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We study uncertain linear complementarity problems (LCPs), i.e., problems in which the LCP vector q or the LCP matrix M may contain uncertain parameters. To this end, we use the concept of Γ-robust optimization applied to the gap function formulation of the LCP. Thus, this work builds upon [16]. There, we studied Γ-robustified LCPs for l1- and box-uncertainty sets, whereas we now focus on ellipsoidal uncertainty set. For uncertainty in q or M, we derive conditions for the tractability of the robust counterparts. For these counterparts, we also give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of their solutions. Finally, a case study for the uncertain traffic equilibrium problem is considered, which illustrates the effects of the values of Γ on the feasibility and quality of the respective robustified solutions.
Complementarity problems are often used to compute equilibria made up of specifically coordinated solutions of different optimization problems. Specific examples are game-theoretic settings like the bimatrix game or energy market models like for electricity or natural gas. While optimization under uncertainties is rather well-developed, the field of equilibrium models represented by complementarity problems under uncertainty - especially using the concepts of robust optimization - is still in its infancy. In this paper, we extend the theory of strictly robust linear complementarity problems (LCPs) to Γ-robust settings, where existence of worst-case-hedged equilibria cannot be guaranteed. Thus, we study the minimization of the worst-case gap function of Γ-robust counterparts of LCPs. For box and l1-norm uncertainty sets we derive tractable convex counterparts for monotone LCPs and study their feasibility as well as the existence and uniqueness of solutions. To this end, we consider uncertainties in the vector and in the matrix defining the LCP. We additionally study so-called ρ-robust solutions, i.e., solutions of relaxed uncertain LCPs. Finally, we illustrate the Γ-robust concept applied to LCPs in the light of the above mentioned classical examples of bimatrix games and market equilibrium modeling.
We consider uncertain robust electricity market equilibrium problems including transmission and generation investments. Electricity market equilibrium modeling has a long tradition but is, in most of the cases, applied in a deterministic setting in which all data of the model are known. Whereas there exist some literature on stochastic equilibrium problems, the field of robust equilibrium models is still in its infancy. We contribute to this new field of research by considering Γ-robust electricity market equilibrium models on lossless DC networks with transmission and generation investments. We state the nominal market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem as well as its variational inequality and welfare optimization counterparts. For the latter, we then derive a Γ-robust formulation and show that it is indeed the counterpart of a market equilibrium problem with robustified player problems. Finally, we present two case studies to gain insights into the general effects of robustification on electricity market models. In particular, our case studies reveal that the transmission system operator tends to act more risk-neutral in the robust setting, whereas generating firms clearly behave more risk-averse.
Linear bilevel optimization problems have gained increasing attention both in theory as well as in practical applications of Operations Research (OR) during the last years and decades. The latter is mainly due to the ability of this class of problems to model hierarchical decision processes. However, this ability makes bilevel problems also very hard to solve. Since no general-purpose solvers are available, a "best-practice" has developed in the applied OR community, in which not all people want to develop tailored algorithms but "just use" bilevel optimization as a modeling tool for practice. This best-practice is the big-M reformulation of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the lower-level problem - an approach that has been shown to be highly problematic by Pineda and Morales (2019). Choosing invalid values for M yields solutions that may be arbitrarily bad. Checking the validity of the big-Ms is however shown to be as hard as solving the original bilevel problem in Kleinert et al. (2019). Nevertheless, due to its appealing simplicity, especially w.r.t. the required implementation effort, this ready-to-use approach still is the most popular method. Until now, there has been a lack of approaches that are competitive both in terms of implementation effort and computational cost.
In this note we demonstrate that there is indeed another competitive ready-to-use approach: If the SOS-1 technique is applied to the KKT complementarity conditions, adding the simple additional root-node inequality developed by Kleinert et al. (2020) leads to a competitive performance - without having all the possible theoretical disadvantages of the big-M approach.
