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We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and characterize situations in which multiple solutions exist.
This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the Γ-approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classical welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria. Surprisingly, it turns out that there is no such economic sensible counterpart for the case of Γ-robustifications of Nash–Cournot models. Thus, an analogue of the welfare theorems does not hold in this case. Finally, we provide a computational case study that illustrates the different effects of the combination of economic competition and uncertainty modeling.
Complementarity problems are often used to compute equilibria made up of specifically coordinated solutions of different optimization problems. Specific examples are game-theoretic settings like the bimatrix game or energy market models like for electricity or natural gas. While optimization under uncertainties is rather well-developed, the field of equilibrium models represented by complementarity problems under uncertainty - especially using the concepts of robust optimization - is still in its infancy. In this paper, we extend the theory of strictly robust linear complementarity problems (LCPs) to Γ-robust settings, where existence of worst-case-hedged equilibria cannot be guaranteed. Thus, we study the minimization of the worst-case gap function of Γ-robust counterparts of LCPs. For box and l1-norm uncertainty sets we derive tractable convex counterparts for monotone LCPs and study their feasibility as well as the existence and uniqueness of solutions. To this end, we consider uncertainties in the vector and in the matrix defining the LCP. We additionally study so-called ρ-robust solutions, i.e., solutions of relaxed uncertain LCPs. Finally, we illustrate the Γ-robust concept applied to LCPs in the light of the above mentioned classical examples of bimatrix games and market equilibrium modeling.
We study uncertain linear complementarity problems (LCPs), i.e., problems in which the LCP vector q or the LCP matrix M may contain uncertain parameters. To this end, we use the concept of Γ-robust optimization applied to the gap function formulation of the LCP. Thus, this work builds upon [16]. There, we studied Γ-robustified LCPs for l1- and box-uncertainty sets, whereas we now focus on ellipsoidal uncertainty set. For uncertainty in q or M, we derive conditions for the tractability of the robust counterparts. For these counterparts, we also give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of their solutions. Finally, a case study for the uncertain traffic equilibrium problem is considered, which illustrates the effects of the values of Γ on the feasibility and quality of the respective robustified solutions.
We consider uncertain robust electricity market equilibrium problems including transmission and generation investments. Electricity market equilibrium modeling has a long tradition but is, in most of the cases, applied in a deterministic setting in which all data of the model are known. Whereas there exist some literature on stochastic equilibrium problems, the field of robust equilibrium models is still in its infancy. We contribute to this new field of research by considering Γ-robust electricity market equilibrium models on lossless DC networks with transmission and generation investments. We state the nominal market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem as well as its variational inequality and welfare optimization counterparts. For the latter, we then derive a Γ-robust formulation and show that it is indeed the counterpart of a market equilibrium problem with robustified player problems. Finally, we present two case studies to gain insights into the general effects of robustification on electricity market models. In particular, our case studies reveal that the transmission system operator tends to act more risk-neutral in the robust setting, whereas generating firms clearly behave more risk-averse.
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated transport networks. The model under consideration is rather general so that it captures basic aspects of related models in, e.g., gas or electricity networks. We formulate the market equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity problem and show the equivalence to a welfare maximization problem. Using the latter we prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium for piecewise linear and symmetric transport costs under additional mild assumptions. Moreover, we show the necessity of these assumptions by illustrating examples that possess multiple solutions if our assumptions are violated.
We consider spot-market trading of electricity including storage operators as additional agents besides producers and consumers. Storages allow for shifting produced electricity from one time period to a later one. Due to this, multiple market equilibria may occur even if classical uniqueness assumptions for the case without storages are satisfied. For models containing storage operators, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness of generation and demand. We also prove uniqueness of the market equilibrium for the special case of a single storage operator. Nevertheless, in case of multiple storage operators, uniqueness fails to hold in general, which we show by illustrative examples. We conclude the theoretical discussion with a general ex-post condition for proving the uniqueness of a given solution. In contrast to classical settings without storages, the computation of market equilibria is much more challenging since storage operations couple all trading events over time. For this reason, we propose a tailored parallel and distributed alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) for efficiently computing spot-market equilibria over long time horizons. We first analyze the parallel performance of the method itself. Finally, we show that the parallel ADMM clearly outperforms solving the respective problems directly and that it is capable of solving instances with more than 42 million variables in less than 13 minutes.