Refine
Language
- English (25)
Keywords
- Multilevel Optimization (4)
- Uniqueness (3)
- Bilevel optimization (2)
- Graph Partitioning (2)
- Pricing (2)
- Benders Decomposition (1)
- Computational Equilibrium Models; Electricity Markets; Investment Incentives; Distribution Network Expansion Planning; Storage Investment and Operation; Renewable Energy Production; (Self-) Consumption (1)
- Convex mixed-integer nonlinear optimization (1)
- Electric fuels, Hydrogen Utilization, Hydrogen Import, LOHC, Mobility (1)
- Electricity Market Design} (1)
We propose an equilibrium model for coupled markets of multiple energy sectors. The agents in our model are operators of sector-specific production and sector-coupling technologies, as well as price-sensitive consumers with varying demand. We analyze long-run investment in production capacity in each sector and investment in coupling capacity between sectors, as well as production decisions determined at repeated spot markets. We show that in our multi-sector model, multiplicity of equilibria may occur, even if all assumptions hold that would be sufficient for uniqueness in a single-sector model. We then contribute to the literature by deriving sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of short- and long-run market equilibrium in coupled markets of multiple energy sectors. We illustrate via simple examples that these conditions are indeed required to guarantee uniqueness in general. The uniqueness result is an important step to be able to incorporate the proposed market equilibrium problem in more complex computational multilevel equilibrium models, in which uniqueness of lower levels is a prerequisite for obtaining meaningful solutions. Our analysis also paves the way to understand and analyze more complex sector coupling models in the future.
Liberalized gas markets in Europe are organized as entry-exit regimes so that gas trade and transport are decoupled. The decoupling is achieved via the announcement of technical capacities by the transmission system operator (TSO) at all entry and exit points of the network. These capacities can be booked by gas suppliers and customers in long-term contracts. Only traders who have booked capacities up-front can "nominate" quantities for injection or withdrawal of gas via a day-ahead market. To ensure feasibility of the nominations for the physical network, the TSO must only announce technical capacities for which all possibly nominated quantities are transportable. In this paper, we use a four-level model of the entry-exit gas market to analyze possible welfare losses associated with the decoupling of gas trade and transport. In addition to the multilevel structure, the model contains robust aspects to cover the conservative nature of the European entry-exit system. We provide several reformulations to obtain a single-level mixed-integer quadratic problem. The overall model of the considered market regime is extremely challenging and we thus have to make the main assumption that gas flows are modeled as potential-based linear flows. Using the derived single-level reformulation of the problem, we show that the feasibility requirements for technical capacities imply significant welfare losses due to unused network capacity. Furthermore, we find that the specific structure of the network has a considerable influence on the optimal choice of technical capacities. Our results thus show that trade and transport are not decoupled in the long term. As a further source of welfare losses and discrimination against individual actors, we identify the minimum prices for booking capacity at the individual nodes.
While single-level Nash equilibrium problems are quite well understood nowadays, less is known about multi-leader multi-follower games. However, these have important applications, e.g., in the analysis of electricity and gas markets, where often a limited number of firms interacts on various subsequent markets. In this paper, we consider a special class of two-level multi-leader multi-follower games that can be applied, e.g., to model strategic booking decisions in the European entry-exit gas market. For this nontrivial class of games, we develop a solution algorithm that is able to compute the complete set of Nash equilibria instead of just individual solutions or a bigger set of stationary points. Additionally, we prove that for this class of games, the solution set is finite and provide examples for instances without any Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We apply the algorithm to a case study in which we compute strategic booking and nomination decisions in a model of the European entry-exit gas market system. Finally, we use our algorithm to provide a publicly available test library for the considered class of multi-leader multi-follower games. This library contains problem instances with different economic and mathematical properties so that other researchers in the field can test and benchmark newly developed methods for this challenging class of problems.
The use of electric fuels (e-fuels) enables CO2-neutral mobility and opens therefore an alternative to fossil-fuel-fired engines or battery-powered electric motors. This paper compares the cost-effectiveness of Fischer-Tropsch diesel, methanol, and hydrogen stored as cryogenic liquid (LH2) or in form of liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs). The production cost of those fuels are to a large extent driven by the energy-intensive electrolytic water splitting. The option of producing e-fuels in Germany competes with international locations with excellent conditions for renewable energy harvesting and thus very low levelized cost of electricity. We developed a mathematical model that covers the entire process chain. Starting with the production of the required resources such as fresh water, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, electrical and thermal energy, the subsequent chemical synthesis, the transport to filling stations in Germany and finally the energetic utilization of the fuels in the vehicle. We found that the choice of production site can have a major impact on the mobility cost using the respective fuels. Especially in case of diesel production, the levelized cost of electricity driven by the full load hours of the applied renewable energy source have a huge impact. An LOHC-based system is shown to be less dependent on the kind of electricity source compared to other technologies due to its comparatively low electricity consumption and the low cost for the hydrogenation units. The length of the transportation route and the price of the filling station infrastructure, on the other hand, clearly increase mobility cost for LOHC and LH2.
We propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze the long-run impact of the electricity market design on transmission line expansion by the regulator and investment in generation capacity by private firms in liberalized electricity markets. The model incorporates investment decisions of the transmission system operator and private firms in expectation of an energy-only market and cost-based redispatch. In different specifications we consider the cases of one vs. multiple price zones (market splitting) and analyze different approaches to recover network cost—in particular lump sum, generation capacity based, and energy based fees. In order to compare the outcomes of our multilevel market model with a first best benchmark, we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem. Using two test networks we illustrate that energy-only markets can lead to suboptimal locational decisions for generation capacity and thus imply excessive network expansion. Market splitting heals these problems only partially. These results are valid for all considered types of network tariffs, although investment slightly differs across those regimes.
In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion.
In this paper we propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze subsidization schemes to affect locational choices for generation investment in electricity markets. Our framework takes into account generation investment decided by private investors and redispatch as well as network expansion decided by a regulated transmission system operator. In order to take into account the different objectives and decision variables of those agents, our approach uses a bi-level structure. We focus on the case of regionally differentiated network fees which have to be paid by generators (a so called g-component). The resulting investment and production decisions are compared to the outcome of an equilibrium model in the absence of such regionally differentiated investment incentives and to an overall optimal (first-best) benchmark. To illustrate possible economic effects, we calibrate our framework with data from the German electricity market. Our results reveal that while regionally differentiated network fees do have a significant impact on locational choice of generation capacities, we do not find significant effects on either welfare or
network expansion.
In this paper we propose a bi-level equilibrium model that allows to analyze the impact of different regulatory frameworks on storage and network investment in distribution networks. In our model, a regulated distribution system operator decides on network investment and operation while he anticipates the decisions of private agents on storage investment and operation. Since, especially in distribution networks, voltage stability and network losses have a decisive influence on network expansion and operation, we use a linearized AC power flow formulation to adequately account for these aspects. As adjustments of the current regulatory framework, we consider curtailment of renewable production, the introduction of a network fee based on the maximum renewable feed-in, and a subsidy scheme for storage investment. The performance of the different alternative frameworks is compared to the performance under rules that are commonly applied in various countries today, as well as to a system-optimal (first-best) benchmark. To illustrate the economic effects, we calibrate our model with data from the field project Smart Grid Solar. Our results reveal that curtailment and a redesign of network fees both have the potential to significantly reduce total system costs. On the contrary, investment subsidization of storage capacity has only a limited impact as long as the distribution system operator is not allowed to intervene in storage operation.
Electric fuels (e-fuels) enable CO2-neutral mobility and are therefore an alternative to battery-powered electric vehicles. This paper compares the cost-effectiveness of Fischer-Tropsch diesel, methanol and Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carriers. The production costs of those fuels are to a large part driven by the energy-intensive electrolytic hydrogen production. In this paper, we apply a multi-level electricity market model to calculate future hourly electricity prices for various electricity market designs in Germany for the year 2035. We then assess the economic efficiency of the different fuels under various future market conditions. In particular, we use the electricity price vectors derived from an electricity market model calibrated for 2035 as an input for a mathematical model of the entire process chain from hydrogen production and chemical bonding to the energetic utilization of the fuels in a vehicle. Within this model, we perform a sensitivity analysis, which quantifies the impact of various parameters on the fuel production cost. Most importantly, we consider prices resulting from own model calculations for different energy market designs, the investment cost for the electrolysis systems and the carbon dioxide purchase price. The results suggest that the use of hydrogen, which is temporarily bound to Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carriers, is a favorable alternative to the more widely discussed synthetic diesel and methanol.
In this paper we analyze a uniform price electricity spot market that is followed by redispatch in the case of network congestion. We assume that the transmission system operator is incentivized to minimize redispatch cost and compare a cost-based redispatch (CBR) to a market-based redispatch (MBR) mechanism. For networks with at least three nodes we show that in contrast to CBR, in the case of MBR the redispatch cost minimizing allocation may not be short-run efficient. As we demonstrate, in case of MBR the possibility of the transmission system operator to reduce redispatch cost at the expense of a reduced welfare may be driven by the electricity supply side or the electricity demand side. If, however, the transmission system operator is obliged to implement the welfare maximizing (instead of the redispatch cost minimizing) dispatch by regulation, this will result in an efficient dispatch also in case of MBR.