We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated transport networks. The model under consideration is rather general so that it captures basic aspects of related models in, e.g., gas or electricity networks. We formulate the market equilibrium model as a mixed complementarity problem and show the equivalence to a welfare maximization problem. Using the latter we prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium for piecewise linear and symmetric transport costs under additional mild assumptions. Moreover, we show the necessity of these assumptions by illustrating examples that possess multiple solutions if our assumptions are violated.
We consider uniqueness and multiplicity of market equilibria in a short-run setup where traded quantities of electricity are transported through a capacitated network in which power flows have to satisfy the classical lossless DC approximation. The firms face fluctuating demand and decide on their production, which is constrained by given capacities. Today, uniqueness of such market outcomes are especially important in more complicated multilevel models for measuring market (in)efficiency. Thus, our findings are important prerequisites for such studies. We show that market equilibria are unique on tree networks under mild assumptions and we also present a priori conditions under which equilibria are unique on cycle networks. On general networks, uniqueness fails to hold and we present simple examples for which multiple equilibria exist. However, we prove a posteriori criteria for the uniqueness of a given solution and characterize situations in which multiple solutions exist.
The development of mathematical simulation and optimization models and algorithms for solving gas transport problems is an active field of research. In order to test and compare these models and algorithms, gas network instances together with demand data are needed. The goal of GasLib is to provide a set of publicly available gas network instances that can be used by researchers in the field of gas transport. The advantages are that researchers save time by using these instances and that different models and algorithms can be compared on the same specified test sets. The library instances are encoded in an XML format. In this paper, we explain this format and present the instances that are available in the library.
We consider optimal control problems for the flow of gas or fresh water in pipe networks as well as drainage or sewer systems in open canals. The equations of motion are taken to be represented by the nonlinear isothermal Euler gas equations, the water hammer equations, or the St.~Venant equations for flow. We formulate model hierarchies and derive an abstract model for such network flow problems including pipes, junctions, and controllable elements such as valves, weirs, pumps, as well as compressors. We use the abstract model to give an overview of the known results and challenges concerning equilibria, well-posedness, controllability, and optimal control. A major challenge concerning the optimization is to deal with switching on-off states that are inherent to controllable devices in such applications combined with
continuous simulation and optimization of the gas flow. We formulate the corresponding mixed-integer nonlinear optimal control problems and outline a decomposition approach as a solution technique.
In this paper we analyze peak-load pricing in the presence of network constraints. In our setup, firms facing fluctuating demand decide on the size and location of production facilities. They make production decisions constrained by the invested capacities, taking into account that market prices reflect scarce transmission capacities. We state general conditions for existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium and provide a characterization of equilibrium investment and production. The presented analysis covers the cases of perfect competition and monopoly - the case of strategic firms is approximated by a conjectural variations approach. Our result is a prerequisite for analyzing regulatory policy options with computational multilevel equilibrium models, since uniqueness of the equilibrium at lower levels is of key importance when solving these models. Thus, our paper contributes to an evolving strand of literature that analyzes regulatory policy based on computational multilevel equilibrium models and aims at taking into account individual objectives of various agents, among them not only generators and customers but also, e.g., the regulator deciding on network expansion.