TY - THES A1 - Nowak, Daniel T1 - Nonconvex Nash Games - Solution Concepts and Algorithms N2 - Game theory is a mathematical approach to model competition between several parties, called players. The goal of each player is to choose a strategy, which solves his optimization problem, i.e. minimizes or maximizes his objective function. Due to the competitive setting, this strategy may influence the optimization problems of other players. In the non-cooperative setting each player acts selfish, meaning he does not care about the objective of his opponents. A solution concept for this problem is a Nash equilibrium, which was introduced by John Forbes Nash in his Ph.D. thesis in 1950. Convexity of the optimization problems is a crucial assumption for the existence of Nash equilibria. This work investigates settings, where this convexity assumption fails to hold. The first part of this thesis extends results of Jong-Shi Pang and Gesualdo Scutari from their paper ``Nonconvex Games with Side Constraints'' published in 2011. In this publication, a game with possibly nonconvex objective functions and nonconvex individual and shared inequality constraints was investigated. We extend these results twofold. Firstly, we generalize the individual and shared polyhedral constraints to general convex constraints and, secondly, we introduce convex and nonconvex, individual and shared equality constraints. After a detailed comparison of solution concepts for the generalized Nash game and a related Nash game, we show that so-called quasi-Nash equilibria exist under similar assumptions than in the original work, provided some additional constraint qualification holds. Subsequently, we prove that the existence of Nash equilibria needs additional assumptions on the gradients of the equality constraints. Furthermore, a special case of a multi-leader multi-follower game is investigated. We show the convergence of epsilon-quasi-Nash equilibria to C-stationary points and prove that these are also Clarke-stationary under reasonable assumptions. In the second part of this thesis, an application in computation offloading is investigated. We consider several mobile users that are able to offload parts of a computation task to a connected server. However, the server has limited computation capacities which leads to competition among the mobile users. If a user decides to offload a part of his computation, he needs to wait for the server to finish before he can assemble the results of his computation. This leads to a vanishing constraint in the optimization problem of the mobile users which is a nonconvex and nonsmooth condition. We show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the computation offloading game and provide an efficient algorithm for its computation. Furthermore, we present two extensions to this game, which inherit similar properties and we also show the limitations of these formulations. The third part investigates a hierarchical constrained Cournot game. In the upper level, several firms decide on capacities which act as constraints for the production variables. In the lower level the same firms engage in a Cournot competition, where they choose production variables to maximize profit. The prior chosen capacities are upper bounds on these production variables. This hierarchical setting induces nonconvexity and nonsmoothness in the upper level objective functions. After a detailed sensitivity analysis of the lower level, we give necessary optimality conditions for the upper level, i.e. for the hierarchical Cournot game. Using these conditions, we construct an algorithm which provably finds all Nash equilibria of the game, provided some assumptions are satisfied. This algorithm is numerically tested on several examples which are motivated by the gas market. KW - Game Theory KW - Nash Games KW - Optimization Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.26083/tuprints-00017637 PB - E-Publishing-Service der TU Darmstadt CY - Darmstadt ER - TY - THES A1 - GrĂ¼bel, Julia T1 - Existence, Uniqueness, and Algorithms for Equilibria in Competitive Energy Markets N2 - Due to the transition towards climate neutrality, energy markets are rapidly evolving. New technologies are developed that allow electricity from renewable energy sources to be stored or to be converted into other energy commodities. As a consequence, new players enter the markets and existing players gain more importance. Market equilibrium problems are capable of capturing these changes and therefore enable us to answer contemporary research questions with regard to energy market design and climate policy. This cumulative dissertation is devoted to the study of different market equilibrium problems that address such emerging aspects in liberalized energy markets. In the first part, we review a well-studied competitive equilibrium model for energy commodity markets and extend this model by sector coupling, by temporal coupling, and by a more detailed representation of physical laws and technical requirements. Moreover, we summarize our main contributions of the last years with respect to analyzing the market equilibria of the resulting equilibrium problems. For the extension regarding sector coupling, we derive sufficient conditions for ensuring uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium a priori and for verifying uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium a posteriori. Furthermore, we present illustrative examples that each of the derived conditions is indeed necessary to guarantee uniqueness in general. For the extension regarding temporal coupling, we provide sufficient conditions for ensuring uniqueness of demand and production a priori. These conditions also imply uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium in case of a single storage operator. However, in case of multiple storage operators, examples illustrate that charging and discharging decisions are not unique in general. We conclude the equilibrium analysis with an a posteriori criterion for verifying uniqueness of a given short-run equilibrium. Since the computation of equilibria is much more challenging due to the temporal coupling, we shortly review why a tailored parallel and distributed alternating direction method of multipliers enables to efficiently compute market equilibria. For the extension regarding physical laws and technical requirements, we show that, in nonconvex settings, existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed and that the fundamental welfare theorems therefore fail to hold. In addition, we argue that the welfare theorems can be re-established in a market design in which the system operator is committed to a welfare objective. For the case of a profit-maximizing system operator, we propose an algorithm that indicates existence of an equilibrium and that computes an equilibrium in the case of existence. Based on well-known instances from the literature on the gas and electricity sector, we demonstrate the broad applicability of our algorithm. Our computational results suggest that an equilibrium often exists for an application involving nonconvex but continuous stationary gas physics. In turn, integralities introduced due to the switchability of DC lines in DC electricity networks lead to many instances without an equilibrium. Finally, we state sufficient conditions under which the gas application has a unique equilibrium and the line switching application has finitely many. In the second part, all preprints belonging to this cumulative dissertation are provided. These preprints, as well as two journal articles to which the author of this thesis contributed, are referenced within the extended summary in the first part and contain more details. KW - Energy markets KW - Equilibrium computation KW - Existence KW - Perfect competition KW - Uniqueness Y1 - U6 - https://doi.org/10.25353/ubtr-xxxx-4c49-7f53 ER -