Transport and trade of gas are decoupled after the liberalization of the European gas markets, which are now organized as so-called entry-exit systems. At the core of this market system are bookings and nominations, two special capacity-right contracts that grant traders access to the gas network. The latter is operated by a separate entity, known as the transmission system operator (TSO), who is in charge of the transport of gas from entry to exit nodes. In the mid to long term, traders sign a booking contract with the TSO to obtain injection and withdrawal capacities at entry and exit nodes, respectively. On a day-ahead basis, they then nominate within these booked capacities a balanced load flow of the planned amounts of gas to be injected into and withdrawn from the network the next day. The key property is that by signing a booking contract, the TSO is obliged to guarantee transportability for all balanced load flows in compliance with the booked capacities. To assess the feasibility of a booking, it is therefore necessary to check the feasibility of infinitely many nominations. As a result, deciding if a booking is feasible is a challenging mathematical problem, which we investigate in this dissertation.
Our results range from passive networks, consisting of pipes only, to active networks, containing controllable elements to influence gas flows. Since the study of the latter naturally leads to a bilevel framework, we first consider some more general properties of bilevel optimization. For the case of linear bilevel optimization, we consider the hardness of validating the correctness of big-Ms often used in solving these problems via a single-level reformulation. We also derive a family of valid inequalities to be used in a bilevel-tailored branch-and-cut algorithm as a big-M-free alternative.
We then turn to the study of feasible bookings. First, we present our results on passive networks, for which bilevel approaches are not required. A characterization of feasible bookings on passive networks is derived in terms of a finite set of nominations. While computing these nominations is a difficult task in general, we present polynomial complexity results for the special cases of tree-shaped or single-cycle passive networks. Finally, we consider networks with linearly modeled active elements. After obtaining a bilevel optimization model that allows us to determine the feasibility of a booking in this case, we derive various single-level reformulations to solve the problem. In addition, we obtain novel characterizations of feasible bookings on active networks, which generalize our characterization in the passive case. The performance of these various approaches is compared in a case study on two networks from the literature, one of which is a simplified version of the Greek gas network.
Bilevel problems are used to model the interaction between two decision makers in which the lower-level problem, the so-called follower's problem, appears as a constraint in the upper-level problem of the so-called leader. One issue in many practical situations is that the follower's problem is not explicitly known by the leader. For such bilevel problems with unknown lower-level model we propose the use of neural networks to learn the follower's optimal response for given decisions of the leader based on available historical data of pairs of leader and follower decisions. Integrating the resulting neural network in a single-level reformulation of the bilevel problem leads to a challenging model with a black-box constraint. We exploit Lipschitz optimization techniques from the literature to solve this reformulation and illustrate the applicability of the proposed method with some preliminary case studies using academic and linear bilevel instances.
In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion.
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated transport networks. The model under consideration is rather general so that it captures basic aspects of related models in, e.g., gas or electricity networks. We formulate the market equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity problem and show the equivalence to a welfare maximization problem. Using the latter we prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium for piecewise linear and symmetric transport costs under additional mild assumptions. Moreover, we show the necessity of these assumptions by illustrating examples that possess multiple solutions if our assumptions are violated.
We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and characterize situations in which multiple solutions exist.
Ongoing policy discussions on the reconfiguration of bidding zones in European electricity markets induce uncertainty about the future market design. This paper deals with the question of how this uncertainty affects market participants and their long-run investment decisions in generation and transmission capacity. Generalizing the literature on pro-active network expansion planning, we propose a stochastic multilevel model which incorporates generation capacity investment, network expansion, and market operation, taking into account uncertainty about the future bidding zone configuration. Using a stylized two-node network, we disentangle different effects that uncertainty has on market outcomes. If there is a possibility that future bidding zone configurations provide improved regional price signals, welfare gains materialize even if the change does not actually take place. As a consequence, welfare gains of an actual change of the bidding zone configuration are substantially lower due to those anticipatory effects. Additionally, we show substantial distributional effects in terms of both expected gains and risks, between producers and consumers and between different generation technologies.