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- Networks (4)
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- Market Equilibria (2)
- Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Optimization (2)
- Multiplicity (2)
- Adaptive error control (1)
- Complementarity constraints (1)
- DC Power Flow (1)
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This paper provides a first approach to assess gas market interaction on a network with nonconvex flow models. In the simplest possible setup that adequately reflects gas transport and market interaction, we elaborate on the relation of the solution of a simultaneous competitive gas market game, its corresponding mixed nonlinear complementarity problem (MNCP), and a first-best benchmark. We provide conditions under which the solution of the simultaneous game is also the solution of the corresponding MNCP. However, equilibria cannot be determined by the MNCP as the transmission system operator's (TSO’s) first-order conditions are insufficient, which goes back to nonconvexities of the gas flow model. This also implies that the welfare maximization problem may have multiple solutions that sometimes do not even coincide with any of the market equilibria. Our analysis shows that, even in the absence of strategic firms, market interaction fails to implement desirable outcomes from a welfare perspective due to the TSO’s incentive structure. We conclude that the technical environment calls for a market design that commits the TSO to a welfare objective through regulation and propose a design where the market solution corresponds to a welfare maximum and vice versa.
Mathematical modeling of market design issues in liberalized electricity markets often leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems for which no general-purpose solvers exist and which are intractable in general. In this work, we consider the problem of splitting a market area into a given number of price zones such that the resulting market design yields welfare-optimal outcomes. This problem leads to a challenging multilevel model that contains a graph-partitioning problem with multi-commodity flow connectivity constraints and nonlinearities due to proper economic modeling. Furthermore, it has highly symmetric solutions. We develop different problem-tailored solution approaches. In particular, we present an extended KKT transformation approach as well as a generalized Benders approach that both yield globally optimal solutions. These methods, enhanced with techniques such as symmetry breaking and primal heuristics, are evaluated in detail on academic as well as on realistic instances. It turns out that our approaches lead to effective solution methods for the difficult optimization tasks presented here, where the problem-specific generalized Benders approach performs considerably better than the methods based on KKT transformation.
In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion.
In entry-exit gas markets as they are currently implemented in Europe, network constraints do not affect market interaction beyond the technical capacities determined by the TSO that restrict the quantities individual firms can trade at the market. It is an up to now unanswered question to what extent existing network capacity remains unused in an entry-exit design and to what extent feasible adjustments of the market design could alleviate inefficiencies. In this paper, we offer a four-level modeling framework that is capable of analyzing these issues and provide some first results on the model structure. In order to decouple gas trading from network congestion management, the TSO is required to determine technical capacities and corresponding booking fees at every entry and exit node up front. Firms book those capacities, which gives them the right to charge or discharge an amount of gas at a certain node up to this capacity in every scenario. Beyond these technical capacities and the resulting bookings, gas trade is unaffected by network constraints. The technical capacities have to ensure that transportation of traded quantities is always feasible. We assume that the TSO is regulated and determines technical capacities, fees, and transportation costs under a welfare objective. As a first step we moreover assume perfect competition among gas traders and show that the booking and nomination decisions can be analyzed in a single level. We prove that this aggregated model has a unique solution. We also show that the TSO's decisions can be subsumed in one level as well. If so, the model boils down to a mixed-integer nonlinear bilevel problem with robust aspects. In addition, we provide a first-best benchmark that allows to assess welfare losses that occur in an entry-exit system. Our approach provides a generic framework to analyze various aspects in the context of semi-liberalized gas markets. Therefore, we finally discuss and provide guidance on how to include several important aspects into the approach, such as network and production capacity investment, uncertain data, market power, and intra-day trading.
Potential-based flows are an extension of classical network flows in which the flow on an arc is determined by the difference of the potentials of its incident nodes. Such flows are unique and arise, for example, in energy networks. Two important algorithmic problems are to determine whether there exists a feasible flow and to maximize the flow between two designated nodes. We show that these problems can be solved for the single source and sink case by reducing the network to a single arc. However, if we additionally consider switches that allow to force the flow to 0 and decouple the potentials, these problems are NP-hard. Nevertheless, for particular series-parallel networks, one can use algorithms for the subset sum problem. Moreover, applying network presolving based on generalized series-parallel structures allows to significantly reduce the size of realistic energy networks.
We study the transient optimization of gas transport networks including both discrete controls due to switching of controllable elements and nonlinear fluid dynamics described by the system of isothermal Euler equations, which are partial differential equations in time and 1-dimensional space. This combination leads to mixed-integer optimization problems subject to nonlinear hyperbolic partial differential equations on a graph. We propose an instantaneous control approach in which suitable Euler discretizations yield systems of ordinary differential equations on a graph. This networked system of ordinary differential equations is shown to be well-posed and affine-linear solutions of these systems are derived analytically. As a consequence, finite-dimensional mixed-integer linear optimization problems are obtained for every time step that can be solved to global optimality using general-purpose solvers. We illustrate our approach in practice by presenting numerical results on a realistic gas transport network.
We consider nonlinear and nonsmooth mixing aspects in gas transport optimization problems. As mixed-integer reformulations of pooling-type mixing models already render small-size instances computationally intractable, we investigate the applicability of smooth nonlinear programming techniques for equivalent complementarity-based reformulations. Based on recent results for remodeling piecewise affine constraints using an inverse parametric quadratic programming approach, we show that classical stationarity concepts are meaningful for the resulting complementarity-based reformulation of the mixing equations. Further, we investigate in a numerical study the performance of this reformulation compared to a more compact complementarity-based one that does not feature such beneficial regularity properties. All computations are performed on publicly available data of real-world size problem instances from steady-state gas transport.
Since 2005, the gas market in the European Union is liberalized and
the trading of natural gas is decoupled from its transport.
The transport is done by so-called transmissions system operators (TSOs).
The market model established by the European Union views the gas
transmission network as a black box, providing shippers (gas traders
and consumers) the opportunity to transport gas from any entry to
any exit.
TSOs are required to offer maximum independent capacities at each
entry and exit such that the resulting gas flows can be realized by
the network without compromising security of supply.
Therefore, evaluating the available transport capacities is extremely
important to the TSOs.
This paper gives an overview of the toolset for evaluating gas
network capacities that has been developed within the ForNe project,
a joint research project of seven research partners initiated by
Open Grid Europe, Germany's biggest TSO.
While most of the relevant mathematics is described in the
book "Evaluating Gas Network Capacities", this article
sketches the system as a whole, describes some developments that have
taken place recently, and gives some details about the current
implementation.
We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and characterize situations in which multiple solutions exist.
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated transport networks. The model under consideration is rather general so that it captures basic aspects of related models in, e.g., gas or electricity networks. We formulate the market equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity problem and show the equivalence to a welfare maximization problem. Using the latter we prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium for piecewise linear and symmetric transport costs under additional mild assumptions. Moreover, we show the necessity of these assumptions by illustrating examples that possess multiple solutions if our assumptions are violated.