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We study network design problems for nonlinear and nonconvex flow models under demand uncertainties. To this end, we apply the concept of adjustable robust optimization to compute a network design that admits a feasible transport for all, possibly infinitely many, demand scenarios within a given uncertainty set. For solving the corresponding adjustable robust mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem, we show that a given network design is robust feasible, i.e., it admits a feasible transport for all demand uncertainties, if and only if a finite number of worst-case demand scenarios can be routed through the network. We compute these worst-case scenarios by solving polynomially many nonlinear optimization problems. Embedding this result for robust feasibility in an adversarial approach leads to an exact algorithm that computes an optimal robust network design in a finite number of iterations. Since all of the results are valid for general potential-based flows, the approach can be applied to different utility networks such as gas, hydrogen, or water networks. We finally demonstrate the applicability of the method by computing robust gas networks that are protected from future demand fluctuations.
We present a feedback scheme for non-cooperative dynamic games and investigate its stabilizing properties. The dynamic games are modeled as generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP), in which the shared constraint consists of linear time-discrete dynamic equations (e.g., sampled from a partial or ordinary differential equation), which are jointly controlled by the players’ actions. Further, the individual objectives of the players are interdependent and defined over a fixed time horizon. The feedback law is synthesized by moving-horizon model predictive control (MPC). We investigate the asymptotic stability of the resulting closed-loop dynamics. To this end, we introduce α-quasi GNEPs, a family of auxiliary problems based on a modification of the Nikaido–Isoda function, which approximate the original games. Basing the MPC scheme on these auxiliary problems, we derive conditions on the players’ objectives, which guarantee asymptotic stability of the closed-loop if stabilizing end constraints are enforced. This analysis is based on showing that the associated optimal-value function is a Lyapunov function. Additionally, we identify a suitable Lyapunov function for the MPC scheme based on the original GNEP, whose solution fulfills the stabilizing end constraints. The theoretical results are complemented by numerical experiments.
Although modern societies strive towards energy systems that are entirely based on renewable energy carriers, natural gas is still one of the most important energy sources. This became even more obvious in Europe with Russia's 2022 war against the Ukraine and the resulting stop of gas supplies from Russia. Besides that it is very important to use this scarce resource efficiently. To this end, it is also of significant relevance that its transport is organized in the most efficient, i.e., cost- or energy-efficient, way. The corresponding mathematical optimization models have gained a lot of attention in the last decades in different optimization communities. These models are highly nonlinear mixed-integer problems that are constrained by algebraic constraints and partial differential equations (PDEs), which usually leads to models that are not tractable. Hence, simplifications have to be made and in this chapter, we present a commonly accepted finite-dimensional stationary model, i.e., a model in which the steady-state solutions of the PDEs are approximated with algebraic constraints. For more details about the involved PDEs and the treatment of transient descriptions we refer to Hante and Schmidt (2023). The presented finite-dimensional as well as mixed-integer nonlinear and nonconvex model is still highly challenging if it needs to be solved for real-world gas transport networks. Hence, we also review some classic solution approaches from the literature.
The optimal control of gas transport networks was and still is a very important topic for modern economies and societies. Accordingly, a lot of research has been carried out on this topic during the last years and decades. Besides mixed-integer aspects in gas transport network optimization, one of the main challenges is that a physically and technically detailed modeling of transient gas dynamics leads to theoretically and computationally highly demanding models involving nonlinear partial differential equations (PDEs). For further background on the application, historical notes and a detailed discussion of mixed-integer aspects for stationary descriptions we refer to Hante and Schmidt (2023). In this chapter, we focus on the most common modeling approaches concerning transient descriptions, point out the challenges, and summarize important contributions concerning the optimization of the most relevant control parameters for this particular class of problems.
Robust and bilevel optimization share the common feature that they involve a certain multilevel structure. Hence, although they model something rather different when used in practice, they seem to have a similar mathematical structure. In this paper, we analyze the connections between different types of robust problems (static robust problems with and without decision-dependence of their uncertainty sets, worst-case regret problems, and two-stage robust problems) as well as of bilevel problems (optimistic problems, pessimistic problems, and robust bilevel problems). It turns out that bilevel optimization seems to be more general in the sense that for most types of robust problems, one can find proper reformulations as bilevel problems but not necessarily the other way around. We hope that these results pave the way for a stronger connection between the two fields - in particular to use both theory and algorithms from one field in the other and vice versa.
