Liberalized gas markets in Europe are organized as entry-exit regimes so that gas trade and transport are decoupled. The decoupling is achieved via the announcement of technical capacities by the transmission system operator (TSO) at all entry and exit points of the network. These capacities can be booked by gas suppliers and customers in long-term contracts. Only traders who have booked capacities up-front can "nominate" quantities for injection or withdrawal of gas via a day-ahead market. To ensure feasibility of the nominations for the physical network, the TSO must only announce technical capacities for which all possibly nominated quantities are transportable. In this paper, we use a four-level model of the entry-exit gas market to analyze possible welfare losses associated with the decoupling of gas trade and transport. In addition to the multilevel structure, the model contains robust aspects to cover the conservative nature of the European entry-exit system. We provide several reformulations to obtain a single-level mixed-integer quadratic problem. The overall model of the considered market regime is extremely challenging and we thus have to make the main assumption that gas flows are modeled as potential-based linear flows. Using the derived single-level reformulation of the problem, we show that the feasibility requirements for technical capacities imply significant welfare losses due to unused network capacity. Furthermore, we find that the specific structure of the network has a considerable influence on the optimal choice of technical capacities. Our results thus show that trade and transport are not decoupled in the long term. As a further source of welfare losses and discrimination against individual actors, we identify the minimum prices for booking capacity at the individual nodes.
Mathematical modeling of market design issues in liberalized electricity markets often leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems for which no general-purpose solvers exist and which are intractable in general. In this work, we consider the problem of splitting a market area into a given number of price zones such that the resulting market design yields welfare-optimal outcomes. This problem leads to a challenging multilevel model that contains a graph-partitioning problem with multi-commodity flow connectivity constraints and nonlinearities due to proper economic modeling. Furthermore, it has highly symmetric solutions. We develop different problem-tailored solution approaches. In particular, we present an extended KKT transformation approach as well as a generalized Benders approach that both yield globally optimal solutions. These methods, enhanced with techniques such as symmetry breaking and primal heuristics, are evaluated in detail on academic as well as on realistic instances. It turns out that our approaches lead to effective solution methods for the difficult optimization tasks presented here, where the problem-specific generalized Benders approach performs considerably better than the methods based on KKT transformation.
In the course of the energy transition, load and supply centers are growing apart in electricity markets worldwide, rendering regional price signals even more important to provide adequate locational investment incentives. This paper focuses on electricity markets that operate under a zonal pricing market design. For a fixed number of zones, we endogenously derive the optimal configuration of price zones and available transfer capacities on a network in order to optimally govern investment and production decisions in the long run. In a multilevel mixed-integer nonlinear model that contains a graph partitioning problem on the first level, we determine welfare-maximizing price zones and available transfer capacities for a given electricity market and analyze their impact on market outcomes. Using a generalized Benders decomposition approach developed in Grimm et al. (2019) and a problem-tailored scenario clustering for reducing the input data size, we are able to solve the model to global optimality even for large instances. We apply the approach to the German electricity market as an example to examine the impact of optimal zoning on key performance indicators such as welfare, generation mix and locations, or electricity prices. It turns out that even for a small number of price zones, an optimal configuration of zones induces a welfare level that almost approaches the first best.
Many long-term investment planning models for liberalized electricity markets either optimize for the entire electricity system or focus on confined jurisdictions, abstracting from adjacent markets. In this paper, we provide models for analyzing the impact of the interdependencies between a core electricity market and its neighboring markets on key long-run decisions. This we do both for zonal and nodal pricing schemes. The identification of welfare optimal investments in transmission lines and renewable capacity within a core electricity market requires a spatially restricted objective function, which also accounts for benefits from cross-border electricity trading. This leads to mixed-integer nonlinear multilevel optimization problems with bilinear nonconvexities for which we adapt a Benders-like decomposition approach from the literature. In a case study, we use a stylized six-node network to disentangle different effects of optimal regional (as compared to supra-regional) investment planning. Regional planning alters investment in transmission and renewable capacity in the core region, which affects private investment in generation capacity also in adjacent regions and increases welfare in the core region at the cost of system welfare. Depending on the congestion-pricing scheme, the regulator of the core region follows different strategies to increase welfare causing distributional effects among stakeholders.