. A governmental third party confirms a measurement through a digital certificate, proving the examined vehicle's trustworthiness and suitability for participation in automated traffic. In the final step of this work, we present an assessment scheme that allows software-defined vehicles to evaluate security incidents during operation in terms of their maximum expected damage and initiate appropriate countermeasures. We follow the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and model attack paths using a graph representing dependencies among internal vehicle assets to account for the propagation effects of cyberattacks. The assessment of a security incident considers not only the probability of individual attack paths but also the vehicle context. Our practical evaluation demonstrates that we can detect, report, and assess security incidents below the human reaction time in the earlier mentioned prototype vehicles.}, language = {en} }