We propose a framework that allows to quantitatively analyze the interplay of the different agents involved in gas trade and transport in the context of the European entry-exit system. Previous contributions have focused on the case of perfectly competitive buyers and sellers of gas, which allows to replace the respective market equilibrium problem by a single welfare maximization problem. Our novel framework considers the mathematically more challenging case of a monopolistic and thus strategic gas seller. In this framework, the objective functions of the gas sellers and buyers cannot be aggregated into a common objective function, which is why a multilevel formulation is necessary to accurately capture the sequential nature of the decisions taken. For this setup, we derive sufficient conditions that allow for reformulating the challenging four-level model as a computationally tractable single-level reformulation. We prove the correctness of this reformulation and use it for solving several test instances to illustrate the applicability of our approach.
Bilevel optimization is a very active field of applied mathematics. The main reason is that bilevel optimization problems can serve as a powerful tool for modeling hierarchical decision making processes. This ability, however, also makes the resulting problems challenging to solve - both in theory and practice. Fortunately, there have been significant algorithmic advances in the field of bilevel optimization so that we can solve much larger and also more complicated problems today compared to what was possible to solve two decades ago. This results in more and more challenging bilevel problems that researchers try to solve today. This survey gives a detailed overview of one of these more challenging classes of bilevel problems: bilevel optimization under uncertainty. We review the classic ways of addressing uncertainties in bilevel optimization using stochastic or robust techniques. Moreover, we highlight that the sources of uncertainty in bilevel optimization are much richer than for usual, i.e., single-level, problems since not only the problem's data can be uncertain but also the (observation of the) decisions of the two players can be subject to uncertainty. We thus also review the field of bilevel optimization under limited observability, the area of problems considering only near-optimal decisions, and discuss intermediate solution concepts between the optimistic and pessimistic cases. Finally, we also review the rich literature on applications studied using uncertain bilevel problems such as in energy, for interdiction games and security applications, in management sciences, and networks.
Bilevel problems are used to model the interaction between two decision makers in which the lower-level problem, the so-called follower's problem, appears as a constraint in the upper-level problem of the so-called leader. One issue in many practical situations is that the follower's problem is not explicitly known by the leader. For such bilevel problems with unknown lower-level model we propose the use of neural networks to learn the follower's optimal response for given decisions of the leader based on available historical data of pairs of leader and follower decisions. Integrating the resulting neural network in a single-level reformulation of the bilevel problem leads to a challenging model with a black-box constraint. We exploit Lipschitz optimization techniques from the literature to solve this reformulation and illustrate the applicability of the proposed method with some preliminary case studies using academic and linear bilevel instances.
We propose an algorithm for solving bilevel problems with mixed-integer convex-quadratic upper level as well as convex-quadratic and continuous lower level. The method is based on a classic branch-and-bound procedure, where branching is performed on the integer constraints and on the complementarity constraints resulting from the KKT reformulation of the lower-level problem. However, instead of branching on constraints as usual, suitably chosen penalty terms are added to the objective function in order to create new subproblems in the tree. We prove the correctness of the method and present its applicability by some first numerical results.
We study network flow interdiction problems with nonlinear and nonconvex flow models. The resulting model is a max-min bilevel optimization problem in which the follower's problem is nonlinear and nonconvex. In this game, the leader attacks a limited number of arcs with the goal to maximize the load shed and the follower aims at minimizing the load shed by solving a transport problem in the interdicted network. We develop an exact algorithm consisting of lower and upper bounding schemes that computes an optimal interdiction under the assumption that the interdicted network remains weakly connected. The main challenge consists of computing valid upper bounds for the maximal load shed, whereas lower bounds can directly be derived from the follower's problem. To compute an upper bound, we propose solving a specific bilevel problem, which is derived from restricting the flexibility of the follower when adjusting the load flow. This bilevel problem still has a nonlinear and nonconvex follower's problem, for which we then prove necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. Consequently, we obtain equivalent single-level reformulations of the specific bilevel model to compute upper bounds. Our numerical results show the applicability of this exact approach using the example of gas networks.