We consider equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms
maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust
optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective
values are to be determined, independently of the specific distributional
assumptions regarding uncertainty. In particular, solutions are to be determined
that are feasible regardless of how the uncertainty manifests itself within
some predefined uncertainty set. Our analysis adopts the robust optimization
perspective in the context of equilibrium problems. First, we consider a singlestage,
nonadjustable robust setting. We then go one step further and study the
more complex two-stage or adjustable case where a part of the variables can
adjust to the realization of the uncertainty. We compare equilibrium outcomes
with the corresponding centralized robust optimization problem where the
sum of all profits are maximized. As we find, the market equilibrium for
the perfectly competitive firms differs from the solution of the robust central
planner, which is in stark contrast to classical results regarding the efficiency of
market equilibria with perfectly competitive firms. For the different scenarios
considered, we furthermore are able to determine the resulting price of anarchy.
In the case of non-adjustable robustness, for fixed demand in every time step
the price of anarchy is bounded whereas it is unbounded if the buyers are
modeled by elastic demand functions. For the two-stage adjustable setting,
we show how to compute subsidies for the firms that lead to robust welfare
optimal equilibria.
Every optimization problem has a corresponding verification problem which verifies whether a given optimal solution is in fact optimal. In the literature there are a lot of such ways to verify optimality for a given solution, e.g., the branch-and-bound tree. To simplify this task, Baes et al. introduced optimality certificates for convex mixed-integer nonlinear programs and proved that these are bounded in the number of integer variables. We introduce an algorithm to compute the certificates and conduct computational experiments. Through the experiments we show that the optimality certificates can be surprisingly small.
A PDE-Constrained Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach for Modeling Gas Markets with Transport
(2021)
We investigate a class of generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) in which the objectives of the individuals are interdependent and the shared constraint consists of a system of partial differential equations. This setup is motivated by the modeling of strategic interactions of competing firms, which explicitly take into account the dynamics of transporting a commodity, such as natural gas, through a network. We establish the existence of a variational equilibrium of the GNEP. In the case of symmetric firms, we identify an equivalent optimization problem. We use this model to numerically explore the impact of linepacking, that is the use of the network as a temporary storage device. In particular, we study the firms' decisions under various linepacking abilities and analyze which market participants benefit from it.