TY - INPR A1 - Grübel, Julia A1 - Huber, Olivier A1 - Hümbs, Lukas A1 - Klimm, Max A1 - Schmidt, Martin A1 - Schwartz, Alexandra T1 - Nonconvex Equilibrium Models for Energy Markets: Exploiting Price Information to Determine the Existence of an Equilibrium N2 - Motivated by examples from the energy sector, we consider market equilibrium problems (MEPs) involving players with nonconvex strategy spaces or objective functions, where the latter are assumed to be linear in market prices. We propose an algorithm that determines if an equilibrium of such an MEP exists and that computes an equilibrium in case of existence. Three key prerequisites have to be met. First, appropriate bounds on market prices have to be derived from necessary optimality conditions of some players. Second, a technical assumption is required for those prices that are not uniquely determined by the derived bounds. Third, nonconvex optimization problems have to be solved to global optimality. We test the algorithm on well-known instances from the power and gas literature that meet these three prerequisites. There, nonconvexities arise from considering the transmission system operator as an additional player besides producers and consumers who, e.g., switches lines or faces nonlinear physical laws. Our numerical results indicate that equilibria often exist, especially for the case of continuous nonconvexities in the context of gas market problems. KW - Energy markets KW - Nonconvex games KW - Existence KW - Equilibrium computation KW - Perfect competition Y1 - 2021 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kramer, Anja A1 - Krebs, Vanessa A1 - Schmidt, Martin T1 - Strictly and Γ-Robust Counterparts of Electricity Market Models: Perfect Competition and Nash-Cournot Equilibria JF - Operations Research Perspectives N2 - This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the Γ-approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classical welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria. Surprisingly, it turns out that there is no such economic sensible counterpart for the case of Γ-robustifications of Nash–Cournot models. Thus, an analogue of the welfare theorems does not hold in this case. Finally, we provide a computational case study that illustrates the different effects of the combination of economic competition and uncertainty modeling. KW - Robust optimization KW - Linear complementarity problems KW - Electricity market equilibrium models KW - Perfect competition KW - Nash-Cournot competition Y1 - 2018 IS - 89(2) SP - 100197 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Çelebi, Emre A1 - Krebs, Vanessa A1 - Schmidt, Martin T1 - Γ-Robust Electricity Market Equilibrium Models with Transmission and Generation Investments JF - Energy Systems N2 - We consider uncertain robust electricity market equilibrium problems including transmission and generation investments. Electricity market equilibrium modeling has a long tradition but is, in most of the cases, applied in a deterministic setting in which all data of the model are known. Whereas there exist some literature on stochastic equilibrium problems, the field of robust equilibrium models is still in its infancy. We contribute to this new field of research by considering Γ-robust electricity market equilibrium models on lossless DC networks with transmission and generation investments. We state the nominal market equilibrium problem as a mixed complementarity problem as well as its variational inequality and welfare optimization counterparts. For the latter, we then derive a Γ-robust formulation and show that it is indeed the counterpart of a market equilibrium problem with robustified player problems. Finally, we present two case studies to gain insights into the general effects of robustification on electricity market models. In particular, our case studies reveal that the transmission system operator tends to act more risk-neutral in the robust setting, whereas generating firms clearly behave more risk-averse. KW - Robust optimization KW - Robust market equilibria KW - Electricity market equilibrium models KW - Transmission and generation investment KW - Perfect competition Y1 - 2020 ER -